













East India Company  
Report on General  
1830



*Librarian*

**Uttarpara Joykrishna Public Library**  
**Govt. of West Bengal**



# CONTENTS OF THE SYNOPSIS.

iii

Para.	Page
316.—Inducements held out to the cultivation of the Native Languages .. ..	lv
347.—How far the institution of the office of Interpreter may have been conducive to this end .. ..	ib.
351.—Rank and Promotion.. ..	lvi
353.—Reference to some explanatory Remarks on the nature and operation of the seniority regimental system of the Company's Service .. ..	ib.
354.—And to Calculations on the progress of Promotion in the Company's Service when unaffected by augmentations .. ..	lvii
358.—Whether Promotion should be regimental to the rank of Lieutenant-colonel..	ib.
359.—Rank of Colonel and of general officer .. ..	ib.
364.—Whether any <del>that</del> what Modifications could be allowed in the existing Seniority system .. ..	ib.
367.—Whether in proportion of the Casualties could be placed at the disposal of the Crown .. ..	lviii
368.—Whether Officers on service should be allowed the benefit of Casualties <del>of</del> long themselves .. ..	ib.
369.—Whether Native Gentlemen could be allowed commissions in Native Corps <del>in common</del> with European Officers .. ..	ib.
371.—Personal Brevets for distinguished service in the field .. ..	ib.
373.—Whether Brevet rank should be conferred upon certain Staff Officers in preference to official rank.. ..	ib.
374.—Whether it would be expedient that a regulated permission should be granted to Officers of all ranks to accept of whatever they may consider an equivalent, to induce them to retire from it .. ..	ib.
380.—Situation and Authority of Commanding Officers of Corps .. ..	lix
397.—Number of Officers required to be effective with Regiments .. ..	lxii
413.—Means of maintaining an uniform efficiency in Corps .. ..	lxiv
418.—Either by restrictions in the selection of Officers for Staff and other Appointments..	lxv
430.—Or the formation of Skeleton Corps .. ..	lxvii
435.—The separation of the Civil Staff .. ..	lxviii
443.—Effect of regimental promotion in opposing a difficulty in the way of a reduction of the Army by whole Regiments, and how obviated in the Plan proposed by Colonel Salmond .. ..	lxix
451.—Furlough Regulation .. ..	lxxi
458.—Retiring Regulation .. ..	ib.
471.—Table of the Number of Officers who have retired from the Service, from 1813 to 1830 .. ..	lxxii
472.) Tables contrasting the Number of Appointments with Retirements at intervals respectively of twenty-two and twenty-five Years, with the remitting	
473.) per-centages, and remarks in reference to the same .. ..	lxxiii
474.)	

Para.	Page
179. } Off reckonings, and whether Colonels who have not served with their Corps	
181. } should be entitled to them; and whether Colonels in Command of Corps	
482 } should be entitled to draw command money also .. .. .	lxxv
484.—Lord Clive's Fund .. .. .	lxxv
486. } Relative Situation of Civil and Military Officers.. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
487. } Whether Officers should be compensated for loss of Bungalows .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
489.—Eligibility of Military Officers to Civil and Political Situations .. .. .	lxxvi

## EUROPEAN CORPS :

501. } Mode in which they are recruited from this country, or Vacancies supplied	
503(a). } in India by Volunteers from King's Regiments on their return to	
England .. .. .	lxxvi
510.—Number of Europeans employed in India in each year from 1793 to 1830..	lxxvii
511. } Pay of the European non-commissioned Officer and Soldier .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
513. } Victualling of European Troops .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
515.—Intebriety among the Soldiers .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
517.—Regimental Schools .. .. .	lxxviii
519. } Regimental Libraries .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
520.—Marriages of European Soldiers .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
521.—Pay of their European Wives .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
523. } Children of Soldiers by European and Native Women .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
525.—Suggested formation of a Corps of East-Indians .. .. .	lxxix
526. } Soldiers' Remittances .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
528.—Pensions .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
530. } Suggested Furlough to the Soldier of a certain Number of Years' Service..	<i>ib.</i>
531.—Whether Colonization would be advantageous or disadvantageous to the	
Public interests connected with the Army .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>

## COMPANY'S EUROPEAN INFANTRY :

551. } Promotion of the Officers by Wings .. .. .	lxxx
552.—Utility of the European Regiments .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
554.—Suggestion that they should be eligible for Service at either Presidency..	<i>ib.</i>
555. } Service in a Native Corps preferred by Company's Officers to Service in	
an European Corps .. .. .	lxxxii
557.—Additional Observations in reference to the utility of the Company's Euro-	
pean Regiments, and the effect of disbanding them upon the Service .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>

## NATIVE CORPS :

563.—Reference to Tables and Returns illustrative of the Numbers, Expense, and	
Organization of Native Troops .. .. .	lxxxiii
567.—Recruits, and description of Men of which the Native Army is composed..	<i>ib.</i>
579.—Fidelity and attachment of the Native Army .. .. .	lxxxv
590.—Duties respectively discharged by European and Native Officers .. .. .	lxxxvi
591. } Promotion of Native Officers, and whether the existing inducements are	
622. } sufficient to attach them to the Service .. .. .	lxxxvi, xc
596.—Appointment of Native Aide-de-camp .. .. .	lxxxvii

Para.	Page
603. } Grant of Medals and honorary Distinctions; appointment of Killedars of Forts,	
605. } and of Natives to command Sebundy Corps .. .. .	lxxxvii, lxxxviii
606.—Suggested Encouragement to the Sons of Native Officers .. ..	lxxxviii
607.—Recruit and Pension Boys .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
612.—Suggested institution of a Royal Order of Merit in favour of the Natives .. ..	lxxxix
614.—Military Widows' Fund .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
618.—Whether Natives could be admitted to higher rank than that of Subadar-major .. ..	<i>ib.</i>
627.—Relative Rank of European and Native Officers .. .. .	xc
631.—Promotion of Native Officers .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
634.—Degree of Communication between the European Officers and the Native Officers and Men .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
639.—Duties of the Adjutant and Quartermaster and Interpreter of a Native Corps .. ..	xc i
640.—European Non-commissioned Staff of a Native Corps .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
641.—Pensions .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
645.—Grants of Land .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
647.—Discipline and Corporal Punishment .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
649.—Desertions .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
650.—Furloughs .. .. .	xcii
652.—Exchanges .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
654.—Mutinies .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
657.—Schools for Native Soldiers .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
658.—Services not Military .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>

ENGINEERS :

661.—Table of the Numbers and Expense of the Engineers at each Presidency, from 1813 to 1830 .. .. .	xciii
662.—Table of the Numbers and Expense of the Pioneers at each Presidency, from 1813 to 1830 .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
664.—Reference to particular Returns illustrative of their Organization .. ..	xciv
665.—Whether the present authorized Establishment of Engineer Officers be adequate .. ..	<i>ib.</i>
669.—Qualification of the Officers .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
670.—Employment of Engineers in the Barrack Department, and in the command of the Pioneers .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>

ARTILLERY :

674.—Table of the Numbers and expense of the Artillery at each Presidency, from 1813 to 1830 .. .. .	xcv
676.—Reference to Returns illustrative of the organization of the Artillery .. ..	<i>ib.</i>
677.—Numbers and Efficiency of the Artillery .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>



Para.	Page
683.—European and Native Artillery Recruits ... ..	xcvi
690.—Mode in which the Artillery is officered, and the Officers instructed ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
700.—Policy or impolicy of employing Natives in the Artillery ... ..	xcvii
710.—Whether Horses should be substituted for Bullocks in the Foot Artillery ... ..	xcviii
715.—Formation of a Troop or Company of Artillery ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
720.—Ordnance and Gun-carriage Department ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
725.—Gunpowder Manufactories of India ... ..	xcix

## CAVALRY :

727.—Numbers and Expense of the Cavalry of each Presidency, in each year from 1813 to 1830 ... ..	xcix
729.—Reference to Returns illustrative of the organization of the Cavalry of each Presidency ... ..	c
731.—Provision of Horses from the Remount, by means of a Stud or purchase from Native Dealers ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
750.—Cost of Horses in India .. ..	cii
752.—Expense of Maintenance ... ..	ciii
753.—Period that a Horse may last ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
755.—Kattywar, Persian and Arab Horses ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
758.—Condition of Horses in India ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
760.—Whether Stabling be used or considered desirable ... ..	civ
765.—Grooming of Horses in India ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
771.—Officers' Horses ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
773.—Provision for the repair of Saddle and Horse Appointments, Line Articles, and Shoeing ... ..	cv
779.—Notices relative to the Origin and Formation of Native Cavalry ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
788.—Whether Cavalry Regiments should consist of Six or Eight Troops ... ..	cvi

## INFANTRY :

791.—Numbers and Expense of the Infantry of each Presidency, in each year from 1813 to 1830 ... ..	cvii
793.—Reference to Returns illustrative of the organization of Infantry Regiments... ..	<i>ib.</i>

## IRREGULAR CORPS :

794.—Numbers and Expense of the Irregulars of each Presidency, in each year from 1813 to 1830 ... ..	cvii
796.—Particular utility of Irregular Horse ... ..	cviii

# CONTENTS OF THE SYNOPSIS.

vii

Para.	Page
798.—Mode in which the Men are obtained ... ..	cviii
799.—Advantage of Irregular Troops, from the facility of reduction ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
800.—Goorkah Troops in the British service ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
801.—Poonah Auxiliary Horse and extra Battalions of the Bombay Establishment	cix
803.—Body-guard of Madras ... ..	<i>ib.</i>

## INVALIDS :

803 (a).—Numbers of the Invalids of each Presidency in each year from 1813 to 1830	cix
806.—Native Veteran Battalion of Bombay ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
808.—Suggested formation of Veteran Battalions for Bengal ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
809.—Suggested employment of Invalid Officers as Barrack-masters... ..	<i>ib.</i>

## GENERAL STAFF :

810.—Numbers and Expense of the General Staff at each Presidency, and in each year from 1813 to 1830 ... ..	cx
812.—Reference to Returns illustrative of the Staff Appointments and Allowances of each Presidency ... ..	cx i
814.—Reference to Returns by Colonel Salmond, and description of the Duties appertaining to each Department of the Staff ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
816.—Mode in which Appointments to the General Staff are made ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
821.—Duties of the Officers, and their Promotion ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
824.—Whether Reductions be practicable in the General Staff ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
828.—Adjutant-general's Department ... ..	cxii
830.—Quartermaster-general's Department ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
831.—Commissariat ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
837.—Pay Department ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
839.—Military Auditor-General ... ..	cxiii
840.—Judge Advocate-General ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
840.—Military Secretary to Government... ..	<i>ib.</i>
841.—Military Board ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
843.—Department of Stores ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
854.—Department of Ordnance ... ..	cxiv
855.—Clothing and Equipments ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
863.—Provision of Carriage for Troops ... ..	cxv

MEDICAL SERVICE :		Page
Para		
861.—	Number and Expense of the Medical Department of each Presidency, in each year from 1813 to 1830 .. .. .	cxv
866.—	Reference to Returns illustrative of the Medical Staff Appointments and Allowances .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
869.—	Duties of Medical Officers in charge of Corps, and proportion of Officers allowed	cxvi
872.—	Medical Contracts and Allowances .. .. .	<i>ib.</i>
871. } 880. }	Company's Medical Regulations .. .. .	cxvi, cxvii
875.—	Regulation requiring a specified period of service as Superintending Surgeon or Member of the Medical Board, to retire on a higher scale of retiring pension	cxvi
877.—	Appointment of Inspector-general and Deputy Inspectors-general of Hospitals of His Majesty's Regiments in India .. .. .	cxvii

## SYNOPSIS

OF THE

EVIDENCE taken before the EAST-INDIA COMMITTEE in relation to the  
ARMY of INDIA,

Including a Reference also to the Information contained in the APPENDIX accompanying  
that EVIDENCE.

## INTRODUCTION.

1. THE Evidence given by the witnesses in relation to the Indian Army is arranged, in this Synopsis, in reference to the Army generally; the two Services (His Majesty's and the Company's) of which it is composed; the three armies into which it is divided, the European and Native Troops as they have been compared together; His Majesty's Army, the Company's Army, the Company's European Commissioned Officers, the European Troops and the Company's European Infantry, the Native Troops, Engineers, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, Irregular Corps, and Invalids; together with the general Staff and Departments, and the Medical Establishment.

## INDIAN ARMY.

2. The particulars, of a general nature, to be stated under this head, have reference to the spirit, discipline, and efficiency of the Indian army; its numbers and expense; its adequacy or inadequacy, and whether any and what reductions may be practicable therein: together with the information which has been afforded in regard to its distribution, organization, clothing, and equipments, casualties and appointments, and pay and allowances. A brief notice will besides be taken in respect to courts-martial, and the control of the home authorities in respect to the army.

*Spirit, Discipline, and Efficiency.*

3. The following evidence is afforded by the several witnesses in relation to the spirit, discipline, and efficiency of the Indian army.

4. Major-general Sir Jasper Nicolls thinks that the discipline of the Bengal army is carried as high as circumstances will admit, but that it is not equal to the discipline of the British army; the words of command being given in a foreign language, operates as a preventive to its arriving at that degree of perfection. The spirit of the Bengal army he considers to be good, but not equal to what it was in the days of Lord Lake. He thinks it very efficient.

Major-general Sir Thomas Reynell is of opinion that the discipline of the Bengal army is extraordinary, considering the difficulties it has to contend against, though it is in some degree imperfect; the troops act well in battalion, but do not manœuvre so well in larger bodies; the difficulty in respect to the orders being given in a foreign tongue, may, in his opinion, be partially rectified by the exertions of the officers. The general discipline of the troops is good; they are subordinate, patient, and obedient to orders, as was particularly exemplified

Questio  
4 and

264 to 2

exemplified at Bhurtpore, where duty was performed by them, contrary to their religious feelings, on its being explained to be a military duty. The Bengal army is efficient. Has observed a difference in the work of sepoy from the same Presidency; the Oude men are generally the best.

Questions  
493-4.  
539.  
541-5, 560.  
5. Colonel Salmond has the best possible opinion of the spirit, efficiency, and discipline of the armies of the three Presidencies. Never has observed any difference in these respects between the sepoy from different districts in the same Presidency. Thinks the discipline in the Indian army perfectly good. Does not think the army could be rendered more efficacious without a great deal of expense.

669.  
Appendix (B.)  
No. 3, p. 201.  
6. Major-general Sir John Malcolm refers the Committee to his opinion respecting the state of the army, to the 39th paragraph of his letter to Lord W. Bentinck of the 27th November 1830.

885 to 887.  
7. Lieutenant-colonel Watson considers the efficiency and state of discipline of the Native troops to be satisfactory in all respects; it depends upon the European officers what the Native troops might be made; with good officers they are capable of being rendered highly efficient. Does not compare them to European soldiers, but they approach very near to them in excellence, and are quite as steady in discipline.

981.  
8. European regiments have more men, in proportion to their numbers, unfit for service than Native; their habits of intemperance, but chiefly the effects of climate upon Europeans, prevent their turning out so strong as the Natives.

1121 to 1126.  
9. Major-general Sir Theophilus Pritzler considers the spirit and discipline of the Native army of Madras to be exceedingly good, and that the army, generally speaking, is very efficient. It has on all occasions shown its readiness to go on foreign service, and acquitted itself well. The Natives of some parts of the Madras territory are better soldiers than others, but considers the whole of them very efficient sepoy; they vary in size, but are equal in eligibility. Thinks the infantry as good as it can possibly be; that the cavalry is good, though there is room for improvement therein. Never had a great opinion of Native artillery, and always doubted the possibility of rendering them efficient, and the policy of attempting it.

1386.  
10. Major-general Sir Robert Scot thinks the spirit of the army has in general been every thing that is desirable, but affected in a small degree at different times by particular circumstances; conceives its efficiency has at all times been equal to the calls made on it; its discipline has been very good, though he thinks it has also varied from particular circumstances.

1694.  
11. Lieut.-colonel J. W. Aitchison is of opinion that the discipline of the Native army is carried to as high a pitch as is possible or necessary. It has the same rules and principles as the British army, and these are enforced as far as they are applicable.

1913.  
12. Colonel Leighton considers the discipline of the Bombay troops to be very good; they are very servicable, and possess a soldier-like spirit. Their equipments are deficient.

534-5.  
13. Colonel Salmond thinks the European officers have every reason to be satisfied with their condition, though he believes some of them are not; but he does not know of any just cause for dissatisfaction.

2316.  
14. General Sir Edward Paget thinks that the Company's troops are equal to contend with the forces of any or all of the Native powers of Hindoostan, and to be very superior to the latter.

2323.  
15. Major-general Sir Lionel Smith has found the Native Bombay army very efficient, very loyal, and well disciplined, and in every respect as well equipped and as well conditioned an army as he could wish to serve with.

1031-2.  
16. Colonel John Munro states, that the discipline, spirit, and efficiency of the army have varied very much at different periods; sometimes the Native troops have been distinguished for

for unshaken fidelity to the British interests, but their conduct has, on other occasions, been of a very different character.

17. Formerly the Carnatic sepoys were considered more faithful than others, and better soldiers than those from the Northern Circars, who frequently deserted in great numbers when moved to the south; this has not latterly been the case; all the recruits are animated by the same feeling and spirit.

18. All the Native armies in India have at certain periods evinced a spirit far from satisfactory.

19. Colonel J. D. Greenhill thinks the Native troops of Madras very efficient, when they are made dependent upon their officers; their spirit is good, when they act alone, without Europeans. They are not so respectful and obedient to their officers now as they were formerly. He ascribes that circumstance to the change which has taken place in their discipline; they are now little dependent on their officers, authority being divided between the heads of companies and the commander of the corps, and there is also great interference on the part of superior military authority, which weakens the power of discipline. From the above circumstances, discipline in the Native troops at Madras has been weakened since 1796: the sepoys are in the habit of making complaints to the commanding or general officer, and their complaints are frequently frivolous and vexatious.

20. Captain Macan observes as follows in respect to the Bengal army: "Its efficiency in point of numbers may be considered under two heads; first, with reference to foreign aggression, and, secondly, to the internal tranquillity of our own vast empire. For either of these purposes, the army in point of numerical strength is more than efficient; but for both, I think it is barely so." And again, "With regard to the discipline of the army, as far as regards regularity of conduct, steadiness under arms, and precision in battalion evolutions, they are, I think, all that can be desired, and much more than could be reasonably expected."

"But in all the higher qualifications of soldiers, in devotedness to the service, readiness for any duty they may be called upon to perform, cheerfulness under privations, confidence and attachment to their officers, unhesitating and uncalculating bravery in the field, with regard to either the number or the character of the enemy, the Native soldier is allowed by all the best informed officers of that service, by those who have had most experience, and who are best acquainted with their character, to have infinitely deteriorated."

21. Our system of discipline is considered by Captain Macan as rather against the habits of the sepoys, but still they have assimilated to it. In some instances we have pushed it too far, and have lost substantial advantages by so doing. He thinks there is sometimes a tendency to carry European discipline too far, but not often. Under a more irregular discipline, we always got a higher character of men, but the advantages of a higher caste of soldier does not by any means counterbalance the want of discipline.

22. Mr. Mackenzie thinks that the Native army, as regards its contending with any Indian enemy, is efficient, but is not equally confident of its capability of contending with enemies from without. The Burmese war shows, that when brought against their superiors in physical strength, and required to surmount obstacles of a different kind to those they have been accustomed to, the Native troops, however well led, will be found inferior to European troops in a degree not ordinarily contemplated, and he thinks, if they were called upon to meet an European enemy in the North of India, they might fail from want of physical strength and moral energy.

23. He thinks our seepahees far superior to the best soldiers of Native princes, but he does not include in this remark troops officered by Europeans in their service, nor the Goorkah troops.

Captain Page is of opinion that "the spirit of the officers in India, both in his Majesty's and the Company's service, is bad."

Question  
1085.

1167 to 1169.

1170 to 1171.

Parts of Question  
2157.

Questions  
2186 to 2188.

2260-1.

First portion of  
2265.

Appendix (A.)  
Nos. 4 to 39.

## NUMBERS AND EXPENSE.

24. THE amount of force maintained in India at each Presidency and the dependent settlements, and in each year from 1813 to 1830, and the expense of the same, appears, by the Tables in the Appendix, to have been as follows :

## NUMBERS :

		Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Java, &c.	Prince of Wales' Island, &c.	St. Helena.	TOTAL.
1813	..	101,759	69,437	28,869	—	6	1,051	201,122
1814	..	99,769	66,389	28,274	—	6	1,031	195,472
1815	..	129,536	68,704	28,937	—	6	902	228,085
1816	..	130,929	70,998	28,950	—	6	824	231,707
1817	..	121,526	72,126	29,533	—	5	800	226,990
1818	..	136,122	73,517	33,595	—	6	824	244,064
1819	..	132,310	76,502	36,524	—	6	767	246,139
1820	..	132,909	83,430	35,951	—	5	714	258,009
1821	..	128,983	88,718	39,277	—	4	855	257,837
1822	..	129,233	77,661	38,337	—	6	897	246,137
1823	..	129,473	71,123	36,475	—	361	942	238,674
1824	..	135,735	69,416	37,885	—	361	902	244,329
1825	..	158,304	76,422	41,511	—	308	991	277,539
1826	..	157,250	83,829	49,755	—	311	1,017	292,162
1827	..	141,056	80,047	49,267	—	245	1,028	274,613
1828	..	135,801	75,473	47,745	—	9	1,038	260,066
1829	..	126,527	72,803	44,103	—	15	1,074	244,522
1830	..	112,533	70,730	40,148	—	15	968	224,444

## EXPENSE:

		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1813	..	3,075,942	3,048,292	1,123,583	411,427	35,686	62,880	7,787,810
1814	..	3,203,788	2,942,508	1,144,804	180,919	36,161	70,701	7,578,881
1815	..	3,795,483	3,106,202	1,394,362	168,267	34,661	60,015	8,558,990
1816	..	3,996,940	3,372,775	1,622,564	123,042	40,947	178,289	9,334,557
1817	..	3,858,570	3,189,079	1,545,285	17,020	13,451	222,225	8,815,630
1818	..	4,180,034	3,392,819	2,038,513	18,291	12,659	192,498	10,143,814
1819	..	4,726,407	3,725,226	1,938,916	—	32,572	215,870	10,638,991
1820	..	4,321,106	3,734,724	1,792,739	—	23,848	128,562	10,000,979
1821	..	4,475,387	3,571,142	2,170,047	—	8,235	218,771	10,469,458
1822	..	4,247,950	3,261,344	1,846,808	—	12,754	157,527	9,532,486
1823	..	4,226,636	3,109,709	1,781,222	—	13,391	87,083	9,233,174
1824	..	4,613,104	3,059,041	1,701,653	—	14,478	77,531	9,490,589
1825	..	6,175,912	3,314,779	1,701,653	—	11,834	77,538	11,308,185
1826	..	7,113,114	3,375,338	2,335,647	—	14,543	80,616	12,919,258
1827	..	6,439,617	3,315,920	2,156,862	—	23,058	87,297	12,022,754
1828	..	5,123,364	3,449,531	2,073,022	—	52,877	75,172	10,773,966
1829	..	4,602,913	3,224,937	1,898,881	—	17,517	6,907	9,751,155
1830	..	4,329,537	3,216,275	1,849,510	—	18,800	60,359	9,461,953

25. The proportion of engineers, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, included in the foregoing amount of force and of charge, will be seen by an inspection of the Tables in Appendix (A.), marked Nos. 2 & 3, in which also the pioneers, invalids, and the general and medical staff are included. The proportion also of regulars and irregulars, and of Europeans and Natives, included in these amounts, will be seen on an inspection of these Tables, in the former of which also the commissioned officers are distinguished from the non-commissioned rank and file, and the Europeans from the Natives, in the several branches of service to which they belong.

26. The proportionate amount of force and of charge in the several branches of service, applicable to each Presidency and the dependent settlements, during the period above referred to, will also appear on a reference to the separate Tables, for each year, from which the preceding abstract is taken.

27. Particular Returns will also be found of the numbers and expense of the general and medical staff of His Majesty's and the Company's forces in India, and also of the expense of military stores sent from England in 1813, 1826, and 1830. There are, besides, calculations of the comparative expense of corps of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and of pioneers, sappers and miners, at each Presidency.

28. Mr. Melvill, in his evidence,\* has stated particulars in regard to the numbers of the army for the years 1814, 1815, 1825, and 1827, and also in regard to expense for these years, and for the years 1821 and 1830.

29. Mr. Melvill has also supplied information in regard to the general staff for the years 1814, 1819, 1821, 1826, and 1829; he has also specified in his evidence† the particular expense of the commissariat, of clothing, of barracks, of hospitals, of retired allowances, of Native pensions, of Lord Clive's fund, of military stores, of the seminary at Addiscombe, and of the dépôt for recruits at Chatham.

30. The pay to officers and soldiers of the Company's service at home, including the amount of off-reckonings to colonels of regiments, and of invalid soldiers and widows, amounts to between £500,000 and £600,000 a year.

*Adequacy or Inadequacy of the Army.*

31. In regard to the adequacy or inadequacy of the army, Captain Macan considers its numerical force and efficiency to be more than sufficient for either foreign aggression or maintaining internal tranquillity, but barely so for both, more than half being necessary to preserve and support the civil administration.

32. The Bengal army was reduced from 170,000 men to about 90,000, by Lord William Bentinck, at the end of the Burmese war.

33. Sir John Malcolm is of opinion that as great reductions have taken place as may be considered to be consistent with its efficiency.

34. Colonel Salmond thinks, that alterations might be made in the expenditure by reductions of unnecessary troops, but not much further in point of numbers.

35. Sir T. Pritzler is of opinion that there could be no reduction in the European troops; but that if the Madras army is not to re-occupy the Dooab, the two Native regiments raised when that country was taken under our management might be spared: no other reduction however,

Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 1 to 39.

Nos. 40 to 41.  
No. 45.  
Nos. 46 to 48.

Questions  
2070 to 2079.

570.

2151, 2205-7.

Colonel Salmond;  
575 to 579.

546.

Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
1185.

\* For numbers, see questions 2016 to 2050, for 1811; 2053, 1815; 2058, 1825; 2061, 1827. See also Col. Salmond's evidence in respect to the Bengal army, questions 506 to 573, and 621.

For expense, see questions 2043 to 2045, for 1811; 2051, 2052, and 2054, 1815; 2055 and 2056, 1821; 2057, 1825; 2059, 2060, and 2062, 1827; 2063 to 2068, 1830; 2071, for latest period; 2069, average since 1811.

† See Questions 2098 to 2102, for Commissariat; 2103 to 2105, for Clothing; 2106 to 2108, for Barracks, and 2109-10, for Hospitals; 2111 to 2120, for Retired Allowances; 2126, for Native Pensions; and 2112 to 2117, and 2121 to 2125, Lord Clive's Fund; 2129, for Military Stores; 2138, for Addiscombe; 2139, for Dépôt.

‡ See also his reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 158.



See also his reply  
to the Board's Circular,  
App. (B.),  
No. 5, p. 265,  
1108.

however should be attempted, the duty of all regiments being sufficiently arduous; but if, from want of funds, reduction became imperative, it should be that of a certain number of men per regiment. The Madras army can only be reduced in a very slight degree, as the present number is absolutely requisite for the maintenance of internal tranquillity in the countries in which it is stationed, and also in order to possess the ability to assemble a force for operations in the field. If called upon to reduce 10,000 men of the Madras army, the reductions should not be drawn from the subsidiary forces at Nagpore and Hyderabad.

Col. J. D. Greenhill,  
1569.

36. Colonel Greenhill, also, does not think it possible to make any retrenchment.

Lieut.-colonel  
J. W. Aitchison,  
1723, 1724.

37. Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison thinks that in Bombay there is no room for reduction. At no station, he remarks, were the men (in May 1831) more than two nights in bed; neither is it believed to be possible to reduce the duties.

Colonel Salmond,  
1908.

1909-10.

1910, 1911-18.

547, 548.

38. Colonel Salmond is nevertheless of opinion, for the following reason, that the Native infantry, both of the Bombay and Madras armies, might be curtailed. "The Bombay Government," he observes, "offered to garrison or occupy some portion of the Deccan, which was then occupied by the Madras troops. The Madras Government were informed to that effect; but the Madras Government said they did not wish to have their troops thrown back on them. In consequence, the Bombay Government acquiesced in keeping their troops at home; from that I infer that they did not want them, that they were supernumerary."

39. Colonel Salmond\* also thinks that the Native artillery, both horse and foot, might be reduced as unnecessary, and at all times dangerous.

Sir J. Malcolm,  
668.

On the other hand, Sir John Malcolm considers the Native artillery a very efficient force, and that it might be continued with advantage and without risk.

Sir T. Pritzler.

40. Sir T. Pritzler thinks that the Native horse artillery might bear a little reduction.

Colonel Salmond,  
551.

41. Colonel Salmond does not consider that any alterations are necessary in the Engineer department.

Captain Macan,  
2162.

2163.

2161-5.

2166.

2167.

2167.

42. With respect to the general staff, Captain Macan supposes that considerable reductions might take place; the stations of Nusurabad and Neuneh, he thinks, might be done away with, as, in a military point of view, they are of no use to us, and in a political, have brought us into embarrassments with the Rajpoots. Several stations in the Bengal Presidency might also, in his opinion, be reduced, and a diminution of expense would thereby be effected in a staff, which, in the aggregate, might be worthy of consideration, while such an alteration would improve the efficiency and condition of the army. His idea is, that the staff should be diminished by concentrating the military force, and diminishing the number of stations.

Colonel Salmond,  
552, 553.

43. Colonel Salmond\* is of opinion that the Native cavalry might be reduced with advantage, and European cavalry substituted.

554.

555.

556.

557.

563.

44. In illustration of this remark, he adds, "My idea is that a larger portion of the King's troops in India ought to be cavalry, and a smaller portion infantry. And I would propose to diminish the Native cavalry in proportion as I increased the European cavalry. I should think that half the cavalry in India should be Europeans. In Bengal I would have four additional regiments of Europeans, and I would have six less of Natives, each regiment being of the same strength. In Madras and Bombay I would have one-half European, and one-half Native. The proposed substitution of European for Native cavalry might be by European troops, either in His Majesty's or the Company's service."

45. Lieutenant-colonel Fielding is against the proposed substitution of European for Native cavalry, because the employment of European cavalry in many duties that the Native cavalry are now employed upon would be objectionable; first, as incurring a great increase of expense, from having a larger body of European cavalry; and, secondly, because in

\* See also his reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 158.

in many of those duties the European cavalry would suffer so much more in their health than the Native cavalry.

46. Sir T. Pritzler thinks that the proportion of European to Native cavalry should not exceed one-fourth. And in favour of the European cavalry being increased in that proportion, he states that the European cavalry at Madras is at present (since the withdrawing of one of our regiments) unequal to furnish its proper proportion. He adds, "Native cavalry could be augmented, European cavalry could not without great difficulty."

Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
1260.

47. Sir John Malcolm is unfavourable to the substitution of European for Native cavalry, observing as follows: "While I give full value to the British cavalry, and deem a certain portion of them politically essential to be maintained in India, there is no corps whose maintenance and support is attended with such great expense, and which can be so little employed in the ordinary military duties that occur in that country, owing to the nature of the climate, and to the expense and inexpediency of moving them, or of detaching them in small bodies, whereas the Native cavalry is one of the most efficient branches we have to maintain internal tranquillity throughout our extensive provinces, as well as to act with European cavalry in case of war."

Major-general  
Sir John Malcolm,  
690.

48. Lieutenant-colonel Watson rather recommends an addition to the Native troops, because he considers their present numbers hardly sufficient for the duties of the country, but without any corresponding diminution of the European troops.

Lieut.-col. Watson,  
925,  
926.

49. Colonel Salmond\* also thinks that the King's European infantry might be reduced for the benefit of the finances without danger to the state, and that this reduction could be made in the same proportion as the cavalry when increased. He further recommends, that "the four King's regiments that were sent out for the Burmese war, might now safely be withdrawn." Sir John Malcolm concurs in this latter opinion.

Colonel Salmond,  
598,  
599-1.

676 7-8, 711.

50. Colonel Sannus states, in reference to the Bombay army, that "the complement of Native corps is at present so much reduced, and the actual state of the army so little increased, that there can be but a very small body of troops disposable for emergencies, after making a reasonable allowance for the garrisons and outposts." He adds, "It may be matter for consideration whether the army has not already been reduced to too low a scale of numerical strength, consistently with the safety of our Indian empire."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 19, p. 383.

51. Lieutenant-colonel de Havilland is of opinion that the army is not too large; and Sir H. Worsley thinks that the army is at present on the lowest possible scale.

No. 8, p. 239.  
No. 15, p. 327.

52. Captain Page observes that the reduction of two troops and companies per regiment, "including the European officers, is a measure fraught with danger to the British interests." The force in India, upon the present reduced scale, he considers to be decidedly inefficient.

No. 21, p. 387.

53. Sir W. Keir Grant thinks that no reductions are practicable, having already been carried to too great an extent.

No. 6, p. 271.

54. It is the opinion of Sir Edward Paget that the more King's troops there are in all the Presidencies, the better; but the expense of them, he observes, is much greater than that of other troops.

Question 2315.

55. Major Justinian Nutt considers "the orders lately issued, directing the discharge of nearly the whole of that most useful body of men, the auxiliary horse, the extra battalions, and two companies from each regiment of the line," to be of "very questionable policy."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 9, p. 286.

56. Captain Balmain considers the army to be too small, particularly in cavalry and horse artillery.

No. 14, p. 311.

#### *Distribution.*

57. A return has been prepared, showing the distribution of the army in India in the years 1813, 1820, and 1830, arranged so as to show the amount of force stationed at each period within the British and protected territory, and the effect of the extension of the British

Appendix (A.),  
No. 55.

\* See also his reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 158.

British frontier in the removal of corps from near to remote stations. The result of this comparison is, that, since 1813, 6,180 Europeans and 55,572 Natives have been allotted to the new territory which has been acquired or taken under British protection. There appears also to have been an increase to the extent of 1,082 Europeans in the territory which was occupied by us in 1813; but a decrease in the Native force therein stationed, amounting to 25,619.

58. The several stations mentioned in this Return are marked in the illustrative Military Map of India accompanying this Appendix, excepting those on the Malay peninsula, which will be found in the General Map.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3,  
pp. 203 to 206.

59. Sir John Malcolm has entered at considerable length into the question of the distribution of the army, in his letter to the Governor-general of the 27th November 1830; but the passage is too long to be extracted, and it does not admit of abridgment.

No. 5,  
pp. 261 to 263.

60. Sir T. Pritzler has also entered largely into this subject in respect to the Madras army, concluding with this remark, that "the Madras army requires a larger proportion of Europeans than either of the other Presidencies, particularly foot-artillery, and perhaps a less proportion of horse-artillery and cavalry than Bengal.

No. 16, p. 350.

61. Lieutenant-colonel Baker recommends that the Bengal army should be formed into eight divisions, each under a major-general; that the station of Mhow should be "placed under the Saugur command, Neemuch and all Rajpootana, Agra and Muttra to form the eighth or western division, head-quarters at Ajmere or Nussurabad. The Madras army to take all stations south of the Nerbudda now occupied by Bengal troops, and the latter to take all the duties now performed by the Madras troops to Tenasserim and the Malay peninsula."

No. 9, p. 286.

62. Major Justinian Nutt thinks that the military cantonments are too numerous, the troops available for service being in consequence unavoidably diminished, and their dispersion prejudicial to discipline.

No. 10, p. 295.

63. Colonel Pennington remarks, that "if an army of 20,000 men were required on the western frontier, near Lodiana, it could not be assembled there at the most favourable season for marching in less than four months."

No. 15, p. 323.

64. Sir H. Worsley is of opinion that the posts of Mhow and Neemuch are more suitable for Bombay troops.

No. 2, p. 156.

65. Colonel Salmond remarks, "it would seem to be advisable that so many of the Madras cavalry as may be judged necessary in the present state of India should be advanced as near as possible to the north-western frontier," seeing that it is there only that "their services are likely to be rendered useful."

No. 22, p. 353.

66. Captain Grant Duff has given a particular description of the mode in which the Bombay army is distributed, and in what way troops could be assembled in different quarters for defence or military operations; and he has also stated his opinion in regard to the mode in which an European invasion of India should be resisted.

No. 6, p. 273.

67. Sir William Keir Grant is of opinion that the Native troops should not be required to serve beyond the limits of their particular Presidency, except in war.

### *Organization.*

Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 15 to 51.

68. Separate Returns have been prepared, illustrating the organization of the several corps, European and Native, of cavalry, infantry, artillery, pioneers, and sappers and miners at each Presidency, and also of the alterations which have been made in the establishment of corps in His Majesty's service on the Indian establishment since 1813.

No. 53.

69. A Return is also given, showing the number of officers withdrawn from each regular regiment of cavalry and infantry for staff and detached employ, in each year from 1813 to 1831.

70. In reference to the present organization of the army, Colonel Pennington remarks as follows:—"The last organization of the army, as established in 1824, seems hardly susceptible of improvement, affording the number of officers to each regiment so much required for the duties of the Native infantry most especially; but various circumstances are constantly in operation to render this improvement rather apparent than real; and this view of the army would be fallacious were they not referred to."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 10, p. 291.

*Clothing and Equipments.*

71. In the Appendix is a list of the articles of clothing and equipment, and also of the means of carriage and other accommodation supplied to the Indian soldier.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 67.

72. There are also Returns illustrative of the Indian off-reckoning system, and of the furlough and retiring regulations, which will be more particularly referred to in the sequel.

Nos. 68 to 75.

73. Sir H. Worsley considers the want of a permanent establishment of carriage cattle for the baggage of the Native troops a great evil; and he has suggested the mode in which, in his opinion, it might be provided for. He is also of opinion that the sepoys should be supplied with knapsacks and watchcloaks (10 per troop or company of the latter) at the public expense.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 15, p. 326.

*Casualties and Appointments.*

74. Particular Returns are given of the number and description of casualties among the Company's European commissioned officers, in each year from 1813 to 1830; and of the number of appointments of cadets and assistant-surgeons, in each year from 1796 to 1830. There are also some illustrative Returns of the soldiers discharged from the Company's service, and of men transferred from His Majesty's to the Company's European corps.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 56,  
No. 57,  
No. 58.

75. The following are the total number of casualties at each Presidency, and in India, taken from the first of these Returns.

No. 59.

**CASUALTIES in each Year from 1813 to 1830, amongst the European Commissioned Officers of the Company's Army.**

					BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	INDIA.
1813	..	..	..	..	53	82	31	169
1814	..	..	..	..	71	53	30	151
1815	..	..	..	..	80	57	22	159
1816	..	..	..	..	63	62	18	143
1817	..	..	..	..	46	80	21	150
1818	..	..	..	..	92	89	22	203
1819	..	..	..	..	78	81	39	198
1820	..	..	..	..	78	50	39	167
1821	..	..	..	..	71	78	45	194
1822	..	..	..	..	75	59	30	161
1823	..	..	..	..	74	67	27	168
1824	..	..	..	..	96	121	43	260
1825	..	..	..	..	107	94	32	233
1826	..	..	..	..	100	95	49	244
1827	..	..	..	..	92	89	52	233
1828	..	..	..	..	87	41	35	163
1829	..	..	..	..	93	63	37	193
1830	..	..	..	..	86	87	31	201

## SYNOPSIS OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE

Average per-centage of Casualties during the above period.

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	INDIA.
Casualties by death .. ..	3·079	3·856	4·166	3·544
Ditto by retirements .. ..	1·482	1·716	1·282	1·530
Ditto of every description .. ..	4·568	5·572	5·448	5·075

76. The number of appointments of cadets and assistant-surgeons in each year from 1796 to 1832, appears, from the second of these Returns, to have been as follows :

	CADETS, Including Seminary Appointments.				ASSISTANT SURGEONS.	TOTAL.
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.		
1796* .. ..	33	55	26	114	32	146
1797 .. ..	41	54	34	132	29	161
1798 .. ..	183	167	58	408	36	444
1799 .. ..	111	75	30	219	27	246
1800 .. ..	164	201	109	474	27	501
1801 .. ..	13	18	12	43	28	71
1802 .. ..	65	190	36	291	31	322
1803 .. ..	196	125	171	492	28	520
1804 .. ..	198	138	21	357	42	399
1805 .. ..	198	230	11	439	51	490
1806 .. ..	110	211	19	340	36	376
1807 .. ..	110	113	28	251	48	329
1808 .. ..	152	55	56	263	24	287
1809 .. ..	59	36	19	114	28	142
1810 .. ..	81	71	39	191	27	221
1811 .. ..	44	42	27	113	11	127
1812 .. ..	18	28	7	53	28	81
1813 .. ..	19	19	14	52	55	107
1814 .. ..	36	13	7	56	40	96
1815 .. ..	10	12	4	26	33	59
1816 .. ..	12	8	5	25	38	63
1817 .. ..	35	32	19	86	29	115
1818 .. ..	122	85	83	290	33	323
1819 .. ..	178	115	86	409	46	455
1820 .. ..	142	234	84	460	62	522
1821 .. ..	131	170	116	417	66	483
1822 .. ..	115	107	36	258	59	317
1823 .. ..	95	56	56	207	48	255
1824 .. ..	206	99	63	368	39	407
1825 .. ..	209	121	37	367	53	420
1826 .. ..	187	210	69	466	74	540
1827 .. ..	126	136	96	358	61	419
1828 .. ..	188	89	77	354	59	413
1829 .. ..	117	53	39	209	57	266
1830 .. ..	42	35	16	93	42	135
1831 .. ..	26	24	11	61	49	110
1832 .. ..	5	11	5	21	6	27

77. In the following Table the number of appointments of cadets in each year, from 1813 to 1830, is contrasted with the number of casualties which during the same period have occurred among the European commissioned officers. The numbers are obtained from the totals of the preceding Tables.

			Appointments.	Casualties.	
1813 .. ..	52	169	During this period the establishment was in progress of reduction at the rate of 12 officers per regiment; but there was an increase to the Bengal infantry, in 1814 equal to six regiments of the present establishment; an increase at Bombay in 1817 equal to three regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry; and at Madras in 1819 equal to four regiments of infantry, independently of augmentations in the cavalry and artillery. The augmentations in the infantry gave an effective increase equal to 292 officers.		
1814 .. ..	56	154			
1815 .. ..	26	159			
1816 .. ..	25	143			
1817 .. ..	86	150			
1818 .. ..	290	203			
1819 .. ..	409	198	In this period, the order reducing the establishment 12 officers per regiment was suspended; and there was an augmentation at Bombay in 1820 equal to two regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry of the present establishment; and at Bengal in 1823, equal to eight regiments of infantry. The infantry augmentations gave an effective increase equal to 405 officers.		
1820 .. ..	460	167			
1821 .. ..	417	194			
1822 .. ..	258	164			
1823 .. ..	207	168			
1824 .. ..	368	260	In 1825, there was an augmentation at Bengal equal to six regiments of infantry; at Madras in 1826, of two regiments of infantry; and at Bombay, in the same year, of two regiments of infantry. Increase of officers in consequence, 230.		
1825 .. ..	367	233			
1826 .. ..	466	214			
1827 .. ..	358	233			
1828 .. ..	354	163			
1829 .. ..	209	193	A reduction equal to three officers per regiment in progress during this period.		
1830 .. ..	93	204			
			4,501	3,399	

78. The increase which took place in the number of European commissioned officers between 1813 and 1830, will appear from the following Table, taken from the Returns in the Appendix.

								1813.	1830.
Engineers	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	70	95
Artillery	{	European	{	Horse	..	..	..	— 70	— 95
								Foot	..
	{	Native	{	Horse	..	..	..	199	182
								Foot	..
								1	71
Native Cavalry	..	..	{	Regular	..	..	..	242	376
								Irregular*	..
								11	13
Infantry	{	European	..	..	..	..	..	259	360
	{	Native	{	Regular	..	..	..	2,078	2,481
								Irregular*	..
								2,348	2,660
Pioneers	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	32	32
General Staff.	..	..	{	Commissariat	..	..	..	34	63
								Other Staff	..
								318	478
* These officers are borrowed from the Irregulars.								3,237	3,969

79. By which it appears that the number of European commissioned officers was larger in 1830 than it was in 1813, by 732; and as a reduction of three officers per regiment, or of 618 officers, ordered in December 1828, was in progress during that period, the difference between the number of appointments and of casualties, amounting to 1,102, is apparently accounted for, as the excess of officers in 1830 beyond those of 1813, amounting to 732, and the 618 officers who belonged to the authorized establishment in 1828, together amount to 1,350, showing that the supernumeraries had not all then become absorbed, which corresponds with the fact.

80. The number of cadetships and assistant-surgeons, at the disposal of the East-India Company during the period stated below, is obtained from the second of the preceding tables, and appears to have been as follows:

				NUMBER OF			Average Number of Appointments per Annum.		
				Cadetships.	Assistant Surgeons.	Total.	Cadetships.	Assistant Surgeons.	Total.
From 1796 to 1800	..	..	..	1,317	151	1,468	269	30	299
— 1801 to 1810	..	..	..	2,814	313	3,157	281	34	315
— 1811 to 1820	..	..	..	1,570	378	1,948	157	37	191
— 1821 to 1832	..	..	..	3,179	613	3,792	265	51	316
— 1796 to 1832	..	..	..	8,910	1,485	10,395	240	40	280

81. These

81. These numbers it will be perceived are considerably in excess of the casualties among the European commissioned officers, which, according to the first of the preceding tables were as follows :

	Casualties.	Average per Annum.
From 1813 to 1820 .. .. .	1,343	168
— 1821 to 1830 .. .. .	2,056	205
— 1813 to 1830 .. .. .	3,399	188

The excess being attributable to the large increases which were made to the number of regular corps during the period referred to.

82. The regular corps in the service, consisting of 206, of twenty officers each, and the average rate of casualties, according to the first of the preceding tables, amounting to 5·075 per cent., the number of cadetships necessary to supply future vacancies, when the existing supernumeraries shall have been completely absorbed, will be 209 on the average per annum.\*

83. The establishment of medical officers of the Company's service, consisting of 683, if the same rate of casualties be in operation among them as among the European commissioned officers, the average number of assistant-surgeons to supply future vacancies would amount to about thirty-four annually.†

84. Recurring again to the table of appointments in paragraph 76 of this Synopsis, it may be observed that Major Wilson has remarked upon the irregularity with which appointments from this country have been made. A similar remark has been made by Captain Grant Duff, on the injury which has resulted to the service from the appointment of large numbers of cadets at irregular intervals ; and Major Justinian Nutt regards such irregularity as a serious defect.

85. Lieut.-colonel De Havilland is of opinion that the sons of Company's officers should have some claim to appointments to the military service. It is suggested, in another of the replies,

Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 363.  
No. 22, p. 395.

No. 9, p. 287.

No. 8, p. 285.  
No. 23,  
paras. 161 and 176,  
p. 432.

$$\begin{array}{r} *206 \\ 20 \\ \hline 1,120 \times \frac{5 \cdot 075}{100} = 209 \cdot 09 \end{array}$$

	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	TOTAL.
† Bengal .. .. .	120	230	350
Madras .. .. .	70	110	210
Bombay .. .. .	13	50	123
	233	450	683

$$683 \times \frac{5 \cdot 075}{100} = 34 \cdot 66225$$



replies, that a proportion of the writerships, cadetships, and assistant-surgeoncies, should be reserved for the sons of the civil, military, and medical officers of the service.

*Pay and Allowances.*

Appendix (A.),  
No. 60,  
No. 61,  
No. 62,  
Nos. 63 to 66.

86. Tables have been constructed representing the several items of the regimental pay and allowances of the European commissioned officers of the Indian establishment; those of the European non-commissioned officers and privates; and of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates. Also the staff allowances of which the military and medical officers of His Majesty's and the Company's service are in receipt.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 23,  
paras. 101 to 127,  
p. 418.

87. In one of the replies to the Board's circular is an analysis of the several items of allowance received by the European commissioned officers, with a suggestion in view to the adoption of a less complicated system of India military finance than at present, by a consolidation of allowances, and by calculating the pay-table according to a daily instead of a monthly rate.

No. 18, p. 377.

88. Major Wilson recommends that the "pay, gratuity, and half-batta of the European officers," should be consolidated under the general head of Pay.

*Courts-Martial.*

Reply of Sir T.  
Pritzler to Q. 1236.

89. For the trial of Europeans, the King's and Company's officers sit in conjunction in the same court; and for the trial of Natives, the court-martial is composed of Native officers, directed by an European officer as a judge-advocate.

1537 to 1539,  
1578.

90. Colonel Greenhill thinks that the commanding officer of a Native corps should have the power occasionally to reduce the Native non-commissioned officers without a court-martial. He had formerly liberty to break havildars, but has lately been deprived of that power.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 23,  
paras. 58 and 59,  
p. 410.

91. In one of the replies to the Board's circular, the difficulty opposed by the seniority regimental system of the Company's service, to the infliction of loss of rank upon a major of cavalry and infantry, is adverted to, and a mode suggested in which it might be obviated.

*Home Authorities.*

No. 8, p. 285.

92. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland is of opinion that Company's officers should have a right of appeal to the Board of Control against the decisions of the court.

No. 9, p. 287.

93. Major Justinian Nutt thinks that no change should be made in establishments in India without a previous reference to the home authorities.

No. 2, p. 167.

94. Colonel Salmond recommends that the orders from home should be countersigned by the "minister for the Affairs of India," so that the "King's commands might always be apparent to those who bear his commission, as well as that of the East-India Company."

No. 21, p. 389.

95. Captain Page is of opinion that the powers of the Board "are by far too limited to be effective to the extent required."

No. 23, para. 175,  
p. 133.

96. In another of the answers to the Board's circular, it is suggested that the estimates for the King's troops in India should be prepared by the Secretary-at-war in concert with the President of the Board of Control, and by the latter, or a member of the Board, be laid before Parliament.

No. 9, p. 289.

97. Major Justinian Nutt recommends "the establishment of a Military Board in England, to be composed, in the first instance, of one officer of artillery, one of engineers, one of cavalry, and one of infantry from each of the three Presidencies, making a total of twelve, not under the rank of a field officer," to revise the Indian military system in the manner explained in his reply to the Board's circular, and also to superintend the provision of stores. Salary to each member £500 per annum, with an annual nomination to a cadetship. Sir Robert Scot seems to think that the Company's officers in England should occasionally be consulted in regard to instructions connected with the details of the army on practical and professional subjects.

## THE TWO SERVICES.

98. THE number of troops of the King's and Company's service employed in India, in each year from 1813 to 1830, were as follow: the first column in the subjoined Table is the total of the table entered under the head of "His Majesty's Troops;" the third column is the total of the Indian army from the Return, No. 2, of Appendix (A.), and the difference between these two columns is the number of troops in the Company's service, stated in the second column. The relative proportion of King's and Company's troops employed in India, at the respective periods embraced in the table, is stated in a fourth column, which has been added for that purpose.

—	King's Troops.	Company's Troops.	TOTAL.	RELATIVE PROPORTION.
1813 ..	21,490	179,632	201,122	1 King's to 8·358 Company's Soldier.
1814 ..	20,049	175,423	195,472	1 — 8·719 —
1815 ..	19,828	208,257	228,085	1 — 10·503 —
1816 ..	20,432	211,275	231,707	1 — 10·340 —
1817 ..	18,709	208,281	226,990	1 — 11·121 —
1818 ..	20,110	223,954	244,064	1 — 11·136 —
1819 ..	17,680	228,450	246,130	1 — 12·865 —
1820 ..	16,743	241,266	258,009	1 — 12·618 —
1821 ..	16,290	241,547	257,837	1 — 14·821 —
1822 ..	15,876	230,261	246,137	1 — 14·503 —
1823 ..	16,652	222,022	238,674	1 — 13·333 —
1824 ..	16,395	227,934	244,329	1 — 13·902 —
1825 ..	16,683	260,856	277,539	1 — 15·636 —
1826 ..	16,832	275,330	292,162	1 — 16·298 —
1827 ..	18,249	256,394	274,643	1 — 14·049 —
1828 ..	19,612	240,454	260,066	1 — 12·260 —
1829 ..	20,132	224,390	244,522	1 — 11·145 —
1830 ..	20,292	204,152	224,444	1 — 10·060 —

99. The different rules of promotion which obtain in respect to His Majesty's and the Company's officers, and their effect upon the two services, fall properly to be considered under this head. Also, what is stated in relation to the brevet rank of captain (common to the two services), and the rank of colonel, to which the Company's officers succeed regimentally, and the lieutenant-colonels of the same standing of His Majesty's service, locally by brevet. Also the effect of the relative rank of the King's and Company's officers in the distribution of commands; whether exchanges should be allowed, and whether jealousies are supposed to exist between the two services, and in what degree.

*King's and Company's Officers.*

100. The following are the observations of Sir Robert Scot, in regard to the different rules of promotion which obtain in the two services: "When the two armies are distinguished from each other by so important a difference in their constitution, as that while the officers in the one can attain to rank by the rule of seniority alone, those in the other may rise by purchase or patronage; the same system of rules and regulations for their general government can seldom be fairly and reciprocally applicable; and when to that distinction is added, perhaps, the still more important consideration that the one is not only strictly local but holds of a master of far inferior dignity, it must be acknowledged that there can exist but little analogy between the situation and pretensions of their respective officers. There is naturally much to depress and little to raise the local army; but no principle seems

Reply to Q. 1151.  
See also reply of  
Col. Salmond to Q.  
539.

seems better established or more freely acknowledged, than that to maintain and elevate its character is essential alike to its own efficiency and the safety of the state."

Question 61.

101. In reference to these two rules of promotion, Sir Jasper Nicolls observes, "I think the seniority rise more beneficial to the individual, selection or purchase more profitable to the state, but there are great disadvantages attending both as a general rule."

303.

102. Sir Thomas Reynell appears to regard the existing system as "satisfactory" in the particular adverted to, every thing having been done, as he remarks, to put the two services "as much upon a level as possible within late years."

304.

540.

1159 & 1160.

103. Sir Thomas Reynell thinks that the advantage of promotion is in favour of the King's officers: Colonel Limond, that it is in favour of the Company's officers, "setting aside purchase altogether;" Sir T. Pritzler, that the "Company's officers have the advantage of the King's at present," even "with purchase;" and he adds, "but this has varied exceedingly, and will vary again; formerly the advantage was in favour of the King's; the augmentation of the army has put it in favour of the Company's; but if the Company's army is not increased, it may revert to what it formerly was, in favor of the King's."

1272.

104. Colonel Limond seems also to be of opinion that the advantage of promotion is in favour of the Company's officers.

105.

106.

338 & 339.

105. The subalterns of His Majesty's and the Company's service receive the brevet (local) rank of captain when of fifteen years' standing. Sir J. Nicolls observes, "the rank being given with impartiality, I do not see that it has any injurious effect upon either." It is of equal advantage to both; if any thing, more "beneficial to His Majesty's officers than to the officers of the Company, their promotion being slower." Sir Thomas Reynell says that the effect of the arrangement is "felt very triflingly, except at courts-martial and garrison duties;" and he adds, it is "of very little advantage to either, except the gratification that an old subaltern feels from being called captain."

1175.

105. (a.) Sir T. Pritzler observes, in respect to the arrangement, as follows: "I do not think that it is of equal advantage, because it is perfectly local to the King's officers, whereas it gives the Company's officer a claim eventually to a brevet rank of major, and therefore it is a greater advantage to the Company's officer than it is to the King's."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 23,  
paras. 31 to 36,  
p. 406.

106. In one of the replies to the Board's circular, the effect of the grant of the brevet rank of captain, in the instance of an augmentation in the Company's service, is adverted to; and also in the eventual promotion of a Company's officer to the rank of major by the operation of His Majesty's brevet.

Reply to Q. 1451.

107. The most important instance, however, in which the different rules which regulate promotion in His Majesty's and the Company's service, and injuriously affect the interests of the Company's officers, remains to be stated. The case is described in the subjoined extract from Sir Robert Scot's evidence, in which he is urging the importance of maintaining and elevating the character of the local army, when he takes occasion to remark; "and yet a rule to regulate promotion in certain cases has lately been brought into practice in India, of a nature than which I scarcely can imagine any thing more calculated to have a contrary effect. I refer to the regulation or order which, on every occasion of a lieutenant-colonel in the Company's army succeeding to a regiment in his own branch of service, and consequently to the rank of colonel, no matter how long his previous service may have been, entitles every lieutenant-colonel of His Majesty's service then in India, or who may afterwards be sent thither with commissions, no matter how obtained or how short their previous service may have been, if an older date than that of the Company's officer, promoted as above, to receive a brevet as colonel, of a date also anterior to his, on the ground I presume, that His Majesty's officers of that rank not being liable to supersession in that manner in their own service, ought not to be liable to it, under any circumstances, by the officers of another. But the officer promoted above in the Company's service may be junior to any number of lieutenant-colonels in his own service, and all of these may be senior to every one of the King's lieutenant-colonels then promoted, to prevent their supersession in the case referred to.

Reply of  
Col. Loughton to  
Q. 1991.

to. And yet, as if they were without feelings to be hurt, or interests to be affected, their grievous supercession passes as a thing of course, entirely unheeded. The effect of such a system cannot fail to be degrading. Undoubtedly common justice demands, that if His Majesty's officers must be protected from supercession, under the circumstances referred to, those of the Company should be held entitled to at least an equal consideration. It must be admitted, however, that one very injurious effect which necessarily attended the system which this supplanted, will in some degree be obviated by the present. By that, an officer succeeding to a regiment in the Company's service acquired no additional rank, and was promoted only when officers of corresponding rank in His Majesty's army came to be promoted by a general brevet. This, in a service in which promotion, though regular, was comparatively slow, had gradually the effect of so reducing the number of colonels in the Company's army, that major-generals from the staff could not be supplied from it."

108. The subjoined extract from Colonel Leighton's evidence contains the following additional remarks in reference to this subject, and the commissions of Company's officers generally. "When the rank of colonel was conferred upon the Company's officers in 1829, the order which was sent out specified that officers so promoted would take the rank of colonel by brevet in the territorial possessions of the East-India Company, and not even in the East-Indies only, as all other King's commissions are expressed; so that a colonel employed out of their territorial possessions would only have the rank of lieutenant-colonel. I can hardly allow myself to think that that was intended, but think it was intended that the commission of colonel should extend as far as the other commissions. I cannot see any reason why the commission of officers in the East-India Company's service should be limited to India, and think they should be effectual wherever their services are required. When the troops went to Egypt from India, the officers were told that their commissions were good for nothing."

Reply to Q. 2112.

109. The remedy proposed by Colonel John Munro\* for the removal of the alleged grievance, in regard to the local commission of colonel conferred on the lieutenant-colonels of His Majesty's service, "is to re-establish the Regulation adopted in 1796, by which Company's officers, on obtaining a regiment, acquired the rank of colonel, without reference to the King's service or the King's brevet;" which Regulations, he observes, "were objected to by the King's officers, for a time abolished, and again established," in the manner described in the extract from Sir Robert Scot's evidence.

Question 1089.

110. Colonel John Munro suggests, that if the Company's officers "should be continued, after the expiration of the present charter, under the Company's control, it might be advisable to give them a separate establishment of general officers and colonels, independently of the King's brevets," and to entrust them also occasionally with the command in chief.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 17, p. 355.

111. Major Wilson states that the colonel's commission recently conferred on the Company's officers is restricted to the "territorial possessions of the East-India Company." He also dwells on the injurious operation of the grant of the local rank of colonel to King's lieutenant-colonels senior to Company's lieutenant-colonels attaining by seniority to a regiment. His opinion is, that the Company's lieutenant-colonels, similarly circumstanced, should be promoted at the same time.

No. 18, p. 366.

112. The subject is also adverted to in another of the replies to the Board's circular, in which the supercession complained of is attributed to the Company's officers succeeding in four distinct lines of promotion at each Presidency, instead of one. In the latter case, no instance of supercession could occur by the grant of a local commission of colonel to King's officers, in the predicament before described.

No. 23,  
paras 60 to 64,  
p. 110.

113. Lieutenant-colonel Baker recommends that the rank of colonel should be given retrospectively

No. 16, p. 350.

\* See reply to Q. 1088; and also his reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 17, p. 351, in which he gives an outline of the arrangements which have been adopted since 1783, to adjust the relative rank of the King's and Company's officers.

spectively to all the lieutenant-colonels commandant who were promoted to the rank of colonel on the 5th June 1829.

Reply to Q. 1161;  
and also 1226.

114. Sir T. Pritzler's view of the Regulation is contained in the subjoined extract from his evidence. The rank of colonel, which is now given to lieutenant-colonels commandant, will bring them over all the King's officers; they now get the rank of colonel with that of lieutenant-colonels commandant, and from that date they take their rank of major-general; the King's officers do not.

Reply to Q. 1151.

115. The following remark of Sir Robert Scot has reference to the relative force of a commission from His Majesty and the East-India Company. "In the Articles of War for the government of His Majesty's forces, there is still to be found, in section 22, that obnoxious one which in former days rankled constantly in the minds of every Company's officer; *viz.* the second, by which it is provided, 'that whensoever officers of the royal forces shall be associated in duty with those of the Company in India, the former are invariably to take command and precedence of the latter of the same grade, notwithstanding that their commissions may be of a later date.' The provisions of this article having long ceased to be applicable in practice, any sufficient reason for retaining it in the code is at least not obvious; while, as all must see how easily it may be made a ground of taunt and derision, its discontinuance would seem to be as expedient as it certainly would be satisfactory. It is not a very long time since a general officer on the staff at Madras thought it his duty to refer to it as a rule that should determine the precedence of certain officers then assembled for a general court-martial."

Appendix (B),  
No. 17, p. 351.

116. It is observed by Colonel John Munro, that previously to 1783 "all Company's officers were commanded by King's officers of the same rank;" but that soon after that date orders were issued, "granting to the Company's officers rank and authority with the King's according to the dates of their commissions." He also dwells on the circumstance as a disadvantage to the service, that the rank of Company's officers is not recognized in this country.

No. 15, p. 331.

117. Sir H. Worsley also objects to the article of war which gives precedence to King's officers over the Company's.

No. 18, p. 366.

118. Major Wilson thinks that the King's commission to a Company's officer should not be restricted to the East-Indies only.

No. 7, p. 275.

119. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke recommends that "officers of the Native army should have permanent rank in the King's service."

Reply to Q. 2112.

120. Complaint has been made, that the officers of His Majesty's service obtained a larger number of divisional and stational commands, in proportion to their relative numbers. Colonel Leighton remarks, "I consider it highly proper that His Majesty's officers should have a due proportion of Government commands, but only so in proportion to the number of His Majesty's troops, not in proportion to the number of superior officers sent out with regiments, or who afterwards exchange into them; but the Governments of the three Presidencies must have the power of selection for commands."

Ditto 1063.

121. From the like cause, Colonel John Munro remarks, that "in general it is a complaint of the Company's army, that on service in the field the superior commands are generally given to the King's officers."

Ditto 305.

Ditto 1161.

122. The witnesses, however, are not all of this opinion. Sir Thomas Reynell remarks, "that the advantage is with the Company's officers certainly, from the circumstance of their having so few officers in proportion in the very high ranks." Sir T. Pritzler adds, "the commands of stations, I think, more generally are left to the Company's officers; they have the power of removing Company's officers from corps to corps, and the King's officers are obliged to remain with their corps; consequently the Company's officers have the advantage, as they cannot move a King's officer to give him a command."

Ditto 66.

123. Sir J. Nicolls and Colonel Salmoud are of opinion that the King's officers have "a fair proportion of commands."

124. The

124. The following are the number of commands held respectively by King's and Company's officers, as given by Colonel Salmond, in elucidation of this remark.

Reply to Q. 541  
and 542.

	General Officers on the Staff.	Brigadiers.
By King's Officers . . . . .	5	7
By Company's Officers . . . . .	10	28

Ditto 512.

125. The divisional commands are fixed, being given to general officers appointed expressly to such commands. There is no established proportion in regard to those held by brigadiers. The following is the reason assigned by Sir T. Pritzer, why a larger proportion of commands are held by brigadiers of the Company's service at Bengal than at Madras. "The King's regiments are more divided throughout the army of Madras, which brings their officers into play, while the King's regiments on the Bengal establishment are all at fixed stations, unmixed with the Company's troops."\*

Reply of Sir T. Pritzer to Q. 1161 and of Col. Leighton to Q. 2142.

Ditto of Sir J. Nicolls to Q. 61.

Reply to Q. 1251.

126. Lieutenant-colonel Watson thinks "that where there are three or four regiments assembled together at a station, the officer who commands should have the rank of brigadier, in consideration of the extent and responsibility of his charge."

Reply to Q. 977;  
and also Q. 978-9  
and 980.

127. Sir John Malcolm remarks, "that His Majesty's and the Company's troops can never join in service without the senior officer of the latter (however high the separate commands they may have held) being superseded by the great proportion of the regimental officers of His Majesty's corps, who must, from their seniority, command every division, brigade or detachment."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 209.

128. By the existing Regulations of the service, His Majesty's officers are prohibited from holding "appointments on that part of the general staff which may be considered as common to the two services, such as that of brigade-major, line-adjutant or assistant-adjutant-general of the division or station at which his regiment may be serving."

Sir J. Nicolls' reply  
to Q. 65;  
also Sir T. Reynell's  
reply to Q. 306.

129. Colonel John Munro is of opinion that such appointments cannot be given to His Majesty's officers "under the present constitution of the service." Sir Jasper Nicolls—"that they might have a share of the military staff appointments, with advantage even to the Company's service, after they had been long enough in the country to qualify themselves as to language, and to obtain a knowledge of the habits and manners of the people." And Sir Thomas Reynell—that they might be admitted "according to the proportion of the number of King's regiments in India." He states, however, when troops are in the field and brigaded, that in that case they are equally eligible with Company's officers to the brigade staff.

Reply to Q. 1063.  
Ditto 66.

Ditto 307.  
Ditto 319.

130. Lieutenant-colonel Baker considers it as a grievance to King's officers, that they should be excluded from "certain staff situations in India," when they have acquired sufficient experience by a long residence to fill such appointments.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 16, p. 311.

131. Major Wilson thinks that "the Indian army should have secured to it inviolably a certain and fair proportion of the commands and staff appointments;" and he states reasons why, in his opinion, a large portion of the commands and staff appointments should remain with the Indian army under any circumstances.

No. 18, p. 381.

132. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke states, that in Java "the indiscriminate employment of the King's and Company's officers, as well on the general staff as in duties of a civil and political

No. 7, p. 271.

\* See the Table given by Col. Salmond (Q. 542), which states the particulars in regard to each Presidency.

political nature, produced a spirit of cordiality and co-operation in the highest degree conducive to the public interests." He adds, "many intelligent and experienced officers of the King's army are kept with their corps, whose service with the armies in Europe would have rendered their assistance in the highest degree useful in organising those of India." His opinion is, that "officers of both services should be eligible to the general staff of the army, and the separate staff of the King's troops should be abolished. All officers appointed to the staff should understand the languages; but there could be no objection to encouragement being given to Native officers and soldiers to learn the English language."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 7, p. 275.

No. 6, p. 272.

133. Sir William Keir Grant observes, in confirmation of the preceding, that a joint staff from the two services was formed for the expedition against the French and Dutch settlements, and in the Persian Gulf, and also in Java.

Reply to Q. 1154.

134. It has been suggested by Sir Robert Scot, "that the privilege of exchanging from the local into the King's army in India, and *vice versa*, would, under proper and peremptory restrictions as to the length of Indian service on the part of His Majesty's officers, and also as to their being qualified by a competent knowledge of the Native language, in the case of a proposed exchange with an officer of a sepoy corps, prove advantageous to the general service in India."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 172.

135. Sir John Malcolm observes, that "the sale of commissions and exchanges between the English and local branches of the army employed in India, under regulations which regarded the efficiency of the local branch, would be most beneficial, both from introducing good and effective officers, and accelerating promotion to the local army."

No. 18, p. 381.

136. Major Wilson thinks that exchanges between the King's and Company's service below "the rank of field officer might be permitted between the European and the Indian army, provided the person passing into the latter had been two years in India. In this case officers making exchanges into the Indian army from the European, should be permitted, with regard to retirement and pension, to count their former services to the State, in the proportion of one-and-a-half year's service in Europe, and one year's service in the West-Indies, to one year's service in the East Indies."

No. 7, p. 271.

137. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke thinks that King's officers should be allowed to exchange into Native corps, provided they understand the Hindoostanee language, and, if a field officer, have served at least three years, and a captain, two years with a "Native corps in subordinate ranks."

No. 23, para. 75,  
p. 413.

138. In another of the replies to the Board's circular, it is remarked that there does not seem to be any particular objection to an exchange of commissions between the two services, provided the King's officers "had been a sufficient time in India to be safely intrusted with the charge of Native troops, and the officers exchanging were nearly of the same age. In the case of a major, the King's officer transferred should be the senior of the officer with whom he exchanged."

Question 470.

1225.

139. The following is the information afforded by the evidence, in regard to the jealousy between the two services, which might be supposed to arise out of the differences which obtain in respect to their respective rules and regulations. Sir Thomas Reynell observes, "there must be something like jealousy. It is impossible that two services constituted as they are, should be there without jealousy; but it is astonishing how little it appears, and how well they manage to go on together." And Sir T. Pritzler states, "I never observed any jealousies to the prejudice of the service, but certainly feelings of that description arise at times."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 12, p. 306.

140. Colonel Limond states that the best understanding exists between the two services.

No. 10, p. 298.

141. Colonel Pennington alludes to certain feelings which were "evinced by the Indian Native army in 1809, on the appointment of His Majesty's officers to the command of some newly-raised light battalions."

No. 23,  
paras. 162 to 166,  
p. 432.

142. Remarks are made in another of the replies on the existing sources of jealousy between the two services.

## THE THREE ARMIES.

143. THE amount of force maintained at each Presidency, and in each year from 1793 to 1830, together with their relative proportions to the whole army of India, which is represented by a decimal fraction (extending however to no more than three places of figures), the aggregate amount of force for all India, being taken as unity, was as follows :

Appendix (A.  
No. 1.

The Three Armies.	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	INDIA.	Relative Proportion.		
					BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
1793 ..	31,922	39,895	13,612	88,429	·391	·451	·153
1794 ..	35,092	40,156	13,411	88,669	·391	·451	·151
1795 ..	31,313	42,198	13,213	89,724	·382	·469	·145
1796 ..	36,916	48,191	16,718	102,188	·361	·474	·163
1797 ..	40,323	52,184	16,494	109,001	·369	·478	·151
1798 ..	47,194	47,784	18,035	113,313	·419	·421	·159
1799 ..	55,760	52,556	21,163	129,489	·430	·405	·163
1800 ..	57,011	56,351	21,740	138,132	·412	·407	·179
1801 ..	58,909	85,696	11,271	155,876	·377	·549	·072
1802 ..	52,156	81,047	13,344	146,847	·357	·551	·090
1803 ..	52,853	72,278	15,010	140,141	·377	·515	·107
1804 ..	78,743	81,907	18,063	178,713	·411	·458	·101
1805 ..	89,068	81,832	21,665	192,565	·462	·421	·112
1806 ..	83,162	73,008	26,696	182,866	·454	·399	·145
1807 ..	80,619	72,139	27,325	180,083	·447	·400	·151
1808 ..	81,375	71,233	28,310	180,918	·449	·393	·156
1809 ..	88,600	69,942	31,962	185,504	·450	·377	·172
1810 ..	87,810	71,455	29,919	189,214	·461	·377	·158
1811 ..	97,053	73,924	30,167	201,144	·482	·367	·149
1812 ..	101,619	69,353	28,485	199,457	·509	·347	·142
1813 ..	101,765	69,137	28,869	200,071	·508	·347	·144
1814 ..	99,775	66,389	28,274	194,438	·513	·341	·145
1815 ..	129,542	68,704	28,937	227,183	·570	·302	·127
1816 ..	130,935	70,998	28,950	230,883	·567	·307	·125
1817 ..	124,531	72,126	29,533	226,190	·550	·318	·130
1818 ..	136,128	73,517	33,595	243,240	·559	·302	·138
1819 ..	132,316	76,502	36,524	245,372	·539	·311	·148
1820 ..	132,914	88,430	35,951	257,295	·516	·343	·139
1821 ..	128,987	88,718	39,277	256,982	·501	·345	·152
1822 ..	129,239	77,664	38,337	245,240	·526	·316	·156
1823 ..	129,834	71,423	36,475	237,732	·546	·300	·153
1824 ..	136,096	69,446	37,885	243,427	·559	·285	·155
1825 ..	158,612	76,422	41,514	276,548	·573	·276	·150
1826 ..	157,561	83,829	49,755	291,145	·541	·287	·170
1827 ..	144,301	80,017	40,267	273,615	·527	·292	·180
1828 ..	135,810	75,473	47,745	259,028	·521	·291	·183
1829 ..	126,512	72,803	44,103	243,418	·519	·299	·181
1830 ..	112,598	70,730	40,148	223,476	·503	·316	·179

144. Under the head of the three armies may conveniently be arranged the statement of the several witnesses in regard to the expediency or in expediency of uniting the three armies into one ; of placing them under one Commander-in-chief, or retaining them, as at present, under three separate commanders. A few incidental facts will be mentioned in relation to the office of Commander-in-chief, connected with this view of the subject, and also in relation



tion to the commands of divisions and stations, which conveniently follow what is to be stated on the subject of the higher commands of the Indian service.

145. Then will follow the substance of the several dispositions in regard to the expediency or in expediency of equalizing the allowances, both European and Native, and of assimilating the three armies in the important departments of stores and supplies.

*Union of the Three Armies.*

146. As to the question of the uniting the armies of the three Presidencies, several officers have expressed a decided opinion against\* such a measure; and even those who consider it to be at all desirable, express an opinion with considerable qualification.

Reply to Q.  
1111-5, 1161.

147. Sir Theophilus Pritzler, who thinks that the armies "cannot be assimilated too much," remarks that the distances are so great, that he should "doubt the advantage of moving Native corps, particularly from the Madras establishment, where their homes are, and where all their relations reside."

1153.

118. Sir Robert Scot is of opinion that it might be expedient to have the armies consolidated, "so as that while no great sacrifice of the rights and interests of individuals were involved in it, the organization of the whole and of all the departments were assimilated, their duties conducted under the same system of rules and regulations, modified only by local circumstances."

1607.

149. Colonel William Dickson thinks it might be "done under certain regulations, keeping the troops of the different Presidencies within certain limits of their own part of the country."

1952.

150. Colonel Leighton, though he thinks it "would be rather an improvement than otherwise when armies on a large scale are to take the field against an European or powerful enemy," adds "but so far as concerns the internal peace of the country, perhaps it is as well that the three armies should remain as they are."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 197.

151. Sir John Malcolm observes as follows: "I have changed none of my opinions regarding the expediency of making the three armies of India *one*, with three divisions, and, as far as relates to the European officers and troops with their establishments, regulating allowance according to remoteness from supply and price of labour and provisions with as much uniformity of system as practicable."

No. 3, p. 171.

152. In another place he adds, "All my recent experience confirms my conviction of the expediency and wisdom of uniting the armies of the three Presidencies of India into one, on the principles I have suggested."

No. 10, p. 300.

153. Colonel Pennington does not anticipate any advantage from an union of the three armies; and Colonel Sherwood is also decidedly opposed to such a measure.

No. 11, p. 321.  
No. 18, p. 377.

154. Captain Balmain is favourable to an incorporation of the three armies, and so is Major Wilson, who has offered suggestions as to the mode in which the amalgamation might proceed, and stated it as his opinion, that "it would be attended with a considerable reduction of expenditure."

No. 1, p. 259.  
No. 23,  
paras. 169 and 170,  
p. 453.

155. Mr. Elphinstone considers the union of the three armies to be difficult of accomplishment, and not desirable. A similar remark occurs in another of the replies to the Board's circular, with the addition, however, that the systems of the three armies might be assimilated.

*Commander-in-chief.*

156. The opinions of the officers differ considerably upon the question whether the Indian army should be under one Commander-in-chief instead of three, as at present.

157. Sir

157. Sir Jasper Nicolls, Sir Thomas Reynell, Colonel Salmond, and Sir Lionel Smith are decidedly opposed to the measure; and Sir Theophilus Pritzler is as much in favour of it, and Captain Macan is "not prepared to offer any objection" to it.

Reply to Q. 111.  
313, 1919-20-21,  
2336, 1165, 1166,  
2203,  
1010 and 12.

158. Lieutenant-colonel Watson thinks that "the details of so vast an army would render it advisable that the three were kept separate, but with a controlling power given to the one over the others."

159. Sir Robert Scot thinks that the army, consolidated on the principle he suggests, might be "placed under one Commander-in-chief (he himself having no particular charge), with three divisional commanders under him, two of these being invariably taken from the Company's service, and the appointments to these divisions being made in regular rotation."

1153.

also 115, 6-7-8 9.

160. Colonel Dickson thinks that "in many points it would be an advantage, and be desirable;" but that "it should be done under certain regulations, keeping the troops of the different Presidencies within certain limits of their own part of the country."

1607.

161. Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison observes, "it would be desirable for all purposes of general efficiency and control; but there are local duties and peculiar habits connected with the army of each Presidency, which must depend on local information and local authority."

1733.

162. Sir Edward Paget observes, "I am very clearly of opinion that there should be but one Commander-in-chief in India; but at the same time I am equally of opinion that it would never do to leave the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras without an officer high in command, who should have the general superintendence of the particular army of that Presidency. Whether the officers in command of those Presidencies should be, as they are now called, commanders-in-chief, I am by no means clear; but I think that a lieutenant-general commanding the forces in each of those Presidencies, and subject to the power and authority of the chief of all, would be unobjectionable, and perhaps might be attended with advantage."

2296.

163. Colonel Limond is unfavourable to a Governor-general and Commander-in-chief having the patronage of the three armies.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 12, p. 307.

164. Colonel Stannus thinks that there would be a disadvantage of having only one Commander-in-chief, "from the delay which the great distance of head-quarters would occasion both to individuals and the public."

No. 19, p. 345.

165. Lieutenant-colonel Mayne is not favourable to there being a Commander-in-chief for the whole army; and Lieutenant-colonel Baker and Major Justinian Nutt agree with him. Captain Grant Duff is also unfavourable to the army being under one Commander-in-chief; but he thinks that officers of one Presidency might be employed on the general staff of another.

No. 20, p. 387.  
No. 16, p. 311.  
No. 9, p. 290.  
No. 22, p. 100.

166. Sir T. Pritzler, whose opinion has been before referred to, observes as follows, in his reply to the Board's circular: "The greatest possible advantage would in my opinion accrue to the army by having the whole of it under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief. The same system would prevail throughout, and all orders would be much more promptly executed. This arrangement would only require a lieutenant-governor and commander of the forces at each of the three Presidencies. By releasing commanders of the forces from forming a part of the civil Government, they need no longer be tied to the Presidency; but they might reside in the centre of it, and visit every part of it during the period of their command, from which it would derive considerable advantage."

No. 5, p. 268-9.

167. Colonel John Munro, Captain Balmain, and Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland think that the army should be under one Commander-in-chief, and the latter, that they should not be incorporated.

No. 17, p. 336.  
No. 11, p. 321.  
No. 8, p. 241.

168. Sir H. Worsley recommends that there should be a Commander-in-chief for all India, "to exercise a general authority and control, and a provincial Commander-in-chief or commander of the forces at each Presidency, to be filled by the senior officer of the Honourable

No. 15, p. 328.

able Company's service, for conducting the details of the army." He suggests an arrangement for the distribution of the patronage in such a case.

Appendix (B),  
No. 2, p. 166.

169. Colonel Salmond, who is not favourable to there being a Commander-in-chief for all India, thinks that "the Governor-general ought also to be appointed captain-general, so that no obstacle or counteracting authority may impede or mutilate such orders as he may find it necessary to give with a view to military economy."

No. 23,  
paras. 171-2;  
p. 133.  
also reply of  
Lieut.-col. Baker,  
No. 16, p. 350.  
Reply to Q. 1222,  
1223, 1224.

170. In another of the replies, it is observed that the army might be under one Commander-in-chief, with a commander of the forces at each Presidency to conduct the details, two of those appointments being held by Company's officers. The staff for the Commander-in-chief, in such a case, to be selected from among the officers of the three armies.

171. The duty of the Commander-in-chief, as member of the Council at the particular Presidency to which he belongs, is stated to confine him very much to the Presidency, and to prevent his seeing but "very little" of the army under his command. Sir T. Pritzler thinks it desirable that the Commanders-in-chief "should see more of their armies."

No. 14, p. 319.

172. Captain Balmain thinks that the Commander-in-chief is changed too frequently.

No. 18, p. 360.

173. Major Wilson observes, that "the utmost attention should be paid to the selection of officers sent from this country to fill high commands in the Indian army;" and that "the whole army of India may be generalised in its composition, and so rendered fit for the most extended services."

Reply to Q. 2112.

174. The Company's officers have not for many years held the situation of Commander-in-chief. "They have been in temporary command, but not permanently so within the last fifty years."\* On this subject Colonel Leighton remarks as follows: "With reference to what I stated regarding the want of general officers, I beg to mention, that by the Act of Parliament the East-India Company are authorized to name Commanders-in-chief for the different Presidencies, either of His Majesty's or their own service, with the approbation of His Majesty; and that for the last thirty-six years which I have known the army in India, not one of the general officers in their own service has been appointed to the situation. I wish to make no remark upon the subject, further than to say that it is any thing but gratifying to the Company's officers. Many of the Company's officers have accidentally obtained the command, and held it for upwards of twelve months, but without a seat in Council, which they would have had if they had been regularly appointed to the office of Commander-in-chief."

See para. 159 of  
this Synopsis.

175. A suggestion of Sir R. Scot, in regard to the manner in which Company's officers might participate in the command of a particular Presidency, has already been stated in reference to the question of a Commander-in-chief for all India.

### *Commanding Officers of Divisions and Stations.*

Questions  
912-3-4.

176. The staff allowance of a general officer on the staff in command of a division of the army "is fixed at 3,333 rupees per month, or 40,000 rupees per annum, exclusive of pay as colonel of a regiment, viz. 300 rupees per mensem."

900, 976, 1248.

177. The number of these divisional commands is fixed for each Presidency, and they are held by officers of His Majesty's and the Company's service in the following proportions:

**Bengal**

Question 512.

					Held by King's Officers.	Held by Company's Officers.
Bengal	..	..	..	..	2	5
Madras	..	..	..	..	2	3
Bombay	..	..	..	..	1	2
					5	10

178. Sir T. Pritzler is of opinion that none of these commands could be reduced, the divisions under general officers being very large.

1250.

179. It has been suggested by Sir Robert Scot, that the "privilege to officers of a high rank in the Company's army of being eligible to be called upon to serve their country in any part of the world, would tend greatly to diminish the spirit of jealousy between the two services, and elevate the character of the Company's army."

1451.

180. Sir T. Pritzler sees "no objection" to the general officers of the Company being eligible to serve at either of the Presidencies. On this subject Sir T. Reynell states, "It has often occurred to me, that the Company's service, generally, would benefit if, when an officer obtained the rank of major-general, he was considered eligible to serve on the staff of any of the Presidencies." Colonel John Munro entirely concurs in this view, adding, "I consider it desirable to view India as a whole, and that all our armies should be available for service at any one of the Presidencies;" and Sir Edward Paget, when the question was put to him, replied, "I confess, without having given the subject a thought more than since it has now been mentioned, that I could see no possible objection to it; but as it strikes my mind at this moment, that even advantage might result from it."

1183.  
161.

1090.

2317.

181. Lieutenant-colonel Watson considers the following as an objection to the measure: "The three Presidencies have hitherto been so completely separated from each other, that I should consider the officer in the one, being required to do duty in the other, would go there under great disadvantages and entire want of local experience. It would also in that case be necessary to establish one general system of rules, forms, regulations, and interior economy for the three Presidencies."

1006.

182. Sir J. Nicolls thinks "an arrangement very much required, by which commandants of corps, who aim ultimately at a command of a district or division, should spend some part of the intermediate time in the rank of brigadier."

Q. preceding 158.

183. The commands of stations are held by brigadiers; the number of such commands at each Presidency is as follows:

Bengal	..	..	..	14 brigadiers
Madras	..	..	..	12 ditto
Bombay	..	..	..	*9 ditto
				35

512

184. These may be held indifferently by colonels or lieutenant-colonels of His Majesty's and the Company's service: the question whether the officers of the two services enjoy a fair

\* "The aggregate of these commands ordered to be reduced from 9 to 7."

a fair proportion of these commands, is considered under the head of "King's and Company's officers."\*

Lt.-col. Atchison's  
reply to Q. 1785.

185. An annual inspection of regiments is made by the generals and brigadiers, according to the principle of His Majesty's service, when a confidential report is made out on every point connected with efficiency and conduct, and the same returns are prepared as in the King's army, with some additional rules applicable to the country.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 195.

186. Sir John Malcolm is of opinion that, with some exception, the allowances of a brigadier "should include the allowance for commanding a corps."

Appendix (A.),  
No. 42, p. 49.  
No. 61, p. 126.

187. "In the Appendix are Returns showing the number of officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, and of brigades or stations at each Presidency; and of the allowances attached to such commands.

*Equalization of Allowances of the European Commissioned Officers.*

Questions  
753.

188. Orders were issued by the Court of Directors in 1814, for assimilating the allowances of the European commissioned officers, which were not carried into effect in respect to Madras and Bombay until 1824, nor at Bengal before 1828.

662, 772-3, 236.

189. The principle on which this equalization proceeded, was to adopt 2s. 6d. as the standard for converting the allowances of the officers into Indian currency at all the Presidencies; to restrict the officers of European corps to half tentage when not in the field or at field stations; to reduce certain stations in the Lower Provinces of Bengal from full to half batta, giving to the Bengal officers at those stations an allowance denominated house-rent, which was made generally applicable to officers at all Presidencies, when not in receipt of full batta or provided with quarters.† The effect of the order in respect to the subordinate Presidencies was, to give an increase to the peace allowances of the officers, and to reduce the amount of what they had previously received when in the field. At Bengal, the order operated to diminish the allowances of the officers serving at the stations in the Lower Provinces, by reducing them from full to half batta with house-rent.

57.

190. The effect of the order in respect to the rank of lieutenant of the Bombay establishment, is illustrated in detail in the subjoined extract from Sir J. Malcolm's evidence. "In the rank of lieutenant, the original pay and allowances were as follow: monthly pay, sixty rupees; half batta, sixty-two; gratuity, twenty-four; house-rent, twenty-five; total, 171 rupees per mensem. Subsequently, tent allowance of fifty rupees was substituted for house-rent; the total was 196 rupees. Lastly, house-rent was added of rupees thirty; the present amount, 226 rupees; so that the increase of batta in the field of sixty rupees, makes the whole amount 286 rupees per mensem; but the house-rent, thirty rupees, has been struck off, which leaves the lieutenant with 256 rupees per mensem, about £22 a-month. But a lieutenant taking the field now only receives an increase of rupees thirty, because his pay and allowances have been increased from 171 to 226."

191. At the Madras Presidency, where the allowances of the officers had been converted into Indian currency at a more favourable rate of exchange than 2s. 6d. the rupee, the effect of the order was to occasion a proportionate reduction in the field allowances, which however was more than compensated to them by the new allowance of house-rent, which they received in garrison or cantonment, when not on full batta or provided with quarters.

192. The general result then of the order is this, that the officers of the three Presidencies receive the same number of rupees in respect to the corresponding parts of their respective allowances, but a larger number of officers of the Bengal establishment are in receipt of full batta than those of the subordinate Presidencies,‡ in proportion to their respective numbers; but the officers of the several Presidencies, when they engage together in

\* See para. 123 of this Synopsis.

† See a table of the regimental allowances of the European commissioned officers, Appendix (A.), No. 60, p. 111.

‡ See Questions 89, 321, and 325, in respect to Bengal; and 702, 704-5, and 998, in respect to Madras and Bombay.

in field operations, receive the same number of rupees, though in the coinage of their respective Presidencies, or the equivalent value in other rupees. The evidence of Sir Robert Scot is intended to show that the equalization thus attempted is more apparent than real, but the extract is too long for insertion in this place. Sir H. Worsley has suggested a mode in which, in his opinion, an uniform coinage might be established.

193. The order has been the occasion of very great dissatisfaction to Bengal officers.\* It is objected to as unequal in its operation;† it bearing “unequally upon the artillery,” (as Sir J. Nicolls observes) “whose head-quarters are at Dum Dum, and not at all upon the cavalry,” who never go to any of the half batta stations, which stations are besides represented by Sir Jasper Nicolls to be more expensive, and to be also subjected to a deduction in the conversion of the sonat into the sicca rupee; but Colonel Salmond does not concur in the opinion that the half batta stations are more expensive than the distant field stations.

194. Bengal officers since 1801 were generally in receipt of full batta, until by the General Order of November 1828, those serving at certain specified stations in the Lower Provinces of Bengal were reduced to half batta, with house-rent. Colonel Salmond states that the practice of equal allowance in peace and war was in 1801 introduced, it having been “found upon calculation that it would be a saving to Government to allow the officers full batta in all the cantonments rather than keep them on half batta, the Government supplying the barracks.” When full batta was introduced generally into the Bengal service, double full batta, an “extraordinary batta given by the Nabob of Oude, to such troops as crossed the British frontier,” was abolished. Sir Jasper Nicolls states that there are few officers “in the service now who ever received” this allowance.‡

195. The stations at which the half batta order has taken effect are “Dum Dum (the head-quarters of the artillery), Barrackpore, Berhampore, Dinapore, and Ghazipoor.” The soldiers are not affected by this order. Lieutenant-colonel Feilding is not aware that the officers were compensated with any pecuniary advantages in another form for the reduction of their allowances; but he admits that some preceding “arrangements may have been beneficial to the army;” and he estimates the saving by the half batta reduction at “about £12,000 a-year.” Other officers, however, are of a different opinion, and they have accordingly enumerated several advantages which were conferred upon the service, in connection with the order which directed the reduction of the Bengal batta stations.§

196. The number of corps in full and half batta respectively at the different Presidencies are thus described by the witnesses. The Bengal corps are stated by Sir Jasper Nicolls to be “five regiments of European infantry on half batta, four on full batta; nine regiments of Native infantry on half batta, and sixty-three on full batta.” Sir Thomas Reynell estimates them at one-eighth on half, and the rest on full batta. The proportion is not specifically stated in respect to the Madras army; but it appears by the subjoined extract from Lieutenant-colonel Watson’s evidence, that the number of half batta stations at Madras, in proportion to the rest of the army, is much larger than at Bengal. There are “many half batta stations on the Madras establishment, and very few in Bengal; hence arises, I believe, a real inferiority of allowances to the Madras officers in comparison with those of Bengal.” Sir J. Malcolm states, “that the whole of the corps of the Bombay establishment, European and Native, who are on full batta, amount only to five corps out of an establishment of thirty-eight.”

197. It is stated by some of the witnesses|| that the expense of living is generally greater at

Question  
1151.  
Appendix (B.),  
No. 15, p. 331.

Question  
90.

122.

529 and 530.  
531.

51 and 55.  
56.

48, 72, 291, 520 1.

777 and 778.  
782.  
763 to 770.

781.

89.

321.

998.

701, 702.

\* See Sir T. Reynell’s reply to Q. 300; Col. Salmond’s, 536.

† See Q. 49, 99, and Lieut.-col. Watson’s reply to Q. 779 and 780.

‡ See evidence of Sir E. Paget, in regard to a deduction from the rupee, in which officers and soldiers serving at the present half batta stations of Bengal are paid. Q. 2229 and 2301.

§ See Sir J. Nicolls’s reply to Q. 60; Col. Salmond’s, 538; Sir J. Malcolm’s, 663.

|| See Sir T. Pritzler’s reply to Q. 1149; Lieut.-col. Aitchison’s, 1729; Sir J. Nicolls’s, 92.

at Madras and Bombay than at Bengal; but it appears that the Bengal officers "live in greater comfort than at Madras;"\* though this fact is called in question by one of the witnesses,† who adds, that the advantages of the Bengal officers "are counterbalanced by many disadvantages, such as climate, unavoidable expense of living," &c.

Question 51. 198. In regard to the adequacy or inadequacy of the existing allowances, the witnesses depose as follows: Sir J. Nicolls thinks that in Bengal they are "sufficient;" and that when he was at Madras "he did not hear any public or frequent expression of any opinion to the contrary." Sir Thomas Reynell thinks the Bengal allowances "sufficient, but not more than sufficient." Colonel Salmond, in speaking of the allowances of the three Presidencies, observes, "I thought them sufficient in my time, and I have no reason to think they are otherwise now." Lieutenant-colonel Feilding states, "that few officers could save out of mere regimental pay before they attained the rank of Major." Sir T. Pritzler states that the allowances are "certainly" "sufficient," but "only just so."‡ Colonel John Munro concurs in this opinion, and adds, "I do not think there would be any advantage in increasing the pay and allowances of the lower rank of officers; the object is to increase the emoluments of the higher, to hold out hopes and expectations to the lower rank of officers on obtaining higher rank." Sir Charles Dalbiac states his belief, "that the pay of the ensign and lieutenant in the Company's service is the very smallest upon which an officer can possibly maintain himself." Sir Lionel Smith says that he considers the subaltern in India worse off than in any other country. "I have served," he says, "all over the world, in America, in the West Indies, and in almost every other quarter. The European troops of the Company and of the King are precisely in the same situation; the subalterns of the Native troops have a little advantage, but their pay requires to be raised. I think they are very badly off. I commanded a regiment there many years. I was a great economist with my regiment. I had no fine lace or nonsensical dress; and in calculating a pint of wine three times a week, and getting the assistance of the Company's stores, to have their uniforms provided thirty or forty per cent. cheaper than they could buy them at the shops, I brought each subaltern fifteen rupees a month in debt. My regiment was constantly employed and got full batta, or the subalterns could not have kept out of debt. There is no other rank in India in which officers have not the means of making themselves comfortable, but the subaltern is very badly off."

93, 94 and 95. 199. Sir Jasper Nicolls has enumerated what were considered to be the indispensable expenses of subalterns at the Meerut station, but he stated that he thought some of those estimates "extravagant and overrated." Sir T. Pritzler states, that "the officers in the Madras army are exposed only to the expense of their mess; all the officers in India must keep a horse to enable them to do their duty; beyond that, I am not aware that their expenses are much greater than in any other foreign station, except for servants."

Appendix (B.), No. 15, p. 325. 200. Sir H. Worsley observes, in reference to the half batta order, "that an overstrained attention to economy on occasions which call for favorable consideration, is too likely to operate injudiciously on the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing the army."

Question 97. 328. 201. In reply to a question whether subalterns in receipt of higher allowances are in the habit of laying by either for the European furlough or for retirement? Sir Jasper Nicolls states, "I do not think they are; in general they are in debt;" and Sir T. Reynell—"I should think the instances of those who do not live up to the actual allowance when on full as well as on half batta with house-rent, are very rare." Sir Thomas Reynell thinks that the habits of expense of the Bengal officers are not so much so as formerly.

202. The Bengal officers being generally in receipt of the same allowances in peace as in war,

\* See Sir J. Nicolls's reply to Q. 52 and 91; Col. Salmond's, 527.

† See Sir T. Reynell's reply to Q. 295, 301, 323, 324.

‡ See also Appendix (B.), No. 5, p. 266.

war, with the exception which has been stated, and the expenses being necessarily greater in the field than in garrison or cantonment, a question arose whether, when called upon actual service, they were equally prepared to meet the additional expenses of field operations, without that increase to their existing allowances, which officers who are generally in receipt of half batta obtain. Sir Jasper Nicolls states as follows: "I have never had experience of a half batta station; I never saw any corps move from a half batta station, therefore I am unequal to answer that question; but the calls upon the officers of the Native army are so frequent, that they are in general extremely well prepared for such contingencies."

Sir J. Nicolls' reply to Q. 53.

Question 73.

203. He observes in another place: "The officers of the Native army should be at all times prepared to move, therefore I would prefer a regular monthly allowance to an addition made upon the spur of the occasion."

75.

204. Sir Thomas Reynell observes, that in his opinion the practice of equal allowance in peace and war has not produced "a bad effect on the spirit and efficiency of the army."

299 and 327.

205. Sir Jasper Nicolls states, that he does "not know of any service (besides Bengal) in which there is not a difference made between the allowances granted to officers when called upon for service, and when stationary in quarters." Upon being asked the question, "Could a medium allowance be advantageously commuted, taking from one and adding to the other?" he replied, "No doubt it would be of advantage to the State, but it would be a serious injury inflicted on Bengal, as it must be taken from Bengal and added to the others, which are inferior." Sir Thomas Reynell is of opinion, that a change establishing different rates in cantonment and the field would be "beneficial inasmuch as that the expense in the field is so much greater from various contingencies." Sir T. Pritzler remarks, "I think it is very desirable to have a different rate of allowance in the field, because officers are exposed to greater expenses for the carriage of their tents and baggage; if that was given them when in quarters as a consolidated allowance, they would spend it, and would not have the means of providing what was required in the field." Colonel John Munro concurs in this view, and for a similar reason. Colonel Salmond thinks that the batta allowance could not with advantage be assimilated, by adding to the one and deducting from the other, "because the expenses are greater in the field and at the outposts, than they are at the large fixed stations on the banks of the Ganges;" and adds, that "it is both just and expedient that there should be a difference between the allowance in cantonments and in the field."

71.

98.

296 and 330.

1150.

1050.  
523, 521.

528.

206. Sir John Malcolm thinks it "desirable that an officer should have an increase when marching, or actually in the field, because his expenses must be increased, and if he is always on field allowances, he will soon acquire habits of living which will, on extraordinary expense occurring, be certain to involve him in difficulties and embarrassments. The officer particularly of a Native corps can live very well when on half batta, if he is frugal." Junior officers should endeavour to habituate themselves "to privations, and to look forward with hope, instead of dwelling on the enjoyment of ease and comfort in their actual condition."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 193.

207. Mr. Elphinstone remarks, that "the allowances of young officers should be fully sufficient to maintain them in comfort without their being involved in debt," and that more is not desirable.

No. 4, 1. 257.

208. The disadvantage of equal allowances in peace and war, is also adverted to in another of the replies to the Board's circular.

App. (B.), No. 23,  
para. 116 to 118.

209. In regard to the mode in which the allowances of the three armies might be equalized, Colonel John Munro observes as follows: "I should recommend a new arrangement altogether, by which the allowances in war should be made higher than those in peace." In answer to the question, whether such an arrangement could be made with expediency, he replies, "I should think so; it has been in contemplation, and calculations have been made, I believe, by the Board with regard to the probable expense of it. In peace, perhaps Bengal officers

Questions  
1092, 1093, 1091.



officers might receive less than they do at present; but they would receive proportionably more in the field."

50.

281 and 353.  
1116 and 1117.  
96 and 660, 1091.  
509, 1403.

210. On the subject of equalization generally, Sir Jasper Nicolls states, "that originally it ought to have been so, but such a long period having elapsed without it having been done, it is a very questionable thing at this time." Sir Thomas Reynell, Sir T. Pritzler, Sir John Malcolm, and Colonel John Munro, are in favour of equalization; and Colonel Salmond is of opinion that equalization "would be desirable, if it could be done without a very great expense." Sir R. Scot thinks that "it would be a point of very great difficulty to accomplish it with justice and satisfaction to the parties."

2130-1.

211. The different rates of allowance at the different Presidencies are not considered by Mr. Melvill as opposing any serious obstacle in the way of keeping accounts.

707.

1171.

77.

212. It has been stated that one feature of the equalization directed in 1814, in respect to Madras and Bombay, was to place the officers of European corps on half-tent allowance when in cantonment or not serving at a field station, while the officers serving with Native corps were left in the receipt of full tentage. Sir John Malcolm states that this order has "operated severely upon officers of European corps, King's and Company's, who are in the half-batta stations." Sir T. Pritzler assigns the following reason for the difference: "The officers of the Native corps are constantly employed in treasure escorts and those sort of detached duties, which the officers of European regiments are not, and therefore they have always granted to them full tent allowance." Sir Jasper Nicolls appears to concur in this view.

79.

101.

80.

213. It would appear that officers of European corps, even when entitled to full tent allowance, are not generally provided with the requisite camp equipage to take the field.\* Sir Jasper Nicolls explains that "the officers of his Majesty's service in general keep up their tents, but not their carriage, which is the expensive part of the equipment, always relying upon having sufficient time to send to a distance for the animals they may require. The European officers of Native regiments are always fully prepared with both; the officers of the European service and the artillery do not in general keep up their portion of conveyance. They can provide themselves in the north-west provinces at a short notice, but it is not so in the Lower Provinces."

78,100,331 &amp; 332.

214. It does not appear that there is any inspection of the tents of officers in receipt even of full tent allowance.

708.

1965.

215. Sir J. Malcolm is of opinion that officers of European corps on half-tentage should every two years receive a certain specified sum "to provide a tent which should be regularly mustered." Colonel Leighton thinks an "allowance given monthly for keeping up camp equipage, a better plan than to supply officers with tents from the stores, or to grant money to purchase them, when ordered to take the field, as formerly."

Sir J. Nicolls' reply  
to Q. 131.

Question 152;  
also reply of Sir T.  
Reynell to Q. 361  
to 366.

216. There is a difference in the system of the three armies, in regard to the repairs of arms and accoutrements. "In Bengal, officers commanding troops and companies receive fifty rupees a-month, which has latterly been divided thus: twenty rupees for the actual repair of the arms, and thirty for the command of the company or troop. At Madras they receive much less, a public establishment being kept up by the Government for the repair of arms." Sir J. Nicolls thinks that "the arms in use by the corps of Madras were in better order generally than those at Bengal." The officers of the three Presidencies each receive the allowance of thirty rupees per month for the command of a troop or company.

#### *Allowances of European Troops.*

919.  
30.

217. Lieut.-colonel Watson states that he believes the European troops receive the same amount of pay and allowances throughout India. Sir Jasper Nicolls is not "aware" that there is any difference.

218. There

\* See reply of Sir J. Nicolls to Q. 76; Sir T. Reynell, 331; Col. Leighton, 1965.

218. There is, however, a difference in the Table in Appendix (A.), No. 61, which is accounted for in the subjoined Note.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 61, p. 118.

*Equalization of Allowances in respect to Native Troops.*

219. A comparative Statement\* of the existing allowances to the Native troops of the three Presidencies, both when in garrison and in the field, is given by Mr. Melvill, in answer to one of the questions proposed to him. Some of the other witnesses† have also stated particulars in regard to the amount of pay to the Native troops of the Presidency to which they belong, which in a great degree are superseded by the very comprehensive and useful Table produced by Mr. Melvill; but their replies may be conveniently consulted as stating, in some instances, the items of allowance, of which only the aggregate is given in Mr. Melvill's table.

220. It will be seen the Madras and Bombay sepoy receives more than at Bengal. Lieutenant-colonel Watson thinks that this difference "must have arisen out of local circumstances, at the time when the sepoys were first employed by the Governments of the three Presidencies respectively." The following is the explanation afforded by Colonel John Munro on this subject: "Just before the conquest of Mysore there was very great difficulty found in procuring recruits and in maintaining the battalions of the Madras army in a complete state; the desertions were very frequent. This was the cause that induced the Madras Government, with the sanction of the Court of Directors, to increase the pay of the Native troops at Madras from five rupees to seven rupees a month; an increase, however, which did not take place until 1800, after the conquest of Mysore; and this has produced a difference between the pay of Madras and Bengal sepoys which exists to the present moment. I understand that the Madras rates of pay were afterwards adopted at Bombay."

Question  
950.

1031-35.

1012.

221. Colonel Greenhill is of opinion that the difference in favour of the subordinate Presidencies may be attributed to the circumstance of Bengal being a much cheaper country; and Sir Robert Scot states the following to be the result of his consideration on the subject. "My attention has been at different times directed to that point, and as far as I now recollect, I thought some years ago the troops serving in the territories under the Bombay establishment were more pinched than those under Madras, and the Madras troops, though a little higher paid in some ranks, considerably more than those in Bengal, where provisions generally, as well as most other things, were cheaper."

1518-19.

1106.

222. The following is the testimony of the several witnesses in regard to the allowances of the native troops as compared with the price of labour. Sir Jasper Nicolls states: "The lowest servant of any officer gets four rupees, some as high as twenty, so that in fact (the pay) is very low compared with servants; but then there are advantages of clothing, medical attendance and promotion, pensions for themselves and their widows." Compared with the price of labour, he states "it to be rather to the advantage of the soldier." Sir Thomas Reynell thinks the advantage in favour of the soldier to be "as four to seven." He adds, "I should think the sepoy has nearly double what the lowest workman or common labourer has." Colonel Salmond concurs in this opinion. Lieut.-colonel Feilding's description is, that the pay, as compared with labour, "is very considerably superior." Sir T. Pritzler, speaking of the Madras sepoy, says, that the pay is "certainly high compared with the price of labour." Colonel John Munro, that the "Native soldiers certainly are in a better condition than the same description of persons out of the service, especially since the subversion of the Nabob's government."

17.

275-6-7-8.

131.

503-1.

753.

1132.

1033 and 1010.

223. Lieut-colonel Baker remarks, that the havildars and naiks are paid too high in proportion

Appendix (B.),  
No. 16, pp. 338  
and 319.

\* See Q. 2091, and also a Table in Appendix (A.), No. 62, p. 117.

† BENGAL.—See Sir J. Nicolls's reply to Q. 16; Lieut.-col. Watson's, 985-6; Colonel Salmond's 501-2 (for the three Presidencies.)

MADRAS.—Col. Salmond's Reply to Q. 502; Col. John Munro's, 1031; Col. Greenhill's, 1517.

BOMBAY.—Lieut.-col. Aitchison's reply to Q. 1752; Sir J. Malcolm's, 703.

proportion to the men, or the men too low in respect to the non-commissioned officers. He thinks that two rupees should be allowed to the sepoys for hutting-money.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 15, p. 325.

224. Sir H. Worsley states that the pay of the Native troops remains the same as when the army was first formed, "although the necessaries of food and raiment have risen from 50 to 100 per cent."

No. 18, p. 376.

225. Major Wilson remarks, that "the batta allowance in the field of the men of the Bombay Native infantry is superior to that of Bengal by one rupee per month,"

Questions  
28 and 29.

226. Besides the difference in respect to pay and allowances, there are other advantages attaching to the Madras and Bombay sepoy, as compared with Bengal, which are enumerated in detail by Sir Jasper Nicolls, in reply to questions that were proposed to him. The passage is of considerable length and of particular importance, but it is too long for insertion, and may be conveniently referred to.

951, also 952.

227. The remedy which has hitherto been applied to obviate the difficulty of troops employed on the same service being in receipt of different allowances, is thus described by Lieut.-colonel Watson: "I remember an order so far back as 1790, of Lord Cornwallis's, directing, that wherever the troops of the several Presidencies happened to meet on service, the higher rates should be established while they were acting together. On those occasions the Bengal troops received the difference between their pay and the pay in the other two Presidencies." He further states as follows: "There is a circumstance which I have some recollection of, that during the Burmese war, a detachment from Madras arrived in aid of the Bengal detachment at Arracan; there were two battalions of Madras Native infantry under Colonel Fair. I remember Colonel Morrison, who commanded that force, writing, stating that there were certain advantages enjoyed by those two battalions which were not allowed to the Bengal corps; and that he was apprehensive of evil consequences arising, when the men in the Bengal service observed the superior allowances or advantages which the others enjoyed. At first it was proposed that those allowances, whatever they might be, should be kept in the back ground, and that the Madras battalions should be settled with on their return to their own Presidency. However, the impolicy of that was so immediately apparent that the idea was dropped directly. I am speaking now from recollection, being at that time deputy-adjutant-general at head-quarters."

956.

957.

228. "Do you remember what was done?—No, I do not exactly recollect, but I have no doubt they were equalized for the time."

958.

229. "If Lord Cornwallis's order, to which you formerly alluded, had been in force at that time, would not that have obviated the difficulty to which you now allude?—It certainly would with regard to pay; but it occurs to me that this was a question of batta or rations. Arracan being on the Bengal side of India, was, with regard to the Madras troops, a sort of foreign service beyond sea, entitling them to receive daily rations at the expense of Government; but with regard to the Bengal troops, it was a service upon their own immediate frontier, in which situation they are not entitled to rations from the State."

Question 506;  
also his reply to the  
Board's Circular,  
Appendix (B.),  
No. 2, p. 157.

230. The following extracts contain the questions which were put to Colonel Salmond on this subject, together with his replies. "Is there any difference in the pay and allowance of the sepoy, and is it a matter of complaint or discontent?—I have not heard of any discontents, except for a short period, when the Bengal sepoys have perhaps met in conjoint service with troops of another Presidency, which lasted no longer than the matter could be made known to the Government, and was then rectified in their being all equalized."

507.

231. "From the situation you now hold, you must be perfectly competent to answer the foregoing questions?—I should consider so; I am answering them from documents that I have had an opportunity of seeing."

508.

232. "All documents regarding the army come before you, do they not?—Certainly."

509.

233. "Should you think it important to equalize the rate of pay and allowance in each of the three Presidencies?—Yes, if it could be done without a very great expense. They were

were ordered to be equalized by the Court of Directors several years ago, as far as was practicable. The Bengal Government in reply say they are equalized as far as it is thought prudent or necessary. When they meet on service they are always put on the same footing; at other times it is not thought necessary to equalize them more than they are at present."

234. In regard to equalizing the allowances and advantages of the Native troops, Sir Jasper Nicolls observes as follows: "It would appear a measure of justice, but I doubt the practicability and safety of reducing each to the lowest level." Why?—"I think that either of the armies would be most reluctant to relinquish those advantages which I have mentioned. Of course the Bengal army would be very happy to have them extended to them." Lieutenant-colonel Watson is of opinion that equalization would be "absolutely necessary" if the troops of the three Presidencies were liable to be brought together; but "while separate (he remarks), I see no reason for it."

Question 31  
32.

951.

255.

235. "Are they often brought near together without acting together?—Very seldom; there are only two or three instances to my knowledge during a period of thirty years."

236. "Are you able to point out any practicable mode of equalizing the pay and allowances?—It would be a very great expense to Government to raise the pay in Bengal to the others, and it would be equally impolitic and impracticable to reduce the others, they having been in the enjoyment thereof for more than sixty years. I do not see how it can be done."

956.

237. The following are the opinions delivered by different witnesses on the propriety or impropriety of effecting this equalization, by beginning with a lower rate of pay in regard to future enlistments, and making an addition to the pay of the older sepoy in proportion to his length of service:—Sir Jasper Nicolls observes, "I think it might be an advantage to do so; and the increased rate received by the senior sepoys would in some degree qualify their disappointment when they were not promoted; I think it very necessary, even now, upon that ground." Colonel Salmond concurs in this view, excepting that he would not lower the "commencing rate of pay," which, in his opinion, "would be objectionable." Colonel John Munro agrees in opinion that it would be inexpedient, and even dangerous, to lower the commencing pay of the sepoy; "but if a small increase were given after a considerable period of service, he thinks it might be advantageous."

196.

432 3, 1888-9.

1071-2.

238. Sir R. Scot observes, that increasing the pay "would no doubt be a means of furthering the attachment of the troops, and so far advisable; but I do not see that it would assimilate rates that are now different, whether absolutely or relatively; but I would not have it inferred that I consider the pay of the subordinate ranks insufficient." Colonel Leighton thinks it "would be a very excellent regulation, if the finances of the Government would admit of it;" but he states, that the sepoys "cannot do with less pay." Captain Macan regards the measure as "desirable;" adding, "any thing that can hold out a hope to the sepoys of gradually bettering their situation, must have a good effect."

1105, also 1103-4.

1972.

1973.

2221.

239. Colonel Salmond states, that the measure of increasing the pay of the older sepoys "has been recommended to the Court by the Indian Governments, but it has not hitherto been sanctioned. It was proposed to give them an additional rupee after a certain number of years' service, fifteen years, I think. It was recommended strongly by Lord Combermere, and favourably received by the Bengal Government, but not acted on by the Court from financial reasons."

1890, also 1891-2.

240. Sir John Malcolm states that, in his opinion, "prospectively a modification might be made that would be beneficial to Government, and not unsatisfactory to the troops, by giving less to the younger sepoy, and more to the older."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 202.

241. Sir H. Worsley recommends that, after a service of ten or twelve years, the pay of the sepoy should be increased a rupee per month.

No. 15, p. 332.

242. The advantage of allowing the pay of the sepoy to increase in proportion to his length of service, is also noticed in another of the replies to the Board's circular.

No. 23, para. 150.

243. Sir H. Worsley also recommends that "on all occasions of foreign war, when troops

No. 15, p. 325.

pass the boundary of the Honourable Company's territories, or those of allied or protected states, one rupee per man per month should be added to the batta of the private soldier, and in proportion to the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officer." This extra sum to be termed "marching allowance."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 23, para. 150.

244. A similar arrangement is also suggested in another of the replies.

*Assimilation in respect to Stores and Supplies.*

245. UNDER the existing system there are material differences: each Presidency has its own pattern for the tent supplied to the troops; the gun-carriages differ materially; and when corps meet on service, each has a separate establishment for the management of the stores, "nothing being given from the one to the other but as a private loan."\*

Question 1930. 246. Sir Robert Scot, however, states that "the general equipments of the army in the three Presidencies varied very much until of late years, when there has been a desire to assimilate them in all things."† And Colonel Leighton, in confirmation of this view, states that "there is not much difference" in the military stores of the three Presidencies, "as far as his experience goes. Models of gun-carriages, store-carts, &c. were forwarded from Bombay to Calcutta a few years ago, with a view to assimilation; brass cannon are cast at Calcutta for the use of the artillery at the different Presidencies." Colonel Hopkinson states that "all the guns are precisely the same, so that the ammunition of one would necessarily fit, and could be used for the other;" and he is therefore of opinion that it is not a disadvantage to have "not only officers providing stores for each of the Presidencies, but" (separate) "civil establishments controlling the expenditure of those stores."

1370. 247. The manner in which the inconvenience of an officer of one Presidency having no stores, or powder or shot of his own, and an officer of another Presidency having more than his complement, would, in practice, be thus obviated, according to Colonel Hopkinson: 1371. "The commanding officer of artillery would at once give an order for making any arrangement the service might require." He adds, "I have done so myself in some cases; we were also always ready to supply the navy, both King's and Company's," in the Ava service. 1365. He rather regards the existing differences as an advantage, from its being productive of "emulation."

241 & 220. 248. Sir Jasper Nicolls is of opinion "that when troops meet on service, it would be found of very great advantage to have all their establishments similar;" though he gives a somewhat qualified opinion in regard to the advantage of having the tents "of an uniform description throughout the three Presidencies."

218-19. 249. Sir Thomas Reynell, however, thinks that uniformity in respect to tents would be 450-7. "advantageous."

825. 250. Colonel Pennington is in favour of an assimilation of "the Store department in all its branches;" and he states the following as the result of his observation of the inconveniences which have hitherto been experienced: "Any accident happening to the wheel of 826. a gun, you cannot replace it, for their axletrees and wheels and every thing were made casually, and mere matter of chance; there was no system throughout the whole army; every magazine was different; two six-pounders moving side by side, the material of one 827-8. could not supply the other." This observation is stated, however, to relate only to the Presidency of Bengal.

937. 251. Lieutenant-colonel Watson is in favour of an assimilation "in every respect, of guns, shot, carriages, and every description of ordnance stores." And Sir Lionel Smith, though he

\* See Sir J. Nicolls's reply to Q. 216-17; Col. Hopkinson's to Q. 1364, and 1367-8; and Sir Robert Scot's to Q. 1418.

† See Sir Robert Scot's reply to Q. 1418-19.

he has no means of speaking positively as to the fact of assimilation, says, "I conclude it as a common arrangement that they should be."

252. Major Justinian Nutt dwells on the importance of rendering the depôts of one Presidency available for corps of another Presidency.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 9, p. 288.

253. Major Wilson remarks, "Were the armies under one head, the depôts for stores, might be so arranged as to have the supplies sent to them from the nearest arsenal on the sea-coast, or elsewhere, which would occasion a most material reduction of expenditure."

No. 18, p. 377.

254. Sir William Keir Grant is of opinion that the Ordnance department should be consolidated.

No. 6, p. 272.

255. Major Wilson also recommends that followers should be reduced to the lowest possible numbers, and the camp equipage to the lowest possible scale.

No. 18, p. 468.

256. One of the Returns in the Appendix contains "a list of articles of clothing or equipment, and also the means of carriage or other accommodation supplied to the soldiers at each Presidency."

Appendix (A.),  
No. 67, p. 372.

257. Captain Balmain is of opinion that the armies of the three Presidencies have been unequally augmented, and the officers of one Presidency not so much benefited in their promotion as those of another. To remedy this inconvenience, it is suggested that future augmentations and reductions of establishment should be proportional from each army.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 14, p. 317.  
No. 23,  
p. 433, para. 173.

### *European and Native Troops.*

258. THE number of European and Native troops which have been maintained in India, in each year from 1793 to 1830, and the proportions which they have respectively borne to each other, appear to be as follows:

Appendix (A.),  
No. 1.

			EUROPEANS.	NATIVES.	RELATIVE PROPORTION.		
1793 .. ..	18,768	69,661	1 European to .. ..	3,711 Natives.			
1794 .. ..	18,392	70,597	1 ditto .. ..	3,838 —			
1795 .. ..	16,872	72,852	1 ditto .. ..	4,317 —			
1796 .. ..	17,956	84,232	1 ditto .. ..	4,691 —			
1797 .. ..	23,933	85,068	1 ditto .. ..	3,554 —			
1798 .. ..	22,166	91,147	1 ditto .. ..	4,112 —			
1799 .. ..	23,947	105,542	1 ditto .. ..	4,406 —			
1800 .. ..	22,832	115,300	1 ditto .. ..	5,049 —			
1801 .. ..	23,012	132,864	1 ditto .. ..	5,773 —			
1802 .. ..	24,341	122,506	1 ditto .. ..	5,032 —			
1803 .. ..	24,930	115,211	1 ditto .. ..	5,022 —			
1804 .. ..	23,042	155,671	1 ditto .. ..	6,755 —			
1805 .. ..	24,891	167,674	1 ditto .. ..	6,736 —			
1806 .. ..	26,445	156,421	1 ditto .. ..	5,914 —			
1807 .. ..	26,460	153,623	1 ditto .. ..	6,280 —			
1808 .. ..	29,798	151,120	1 ditto .. ..	5,071 —			
1809 .. ..	31,387	154,117	1 ditto .. ..	4,910 —			
1810 .. ..	31,952	157,262	1 ditto .. ..	4,921 —			
1811 .. ..	34,479	166,665	1 ditto .. ..	4,833 —			
1812 .. ..	38,835	165,622	1 ditto .. ..	4,264 —			
1813 .. ..	34,171	165,900	1 ditto .. ..	4,854 —			
1814 .. ..	31,657	162,787	1 ditto .. ..	5,143 —			
1815 .. ..	31,611	195,572	1 ditto .. ..	6,186 —			
1816 .. ..	32,399	198,484	1 ditto .. ..	6,126 —			
1817 .. ..	31,056	195,134	1 ditto .. ..	6,283 —			

(continued.)

(continued)				EUROPEANS.	NATIVES.	RELATIVE PROPORTION.			
1818	..	..	..	32,161	211,079	1	European to	..	6,563 Natives.
1819	..	..	..	29,494	215,878	1	ditto	..	7,319 —
1820	..	..	..	28,645	228,650	1	ditto	..	7,982 —
1821	..	..	..	28,914	228,068	1	ditto	..	7,880 —
1822	..	..	..	29,065	216,175	1	ditto	..	7,436 —
1823	..	..	..	30,933	206,799	1	ditto	..	6,685 —
1824	..	..	..	30,585	212,842	1	ditto	..	6,959 —
1825	..	..	..	30,423	216,125	1	ditto	..	8,090 —
1826	..	..	..	30,872	260,273	1	ditto	..	8,430 —
1827	..	..	..	32,673	240,942	1	ditto	..	7,374 —
1828	..	..	..	34,557	224,471	1	ditto	..	6,499 —
1829	..	..	..	35,786	207,662	1	ditto	..	5,800 —
1830	..	..	..	36,409	187,067	1	ditto	..	5,110 —

259. The European and Native troops will be compared in respect to numbers, or the proportions which they have borne, or should bear, relatively to each other; also in respect to expense, to efficiency, to health, and to the nature of the accommodation respectively provided for them.

260. The number of European and Native troops maintained in India in each year from 1793 to the present time, are exhibited in the Return, Appendix (A.), No. 1, and more particularly in the preceding Table, in which their relative proportions are particularly stated.

Question  
927.  
  
1258.  
  
1259.  
1260, 1110;  
also Col. J. Munro's  
reply to the  
Board's Circular,  
Appendix (B.),  
No. 17, p. 351.  
Question  
1145.  
1146.  
2278.

261. Lieutenant-colonel Watson is of opinion that, "in ordinary cases, for every eight battalions of Native infantry, there should be one strong regiment of Europeans; but in taking the field a much higher proportion would be desirable, say one to every six at least." Sir T. Pritzler is of opinion that the proportion "must depend very much on circumstances and situation." As an army in the field, he is decidedly of opinion that every brigade of cavalry ought to have two squadrons of European cavalry with it to render it efficient," or about "one-fourth." Colonel John Munro remarks, in reference to this question, "I should say about one-third of Europeans; that was the proportion long observed at Madras; indeed we had sometimes rather more, now we have considerably less. I once conversed with Sir Thomas Munro on that point, and he expressed his opinion very decidedly that there should be that proportion." Sir Robert Scot would fix the proportion at "one-tenth" of the number of troops maintained; at "one-sixth" when they take the field. Mr. Mackenzie observes, "I consider that a large Native army is quite essential for maintaining the tranquillity of the country; but I should be very sorry to see its defence and obedience trusted to them without also a large European force. The vast extent of the country seems to render a large Native army indispensable."

1631, 1631.  
  
1632 and 1633.  
  
2022.

262. Colonel Dickson is of opinion "that the cavalry require a smaller proportion of Europeans than the infantry, but they ought to be in the proportion of a regiment of dragoons to four or five regiments of Native cavalry; a fourth or a fifth when on service." The reason he gives in support of this opinion is, that a cavalry "soldier is a superior and higher-spirited man, and, when mounted, has, with the assistance of his horse, more physical power over his enemy on a plain than an infantry soldier, who often has to act against an enemy posted behind works." Sir Charles Dalbiac thinks that, in regard to these proportions, "much must depend upon the service, and the object which is in view."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 202.

263. Sir John Malcolm remarks, "That a certain proportion of European troops should always be in India is fully admitted; but there is no error more common than that of considering them as a check upon the Native armies. They never have, and never will prove such."

such. It is by complete confidence alone that the Native army of India can be preserved in efficiency, and attached to the Government it serves."

264. Lieutenant-colonel Baker thinks that, "*prima facie*, one-eighth of our force in India should be European."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 16, p. 339.

265. Lieutenant colonel Mayne thinks that if employed against an European enemy, the European troops should be at least a third of the Native.

No. 20, p. 356.

266. Captain Balmain considers the proportion of Europeans as much too small.

No. 11, p. 315.

267. Sir H. Worsley thinks the present proportion of European and Native troops suitable.

No. 15, p. 326.

268. Some remarks will be found in another of the replies in reference to the proportions which have obtained in respect to European and Native troops, and the expression of an opinion that the European agency employed in India is on too large a scale.

No. 23,  
paras. 153 & 171

269. Sir H. Worsley dwells on the impolicy of supposing the King's troops to be maintained in India to keep the Native army in awe.

No. 15, p. 327.

270. Major Wilson observes that "our military successes in India have proceeded from the efforts of the British and Indian troops in conjunction as well as separately;" and that "it is only by uniting the two descriptions of troops as closely as possible that we can hope to preserve our rule either from internal commotion or external attack."

No. 18, p. 35.

271. The difference of expense between European and Native troops is allowed to be "very considerable." Lieutenant-colonel Watson estimates that difference as high as in the proportion of three or four to one in regard to private soldiers. An account produced by Sir John Malcolm, in which the expenses of officers and soldiers and all other expenses are included, exhibits the proportion of expense for an European soldier as double for a native. The actual cost of each description of corps, European and Native, is exhibited in the replies of other witnesses; and the Tables in Appendix (A.), Nos. 46, 47, and 48, afford the following result of the expense per man per annum (officers and men and all other regimental charges being included) in the branches of service undermentioned.\*

Questions  
50 & 651, 127  
890 to 891.

Q. preceding 709.

				BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
				European.	Native.	European.	Native.	European.	Native.
				£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Cavalry	..	..	..	100	64	109	90	107	87
Artillery (Foot)	..	..	..	61	28	81	45	90	46
Infantry	{ King's	..	..	61 {	30	{ 66 }	35	{ 65 }	32
	{ Company's	..	..	59 }		{ 63 }		{ 67 }	

The comparative expense of European and Native horse artillery is not separately exhibited in the tables; and in the foot artillery of Madras and Bombay, the average annual charge per man seems to be enhanced by the expense of gun lascars being included in the total, which does not appear to be the case from the Bengal calculation. Lieutenant-colonel Baker states, that the average of "every fighting man in India, including King's and Company's

Appendix (B.),  
No. 16, p. 338.

\* See questions 591, 595, 596, 597 and 645, for the Native Infantry; 578-9 and 645, for the Native Cavalry; 587-8 and 593, for European Infantry; 592-3, for European Cavalry; and 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086 and 2087, for the expense generally.



pany's troops, officers and men, costs the State, taking all the military charges into account, only £36 per annum."

question  
1415.

272. In regard to the relative efficiency of European and Native troops, Sir Robert Scot observes, that their comparative efficiency, when on actual service, "would vary very much according to circumstances. In some situations, the Native troops I should think better calculated for employment than European troops; in others, I should think the European troops better calculated than the Native; but in the general course of service, I should say they act better together, and perhaps they should always be so employed, but with a very limited proportion of Europeans to Natives." Colonel Greenhill's opinion on this subject is thus expressed: \* "The efficiency of the Native and the European are quite different. The Natives are to be employed in the country; the Europeans cannot be employed in that way; in escorting treasure, and every thing of that nature where escort is to be employed, the Europeans cannot be employed; they cannot be depended on as to keeping sober."

1273.  
1301, 1302, 1303.

273. In regard to the artillery, Colonel Limond observes: "There can be no doubt the European artillery are far superior; the European is possessed of a wreckless energy and intrepidity that the Native does not possess; he acquires a knowledge of the object that his officer contemplates, and is enabled, in the event of the loss of that officer, to follow it up; whereas the Native in losing the officer too frequently loses all confidence. But as for the use for which they were originally embodied, I consider that they answer the end fully; they are a force that occupy stations where artillery are absolutely necessary, and at a comparatively trifling expense, when compared with the establishment of European artillery. They are, comparatively speaking, better for stations and forts than for the field, and for stations where it is absolutely necessary to have artillery: they enable the Europeans to be kept united and available for more important service."

1271.

1109.

1998 and 1999.

666.

274. Respecting the cavalry, Colonel John Munro remarks: "The Native troops are in an excellent state of discipline, but of course the European are always superior to the Native." Sir Charles Dalbiac—that his opinion of the Native cavalry "is exceedingly good; certainly not to be compared with a King's regiment; inferior in point of physical force; not so substantially mounted, and certainly not so well appointed, because they are appointed under different regulations." Sir John Malcolm—that "the European cavalry of His Majesty have of course the advantage over the Native cavalry, in being stronger men, and having more physical force; but I do not know of any other difference in efficiency."

1388.

1417

275. Speaking of natives generally, Sir Robert Scot states that, upon the whole, he should give the preference to the infantry; but being an infantry officer himself (he adds), "I perhaps may speak under some prejudice. I think the discipline of the infantry, as far as I have been capable of judging, has in general been better than that of the cavalry. As to the artillery, for a long period of time after I entered the service, we had no Native artillery; but constituted as it is now, I believe it is very efficient, and animated by the best spirit; and I know the natives in general who belong to the artillery service have a greater *esprit du corps* than can be said to belong to the other branches of the armies in India, making it a point of honour with them to remain with their guns to the last, even when deserted by the other arms."

1422.  
1423.  
1360.  
1488.

276. An European soldier is considered by Sir Robert Scot to be "fit for service in India for about twelve or fifteen years, and a Native enlisted at the usual period of life, from twenty to twenty-five years." Colonel Hopkinson, however, has known instances of short, stout-made, well-behaved Europeans that will last almost for thirty years. Colonel Greenhill estimates the average service of a Native soldier at twenty-two years, and of an European from about ten to sixteen years.

277. The

\* See also reply of Col. Hopkinson to questions 1313 and 1317, to the same effect.

277. The weight of an European dragoon, with his accoutrements, is estimated by Colonel William Dickson at about seventeen stone, and of a Native trooper at thirteen stone, five stone being allowed for accoutrements and articles. Colonel Houstoun states the difference between a dragoon and a Bengal Native trooper at no more than a stone; and the weight of the latter, with his accoutrements, to be sixteen stone, the weight of the accoutrements being four stone. Sir Charles Dalbiac, who has served on the Bombay side of India, averages the weight of an European dragoon at between eleven and twelve stone, and of a Native cavalry soldier at not much above nine; with his accoutrements the dragoon would weigh between seventeen and eighteen stone, and a Native trooper "from three to four stone less." Sir Lionel Smith agrees in this estimate.

Questions  
1671.  
1670.  
1826 to 1829.

2001.

2003-4, 2328.

278. In regard to character and conduct, Colonel Limond states that "the moral character of the Native is far superior to the European; that the charge of 100 Europeans is much more troublesome than 100 Natives, considering the trouble that the officer has to look after the discipline and moral conduct of the troops; the Natives being a quiet, biddable race of people, and the European having habits that the Native is not so much addicted to." Colonel Limond considers the Natives to be as much attached to the service as the Europeans; and that "the fidelity of the one is just as unimpeachable as the other."

1282.

1283 and 1284.

1301.

279. The average sick of Europeans is estimated by Colonel Leighton at five per cent., and of Natives at two per cent. Sir T. Pritzler says, "I have had Native regiments of 800 or 900 strong, with six or eight sick; but I should make enquiry if I found the number exceeded twenty or twenty-five in a Native corps." And in regard to Europeans, "we have always considered our corps unhealthy when they exceeded ten per cent."

1702 and 1701.

1197.

1198.

280. The casualties in an European corps are stated by Colonel Leighton to be not less than fifty, and frequently 100 out of 900 or 1,000 men annually. He states the casualties in a Native regiment to be "very few." Sir C. Dalbiac also represents the proportion of casualties in an European corps as very considerable.

1981.

2016 17.

281. The following is Sir T. Reynell's reply to the question: "In what respects do the accommodation, equipments or allowances of the sepoys in the field or in cantonment, differ from those of the European soldiers of the King's service, either in India or in other parts of the world?"—"The allowances differ in his pay. There is a difference in pay, and a difference in food, and a difference of provision in quarters: for instance, the sepoy makes his own hut, whereas the European is provided with a barrack in the cantonment."

279.

281 (a). It is stated by Colonel Dickson, that where Native regiments are serving with an European regiment, "in general a very good understanding exists between them, particularly where the European regiments have served a long time in India."

1601.

281 (b). Sir Robert Scot is unfavourable to the cantonment of Native troops in large bodies; and Europeans cannot be collected together in considerable numbers, from the comparative smallness of their numbers, and the extent of territory they have to occupy.

1136-7.

### HIS MAJESTY'S ARMY.

282. THE numbers and expense of the King's troops in India in each year, from 1813 to 1830, with the corresponding amount of charge, were as follows:

Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 2 and 3.

His Majesty's Troops.		NUMBERS.				EXPENSE.		
		CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.		TOTAL.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
		Officers.	Non-Commissioned Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Rank and File.			
							£.	£.
1813	..	188	3,881	655	16,763	21,490	314,987	699,984
1814	..	180	3,734	627	15,508	20,019	316,682	617,827
1815	..	186	3,979	672	11,991	19,828	329,016	661,342
1816	..	184	3,956	668	15,624	20,432	313,455	668,817
1817	..	177	3,586	613	14,333	18,709	293,315	613,840
1818	..	198	3,626	614	15,634	20,110	298,180	687,933
1819	..	126	2,595	587	14,372	17,680	211,080	600,862
1820	..	120	2,651	558	13,105	16,743	228,895	550,582
1821	..	119	2,416	522	13,233	16,290	214,173	560,744
1822	..	108	2,261	489	13,018	15,876	180,698	512,863
1823	..	123	2,642	485	13,402	16,652	192,748	522,959
1824	..	122	2,548	466	13,259	16,395	193,080	510,111
1825	..	115	2,449	463	13,656	16,683	188,788	529,220
1826	..	107	2,364	553	13,808	16,832	201,071	533,712
1827	..	109	2,159	536	15,445	18,249	261,529	634,638
1828	..	113	2,162	559	16,778	19,612	180,806	623,388
1829	..	99	2,317	602	17,114	20,132	176,826	678,034
1830	..	103	2,458	619	17,082	20,292	172,588	628,612

Appendix (A.),  
No. 10.  
No. 41.  
No. 66.

No. 51.

Nos. 16 to 48.

Question  
652.

118, 119, and 120.  
352.  
1189 and 1190.  
121.

283. A separate Return is also given of the general and medical staff of His Majesty's forces on the Indian establishment. The expense of the same is stated in the Return of the general staff of the Indian army; and the allowances drawn by officers holding these appointments are given in a separate Return.

284. A Return has been prepared illustrative of the organization of His Majesty's cavalry and infantry regiments on the Indian establishment since 1813, and of the changes which intermediately have been made therein.

285. The several items of charge incident to a regiment of cavalry and infantry of His Majesty's at each Presidency are also particularized in separate Returns.

286. The pay and allowances of His Majesty's forces in India are the same with the corresponding ranks in the Company's army. The pay of the officers is somewhat higher, but in such instances a deduction is made from the Indian allowances,\* so as to keep the two services on a footing of equality in the corresponding ranks. In whatever respects the corresponding allowances of one Presidency may differ from those of another, the King's troops serving at those Presidencies partake of that difference, from the circumstance of their allowances being regulated by the standard of the particular Presidency to which they are attached. Sir Jasper Nicolls, Sir T. Reynell, and Sir T. Pritzler, state that the removal of a King's regiment from one Presidency to another, under these circumstances, has not been the occasion of discontent, as far as their knowledge extends. In the instance of officers in command

\* See also the Table of Regimental Allowances, Appendix (A.), No. 60, p. 114, and the explanatory note accompanying it.

command of a division or station being of superior army and inferior regimental rank to a Company's officer, the King's officer would receive only the pay and batta of the inferior rank, but the command-allowance would be the same as that received by a Company's officer. The pay and allowances of King's officers on the staff of His Majesty's forces in India correspond with those received by Company's officers holding the corresponding appointments.

1067.

287. Sir John Malcolm has the following remark in regard to the allowances of a captain of His Majesty's service: "The restoring the allowances of captain and officers in charge of companies to what it was before 1825, would, I think, be a proper and salutary measure. Captains of troops and companies before that date, drew a personal allowance of £20 per annum, under the head of non-effective allowance." This reduction, with the half tentage, "may be said to have deteriorated the allowances of a captain of a company in one of the King's regiments nearly £100 per annum." "A discontinuance of half the field officers, or even one in a King's regiment serving in India, would go far to meet the expense of restoring those allowances," and be little, if any, "loss to the efficiency of a corps."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 191.Paras. 210 and 211  
of this Synopsis.

288. The following is Mr. Melvill's explanation of the general principle by which the expense incurred in this country on account of His Majesty's forces in India is repaid by the Company to the public. "The Company repay to the King's Government every thing expended in this country in respect of regiments serving in India. Difficulty was found in carrying that principle into effect; and it was arranged in 1824,\* between the Lords of the Treasury and the Court, that an officer on the part of the Crown, and an officer on the part of the Company, should meet and consider all the items of expense, and report upon the subject. They did so; they made a report to the Lords of the Treasury on the 18th June 1824, in which they stated all the points upon which they agreed, and all the points upon which they differed in opinion. The Lords of the Treasury and the Court corresponded upon the subject, and an agreement was finally entered into."

Question 2110.

289. The expense in this country on account of His Majesty's forces in India, is stated to be about £270,000 a-year, exclusive of the sum of £60,000 paid annually to the Crown on account of half-pay and pensions, under the provisions of a separate Act of Parliament.

2141.

290. The regiments of His Majesty on the Indian establishment have a lieutenant in each Company more than those serving in His Majesty's colonies, and a second lieutenant-colonel besides. The reasons assigned by Sir Jasper Nicolls to account for this peculiarity are, that "many are forced to leave the regiments from ill health; some come home on leave of absence: and the length of the voyage requires a longer leave of absence." Sir John Malcolm remarks, "that it is very essential His Majesty's regiments in India should be very strong in field officers, and there should be no hazard of the command of such corps falling to an officer of junior rank." The latter part of the question he does "not deem of so much importance."

87.

88.

720 and 721.

291. The witnesses generally agree in considering service in India more advantageous than service in His Majesty's colonies, in respect to the higher ranks, but not to the lower. Sir L. Smith thinks the subalterns to be badly off. Sir T. Reynell, however, seems to consider the Indian service generally more lucrative than the colonial service; and Sir T. Pritzler, that in the lower ranks they are pretty much on a par.

Sir J. Nicolls' reply  
to Q. 350.  
Sir L. Smith's, to  
2331.  
Q. 419, 1111-2.

292. A question has been raised, whether officers of His Majesty's service should previously have been in India before they are appointed to any high situation. Sir Jasper Nicolls think they should, "every thing connected with the service being so different from what they ever could have learned in any other part of the world." Sir T. Reynell—that "the choice of King's officers to staff situations should be regulated by the period they have been in India, and by their known acquaintance with Indian habits and with the language;" that

113.

320.

313.†

it

\* See the Correspondence here referred to, at the conclusion of the Evidence, on pp. 241 to 265.

† See also reply of Sir T. Pritzler to questions 1180 and 1181.

Question  
315.  
316.  
2226.

it would be of great advantage to a commander-in-chief to have previously been in India, "as well as to the service generally;" and his opinion is that an officer should have served six years in India before he is appointed a general officer on the staff. He does not think it necessary to apply this remark to the situation of adjutant-general or quarter-master-general of His Majesty's forces in India. Captain Macan does "not clearly see those advantages which would render it advisable as a rule, to appoint commanders-in-chief only from among officers who have served at some time of their military career in India."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 350.

293. Major Wilson regards the short time that the chief command is held by a King's officer as prejudicial to the service.

Sir T. Pritzler's  
reply to Q. 1215.  
Question 2157.

294. The cavalry soldiers of His Majesty come out to India dismounted, and receive the horses of the regiment they relieve. Captain Macan thinks that King's soldiers generally "take their own arms to India, and that they are left there in store for succeeding corps."

1228.

295. The following is Sir T. Pritzler's reply to the question, whether it "would be an advantage in a military as well as an economical point of view, to complete the King's regiments in India, rather by sending recruits to fill up casualties than by a relief of the entire regiment?"—"I should think a frequent relief of the King's regiments in India would be attended with a great expense both of money and life, and the regiments would certainly require some time to understand the management of the men in that country; but on the other hand, I consider the keeping them too long in the country is equally prejudicial, because they would thereby lose their native feeling."

App. (B.), No. 1  
pp. 311 & 350  
No. 11, p. 319.

296. Lieutenant-Colonel Baker thinks that "all the European establishment for India should be a permanent one;" and Captain Balmain is of the same opinion.

#### *Company's Army.*

No. 3,  
pp. 173 to 192.

297. Sir J. Malcolm has given an account of the rise, progress, and character of the Native army of India, in a paper which accompanies his reply to the Board's circular.

No. 10,  
pp. 291 to 291.

298. Colonel Pennington has given an outline of the history of the Bengal army, and the successive changes therein from 1783 to the present time.

No. 15, p. 323.

299. Sir Henry Worsley, in his reply to the circular, designates the Company's as "the most interesting and the most enviable military service in the world."

300. The number of troops in the service of the Company in each year, from 1813 to 1830, is shown in the second column of the Table given under the head "Two Services," in this Synopsis.

No. 3, p. 171.

301. Sir John Malcolm observes that the present constitution of the Indian army is one "which (with all its defects) should not be rashly changed, or injudiciously altered." Any improvement therein "should be considered on its own grounds, and not with the reference which is too often made, to the comparative condition and pretensions of an army from which its constitution is altogether different."

No. 23, p. 101.

302. In the Appendix are some remarks on the peculiarities of the India military system, intended principally for those who have not previously informed themselves of the subject, and who might otherwise encounter difficulties in the investigation of the subject, which it is the object of these remarks to remove.

#### *Transfer of the Company's Army to the Crown.*

Reply to Questions  
308, 1162.  
2201.  
2297 and 2298.

303. On the question whether it would be desirable to transfer the Company's army to the Crown, Sir Thomas Reynell and Sir Theophilus Pritzler, who have both served as general officers on the Indian staff; Captain Macan, who acted as Persian interpreter to the Commander-in-chief in India; Sir Edward Paget, who served as Commander-in-chief; and Colonel Watson, who served as Adjutant-general of Bengal, are in favour of the transfer with qualifications.

304. On

304. On the other hand, Sir Jasper Nicolls and Sir Lionel Smith, who have also served as general officers on the staff, and Colonel Hopkinson of the Madras artillery, and Colonel David Greenhill of the Madras infantry, are as decidedly opposed to such an arrangement. Reply to Questions  
67 and 68, 2338.  
1351-5-6,  
1367-8.
305. Colonel Aitchison of the Bombay army, gave only a qualified opinion; Colonel John Munro of the Madras army, an undecided one; and Sir John Malcolm declined to give one, while "ignorant of what is intended to be done relative to the future government of India." 1731-5-6,  
1096, 730.
306. Sir Robert Scot of the Madras infantry, and Colonel Leighton of the Bombay infantry, are of opinion that the transfer could only with propriety be made in case the territory were at the same time to be taken from the Company. 1152,  
1951.
307. Sir Thomas Reynell is of opinion that it is, and Colonel David Greenhill of the Madras infantry, that it is not, the wish of the Company's officers generally that such a transfer should be made. 171,  
1568.
308. Should the transfer be made, Sir Thomas Reynell and Colonel Watson think it should be on the principle of retaining it still as a colonial army, the promotion being kept quite distinct; and Sir Theophilus Pritzler, who also concurs in that view in respect to the cavalry and infantry, is further of opinion that the Company's European regiments should be disbanded, but that the artillery might with propriety and advantage be incorporated with the royal artillery. Colonel Hopkinson is opposed to this view. It is stated by Sir R. Scot, that King's artillery formerly served in India. 309, 183-4,  
1008-9.  
1163.  
1351, 1355, 1356,  
1135.
309. In the Appendix, the following additional information is supplied in regard to this question.
310. Sir T. Pritzler observes that the separation of "the Company's army from the King's has been productive of the greatest obstacle to its efficiency, good spirit, and economy." He adds, "the bringing of the whole together directly under the authority of ministers and establishment of the Crown, would, in my opinion, at once remove all jealousy, and for ever banish the idea of its being possible for the officers of the Indian army to resist authority. It would be desirable to keep regimental officers of the Native army (both cavalry and infantry) distinct from the European army, inasmuch as that the management of Europeans and Natives is so widely different. Officers and soldiers now pensioned because they cannot serve in India, would be equal to service in Europe." Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 267.
311. Colonel John Munro, who it will be perceived is favourable to the principle of a transfer, has, in his reply to the Board's circular, entered into an exposition of the general principle on which the transfer might be made. No. 17, p. 356.
312. Major Wilson, who advocates "the important measure of amalgamating the whole of the Indian army into one body, to be under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief," dwells on the disadvantage from the existence of a local Company's army, and expresses an opinion in favour of the army being under the authority of ministers and the establishments of the Crown. No. 18, p. 375.  
  
p. 379,  
p. 381.
313. Captain Page thinks that the change that would be effected by the transfer of the army to the Crown, "could not but be of the most beneficial nature." No. 21, p. 388.
314. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke is decidedly favourable to a transfer. In this case, he remarks, the artillery and engineer corps at each Presidency "would form a separate battalion or division, and the officers of corresponding rank might be allowed to exchange with those of the royal artillery and engineers, without any limitation or restriction." Addiscombe should be incorporated with Woolwich, but the engineer appointments should be the prizes of proficiency as at present. No. 7, p. 274.  
p. 275.
315. Sir William Keir Grant states that the transfer of the army to the Crown would not be acceptable to the Company's officers, but that the Indian army "would ultimately gain much (and the State would also gain) in the zeal, efficiency, subordination, and discipline" No. 6, p. 270.  
.

cipline of the troops by a transfer to the Crown; but then the measure must be guarded by many precautionary checks, or the advantages of the change might be considerably impaired."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 19, p. 384.

316. On the other hand, Colonel Stannus states, that the effect of consolidating "the Indian army with the King's would prove highly prejudicial to the public interests. It would be most injurious to the discipline of Native regiments, if officers were transferred to them from the British army." The inevitable result would be the gradual but complete disorganization of the army.

No. 16, p. 343.

317. Lieutenant-colonel Baker thinks that the army must go with the territory; and Lieutenant-colonel Mayne,\* Colonel Pennington,† Colonel Sherwood,‡ and Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland§ are unfavourable to a transfer of the army to the Crown.

No. 8, p. 282.

318. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland remarks that the army cannot be separated from the Government.

No. 15, p. 327.

319. Sir H. Worsley considers the continued separation of the King's and Company's army as desirable.

No. 2, p. 164.

320. Colonel Salmond states that the transfer of the army to the Crown, unless with the territory, "appears to be an experiment at once hazardous and gratuitous." He adds, if the measure be determined upon, "no better scheme can be devised for that purpose than the one proposed by Lord Cornwallis in his letter to Mr. Dundas of the 7th November 1794."

No. 22, p. 398.

321. Captain Grant Duff dwells on the danger from a transfer of the army to the Crown from an abuse of patronage.

No. 4, p. 258.

322. Mr. Elphinstone, in speaking of the disadvantage that would result from transferring the army to the Crown, states that "the transfer would introduce greater and more lasting discontent than has ever been experienced yet;" and that "the separation of the Civil government from the Military would probably not answer in any country, but least of all in India."

No. 23,  
paras. 159 & 160,  
pp. 431, 432.

323. In another of the replies to the Board's circular, it is supposed that no advantage would result from a transfer of the army to the Crown; but it is remarked that if a transfer should be determined upon, the details should be settled in concert with a committee of officers; and that the army must continue a local army even if the transfer were to take place.

No. 13, p. 312.

324. Lieutenant-colonel Hopkinson thinks that if the transfer were to take place the Company's officers would, "if not immediately, very soon lose by the greater interest of the officers coming from England."

No. 3, p. 171.

325. Sir John Malcolm refers to his opinions in vol. ii. page 204, of his Political History, remarking, that "as a question of expediency or policy, it will be most materially affected by any changes or revisions that may be made in the constitution of the government of our Eastern empire at home or abroad."

No. 12, p. 306.  
No. 3, p. 171.  
No. 2, p. 165.  
No. 6, p. 270.  
No. 23, para. 167,  
p. 432.  
No. 5, p. 268.

326. Colonel Limond doubts whether a transfer to the Crown would be productive of economy. Sir John Malcolm, Colonel Salmond, and Sir William Keir Grant are of opinion that no savings would result from the transfer that could not now be carried into effect. Sir T. Pritzler anticipates no considerable saving, "except by the consolidation of the King's and Company's establishments, unless the troops could be conveyed to and from India at a cheaper rate by the Transport Board than it is now done by the Company."

No. 17, p. 356.

327. Colonel John Munro thinks that the army could be as economically managed by the King as the Company.

328. Captain

\* Appendix (B), No. 20, p. 386.

† Appendix (B), No. 10, p. 208.

‡ Appendix (B), No. 11, p. 303.

§ Appendix (B), No. 8, p. 282.

328. Captain Page is of opinion that the transfer would be attended with "a very considerable saving of expense."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 21, p. 388.

#### COMPANY'S OFFICERS.

329. THE information afforded by the witnesses in relation to the European commissioned officers of the Company's service, may be classed in reference to the rules observed in regard to their appointment originally as cadets, the means adopted to qualify young officers on their arrival in India for the discharge of their respective duties, by impressing upon them the importance of respecting the prejudices of the Natives, and encouraging them to cultivate the native languages.

330. The regulations of the service in respect to promotion; the situation and authority of commanding officers of corps; the number of officers required to be effective with regiments, and the means of maintaining an uniform efficiency in corps, either by restrictions in the selection of officers for staff and other appointments, by the formation of skeleton corps, or by the separation of the civil staff.

331. The effect also of regimental promotion in opposing a difficulty in the way of a reduction of the army by whole regiments, will have to be considered under this head, as well as the regulations in regard to furlough and retirement, the employment of military officers in civil situations, and any other points in relation to the officers, not specified above.

*Cadets, including their preparatory Education in England and in India, to qualify them, as officers, for the competent discharge of their Duties.*

332. The European officers of the Company's army commence their service as cadets. They are eligible to be appointed cadets at 16 years of age; but Colonel Leighton is of opinion that "it would be better for the service and for themselves were cadets not sent to India before the age of 18." He thinks "they would be more healthy and more useful." He recommends that some rule should regulate the future appointment of cadets, to avoid the inconveniences described in the subjoined extract: "The practice of allowing a great number of casualties to occur in the army, and of then sending out a great number of cadets at one time or in one season,\* I consider very injurious to the service. It makes too great a break in the regiments, too great a difference between the length of service or standing of subalterns in succession, and too great a number of young men get together. At other times, cadets are sent out when there are not commissions for them. When I left Bombay there were 28 cadets in the infantry alone for whom there were no vacancies, and two or three supernumerary lieutenants and ensigns in most of the regiments, which was owing to the reduction of the strength of the army, and number of officers, ordered in 1829."

Questions  
1813.  
1958.  
2112.

333. Sir T. Pritzer is of opinion that "if the officers of cavalry and infantry were allowed to purchase ensigncies and cornetcies at a moderate rate," he is "not certain but that it would cost their friends less money than it does at present to equip and send out cadets, and the benefit to young men and the service would be incalculable."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 5, p. 268.

334. Colonel Stannus thinks that, in case of a transfer, cadets should be appointed by ministers under similar regulations as at present, and that "the system of regimental rise by seniority ought never to be interfered with."

No. 19, p. 384.

335. Lieutenant-colonel Mayne remarks, that "it would be highly beneficial to themselves and the service were cadets, after attaining the age of 16, obliged to pass one year at Addiscombe or some military institution, and on arrival in India they should be attached for another year to Native regiments at a large military station."

No. 20, p. 386.

336. Major

\* See a Table of Appointments which have been made in each year from 1796 to 1832, in illustration of this remark, para. 76 of this Synopsis.



Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 360.

336. Major Wilson observes, "It seems absolutely necessary that the present system of recruiting the service generally by young men set apart for it should be continued. The occasional introduction of others should be the exception, and the above should be the general rule. Well educated young men should alone fill up vacancies."

No. 22, p. 397.

337. Captain Duff recommends that there should be a Board of Examiners at the India House, who should "prevent the passing of any cadet for the cavalry or infantry who had not received as good an education as is common to gentlemen's sons of their age;" and he thinks there should be a seminary at each Presidency "for the instruction of a certain number of officers."

Questions  
640, 1808,  
1811, 1821.

338. Cadets for the artillery and engineers are educated at the military seminary at Addiscombe. There are generally about 150 cadets under instruction at the seminary, and about 60 annually are dispatched to India. "The establishment is formed for the training of officers for the engineers and artillery service; but for the last year or two those branches of the service not requiring all the cadets, the others have been drafted to the general service." Colonel Houstoun's evidence may be consulted for further particulars in relation to the seminary at Addiscombe, which it does not appear requisite to notice in detail in this place.

696.  
1801 to 1861.

696.

339. Sir J. Malcolm, in speaking of the cadets of the Company's service, describes the education given to the engineers at Addiscombe, and completed at Chatham, as "excellent." He continues: "Officers of the artillery who require science are also well educated at Addiscombe, and the officers of this branch, when they arrive in India, join dépôts (I am speaking more particularly of Bombay,) pass through an institution which completes their education in all practical branches of artillery, in a manner that perfectly fits them for their duties." Colonel Limond also bears similar testimony in regard to the "very able manner" in which the artillery cadets are educated at Addiscombe; and he has supplied full particulars of the mode in which that education is followed, on the arrival of the cadet in India, at the dépôt of instruction at Madras.

1288.

Iditto.

696.

"With respect to officers of cavalry and infantry" (Sir J. Malcolm continues), "I am not aware that any particular education has been prescribed for them in England; but speaking from my knowledge of those who have come to India many years past, I must say that I deem it impossible any army could receive youths better qualified to enter upon the general duties of the military profession, both by their education and habits of life. They have sometimes been placed at dépôts, where they receive instruction from officers specifically appointed to qualify them to join the respective corps to which they are attached, as soon as vacancies occur, but of late it has been usual to send them to the corps to which they were appointed. They are not, however, employed on detachment duties until qualified."

700.  
1817.

1001, 1851.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 8, p. 283.

340. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland is of opinion that the seminary at Addiscombe is not now necessary.

Question  
1173.

341. An officer on his arrival in India takes his chance whether he is appointed to an European or a Native regiment; and "in that corps he remains until he obtains the rank of lieutenant-colonel, unless removed by augmentation of the army."

1107.

342. The following additional particulars are supplied by Sir Robert Scot, in regard to cadets on their arrival in India: "When I arrived in India, cadets were usually allowed, under some restrictions, to choose their own corps; afterwards, it became the rule to attach them for some time to European corps. To that succeeded a cadet company, organized, as far as circumstances admitted, as a company of regular infantry, with which all infantry cadets were detained for a considerable time; but this plan proving eminently unsuccessful, was discontinued, and since that time the system has been to post them temporarily, that is, until their rank on the list of the season was ascertained from England, to such corps as lay most conveniently, or was thought likely to prove the best school for teaching them their duty: on their rank being fixed, they were posted permanently and ordered to join. When I left India there was what was called a cadet institution at each Presidency, when the young gentlemen on their arrival from Europe were received, taken care of, and equipped for

for joining their respective regiments, by an officer selected and permanently appointed for that purpose; but I understand these institutions have since been discontinued, which I think is to be regretted."

343. It is not requisite that an officer on his arrival in India should be appointed to an European corps before he is allowed to serve with Native troops. Sir Jasper Nicolls states that "officers are appointed according to their seniority upon the list, as vacancies occur: but exchanges are sometimes made from the Native branch to the European." Sir Thomas Reynell thinks it "very desirable" that officers should "on their first arrival in India, serve with an European corps, before they are attached to a Native Regiment." The following extract from Lieutenant-colonel Watson's evidence explains the reasons why they are not so previously attached. "There is but one European regiment on the Company's establishment in Bengal; they are precluded from serving in His Majesty's regiments at all; therefore when that regiment is near to the Presidency, and favourably situated for the young men to be sent to it, they generally are; but it frequently happens that that regiment is quartered at a distance from the Presidency, and it would not be expedient in such cases to send young cadets up the country to it, consequently they are generally sent to the Native regiments most favourably situated." He thinks, however, it would be better if they could, in the first instance, be attached to an European corps. Colonel Salmond and Sir T. Pritzler are of opinion "that the European officers of Native corps should be trained up with the men through the different steps of promotion." Sir T. Pritzler adds, "I think the management of the sepoys and the Europeans so widely different, that the sepoy officer is not calculated to manage Europeans, or the officers of European corps to manage sepoys *regimentally*." He accordingly recommends "that young officers, upon first going out to India, should be appointed at once as sepoy officers;" because he thinks "that the officers trained in the Company's European regiments have been by no means their best officers, but rather their worst, when employed with sepoys." Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison is also of opinion that it is desirable that young officers on their arrival should at once be attached to a Native regiment; "the chief object" being "to separate them as much as possible, and to place them in a healthy situation on first entering the service; if they get together they are apt to be idle and mischievous."

344. Lieutenant-colonel Baker recommends the recall of an order by which certain supernumerary cornets, ensigns, and second lieutenants, were reduced again to cadets.

345. It is "an important part of the standing orders of each Presidency that the Natives shall be treated on all occasions with kindness, and attention to their prejudices." Sir J. Nicolls states that "officers have been occasionally sent home deprived of their commission for breaches of those orders." Sir Robert Scot observes that these orders are "sufficiently explicit and imperative to make young officers respect the feelings and customs of Native troops, as far as that object can be attained by regulations." Sir T. Reynell considers that its success "depends entirely upon the feeling and capacity of the officer under whose command a cadet is placed, or rather his good sense." Colonel Greenhill, in alluding to the strictness of the regulations, observes, that "no officer of any standing is ignorant of the customs and feelings of the Natives, or would encroach on them."

346. The study of the Native languages is one of the most important qualifications to enable an European officer adequately to discharge his duty, and accordingly inducements have been held out to the officers to cultivate them. Among these, the appointment of interpreter to each regiment; a restriction in regard to employment upon the general staff, unless adequately acquainted with the languages; and the rewards which have occasionally been given to officers who have attained a proficiency, may be noticed as important encouragements to the officers to acquire the knowledge requisite to the proper discharge of their duty.

347. Sir Jasper Nicolls is of opinion that the appointment of interpreter has "acted as an inducement to the European officer to study the Native languages, with the view of obtaining such appointment;" and Sir T. Reynell concurs in this opinion. Lieutenant-colonel Greenhill

Question  
335.  
103.

335 & 336.

999.

1001.  
510 & 1131.

1135.  
1136

1698.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 16, p. 350.

Question  
101.  
1695.  
1113.

337.

1183.

177.

- Greenhill, whose experience is limited to the Madras establishment, states it as his opinion that "the European officers are not at all encouraged" to study the Native languages; and that "they do not get a situation from being qualified." He adds, "I have known an instance of an officer being appointed interpreter who knew nothing of the language, and another officer in the same corps was taken out of that corps to examine him. An officer without interest gets nothing in India generally."
1498. "It is not a *sine quâ non* for an officer being appointed to the staff, that he should understand something of the language of the country?—No; he is appointed to the situation, and required to study afterwards; that has been the custom of late, but that has not always been the custom."—"Is he not required to qualify within some given period?—Yes, after he has been appointed he is."—"How long is that period?—Six months, and twelve months sometimes; six months generally."—"Have such appointments frequently been made without the persons obtaining them being perfectly qualified?—Very often."—"And for important situations?—Interpreters to regiments; I conceive no situation can be more important than that."—"Under whom does he obtain his qualification?—He is examined by a committee appointed at the station."—"If found disqualified on his examination, is he removed?—He is removed afterwards if not qualified."
1507. 348. On being asked whether an officer is not occasionally appointed to the situation of  
1508 to 151 interpreter, Colonel Greenhill replied, "Never. It has only been lately that the commanding officer has not recommended. The commanding officer seldom recommended when I left India for any regimental situation." Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison of the Bombay establishment, states that he "never knew any instance of the appointment of an interpreter that was not sufficiently conversant with the language." Sir Robert Scot, a Madras officer, is of opinion "that encouragement is not sufficiently held out now to study the Native languages;" but he admits that the officers "acquire in a very short time, either by study of custom, sufficient to enable them to hold some conversation with the Native troops under their orders."
- 1710.\* 349. Sir Jasper Nicolls and other officers are of opinion that the great inducement to study the Native languages, "is that of obtaining staff employment, for which it qualifies them."
- 2275, 2276 & 2277. 350. Mr. Mackenzie expresses a fear, "that the language is not generally understood so well as it is desirable that it should be known by the European officers;" and Captain Macan states it is his opinion, that a competent knowledge of the languages "should be made a necessary qualification before an officer was raised to the rank of captain."
- 2182 & 2183.
- Rank and Promotion.*
62. 351. The promotion of officers of the Company's service is regimental to the rank of major, and afterwards in the line, whether of cavalry or infantry, according to the particular branch of service or Presidency to which an officer may belong. In the artillery and engineers, the promotion is regimental to the rank of colonel, as in His Majesty's service.
605. 352. The rank of general officer is attained in the Company's service by the operation of His Majesty's brevet.
- App. (B.), No. 23, 353. In the Appendix is an explanation of the nature and operation of the seniority regimental system of the Company's service, the manner in which officers are obtained for new regiments upon an augmentation, and of the difficulties which present themselves in the way of a reduction of the army by whole regiments, and the way in which it is therein thought they might be overcome.

354. In

\* See also reply of Col. Limond, to question 1287; of Col. Dickson, to 1591; of Col. Houstoun, to 1851; and of Sir L. Smith, to 2338.

† See also reply of Sir T. Reynell, to questions 417 and 418; of Sir J. Malcolm, to 701; and of Sir R. Scot, to 1411.

354. In the same paper, also, will be found calculations of the progress of promotion in the Company's service when unaffected by augmentations, from which it is deduced that the effect of the new organization of 1824 has been to accomplish a permanent acceleration in the rise to the rank of colonel to the extent of six years.

App. (B.), No. 2  
paras. 83 to 103,  
p. 111, and Promo-  
tion Calculations  
annexed, p. 135.

355. Sir John Malcolm seems to doubt this inference, when he remarks that the doubling of the number of colonelcies will not accelerate promotion to the extent that might be supposed. "The casualties in the higher ranks will, from the residence in England of a greater proportion of commandants, decrease in a ratio that will probably balance the difference of numbers calculated upon; and if not, the improved prospect of attaining this provision will prevent many from retiring on the pay of their rank, who, under the former system, would have done so either from incompetence to active duties, or from despair of obtaining the off-reckonings of a regiment."

No. 3, p. 209.

356. It however appears by the detailed promotion calculations accompanying the Paper above referred to, that the number of retirements from the years 1813 to 1823, anterior to the new organization, averaged only forty-six annually, and from 1824 to 1830, subsequently to its coming into operation, have increased to as many as sixty-two on an average annually.

No. 23, p. 118.

357. Lieutenant-colonel Baker recommends that colonels of regiments, like other officers, should be out of the service if they are absent from India more than five years.

No. 16,  
pp. 335 & 319.

358. Colonel John Munro,\* Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland,† and Captain Balmain,‡ recommend that promotion should be regimental to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The subject is also discussed in another of the replies, in connection with the question whether officers should be allowed to buy off their seniors willing to retire.

No. 23,  
paras. 67 & 118,  
pp. 112 & 121.

359. Lieutenant-colonel Baker recommends that the rank of colonel should be given retrospectively to all the lieutenant-colonels commandant who were promoted on the 5th June 1829.

No. 16, p. 152.

360. Captain Balmain is of opinion that the rank of general officer should be attained otherwise than through the operation of His Majesty's brevet.

No. 11, p. 350.

361. Colonel Salmond thinks that "the Company's officers, when they shall have attained the rank of general officer, should be eligible to serve His Majesty in any part of the world."

No. 2, p. 167.

362. Major Wilson thinks that "the general officers of a permanent rank on the staff in India are too few in number, and require higher rank and title." And he recommends that superior allowances should be attached to the rank of lieutenant-general.

No. 18, p. 373.

363. He considers the recall of the commission of brigadier-general to colonels who have been employed upon the staff, as "calculated to lower officers so deprived of their rank in the eyes of the Native troops, over whom they are principally placed."

364. It is remarked, in one of the replies in the Appendix, that "no very essential variation should be made in the existing system of promotion." The Company's service is a provision for officers entering it, and an interference with the existing system, if it deprived an officer of the certainty of rising to the higher ranks, would be disheartening in the extreme; while honours, which do not interfere with the regularity of promotion, would be very advantageous. The commission of a Company's general officer should not be local to India, and Company's officers should be appointed occasionally to the chief command.

No. 23,  
paras. 80 & 81,  
p. 111.

365. Major Wilson dwells on the disadvantage of a seniority promotion.

No. 18, p. 361

366. In the Paper before referred to, the question is discussed at some length, whether the existing seniority system could be materially interfered with.

No. 23,  
paras. 65 to 81,  
p. 111.

367. Major

\* Appendix (B.), No. 17, p. 353.

† Ditto, No. 9, p. 282.

‡ Ditto, No. 14, p. 316.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 361.  
No. 23, para. 73,  
p. 413.

367. Major Wilson thinks that "a certain number of vacancies from casualties, say one-sixth, might be reserved by the State for the reward of those in the next rank of the casualty who may show superior qualification." This suggestion is remarked upon in another of the replies.

No. 7, p. 275.  
No. 23,  
paras. 76 & 77,  
p. 413.

368. It is suggested by Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke, that casualties on service should be filled up by a promotion from among the officers present. In another of the replies to the Board's circular it is suggested, that in the case supposed, officers on furlough or on sick leave should be excepted from supercession, if they had left India "at a time when the military operations upon which their regiment was employed could not have been foreseen, and they had not the option, like officers upon the staff in India, of taking their chance of promotion in common with the rest, or of relinquishing their staff employment."

No. 7, p. 276.  
No. 23, para. 78,  
p. 413.

369. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke has also suggested, that Native gentlemen should be employed as officers with the Native corps, in common with Europeans; but in another of the replies it is supposed that such appointments might have an injurious operation upon the minds of Native officers, from being "probably more galling to their feelings to see a *Native* preferred before them," although they have been long habituated to serve in subordination to Europeans.

Questions  
1736, 1740 & 1741.

370. Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison seems to be of opinion that the strictly seniority system of the Company's service might, in case of a transfer to the Crown, be advantageously departed from, by allowing officers to obtain "rank through merit, favour, and staff services."

1738.  
109.

371. The only instance in which the seniority promotion of the service has in the slightest degree as yet been infringed, is in the grant of personal brevets to Company's officers for distinguished service in the field, as in His Majesty's service. Sir Jasper Nicolls regards this concession in favour of the Company's officers as "advantageous to the public interests;" and he adds, "I think it has been well deserved generally."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 361.

372. Major Wilson considers the personal brevets which have been granted to Company's officers as too confined, and too much restricted in regard to services that are passed.

Question  
107.

373. The witnesses are not all agreed as to whether it would be desirable to "grant the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel and major to officers of the Company's service holding the situation of adjutant and quarter-master-general and of deputy, as in His Majesty's service." Sir Jasper Nicolls remarks as follows: "The introduction of brevet rank is very unpopular in the Company's service generally, and unpalatable; but this is not my opinion, as those staff situations require the weight of rank." He thinks, however, that such a rule is liable to the objection of opening "a door to favouritism." Sir Thomas Reynell "rather objects" to such a rule. Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison does not think it ought to occasion any "jealousy" or "uneasy feeling" among the officers. By the rule at present in force, officers holding the situation of adjutant-general and quarter-master-general have had the official rank of lieutenant-colonel, and their deputies that of major, which however is relinquished when they cease to hold the appointment, and they then resume their regimental or army rank.

110.  
310, 311 & 312.  
1740.

895 to 899.

1454.

374. Sir Robert Scot suggests a modification of the retiring regulation, contained in the subjoined extract, which, in its consequences, might ultimately interfere with the regularity of promotion. "Orders prohibitory, under severe penalties, of any inducement being privately held out to officers to retire from active service on the pension of their rank are now in force: but whether the practice could be prevented altogether by any orders whatever may perhaps be doubted. Upon the whole, it seems to me that it would be advisable rather to rescind the regulation than that there should be any appearance of a disposition to connive at its invasion. As a means of accelerating promotion, its abolition would have considerable effect; and I should be glad to see the announcement, by orders of the Court of Directors, of a regulated permission for officers of all ranks in their service to accept of whatever they may consider an equivalent, to induce them to retire from it."

375. Lieutenant-

375. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland is favourable to a sale of commissions according to certain established rules. Appendix (B.), No. 8, p. 282.
376. Captain Balmain is also in favour of a sale of commissions. No. 11, p. 316.
377. Major Wilson thinks that promotion should be accelerated by allowing purchase and annuities. No. 18, p. 362.
378. Some remarks on this subject will also be found in another of the replies to the Board's circular, in reference to its bearing upon the seniority system of the Company's service, with which the adoption of such a rule is considered as not at variance. No. 23, paras. 67 & 118, pp. 412 & 424.
379. The above comprises what is peculiar to the seniority promotion of the Company's army, and the nature and extent of such deviation from the seniority rise as it might be expedient to allow. As far as the Company's officers are affected in these particulars by the regulations which obtain in His Majesty's service, in respect to promotion, is considered under a separate head;\* and the inconvenience which has resulted from the introduction of regimental promotion in regard to selection for the staff and the efficiency of regiments,† as well as the difficulty which has been experienced in the reduction of the army by whole regiments,‡ will be stated in those that follow, together with the remedies which have been suggested in view to the removal of these defects. The testimony of the witnesses in respect to commanding officers of corps will however precede that which is to be stated in respect to regimental officers.

#### *Commanding Officers of Corps.*

380. The allowance attached to the command of a regiment in His Majesty's and the Company's service on the Indian establishment, in addition to the regimental allowances of the officer in command, is 400 rupees per month.§ Colonels, however, in receipt of off-reckonings are not entitled to draw the command-allowance of the corps which they may command. Sir Jasper Nicolls is of opinion, that "if the command money were paid, in addition to off-reckonings to officers of that rank, commandants would frequently remain in command of their corps;" and he would not consider such an arrangement to be advantageous to the service, "as it would tend to keep back the rising officers of the service, the younger lieutenant-colonels and majors." Sir Thomas Reynell concurs in thinking the regulation a wise one, which prevents a colonel in receipt of off-reckonings from receiving command money. Sir J. Nicolls's reply to Q. 128 & 129, Question 129. 130. 363.
381. A question has been raised, whether the command-allowance of 400 rupees a month is a sufficient inducement to good officers to remain with their corps rather than seek employment in the general staff. Sir Jasper Nicolls is of opinion that as there are few staff appointments open to an officer when he has attained the rank of field-officer, he would prefer the command of his regiment. In reply to another question, however, he admits that, except on service, an officer would rather be in the enjoyment of a lucrative "staff appointment." Sir Thomas Reynell thinks the command-allowance to be adequate, "because there are so few staff situations that would place an officer in a more lucrative position." Sir Lionel Smith—that, "the present regulations are very good. They do not work so well yet as they will in a little more time, when the army becomes more settled." 71. 255. 311. 2333.
382. Sir John Malcolm states as follows: "I have always considered that the armies in India would never be in a healthy or proper state until the command of a regiment was made decidedly preferable for an officer to any staff station, except the heads of the respective departments. I consider that the allowance of 400 rupees per month, which was granted from 728 ; also Appendix (B.), No. 3, pp. 492 & 211.

\* See head entitled "King and Company's Officers."

† See head entitled "Regimental Officers."

‡ See head entitled "Augmentation and Reduction by whole Regiments, and Alterations of Establishment affecting Rank."

§ See Sir J. Nicolls's reply to question 70 ; Lieut.-col. Feilding's, 768 and 784.

from home, would, if the measure had been carried into execution at Bengal in the manner it was carried into execution by Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, and Mr. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, have been fully adequate to effect this object. It was given at these Presidencies, where most of the troops are on half batta, without any diminution from the full batta, before drawn by the commanding officer of the corps, who had always enjoyed that allowance; but this arrangement was annulled at Bengal, where the officers in command of corps at that period were almost all on full batta, and therefore derived no benefit from it whatever; on the contrary, I believe, from the allowances they then enjoyed, it was rather a trifling loss to them."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 195.

383. In another place Sir John Malcolm adds: "The allowance for commanding a corps should, I think, be raised to 500 rupees per month; and if with this should be associated a modification of minor commands, and given to officers who exercised them a superior allowance of 200 rupees, without removing him from the charge of his corps, his duties would be in no way increased beyond his power of performing them, and the ends of economy, as far as such commands were concerned, would be combined with the promotion of the efficiency of the service."

No. 23,  
paras. 119 to 128,  
p. 121.

384. In one of the replies to the Board's circular, reasons are stated why the command of a corps should not be on a lower scale than 600 rupees per month, and that the expense might be met by a reduction of two subalterns per regiment.

Q. 1799 & 1800.

385. Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison agrees in opinion with Sir J. Malcolm that, in addition to the command-allowance, the officer in command of a corps should receive what is termed "the 'batta' of his rank, wherever stationed, in order to induce him to remain with his regiment, and not to seek a staff appointment."

Reply of  
Mr. H. Russell to  
Q. 2238 to 2218,  
2232.

386. The loss to commanding officers of an emolument formerly derived from bazars and the tent contract, is considered by one of the witnesses as having weakened the attachment of the European officers, and impaired the efficiency of the army. Mr. H. Russell, the witness referred to, expresses himself on this subject as follows: "When I first went to Hyderabad thirty years ago, there were at that station six battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry. The command of those corps was, at that time, among the best situations that an officer could hold, and it was consequently held by the best officers. An officer commanding a corps was then a person of importance; he had his markets, his commissariat, his artificers, and followers of every description attached to his immediate corps. His allowances were considerable, and enabled him to exercise hospitality towards his officers, and to be liberal to his men. The first of those allowances that was taken away was, I believe, the bazar allowance, consisting of a duty levied on spirituous liquors, tobacco and other intoxicating drugs. This duty, in the general bazar, which belonging to the officer commanding the whole force, produced near £5,000 a-year; and in the battalion bazars, which belonged to the commanding officers of corps, about £1,000. The reduction of this allowance was followed by that of the tent contract, and of others of smaller amount, of which I cannot now recollect the particulars; and by degrees the advantages of a command were reduced so low, that no officer would take the command of a corps whose character or pretensions enable him to procure any other situation." Mr. Russell states that the profit formerly derived by the officers from the bazars now goes "to the Government." It passed however through an intermediate "process. In the first instance it was thrown into a general fund, called the bazar fund, of which the produce was divided periodically among officers of a certain rank throughout the army; but it was perfectly understood at the time that it was only a preparatory measure to a resumption of the duty by the Government themselves; and accordingly, at the expiration of, I think, about two years, it was resumed, and is now received by the Government." Mr. Russell further states, that in point of fact the receipt of this emolument by commanding officers did not operate "as an inducement with them to encourage the consumption of spirits and opium, and other drugs of that sort." He observes, "I do not believe that drunkenness was at all more prevalent then than it has been since. One strong reason why such should not be the case, was, that the conduct of the commanding officer

Question  
2210.

2211.

officer was opened to the inspection of the whole body of the officers collectively, and such an abuse could not have been suffered by them to prevail to any extent."

387. The following are the sentiments of Mr. Russell on the general question of the allowances of commanding officers. "Towards the European officers, the great error that has been committed has been the reduction to so very low a scale of the allowances attached to the actual command of a corps. The allowances of the inferior ranks are necessarily of minor importance. A junior officer is satisfied if he can live creditably on his pay; and as long as the allowances of the commanding officer are liberal, every subaltern feels his interest in them, and knows that, if he lives, he will enjoy them in his turn. I have always thought, and I still think, that it is an object of first-rate importance, in the treatment of the army, to make the post of the command of a corps so advantageous in point of emolument, as to render the best officers in the service willing and anxious to hold it."

Question  
2236.

388. Another of the witnesses is of opinion that the authority given to the commanding officer of a regiment is insufficient in the following particulars. He thinks that, "after certain service, he should be allowed to promote" such Native officers as "he pleases, and to break also without court-martial; unless he has that power, sentinel duty never will be well performed among the Natives, who combine together to make their duties as pleasant as possible to each other. When I entered the service in 1795" (continues Lieutenant-colonel Greenhill), "and joined a corps in 1796, most of the corps were in single corps stations; few of the companies at head-quarters, most of them detached. The commanding officer then had unlimited powers; the men looked up to him accordingly with great respect, and never thought he could do wrong; many abuses were practised by him, but they were not thought wrong. I do not advocate these abuses: he had the power to make and the power to break, and he promoted Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers as he himself pleased, not always agreeable to seniority; he felt the strongest interest in their welfare, and treated them with the greatest kindness, although very often with a good deal of violence; they saw no person superior to him; superior military authority never interfered, and civil authority could not interfere; they respected him accordingly. All their disputes were settled by punchayet or arbitration; punchayet has been forbid lately, and now, when the corps comes to a large station, the subadar finds his commanding officer of no consequence, frequently hears him rudely spoken to on parade, and not able to prevent the issuing of orders which are sometimes obnoxious to the feelings of the sepoy."

Reply of  
Lt-col. Greenhill  
to Q. 1531.

1570.

389. The commanding officers of corps, it is besides stated, have no influence in the appointment of the regimental staff, which appointments rest with the Commander-in-chief. Sir T. Pritzler is of opinion that they have not sufficient influence in that appointment, he observes, "I should doubt the expediency of their having the sole control of it, but I doubt whether they have at present sufficient influence." He says, "It has never been made an official complaint to me, but it has been a frequent reply to me when I have found fault with the want of efficiency of their regimental staff," that commanding officers of corps do not possess sufficient influence in the appointment of their regimental staff. Sir T. Pritzler adds, that many of the regimental staff have been appointed in direct opposition to the commanding officers. On this subject Lieutenant-colonel Greenhill remarks, "I think that the commanding officer of the regiment should have the recommendation of the staff always; he is answerable for their being properly qualified."

1238 & 1239.

1210.

1211.

1242.  
also Appendix (B.),  
No. 5, p. 261.

390. Lieutenant-colonel Greenhill is also of opinion that the system of encouraging Native soldiers to make complaints against their commanding officers at the periodical inspections of the general officers, has had a further injurious tendency to weaken his authority. He does not object to their being asked on those occasions, whether they have any complaints to offer in respect to their pay and allowances; but that they should not be encouraged to complain that "they have not promotion, very often that they have not got leave, and very often that they want to get removed to another corps; sometimes, that they have been brought to a court-martial improperly."

Questions  
1471 to 1481.  
1478, 1479;  
also his reply to  
Q. 1578.

391. Lieutenant-colonel Hopkinson states that the power and respectability of a commanding

Appendix (B.),  
No. 13, p. 310.



ing officer on the Madras establishment is not so great as formerly ; “ the soldier has been taught to look for every comfort and advantage, not to his commanding officer, but to headquarters.”

- Appendix (B ),  
No. 10, p. 328.      392. Sir H. Worsley is of opinion that regimental staff appointments should be made only on the recommendation of the commanding officer.
- No. 22, p. 396.      393. Captain Duff thinks that the power of commanding officers should be increased, by requiring his recommendation before an officer is appointed to the general staff.
- No. 4, p. 257.      394. Mr. Elphinstone recommends that the commanding officer should have a share of the patronage of his regiment, and that an open reference should be made to him for the character of any officer who was thought fit for the staff.
- No. 18, p. 333.      395. Major Wilson is of opinion that officers of the rank of major should be removable for the command of other regiments, without however interfering with the regularity of regimental promotion ; and that officers incapable of exercising command should be transferred to the invalids.
- No. 22, p. 396.      396. Captain Duff is also of opinion that all field-officers should be “ removable from corps in which they have been brought up ;” and brought generally “ back to the same when they have become lieutenant-colonels.”

#### *Regimental Officers.*

- Question 713.      397. The establishment of European commissioned officers attached to a regiment of Native cavalry of six troops, and of Native infantry of eight companies, is

1 colonel.  
1 lieutenant-colonel.  
1 major.  
5 captains.  
8 lieutenants.  
4 cornets or ensigns.  
—  
20 officers.  
—

Besides which there are two Native commissioned officers, a subadar, and a jemadar, with each troop or company.\*

398. There is a great variety of opinion in regard to the number of European officers required to be effective with their corps, the establishment above mentioned being intended to provide for the duties of the general staff, and liable to further reduction on account of sickness and on furlough in Europe.

1151 ;  
also reply of  
Lieut. col. Watson  
to Q. 907 & 908.

399. Sir Robert Scot states that “ on an average, there is probably about five or six officers per regiment (including absentees in England) permanently removed from duty with their corps ; about two more may be stated as the proportion absent on mere temporary occasions, scarcely leaving half of their fixed complement present ; and that number constantly liable of course, in any particular regiment, to be still further reduced.” Excluding then the colonel from the calculation, who generally does not perform regimental duty, out of an establishment of nineteen officers, there would not, according to Sir Robert Scot, remain, on an average, more than thirteen or fourteen officers per corps for regimental duty, and these liable to still further reduction on account of temporary absences in India estimated

\* See questions 774 and 514 ; also the Table to question 2091, which details the Native regimental establishment of each Presidency.

mated at two per regiment. Excluding then the temporary absentees, the present authorized establishment would allow

1 officer to command;

2 officers for the regimental staff; and

10 or 11 officers, without taking the temporary absentees into account, or including them in the estimate, eight or nine officers for six troops in the cavalry, and eight companies in infantry, in regular Native regiments of the Company's service; or about one European officer per troop or company, exclusive of the quartermaster and interpreter, who is always available in action as an additional subaltern, and of the two Native commissioned officers per troop already mentioned.

400. The following is what is stated by the witnesses in regard to the number of European commissioned officers required to be effective with Native corps.

401. Sir Lionel Smith thinks that "not many officers are wanted in the Native army except when a corps goes on service." (See Question 2330.)

402. Sir John Malcolm observes, "It is not for the parade and drill of a corps that officers of standing are much required in the Native infantry. A good commanding officer and staff, with junior officers, will bring a Native corps into full as high order as if the whole complement of senior officers were present; but it is in the command of these troops when on service, and when detached on special duty, that good and efficient officers are required; and all those I have stated are in the daily exercise of this duty."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 196.

403. In another place he observes, the rank of captain "is one of the most important in the army, and there cannot be a condition more unfavourable to military discipline than that of many corps of this Presidency (Bombay), in which there is not an officer between the commander of the regiment and the subalterns."

p. 213.

404. Sir T. Pritzler, in speaking of the Madras army, remarks that in general it is "as efficient as the material of which it is composed will admit;" but that it is generally "ill supplied with European regimental officers in the field."

No. 5, p. 261.

405. Colonel Stannus thinks that "the number of European officers is unquestionably too limited, as it is well known that on them depends the confidence and military spirit which elevates a Native soldier far above those in the service of the Native powers."

No. 19, p. 381.

406. Lieutenant-colonel Baker is of opinion that the two lieutenants and one ensign per regiment, reduced in 1829, should be restored.

No. 16, p. 336.

407. Major Wilson remarks that "the present establishment of European officers to the Native regiments is considerably too low to enable them to meet a powerful enemy." He accordingly recommends the formation of two regiments of Native infantry into single regiments of two battalions, the European officers being attached to one battalion, and the Native to the other; the latter being commanded by a selected field-officer or captain, with a Native adjutant and European regimental staff.

No. 18, p. 368.

408. Captain Page states that "few companies should, in his opinion, have less than two European officers."

No. 21, p. 390.

409. Captain Duff remarks that "an efficient number of European officers, the full complement at least, will always prove of incalculable advantage on service."

No. 22, p. 395.

410. Sir William Keir Grant thinks that the number of European officers with Native corps is too few.

No. 6, p. 271.

411. In another of the replies the injurious effect of increasing the number of European commissioned officers in respect to promotion is dwelt upon, and reasons are stated why, on other grounds, an increase of officers is not necessary, and that even a further reduction might be desirable.

No. 23,  
para: 97 to 100,  
p. 417.

412. Some of the witnesses, besides a field-officer to command, and an officer for each of the regimental staff appointments, deem an European officer for each troop or company to be adequate to every purpose of efficiency, assisted as he is by two Native commissioned officers under him.\* Others, in addition to the number above mentioned present with the corps, would have a captain to every squadron of cavalry and to each grand division of infantry;† and there are other witnesses who advocate an establishment which, in addition to a commanding officer, a second in command, and the regimental staff, would allow as many as two ‡ and even three § European officers, besides the Native officers being present with each troop or company.

Questions.  
913 & 971.¶

413. To maintain the degree of efficiency above stated, Lieutenant-colonel Watson recommends the following establishment of European commissioned officers.

	Regiment of Native Cavalry.	Regiment of Native Infantry.
Colonel .. .. .	1	1
Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	1	1
Major .. .. .	1	1
Captains .. .. .	5	5
Lieutenants .. .. .	10	12
Cornets or Ensigns .. .. .	4 or 5	4 or 5
Total .. .. .	22 or 23 officers.	24 or 25 officers.
Increase .. .. .	2 or 3 officers per regiment.	4 or 5 officers per regiment.

1945 & 1957.¶

414. Colonel Leighton recommends two majors instead of a major per regiment, besides a captain and a lieutenant per company, and two for the regimental staff appointments, and the four ensigns per regiment as at present. This would give an increase of one major, three captains, and three lieutenants, or seven officers beyond the present authorized establishment of Native infantry regiments.

415. Those who advocate the higher efficiency of two and even three European officers per troop or company, would require a still more considerable increase to the present authorized establishment, probably not less than four or ten officers to each Native cavalry regiment, and eight or sixteen officers to each Native infantry regiment, as the case might be.

416. There being twenty-one regiments of Native cavalry and 152 regiments of Native infantry

\* See Sir R. Scot's reply to question 1954; Sir L. Smith's, 2331; Sir T. Pritzler's, 1166; Colonel John Munro's, 1053; Sir T. Reynell's, 396 and 397, who advocates two-thirds of the captains and subalterns which gives somewhat more than one officer per troop or company. This view of the answer is somewhat at variance with Sir T. Reynell's reply to question 474, where he advocates three officers per troop or company.

† See Sir J. Nicolls's reply to questions 162 and 163; Lieut.-col. Feilding's, 741, 836, and 837; Lieut.-col. Watson's, 906.

‡ See Col. Leighton's reply to question 1945.

§ See Sir T. Reynell's reply to questions 474 and 475; Col. Dickson's, 1584, 1585, and 1586; Capt. Macan's, 2199 and 2200.

¶ See also Col. John Munro's reply to question 1061; Lieut.-col. Aitchison's, 1745.

¶ See also reply of Sir T. Pritzler to question 1167.

fantry on the Indian establishment, the increase required to the army, if the views of those officers were to be acted upon, would be very considerable.

417. The lowest calculation\* would extend to 498 officers, and the highest to 2,600 officers of the Native cavalry and infantry of India, independently of the number requisite to place the Company's European infantry and the artillery, both European and Native, in a corresponding scale of promotion.

418. Independently of the question, whether the present authorized establishment be adequate to the wants of the service, another remains to be stated, which has reference to the unequal number of officers withdrawn from particular regiments on account of staff employ, or absent on furlough to Europe. From this cause the number of officers available for regimental duty, in particular regiments, has varied, according to Sir Jasper Nicolls, in the old double regiments, from as many as eighteen to as few as eight;† and Sir Edward Paget states, that on the occasion of his making a tour of inspection, when he saw by much the largest portion of the Bengal infantry, "there were instances, after the regiments were divided into two battalions each, in which he did not find more than three, four, or five officers with their corps."

419. To remedy this, a rule was adopted by the Court in November 1823, requiring that not more than five officers in each regiment should be absent on account of staff employ;‡ and the practice of the local Government in carrying this regulation into effect, is stated by Sir T. Pritzler to be, that if a regiment has too many officers on furlough, an officer from that regiment is not allowed to go upon the staff as long as that cause of deficiency may continue. These regulations "are not yet in force throughout the corps, because they only take effect as the officers remove; the Government do not send a man from his staff appointment."

420. The

\* Increase, by Two Officers per Cavalry Regiment, and Three Officers per Infantry Regiment :

21	Regiments at	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	42
152	—	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	156

198 Officers.

Ditto, by Three Officers per Cavalry Regiment, and Four Officers per Infantry Regiment :

21	Regiments at	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	63
152	—	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	608

671 Officers.

Ditto, by Four Officers per Cavalry Regiment, and Seven Officers per Infantry Regiment :

21	Regiments at	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	81
152	—	7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,061

1,118 Officers.

Ditto, by Four Officers per Cavalry Regiment, and Eight Officers per Infantry Regiment :

21	Regiments at	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	81
152	—	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,216

1,300 Officers.

Ditto, by Eight Officers per Cavalry Regiment, and Sixteen Officers per Infantry Regiment :

21	Regiments at	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	168
152	—	16	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,132

2,600 Officers.

† See also reply of Sir T. Reynell to question 419 ; Lieut.-colonel Watson, 1051.

‡ Lieut.-colonel Feilding states, that no more than one captain and two subalterns per regiment are allowed to be absent at the same time on staff duty (see question 742) ; and Lieut.-colonel Aitchison says, that the general average of absentees is four per regiment (see question 1743).

Question  
32.

420. The following is the opinion of the witnesses in regard to the efficacy of this rule; "in equalizing the number of officers available for duty in their corps." Sir Jasper Nicolls says, that it "is not so much so as it was intended to be; I had (he observes) one corps under me at the siege of Bhurtpore that had but one captain; many similar instances may be seen in the three armies;" and Sir Thomas Reynell thinks that the rule has been efficacious.

313.

421. The effect of the rule, however, may be correctly ascertained by a Return, Appendix (A.), No. 53, which shows "the number of officers withdrawn from each regular regiment of cavalry and infantry, for staff and detached employment, in each year from 1813 to 1831."

422. By this it appears, that in 1824, when the rule came into operation, and in 1831 (the latest period to which the Return could be prepared) the number of Native infantry regiments which had respectively the under-mentioned amount of staff and detached absentees, was as follows :

					1824.				1831.			
					Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
Regiments from which												
9 officers had been taken for staff					7	—	1	8	—	—	—	—
and detached employ .. }												
8	..	ditto	..	..	4	3	3	10	—	—	—	—
7	..	ditto	..	..	9	2	5	16	—	—	1	1
6	..	ditto	..	..	10	1	2	13	1	—	3	4
5	..	ditto	..	..	14	7	5	26	5	7	6	18
4	..	ditto	..	..	16	14	4	34	12	12	2	26
3	..	ditto	..	..	3	12	1	16	34	11	9	54
2	..	ditto	..	..	2	8	3	13	14	15	4	33
1	..	ditto	..	..	2	3	—	5	7	7	1	15
None had been taken for such employ					1	—	—	1	1	—	—	1
Total Regiments .. ..					68	50	24	142	71	52	26	152

423. The effect then of the rule appears to have been as follows : namely, that in the year in which it came into operation there were altogether 47 Native regiments of infantry, out of an establishment of 142 regiments, from which more than five officers had been taken for staff and detached employ, and that when the rule had been in operation about seven years there were no more than five regiments, out of an establishment of 152 regiments, in which the prescribed number of five such absentees per regiment had been exceeded.

Question  
37.

686.

424. Some of the witnesses are of opinion that this rule, if too strictly adhered to, would be productive of inconvenience. Lieutenant-colonel Feilding puts the following case in illustration of his opinion : "A very able man as lieutenant may be placed in the Political department, and very much distinguish himself in it; he may, before he attains the rank of captain, have attained a very high political situation; and if it so happens that the officer immediately above him is of the staff also, by the present regulation, that officer, notwithstanding the importance and dignity of the situation in which he is employed, must be remanded to his own corps to do duty as a captain." Sir John Malcolm adds to the same effect—"Services are continually occurring in India, the success of which depends upon the individual character and qualification of the officers employed; and I have had, during the last three years, recurring instances of the difficulties which this has occasioned to the Government

Government in the selection of its instruments. I cannot mention a stronger case than that strict attention to this rule was likely to have prevented my employing Captain Burnus, who has lately surveyed the Indus, and who, from local experience and other causes, was the only man, as far as I could judge, qualified to carry that important service into successful operation."

425. Colonel John Munro also appears to consider the rule as liable to the objection of limiting too much "the field of selection to the Commander-in-chief and Government of officers fit for staff situations." Sir Jasper Nicolls and Sir T. Reynell do not appear to concur in this view.

Question  
1056.  
83.  
314.

426. Sir John Malcolm again remarks, "I should think the staff regulations might be construed to relate only to officers removed from regimental duty, or from the command of men of their line; and they might not be applied to brigade-majors or line adjutants if the system was introduced of giving these temporary appointments to officers belonging to corps at the station. No situation of brigade or line staff should remain to the same individual beyond a period of three years, except on field service." He observes, "Under the head of military staff is the general, the divisional, the brigade, the garrison, and the regimental staff. I consider also that in India the officers of the Commissariat department must continue on the military staff of the army." Also those employed in the Political department, and as surveyors.

App. (B.), No. 3  
p. 197.

p. 196.

427. Lieutenant-colonel Baker considers the restriction in regard to staff absentees as "highly expedient and politic."

No. 16, p. 335.

428. Major Nutt thinks that the order of the Court relative to staff absentees should be rigidly enforced.

No. 9, p. 287.

429. In another of the replies it is suggested that "the regulation at present in force, if modified in some such manner" as is therein suggested, "by leaving it discretionary with the local Government to deviate from the rule in special cases, the grounds of which to be recorded at the time, seems to be well worth a further trial, since the other remedies which have been suggested to widen the sphere of selection for staff employ, are not altogether free from difficulty, and might be attended with embarrassment."

No. 23,  
paras. 49 & 56,  
p. 109.

430. To obviate the objections above stated by some of the witnesses to the rule, it has been proposed to form a number of skeleton corps, with the view of substituting an officer from such corps in the place of a staff absentee, to do duty in his absence, with the view of obtaining a more full scope of selection. Sir Jasper Nicolls thinks that such a plan would be "preferable to distressing the corps, as they now are, by taking so many officers away." Sir T. Reynell—that "it would be a good arrangement, inasmuch as it would tend to the efficiency of the corps." Sir J. Malcolm gives his opinion in favour of the plan, and offers the following suggestion in regard to the mode in which it should be carried into effect, in the subjoined extract from his evidence: "Various modes have been proposed as to the construction of such corps; the most practicable appears the formation of corps of officers without men, from whom vacancies caused by appointment to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the staff, and when not so employed would serve with the regiment by whom their services were most required. These officers would, in short, be disposable in any way, though they would rise in unattached corps. There are fewer objections to this plan than any other; for it could in no degree disturb the regular rise of other corps, or produce those inequalities of promotion that must result from filling the vacancies made by nominations to the staff in the regiments to which they belonged. The unattached corps which have been proposed need have no ensigns, the seniors of that rank in the army being promoted into them as vacancies occurred; it would be formed, in the first instance, as an augmentation."

Question  
81.  
315.

App. (B.), No. 3,  
pp. 196, 213, 227.

Question  
686.

431. Sir Robert Scot is also in favour of the plan; but Lieutenant-colonel Feilding has stated as an objection to it, "that it would be placing" the officers of the skeleton corps "in a very disagreeable situation, to be liable to be handed about from one part to another, and

1151.  
838.

Question  
1055;  
Iso Appendix (B.),  
No. 17, p. 352.

and from one corps to another;" and Colonel John Munro states the objections to the plan contained in the subjoined extracts from his evidence: "I consider it to be a very unmilitary plan, and extremely difficult of execution: for instance, a skeleton regiment must be composed of the same number of officers in the several ranks as the other regiments, in order to have the same chance of promotion with them. As a regular regiment consists of five captains, eight lieutenants, and four ensigns, and as most of the officers absent on staff duty and furlough are from the higher ranks, it would be almost impracticable to form skeleton regiments that should supply the exact number absent, because there are probably as many captains absent as lieutenants and ensigns. Then, with regard to the military principles, the officers of the skeleton regiments would have no corps of men to which they would be permanently attached; they would be moveable from one regiment to another of the regular army, according to the casualties of the service, and therefore would have no motive to attach themselves to any particular corps, or make themselves acquainted with the character of the men belonging to the corps to which they were only temporarily attached. If there should be a deficiency of officers in any particular regiment to any considerable extent, officers might be appointed with as much propriety to supply that deficiency from a regular regiment, where there was a greater number of officers, as from a skeleton regiment."

Question 1056.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 14, p. 316.  
No. 15, p. 321.

432. Captain Balmain appears to advocate the plan of skeleton corps.

433. Sir H. Worsley recommends that certain irregular corps of cavalry and infantry should be regimented, and that corps of officers should be formed to provide for a portion of the staff designated by him.

No. 23,  
paras. 51 & 52,  
p. 109.  
Question  
85.

434. The difficulties which appear to be in the way of the plan of skeleton corps are stated in another of the replies to the Board's circular.

86.

745, 746.

435. To obviate the objections which attach to the skeleton plan, it has been suggested that the pressure upon particular regiments, occasioned by demands for the staff, might be obviated by a regulation to the effect, "that where an officer has been absent for four or five years from his regiment on staff or other employment, his place should be filled up by an effective officer, and he promoted in every grade of rank, up to that of lieutenant-colonel, with the officer who stood next below him in his regiment at the time he was appointed to the staff." Sir Jasper Nicolls thinks that such a plan "would be an expensive arrangement for the service, though beneficial for the individual;" and that it is liable to the objection of occasioning an irregularity of promotion which would make it "very unacceptable to the army at large." Lieutenant-colonel Feilding appears to consider a plan of this description as liable to this objection: "If several officers were taken from one regiment to this staff duty or civil duty, the rapidity of promotion of the junior ranks in that regiment would be much greater than in a regiment whose officers were not taken for that permanent duty; and I do not exactly see how the difficulty is to be obviated." Colonel Dickson is of opinion that if the staff, particularly "the civil branch of it, (the commissariat, &c.) could be removed from the effective strength, it would be desirable;" and Captain Macan, that "the staff, on a reduced scale, might be borne on corps as supernumeraries, except officers employed on actual military staff duty," and that "those attached to political situations, to the commissariat, and all duties unconnected with the military profession, should be borne as supernumeraries on corps; and upon the occasion of corps taking the field, such officers should not be allowed to leave their civil duties, and reap the advantages of military command." Sir T. Reynell—that "if the arrangement for the commissariat," which bears the officers upon the strength of regiment, "could be altered, it would be advisable, so as not to deprive the army of so many officers;" but he would not recommend such an alteration for the pay department. Lieutenant-colonel Watson is of opinion that "many of the appointments might be filled, as in the British service, by persons non-military."

2201 & 2202.

452.

453.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 195.  
p. 214.

436. Sir John Malcolm thinks that "the pay department should be separated from the army." He remarks in another place as follows: "I must place under the head of civil staff the auditor-general's department, paymasters, collectors, magistrates, or other officers, continued permanently on civil duties. All persons appointed permanently to this branch should

should be struck off the strength of the corps to which they belonged. Their promotion should cease, and they should retain no further claims upon the military line than that of a right, at the stated period, to the pension of the rank they held when they were nominated to the civil staff. Any vacancy caused by the transfer of an officer to the civil staff should be filled up by line and not regimental promotion. It will be but just to the meritorious officers now in this branch to give them two or three years to make up their option, whether they will remain in it, or return to the military line of the service."

Appendix (B.)  
No. 3, p. 215.

437. Major Wilson recommends that the civil staff should be a distinct service, by the "formation of a general and ordnance commissariat, on similar principles to those in His Majesty's service."

No. 18, p. 365.

438. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke is of opinion that officers appointed to the staff "should invariably be taken off the strength of their regiments without prejudice to their promotion."

No. 7, p. 275.

439. Sir William Keir Grant thinks that there should be a separate service for the duties of the stud, commissariat, building department, and such like.

No. 6, p. 271.

440. Lieutenant-colonel Mayne is of opinion that "the establishment of European officers present with Native corps should be kept more complete than has been the case of late years, by a promotion in lieu of officers appointed to the staff."

No. 20, p. 385.

441. Colonel Stannus thinks that "perhaps it might be found advisable to have separate establishments for the commissariat, barrack, and other branches connected with the military department."

No. 19, p. 385.

442. In another of the replies to the Board's circular, the difficulties in the way of a separation of the civil staff, on account of its unequal operation upon promotion, are stated and considered.

No. 23,  
paras. 53 to 55,  
p. 109.

*Augmentation and reduction of the Army by whole Regiments, and alteration of Establishments affecting Rank.*

443. The introduction of regimental promotion into the Company's service, besides the inconvenience it has occasioned in regard to selection for the staff, and the unequal demand for staff employ upon particular regiments,\* has been productive of a still more serious inconvenience in regard to alterations of establishment affecting rank, or requiring an augmentation or reduction of establishment by whole regiments. Sir Robert Scot, in adverting to the former class of these difficulties, observes as follows: "Hitherto, when it has become necessary to augment the armies of India, by adding to the number of regiments at the several Presidencies, the rule by which the officers have been taken from the old and promoted into the new regiments, or kept and promoted in their own, has either not been always the same, or it has at different times been very differently understood or applied; and great public as well as private inconvenience has repeatedly been sustained by the measures which the Governments were afterwards compelled to adopt, with the view of correcting the irregularities committed on these occasions. On a late occasion also, when a certain change in the organization of the three armies, and an increase in the complement of European officers took place, the promotions occasioned thereby were in various instances dissimilarly and unsatisfactorily effected. Whether this want of uniformity in so important a procedure has in every instance been produced by a want of sufficient clearness and precision in the regulations or instructions applicable to such matters, or from any other cause, I am not prepared to state; but as jealousies and discontent, and in many cases, serious injustice to individuals have been, and, while it is suffered to remain uncorrected, will continue to be its inevitable consequences, I submit that some just and uniform system should be clearly laid

Question  
1154.

\* See head entitled "Regimental officers."



laid down and published to the army, and the several Commanders-in-chief and Governments abroad imperatively required to conform thereto."

444. But the difficulty of doing justice to the claims of the Company's officers, upon occasions even when the service has been benefitted by an improved establishment or an augmentation by whole regiments, is trivial indeed, when compared with the serious public inconvenience which has resulted, since the introduction of regimental rise in 1796, from the impediment which it has opposed to the reduction of the army by whole regiments. It is stated by three of the witnesses,\* that no reduction by a whole regiment has been in consequence attempted since 1796. This difficulty, in the opinion of Colonel Salmond, constitutes the principal defect in the system of the Indian army. It arises, as Sir J Nicolls remarks, "from the location of the officers of the corps so reduced, so as to place them in other corps, without prejudice to their brother officers."

Question

1866,

115;

also reply of Sir J  
Malcolm to Q. 687

Question

116.

687.

445. The mode in which the officers of a reduced regiment might be provided for, according to Sir Jasper Nicolls, would be to leave them in skeleton corps, "to supply staff vacancies." Sir John Malcolm thinks that when a temporary addition has been required, it should not have been made by whole regiments, but by the formation of "what are termed extra battalions," which "are commanded by a captain of experience selected from the line, and have only two staff, an adjutant and quartermaster. They are found (he says) to attain excellent discipline, and are quite equal to all the duties that occur within our territories. In case of war or foreign service, they would no doubt require an additional number of European officers; but this could with facility be given them from corps in garrison. The reduction of such corps, which has lately taken place to a considerable extent at all the Presidencies, is attended with none of the inconveniencies before mentioned, and their maintenance is comparatively economical."

446. The Return in Appendix (A.), No. 1, may be referred to in illustration of the preceding remarks. It will be seen by this, that the Native troops of the three Presidencies, in the year 1826, amounted altogether to 260,273 men, and that the establishment, as at present fixed, is reduced to 156,500 men, or by upwards of 100,000 men, without any reduction of the number of regiments which had been raised, and which still form a burthen upon the Indian establishment, the only reduction of European commissioned officers which has taken place, in consequence of this large reduction in the number of Natives, amounting to no more than "two or three subalterns in each corps."

689.

566.

1869 & 1870.

1871.

1868.

447. The mode in which Colonel Salmond proposes to obviate this serious defect in the system of the Company's service, is to offer "a liberal and satisfactory commuted allowance for their commissions to as many officers," upon a reduction of the establishment by whole regiments, "as chose to take it, allowing the seniors of each rank the first choice; the reduced officers," if they did not accept of the commuted allowance, "being allowed to exchange with officers of corresponding rank in other regiments" who might be so disposed.† The officers being nearly of similar ages in the corresponding ranks, Colonel Salmond does not apprehend that in any case a young man, by the proposed method of exchange, would be substituted for an old man. Colonel Salmond is also of opinion that the arrangement would not be attended with great additional expense, because all the expenses of a regiment not wanted for the service would thereby be saved, and the outlay incurred in buying off as many European commissioned officers as are equal to the number required to be reduced, be thereby more than repaid in a short course of time.

448. Independently, however, of the difficulty above stated to a reduction by whole regiments, it may be observed, that the system of the Company's service would hardly admit of such reduction, even if the officers rose in one line, their existing allowances, especially in

\* See reply of Sir J. Nicolls to question 117; Sir T. Reynell, 349; Col. Salmond, 622.

† See also a further and more detailed illustration of this plan in Colonel Salmond's reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, pp. 156 to 160.

in the lower ranks, being represented as not more than sufficient for their maintenance;\* a fact which is of itself sufficient to account for the non-introduction into the Company's service of half pay, "as it is understood in the King's service." Sir John Malcolm states, that he recollects only one instance of any considerable reduction, which took place immediately after his arrival at Madras, and consequently before the introduction of regimental promotion. He states, that on this occasion the reduction "was attended with the greatest distress to the European officers, who were, as far as he recollects, reduced to their mere subsistence, and allowed to go where they chose, while the men were wholly disbanded."

Question  
606 & 607.

688.

449. Sir T. Pritzler remarks, that "additional companies to regiments will always be found the best augmentation in case of war, as they would do for garrison duty, and thereby prevent recruits from being sent on service, who only tend to fill the hospitals; and when the service is over, the augmentation would soon be absorbed in the corps by filling the vacancies occasioned by service."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 5, p. 266.

450. In another of the replies to the Board's circular the difficulties in the way of a reduction by whole regiments are stated and illustrated, and an opinion expressed that they are completely obviated by Colonel Salmond's plan above referred to.

No. 23,  
paras. 38 to 17,  
p. 106.

### *Furlough Regulation.*

451. Major-general Sir Jasper Nicolls states that officers, after a residence of ten years in India, are allowed a furlough for three years, with the privilege of the pay of their rank; but he does not think that one officer out of ten, as a subaltern, has availed himself of the leave of absence, from being unable to meet the expense, and probably, at length, having obtained some regimental or staff appointment. Many officers who have suffered from ill health will make any sacrifice in preference to returning to India, but in general they are very glad to get back.

Questions  
122 to 125.

452. Major-general Sir Thomas Reynell has corroborated the above testimony. He doubts the effect of the furlough regulation to be to induce officers to save money with a view to their eventual retirement when they have served twenty-two years.

355 to 358.

453. Lieutenant-colonel J. W. Aitchison states, that the limitation regarding furlough is generally confined to the absence of four officers per regiment; but in some there are more, in others less; it depends chiefly on sickness. The Court's orders are, that all officers who require furlough on account of sickness be allowed to come home.

1711.

454. In the Appendix will be found a Statement of the rates of furlough pay as they existed in 1813 and at present, and a Return of the number of officers in receipt of furlough pay, with the amount of charge in each year from 1796 to the present time. It may be remarked, however, that furlough operates as a great saving to the Company, every officer on furlough losing at least two-thirds of his Indian allowances.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 70.  
No. 71.

455. Captain Balmain is of opinion that some check should be made to the frequency of furlough.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 11, p. 316.

456. Major Wilson thinks that officers should be encouraged to acquire information in foreign countries.

No. 18, p. 361.

457. In another of the replies to the Board's circular, the indulgence of furlough is considered of importance, from its tending to keep alive the connexion between the European officer and his native country, the feeling of which might be weakened, if the officer had not the option of visiting this country on the pay of his rank, before he had served a sufficient time in the country to entitle him to retire on full pay.

No. 23, para. 152.

### *Retiring Regulation.*

458. Major-general Sir Jasper Nicolls states, that after officers have served sixteen or eighteen years in India they generally prefer completing the term which entitles them to full pay in preference to seeking furlough, but it depends much upon the situation the officer holds, and upon his general health.

Questions  
126-7.

459. Major-

\* See head "Equalization of Allowances."

- Questions**  
**359-60.** 459. Major-general Sir Thomas Reynell corroborated this evidence (Nos. 126-7). A certain number of officers have availed themselves of the retiring Regulation; certainly not so many as remain to serve.
- 608-9. 460. Colonel Salmond has not found the retired pay list to increase much of late years; not so much as when it was first established. He accounts for the circumstance by stating that advantages had of late years been conferred upon the service which formerly had not existed; and the service becoming more valuable, officers were naturally less willing to relinquish it.
- 613 11. 461. He should calculate that the number of cadets who returned home to enjoy their pensions might be one in twenty. His observation regarding the retired half pay did not apply to Bengal alone, but to India in general.
612. 462. The amount of the retired half pay was, in round numbers (ending April 1831), £115,798.
- Appendix (B.),**  
**No. 20, p. 386.** 463. Lieutenant-colonel Mayne is of opinion that inducements should be held out for a greater number of retirements.
- No. 9, p. 289.** 464. Major Nutt dwells on the importance and advantage of a retiring fund.
- No. 10, p. 299.** 465. Colonel Pennington thinks that improved retiring pensions are required.
- No. 15, p. 333.** 466. Sir H. Worsley is an advocate for a retiring pay in proportion to length of service.
- No. 22, p. 398.** 467. Captain Grant Duff thinks that the retiring allowances are on too low a scale, and that the retiring fund among the officers should be supported by the Directors.
- No. 5, p. 266.** 468. Sir T. Pritzler is of opinion that "all officers who have served twenty-two years are entitled to the same retiring pension, whatever rank they may have attained."
- No. 7, p. 275.** 469. Lieutenant-colonel Colcbrooke thinks that pensions should be given to European officers and soldiers in proportion to their length of service.
- Appendix (A.),**  
**No. 72.** 470. In the Appendix will be found a statement of the retiring allowances of European commissioned officers in 1813 and at present, and a return of the number of retired officers in the receipt of full and half pay, with the amount of charge in each year from 1796 to the present time.  
**No. 73.** 471. The following are the number of European commissioned officers who retired from the service in each year, and at each presidency, and in India, from 1813 to 1830, according to the Table in Appendix (A.), No. 56:

				BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	INDIA.
1813	..	..	..	12	21	19	52
1814	..	..	..	30	22	8	60
1815	..	..	..	35	18	4	57
1816	..	..	..	25	27	10	62
1817	..	..	..	11	15	7	33
1818	..	..	..	19	20	3	42
1819	..	..	..	15	18	8	41
1820	..	..	..	21	7	5	33
1821	..	..	..	16	15	5	36
1822	..	..	..	26	17	9	52
1823	..	..	..	27	13	3	43
1824	..	..	..	24	19	5	48
1825	..	..	..	31	22	4	57
1826	..	..	..	25	23	4	52
1827	..	..	..	29	31	8	68
1828	..	..	..	32	15	5	52
1829	..	..	..	36	28	11	75
1830	..	..	..	28	52	8	88

# SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

472. In the following Table the retirements are contrasted with the appointments of cadets made twenty-two years preceding that of the year of retirement. The retirements are obtained from the preceding Table, and the appointments from the second of the Tables, given under the head of "Casualties and Appointments." In the third column the rate per cent. of retirements, contrasted with the appointments twenty-two years back, is stated. When an officer has completed twenty-two years of actual service in India, he is entitled to retire on the full pay of his rank, and the Table has accordingly been constructed to show whether there is any and what proportion observable between the number of appointments and retirements at the interval above stated :

APPOINTMENTS.					RETIREMENTS. After an interval of Twenty-two Years.				Per-centage of Retirements.	
1796	..	..	..	114	1818	..	..	..	42	36·842
1797	..	..	..	132	1819	..	..	..	41	31·060
1798	..	..	..	408	1820	..	..	..	33	8·088
1799	..	..	..	219	1821	..	..	..	36	16·438
1800	..	..	..	474	1822	..	..	..	52	10·970
1801	..	..	..	43	1823	..	..	..	43	100·000
1802	..	..	..	291	1824	..	..	..	48	16·194
1803	..	..	..	492	1825	..	..	..	57	11·585
1804	..	..	..	357	1826	..	..	..	52	14·565
1805	..	..	..	439	1827	..	..	..	68	15·489
1806	..	..	..	340	1828	..	..	..	52	15·294
1807	..	..	..	281	1829	..	..	..	75	26·690
1808	..	..	..	263	1830	..	..	..	88	33·160
From 1796 to 1801	..	..	..	1,390	From 1818 to 1823	..	..	..	247	17·769
— 1802 to 1808	..	..	..	2,463	— 1824 to 1830	..	..	..	210	17·864
— 1796 to 1808	..	..	..	3,853	— 1818 to 1830	..	..	..	687	17·830

473. Officers, however, having the privilege of a furlough to England of three years, after a service of ten years in India, many avail themselves of this privilege previously to retirement, which postpones their privilege of retiring on the pay of their rank to a service of twenty-five years. Accordingly, the following calculation is meant to provide for the case of officers so circumstanced :

APPOINTMENTS.				RETIREMENTS. Twenty-five Years afterwards.			Per-centage of Retirements.
From 1796 to 1800	..	..	1,347	From 1821 to 1825	..	236	17·520
— 1801 to 1805	..	..	1,622	— 1826 to 1830	..	335	20·653
— 1796 to 1805	..	..	2,969	— 1821 to 1830	..	571	19·232

474. According to these data, the average number of appointments from 1796 to 1813, being at the rate of 243 annually, the retirements in the years from 1831 to 1835, would average 43 at a per-centage of 17·83. If the period of twenty-five years be taken, the per-centage from the Table being 19·232, the average number of retirements in the years from 1834 to 1838 would be 46. But these numbers are evidently too low, as they fall

considerably below the average of the actual retirements for several years past, which in the years from 1824 to 1830 amount to 62 annually.\*

Para. 75 of this  
Synopsis.

475. The per-centage of retirements from among the European commissioned officers, from 1813 to 1830,† being 1·53, and the present authorized establishment of European commissioned officers being 4,120,‡ the average number of retirements annually would, according to this method of calculation, amount to sixty; but the following considerations seem to show that this average is likely to vary in a series of years, being sometimes above and sometimes below that amount.

Para. 82 of this  
Synopsis.

476. The average number of appointments per annum to keep up the present authorized establishment being 209, when the existing supernumeraries shall have been absorbed, and the appointments from 1796 to 1806 averaging annually 303, the retirements in the years from 1818 to 1828, when these officers completed their twenty-two years of service, must be expected to be considerably in excess of what will take place in the succeeding ten years, the appointments affecting which, namely, from 1807 to 1818, averaging no more than 129 annually. Again, in the years 1819 to 1828, the appointments average annually 366, and consequently the retirements that will take place in the years from 1841 to 1850, may be expected to be considerably in excess of sixty annually, when the retired list will probably have attained its maximum, if the establishment of European commissioned officers should not intermediately have been increased.

477. The variation, therefore, between the result obtained from the ascertained per-centage on appointments, and the per-centage of retirements, contrasted with the establishment of European commissioned officers, seems to be attributable to the number of appointments affecting retirements being considerably in excess of the actual number of casualties, occasioned by the large augmentations which have intermediately been made since 1796, while the number of retirements are not as large as they would have been if the establishment had been as large in 1796 as it is at present. In corroboration of this remark, it may be observed that the average number of appointments from 1796 to 1813 is 243, while the casualties on the present authorized establishment do not exceed 209 annually on an average. From 1796 to 1811, the average of appointments annually is 211; from 1796 to 1823, it is 237; and from 1796 to 1828, it is 258; which shows that during the whole period up to 1830, a larger number of appointments affecting retirements up to that time have been made, than will be brought into operation in succeeding years.

478. A few facts or suggestions in relation to the European officers, not comprehended under the preceding heads, will conclude what the witnesses have stated in regard to this important branch of the Indian military establishment.

#### *Off-reckonings.*

Question 1018.

2113.

479. The officers, on succeeding to a regiment, participate in the profits of a fund denominated the off-reckoning fund, which is formed from the surplus of the off-reckonings of the European and Native troops of the different branches of service belonging to the Company at the three Presidencies. The funds of the three Presidencies are thus joined for general and equal division among the colonels of regiments. Lieutenant-colonel Watson states, that "the Bengal Presidency furnishes a greater surplus sum for dividend than the others proportionably." Colonel Leighton states, that "when the regiments were divided in 1824, a colonel-commandant was given to each battalion, and which is now called a regiment; and by the Regulations of the Company it is ordered, that an officer promoted, and who would have obtained off-reckonings on the old establishment prior to 1826, should receive

\* See promotion Calculations accompanying Appendix (B.), No. 23.

† See the first of the Tables under the head "Casualties and Appointments," para. 75 of this Synopsis.

‡  $4,120 \times \frac{1.53}{100} = 63.036$

receive the old established allowance for two battalions ; and that officers who succeed to off-reckonings subsequently, should only get the short or half allowance."

480. In the Appendix will be found a statement of the rates of off-reckonings at each Presidency as they existed in 1813 and at present, and also the value of an off-reckoning share in each year from 1813 to the present time ; with the number of colonels in receipt of full and half shares of off-reckonings, and of those who have not yet come into the receipt of a half-share, with the sum paid as compensation to officers who succeeded to off-reckonings between 1824 and 1826, in each year from that period to the present time.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 68.  
No. 69.

481. Sir John Malcolm is of opinion that " officers should serve a certain number of years before they could be entitled to enjoy the benefits of off-reckonings ; this arrangement, however, to be just, should in a great degree be prospective, affecting in its operation none who had been more than six or seven years in the service." He adds again, " Every individual, before he became eligible" to the command of a regiment, " should have served with credit for a certain period in the command of a corps, or in station so high in the general staff, as to be deemed of equal importance as that charge."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 195.

p. 210.

482. He thinks that colonels should be " allowed to command their regiments when they had no general charge."

p. 212.

483. In another of the replies to the Board's circular, the Regulation is considered impolitic, which prevents a colonel in receipt of off-reckonings from drawing the command-money of his regiment, from its discouraging many good officers of that rank from remaining in India, which they probably would do if they could receive command-money and off-reckonings at the same time ; and by this means there would be a larger proportion of senior officers of the Company's service present with corps, and entitled to exercise the higher commands on field service than there are at present."

No. 23, para. 66,  
p. 111.

### *Military Funds.*

484. " There are funds at all the Presidencies of India called military funds, which are maintained by subscriptions on the part of the officers, and by contributions from the Company. From those funds, and the orphan fund in Bengal, and from Lord Clive's fund,\* the widows of officers and their children are provided for. Lord Clive's fund has long since been worn out, principal and interest, so that the charges upon it are in fact charges upon the Company. With regard to the military fund, the direct aid of the Company is £5,123 per annum ; but the funds profit principally by an indirect aid, in the shape of a high rate of interest on their balances, and on an advantageous rate of exchange on their remittances to England." Mr. Melvill calculates " the total advantages to the funds in those various modes" at £17,091 a-year, " including the direct contribution of £5,123. Those funds are not managed by the Company, but by trustees appointed on the part of officers."

Mr. Melvill's reply  
to Q. 2116-17.

485. In the Appendix will be found a Statement of the rates of pensions payable from Lord Clive's fund, as they stood in 1813 and at present ; and also a Return of the number of officers and soldiers, and their widows, in receipt of pensions from Lord Clive's fund, with the aggregate amount of charge in each year from 1813 to the present time.

App. (A.), No. 71.  
No. 75.

486. Captain Macan describes " the comparative situation of officers in India with that of civilians," as being " infinitely inferior in every respect ; in power, in confidence of the Government, in allowances and emoluments, and in relative rank or precedence in society." In illustration of this remark, he states that " an officer commanding a corps has to pay the sum of twenty rupees a month from Government to the Cutwal before two witnesses. A civilian has the disbursement of thousands, without such unjust or degrading suspicion."

Question 2189.

487. Lieutenant-colonel Baker recommends that officers should be compensated for the loss of bungalows when a station is abandoned.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 16, p. 319.

488. Sir

\* See questions 2113, 2114, and 2115, for Mr. Melvill's account of the origin of this fund, and the charges upon it.

- Questions 693 & 694. 488. Sir John Malcolm does not think "it desirable that any share of the ordinary civil situations of Government should be given to military men;" but he advocates the existing practice of their having "equal pretensions with other branches of the service to political situations in India." Lieutenant-colonel Watson concurs in this opinion, adding that "political and military functions are more analogous to each other, as far as relates to Asiatic courts and Eastern diplomacy."
972. 489. Sir John Malcolm in another place remarks as follows: In the various situations, civil and political, which military men have been called upon by emergencies to fill during the last forty years of wars and revolutions, they have rendered the greatest services to the Government and their country.
- Appendix (B.), No. 3, p. 171. 490. "In the political line their claim, when recommended by superior qualifications, has been long recognised, and it would be the worst of policy to narrow selection to stations, on the fulfilment of the duties of which peace or war may depend."
- No. 5, p. 265. 491. Sir T. Pritzler remarks, that "the employment of military men generally in civil situations must be injurious to the army;" but he admits, indeed, that "military men only are fit persons to be employed at some of the Native courts."
- No. 16, p. 338. 492. Lieutenant-colonel Baker and Lieutenant-colonel Mayne consider the employment of military men in civil situations as objectionable.
- No. 20, p. 386. 493. Colonel John Munro and Sir H. Worsley, on the other hand, regard the employment of officers in political situations and on the civil staff as desirable.
- No. 17, p. 353. 494. Colonel Salmond remarks, that "the qualifications of many military men for political and even for judicial and revenue duties cannot be doubted: experience has settled that point. As residents at Native courts they are peculiarly acceptable and useful."
- No. 15, p. 329. 495. Colonel Salmond has given a return of the number of officers in civil employment at the three Presidencies, amounting altogether to 218.
- No. 2, p. 160. 496. Major Wilson thinks it advisable to employ military men on extraordinary occasions, such as the acquisition of new territory, &c. except in the political department, where their services are always useful.
- p. 163. 497. Captain Duff is of the same opinion.
- No. 18, p. 365. 498. Captain Page remarks, that the Natives are more disposed to yield a cheerful obedience to military men than they would to civilians.
- No. 22, p. 397. 499. The employment of military men in civil situations is in another of the replies considered beneficial.
- No. 21, p. 388. No. 23, para. 151, p. 430.

#### EUROPEAN CORPS.

500. WHAT relates to the European corps of the Indian service may be conveniently comprised in a statement of the information or opinions given by the several witnesses, in relation to the mode in which they are recruited from this country, or by volunteers from His Majesty's regiments on their return from India to England.

The pay of and the mode in which the soldiers are victualled; the practice of inebriety, how checked; the method taken to improve them by the establishment of regimental schools and libraries.

The provision made for the maintenance of their children, whether by European or Native women, together with a few particulars in regard to European corps generally, not comprised in those above mentioned.

Major-gen. Sir T. Pritzler, 1230. 501. The Company's European regiments are kept complete by receiving a certain portion of recruits annually from Chatham (the dépôt), and in some degree by volunteers from His Majesty's regiments when sent home.

Sir R. Scot, 1431. 502. The artillery have the choice of all European recruits, which is considered by Sir T. Pritzler to be prejudicial to the infantry.

503. The

503. The bounty for the recruit is the same in the Company's service as in the King's, and recruits are sent out at the age of from twenty to thirty. Col. E. Hay, 1616. 1656.
504. Recruiting for the Company's army has diminished lately, only 500 recruits having been sent out last year, instead of, upon an average, 1,500 for the last eleven years. 1660.
505. Lieutenant-colonel Hopkinson is of opinion that the system of recruiting might be improved. Appendix (B.), No. 13, p. 312.
506. Major Nutt recommends that an artillery officer from each Presidency should be detached to England for the purpose of enlisting men. No. 9, p. 288.
507. The embarkation of troops for India should be so arranged that they may arrive there in the cool season. Sir J. Malcolm, 727.
508. It is seldom practicable to attend to the stationing of troops in the most healthy situations on their first arrival in India. Bangalore is the most healthy situation for new comers, in the Madras Presidency. Major-gen. Sir R. Scot, 1129-30.
- 508 (a). A considerable expense is saved in recruiting and transporting men to India for the purpose of maintaining the European troops in an efficient state, by the soldiers of King's regiments, on the return of their corps to England, volunteering into regiments in the service of His Majesty or the Company. Sir J. Nicolls estimates the saving from this practice at not less than £50 per man. Sir J. Malcolm's reply to Q. 158 to 161. Sir J. Nicolls's reply to Q. 158 to 161.
509. Sir R. Scot thinks it is advisable that all soldiers who are desirous and efficient, not exceeding forty years of age, should be allowed to volunteer; but by the present regulation the King's soldiers, when their regiments are ordered home, are not allowed to volunteer into regiments in India beyond the age of thirty years. Sir Edward Paget, however, does not think it would be prudent to extend their period. It is not recommended that soldiers should be allowed to colonize in India, with the view ultimately of providing recruits for the Indian army. Major-gen. Sir R. Scot, 1427. Sir E. Paget, 2318. Sir T. Pritzler, 1220.
510. The number of Europeans employed in India in each year, from 1798 to 1830, is stated in the first column of the Table which is given under the head of European and Native troops.
511. In the Appendix is a Table of the pay of European non-commissioned officers and privates at each Presidency. Appendix (A.), No. 61, p. 116.
512. Sir John Malcolm observes: "With respect to the pay of the European soldier, my opinion is that we have gone to an extreme, and that in many respects an expense has been incurred beyond what was called for, either by attention to the habits or health of European troops serving in India." Appendix (B.), No. 3, p. 197.
513. European soldiers in Bengal are victualled altogether by the commissariat at a fixed daily stoppage; a system which is much preferable to the soldier providing for himself. Major-gen. Sir J. Nicolls, 133-4.
514. The supply of meat and bread to Europeans in India is stated to be very good. Major-gen. Sir T. Reynell, 367.
515. No means have as yet proved an effectual check to drunkenness. The establishment of canteens has been attended with good effect as to the quality of the liquor consumed by the men and keeping them in their quarters, but habitual drunkards have in consequence more facilities than formerly for obtaining liquor. The soldier at the Presidency of Bengal receives a compensation in lieu of spirits. Beer, wine, and all kinds of spirits have been introduced into the canteens, but to no use, as those inclined to drink will always resort to the most ardent spirits. Major-gen Sir J. Nicolls, 135 to 148.
516. The rule which obtains in His Majesty's service, that the European soldiers shall receive their pay daily, is stated to have had the most demoralizing effect among the Company's Col. C. Hopkinson, 1325.\*

\* See also his reply to Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 13, p. 311.



pany's troops, and to have given rise to increased drunkenness. The difficulty, also, of carrying the order into effect in the Company's service is urged as an obstacle to the rule.

Questions  
119 to 152.

517. The regimental schools established in India are of the best description, where the half-caste children, as well as the children by European women of European soldiers, are taught without distinction. Sir T. Reynell states that these schools are well attended.

372-3.  
152-3.

518. The half-caste children of the Company's soldiers at Bengal are removed at eight years old to the orphan school of the Presidency to which they belong. They are not generally brought up to any trade.

146-8.

519. In regard to the libraries established for the soldiers, it is stated that the effect of these has been very good in relieving the tedium of a barrack life. The books are said to be read "very much" by the soldiers. "When canteens were established, all implements which could be of any use, to encourage the soldiers to exercise were given to them at the expense of the canteen. Public five-courts are built at all European stations, and other methods are besides adopted for diverting the minds of the soldiers when not on duty."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 7, p. 274.

520. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke is of opinion that the discouragement of the marriage of European soldiers "with the Natives is unjust and impolitic;" and that "their children would form a most valuable class, if properly attended to."

No. 13, p. 311.

521. Lieutenant-colonel Hopkinson is of opinion that the pay to the European wives of European soldiers should be increased from five to seven rupees per month. In Bengal it is eight rupees per month.

Question 157.  
Major-gen.  
Sir J. Nicolls,  
382, 1746 to 1750.  
1327.

Also his reply to the  
Board's Circular,  
App. (B.), No. 13,  
p. 312.

522. It is stated by Sir J. Nicolls and Sir T. Reynell that many of the children of European soldiers by European women, when of proper age, are enlisted into the King's and Company's service. The following testimony of Colonel Hopkinson, in regard to children of this description, would seem to lead to a different conclusion: it is striking and important: "When I was a subaltern in the corps it was my custom and duty to go round the place where the Europeans lived, to see that they were comfortable, and had got their houses and streets clean. In going there so frequently, I had an opportunity of seeing children in great numbers, of pure European blood; yet long as I have been in the service, I cannot recollect above *one instance* where one of those children attained maturity. The circumstance made a deep impression on me, and for many years I have made enquiries on this subject, but I never could ascertain that in any corps the children, ever lived; if they did, many would be now bearing arms or in public offices. This struck me the more forcibly from the circumstance that many young men who have come out as recruits in the artillery, wanting to get their discharge, to obtain which, it is necessary a substitute should be provided. Now, if any or even a very small proportion of those children born had lived to attain the age of maturity there would have been no difficulty whatever in getting substitutes; but I never knew or ever heard of one single instance in the Madras establishment where one was so procured, or where a man born in India, of pure European blood, ever attained an age sufficiently mature to be taken as a substitute. I stated this fact to the adjutant-general at Madras, and pressed the point on his attention; he was struck with the circumstance, and obtained the sanction of the Commander-in-chief to order that the European corps, King's and Company's, should send in a return of the children born of European parents in India: that return came, and was sent to me to arrange. I have got the papers with me. The corps did not, however, seem exactly to understand the order, and the returns were, I found on examination, very incorrect and incomplete, some corps having included children that have been born in this country, and have gone out with their parents; other corps included the half-caste children; but however incorrect, it will still seem to show how very few are living in proportion to the great number that have been born there, and how very few are still beyond the age of childhood. This return is perfectly correct as to the number now living, but is not correct as to the number born, for it is, I believe, only these few years that any thing like a register of children has been kept."

Question  
154.

523. The half-caste children of European soldiers are never enlisted into an European regiment except as drummers or fifers. Sir Jasper Nicolls sees no objection to half-castes being

- being admitted into the Company's Native or European regiments as rank-and-file men, but, as there is a strong prejudice against them on the part of Natives, it is better that they should not be admitted to the rank of officers. Questions 217-8.
524. The half-caste population in the neighbourhood of cantonments is not considerable or increasing. 155-6, 380-1.
525. Major Wilson recommends the formation of "two experimental regiments of East Indians," the first battalions being officered with Europeans, and the second with East Indians. Appendix (B.), No. 18, p. 370
526. European troops in India are stated to sustain a disadvantage with respect to their accounts, *viz.* that in payments made by the troops to the East-India Company, the rupee is credited at a sterling value considerably below that at which it is debited to them in the payments made in England on their account.\* Major-gen. Sir C. Dalhousie, 2115.
527. The system in respect to European corps generally is not to detach them on any but important services. Major-gen. Sir R. Scott, 1116.
528. Regarding the pensions of non-commissioned officers and men, it is stated that any man after ten years service is eligible to the pension or invalid establishment; but if he has received an injury which prevents him doing his duty, he is always entitled to be invalided or pensioned, without reference to period of service. Col. C. Hopkinson, 1361.
529. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke is of opinion that pensions should be given to European officers and soldiers in proportion to their length of service. Appendix (B.), No. 7, p. 275.
530. Major Wilson recommends that a furlough should be granted "to the well behaved European soldier of a certain number of years service." No. 18, p. 368
531. The following are the replies which have been received to the question, "Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interests connected with the army might be expected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies?" No. 1, p. 155.
532. Colonel Limond thinks that "the introduction of promiscuous settlers, by bringing in collision the vices of our country, would be destructive of the impression on the mind of the Native of European superiority and perfection, and ultimately, by the increase of that description of offspring, accelerate a crisis yet far distant." No. 12, p. 307.
533. Sir John Malcolm observes, "I cannot think that settlers in India would ever fill our ranks with recruits equal to those which are freshly imported from England; and there is no other mode in which I can contemplate any benefit to the public interests, as connected with the army, from such colonization." No. 3, p. 171.
534. Sir T. Pritzler states that, "except in the hills, no European could earn his living by labour." He adds, "It would be very desirable to establish European pensioners on the hills, where, by a little labour, they would, with their pension, be enabled to live more comfortably, and to render their progeny a much more moral and useful race of beings than they are at present. Europeans with capital might settle in India to advantage." No. 5, p. 268.
535. Colonel Stannus remarks, that the danger resulting from colonization, "in enabling Native powers to attach Europeans to their service with greater ease than at present, is more of a political than a military question." No. 19, p. 385.
536. Colonel John Munro states, "I consider the free settlement of British subjects in India to be extremely important to the prosperity of that country. With respect to the army, I do not apprehend that it would have any consequences either favourable or otherwise, for a considerable period of time. Hereafter, perhaps, recruits might be found among the descendants of the settlers, or corps of topassees might be formed; a description of force that was indeed used in the early period of our military history."

537. Lieutenant-

Appendix (B.),  
No. 20, p. 387.

537. Lieutenant-colonel Mayne—"I cannot see how any advantage to the public interests connected with the army should be expected from encouraging the settlement of Europeans in India. A general colonization would endanger the safety of the empire. Our strength is in the high opinion the Natives entertain of the European character; weaken that high opinion, and you undermine the foundation of our power."

No. 8, p. 283.  
No. 10, p. 300.

538. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland and Colonel Pennington expressed themselves nearly to the same effect.

No. 9, p. 290.

539. Major Nutt says, "The permanent residence of British subjects in India, I am decidedly of opinion should rather be discouraged than promoted. It must be recollected that the soil in India is not like that of New South Wales, unappropriated, but, generally speaking, private property, and therefore not at the disposal of Government. It should also be our policy gradually to introduce the Natives of the country into the administration of its affairs, which would never be accomplished, at least amicably, if Europeans were allowed to settle there in any considerable number, as they would naturally look, and soon become clamorous for the introduction of English laws and an English legislative assembly, to the exclusion or suppression of the Hindoos and Mahomedans. The Anglo-Indians would also desire to have their representatives and share in the Government, and hence would probably ensue a contest that would be alike fatal to the interests of all, and possibly the existence of two parties out of the three."

No. 11, p. 320.

540. Captain Balmain thinks that "advantage may be expected from the settlement of British subjects in India;" and he states his reasons at some length.

No. 15, p. 329.

541. Sir H. Worsley remarks that colonization would be disadvantageous, except in respect to individuals of capital, or in Ceylon and the Eastern Islands.

No. 2, p. 165.

542. Colonel Salmond observes, that "Englishmen cannot increase and multiply in the country called India; in the hot triangle included within the Himalaya Mountains, the Indus and the sea, there are not perhaps 100 men and women now living in all India, the offspring of European soldiers by European women, who have been born in that country."

No. 18, p. 382.

543. Major Wilson thinks that "the interests of a body of British colonists in India would be much more identified with the British Government than those of any others of our subjects; there would from colonization be a greater number, and a better description of contractors for public works and supplies, who would be individuals of greater energy and more active habits than they are at present. There cannot be a doubt that a militia composed of colonists, or one of which colonists formed an influential part, would be a material addition to the military strength of our Government in India"

No. 21, p. 389.

544. Captain Page is of opinion that the interests of the army would not be affected by the settlement of Europeans in India, but that great commercial advantages would be derived from it, as cotton, silk, sugar, tobacco, drugs, and other produce of India might be cultivated by Europeans with similar advantages as Indigo.

No. 22, p. 400.

545. Captain Grant Duff considers colonization as unjust to the Natives; and he replies to the reasoning which has been urged in favour of the measure.

No. 4, p. 259.

546. Mr. Elphinstone observes, "I do not see much effect the settlement of Europeans would have on the army. The sepoys would participate in any effect it had on the other Natives. It might afford employment to European soldiers worn out in the service, and it might also offer attractions to men before they could get their discharge. I do not think it would lead to more marriages among men who remained with their regiments, or that it would have much effect on their conduct in other respects. It would probably lead to many marriages among the officers, which with the introduction of the sons of settlers into the army would weaken the tie between it and this country."

No. 7, p. 276.

547. Lieutenant-colonel Colebrooke thinks that European officers as well as soldiers should be allowed to settle in India, and that jagheers should be granted to them; and he also suggests whether colonies of Europeans might not be formed at stations where large bodies of troops are no longer required.

548. Sir

548. Sir William Keir Grant is of opinion that European soldiers when invalided should be allowed to settle in India, and also officers.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 6, p. 272.

549. In another of the replies to the circular, it is remarked that colonization is not necessary for military purposes, and that there is little probability of Europeans earning a subsistence in India by labour.

No. 23, para. 168,  
p. 133.

#### COMPANY'S EUROPEAN INFANTRY.

550. THERE is an European regiment in the service of the East-India Company at each Presidency, the officers of which are promoted in separate wings.\*

551. The separate promotion of officers serving in the same corps, and liable to supersede each other, is strongly objected to by some of the witnesses:† Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison observes that, "as far as the European officers are concerned, it must prove injurious to the actual performance of their duty, inasmuch as they rise separately by wings, and are liable to supersede each other, instead of rising by a regular routine, according to previous seniority in the regiment;" and Colonel Leighton states, that "a better plan could not have been fallen upon to create dissension among the European officers."

Question  
1773.

1987, 1988.

552. Colonel Leighton is of opinion that it would be impolitic to dispense with the European regiments of the Company's service, as from those corps "a great number of non-commissioned officers are supplied to the Native infantry and to departments." He adds, "there are other reasons why those regiments should be kept up, and the number of men increased instead of being diminished. I consider that they were much more useful as two regiments than as they are at present; 500 Europeans in one part of the country and 500 in another, are sometimes very much wanted, and very useful." Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison also considers the corps "highly efficient, as much so as any European regiment can be;" and that "if any want be felt, it is the want of officers."

2112.

1765.  
1766 to 1769.

553. Lieutenant-colonel Watson would not advise the reduction of the European regiments, "unless some arrangement could be provided for supplying the numerous subordinate departments of general staff with warrant and non-commissioned officers;" and he considers that, if practicable it would be better that cadets, on their arrival in India, should serve in an European before they join a Native corps.

1003.

1004.

554. The remarks of Sir Robert Scot on this subject are as follow: "In my judgment, the maintenance of a large and efficient force of European infantry, in the service of the Company, is not less indispensable to the completion of their army, and as the principal source from which a very extensive demand for non-commissioned officers and privates for employment in all the different branches of the staff and other departments of the army in garrison, cantonment, and in the field, and in many other situations besides, must always be supplied, that it is advisable on political grounds also; and it is therefore with equal regret and surprise that I have lately heard of a measure being in contemplation, if not already in progress in Bengal, which, if persevered in, cannot fail I think in lowering its consequence and efficiency while it reduces its numbers; this would prove a most serious blow, and one that could not be long unfelt by the Native army, which, deprived of the support of a respectable European force in the service of the same master, a result which would in no great time follow the adoption of the measure in question, would probably sink in self-estimation, as well as in that of others, and by degrees become so inferior in character and efficiency, as to be unfit to be any longer trusted with those great interests of which it is, and always has been, the only effectual and legitimate guardian. I strongly deprecate, therefore,

1151.

Reply of  
Lt.-col. Aitchison  
to Q. 1787.

\* See reply of Col. Salmond to question 600; Lieut.-col. Feilding, 794; Lieut.-col. Watson, 1002; Col. Wm. Dickson, 1618 and 1704.

For the Numbers and Expense of the European infantry regiments, in each year from 1813 to 1830, see the Return in Appendix (A.), Nos. 2 and 3, p. 6.

† See reply of Lieut.-col. Aitchison to question 1773; Col. Leighton, 1987 and 1988.

- Mr. Russell, 2234. tribes, from which the Bengal sepoy is chiefly drawn, are stated to be, both morally and physically, a much finer race than that from which the Madras army is recruited. The Bengal sepoy is born soldier, the Madras is taught to be so. Among the Bengal sepoy, Hindoos of the better class greatly preponderate; among the Madras sepoy there is a much larger proportion of Mahomedans, and Hindoos of the lower castes. Mutinies are of less frequent occurrence among the Bengal than among the Madras sepoy. No bounty is paid to a sepoy on enlistment.
2234.  
Col. Watson, 959. 568. At one time, just before the conquest of Mysore, there was great difficulty found in procuring recruits at Madras, and in maintaining the battalions in a complete state. The desertions were frequent. This induced the Madras Government, with the sanction of the Court, to increase the pay of the Native troops at Madras from five to seven rupees a-month. This has produced a difference between the pay of the Bengal and Madras sepoy, which exists to the present moment. There was also difficulty in recruiting the Madras army in 1806 and 1807; but there is no difficulty at the present time. Mussulmans are not so frequently enlisted now as formerly. They obtain preferable employment in other ways; such as in provincial courts of justice, for instance.
- Major-gen. Sir R. Scot, 1450-1; Col. Greenhill, 1522-3. Lt.-col. Aitchison, 1705, 1709-10-11, 1712. 569. At Bombay, during the war in 1817-18, there was a difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of recruits within that Presidency, and many were enlisted from Hindoostan. No difficulty, however, is apprehended in future. Recruits are enlisted from the age of eighteen to twenty-two in time of peace; in war, as old as twenty-five. Recruit boys are a most useful establishment, from which are obtained the best non-commissioned officers in the service. The practice of enlisting these boys attaches both the parent and son to the service. Five thousand men could be raised for the Bombay army in six or ten months. The Bombay troops are stated to be best adapted for infantry.
- B.-gen. Leighton, 9166, 9168. Capt. Macan, 2176. 570. It is a common saying among Natives of rank, that "We (the Europeans) have taught the mean to beat the noble." Captain Macan thinks that we shall always have good troops if we can command their affections and fidelity, which (he says) is of much greater importance than any imaginable perfection of discipline. The attachment to the service he considers to be less than it was formerly, in consequence of a diminution in its advantages and importance. The sepoy was never much imbued with notions of loyalty, and if discharged from our ranks, would not hesitate to take service wherever he could better himself. The discontents of the sepoy are stated by Captain Macan to be artfully worked on by brahmins or priests, who never, in his opinion, should have been enlisted in our ranks; for no man (he says) who possesses a character superior to that which he can acquire as a soldier, and who, although he may have disgraced himself before the enemy, is still venerated by his companions in arms, can be fit for the military service. Captain Macan, however, states that the fancy for brahmins has almost entirely ceased, and that we are getting rid of them as fast as we can.
2177. 2196. 2197. 571. Sir John Malcolm, in speaking of the Natives of the Bombay army, states, that "the Hindoostanee men, though in size, appearance, and perhaps in a certain degree of military pride, superior to the Konkanecs, and Deccanees, the latter are more patient under privation and fatigue, more easily subsisted and managed, and in bravery to be fully their equals. The Bombay army is at present (1830) composed of
- |                 |    |    |    |    |    |        |
|-----------------|----|----|----|----|----|--------|
| " Hindoostanees | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12,476 |
| Konkanecs ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10,015 |
| Deccanees ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1,910  |
572. "If the encouragements now given are continued to the men of the Bombay provinces, there will not in future be occasion to have recourse to other countries for recruits.
- p. 199. 573. "I regret to observe that the pride of caste is now much cherished by the men, and considered by the officers. There are no prejudices and pretensions that will be found so injurious, if not resisted, as those minor ones of caste, if they receive more attention than is due to them. When as frequently happens, (brahmins) solicit their European superiors to classify sepoy, and to place sentries in a manner that will prevent the inconvenience of

of their washing or being offensive, they should be told the soldier is ennobled by his occupation, and that they might leave the public service, if the proximity to any of those employed in it was insufferable.

574. "I have served with and commanded Native troops of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, and I have hardly a choice. They have different qualities, but with good officers they are all excellent troops. I should dislike to see any serious change in their composition, further than was dictated by a gradual change of circumstances." Appendix (B), No. 3, p. 201.

575. Sir T. Pritzler states, that "the sepoy of the Madras army is a light active man, not equal in appearance to the sepoy of Bengal, but certainly likely to endure much more fatigue." He adds, "sepoys never desert, because corps generally consist of an assemblage of families." No. 3, p. 265.

576. Colonel Salmond states, that "the Bengal troops are Hindoostances, the Madras Deccanees, and the Bombay troops a mixture of both." No. 2, p. 157.

577. Captain Page thinks that corps should be formed "of every variety of caste and religion." No. 21, p. 391.

578. Captain Grant Duff recommends that the Hindoos of the Bombay army should never exceed one-fourth. No. 22, p. 395.

579. The natives of some parts of the Madras territory are stated by Sir T. Pritzler to be better soldiers than others; but all are, in his opinion, "very excellent sepoys." The infantry he states to be as good as it possibly can be; the cavalry to be good, but capable of further improvement. He entertains doubts both as to the efficiency of the Native artillery, and also as to the policy of making them efficient. Sir T. Pritzler,\* 112a 6.

580. Captain Macan thinks that our Native armies are infinitely superior to any Native army that ever appeared in India, and fully capable (if their fidelity and attachment is preserved) to cope with any Asiatic enemies we are likely to encounter on the plains of India. Capt. Macan, 2185.

581. If called upon to meet an European enemy in the north of India, Mr. Mackenzie thinks that they might fail, partly from want of physical strength, and partly from the want of moral energy. Sir Lionel Smith says, "they will always follow Europeans, and do their duty well when they are well led." All the evidence tends to show that the Native troops are well affected to the Government.\* Mr. H. Mackenzie, 2261. Sir L. Smith, 2313.

582. Captain Macan's testimony in their favour is somewhat qualified. He says: "In case of foreign invasion, I think they might still be depended on, unless under great reverses at the onset, when artful and flattering overtures from an enemy, and more particularly if a Mahomedan, might be attended with doubtful consequences, unless efficient means are taken to renew the attachment which formerly existed between the sepoy and his officer." He afterwards says: "The Native troops would remain faithful, so long at least as we were victorious, paid them regularly, humoured their prejudices, and treated them with consideration and kindness." Mr. Holt Mackenzie believes that their attachment to the service rests chiefly upon the goodness and regularity of their pay, and the consequent comfort which it secures to them. 2178-9, 2181, 2190.

583. Our military force in India is considered by Mr. Russell to be the sole and exclusive tenure by which we hold the Government. This, he says, has been too much overlooked. "Towards the European officers, a short-sighted system of economy has been prosecuted, injurious in the first instance to the army, and in its consequences to the Government; and with respect to the sepoys, much of that care which ought to have been bestowed on securing their attachment and improving their efficiency has been wasted in a frivolous, vexatious attention to outward forms." The system however, he admits has been improved. He considers that "the best means of warding off danger consists in a steady, uniform, conciliatory treatment both of the European officers and Native soldiers." Mr. Russell, 2231-2.

Instance mutiny at Vellore. 2233. 2236.

584. The

584. The Native soldier is temperate in his habits, and easily managed; but his feelings are strong, and much depends on the conduct towards him of his European officer; but his feelings are generally those of attachment.\*

Appendix (B.),  
No. 11, p. 318.

585. Captain Balmain states what he deems to be the cause of the non-attachment of the Natives to the service, and dwells on the impolicy of frequent changes in the dress of the soldiery.

No. 15, p. 327.

586. Sir H. Worsley considers the Native army as rather deteriorated from what it was. The Natives seem to him "to have lost much of their characteristic purity and simplicity of manners, by which their moral and military virtues were formerly enanchored. They are, nevertheless, the most orderly, respectful, and obedient soldiers in the world." Sir H. Worsley has offered some suggestions calculated, in his opinion, "to promote and cherish the fidelity and attachment of the Native army."

p. 332.

No. 18, p. 359.

587. Major Wilson remarks, that "Native troops are capable of the greatest devotion, with skill, confidence, and ability; and the various histories of our military transactions in India abound in such proofs." When commanded with judgment, they have "emulated the courage and enterprise of the British."

No. 2, p. 156.

588. Colonel Salmond regards the Native Infantry "as the standing police force of the country, yet ready to be withdrawn for systematic military purposes when wanted." He suggests whether "it would not be wiser to discountenance, rather than enforce or encourage the retention of subsidiary armies by Native powers."

No. 3, p. 169

589. Sir John Malcolm observes, "The Native troops constitute the real strength of our empire. Some may think otherwise. I must however state, that all my recent experience confirms the opinions I have elsewhere stated."

Sir J. Nicolls, 165.  
Sir T. Reynell, 103.

590. Regarding the duties respectively discharged by the European and Native officers, it is stated by Sir J. Nicolls and Sir T. Reynell, that the European officer who commands in the field, or at field exercise is responsible for the arming, clothing, and payment of the men, and that he seldom moves but with his own company, or a number equivalent thereto. The European officer of a company also investigates the complaints of the men before submitting them to the commanding officer for decision. The Native officer does all the smaller duties of the camp or station.†

Sir J. Nicolls, 38.

187, 199; also  
Sir T. Reynell, 435.

591. Native officers are generally the oldest sepoys of the corps raised to those ranks by seniority, combined with character, without reference to caste; the highest rank they can attain is that of subadar-major. The present inducement in respect to promotion Sir J. Nicolls considers sufficient to attach the Native officers permanently to the service; but he thinks the pay of jemadars should be increased.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 4, p. 257.

592. Mr. Elphinstone recommends that Native officers should continue to be promoted by seniority, and that "there should be many different grades, that promotion may never stop till the men are worn out."

No. 22, par. 68.  
110-1, p. 129.

593. In another of the replies to the circular it is suggested, that the subadar-major per regiment should be extra to the establishment of subadars, and that an additional subadar-major or subadar-captain per regiment, also extra to the establishment of subadars, should be allowed. These officers to have occasionally the charge of a vacant troop or company, with a portion of the command-allowance.

No. 21, p. 390.

594. Captain Page considers the appointment of subadar-major as a "revival, under a different name, of the old appointment of commandant."

No. 18, p. 369.

595. Major Wilson recommends that one-sixth of the vacancies among Native officers should be given to the sons of Native gentlemen.

596. A

\* Sir J. Nicolls, 12, 252; Sir John Malcolm, 670; Colonel Watson, 889; Sir T. Pritzler, 1129; Sir T. Reynell, 272; Colonel Dickson, 1610; Colonel Salmond, 499.

† Sir J. Nicolls, 171-2; Sir T. Reynell, 409-10.

596. A Native aide-de-camp, might, in the opinion of Sir J. Nicolls, be attached with advantage to each general officer on the staff. Lieutenant-colonel Watson concurs in this opinion. Sir T. Reynell speaks rather doubtfully on the subject. Sir T. Pritzler not only recommends such an appointment as an encouragement to the Natives, but he adds, "I never could do my duty in the field without assistance of that description." Sir J. Malcolm remarks as follows: "I have never known any attached to Governors-general or Governors; but the Native officers belonging to their body-guards may be considered as personal staff. The Native aides-de-camp have been for many years past very common and usual in the Madras establishment. Two Native aides-de-camp accompanied Sir Thomas Hislop during the war of 1817 and 1818, and one if not both of these have continued with the subsequent commanders-in-chief of Fort St. George, Sir Alexander Campbell and Sir George Walker. A subadar of Native cavalry of very high character was aide-de-camp, thirty years ago, to Major-general Dugal Campbell in the staff, and the same Native officer accompanied the Duke of Wellington in the Mahratta war of 1803. During the war of 1817 and 1818, I had a Native aide-de-camp, now a subadar-major of the body-guard of Madras, attached to me, and I can state that, during a period of four years, I derived a benefit from his services in many lines which it is impossible I could, from the nature of those services, have derived from any European officer on my staff." And as to whether it would be generally expedient that a general officer in the staff should have a Native aide-de-camp attached to him, he remarks: "It very much depends upon the power those general officers possess, from knowledge of the country or of the language, to employ them usefully. At Madras it so occurred that the most efficient officers of this description on the staff spoke English remarkably well; but this is a very rare qualification in a Native officer, and quite unknown, I believe, at Bengal, and very little at Bombay."

Sir J. Nicolls, 193.  
Questions  
921, 128-9, 1213.

723.

597. Colonel J. Munro states, that the appointment "would be certainly desirable, and that it would be very gratifying to the Natives themselves." He adds, however, that in the event of Native officers being appointed to such situation, "they never would associate at table; they might occasionally sit down at breakfast, but they would not dine together upon meat." Lieutenant-colonel Feilding sees no objection to the appointment, and thinks that "in many instances it might be beneficial;" but he hardly anticipates that it would operate as an encouragement to the Natives in entering the service, or increase their attachment to it.

1061.

1066.

839 10.

598. Colonel Greenhill thinks that Native officers employed in this way "would be of no use afterwards with a battalion; they would have ideas altogether above the performance of regimental duties."

1196.

599. Sir Robert Scot states as follows: "With very great care in the selection of officers, and scrupulous attention to the mode of employing them, I think good effects would result from it. The plan has been tried at Madras, but perhaps not under the most favourable circumstances." Mr. Russell enumerates appointments of this description among the measures which he recommends for attaching the Natives to our service.

1100.

2236.

600. Sir L. Smith thinks such an appointment to "be very proper, exceedingly proper, and very desirable."

2241.

601. The appointment of Native aides-de-camp is also recommended in one of the replies to the Board's circular.

App. (B.), No. 23,  
paras. 136 to 139,  
p. 429.  
195.

602. Sir Jasper Nicolls further recommends the grant of medals to Natives for their services as particularly gratifying to them; and he adds, "I should be glad to see a portion of the distinctions and advantages conferred at Madras extended to Bengal."

603. The following is Sir J. Malcolm's description of what has been done at Madras and Bombay, in view to the encouragement of the Natives: "Native officers under the Presidency of Madras have for a long period received honours and pensions, and at times grants of lands for peculiar services; and two who were very distinguished have been lately promoted to the highest rank to which men in their condition of life could aspire. At Bombay the late Governor, Mr. Elphinstone, subsequent to the war of 1817 or 1818, made an arrangement

Q. 1262;  
also his reply to the  
Board's Circular,  
Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 209.



Appendix (B.),  
No. 3,  
pp. 232 and 231.

rangement by which several Native officers of rank and character were promoted to be killadars or commanders of hill forts. Three years ago I proposed a modification of this measure, which was carried into execution, by which, at a very trifling cost, not amounting to £1,000 sterling per annum, several more distinguished officers of the Native army were appointed to commands of the principal hill forts: the whole number was six subadars as killadars, and six jemadars as naibs or lieutenants. They were divided into three classes with different staff allowances, and the two subadars belonging to the first class were admitted into the third order of the privileged order of the class of the Deccan, a description of aristocracy, by which they become exempted from personal arrest, and were entitled to marks of respect highly gratifying to their ambition. These rewards were made a part of the establishment; and on a vacancy occurring, the Native officer who, after a certain period of service, bore the highest character, was placed in the situation of a commission from Government, from whom he receives, at the same period that he is publicly invested, marks of distinction, according to the grade to which he is raised, such as dresses, or to the higher ranks, a horse. Those marks of favour from Government are of great value in the eyes of the Natives. The first investiture of this order took place in the presence of his Excellency Sir Thomas Bradford, who was Commander-in-chief, in the large cantonment of Poonah, and the whole of the troops at that station were drawn out upon that occasion. Independent of this establishment, I have mentioned, in answer to a former question, that the revenue corps are now commanded by active Native officers of high character. I can only add, that I consider such distinctions and employments to be of much importance, as also an increase of the number of sepoy boys to each corps, with the privilege to a small proportion of sons of Native officers, which renders them exempt from corporal punishment, and gives them a trifle of increased pay. At Bengal, I believe, no measures have been adopted similar to those which have been taken at Madras and Bombay to give encouragement to this meritorious class of men. From the different composition of the army of that Presidency, they may not be so much required. An account of what has been lately done at Bombay, with the causes and results, will be found in the enclosures of my letter to Lord Wm. Bentinck, dated 27th November 1830, which is upon the table of the Committee."

also p. 201.

604. From the papers above referred to, the following additional extracts have been made:

pp. 200, 237.

605. "Our sebandy corps are now commanded by active and distinguished Native officers, by which economy and efficiency have been promoted, and great encouragement given to the Native army.

pp. 200, 230.

606. "A subsequent measure, which allows a trifling distinction in pay, and exemption from corporal punishments in passing through the ranks, to a limited number in each corps of the sons of Native commissioned officers, has been carried into execution at this Presidency."

pp. 200, 229.  
No. 11, p. 316.

607. He states reasons in favour of the system of attaching sepoy boys to corps. Major Nutt considers the establishment of recruit and pension boys as excellent.

Questions  
238-9.

608. Sir J. Nicolls states, that the Native commissioned officers in Bengal do not like to enlist their sons as sepoys.

1511.

609. Colonel Greenhill thinks that a regulation giving a small increase of monthly allowance, and exemption from corporal punishment, might operate as an encouragement.

1962.  
1396.

610. Colonel Leighton states that some such regulation has been passed at Bombay, where sepoys enlist as frequently as formerly, which Sir R. Scot says is not the case at present.

1263, 1540, 1677,  
1702, 1985 G.

611. Sir T. Pritzler, Colonel Greenhill, and Colonel Dickson, consider an establishment of sepoy boys as the most valuable part of the corps. The best non-commissioned officers are stated by Colonel Leighton and Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison to be obtained from that source at Bombay.

612. Major

612. Major Wilson remarks, that "by a judicious and liberal distribution of honours, distinctions, and titles," a powerful "stimulus might be given to our Native troops, and a royal order of merit for them would be attended with the best possible effects." Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 360.
613. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland is of opinion that an order of merit should be established by His Majesty for the Native officers. No. 8, p. 281.
614. As a further encouragement to the Natives, Sir John Malcolm has recommended the formation of a widow's fund for Native commissioned officers, and he has given a plan of the proposed institution. No. 3, p. 201,  
238, and 251.
615. The habits and prejudices of the Natives are considered by Sir Jasper Nicolls to be an obstacle in the way of the successful introduction of such an institution. Question  
210.
616. Sir T. Pritzler regards it as "most essential that rewards and marks of distinction" should be given to Native officers of "the army in India." Colonel Pennington is an advocate for "every stimulus" of this description "that can be given." He states that the usage at Bengal has been to reward "only by medals, which have been given to officers;" adding, "I know, as an example, an old Native officer in my command, who had served with Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Cornwallis on the coast of Coromandel, and again with General Harris at Seringapatam, and with Lord Lake in the war of Hindostan, and in Lord Hastings' war, and as serang of lascars; he had only 16 rupees a-month, which Lord Hastings increased by 12, making a total of 28 rupees per month, although he was covered with medals." Lieutenant-colonel Feilding remarks, "I am perfectly aware that all Natives in our service are highly flattered by distinctions of medals, particularly for active service; and no people in the world are more open to the influence of personal distinctions than the Natives of India are." 1262.  
831.  
  
811.
617. Captain Macan observes, "that by a judicious distribution of rewards, both honourable and lucrative, the fidelity and attachment of the Natives may be secured, and without this it will rapidly decrease." Mr. Russell and Sir L. Smith are also advocates for "horse and palanquin allowances, medals, grants of lands, honorary distinctions, and privileges of every kind" being conferred on Natives. 2198.
618. Sir Jasper Nicolls is of opinion that the Natives could not be admitted to higher rank than that of subadar-major "with any advantage to the service;" but he thinks that "the appointment of a subadar-major to each flank company, instead of one subadar-major to the regiment, would operate as an encouragement, undoubtedly." He adds, however, "as they are infirm men, for the most part they are not fit for flank companies." Sir T. Reynell does not think that any advantage would result from admitting Natives to higher rank; and Colonel Salmond thinks that "it would be hazardous." 46.  
190.  
  
287.  
516.
619. Colonel John Munro, to prove that Native officers have not hitherto been sufficiently encouraged, adduces the fact, that "on all occasions of mutiny or revolt, they are always the ringleaders, almost always the instigators." He thinks they should be admitted to a higher rate of pay. 1046.  
1017-8.
620. Sir T. Pritzler says the Native officers are not what they formerly were: "they were formerly composed of what I should call Native gentlemen; they are now composed entirely of the non-commissioned officers of the corps who have risen to be Native officers, and consequently I think they are sufficiently well provided for; the being a Native officer is a sufficient reward; and when they are no longer able to do their duty they are pensioned." 1137.
621. Sir Robert Scot does not think they are sufficiently encouraged, and thinks that they should have some advantages affecting the situation of their families. If any higher rank could be assigned them without giving them the command over European commissioned officers he thinks it would be advantageous, but he does not see how it could be done. They might be appointed commandants of forts and small posts in different parts of the country, "which would raise and gratify them very considerably, and do a great deal of good." 1391.  
  
1398.

- Question  
1490, 1492.  
1526.  
1548-9,  
1550, 1554. 622. Colonel Greenhill thinks they *are* sufficiently encouraged. "They might be made killadars of forts; I am aware of nothing else they could be made." Is not altogether convinced that the rewards given at Madras to Native officers of distinguished character have had a good effect. "It makes more people dissatisfied than it makes satisfied." He thinks the pay of Native officers sufficient, and that they could not be employed with *advantage* in revenue or police.
1592.  
1595. 623. Colonel Dickson thinks they should have further advantages; that there should be a higher rank than that of subadar-major, *on which they might retire*, as a reward for past services.
1716.  
1718. 624. Lieutenant-colonel Aitchison thinks there should be additional advantages, in regard to removal to the pension list, pay of jemadar, &c. He considers their appointments to the command of forts most desirable.
1960. 625. Colonel Leighton recommends rewards in the shape of medals, horses, and palanquins; also the command of hill forts.
2237. 626. Mr. Russell considers honorary distinctions as one obvious method of attaching Native officers to the service; but to employ them more extensively in military command, would perhaps have a better effect than any other measure. Sir Lionel Smith thinks the Native officers "should be held up more than they have been," and be better provided for a retirement.
- 2339-40.  
41 to 46. 627. Regarding the rank of Native officers, it is stated by Sir Jasper Nicolls, that a subadar-major is the highest rank to which a Native can attain, and that he is a subaltern with something like brevet rank, and a small additional allowance; but he does the same duty as the other subadars who rank as lieutenants, and jemadars as ensigns. Havildars are serjeants, naicks corporals.
389. 628. In the absence of European commissioned officers, the senior Native commissioned officer, according to Sir T. Reynell, would take the command.
- Col. Salmond, 511. 629. The number of Native officers to each troop or company is one subadar, one jemadar, four or five havildars, and four or five naicks, according to the strength of the company.
- Appendix (B.),  
No. 19, p. 383. 630. Colonel Stannus observes, that the Native commissioned officers "possess little influence in their corps, the men being taught to look for promotion exclusively to their European officers."
- Also Col. Greenhill,  
1571 to 1577. 631. The senior sepoy upon the roll, of suitable character, is the person generally selected for promotion to the rank of naick. In the promotion of naicks to the rank of havildar, length of service gives the preference; in the promotion of havildars to the lowest commissioned rank, that of jemadar, the selection is wider. The jemadar rises very much by seniority to the higher commissioned rank of subadar. The subadar-major is either the senior Native officer in the corps, or a man who has distinguished himself on some occasion.
- Sir J. Nicolls, 180  
to 185; also Sir T.  
Reynell, 120-1-4-6. 632. Some of the old Native officers now in the army came in from local corps that belonged to Native princes, but all the rest are promoted from the sepoy rank.
- Sir T. Pritzer,  
1211. 633. Non-commissioned officers are recommended for promotion exactly on the principle adopted in His Majesty's service. Non-commissioned officers are appointed fairly, and promoted much in the way that European officers are; that is, by seniority. "Hence arises a great feebleness of character and physical incapacity, arising from age and infirmity, in the higher Native officers of the service."
- Col. Aitchison,  
1790. 634. As to the *degree of communication between the European officers*, the Native officers, and men, the evidence\* tends to show that they are in daily communication chiefly on points of duty, but that communication is not so great as in European regiments.
- Captain Macan,  
2220, 2222. 635. Native

\* See Sir J. Nicolls, 35, 37, 167, 169, 284; Sir T. Reynell, 404-5; Col. Salmond, 511.

635. Native officers are prevented by religious prejudices from attending convivial or dinner parties, or rather intercourse of that description. A good understanding between the European and Native officer is strictly enjoined by the regulations. Col. Dickson, 1588, 1589-90; Col. Atchison, 1715.

636. The more minute superintendence over the men is necessarily left to the Native officers. Col. J. Munro, 1015.

637. The men are paid in the presence of the European officer, by the pay-havildar, who is responsible for the expenses of the troop or company.\*

638. Every thing relating to the drill and instruction of the corps, the parading of guards and detachments, attendance upon the commanding officer for instructions and orders, besides many line and station duties, devolve on the adjutant. Sir J. Nicolls, 173. Sir T. Reynell, 111-12.

639. The duties of quartermaster and interpreter are, as *quartermaster*, the care of the ammunition, new clothing, the furnishing the smaller articles of equipment, and the care of the tents. As interpreter, he attends all courts-martial and courts of inquiry, and on parade translates the general and regimental orders. Sir J. Nicolls, 175. Sir T. Reynell, 111.

640. There is also an European non-commissioned staff to a Native army, consisting of serjeants-major and quartermaster-serjeants. At Bengal they superintend the drill. Their situation is much the same as that of a non-commissioned officer in an European corps. Their services could not be dispensed with. Sir T. Pritzler does not think these European non-commissioned officers attached to Native corps are efficient at Madras. They are made use of more as clerks to write and make out returns, and are not at all employed in the discipline of the corps. Sir T. Reynell, 386 to 391. Sir T. Pritzler, 1231.

641. Under the Bengal Presidency the sepoy is entitled to an invalid pension allowance after fifteen years' service. The pension establishment of Madras is considered by Sir R. Scot of great importance. Col. Watson, 991. Sir R. Scot, 1119.

The men at that Presidency are pensioned on half-pay, when unfit for field service. They are also invalided on full-pay, in which case they do garrison duty. At Bombay they are either discharged or invalided, as the case may be, when reported unfit for duty. Col. Greenhill, 1513, 1545; Col. Atchison, 1770-1.

642. Pensions are granted generally for wounds, disabilities, and length of service, to all ranks, both Native officers and sepoys. The amount of pensions to Native officers and soldiers at the three Presidencies in the year 1828, was £211,903. Col. Salmond, 1891, 1895, 1902. Mr. Melvill, 2127.

643. Lieutenant-colonel Baker recommends that Natives should not be entitled to pensions under twenty-five years' service, except for wounds. Appendix (B.), No. 16, p. 319.

644. Captain Balmain thinks that pensions to Natives should be on a graduated scale.

645. Grants of land have been recommended instead of pensions to Native officers and sepoys. The practice prevailed formerly in the upper parts of Bengal. It was discontinued in the time of Lord Minto; but it is considered desirable by Mr. Mackenzie to renew it, as it would operate essentially in securing the attachment of the sepoys. Mr. Russell, 2219 to 2253. Mr. H. Mackenzie, 2285, 2292.

646. Sir William Keir Grant is of opinion that jagheers should be granted to Native soldiers. Appendix (B.), No. 6, p. 272.

647. The system of discipline maintained in the Native corps is not considered objectionable in the main by Mr. Mackenzie. Mr. H. Mackenzie, 2272.

648. Military flogging is all but abolished in the Bengal army. Sir J. Nicolls, 249-50.

649. The sepoys of the Bengal army have a great aversion to serve at a great distance from their homes. On removal from the Upper to the Lower Provinces, desertion always takes place to a great extent; increase of pay might serve as a palliation to this evil. Sir T. Reynell says, that desertion takes place on sepoys leaving places where they have been recruited, 197-8, 253. 131.

\* See Sir J. Nicolls, 170; Sir T. Reynell, 407; Col. Greenhill, 1184; Col. Dickson, 1587.

- Question 179. recruited. Colonel Feilding says, desertion is not great under ordinary circumstances. Desertion is stated to be not frequent at Madras, nor latterly at Bombay.\*
- Col. Feilding, 788-9. 650. There is no permanent regulation at Bengal in regard to furloughs to sepoy. This, according to Colonel Feilding, may account in some measure for desertions among the Bengal troops. At Madras, the furloughs are given under regulation; and at Bombay, five per company, in time of peace.†
- Appendix (B.), No. 18, p. 376. 651. Major Wilson observes, "The absolute necessity of granting freely and liberally, furloughs should not be overlooked, and the gross strength of the army should be calculated so as to admit of them. I see no reason why a diminution should not be made to a small extent in the pay of the absentee, to serve as a check to the abuse of this indulgence."
- Col. Dickson, 1611-12. 652. Native soldiers are allowed to exchange from one regiment to another, where it does not interfere with the convenience of the service; but exchanges are not frequent.
653. A man may get his discharge at any time. The average general service of a Native soldier is from twenty to twenty-five years.‡
654. Natives, generally speaking, are represented as equally efficient for every branch of the service; the same families usually attach themselves to the same corps. Sepoys are allowed to send letters postage-free to their families.§
- Col. Greenhill, 1556. 655. The latest occasion on which dissatisfaction was strikingly marked in the Madras army, was a mutiny contemplated by the troops at Quilon, in Travancore, in 1812; but the memory of it is considered as entirely effaced from the minds of the Madras army.
- Capt. Macan, 2196. 656. The affair at Barrackpore is the last at Bengal. Occasions of this kind may arise from the most frivolous and trifling causes; hence, in the opinion of the witnesses, the necessity of conciliatory treatment.
- H. Russell, Esq., 2232, 2236.
- Col. Dickson, 1680-1. 657. *Schools for Native soldiers* are, in the opinion of Colonel Dickson, a very useful institution. The instruction imparted therein (at Bombay) is purely elementary, the common rules of arithmetic, reading, writing, sufficient to qualify for the duties of non-commissioned officers.
- Col. Aitchison, 1755-6-7.
- Sir J. Malcolm, 691-2. 658. The Native infantry are sometimes employed in service not military, such as escorts to treasures, guards over gaols, &c.; but not in the collection of the revenue within the Company's territories.
- Appendix (B.), No. 8, p. 281. 659. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland thinks that Natives should be employed in police duties.
- No. 3, p. 195. 660. Sir John Malcolm thinks that a cheap and efficient agency might be obtained in this way.

## ENGINEERS.

- Appendix (A.), Nos. 4 to 39. 661. THE officers of engineers of the three Presidencies, with the cost of the corps in each year from 1813 to 1830, were as follows:

\* Col. J. Munro, 1068; Col. Greenhill, 1566; Col. Dickson, 1675; Col. Aitchison, 1788.

† Col. J. Munro, 1069; Col. Dickson, 1614; Col. Aitchison, 1753.

‡ Col. Salmond, 1897-1900; Sir R. Scot, 1423; Brig.-gen. Leighton, 1980.

§ Col. J. Munro, 1038-9; Sir R. Scot, 1388; Col. Greenhill, 1520; Col. Dickson, 1600; Col. Greenhill, 1563.

OFFICERS of ENGINEERS.	NUMBERS.				EXPENSE.			
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1813	28	23	19	70	12,964	18,650	11,388	43,002
1814	26	25	23	74	13,380	15,167	11,970	40,517
1815	27	26	25	78	12,362	19,476	13,339	45,177
1816	25	21	25	71	12,147	17,536	14,436	44,119
1817	31	25	26	82	12,046	18,342	14,381	44,769
1818	30	26	23	79	12,281	18,131	16,693	47,105
1819	34	23	20	77	21,452	20,570	20,000	62,022
1820	29	25	17	71	24,413	20,101	20,902	65,416
1821	30	21	16	67	24,212	16,412	20,092	60,716
1822	28	22	18	68	23,693	16,064	21,499	61,257
1823	30	22	24	76	25,289	17,392	25,052	67,733
1824	32	22	23	77	21,304	17,416	24,090	62,810
1825	31	16	23	70	21,282	18,075	24,090	63,447
1826	36	17	22	75	24,136	17,788	31,621	73,545
1827	32	20	23	75	23,804	19,310	36,673	79,787
1828	35	23	24	82	23,485	22,231	39,835	85,551
1829	47	28	22	97	29,321	23,182	38,643	91,146
1830	44	30	21	95	23,968	24,022	35,883	83,873

662. The pioneers for the same period were also of the following amount and charge. This corps has, with the sappers and miners, recently been transferred to the management of the engineers at Bombay, and called the engineer corps. At Madras and Bengal, one-half of the pioneers have been converted into sappers and miners, under the exclusive command of engineer officers.

Appendix (A.),  
Nos 4 to 39.

PIONEERS.	NUMBERS.				EXPENSE.			
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1813	886	1,520	431	2,837	18,714	28,223	7,531	54,468
1814	880	1,497	412	2,789	16,620	28,517	7,184	52,321
1815	1,114	1,484	405	3,003	23,304	28,943	8,481	60,728
1816	1,195	1,491	411	3,097	25,665	28,532	8,796	62,993
1817	1,155	1,500	409	3,064	26,122	29,750	8,296	64,168
1818	1,652	1,422	378	3,452	27,853	28,367	11,147	67,367
1819	1,226	1,468	503	3,197	24,281	28,317	15,152	67,750
1820	856	1,464	543	2,863	18,894	28,577	13,191	60,665
1821	863	1,457	670	2,990	19,561	29,162	16,811	65,564
1822	959	1,524	694	3,177	21,097	30,412	21,001	72,513
1823	863	1,518	913	3,294	20,799	30,864	29,561	81,224
1824	837	1,515	920	3,272	18,934	30,892	31,347	81,173
1825	1,092	1,887	911	3,890	29,665	38,390	31,347	102,402
1826	1,382	2,178	930	4,490	27,520	41,720	50,024	120,164
1827	857	2,024	917	3,798	18,194	40,197	52,043	110,434
1828	696	1,930	917	3,543	15,915	39,418	24,424	79,757
1829	870	1,776	918	3,564	17,589	37,101	23,039	77,729
1830	851	1,718	918	3,487	17,312	35,393	21,806	74,511

663. The

663. The number of European commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and also of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates belonging to the engineers and pioneers of India, will be seen on an inspection of the Return in Appendix (A.), No. 2, and of those belonging to a particular Presidency, in the separate Return for each year, from which the preceding tables have been constructed.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 51.  
No. 46.

664. Particular Returns have been prepared, illustrating the organization of the corps of engineers, pioneers, and sappers and miners, at each Presidency: and the several items of charge incident to a corps of sappers and miners at the Bengal Presidency may be ascertained by another Return.

Question 1922.

665. The engineers of India consist of three battalions in Bengal, two at Madras, and two at Bombay. There are 20 officers to each battalion, and consequently 140 in all.

App. (B.), No. 16,  
pp. 337, 349.

666. Lieutenant-colonel Baker is of opinion that four battalions of engineers are required for Bengal.

No. 8, p. 277.

p. 277.

667. Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland is of opinion that the engineer department is too much neglected, and he has suggested the remedies which appear to him to be calculated to put it upon an efficient footing. He thinks that the engineers are in want of "a body of soldiers under their immediate command," and that the pioneers should not be commanded by a subordinate officer of engineers. Officers of engineers have, in his opinion, a preferable claim to employment at home, alluding probably to the seminary at Addiscombe and the Company's dépôt at Chatham. He has given an account of the revenue and irrigation department of the Madras Presidency, which is under the superintendence of engineer officers.

668. Major Nutt has dwelt on the inadequacy of the engineers, in point of numbers, for the duties of superintendence which devolve upon them.

Question 671 ;

also reply of Col.  
Houston to Q.  
1837, 1843 & 1846.

669. Sir J. Malcolm states, that the engineer department has always had a just "reputation in India; but of late years, since the Government at home have paid such attention to youth sent out to their different establishments in India, rendering appointments to that branch the prizes of the seminary of Addiscombe, and giving them, subsequent to their obtaining those prizes, every advantage they could derive from the instructions of Colonel Pasley, the officer in charge of the engineer dépôt at Chatham, this corps may be said, both in science and high feeling, to be fully equal to that in the British army."

670. The engineers have recently been put in charge of the whole building department, including what is termed in India the barrack department, that is, the superintendence of the building and repair of barracks.\*

Appendix (B.),  
No. 15, p. 325.

671. Sir H. Worsley regards the pioneers as one of the most necessary and useful branches, and thinks that it might be increased.

No. 18, p. 372.

672. Major Wilson recommends the formation of an establishment of pioneers and artificers to be attached to each regiment.

No. 3, p. 253.

673. Sir John Malcolm thinks that engineers should be "only employed on works requiring scientific knowledge; and that common repairs, and even the erection of ordinary buildings of limited costs, may be made over to the heads of departments."

#### ARTILLERY.

Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 4 to 39.

674. THE amount of Artillery employed at the three Presidencies and at St. Helena, and the cost of the same, with the exception of the latter, the military charges of which are blended in a total, were, in each of the years from 1813 to 1830, as follows :

\* See Colonel Salmond's reply to questions 1923 to 1929, and also Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 161.

ARTILLERY.	NUMBERS.					EXPENSE.				
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	St. Helena.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Java, &c.	TOTAL.
						£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1813 ..	10,411	3,468	2,103	475	16,460	181,164	119,401	66,214	31,630	398,929
1814 ..	9,912	3,526	2,130	464	16,062	180,392	127,317	66,508	20,266	391,483
1815 ..	10,226	3,530	2,015	447	16,218	167,081	133,929	71,561	19,493	392,067
1816 ..	10,664	3,610	2,344	416	17,034	200,232	138,109	80,681	6,182	425,504
1817 ..	10,773	3,497	2,295	365	16,930	203,255	139,001	78,060	—	420,319
1818 ..	11,311	3,279	2,415	377	17,385	227,641	138,530	86,158	—	452,332
1819 ..	9,671	3,153	2,216	316	15,386	222,688	133,907	81,027	—	440,622
1820 ..	10,227	4,950	2,108	284	17,569	216,623	188,238	115,806	—	550,667
1821 ..	10,155	5,231	1,810	314	17,510	250,814	165,628	106,863	—	523,303
1822 ..	10,228	5,026	2,110	347	17,711	222,061	193,475	101,510	—	520,076
1823 ..	7,061	4,758	2,196	426	15,344	229,093	192,487	98,714	—	520,294
1824 ..	7,741	4,706	2,062	416	14,928	217,585	196,253	101,321	—	515,159
1825 ..	8,894	4,600	2,011	419	15,984	245,329	205,689	101,321	—	652,339
1826 ..	9,026	5,426	2,578	458	17,488	267,749	227,600	136,325	—	631,674
1827 ..	8,553	5,309	2,368	469	17,199	267,995	237,811	134,707	—	640,173
1828 ..	8,093	5,422	3,101	492	17,108	266,312	224,853	117,606	—	638,771
1829 ..	8,098	5,443	2,952	457	16,950	272,494	216,817	140,786	—	630,097
1830 ..	7,912	5,551	3,469	423	17,385	273,310	214,449	138,701	—	626,463

675. The proportion of European and Native horse and foot artillery maintained in India, and also of ordnance drivers and European warrant-officers, in each of the years from 1813 to 1830, and the charge of the same, will appear upon an inspection of the two Tables in Appendix (A.), Nos. 2 and 3, in which also the commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates are distinguished. Similar information in regard to each particular Presidency, and St. Helena, may be obtained by consulting the separate Tables for each year, from which the preceding Table has been constructed.

676. Particular Returns are given, illustrating the organization of a brigade of horse and battalion of foot artillery, European and Native, at each Presidency; and the several items of charge incident to each description of force may be ascertained by consulting other Returns.

Appendix (A.),  
No 50.

Nos. 46 to 48.

677. The particulars relating to the artillery of the Indian service may be conveniently arranged in reference to what the witnesses have stated respecting its numbers and efficiency generally; the mode in which it is recruited and officered, and the young officers qualified for the discharge of their duties; the policy or otherwise of employing Natives in the artillery, and of substituting horses for bullocks in the foot artillery; the formation of troops and companies of artillery, the field guns attached to them, together with what is stated respecting ordnance and gun-carriages, and the manufacture of gunpowder.

678. Colonel Salmond states, that the number of artillery, according to the last Returns, at the three Presidencies, distinguishing horse from foot, were, in Bengal (July 1830), horse, 1,021, foot 2,109, in Madras (July 1831), horse 596, foot 1,459; and in Bombay (January 1831), horse 2,052, foot 4,593; making a total of 6,645.

Col. Salmond, 603.

679. Lieutenant-colonel Hopkinson remarks: "With regard to the European artillery, I can imagine no corps better equipped in every respect, especially the horse artillery, since its formation in 1804, and at the time I left it in 1829."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 13, p. 310.

680. Sir John Malcolm, speaking generally of the European artillery, remarks: "As far Sir J. Malcolm, 673.



- Col. Pennington, 819-20. as my military knowledge renders me capable of judging, there cannot be a more efficient body of artillery in any service." Colonel Pennington thinks "the foot artillery to be very deficient in its field establishments;" states that "the men are perfectly efficient for all purposes."
- Lt.-col. Watson, 928-20-30. 681. Lieutenant-colonel Watson says, "I have served frequently with armies where large bodies of the artillery have been employed; I think it a most efficient corps in every respect; I think them equal to any artillery that possibly could be kept up in India, as they are."
682. Colonel Leighton thinks the artillery of Bombay, both European and Native, to be efficient.
- Col. Limond, 1290. 683. The recruits for the European battalions are generally received from the ages of eighteen to twenty-four. The artillery are selected in England; but when the recruits come out for the infantry, if the artillery are in want of men, a selection is made for them from the infantry recruits.
684. The Native troops are generally enlisted, and are for the most part recommended by the Native officers and men, who are much attached to the service.
1305. 685. Colonel James Limond thinks that the Natives prefer the cavalry even to the artillery, especially the Mussulmans, of which it chiefly consists. The military order of Hindoos are, however, partial to do duty with horses.
- 1276-77.
1319. 686. Colonel Charles Hopkinson recommends recruiting the Madras artillery from Bengal or Bombay. In 1803, it was customary to recruit the Lascars of the artillery in Bengal; it was from them the Madras golundauze were originally formed, as well as selections from the infantry, which accounts for the original stoutness of that force.
- Appendix (B.), No. 12, p. 304. 687. Colonel Limond states, that the corps of golundauze of Madras is composed "of the sons and relations of old Native officers attached to the service," and that it "has answered all the purposes contemplated, and at a comparatively small expense."
- Ditto. 688. The Native horse artillery of Madras was formed in 1804, from the cavalry gallopers, on a recommendation of the Duke of Wellington, then General Wellesley.
- Questions 1970-71. 689. Colonel Leighton states that the recruits for the Bombay artillery are generally Natives of Oude or Central India, and that they have sufficient strength and stamina.
- 830-31. 690. Colonel Pennington is of opinion that the artillery is at present very deficient of officers; he is an advocate for a number of captains-lieutenant, in addition to the present establishment of officers, for the Company's artillery, the officer being allowed to exercise general command.
1355. 691. Colonel C. Hopkinson also thinks the existing establishment of artillery officers too low, and that it ought to be increased to nearly double its present amount.\*
- 1203-4-5-6. 692. Sir T. Pritzler states that the European foot artillery are deficient in officers, because the Native foot artillery and all the horse artillery are officered from them, and all the commissaries of stores are appointed from them, so that there are left very few officers for the European foot artillery, which is the most valuable arm, and required the greatest care.
- 1285-86. 693. Colonel Limond states that the commandant of artillery had the power of selecting officers for the horse artillery, and that his guide in making the appointments was grounded on a proper knowledge of artillery duty. Colonel Charles Hopkinson however states, that officers for the horse artillery are now selected by favour. When he was in command, he never had influence enough to get an officer appointed to the horse artillery.
- 1321 to 1323.
164. 694. Sir J. Nicolls considers it necessary to have with the troops possessing six guns, a captain and three subalterns, which admits of a subaltern officer being employed or detached into each brigade of guns, and precisely the number with a company of Native foot artillery.

695. Sir

695. Sir T. Reynell is of opinion that each troop of Native horse artillery of six pieces should have four European officers, to make allowances for those who may be away from casualties. When serving in brigade, perhaps less might do; three present with the troop would be sufficient, and the same establishment of officers for a company of Native foot having six pieces. Questions 398 to 402.
696. Lieutenant-colonel Watson would propose the same number of officers to a corps of horse artillery as to a battalion of foot artillery. 914-15
697. The officers of artillery obtain promotion in one general line at each Presidency. 1270.
698. Regarding the tuition of young men intended for the service, Colonel James Limond states, that after they have received instruction at Addiscombe, their military education is followed up in India. A *depôt* of instruction was established at the Madras military headquarters, which has progressively improved in accomplishing the ends contemplated at its formation. The artillery instructions issued by Colonel Limond on its first establishment, and a later compilation of the system are printed. (See Question 1289.) 1322.
699. The young men generally join the artillery in India about the ages of seventeen or eighteen; but sometimes earlier or later, according to the passing of their examinations at the academy. The above remarks are confirmed by the evidence of Colonel C. Hopkinson. 1290.  
1320.
700. Regarding the policy or otherwise of employing Natives in the artillery, Colonel Salmond is of opinion that the Native artillery ought to be disbanded, as equally unnecessary and dangerous.\* 621.
701. Colonel Pennington does not see any danger in instructing Natives in gunnery; and from the excellence of the artillery which had been trained in the service of Scindia and Holkar, he felt assured that Native artillery were a most efficient body, equal to any force that could be opposed to them. He adds, "they were persons trained to the Native service. A part of the enemy captured at their guns were delivered over to me by Lord Lake; we at that time had not forty men Europeans, and we were so low that we were eleven days in the trenches without relief, and he transferred those men to me, and I had occasion to drill them a little; but when practised to all the business of loading and firing, they were as prompt and ready as any men. They did not at first know manœuvring; but, with a little patience, I soon taught them manœuvring; they were foot men, but no men ever stood better to their guns than they did." He adds, "I think, with regard to Europeans and Natives, the more they are mixed the better; for you may confide in a Native artillery-man as much as you may in an European; there are no men in whom you may put more trust." 814 to 816.  
820. \*
702. Sir Theophilus Pritzler says, that he always "doubted the rendering Native artillery efficient, and, if it were practicable, the policy of so doing,"† and he therefore thinks that it would be advisable gradually to discontinue the force; a sudden reduction might be productive of bad effect. His opinion is formed both from the inefficiency of the Natives, as well as from motives of general policy; and he besides thinks they do not possess sufficient physical strength to form effective artillery. 1207.  
1208.
703. Colonel W. Dickson thinks that the whole of the artillery should consist of Europeans. 1626.
704. Sir Edward Paget does not think the sepoy equal to the European, especially to the British soldier. The *golundauze*, or Native foot artillery, however, are admirable troops, and have given repeated instances of bravery; endless examples might be given of their standing to be cut down. 2310.
705. Colonel Pennington states, that the Native branch of the artillery act as gunners, but never have shells given to them, because they cannot read and decipher the stamp upon a shell, and are, consequently, ignorant of its range. 810 to 813.
706. Sir J. Malcolm is of opinion that the *golundauze* are very efficient; the Hindoos are 668.

\* See also his reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 158.

† See also his reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 5, p. 261.

are partial to the service, and they are remarkable for attaining excellence in discipline and gunnery. Some of the Madras Native horse artillery have been under his command, and were in a most serviceable state. He does not think it impolitic to instruct the Natives in gunnery, and is a strong advocate for so employing them.

**Question 1278.** 707. Colonel James Limond states, that the artillery of the principal Mahratta princes, without any European officers, have done their duty thoroughly; and that at Assye and Mahidpore they stood to their guns to the very last. With Scindia at Assye he believed there were some Europeans.

**1316.** 708. Colonel C. Hopkinson states, that in Ava two companies of golundauze, though not actually employed, were found to be efficient; he is, however, unfavourable to Natives being employed generally in the artillery.  
**Appendix (B.), No. 13, p. 309.**

**Questions 1970-71** 709. Colonel Leighton represents the Native artillery as very good. The Natives save Europeans from being detached in small parties; and as they endure the climate better than the British, they are the means of a considerable preservation of life among the latter.

**822-23.** 710. In regard to the cattle and field establishment of the foot artillery, Colonel Pennington is of opinion that the cattle are perfectly inefficient, and that guns dragged by bullocks never can be brought into action; he consequently proposes substituting horses.

711. Colonel Charles Hopkinson, however, represents the power of the Seringapatam bullocks as astonishing; and he thinks them as efficient for the army as it is possible for animals to be.

**1944.** 712. Colonel Leighton, while he thinks that a certain number of bullocks should be kept up for the artillery, instead of depending on hired cattle, admits that a substitution of horses instead of bullocks is infinitely more desirable, though it would undoubtedly add to the expense.

**Appendix (B.), No. 3, p. 253.** 713. Sir John Malcolm states that experience has proved bullocks to be equal to the service of the artillery, "and that they are not so expensive as horses, or so difficult to be procured as mules."

**Questions 1346-47.** 714. Colonel Hopkinson states that the average march of the foot artillery, with its present cattle establishment, is about the same as that of the infantry, and that fifteen miles per diem can be easily accomplished on an average.

**1338-39.** 715. Regarding the numbers of which a troop or company of artillery consists, and the guns with which it is supplied, the following information is afforded: Colonel C. Hopkinson states: "We had eight guns, but we had 155 Europeans when I was in India." No howitzer was permanently attached. Six horses were attached to each gun, and 225 horses to each troop.  
**1340-41.**

**Appendix (B.), No. 3, p. 253.** 716. "The troops of horse artillery have latterly been reduced from six to four guns, and the mules and horses of the foot artillery (at Bombay) disposed of, and replaced by bullocks."

**Question 1342.** 717. The horse artillery have now only, rank and file, 102 men and six guns per troop at the advanced stations, and four only at head-quarters and Bangalore.

**1345.** 718. The number of tumbrils to each gun depends on the nature and size of the ordnance; for a six-pounder one only is required.

**1340.** 719. As regards the field-guns of the foot artillery, they consist, according to Colonel Hopkinson, of every description of light field-guns, twelve-pounders, six-pounders, five and a half-inch howitzers, and four and two-fifths howitzers, but none of them were considered attached to the corps; they were in park, and called for when wanted. There was a park under the commissary, who had the general charge of the army ordnance. When any of this ordnance was wanted, the commander-in-chief directed communication to be made to the commandant of artillery, under whose orders the commissary is.

720. Brass guns for the Indian service are all cast in Calcutta, but the iron guns are sent from England, as well as the shot and shells; all the gun-carriages, also, are constructed in India.\*

721. An

\* See Colonel Salmond's reply to question 630; Colonel Hopkinson's, 1363; Lieut.-colonel Watson's, 9, 33, 34.

721. An agency is established for the manufacture of gun-carriages at each Presidency in India, which is conducted by an officer of the army, generally an artillery officer, but not always, who is purely an agent.

Questions  
637 to 639.

722. The gun-carriage department, according to Colonel Hopkinson, was on the best possible footing at Madras when he left India; it has however been since changed.

1330.

723. The gun-carriages are made of teak-wood almost entirely. The felloes of the wheels made at Hyderabad are sometimes made of babool, the Seringapatam ones of teak; the very best are teak. The weight of a six-pounder gun and carriage is about 14 cwt.: with timber and ammunition in the boxes, about a ton.

1331 to 1338.

724. A re-organization of the gun-carriage and store departments "in all their parts, including the distribution of arsenals and dépôt, and of the different establishments connected with them," was made by Sir John Malcolm at Bombay, "after a complete personal investigation of the details of this branch of the service, and by the inspection of every establishment." Sir John adds, "In making this reform I was aided by the officers at the heads of the respective branches of the department, and the results will, I trust, be found to be the introduction of more prompt and efficient check, a simplification of accounts and establishments, together with a considerable reduction of expenditure; but that reduction will be still greater progressively than immediately."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 251.

725. There are three gunpowder establishments in India at present, one at each Presidency, but not working now, in consequence of the large quantity of powder manufactured during the war. The local government generally calculated upon three years consumption; but the stock sometimes depends upon the orders of Government.

Questions  
631 to 631.

726. Colonel Charles Hopkinson, who has frequently visited the powder manufactory at Madras, states that as far as he can judge it appeared to be in good working order, and to have every necessary for such an establishment.

1375 to 1378.

#### CAVALRY.

727. THE number of cavalry employed at the three Presidencies and the dependent settlements, in each year from 1813 to 1830, with the charge of maintaining the same, were as follow:

Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 4 to 39.

CAVALRY.		NUMBERS.				EXPENSE.				
		Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Java, &c.	TOTAL.
						£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1813	..	8,903	5,875	1,148	15,926	397,943	421,446	90,313	29,788	939,490
1814	..	8,776	5,928	1,103	15,807	392,754	454,108	97,837	11,493	959,192
1815	..	12,232	6,086	1,136	19,454	487,768	478,381	119,481	10,333	1,095,963
1816	..	15,017	6,012	1,089	22,118	525,520	441,435	95,649	—	1,062,604
1817	..	14,535	6,308	1,052	21,895	547,688	415,121	94,622	—	1,057,431
1818	..	16,023	6,357	1,578	26,558	796,861	440,513	174,686	—	1,412,060
1819	..	19,591	7,450	1,694	28,735	761,928	435,130	164,246	—	1,361,304
1820	..	13,160	7,252	1,627	22,039	524,710	490,100	163,111	—	1,178,011
1821	..	11,862	7,072	4,565	23,499	516,573	455,957	300,383	—	1,332,913
1822	..	11,438	6,390	3,948	21,776	356,554	414,523	298,977	—	1,070,054
1823	..	11,480	6,161	3,091	20,732	492,098	395,953	229,717	—	1,118,368
1824	..	11,845	6,162	3,193	21,200	504,066	402,275	231,183	—	1,137,524
1825	..	15,303	6,244	3,726	25,273	603,003	436,089	231,183	—	1,270,275
1826	..	17,000	6,240	4,439	27,679	626,196	422,087	349,232	—	1,397,515
1827	..	15,006	6,307	3,941	25,254	723,091	417,671	306,986	—	1,447,748
1828	..	13,827	6,031	4,244	24,102	613,115	405,156	293,481	—	1,311,752
1829	..	13,116	5,690	3,808	22,614	755,629	349,343	263,327	—	1,368,299
1830	..	10,446	5,571	3,522	19,539	503,626	338,119	229,089	—	1,070,834

## SYNOPSIS OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE

728. Of these part are composed of King's regiments of dragoons, and the remainder are distinguished into regular and irregular Native cavalry, of the Company's service, in the Tables in Appendix (A.), Nos. 2 and 3, in which also the commissioned and non-commissioned officers, European and Native, for the whole of India, are specified. Particular information in regard to each Presidency and the subordinate settlements, may be had by consulting the separate Returns for each year, from which the preceding table has been constructed.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 49.  
Nos. 46 to 48.

729. The particular organization of a regiment of Native cavalry at each Presidency is compared in a separate Return, and the several items of expense incident to a regiment at each Presidency may be ascertained by other Returns which will be found in the Appendix.

730. The information relative to the cavalry of India furnished by the witnesses, has reference to the provisions of horses for the remount, by means of the stud, or purchase from the Native dealers, or the appointment of agents for that purpose in the Persian Gulf. The qualities of different descriptions of the horses of India; whether stabling be used or considered desirable in that country, and also whether the horses be well taken care of by the men; together with the provision which is made for the repair of saddlery and horse appointments, and of line articles. The witnesses have also supplied information relative to the men of which the Native cavalry is composed.

Lt.-col. Feilding,  
861 to 864.  
Sir J. Nicolls, 205.

731. At the Bengal Presidency a stud has been established for the breed of horses since 1796 or 1797, which is divided into several branches, and as many horses are provided for the remount as can be supplied from the Company's stud establishment, the remainder being purchased from Native dealers.

Sir T. Reynell,  
440, 446-47.

732. The stud horses were not bred in sufficient numbers to supply the horse artillery and European cavalry when Sir Thomas Reynell left India; but there is, in his opinion, every prospect of a sufficient supply being furnished in a short time from that source.

Lt.-col. Feilding,  
739-40.

733. Lieutenant-colonel Feilding considers that the horses supplied from the stud are the best, and the most fit for the duties required.

Sir J. Nicolls, 206.

Sir T. Reynell,  
441-42.

734. Sir Jasper Nicolls thinks, the physical power of the high-caste northern horse purchased from the dealers is superior, but that horses supplied from the stud are more tractable and less vicious. Sir Thomas Reynell prefers the horses obtained from the stud to those purchased from the country dealers. He states that there is a difference in the mode of breeding horses at the different studs. At the Haupper stud, near to Meerut, the mares are brought by the peasants or farmers to the stud; they afterwards take back the mare, and when the colt has got to a certain age it is purchased by the stud, and trained at the stud until fit for service.

Col. Pennington,  
817-18.

735. Colonel Pennington is of opinion that the stud horses, as compared with those purchased from Native dealers, are much superior, not only in temper but in duration, and that one of the former will last twice as long as one of the latter.

Lt.-col. Watson,  
961-2-3, 969.

736. Lieutenant-colonel Watson states that the stud furnishes a considerable number of horses both for the artillery and cavalry generally, perhaps not less than 800; but that commanding officers of regiments have been empowered to purchase horses from dealers and others by presenting them for approval before a regimental committee of officers, and this plan has been found very efficacious indeed. Very excellent and good horses are obtained from the stud, after a selection of the superior horses fit for officers' chargers, which are drafted among all the mounted corps in certain proportions; the artillery and European cavalry are next supplied with the best horses, and the remainder are sent to the Native cavalry. This is done annually. Horses are never drafted from one corps to another. The Native horse does not last to so great an age as the stud horse, in consequence of not being so well bred. A country horse is an old horse at twelve or thirteen: but horses of a better description and better bred work in the ranks at fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, and even eighteen, admirably well.

Sir E. Paget, 2302.

737. Sir Edward Paget states that, during the time he held the command in India, he had no reason to find fault with the horses, or consider those purchased for the service as unequal to the duties required by them; he considers the horses bred at the stud as very fair,

fair, good horses, and that they certainly ought to be so, as the expense of the breeding of them is very great.

738. Colonel Dickson states that the description of the horse procured at Madras is "fully equal to the Native service."

Col. W. Dickson,  
1601.

739. According to Sir T. Pritzler, the horses provided for both the King's and Native troops at Madras have generally been as good as were procurable; but the Madras cavalry have suffered very much of late years from the large proportion of horses required for the artillery, which took from the cavalry all the best horses, and by the expenditure of them left only the very refuse for the Native cavalry. There is no stud at Madras; all the horses are brought down from the Persian Gulf by sea, and are purchased by the commissary for the army.

Sir T. Pritzler,  
1151-5, 1158.

740. Colonel Limond states that all the horses for the artillery at Madras are purchased by contract, a certain sum being allowed by Government for each horse; the horses, however, must be approved by a confidential officer appointed for that express duty, or a committee of officers. The horses thus selected are sent to a dépôt in Mysore. The artillery are allowed to make the first selection, and afterwards the cavalry. Colonel Limond considers those used in the horse artillery as very well adapted for the service, and strong, compact little horses.

Col. J. Limond,  
1291, 1296-7.

741. Colonel Hopkinson gives a similar account to the preceding, and states that the height of the horse for the artillery is as near fifteen hands as possible, which he considers the size best adapted to that service, from the circumstance that the horses had only their work to do, and not to carry themselves. A great horse has himself to carry, as well as his work to do.

Col. C. Hopkinson,  
1331-2-3.

742. Colonel Dickson states that the horses that have lately been received at Madras are rather deficient in weight for the English dragoon, and are inferior to those formerly supplied. He accounts for this in the following manner: the whole country being now in the occupation of the English, the chiefs who formerly encouraged the superior breed of horses have disappeared, and with them the horses which they reared. The Madras cavalry, consequently, are principally mounted on horses not bred in the country, but procured from long distances, generally from the coast of Guzerat, Arabia, and Persia.

Col. W. Dickson,  
1672-3-4.

743. Major Wilson states, in reference to the Madras officer who is stationed at Bombay for the purchase of horses, that he is "looked upon by the dealers as a rival in the market to the Bombay commissariat."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 377.

744. The stud establishment of Bombay is stated by Sir John Malcolm to be of recent formation, and upon a very moderate scale; but he considers it the most efficient establishment that a stud could be placed upon in a country which, like the Deccan, is very favourable to the breed of horses, and in which the inhabitants are well accustomed to rearing them, and well taught to do so, when they see that it is rendered to them, as it now is, a source of profit.

Sir J. Malcolm, 685;  
also Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 256.

745. Colonel Leighton states, that of late years the horses procured for the Bombay army have not been of sufficient bone; they have been too small for Europeans. When the 17th dragoons went out to Bombay they were as well, if not better mounted than they had been in England; but the description of horse they then got is not to be met with now in large numbers. The horses are generally supplied by contract. A regulation was published in 1830, permitting regimental commanding officers to purchase horses for their regiments. The average number of years a horse will serve, if it is not of sufficient size and bone, will not exceed five or six years, while others, called the Kattywar horse, will last much longer. There are in the horse artillery some few horses which have served upwards of fifteen years. It is impossible to provide the whole artillery with that description of horse at the price allowed. They are not bred in large numbers now by the inhabitants of Kattywar for sale; but the Bombay Government, of late years, have sent English and other horses of large bone into that and other provinces, for the purpose of improving the breed of horses.

Col. D. Leighton,  
1974-5, 1978-9.

746. Sir

Sir C. Dalbiac,  
2009-10.

746. Sir C. Dalbiac is of opinion that the Bombay cavalry and horse artillery *ought* to be decidedly the best mounted of any in India; because Bombay is particularly well placed for the mounting of troops, being contiguous to the Gulf of Persia and close to the province of Kattywar. I conceive, from my observation (he adds), when I took up the horses of the 17th dragoons in the year 1822, and judging from the description and appearance of many old horses, that were then sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen years old, that some eight or nine years before that period the 17th dragoons was perhaps the best mounted regiment in the world: they had been mounted upon two descriptions of horses, partly from the province of Kattywar, which I found to be a most admirable horse, purchased previous to the famine of 1813 or 1814, when that breed was very much broken up, by reason of the general want of grass and forage in that province; subsequent to that, the Kattywar horses were not to be had in such numbers or of such good quality. The 17th dragoons had also been partly mounted on the Persian horse, not the Arab. The indifferent Persian is a sad brute, but the good Persian I hold to be as desirable a horse for the horse artillery and the cavalry as any in the world, and they were bought by two men, whom I did not know personally, but I know by character, from their initials being branded upon the horses which they bought for the service of Bombay; their names were Rome and Lindsay, and must have been men of extraordinary good judgment with regard to horses, for they purchased them of the very best description, the former officer at the Presidency, the latter in Persia; and I conceive that if the same means were taken to send equal judges to Persia, that the same horse might still be obtained, supposing the breed not to have been deteriorated, which I do not know that it has.

747. The King's regiment of cavalry and the horse artillery receive no Arabs, by reason of their small size, but the Arab is an excellent horse for the Native cavalry, and, as I said before, ought to be produced in Bombay of the best description. So that there is the Kattywar horse and the Persian horse for the King's regiments and horse artillery, and the Arab horse for the Native cavalry. The Bombay mounted troops ought to be the best mounted in India. Upon this very important subject I wish to add, that the Arab horses sent from the Gulf for the Native cavalry were not uniformly purchased of a desirable description; very many were purchased at seven years old and upwards, of a stumpy, inactive sort, wholly unfit for cavalry purposes, and after they had *done some work*. Horses at four years old, or even a few months younger, are of the best age for cavalry remounts, and it is to be presumed that, if purchased as raw colts at that age, they may be procured of a much better caste, and at as low a price as horses of an inferior caste at six or seven years old.

748. The manner in which horses are selected for the King's cavalry when they arrive in India is stated by Sir Charles Dalbiac to be by a committee; the committee no doubt, when they are appointed, do their best, and they select horses according to the best of their judgment; but I need not mention to this committee, that we do not all judge of horses alike; and I should say, that one such man as Lindsay or Rome to select horses in the original purchase, was worth more than any committee which could be appointed after the arrival of horses in Bombay. The horses for the King's regiments are also selected and approved by the committee, but there is a very little interference between the two services, for the King's regiments receive no Arab horses, whilst the Native cavalry are almost exclusively mounted upon horses of that breed. Sir C. Dalbiac has been in the province of Kattywar, where the system of rearing horses is by endeavouring to breed from the best mares: the people engaged in breeding are very particular in their stallions and their mares,\* and they devote considerable time and property to this purpose.

Brig.-gen.  
D. Leighton, 2112.

749. Colonel Leighton states that horses for the cavalry are generally purchased by contract, but commanding officers of regiments have an option to purchase them for their corps.

Lt.-col. Feilding,  
865.

750. It is a difficult thing, according to Lieut.-colonel Feilding, to make any estimate of the cost of a horse to Government, but according to one which was made when he was secretary to the Board of Superintendence, the cost of horses to the Company, in rearing them

them in this way, was much the same as in purchasing them; but then there was an element always taken into calculation which was liable to cavil, and that was, the value placed upon all the young stock not appropriated to military purposes. When they were highly valued, there was an increase of the amount of stock, as the merchant would call it. It was estimated to increase so much what was set off against the price of the horses, that it would not be an easy thing to say exactly what the real cost was. The mode of mounting the cavalry now is, to allow an average of 400 rupees for every horse in Native corps, and 450 for those in the horse artillery and European cavalry regiments. Very good horses are stated to be procured at these rates.

Lt.-col. Watson,  
960.

751. According to Sir T. Pritzler, the average price of the troop horse is from 350 to 400 rupees. Colonel Limond estimates the cost at Madras at about 500 rupees. At Bombay, Colonel Leighton states there is a fixed price of 450 rupees for a horse for the Native cavalry at the time he is delivered over to a regiment, and for European cavalry and horse artillery 575 rupees, or not more than 600 rupees at the utmost. Sir Charles Dalbiac states the expense of horses in Bombay to vary from 350 to 550 rupees, and upon some few occasions to 650, but taking the general average from 450 to 500 rupees.

Sir T. Pritzler, 1156.  
Col. Dickson, 1603.  
Col. Limond, 1295.  
Col. Leighton, 1976.  
Sir C. Dalbiac, 2035.

752. The expense of maintaining a troop horse is estimated by Lieut.-colonel Feilding at about fifteen or sixteen rupees a month, inclusive of shoeing, &c., which costs about four rupees a month more.

Lt.-col. Feilding,  
866-67.

753. The common race of horses in India are stated by Lieut.-colonel Watson to arrive at their maturity sooner than blood horses; at four years the common breed being perfectly fit for any work they may be put to, but another year is required for those bred at the stud. Upon an average, he thinks horses may last about nine or ten years.

Lt.-col. Watson,  
966, 968.

754. Sir Charles Dalbiac states that it depends upon the shape and make how long a horse may last in India; a bad horse lasting a very few years, while a well-shaped horse (of which there were many) will last from twelve to fifteen years and upwards. Sir Charles thinks that if Persian horses could be obtained at a fair price, they would amply repay the pains taken to procure them; they being far more tractable, better shaped, and better calculated to stand work than the generality of horses now to be procured from Kattywar.

Sir C. Dalbiac,  
2012.

755. The average size of the Kattywar horses of the 4th dragoons was fourteen hands three inches and a half. These horses are very unruly.

2035.  
2038.

756. The Persian horse, as compared with the Kattywar horse, is rather less, on the average about fourteen hands three inches, of the best description. The Persian horses are very docile and good tempered. The facilities Mr. Rome and Mr. Lindsay had in purchasing good horses in Persia rested entirely upon their good judgment.

2037.  
2038.

757. The Arab horse is from about fourteen hands one inch to fourteen hands two inches high. The Arab horse is very docile and good tempered.

2037.  
2038.

758. Sir Charles Dalbiac states that he scarcely ever saw a contracted heel in the horses of the 4th dragoons, or know a horse to go broken-winded; blindness was very rare, except with the worm in the eyes, which is a peculiar disease; the worm forms in the eye and gets alive, a sort of bag of water collects, and when that is punctured with judgment the worm comes out, and the chances are then very much in favour of the eye recovering its sight, but if the worm does not come out with the rush of water, it is impossible to get it afterwards; inflammation then ensues, and the eye is almost sure to be lost. The glanders are nothing like so contagious in India as in this country; the infection has spread in a very slight degree in comparison to that which might be expected, or to what would inevitably have been the case in this country when it has broken out in any of the regiments.

2039.

759. Contracted feet are less common in India than in England, and may be attributed to the circumstances, that during one part of the year, especially in the sandy districts, or when not actively employed, you may dispense with the shoe altogether during the monsoon; the natural state and shape of the foot then recovers itself; another is, that there are a very few hard

2040.

2011.



hard roads. Horses are not much subject to corns, because corns are produced by improper shoeing, and the state of the foot arising therefrom.

Sir J. Nicolls,  
207-8.

760. Stabling is not used for the horses at Madras or Bombay; but Sir Jasper Nicolls states that, with the exception of the stations of Nusseerabad and Mhow, stabling is used throughout the Bengal service.

Sir T. Reynell,  
443 to 445.

761. Sir Thomas Reynell states that horses are generally kept in stables, and that he superintended the building of the stables at Meerut, when the 10th regiment of light cavalry was first embodied there.

Sir T. Pritzler, 1157:

762. Sir Thomas Pritzler considers that the horses are better when they are not under cover, being liable to frequent exposure on field service; those of Madras which are not under cover are particularly healthy.

Sir C. Dalbiac, 2007.

763. Sir C. Dalbiac concurs in this opinion, observing, that whilst he commanded at Kaira, the horses of the King's regiment of cavalry were all under cover, while those of a troop of horse artillery were not; neither the appearance nor the condition of the former was decidedly superior. It is of more consequence, in the opinion of Sir C. Dalbiac, to the men (Europeans) that the horses should be under cover, as it preserves them from the sun during their stable duties.

2034.

764. The rainy season does not prejudicially affect horses while exposed to its influence. The Kattywar horse is subject to a peculiar disease called the Bursatee, which does precede or accompany the period of the monsoon; other horses are not attacked. The disease breaks out in large greasy spots over different parts of the head, body, and limbs.

Lt. Col. Feilding,  
852.

765. Lieutenant-colonel Feilding cannot say whether the Europeans or Natives take the greater care of their horses, having seen so little of the European cavalry.

Sir T. Pritzler, 1153.

766. Sir T. Pritzler states that the Native troops do not take so good care of their horses as they ought to do.

Lt.-col. Watson,  
982.

767. In the course of active service the horses of the sepoy cavalry are not, in the opinion of Lieutenant-colonel Watson, more injured by sore backs than is the case in all other services; the saddles are all procured from Europe, and very carefully looked after, and therefore he does not think the horses are more liable to sore backs. Instances have occurred of about ten or twelve in the hundred being led in the rear of regiments, from lameness and sore backs, after a great deal of marching.

984.

Sir C. Dalbiac, 2006.  
2032.

768. The Native system of grooming horses is not, according to Sir C. Dalbiac, carried to so high a pitch as the European. In Bombay the King's troops clean and take care of their horses the same as they do in England, because they have only one horse-keeper to every three horses; whereas in Bengal they have one horse-keeper to every horse. The reason of the difference in the establishment is not on account of the warmth of the climate, but in consequence of an entirely different arrangement; the thermometer for seven months in the year at Kaira, is considerably higher than in almost any part of Bengal.

2033.

Lt.-col. Feilding,  
855.

769. In Bengal every Native commissioned and non-commissioned officer has a groom to his horse, and there is a groom to every three troopers' horses. One grass-cutter is allowed to every horse.

856.  
857.

770. A regiment of Native cavalry would on all occasions be perfectly inefficient without this number of grass-cutters and grooms. It does not impede the progress of a regiment, for the Natives of India are extremely good walkers, and will make very long marches in a day, and keep it up for a considerable period. Now and then a regiment might probably out-march their grass-cutters, and then the horses must suffer inconvenience; but in the course of a campaign the grass-cutters will always keep up with a regiment.

Lt.-col. Feilding,  
858-59.

771. In India a field officer has an allowance for four horses, a captain for three, a subaltern for two; but none of these horses are regimental chargers.

Lt.-col. Watson,  
964.

772. Officers are allowed to select horses from those which are sent to their regiments from the stud for 800 rupees; and for the horse bought of Native dealers, they pay the regimental

regimental price of 400 rupees. The stud horses are generally bred from English stock; the stud has existed thirty-five years, and there are hundreds of colts bred there, whose pedigrees can be traced for six or eight generations, therefore they are considered much superior; but for the general remount the officers prefer buying them of dealers to taking them from the stud.

773. The arrangements by which saddlery and horse appointments are supplied and kept in repair at the Presidency of Bengal are by what is termed troop contracts, by which the captain or officer commanding a troop receives a stipulated sum for each horse.

Sir J. Nicolls,  
200-1.

774. The articles are inspected monthly at Bengal by the commanding officer, in order to ascertain that they are efficiently supplied and kept in repair.

Sir T. Reynell,  
436-7-8-9.

775. The mode of equipment, in the particulars abovementioned, assimilate as nearly as circumstances will admit in the King's and Company's services. The style of saddlery is very different from that of the King's army in the present day, but it is similar to what it was formerly.

Lt.-col. Feilding,  
737.

776. At the Madras Presidency Government supply the accoutrements, and the commanding officers of regiments (cavalry) have a contract for furnishing the horses with saddlery. The accoutrements are all of Native manufacture, both for the cavalry and the infantry. Sir T. Pritzler thinks that it would be more economical, from its durability, to employ European manufacture. European saddlery is used in the Bombay army.

Sir T. Pritzler,  
1211-12, 1214-15.

777. Committees are assembled quarterly for the purpose of ascertaining that the contracts for the provision of line articles are properly observed by the officers.

Sir J. Nicolls,  
202-3-1.

778. The shoeing of the cavalry horses is performed in the same manner as it is in the King's regiments in this country, by an allowance to the troop farriers: the farrier works himself, or employs work people. In some parts of India the hind shoes are not put on during the rainy season, which is of advantage to the horse, because it allows the foot to expand and to recover its natural shape during three months of the year. During that period the allowance for shoeing is continued; the whole of the shoes in store being put in order, and completed in the event of a march; the expense at other times is often very much beyond the allowance.

Sir C. Dalbiac,  
2027-8-9-30-31.

779. The oldest corps of cavalry in the service of the East-India Company is that of Madras; and it will appear upon record that they have proved in all duties as efficient as those corps of His Majesty's European cavalry, with whom they have been for so many years associated in the public service. This corps was formed under the most favourable circumstances, being originally embodied by the Nabob of Arcot, under European officers. The pride of that prince led to his inducing some of the best families of his Mahomedan subjects to enter into it; their sons have continued in the service; and it is a remarkable fact, that while almost the whole of this corps are Mahomedans, they nearly all belong to the Carnatic, and their families are inhabitants of Arcot, the former capital of that province, and one of its largest suburbs.

Sir J. Malcolm, 666.

780. Desertion, Sir John Malcolm states, never occurs in the Madras cavalry, and punishments are almost unknown. The European cavalry of His Majesty have of course the advantage over this body, in being stronger men, and having more physical force; but Sir J. Malcolm is not aware of other difference in point of efficiency.

781. The Bengal cavalry has been more lately formed, but is an uncommonly fine body of men; a considerable proportion of them are Hindoos, and they may be said to approach nearer to the European in physical force than the Madras men. The Bombay cavalry is also of much more recent formation, a considerable number of it are inhabitants of the north-western provinces of Bengal, and they are a most efficient corps. All these corps are under

under

under European officers, with the usual proportion of Native commissioned and non-commissioned attached.

- Lt.-col. Feilding,  
749.      782. Lieutenant-colonel Feilding states that the greater part of the sepoy of a regiment of cavalry are drawn from pretty nearly the same part of the country. No difference is found to arise from particular districts.
750.      783. Among the Mahomedans there is a preference for serving in the cavalry, but amongst the Hindoos there does not appear to be any. There is no difficulty in obtaining recruits for either army. They are remarkably fond of, and generally take good care of their horses.
- 751.
- Lt.-col. Watson,  
938-39-40-41.      784. Lieutenant-colonel Watson thinks that the Natives are well adapted for cavalry service, being excellent and fearless riders and good swordsmen, and superior to Europeans as riders. They are exceedingly fond of their horses, and take very good care of them. Sir T. Pritzler, on the other hand, thinks that the Native troops might be better horsemen.
- Major-gen. Pritzler,  
1152.
850.      785. For a war establishment, considering the number of men and the number of officers that rapidly become inefficient, the troops should be one hundred strong.
- Col. W. Dickson,  
1081-85.      786. The longest forced march which Colonel Dickson recollects making with European and Native cavalry, was about seventy-five miles in twenty-four or twenty-five hours. There was no engagement at the end of the march, but the troops were fully equal to it had it been necessary.
- Col. D. Leighton,  
1969.      787. Colonel Leighton states that the Bombay regiments of cavalry get their recruits from Central India, or the province of Oude; they are the same description of men as those in the Bengal Native cavalry, being chiefly Hindoos. Sir C. Dalbiac, who was inspector of the Bombay cavalry, and has had two of the three regiments under his immediate command for drill, in brigade with the fourth dragoons, and has also inspected the third regiment and all the horse artillery, states that he has no reason to find fault with the Natives for not being as expert horsemen as the British cavalry in Bombay, and the Native cavalry acquire their field exercises and duties with considerable quickness. Two of the regiments of Bombay Native cavalry had been raised about four or five years, and the third about three or four years.
- Sir C. Dalbiac,  
2005.
- 2008.
- Lt.-col. Feilding,  
813-44-45.      788. Colonel Feilding thinks that the organization of the regiments of cavalry would be improved if they consisted of eight troops instead of six, principally from the circumstance of the easy division into two wings, each of which might often be employed where it is perhaps necessary now to send an entire regiment. Supposing the addition of two troops to each regiment to be made, and that it was also desirable to retain only the same number of cavalry as exists at present, it would be preferable to make a reduction in the strength of the different troops in order to increase their number; then on emergency a better nucleus would be formed for increasing the regiment at once by recruiting.
- Appendix (B.),  
No. 16, p. 349.      789. Lieutenant-colonel Baker is also an advocate for eight instead of six troops per regiment.
- Questions  
816-47-48.      790. A cavalry regiment consisted of six troops in the time of Lord Hastings, who increased it to eight. It has since been reduced again to six troops, which is its present establishment.

#### INFANTRY.

- Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 4 to 39.      791. THE amount of infantry maintained in India, in each year, from 1813 to 1830, at each Presidency and the dependent settlements, with the charge of the same, appears to have been as follows:

INFANTRY.	NUMBERS.					EXPENSE.				
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Dependent Settlements.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Dependent Settlements.	TOTAL.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1813 ..	78,589	53,223	23,076	491	156,279	1,474,633	1,322,642	565,446	281,378	3,644,099
1814 ..	77,297	51,896	23,277	473	152,943	1,530,018	1,316,265	557,701	116,160	3,550,147
1815 ..	103,224	49,546	24,139	361	177,270	2,102,988	1,276,621	603,891	138,441	4,121,944
1816 ..	101,433	50,348	23,840	330	175,951	1,881,889	1,316,254	617,039	116,860	3,962,042
1817 ..	95,361	51,483	24,287	356	171,487	1,869,318	1,277,457	614,526	—	3,761,301
1818 ..	101,835	52,531	27,698	364	182,428	1,869,152	1,258,230	751,512	—	3,881,894
1819 ..	98,835	54,833	30,209	367	184,244	1,834,766	1,271,020	745,087	—	3,850,873
1820 ..	105,099	65,534	29,580	353	200,566	1,944,467	1,452,759	635,536	—	4,032,762
1821 ..	102,269	65,425	29,913	467	198,074	1,531,653	1,477,617	669,869	—	3,679,139
1822 ..	102,530	55,910	29,175	481	188,126	1,111,050	1,333,040	611,181	—	3,385,171
1823 ..	104,998	53,537	27,778	802	187,115	1,531,653	1,477,617	669,869	—	3,679,139
1824 ..	111,108	52,023	28,964	758	192,853	1,665,201	1,275,170	581,238	—	3,521,609
1825 ..	128,820	58,559	31,866	756	220,001	2,145,232	1,459,850	581,238	—	4,186,320
1826 ..	125,643	64,405	38,804	784	229,636	2,392,749	1,468,766	793,640	—	4,655,155
1827 ..	115,424	59,949	38,024	716	214,113	2,032,505	1,534,724	706,443	—	4,363,372
1828 ..	109,183	55,496	35,609	462	200,750	2,218,448	1,493,101	805,766	—	4,517,315
1829 ..	100,287	53,524	32,990	524	187,325	1,982,882	1,529,185	756,512	—	4,268,579
1830 ..	88,832	51,034	29,751	445	170,062	1,953,487	1,468,495	703,097	—	4,025,079

792. In the Returns in Appendix (A.), marked Nos. 2 and 3, the infantry of India is distinguished into King's and Company's European and the Native into regular and irregular; and the commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates, both European and Native, are also specified in the former of these Returns. Similar information in regard to each particular Presidency may be obtained by consulting the separate Returns for each year, from which the preceding Table has been constructed.

793. Particular Returns are given, illustrating the organization of a regiment of European and Native infantry at each Presidency; and the several items of charge incident to each description of corps may be ascertained by consulting other Returns in the Appendix.

Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 49 & 52.  
Nos. 46 to 48.

#### IRREGULAR CORPS.

794. THE following are the number of irregulars, including the invalids, which have been maintained at each Presidency and the subordinate settlements, in each year from 1813 to 1830, with the charge of the same, as it is collected from the particular branch of service to which they belong.

Nos. 4 to 39.

IRREGULAR CORPS.	NUMBERS.					EXPENSE.			
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay	Subordinate Settlements.	TOTAL.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	TOTAL.
						£.	£.	£.	£.
1813 ..	22,391	5,621	1,130	77	29,222	6,339	78,205	242,014	326,558
1814 ..	23,243	3,007	1,272	89	27,611	5,895	76,718	248,756	331,319
1815 ..	33,512	7,483	1,155	87	42,267	7,788	155,266	433,189	596,243
1816 ..	39,757	8,968	1,157	71	49,953	7,812	168,482	346,816	523,140
1817 ..	36,116	8,767	1,316	72	46,301	8,997	185,450	253,875	418,312
1818 ..	46,976	9,318	1,402	76	57,772	8,925	414,338	326,598	749,861
1819 ..	41,255	8,954	1,772	78	55,059	3,718	408,393	313,997	756,108
1820 ..	36,201	9,794	3,055	71	49,121	3,927	164,173	331,632	502,732
1821 ..	34,799	8,811	5,697	66	49,373	4,397	283,141	363,532	651,070
1822 ..	35,632	8,065	4,916	62	46,675	4,118	239,050	338,174	581,672
1823 ..	36,852	4,726	4,371	417	46,366	4,078	174,463	332,263	510,804
1824 ..	38,112	4,287	5,006	411	47,836	3,924	186,025	394,050	583,999
1825 ..	42,460	5,773	6,058	373	54,661	3,826	302,601	373,758	680,185
1826 ..	44,168	6,072	7,837	374	58,451	3,698	351,706	441,636	797,040
1827 ..	38,617	7,034	7,337	308	53,326	3,554	311,037	378,735	693,326
1828 ..	37,351	6,911	6,553	76	50,891	3,469	295,097	343,660	612,226
1829 ..	35,332	6,622	5,015	85	47,054	3,212	438,081	159,175	600,768
1830 ..	28,904	7,031	3,878	92	39,905	3,035	179,393	270,712	453,140

795. In the Returns for each year from which the preceding Table has been constructed, the proportion of European and Native invalids is stated, and the proportion of charge for each Presidency is also specified; but the insertion of these latter particulars would have extended the number of columns, so as to have made the Table more complicated than appears to be necessary or desirable for the purpose for which it has been prepared.

Question 803.

796. The irregular horse is considered by Lieutenant-colonel Feilding as extremely useful. In war, "they are, in fact, the hussars of our Native army."

Capt. Macan, 2208.

797. Captain Macan thinks the irregular cavalry, particularly Colonel Skinner's corps, "as one of the most efficient branches of our military service for the purpose for which it is intended, and which saves the regular cavalry many harassing duties in time of war."

2218.

Colonel Skinner is represented as peculiarly qualified to command such a corps; but other corps might, in the opinion of this officer, be made as good. Colonel Gardener commanded a very efficient irregular corps which served in the Burmese war.

2209.

798. Irregular corps are composed of men hired, for a certain sum of money, by the month, who furnish their own horses and their own arms.

2214.

799. These corps are increased in war, but hastily reduced in peace. Sir T. Pritzler would prefer an augmentation of regular regiments to any local corps of infantry.

Sir T. Pritzler,  
1257.  
Mr H Mackenzie,  
2265 to 2271.

800. The Goorkah troops which entered our service, and are formed into irregular corps, are considered by Mr. Mackenzie as equalling any troops in the world in "the moral qualities of a soldier." The small body of irregulars that served at Bhurtpore has always been spoken of in the highest terms. They might perhaps be enlisted in our service without much difficulty; but their health would suffer from service in the plains of India. It would not be safe to rest upon them as a substitute for Europeans, who also stand variety of climate better than the Natives, particularly Hindoos, who suffer from their prejudices as to food.

2281 to 2281.

801. Major

801. Major Nutt considers that the Poonah auxiliary horse and the extra battalions of the Bombay army were a useful description of irregular corps, and regrets their abolition.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 9, p. 286.

802. Sir John Malcolm speaks also in high terms of this description of force; but he thinks that the extra battalions were no longer required.

No. 3, p. 252.

803. Sir T. Pritzler is of opinion that the duty of the body-guard at Madras would possibly be better performed, and at a less expense, by a squadron of cavalry from Arcot, and a brigade of guns from St. Thomas's Mount, to be relieved every three months.

No. 5, p. 261.

INVALIDS.

803 (a). THE number of invalids at each Presidency and the subordinate settlements, in each year from 1813 to 1830, was as follows. The charge of maintaining them is not specified separately in the Returns.

Appendix (A.),  
Nos. 4 to 30.

INVALIDS.	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	Prince of Wales' Island.	ST. HELENA.	TOTAL.
1813 .. ..	2,451	4,813	1,018	—	77	8,359
1814 .. ..	2,325	3,007	1,160	—	89	6,581
1815 .. ..	2,176	7,483	1,043	—	87	10,789
1816 .. ..	2,043	8,968	1,045	—	71	12,127
1817 .. ..	2,101	8,767	1,234	—	72	12,174
1818 .. ..	2,037	9,318	1,200	—	76	12,721
1819 .. ..	1,960	8,954	1,573	—	78	12,565
1820 .. ..	2,006	8,544	1,823	—	71	12,444
1821 .. ..	2,189	8,811	2,095	—	66	13,161
1822 .. ..	2,535	8,065	2,161	—	62	12,823
1823 .. ..	2,593	4,726	2,189	—	62	9,570
1824 .. ..	2,587	4,287	2,456	—	76	9,406
1825 .. ..	2,532	4,363	2,657	—	76	9,628
1826 .. ..	2,391	4,777	2,674	—	71	9,913
1827 .. ..	2,499	5,630	3,045	—	72	11,246
1828 .. ..	2,228	5,087	3,297	—	76	11,288
1829 .. ..	2,298	5,472	2,764	—	85	10,619
1830 .. ..	2,746	5,887	1,863	—	92	10,588

804. The Return forming No. 2 of Appendix (A.) specifies the proportion of European and Native invalids of which these numbers are composed; and the particular Returns for each year, from which the preceding Table has been constructed, supplies the same information in respect to each Presidency and the subordinate settlements.

805. Colonel Watson states that invalids in Bengal receive full pay and perform garrison duty.

Question  
1005.

806. Colonel Greenhill states that at Bombay there is a Native veteran battalion into which men are admitted, if with a good character, after a twenty years' service. In regard to these, Colonel Aitchison observes, "We then get ten years more service out of him for local duty."

1545.  
1707.

807. The inefficient men of the invalid corps of Bombay were transferred by Sir John Malcolm to the pension establishment.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 254.

808. Colonel Pennington recommends the establishment of "veteran battalions to be composed entirely of old officers and sepoys, having the same proportion, as far as the means would allow, of invalid European officers."

No. 10, p. 297.

809. Major Wilson thinks that the situation of barrack-masters might be filled by officers on the veteran, or invalid, or pension establishment, or that officers holding such appointments might, on promotion, be remanded to their regiments.

No. 18, p. 366.

GENERAL

## SYNOPSIS OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE

## GENERAL STAFF.

810. THE numbers employed upon the general staff, including the commissariat, with the charge of those departments, in each of the years from 1813 to 1830, are specified below :

GENERAL STAFF.				NUMBERS.					
				BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	Prince of Wales' Island.	ST. HELENA.	TOTAL.
1813 .. ..				188	202	74	—	—	464
1814 .. ..				204	213	70	—	—	487
1815 .. ..				200	261	72	—	—	533
1816 .. ..				182	220	93	—	—	495
1817 .. ..				220	234	130	—	—	584
1818 .. ..				242	277	108	—	—	627
1819 .. ..				268	321	170	—	—	759
1820 .. ..				285	321	138	—	—	744
1821 .. ..				368	336	93	—	—	817
1822 .. ..				282	329	112	—	—	723
1823 .. ..				328	324	108	—	—	760
1824 .. ..				364	350	97	—	—	811
1825 .. ..				384	362	102	—	—	848
1826 .. ..				383	380	112	—	—	875
1827 .. ..				391	390	109	—	—	890
1828 .. ..				432	420	129	—	—	981
1829 .. ..				495	424	139	—	—	1,058
1830 .. ..				440	445	148	—	—	1,033

GENERAL STAFF.		EXPENSE.								TOTAL.
		BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.		JAVA, &C.		
		Staff.	Commis- sariat.	Staff.	Commis- sariat.	Staff.	Commis- sariat.	Staff.	Commis- sariat.	
		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1813	..	179,810	221,438	182,064	230,398	41,291	57,401	51,777	46,854	1,011,033
1814	..	154,708	206,598	143,994	159,055	64,184	57,513	—	—	816,052
1815	..	161,465	280,618	151,561	153,292	62,050	167,776	—	—	976,762
1816	..	123,741	290,064	150,796	173,191	330,128	67,295	—	—	1,135,215
1817	..	186,094	329,735	146,440	157,078	291,984	62,564	—	—	1,173,895
1818	..	201,223	345,527	142,037	198,148	430,694	115,403	—	—	1,433,032
1819	..	247,270	483,807	151,785	194,208	319,275	42,502	—	—	1,438,947
1820	..	212,692	367,720	149,857	191,666	237,117	48,818	—	—	1,207,870
1821	..	215,509	720,063	151,664	265,146	326,538	74,232	—	—	1,753,152
1822	..	235,796	547,989	148,282	222,648	202,725	80,460	—	—	1,437,901
1823	..	230,445	502,112	147,450	97,681	167,280	54,639	—	—	1,199,607
1824	..	247,730	613,389	151,425	135,380	158,322	36,171	—	—	1,342,417
1825	..	260,707	550,321	153,812	158,187	158,322	36,171	—	—	1,317,520
1826	..	251,008	585,121	150,561	245,845	227,898	52,704	—	—	1,513,137
1827	..	233,118	594,477	159,860	147,643	199,936	37,663	—	—	1,372,697
1828	..	177,593	683,478	167,480	306,377	182,501	29,973	—	—	1,547,402
1829	..	142,567	408,431	113,382	243,862	116,688	37,163	—	—	1,062,093
1830	..	174,794	382,499	168,501	207,346	145,195	24,482	—	—	1,102,817

811. The Return No. 2 in Appendix (A.) specifies the number of European officers employed, both in the staff and commissariat, in India, and also the number of European non-commissioned officers employed on the general staff in each year; and similar information in respect to each Presidency may be obtained by consulting the separate Returns for each year, from which the preceding Table has been constructed.

812. The particular appointments in the general staff of the three Presidencies are stated in a separate Return, and the expense of the same, and of the military departments, in the years 1813, 1826, and 1830, is also given.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 11.  
No. 11.

813. The allowances, also, of the officers on the general staff are stated in a separate Return.

No. 63.

814. Colonel Salmond, in his reply to the Board's circular, has supplied an abstract Return of the number of officers employed upon the staff in 1813 and at the present time, distinguishing the Presidencies and departments; and also a Return of officers in civil employment at the three Presidencies. He has given a general description of the duties appropriate to each department, which may be conveniently consulted as a suitable introduction to the suggestions of the several witnesses in respect to the staff.

App. (B.), No. 2.  
pp. 155 & 162.

pp. 160 to 163.

815. This head comprises what is stated by the witnesses in regard to the appointment of officers to the general staff, their duties, and the mode in which they are promoted; and whether any reductions be practicable therein. Also, such notices as are given by them in relation to the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general's departments, the commissariat, the pay department, and department of the military auditor-general, the military boards, together with the information supplied in relation to stores, clothing, and carriage for the troops.

816. It is necessary that an officer should have done regimental duty before he is allowed to hold a staff situation; and this rule is, by Colonel J. Munro, held to be essential for the service.

Col. J. Munro,  
1059-60.

817. Sir E. Paget is of opinion that it would be a beneficial alteration in the system if staff officers at the cantonments were to give up their offices when their corps are removed to another station; but he thinks the way in which officers are taken from their corps to fill up these and all sorts of situations at Bengal is objectionable.

Sir E. Paget, 2312.

818. Colonel Linond remarks, that it is "a lamentable fact that foreign influence is, and has been for many years, paramount to the claim of desert or length of service; that this influence, under a transfer to the Crown, would be increased, and its baleful effects extended, there can be no doubt."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 12, p. 306.

819. The staff officers in each Presidency are selected exclusively from the Company's service in the same Presidency.

Sir J. Nicolls, 112.

820. Colonel Greenhill thinks that staff officers should be selected only on the recommendation of the officers commanding the corps as to good conduct and a knowledge of the country languages.

Col. Greenhill,  
1539.

821. The duties of the general's staff at Bengal are nearly the same as in the British army. General officers in India have more to do than elsewhere. The duties of a general officer at Madras are of a wider nature than those in Bengal, every detail of the service passing through his hands.

Sir J. Nicolls,  
209 to 212.

822. In the department of the general staff at Bengal, the junior officers are promoted by seniority, the seniors by selection.

212.

823. The officers of the Bengal army are generally selected for their merits, and by no means from European recommendations.

260-1.

824. In 1813 the total amount of force was 199,950, and that in 1830, 194,685; the staff is nevertheless more by 84 now than it was in 1813. This is accounted for by the number of stations having been increased of late years, and it does not appear from any of the witnesses that reductions can be made in the officers on the staff.

Sir J. Malcolm,  
679-80, 682.

825. Captain



- Appendix (B.),  
No. 21, p. 388.  
Question 682-3.
825. Captain Page is of opinion that reductions in the staff are practicable.
826. In the adjutant-general's department in Bengal the number of staff officers has increased since 1813, from 58 to 75; at Madras, from 25 to 26; at Bombay, from 12 to 20, which cannot, in the opinion of the witnesses, be reduced without a loss of efficiency.
- Lieut.-col. Watson,  
979-80.
827. The territory occupied by the Indian army is divided into military districts, with a centre staff, from whom all orders emanate.
- Col. J. Munro,  
1073-71.
828. These duties of the departments of adjutant-general and quartermaster-general are understood to be different at Bengal from those at Madras. Lord Howden made the same distribution in those duties at Madras as *subsists* in England, and the plan, in the opinion of Colonel J. Munro, works well.
829. Major Wilson is of opinion that the office of adjutant-general and quartermaster-general should be united, as in the continental armies.
- Sir T. Pritzler,  
1200-1.\*
830. The quartermaster-general's department at Madras is stated to have deteriorated of late, in consequence of officers being appointed to it indiscriminately, instead of, as formerly, from the military institution at Madras, which is now abolished.
- 1216.
831. The commissariat provides almost every thing for the army, even to the horses of the cavalry, under the instruction and control of the Governor in Council of the Presidency only.
- Capt. Macan, 2158.  
Col. Salmond,  
565.†
832. There appear to be no means of ascertaining whether it be more economical to obtain the supplies by the commissioners, or by the old mode of contract as before. The several Indian Governments have been called upon to report on the subject.
- App. (B.), No. 3,  
p. 254; also p. 169.
833. Sir John Malcolm observes as follows, in reference to the commissariat of Bombay, during the period of his administration of the government: "From my first arrival in India in 1827, I was aware the commissariat department called for minute investigation, and a considerable reform of its establishment; and I anticipated great reduction of expenditure might be more beneficially introduced. In prosecution of the reforms made in this branch, the commissary-general was relieved from the detail duties at the Presidency. All the branches of the commissariat, including supplies, labourers, carriage, and dooley establishments, were reduced to a more economical scale, and great improvements introduced by a revision of office forms of returns, correspondence, &c., simplifying the routine of business; and I can now assert that a saving of nearly 30 per cent. has been made, upon an average of its whole expenditure."
- Appendix (B.),  
No. 12, p. 301.
834. Colonel Limond is of opinion that "the formation of the commissariat of provision and supply has proved of incalculable benefit to the service;" and he recommends the formation of an ordnance commissariat, on a plan similar to that which he submitted to Lord Ellenborough.
- No. 17, p. 352.
835. Colonel John Munro is equally impressed with the advantages of the commissariat.
836. Captain Balmain observes, "Were the system of contract generally introduced it would tend to much economy."
- Col. Salmond,  
621-26;.
837. The mode in which the pay department is managed is stated by Colonel Salmond to be as follows: The paymaster-general makes a calculation of what will be required for military disbursements every month, and that calculation is handed up to the auditor-general to check, and according to his opinion issues are made to the paymaster-general. The paymaster-general issues the money he receives to the paymasters of stations, who pay it to the captains of companies for the men in Bengal.

838. In

\* See also his reply to the Military Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 5, p. 390.

† See also his reply to the Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 162.

‡ See also his reply to the Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 161.

838. In Madras the money is paid to the paymasters of regiments in the first instance, and by him to the captains of companies for the men.

839. The duties that are at home performed by the Secretary at War, in India are performed by the auditor-general. The financial part of the army is under the auditor.

Col. Salmond,  
627.\*

840. Colonel Salmond thinks that "the judge advocate-general might with propriety be, as at home, a barrister;" and that the Bengal system of employing officers in the department of military secretary to Government is preferable to that which obtains at the other Presidencies, of filling these offices with civilians.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 2, p. 161.

841. The Military Board at Bombay has been abolished. The following are the reasons stated by Sir John Malcolm in support of this measure: "My most serious attention was called to the constitution of the Military Board of this establishment. That it had been an useful institution there can be no doubt; but during the present well-understood system of detail, it had become a real source of expense, and caused a multiplication of business which I thought would be much more effectually transacted by throwing direct responsibility upon the heads of departments, and causing them to correspond with Government or the Commander-in-chief.

Sir J. Malcolm, 665  
Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 255.†

"The functions of the Board have now ceased more than a twelvemonth; and the manner in which departments conduct their duties, as now laid down, shows the system to be generally improved. Every good effect that I anticipated from its abolition has resulted, and no inconvenience has been found from that measure in any branch of the service; on the contrary, both efficiency and economy have been essentially promoted, while a much more operative check has been placed upon public expenditure; and that check is in all cases, except on emergency, upon demand, not upon supply." Major-general Sir T. Pritzler thinks the Military Board might be dispensed with at Madras.

Major-gen. Pritzler,  
1255.

842. In Bengal the Military Board has been modified. Lord William Bentinck has made two special appointments to this Board, the officers holding which are salaried and have no other duties to attend to. Some of the staff officers who used to belong to the Board, without salaries, have been relieved from that duty.

Col. Salmond,  
1931-32.\*

843. The duty of indenting upon England for military stores is performed by the Military Board of each Presidency, under instructions from England. In the Appendix is a statement of the aggregate expense of military stores sent from England in the years 1813, 1826, and 1830.

Sir J. Nicolls, 214  
Appendix (A.),  
No. 15, p. 53.

844. Sir John Malcolm remarks as follows, in reference to the department of stores and camp equipage at Bombay: "My attention having been called to the general revision in the establishments of stores and camp equipage, reductions were made in the number of store artificers, and of pay to tent and store lascars. Of the respectable classes of serangs and tindals, however, it did not appear expedient to reduce the pay, although the number was lessened; but in the whole of the abovementioned reductions, notwithstanding the saving of expenditure to Government, the just claims of individuals to exemption from reduction or reward from Government, on account of service or good conduct, have never been sacrificed to measures of economy."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 3, p. 251;  
also p. 169.

845. An immense stock of ordnance is kept at the different Presidencies; and if artillery stores are wanting at one Presidency, they could easily be transferred coastwise from any of the other Presidencies that could spare them.

Col. J. Limond,  
1280.  
Lt.-col. Watson,  
935.

846. Sir J. Malcolm states that at Bombay, and he believes at the other Presidencies, every article that can be furnished equally serviceable, and at less expense, is furnished in India, and not included in the indents upon England.

Sir J. Malcolm, 661.

847. Guns and shot, arms and accoutrements, are supplied from England; gunpowder, ordnance-

Col. J. Limond,  
1279.

\* See also his reply to the Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 161.

† See also the Minute recorded by Sir J. Malcolm upon the occasion, 1 Dec. 1829, pp. 245 to 250.

ordnance-carriages and appointments are made at the Company's establishments in the country.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 9, p. 258.

848. Major Nutt remarks as follows: "An inquiry might be useful into the mode by which the military stores are supplied from England. It is generally understood that the East-India Company pay a liberal price for every article of supply, whilst the stores themselves are oftentimes of a very inferior description. The arms, accoutrements, surveying and mathematical instruments, &c. fall more particularly under this observation. There seems to me to be great inattention in not adapting the articles to the climate, they are destined to be used in, by which Government sustains a heavy pecuniary loss, and the efficiency of the military equipments is seriously impaired."

Sir E. Paget, 2309

849. It appears that stores sent out are generally good, but will deteriorate from the nature of the climate. The gunpowder manufactories in India are excellent.

Col. Salmond,  
635-36.

850. There is no manufactory of arms in India, or of shot; both are supplied from England.

Sir L. Smith, 2325

851. Sir Lionel Smith thinks the musket-locks supplied are not so good as in the King's service.

852. Colonel Forrest thinks that no arms are better got up than those for the Company's service, and are better than those for His Majesty's troops.

Col. Hopkinson,  
1362-63.

853. The saddlery and harness are all made in the country. The calibres of the guns, stores, and carriages are believed to be the same at the three Presidencies. The brass ordnance is made in Bengal, and supplied to the other Presidencies.

Col. Salmond,  
628-29.

854. The commandant of artillery has the general superintendence and control of the whole artillery of his establishment. The civil duties of this department in Bombay are also under the management of the commandant of artillery since the abolition of the Military Board by Sir John Malcolm. These duties used to be partly managed by the Military Board, and partly by the commandant of artillery everywhere; but since the alteration in the Military Board, Colonel Salmond cannot speak for certain as to how the duties are conducted at Bombay.

Sir J. Nicolls, 215.

855. All kinds of clothing made in England are superior, but small stores are prepared with advantage at the different arsenals in India, and much cheaper than they could be procured from Europe.

856. The clothing of the Company's troops in India is managed, at Bengal and Bombay, by agents appointed by the Government of each Presidency.

Col. Houstoun,  
1874.

857. At Madras they have, for the last three or four years, provided the clothing by contract, which is found to be a cheaper and better system, and will probably be applied to the other Presidencies; but at each Presidency the clothing agents are under the orders of a Clothing Board, consisting of a certain number of officers.

Col. J. Salmond,  
1890.\*

858. The cloth is sent from England, and made up at several Presidencies under the orders of their respective Clothing Boards.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 13, p. 309.

859. Lieutenant-colonel Hopkinson states as follows: "The clothing of the Madras army generally is of the best quality *now*, especially since the mode of providing it has been altered. The arms of every description are of the best quality that England can produce; but I do think, as an old commissary, that the equipments, such as belts, pouches, drums, and such like, are bad. It is true a sort of country-made accoutrements may cost infinitely less than those from Europe, but even this is, I think, a question; certainly, however, they do not last, even under the most favourable circumstances, one-third the time. I have, when commissary, frequently known commanding officers take back condemned *Europe* articles in preference to receiving new country."

860. Sir

\* See also his reply to the Board's Circular, Appendix (B.), No. 2, p. 102.

860. Sir T. Pritzler is also of opinion that "a saving would be made, by the durability of European accoutrements and appointments being greater than those of Native manufacture which are now in use.

Appendix (B.),  
No. 5, p. 255.

861. Sir H. Worsley is of opinion that the musket in general use for the infantry is too heavy, and that fusils, such as artillerymen often carry, might be substituted.

No. 15, p. 324.

862. In the Appendix is a list of articles of clothing and equipment, and also of the means of carriage or other accommodation supplied to the soldier at each Presidency, and in each branch of service.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 67, p. 129.

863. There is no restriction as to the number of animals employed upon the lines of march for the carriage of baggage. Horses are not employed; all baggage is carried either upon elephants, camels, or bullocks.

Lt.-col. Feilding  
870-1-2.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

864. THE number of medical officers, European and Native, employed at each Presidency and the subordinate settlements, in each year from 1813 to 1830, with the charge of the same, were as follow :

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.	NUMBERS.						EXPENSE.			
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Prince of Wales' Island.	St. Helena.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
							£.	£.	£.	£.
1813 ..	300	313	100	6	8	727	34,836	24,843	19,977	79,656
1814 ..	319	297	99	6	8	729	42,766	25,316	21,120	89,202
1815 ..	337	288	102	6	7	740	8,775	29,438	21,835	60,048
1816 ..	370	325	103	6	7	811	42,132	30,674	21,601	94,407
1817 ..	350	312	100	5	7	774	42,494	29,993	21,391	93,878
1818 ..	389	307	105	6	7	814	41,858	29,692	22,387	93,937
1819 ..	393	300	109	6	6	814	52,442	22,723	23,934	99,099
1820 ..	386	340	115	5	6	851	51,954	22,976	25,331	100,261
1821 ..	371	365	115	4	8	863	57,952	26,367	22,916	107,235
1822 ..	382	368	119	6	7	882	54,968	27,676	38,903	121,547
1823 ..	376	377	176	6	7	942	58,085	31,234	40,938	130,257
1824 ..	389	381	170	6	7	953	57,034	29,687	29,059	115,780
1825 ..	425	391	188	11	7	1,022	63,443	31,314	29,059	123,816
1826 ..	450	406	196	8	7	1,067	14,225	28,267	27,217	69,709
1827 ..	439	418	220	9	7	1,093	67,015	29,507	26,355	122,877
1828 ..	475	464	196	9	8	1,152	70,442	35,074	27,518	133,034
1829 ..	486	446	272	15	8	1,227	67,538	29,323	28,493	125,354
1830 ..	457	494	292	15	8	1,266	66,772	35,134	30,952	132,858

865. In the Return No. 2, Appendix (A.) the European surgeons and Native doctors are distinguished, which is also the case in respect to each Presidency, in the separate Returns for each year, from which the preceding Table has been constructed.

866. The number of medical staff appointments of the three Presidencies is shown in a separate Return; and also in another Return the allowances of officers holding those appointments are stated.

Appendix (A.),  
No. 13.  
No. 65.

867. Major Wilson is of opinion that the number of medical officers is too few, and that the department "demands a very attentive review and consideration."

Appendix (B.),  
No. 18, p. 374.

868. The witnesses have supplied information in relation to the duties of medical officers, both of European and Native corps; the medical contracts they formerly held, and the allowances of which they are in receipt; the efficiency or otherwise of the Company's medical regulations; and the appointment recently made by His Majesty's Government of an inspector-general of hospitals, or a deputy inspector-general of hospitals, at each Presidency.

Sir J. Nicolls, 221. 869. The duties of the medical officer in charge of an European corps are more numerous than in any other part of the world; the hospitals being full of sick, and the medical officer having a double set of voluminous Returns to prepare. Besides the care of his hospital, he has to attend English gentlemen, civil and military, together with their families, at the station.

Sir J. Nicolls, 222. 870. The duties of the medical officer in charge of a Native, are the same as in an European corps, but different in quantity and degree: he has not so many books to keep, and the Native troops are infinitely more healthy than the European.

Sir T. Reynell, 458. Sir J. Nicolls, 223. 871. The proportion of medical officers allowed to European and Native corps is one to a Native and three to an European regiment: each has a sufficient establishment of Native assistants. The number attached to an European regiment is at times insufficient.

221. 872. Under the former regulations the surgeon contracted to furnish country medicines, according to the number of men under his care, as also bedding and clothing, at a given amount of each European, and in Native regiments so much for every 100 natives; but European medicines were always furnished by the Government. These allowances to surgeons were formerly very great, but they had to find all the *matériel* of the hospital. Under the new regulations, however, the substitution of allowance in lieu of contract is generally beneficial, as it places the superintendence in proper hands, but at the same time, it is no saving to the East-India Company; on the contrary, it is believed that the expense is increased. Some years ago, the medical officers at Bombay were under considerable alarm (which has not yet subsided) in consequence of the reductions and alterations in their allowances.

Sir T. Reynell, 460. 873. The medicines are now, except the most trifling articles, supplied from the public stores by indents, and are much superior in quality to those formerly furnished by contract. The quantity is also certainly greater than before.

Sir J. Nicolls, 227. 874. The Company's regulations in this department are very liberal; the hospital and medical duties generally (at least of Bombay, of which Sir C. Dalbiac speaks) are particularly well conducted; the officers in the superior and middle ranks of this class, as well in the King's as in the Company's service, being men of excellent education. But if these officers should entertain anything like mistrust as to the pay and allowances hitherto granted to them, the same description of men who have gone out for the last twelve or fourteen years, and who have brought this portion of the service to its present highly creditable state, will not again be induced to go out; and the introduction of officers of inferior education would be generally very prejudicial, and would at times materially affect the efficiency of the army. It is to be observed that the number of invalids in a Native regiment varies very much according to the country in which they are employed; those of 800 or 900 strong have sometimes six or eight sick; but Sir T. Pritzler states that if he found that they exceeded twenty or twenty-five out of 800, he should have made inquiry. In an European regiment, the corps are considered unhealthy when the invalids exceed 10 per cent. A regiment, stationed under his command for two years at Bangalore lost only twenty-five out of 800 men each year; at Arcot, and in the field, about fifty men per annum; but at Trichinopoly, when first they came out, they lost seventy, the greatest loss they had sustained for twenty-five years.

1198. 875. With regard to the Company's regulation requiring a specified period of service, as superintending surgeon or member of the Medical Board, in order to entitle medical officers to

to the higher scale of retiring pension, it is considered by them as a hardship, that they should not have the privilege, in common with the field officers in the army, of retiring on the day they attain their new rank. Sir T. Reynell, however, thinks that the above regulation is a very just arrangement. It is supposed by some that it would be advantageous to the service if the situations of superintending surgeon and member of the Medical Board were filled by selection, instead of seniority, as at present, because younger men would be brought forward, and more active officers obtained; but it must be a very high scale of retiring pension that would induce the medical service to consider it as a favour done to them; every class in India being so much attached to the seniority rise. Though there is a power of selection vested in the Government, Sir J. Nicolls never remembers it to have been exercised at Bengal.

Sir J. Nicolls, 228-29.

Sir T. Reynell, 462.  
Sir J. Nicolls, 230.

231.

876. In one of the replies to the Board's circular it is suggested, that the retiring pensions should have reference to length of service, rather than the appointment of superintending surgeon and member of the Medical Board, on account of its injuriously fettering "the discretion of the local government in the selection of medical officers for the higher and more important situations, by securing, as it in a measure does, the practical observance of a seniority promotion, without regard to individual qualification."

App. (B.), No. 23,  
paras. 151 & 155,  
p. 431.

877. The appointment of a superintending medical officer, who has also had experience of diseases in other climates, is considered of advantage; but Sir J. Nicolls does not think it indispensable that previous service in India should be a qualification in the selection of an inspector of His Majesty's hospitals in that country. Sir T. Reynell, however, considers the above qualification undoubtedly necessary. Since inspectors of hospitals have been appointed to the King's regiments in India, and a more accurate registry of the cases and their treatment is kept, which has doubtlessly led to an improved practice, the system of registration has been extended to the Company's service. The duty of inspector is believed to be entirely confined to communication with the surgeons of the different regiments in His Majesty's service, and with the director-general of hospitals at home. The King's army has a deputy inspector of hospitals for Madras, and an inspector at Calcutta.

Sir T. Reynell, 461.  
Sir J. Nicolls, 232,  
233

Sir T. Reynell, 465.  
Sir J. Nicolls, 235.

Sir T. Reynell, 467.

878. Sir T. Reynell is of opinion that this inspector of hospitals should have a seat at the Medical Board of the Presidency at which he is stationed, as belonging to a large portion of the army.

463.

879. In one of the replies to the circular it is remarked "that the appointment of an inspector-general of hospitals of His Majesty's regiments in India, and of a deputy inspector-general at each of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, is calculated to improve the character of the medical service of India, by the introduction of individuals into that country who have had experience of the diseases of other climates, and are familiar with the most recent improvements that may have taken place in the science in Europe. It also forms an important link between the presiding medical authorities in this country and in India, which was before wanting. Every measure should, however, be taken to prevent collision between the medical authorities of the two services; and if the inspector-general and his deputies had a seat at the Medical Board of the Presidency to which they are respectively attached, much advantage might accrue to each service, by the opportunity which would thereby be afforded for mutual communication and confidential explanation. A similar remark is applicable to the officers at the head of the departments of adjutant-general and quartermaster-general at the Presidencies, at which a Military Board is still in existence.

App. (B.), No. 23,  
paras. 156-7, p. 431.

880. The Medical department of the Company's service in India has been revised very lately, and it is believed satisfactorily established. Sir T. Pritzler recommends that medical officers should be examined at every step of promotion, as is the case in the King's regiments.\*

Col. Salmond, 561.  
Sir T. Pritzler, 1202.

881. No

Sir C. Dalbiac, 2023. 881. No officer in any military service is exposed to the same continued fatigue and risk as the medical officer in charge of an European corps in India ; and it is believed it will be found that these officers die there in the proportion of at least two, or perhaps three to one, as compared with officers of other ranks. In less than ten years, the 4th dragoons, (King's) have buried three full surgeons in India, besides a fourth who came to England in bad health, and died after his arrival.

882. Altogether, a point of more importance to the welfare and efficiency of the Indian army can scarcely be contemplated, than that of affording due encouragement and remuneration to, and keeping perfect faith with, the medical officers of all ranks employed in that country.

---

---

## APPENDIX.

---





# LIST OF APPENDIX.



## APPENDIX (A.)

Consisting of the undermentioned Returns, Statements, and Tables, illustrative of the System of the Indian Army :

### *1st. In respect to Numbers and Expense.*

No.											Page
1.—	A RETURN, showing the Number of European and Native Troops employed at each Presidency, and in India, in each year, from 1793 to 1830	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
2.—	A RETURN, showing the Number of Europeans and Natives employed in India, in each Branch of Service, and in each year, from 1813 to 1830	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
3.—	A RETURN, showing the Annual Expense of the Military Force of the Three Presidencies and Subordinate Settlements, in each year, from 1813 to 1830	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
4 & 5.—	Particular and similar Returns, showing the Numbers and Expense at each Presidency, and the Dependent Settlements, in each Branch of Service, for the year 1813	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8
6 & 7.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1814	..	10
8 & 9.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1815	..	12
10 & 11.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1816	..	14
12 & 13.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1817	..	16
14 & 15.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1818	..	18
16 & 17.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1819	..	20
18 & 19.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1820	..	22
20 & 21.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1821	..	24
22 & 23.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1822	..	26
24 & 25.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1823	..	28
26 & 27.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1824	..	30
28 & 29.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1825	..	32
30 & 31.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1826	..	34
32 & 33.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1827	..	36
34 & 35.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1828	..	38
36 & 37.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1829	..	40
38 & 39.—	Ditto	..	..	..	ditto	..	..	..	1830	..	42

No.	Page
40.—A Return of the General and Medical Staff of His Majesty's Forces on the Indian Establishment .. .. .	44
41.—A Return of the General Staff of the three Presidencies .. .. .	45
42.—A Return, showing the Number of Officers in command of Divisions of the Army, Subsidiary or Field Forces, and of Brigades or Stations .. .. .	49
43.—A Return, showing the Number of Medical Staff Appointments of the three Presidencies .. .. .	49
44.—A Statement of the Aggregate Expense of the General Staff of the three Presidencies, and the Military Departments in the years 1813, 1826, and 1830 .. .. .	52
45.—A Statement of the Aggregate Expense of Military Stores sent from England in the years 1813, 1826, and 1830 .. .. .	53
46.—Calculation of the comparative Expense of a Regiment of European and Native Cavalry, and Infantry, a Brigade of Horse, and Battalion of Foot Artillery, and of the Corps of Engineers, and Sappers and Miners of the Bengal Establishment .. .. .	54
47.—A similar Calculation in respect to the Corps of the Madras Establishment .. .. .	56
48.—Ditto .. .. . Bombay Establishment .. .. .	58

### *2dly. Organization.*

49.—Establishment of a Regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry at each Presidency, with Columns showing in what particulars the Regiments of Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal .. .. .	60
50.—A similar Comparison in respect to a Brigade of Horse and Battalion of Foot Artillery at each Presidency .. .. .	63
51.—A similar Comparison in respect to the Corps of Engineers, Pioneers, Sappers and Miners of the three Presidencies .. .. .	70
52.—A similar Comparison of the Company's European Infantry of the three Presidencies ..	73
53.—A Return, showing the Number of Officers withdrawn from each regular Regiment of Cavalry and Infantry for Staff and Detached Employment, in each year, from 1813 to 1831 .. .. .	74
54.—A Return, showing the Alterations which have taken place in the Establishment and Numbers of His Majesty's Cavalry and Infantry Regiments in India from 1813 to the present time .. .. .	78

### *3dly. Distribution.*

55.—A Return, showing the Distribution of the Army in the years 1813, 1820, and 1830, arranged so as to show the Amount of Force stationed at each Period within the British and Protected Territory, and the Effect of the Extension of the British Frontier in the Removal of Corps from near to remote Stations .. .. .	81
--	----

*4thly. Casualties and Appointments.*

No.		Page
56.—	A Return of the Number and Description of Casualties among the <sup>*</sup> Company's European Commissioned Officers in each year, from 1813 to 1830 .. .. .	108
57.—	A Return, showing the Number of Cadets and Assistant Surgeons appointed in each year, from 1796 to the present time .. .. .	110
58.—	A Return, showing the Number of Men discharged from the Company's Service during the last Six Years, their average Length of Service, and their Age at the Period of Enlistment .. .. .	112
59.—	A Return, showing the average Length of Service, in the Company's Army, of Men transferred from His Majesty's Service, who have arrived in this Country as discharged Soldiers, since 1825 .. .. .	113

*5thly. Pay and Allowances.*

60.—	A Table of the Regimental Pay and Allowances of the European Commissioned Officers of the three Presidencies, with a Note explanatory of the Mode in which the Allowances of Officers of His Majesty's Service are equalized with those of the corresponding Regimental Rank of the Company's Service .. .. .	114
61.—	A Table of the Pay and Allowances of the European Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates of the three Presidencies .. .. .	116
62.—	A Table of the Pay and Allowances of the Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates of the three Presidencies .. .. .	119
63.—	A Table, showing the Allowances drawn by Officers holding the Appointments in the General Staff mentioned in the Return, forming No. 41 of this Appendix .. .. .	122
64.—	A similar Table of the Allowances drawn by Officers in command of Divisions of the Army, Subsidiary or Field Forces, and Brigades or Stations, mentioned in the Return, <sup>*</sup> forming No. 42 of this Appendix; and also of the Allowances drawn by Officers in command of Corps and of Troops and Companies .. .. .	126
65.—	A Table of the Allowances drawn by Officers holding the Medical Appointments mentioned in the Return, forming No. 43 of this Appendix .. .. .	127
66.—	A Table of the Allowances drawn by Officers of His Majesty's Service holding the Appointments mentioned in the Return, forming No. 40 of this Appendix .. .. .	128

*6thly. Clothing, Equipment, and Off-reckonings.*

67.—	A List of Articles of Clothing and Equipment, and also of the Means of Carriage or other Accommodation supplied to the Soldier at each Presidency, and in each Branch of Service, in 1813 and at present .. .. .	129
68.—	A Statement of the <sup>*</sup> Rates of Off-reckoning at each Presidency as they existed in 1813 and at present .. .. .	144

No.	Page
69.—A Statement of the Value of an Off-reckoning Share in each year from 1814 to the present time, with the number of Colonels at present in Receipt of full and half Shares of Off-reckonings, and of those who have not yet come into the Receipt of a half Share, with the Sum paid as Compensation to Officers who succeeded to Off-reckonings between 1824 and 1826, in each year, from that period to the present time .. .. .	146

*7thly. Furlough, Retirement, and Pensions.*

70.—A Statement of the Rates of Furlough Pay as they existed in 1813 and at present ..	147
71.—A Return of the Number of Officers in Receipt of Furlough Pay, with the Amount of Charge in each year, from 1796 to the present time .. .. .	148
72.—A Statement, exhibiting the Rates of Retiring Allowances to Company's European Commissioned Officers in 1813 and at present .. .. .	149
73.—A Return of the Number of Retired Officers in the Receipt of Full and Half Pay, with the Amount of Charge in each year, from 1796 to the present time .. .. .	150
74.—A Statement of the Rates of Pensions payable from Lord Clive's Fund, as they stood in 1813 and at present .. .. .	151
75.—A Return of the Number of Officers and Soldiers, and their Widows, in Receipt of Pensions from Lord Clive's Fund, with the aggregate Amount of Charge in each year, from 1813 to the present time .. .. .	153

---

## APPENDIX (B.)

Consisting of a CIRCULAR LETTER, addressed, by Order of the Commissioners for the Affairs of *India*, to Officers of the Indian Service, and of REPLIES to the same.

1.—COPY of the Circular Letter abovementioned .. .. .	154
2.—Reply of Lieut.-colonel Salmond, formerly Military Auditor-general of Bengal, who was deputed by Lord Wellesley to Madras and Bombay to obtain information respecting the system of Military Finance in force at those Presidencies, and is now Military Secretary to the East-India Company, and in that capacity has had charge of the entire Correspondence relating to the Indian Army since the year 1809; dated 24th Feb. 1832 .. .. .	155
3.—Reply of Major-general Sir John Malcolm, G. C. B., of the Madras Infantry, who had charge of the administration of Central India, and was Governor of Bombay from Nov. 1827 to Dec. 1830; dated 13th Feb. 1832 .. .. .	168

# LIST OF APPENDIX.

CXXV

No.	Page
4.—Reply of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was Resident at Poona and Commissioner of the Poona Territories, and was the predecessor of Sir John Malcolm in the Government of Bombay; dated 5th Aug. 1832 .. .. .	257
5.—Reply of Major-general Sir Theophilus Pritzler, K. C. B., of His Majesty's Service, who was in command of a regiment of Dragoons under the Madras Government, employed in the Southern Mahratta Country, and afterwards a Major-general on the Staff of the Madras Army; dated 17th Feb. 1832 .. .. .	260
6.—Reply of Lieut.-general Sir William Keir Grant, K. C. B., of His Majesty's Service, who served in Java during its occupation by Troops of the Indian Service, commanded an Expedition against the Pirates in the Persian Gulf, and was a Major-general on the Staff of the Bombay Army; dated 27th March 1832 .. .. .	270
7.—Reply of Lieut.-Colonel Colebrooke, of His Majesty's Service, who served in Java during its occupation by Troops from India, and has also served in India; received 4th May 1832 .. .. .	273
8.—Reply of Lieut.-colonel De Havilland, late of the Madras Engineers; dated 7th July 1832 .. .. .	277
9.—Reply of Major Justinian Nutt, of the Bombay Engineers who was present at most of the Sieges undertaken by Sir T. Pritzler in the Peishwa's Country in 1817-18; dated 24th Aug. 1832 .. .. .	285
10.—Reply of Colonel Pennington, C. B., of the Bengal Artillery, who was employed in the formation of the Horse Artillery of that Establishment, and had the command of it for several years; dated 7th March 1832 .. .. .	291
11.—Reply of Colonel Sherwood, of the Bengal Artillery, who was Commissary of Stores at Fort William; dated 28th Feb. 1832 .. .. .	301
12.—Reply of Colonel Limond, of the Madras Artillery, who served in the Department of Ordnance Commissariat in Egypt, in the Isle of France, and in Java, as well as in the Madras Territories, was Acting Commandant of Artillery, and Principal Commissary of Ordnance at Madras; dated 31st January 1832 .. .. .	303
13.—Reply of Lieut.-colonel Hopkinson, C. B., late of the Madras Artillery, who was in command of the Artillery employed in Ava; dated 15th Feb. 1832 .. .. .	308
14.—Reply of Captain Balmain, late of the Madras Cavalry, who appears to have served in "almost every Department of the Staff, both in the Field, and at Head-quarters," and was Superintendent of the Gunpowder Manufactory at Madras; dated 31st March 1832 .. .. .	314
15.—Reply of Major-general Sir H. Worsley, K. C. B., of the Bengal Infantry, who was Adjutant-general of the Bengal Army; dated 30th March 1832 .. .. .	323
16.—Reply of Lieut.-colonel Baker, late of the Bengal Infantry, who states himself to have been employed in Java, and to have had experience in the several Departments of the Staff at Bengal, and was Assistant Secretary in the Military Secretary's Office at Calcutta; dated 29th Feb. 1832 .. .. .	333
17.—Reply of Colonel John Munro, of the Madras Infantry, formerly Quartermaster-general of the Madras Army, and subsequently Resident at Travancore; dated 13th March 1832 .. .. .	350
18.—Reply of Major D. Wilson, of the Bombay Infantry, who has served in the Quartermaster-general's Department and in the Commissariat, and was latterly Resident at Busheer; dated 29th March 1832 .. .. .	357
19.—Reply of Colonel Stannus, C. B., of the Bombay Infantry, who served in the Expedition against the Pirates in the Persian Gulf, was Resident at Busheer, and has been employed in the Department of Adjutant-general; dated 20th Feb. 1832 .. .. .	383

No.	Page
20.—Reply of Colonel Mayne, c. b., of the Bombay Infantry, who was with the Expedition in Egypt, and was Quartermaster-general of the Poona Subsidiary Force for a period of about twenty years; dated 5th March 1832 .. .. .	385
21.—Reply of Captain Page, late of the Bombay Infantry, who was employed in the Department of Military Finance at Bombay, and afterwards as Inspector of Military Stores at the East-India House; dated 12th March 1832 .. .. .	387
22.—Reply of Captain James Grant Duff, late of the Bombay Infantry, who held an appointment under Mr. Elphinstone in the Administration of the Poona Territories; dated 25th March 1832 .. .. .	393
23.—Remarks by Mr. Cabell, of the India Board, who was in charge of the Military Correspondence with India from 1818 to 1828, in reference to the peculiarities of the Military System of India, and the Queries contained in the Board's Circular; dated 6th August 1832 .. .. .	401

---

**APPENDIX (A)**

---

**RETURNS, STATEMENTS, AND TABLES**

**ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE**

**SYSTEM OF THE INDIAN ARMY.**



APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 40.

# APPENDIX (A.)—No. 40.

I. Numbers and  
Expense.

## A RETURN of the GENERAL and MEDICAL STAFF of His Majesty's Forces on the INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT.

### BENGAL.

The Commander-in-chief. (a)  
Military Secretary to ditto. (a)  
Persian Interpreter to ditto. (a)  
Aides-de-camp to ditto. (a)  
2 Major-generals in command of divisions of the  
Army.  
2 Aides-de-camp to ditto.  
Adjutant-general of His Majesty's Forces.  
Assistant Adjutant-general ditto.  
Brigade-major of His Majesty's Forces at the  
Presidency.  
Quartermaster-general of His Majesty's Forces.  
Inspector-general of His Majesty's Hospitals.  
Assistant to ditto.  
Surgeon to the Commander-in-chief. (a)

### MADRAS.

1 Lieutenant-general commanding the Forces. (b)  
Military Secretary to ditto. (b)  
Persian Interpreter to ditto. (b)  
Aides-de-camp to ditto. (b)  
2 Major-generals commanding divisions of the  
Army.  
2 Aides-de-camp to ditto.  
Deputy Adjutant-general of His Majesty's  
Forces.  
Brigade-major of His Majesty's Troops.  
Deputy Quartermaster-general of His Majesty's  
Forces.  
Deputy Inspector-general of His Majesty's  
Hospitals.

### BOMBAY.

1 Lieutenant-general commanding the Forces. (c)  
Military Secretary to ditto. (c)  
Persian Interpreter to ditto. (c)  
Aides-de-camp to ditto. (c)  
1 Major-general in command of a division of the Army.  
1 Aide-de-camp to ditto.  
Brigade-major of His Majesty's Troops.  
Deputy Inspector-general of His Majesty's Hospitals.

---

(a) Also Commander-in-chief of the Company's Army, and allowed, in his joint capacity,—

1 Military Secretary.  
1 Persian Interpreter.  
3 Aides-de-camp.  
1 Surgeon.

(b) Also Commander-in-chief of the Company's Troops at Madras, and allowed, in his joint capacity,—

1 Military Secretary.  
1 Persian Interpreter.  
2 Aides-de-camp.

(c) Also Commander-in-chief of the Company's Troops at Bombay, and allowed, in his joint capacity,—

1 Military Secretary.  
1 Interpreter.  
2 Aides-de-camp.

East-India House,  
14th December 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 41.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 41.General Staff of the  
Three Presidencies.

## RETURN OF THE STAFF, &amp;c.

## BENGAL:

1 Adjutant-general.	1 Presidency Paymaster (an Invalid Officer).
1 Deputy Adjutant-general.	7 Deputy Paymasters.
2 Assistants Adjutant-general (head-quarters).	5 Paymasters of Native Pensioners and Family
1 Assistant Adjutant-general of Artillery.	Money.
4 Assistants Adjutant-general of Divisions.	13
3 Deputy Assistants Adjutant-general of Divisions.	1 Judge Advocate-general.
13 Brigade-majors.	7 Deputy Judge Advocates-general.
5 Fort Adjutants (2 are Invalid Officers).	8
1 Town Major.	1 Military Secretary to Government.
31	1 Deputy Military Secretary to Government.
1 Quartermaster-general.	1 Assistant Military Secretary to Government.
1 Deputy Quartermaster-general.	3
2 Assistants Quartermaster-general.	2 Stipendiary Members of the Military Board.
4 Deputy Assistants Quartermaster-general, 1st Class.	1 Secretary and Accountant to Military Board.
3 Deputy Assistants Quartermaster-general, 2d Class.	2 Assistants Secretary to Military Board.
11	5
1 Commissary-general.	
1 Deputy Commissary-general.	ARTILLERY OFFICERS:
3 Assistants Commissary-general, 1st Class.	1 Principal Commissary of Ordnance.
3 Assistants Commissary-general, 2d Class.	1 Deputy Principal Commissary of Ordnance.
4 Deputy Assistants Commissary-general, 1st Class.	6 Commissaries of Ordnance.
4 Deputy Assistants Commissary-general, 2d Class.	2 Deputy Commissaries of Ordnance.
12 Sub-Assistants Commissary-general.	1 Agent for Gun-carriages.
28	1 Superintendent of Foundry, Fort William (Engineer Officer).
1 Auditor-general.	12
1 Deputy Auditor-general.	1 Secretary to the Clothing Board.
1 First Assistant Auditor-general.	2 Agents for Army Clothing.
1 Second Assistant Auditor-general.	3
4	

(continued.)

• This Establishment is in course of reduction to four Sub-Assistants.

## BENGAL—continued.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. II.I. Numbers and  
Expense.

42 Department of Public Works; (of these 22  
— are Engineer Officers, 1 a pensioned  
Officer, and 5 are not military men).  
16 Survey Department (1 are Engineer Officers).  
12 Stud Department (1 not a military man,  
— Chevalier De L'Etang).  
59 In Political, Civil, and Miscellaneous Situa-  
tions:  
9 Residents and their Assistants.  
11 Nizam's and such Service.  
18 Political Agents and their Assistants.  
21 Miscellaneous.

Aides-de-camp to Governor-general (3 are  
King's Officers; 1 is also Military Secre-  
tary).  
1 Military Secretary to Commander-in-chief  
(King's Officer).  
1 Persian Interpreter to Commander-in-chief.  
3 Aides-de-camp to Commander-in-chief  
(King's Officers).  
7 Aides-de-camp to General Officers on the  
— Staff (King's and Company's).  
18  
—  
265 Total in Bengal.

## MADRAS:

1 Adjutant-general.  
1 Deputy Adjutant-general.  
1 Assistant Adjutant-general.  
1 Deputy Assistant Adjutant-general.  
4 Assistants Adjutant-general of Forces and  
Artillery.  
6 Deputy Assistants Adjutant-general of Divi-  
sions.  
2 Majors of Brigade.  
3 Cantonment Adjutants.  
6 Fort Adjutants (1 at Fort St. George is also  
Superintendent of Gentlemen Cadets).  
2 Staff Officers (Neilgherries and Cuddalore  
Depôt).  
1 Town Major.

28

1 Quartermaster-general.  
1 Deputy Quartermaster-general.  
1 Assistant Quartermaster-general.  
1 Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-general.  
1 Deputy Quartermaster-general of Nagpore  
Force.  
2 Assistants Quartermaster-general of Hydra-  
bad Force.  
5 Deputy Assistants Quartermaster-general of  
Divisions.

12

1 Judge Advocate-general.  
9 Deputy Judge Advocates-general of Districts.

10

1 Commissary-general.  
1 Deputy Commissary-general.  
7 Assistants Commissary-general.  
8 Deputy Assistants Commissary-general.  
12 Sub-Assistants Commissary-general.

29

## ARTILLERY OFFICERS:

1 Principal Commissary of Ordnance, and  
Superintendent of Gun-carriages.  
7 Commissaries of Ordnance.  
3 Deputy Commissaries of Ordnance.  
1 Deputy Superintendent of Gun-carriages.

12

1 Deputy Surveyor-general.  
6 Assistants Surveyor-general.

7

1 Auditor-general.  
1 Deputy Auditor-general.  
1 Assistant Auditor-general.  
1 Deputy Assistant Auditor-general.

4

## MADRAS—continued.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 41.General Staff of the  
Three Presidencies.

1 Paymaster Presidency.	1 Military Secretary to the Governor.
13 Paymasters of Divisions, Districts, and Forces.	2 Aides-de-camp to the Governor.
1 Paymaster of Family Payments and Pensions.	1 Military Secretary to the Commander-in-chief (King's Officer).
15	2 Aides-de-camp to Commander-in-chief (1 King's Officer).
	5 Aides-de-camp to General Officers on the Staff (King's and Company's Officers).
1 Secretary to Military Board.	41 In Political and Miscellaneous Situations:
1 Deputy Secretary to Military Board.	9 Residents and Officers under them.
1 Assistant Secretary to Military Board.	23 Nizam's and such service.
3	3 In Persia.
	6 Miscellaneous.
1 Secretary to Clothing Board.	
28 Department of Public Works (all Engineer Officers except one).	
1 Barrack-master, Fort St. George.	
1 Superintendent Gunpowder Manufactory.	
31	203 Total at Madras.

## BOMBAY :

1 Adjutant-general.	ARTILLERY OFFICERS :
1 Deputy Adjutant-general.	4 Commissaries of Ordnance.
2 Assistants Adjutant-general.	4 Deputy Commissaries of Ordnance.
1 Deputy Assistant Adjutant-general.	1 Agent for Gun-carriages.
7 Brigade-majors.	1 Agent for Gunpowder.
1 Cantonment Adjutant (Belgaum).	1 Director of Depôt of Instruction.
3 Line Adjutants.	11
3 Fort Adjutants.	
19	
	1 Auditor and Accountant of Military Store, Accounts, and Returns.
1 Quartermaster-general.	1 Ordnance Assistant to Commandant of Artillery.
1 Deputy Quartermaster-general.	2
2 Assistants Quartermaster-general.	
4 Deputy Assistants Quartermaster-general.	1 Auditor-general.
8	1 Deputy Auditor-general.
	1 First Assistant Auditor-general.
1 Commissary-general.	1 Second Assistant Auditor-general.
3 First Assistants Commissary-general.	1
3 Second Assistants Commissary-general.	
5 Third Assistants Commissary-general.	6 Paymasters.
12	

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 41.I. Numbers and  
Expense.

## BOMBAY—continued.

1 Judge Advocate-general.	1 Military Secretary to the Governor.
2 Deputy Judge Advocates-general.	2 Aides-de-camp to the Governor.
3	3
1 Deputy Surveyor-general.	1 Military Secretary to Commander-in-chief.
1 Assistant Surveyor-general.	2 Aides-de-camp to Commander-in-chief.
1 Assistant to Surveyor in the Concan.	1 Interpreter to Commander-in-chief.
3	4
16 Department of Public Works (all Engineer Officers).	3 Aides-de-camp to General Officers on the Staff.
1 Barrack-master (Bombay).	12 In Civil, Political, and Miscellaneous Situations :
1 Superintendent of the Stud.	5 Residents and Assistants.
	2 Nizam's Service.
	3 Guicowar's Contingent.
	1 Holkar's Contingent.
	1 Collector at Ahmednugger.
	108 Total at Bombay.

Military Secretary's Office,  
11th October, 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Secy

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 42.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 42.-----  
Officers in Command  
of Divisions.

A RETURN of the Number of OFFICERS in command of Divisions of the Army,  
Subsidiary or Field Forces, and of Brigades or Stations, at each Presidency.

	Number of Officers in Command of Divisions.	Number of Officers in Command of Subsidiary or Field Forces.	Number of Officers of the Second Class of Brigadiers in Command of Brigades or Stations.
Bengal	7	3	11
Madras	5	4	7
Bombay	3	*2	*5

\* The numbers fixed by the Orders of the Court of Directors in their Military Despatch to the Supreme Government of the 25th November 1823; and as again established by them in the Orders to the Government of Bombay, dated 8th February 1832. The numbers to whom, in April 1831, the Allowances were paid, were one of the first Class, and eleven of the second Class.

East-India House  
14th Dec. 1832.

SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 43.

I. Numbers and  
Expense.

### APPENDIX (A.)—No. 43.

#### A RETURN of the Medical Staff Appointments of the Three Presidencies.

##### BENGAL:

- 3 Members of the Medical Board.
- 1 Secretary of ... ditto.
- Superintending Surgeon, Allahabad.
- ditto Agra.
- 1 .. ditto Barrackpore.
- 1 .. ditto Berhampore.
- 1 .. ditto Benares.
- 1 .. ditto Cawnpore.
- 1 .. ditto Dinapore.
- 1 .. ditto Kurnaul.
- 1 .. ditto Meerut.
- 1 .. ditto Rajpootanah.
- 1 ... ditto ... Saugor.
- 1 Surgeon to the Commander-in-chief.
- 1 Surgeon of the General Hospital at the Presidency.
- 2 Assistants Surgeon of ... .. ditto.
- 1 Apothecary of the Dispensary.
- 1 Deputy ... ditto.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon, Fort William.
- 2 Assistants ditto ... ditto.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon, Allahabad.
- 1 Assistant ditto ... ditto.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon, and in charge of Medical Depôt, Agra.
- 1 Garrison Assistant Surgeon, Buxar.
- 1 ... ditto ... .. Delhi.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon, Chunar.
- 1 Assistant ditto ... ditto.
- 1 Garrison Assistant Surgeon, Monghyr.
- 1 Medical Storekeeper, Cawnpore.
- 1 ... ditto ... .. Rajpootanah.
- 1 Superintendent for the School for Native Doctors.
- 1 Surgeon (Assistant) of the Military Orphan School.
- 1 Assistant Surgeon Stud Establishment, Hissar.

##### MADRAS:

- 3 Members of the Medical Board.
- 1 Secretary of ... ditto.
- 1 Superintending Surgeon, Centre Division.
- 1 ... ditto ... At the Presidency.
- ... ditto ... Southern Division.
- ... ditto ... Northern Division.
- ... ditto ... Mysore.
- ... ditto ... Ceded Districts.
- ... ditto ... Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.
- ... ditto ... Nagpore Subsidiary Force.

MADRAS—*continued.*APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 43.Medical Staff Appointments of the  
Three Presidencies.

- 1 Superintending Surgeon, Malabar and Canara.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon, Fort St. George.
- 1 Permanent Assistant to ditto, and Hospital Storekeeper, ditto.
- 1 Garrison Assistant Surgeon .. .. ditto.
- 1 Assistant Surgeon .. .. ditto.
- (In Medical Charge of Sick Officers at St. Thomé and S. Eastern Division.)
- 1 Assistant Surgeon in Medical Charge of the Families of Warrant Officers, Fort St. George.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon, Bangalore.
- 1 .. ditto .. Bellary.
- 1 .. ditto .. Cannanore.
- 1 .. ditto .. Masulipatam.
- 1 .. ditto .. Trichinopoly.
- 1 Staff Surgeon, Jaulnah.
- 1 .. ditto .. Tenasserim.
- 1 Dépôt Surgeon, Cuddalore.
- 1 .. ditto .. Poonamallee.
- 1 Superintending Medical Officer, Neilgherry Hills.
- 2 Assistants to .. ditto .. ditto.
- 1 Medical Storekeeper, Fort St. George.
- 1 Deputy .. ditto .. Hyderabad.
- 1 Ditto .. ditto .. Jaulnah.
- 1 Ditto .. ditto .. Nagpore.
- 1 Superintendent of the Eye Infirmary.
- 1 Assistant Surgeon at .. ditto.

## BOMBAY:

- 3 Members of the Medical Board.
- 1 Secretary to .. ditto.
- 1 Superintending Surgeon, Southern Division.
- 1 .. .. ditto .. Concan Division.
- 1 .. .. ditto .. Poonah Division.
- 2 .. .. ditto .. Northern Division.
- 1 Surgeon of the General Hospital of the Presidency.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon .. .. Bombay.
- 1 Assistant Garrison Surgeon, ditto.
- 1 Garrison Surgeon, Tannah.
- 1 .. ditto .. Surat.
- 1 Assistant Surgeon in Medical Charge of the Convalescent Hospital Mahabaleshwar.
- 1 Surgeon in Medical Charge of the Convalescent Station on the Neilgherry Hills.
- 1 Medical Storekeeper, Bombay.
- 1 Deputy .. ditto .. ditto.
- 1 Deputy .. ditto, and Staff Surgeon, Southern Division.
- 1 Deputy Medical Storekeeper, Poonah Division.
- 1 .. .. ditto .. .. Northern Division.
- 1 Hospital Storekeeper at the Presidency.
- 1 Superintendent of the Native Medical School.

\* One of these appointments has been ordered to be abolished.

N.B.—Appointments for which Allowances are not drawn in the Military Department are not inserted in this Return.

East-India House,  
14th Dec. 1832.J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.



APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 11.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 44.

I. Numbers and  
Expense.

**RETURN** showing the **AGGREGATE EXPENSE** of the **STAFF** and the undermentioned **MILITARY DEPARTMENTS**, at each of the **Three Presidencies**, as the same stood on the **30th April 1813**, **30th April 1826**, and **30th April 1830**, respectively.

					30th April 1813	30th April 1826.	30th April 1830.
<b>BENGAL:</b>					Sonat Rupees, per Ann.	Sonat Rupees, per Ann.	Sonat Rupees, per Ann.
General Staff	...	...	...	...	2,39,934	3,11,290	1,85,773
Staff attached to Army Stations	...	...	...	...	6,37,869	13,68,385	8,18,918
Garrisons and Cantonments	...	...	...	...	4,10,763	3,78,537	3,37,298
Staff of His Majesty's Troops	...	...	...	...	2,90,292	1,92,324	2,32,734
Ordnance Department	...	...	...	...	3,31,132	7,50,216	6,40,618
Medical Department	...	...	...	...	3,13,843	5,12,128	6,01,550
Military Offices...	...	...	...	...	7,00,631	11,58,929	10,39,256
Commissariat	...	...	...	...	19,94,934	52,71,360	34,45,931
<b>TOTAL</b>	...	...	...	<b>St. Rs.</b>	19,19,398	99,43,469	73,02,078
					or ₹	1,103,725	810,531
<b>MADRAS:</b>					Madras Rupees, per Ann.	Madras Rupees, per Ann.	Madras Rupees, per Ann.
General Staff	...	...	...	...	1,25,832	1,22,318	1,32,633
Staff attached to Stations...	...	...	...	...	6,54,262	7,59,011	7,73,721
Cantonments and Garrisons	...	...	...	...	4,09,976	3,92,577	4,87,504
Staff of His Majesty's Troops	...	...	...	...	61,216	76,682	80,927
Ordnance Department	...	...	...	...	3,39,997	6,22,069	5,22,893
Medical Department	...	...	...	...	2,17,368	2,38,413	3,07,926
Military Offices...	...	...	...	...	4,39,110	5,94,237	6,06,389
Commissariat	...	...	...	...	20,15,993	21,85,292	18,14,270
<b>TOTAL</b>	...	...	...	<b>Rs.</b>	42,63,784	49,90,629	47,26,263
					or ₹	570,358	510,144
<b>BOMBAY:</b>					Bombay Rupees, per Ann.	Bombay Rupees, per Ann.	Bombay Rupees, per Ann.
General Staff	...	...	...	...	1,08,104	51,666	86,094
Divisional District and Brigade Staff	...	...	...	...	2,62,585	15,40,867	6,35,159
Garrison Staff	...	...	...	...	1,04,148	2,63,205	4,38,376
Staff of His Majesty's Troops	...	...	...	...	2,880	53,704	53,392
Ordnance Department	...	...	...	...	6,89,512	10,58,356	6,25,985
Medical Department	...	...	...	...	1,77,570	2,41,932	2,75,134
Military Offices...	...	...	...	...	1,61,420	2,66,172	1,63,944
Commissariat	...	...	...	...	5,10,232	4,68,480	2,17,984
<b>TOTAL</b>	...	...	...	<b>Rs.</b>	20,16,751	39,44,362	24,96,068
					or ₹	443,743	280,808
<b>TOTAL INDIA</b>	...	...	...	<b>₹</b>	1,260,228	2,117,826	1,631,483

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
9th May 1832.

JAMES C. MELVILLE,

Aud. India Accts.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 45.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 45.Expense of  
Military Stores  
sent from  
England in 1813,  
1826, and 1830.

A RETURN of the AGGREGATE EXPENSE of MILITARY STORES sent from *England*,  
in the Years 1813, 1826, and 1830.

---

1813	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	£152,001
1826	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	944,132
1830	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	92,032

*Mem.*—The last two years of the above Return contain many articles sent from this country Military Stores which, in the Year 1813, were not exported under that designation, but were supplied in India, as required by the Military Department, from the Company's Stock of Commercial Exports.

East-India House,  
8th May 1832.

(Errors excepted)

THOS. G. LLOYD,  
Acct. Gen

## APPENDIX (A.) --

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 16.I. Numbers and  
Expense.

## A CALCULATION of the Comparative Expense of the

	A Regiment of His Majesty's Light Dragoons, consisting of Eight Troops; Number of Officers and Men 736.	A Regiment of Company's Native Cavalry, consisting of Six Troops; Number of Officers and Men 551.	A Brigade of Company's Horse Artillery, consisting of Three European and One Native Troop Number of Officers and Men 510.
Actual Cost of numbers present, per Military Statement of 1830 .. .. }	St. Rups. per Mo. 30,220	St. Rups. per Mo. 19,690	St. Rups. per Mo. 26,832
Add, for Deficiency in Complement	9,401	2,924	3,124
Calculation of feeding Horses ..	1,871	1,531	1,871
Ditto .. for Rations .. ..	2,772	—	1,308
Ditto .. for Clothing .. ..	.. see below ..	1,106	1,056
St. Rups.	44,267	25,251	34,191
or, Sicca Rups.	42,275	24,115	32,652
£ per Month ..	4,904	2,797	3,788
or, per Annum ..	58,848	33,564	45,456
Clothing Allowance issued in England	4,700	—	—
Recruiting Charges ditto .. ..	2,200	320	1,200
Calculation of Passage to India, whole Regiments and Recruits; also Reliefs and Return of Invalids (as respects European Troops) .. .. }	4,500	400	1,400
Proportion of Pensions, &c. .. ..	2,500	1,500	1,500
Colonel's Pay .. .. .	1,010	—	—
Cost per Annum .. £	73,788	35,784	49,556

Note.—The numbers of fighting Men only are stated above, but the

## No. 46.

undermentioned REGIMENTS on the *Bengal* Establishment.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 46.  
—  
Comparative  
Expense of  
Regiments on the  
Bengal  
Establishment.

A Battalion of Company's Foot Artillery, consisting of Four Companies; Number of Officers and Men 570.	A Battalion of Company's Gondalauze, consisting of Eight Companies; Number of Officers and Men 1,090.	A Regiment of His Majesty's Infantry, consisting of Ten Companies; Number of Officers and Men 811.	A Regiment of Company's European Infantry, consisting of Eight Companies; Number of Officers and Men 783.	A Regiment of Company's Native Infantry, consisting of Eight Companies; Number of Officers and Men 792.	A Battalion of Sappers and Miners, consisting of Six Companies; Number of Officers and Men 825.
St. Rups. per Mo.	St. Rups. per Mo.	St. Rups. per Mo.	St. Rups. per Mo.	St. Rups. per Mo.	St. Rups. per Mo.
17,812	17,851	22,066	20,039	14,385	12,487
2,623	3,513	1,181	5,177	1,831	757
—	—	—	—	—	—
1,728	—	3,188	2,952	—	—
1,154	666	.. see below ..	1,316	539	660
23,317	22,030	29,135	29,781	16,755	13,901
22,297	21,039	28,110	28,111	16,001	13,279
2,586	2,110	3,261	3,300	1,856	1,540
31,032	29,280	39,132	39,600	22,272	18,180
—	—	2,300	—	—	320
1,200	320	2,200	2,200	320	—
1,400	400	5,000	2,100	400	400
1,500	1,500	2,500	2,300	1,500	1,500
—	—	613	—	—	—
35,132	31,500	51,715	46,500	24,192	20,700

Expense includes the allowances to Grasscutters, Followers, &amp;c.

(Errors excepted)

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

## APPENDIX (A.)—

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 17.1. Numbers and  
Expense.

## A CALCULATION of the Comparative Expense of the

	A Regiment of His Majesty's Light Dragoons, consisting of Eight Troops; Number of Officers and Men 736.	A Regiment of Company's Native Cavalry, consisting of Six Troops; Number of Officers and Men 512.
	M. Rs. per Month.	M. Rs. per Month.
Actual Cost of Numbers present, per Military Statement } of 1830 .. .. . }	29,752	23,246
Deduct, Surplus the Establishment .. .. . }	—	—
	29,752	23,246
Add, for deficiency in Complement .. .. . }	9,978	1,350
Calculation of feeding Horses .. .. . }	5,056	3,832
Ditto for Victualling European Troops in the Field beyond } the Stoppage made for that purpose .. .. . }	3,118	—
Ditto for Clothing .. .. . }	—	523
Per Month, Madras Rupees ..	17,904	33,951
or £ Sterling ..	5,475	3,880
or, per Annum ..	65,700	46,560
Issued in England :		
Clothing Allowance .. .. . }	4,700	—
Recruiting Charges .. .. . }	2,200	320
Passage to India of whole Regiments and Recruits, also Re- } liefs and Return of Invalids (as respects European Troops) }	4,500	400
Proportion of Pensions, &c. .. .. . }	2,500	1,500
Colonel's Pay .. .. . }	1,040	—
Cost per Annum .. .. . }	80,640	48,780

*Note.*—The pay of the Madras European Troops is considerably higher than those in Bengal ; the soldiers of the batta stations, an additional charge is incurred for victualling Europeans beyond the stoppage made for that purpose,

East-India House,  
24th Oct. 1832.

No. 47.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 17.undermentioned REGIMENTS on the *Madras* Establishment.Comparative  
Expense of  
Regiments on the  
Madras  
Establishment.

A Brigade of Company's European Horse Artillery, consisting of Four Troops; Number of Officers and Men 655.	A Battalion of Company's European Foot Artillery, consisting of Four Companies; Number of Officers and Men 456, with Four Companies of Gun Lascars; Number of Officers and Men 301.	A Battalion of Company's Golundauze, consisting of Four Companies; Number of Officers and Men 909, with Ten Companies of Gun Lascars; Number 591.	A Regiment of His Majesty's Infantry, consisting of Ten Companies; Number of Officers and Men 841.	A Regiment of Company's European Infantry, consisting of Eight Companies; Number of Officers and Men 782.	A Regiment of Company's Native Infantry, consisting of Four Companies; Number of Officers and Men 776.
M. Rs. per Month	M. Rs. per Month.	M. Rs. per Month.	M. Rs. per Month.	M. Rs. per Month.	M. Rs. per Month.
37,033	17,388	21,658	26,713	30,282	16,871
—	—	—	—	1,110	—
37,033	17,388	21,658	26,713	29,172	16,874
1,838	3,666	5,721	1,165	—	1,093
5,272	—	—	—	—	—
2,822	1,553	—	3,587	3,325	—
1,959	1,482	988	—	1,760	605
48,921	24,089	28,370	31,495	31,257	18,572
5,591	2,753	3,212	3,599	3,915	2,123
67,092	33,036	38,904	43,188	46,980	25,476
—	—	—	2,300	—	—
1,200	1,200	320	2,200	2,200	320
1,400	1,400	400	5,000	2,400	400
1,500	1,500	1,500	2,500	2,300	1,500
—	—	—	613	—	—
71,192	37,136	41,121	55,810	53,880	27,696

former Presidency providing themselves with rations in garrison and at half-batta stations. In the field, and at full which is estimated above. There is not any corps of Sappers and Miners at Madras.

(Errors excepted)

JAMES C. MELVILL,

Aud. India Accts.

## APPENDIX (A).—

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 48.1. Numbers and  
Expense.

## A CALCULATION of the Comparative Expense of the

	Engineer Corps, (late Corps of Sappers & Miners) consisting of two Companies ; Number of Officers and Men 164.	A Regiment of His Majesty's Light Dragoons, consisting of Eight Troops ; Number of Officers and Men 736.	A Regiment of Company's Native Cavalry, consisting of Six Troops ; Number of Officers and Men 533.
Actual Cost of Numbers present, per Military Statement of 1830 .. .. . }	Rupees per Month. 3,660	Rupees per Month. 35,763	Rupees per Month. 35,544
Deduct, Surplus the Establishment .. .. .	—	—	3,211
	3,660	35,763	32,333
Add, for Deficiency in Complement .. .. .	1,363	11,738	—
For Clothing .. .. .	210	.. see below ..	510
Per Month, Bombay Rupees	5,233	47,501	32,873
or, £ Sterling	589	5,311	3,698
or, per annum £	7,068	64,128	44,376
Issued in England :			
Clothing Allowance .. .. .	—	4,700	—
Recruiting Charges .. .. .	60	2,200	320
Calculation of Passage to India, whole Regi- ments and Recruits; also Reliefs and Return of Invalids (as respects European Troops) }	80	4,500	400
Proportion of Pensions, &c. .. .. .	100	2,500	1,500
Colonel's Pay .. .. .	—	1,040	—
Cost per Annum .. .. . £	7,308	79,068	46,596

*Note.*—The pay of the European troops in Bombay is considerably higher than in Bengal, the soldiers of the former peans when actually in the field beyond the stoppage made for that purpose. The above calculation having been made *finding horses*, as a regimental charge.

East-India House,  
24th Oct. 1832.

No. 48.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 18.undermentioned REGIMENTS on the *Bombay* Establishment.Comparative  
Expense of  
Regiments on the  
Bombay  
Establishment.

A Troop of Company's European Horse Artillery; Number of Officers and Men 148.	A Battalion of Company's European Foot Artillery, consisting of Four Companies; Number of Officers & Men 131, with a Battalion of Lascars attached, Four Companies, No. 272	A Battalion of Company's Gondalauze, consisting of Eight Companies; Number of Officers & Men 728, with Eight Companies of Lascars attached, No. 100.	A Regiment of His Majesty's Infantry, consisting of Ten Companies; Number of Officers & Men 811.	A Regiment of Company's European Infantry, consisting of Eight Companies; Number of Officers & Men 781.	A Regiment of Company's Native Infantry, consisting of Four Companies; Number of Officers & Men 776.
Rupees per Month.	Rupees per Month.	Rupees per Month.	Rupees per Month.	Rupees per Month.	Rupees per Month.
10,072	21,318	15,685	21,424	31,290	18,704
—	—	—	—	2,237	1,616
10,072	21,318	15,685	21,424	32,053	17,088
661	3,202	7,206	10,173	—	—
381	1,419	785	... see below ...	1,754	612
11,117 or the Brigade four Troops, 11,108 rs.	26,019	23,676	31,597	33,807	17,700
5,002	2,927	2,664	3,551	3,803	1,992
60,021	35,124	31,968	12,648	45,636	23,904
—	—	—	2,300	—	—
1,200	1,200	320	2,200	2,200	320
1,400	1,400	400	5,000	2,400	400
1,500	1,500	1,500	2,500	2,300	1,500
—	—	—	613	—	—
61,124	39,224	34,188	55,261	52,536	25,124

Presidency providing themselves with rations when stationary. An additional charge is, however, for victualling Euro-  
as of troops in the field, this expense is included in each case. The Bombay Accounts also include the expense of

(Errors Excepted)

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.



## II.—ORGANIZATION.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 49.

RETURN of the ESTABLISHMENT of a REGIMENT of NATIVE CAVALRY and NATIVE INFANTRY at *Bengal, Madras, and Bombay*, in the Year 1831 ; with Columns showing in what Particulars the Establishments of Regiments at *Madras and Bombay* respectively differ from those of *Bengal*.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Regiment of Native Cavalry of the Bengal Establishment and that of			
	Bengal ; 10 Regts. 6 Troops each.	Madras ; 8 Regts. 6 Troops each.	Bombay ; 3 Regts. 6 Troops each.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.		
<b>NATIVE CAVALRY :</b>							
<b>European Commissioned Officers :</b>							
Colonel .. .. .	1	1	1	This appointment (held by a commissioned officer) lately abolished at Madras.	No European riding-master.		
Lieutenant-colonel .. ..	1	1	1				
Major .. .. .	1	1	1				
Captains . . . . .	5	5	5				
Lieutenants .. .. .	8	8	8				
Cornets .. .. .	4	4	1				
<b>European Staff :</b>							
Adjutant (non-effective) ..	1	1	1				
Quartermaster and Interpreter (non-effective) .. ..	1	1	1				
Riding-master (warrant officer)	1	—	—				
Surgeon .. .. .	1	1	1				
Assistant Surgeon .. ..	1	1	1				
Veterinary ditto .. ..	1	1	1				
<b>European non-commissioned Officers :</b>							
Serjeant-major .. ..	1	1	1				
Quartermaster-serjeant ..	1	1	1				
<b>Native Officers :</b>							
Subadar-major .. ..	1	1	1				
Subadars .. .. .	5	5	5				
Jemadars .. .. .	6	12	12				
<b>Native non-commissioned Rank and File :</b>							
Staff Havildars .. ..	3	6	6				
Havildars .. .. .	24	24	24				
Staff Naick .. .. .	1	—	—				
Naicks .. .. .	24	24	24				
Troopers .. .. .	420	420	420				
Trumpeters .. .. .	6	12	12				
Recruit and Pensioned Boys	—	40	21				
Puckallies .. .. .	6	6	6				
Maistry Horse-keepers ..	—	6	6				
				Six jemadars more .. ..	Six jemadars more.		
				Denominated troop havildar-majors ; 3 more.	Denominated colour havildars ; 3 more.*		
				The drill or staff naick at Madras is non-effective.	The same at Bombay.		
				Six more .. .. .	Six more.		
				None in Bengal .. ..	Denominated troop boys at Bombay ; 16 less than at Madras.		
				None in Bengal .. ..	Called muccadums at Bombay.		

\* Vile Non-effective Staff, Troop Havildars.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 49—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Regiment of Native Cavalry of the Bengal Establishment and that of	
	Bengal ; 10 Regts 6 Troops each.	Madras ; 8 Regts. 6 Troops each.	Bombay ; 3 Regts. 6 Troops each.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
<b>Native Non-commissioned Rank and File :</b>					
Syces .. .. .	220	213	261	Called horse-keepers at Madras. This is an average number.	Called horse-keepers at Bombay. This number varies.
Muistry Grass-cutters .. ..	—	6	—	None in Bengal .. ..	The Bombay system of providing grass is to be assimilated to the Madras system.
Grass-cutters .. .. .	502	480	—	The number at Madras is an average number ; 22 less.	
Establishment under Quarter-master .. .. .	6	10	22	Denominated artificers at Madras ; 4 more.	Denominated artificers at Bombay ; 16 more.
Lascars .. .. .	6	16	—	Ten more at Madras ..	None at Bombay.
<b>Effective Native Staff, &amp;c. :</b>					
Regimental Havildar-major ..	—	1	—	The havildar-major at Bengal and Bombay is Non-effective.	
Farrier-major .. .. .	1	—	—	Non-effective at Madras ..	The same at Bombay.
Farriers .. .. .	6	12	12	Six more at Madras ..	Six more at Bombay.
Native Doctors .. .. .	2	2	2	1 assistant apothecary and 1 second dresser at Madras	Native hospital assistants at Bombay.
Trumpeter-major .. .. .	1	—	—	<i>Vide</i> Non-effective Staff ..	<i>Ibid.</i>
Veterinary Pupils .. .. .	—	3	—	None in Bengal.	
Vakeel .. .. .	—	1	—		
Toties .. .. .	—	2	—		
Regimental Moonshee .. ..	—	1	1	None in Bengal .. ..	Pundit at Bombay.
Bazar Servants .. .. .	5	5	3	.. .. .	One chowdry and two peons at Bombay.
<b>Non-effective Native Staff :</b>					
Native Adjutant .. .. .	—	1	1	None in Bengal.	
Havildar-major .. .. .	1	—	1	Effective at Madras.	
Drill-havildar .. .. .	1	1	1		
Quartermaster-havildar .. ..	1	—	—	None at Madras ..	None at Bombay.
Drill-naick .. .. .	1	1	1		
Pay-havildars .. .. .	6	6	6		
Troop-havildars .. .. .	6	—	—	<i>Vide</i> Effective Troop havildar-majors.	<i>Vide</i> Effective colour havildars.
Riding-master .. .. .	—	1	1	A warrant officer at Bengal.	
Rough-riders .. .. .	12	12	12		
Trumpeter-major .. .. .	—	1	1	Effective in Bengal.	
Head Farrier .. .. .	—	1	1	Ditto.	
Hospital Orderlies .. .. .	—	—	1	.. .. .	None at Bengal or Madras.
<b>NATIVE INFANTRY :</b>					
<b>European Commissioned Officers :</b>					
Colonel .. .. .	1	1	1		
Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	1	1	1		
Major .. .. .	1	1	1		
Captains .. .. .	5	5	5		
Lieutenants .. .. .	8	8	8		
Ensigns .. .. .	4	4	4		

\* The repairs of arms at Madras, and of arms and saddlery at Bombay, effected by this establishment, are otherwise provided for in Bengal.

## Appendix (A.) -No. 49—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Regiment of Native Cavalry of the Bengal Establishment and that of	
	Bengal ; 10 Regts. 6 Troops each.	Madras ; 8 Regts. 6 Troops each.	Bombay ; 3 Regts. 6 Troops each.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
<b>European Staff:</b>					
Adjutant (Non-effective) ..	1	1	1	Practically one Surgeon or one assistant Surgeon is attached to the Regiment, but seldom both.	
Quartermaster and Interpreter (Non-effective) .. ..	1	1	1		
Surgeon .. ..	1	1	—		
Assistant Surgeon .. ..	1	1	1		
<b>European Non-commissioned Officers:</b>					
Serjeant-major .. ..	1	1	1		
Quartermaster-serjeant ..	1	1	1		
<b>Native Officers:</b>					
Subadar-major .. ..	1	1	1		
Subadars .. ..	7	7	7		
Jemadars .. ..	8	8	8		
<b>Native Non-commissioned Rank and File:</b>					
Havildars .. ..	40	40	40	.	
Naicks .. ..	40	40	40		
Drummers .. ..	16	16	16		
Privates .. ..	640	640	640		
Recruit and Pension Boys ..	—	70	38	None in Bengal .. ..	Called sepoy boys.
Puckallies .. ..	8	8	8		
Lascars .. ..	8	19	—	Eleven more at Madras ..	None at Bombay.
Establishment under the Quartermaster .. ..	6	9	4	Artificers at Madras ..	Artificers at Bombay.
<b>Effective Native Staff, &amp;c.:</b>					
Regimental Havildar-major ..	—	1	—	None in Bengal .. ..	Non-effective at Bombay.
Native Doctors .. ..	2	2	2	One assistant apothecary and one second dresser ..	Native hospital assistants at Bombay.
Bazar Servants .. ..	5	5	3	.. ..	One chowdry and two peons.
Toties .. ..	—	2	—	None in Bengal.	
Vakeel .. ..	—	1	—	Ibid.	
Moonshee .. ..	—	1	1	None in Bengal .. ..	Pundit at Bombay.
<b>Non-effective Native Staff:</b>					
Native Adjutant .. ..	—	1	1	None in Bengal.	
Havildar-major .. ..	—	—	1	.. ..	None at Bombay.
Drum and Fife-major .. ..	2	2	2		
Pay-havildars .. ..	8	8	8		
Drill ditto .. ..	1	1	1		
Colour ditto .. ..	8	8	8		
Drill-naick .. ..	1	1	1		
Hospital Orderly .. ..	—	—	1	None in Bengal.	

## APPENDIX (A.) --No. 50.

**RETURN** of the **ESTABLISHMENT** of a **BRIGADE** of **HORSE** and **BATTALION** of **FOOT ARTILLERY** at *Bengal, Madras and Bombay*, in the Year 1831; with Columns showing in what Particulars the Establishments at *Madras and Bombay* respectively differ from those of *Bengal*.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Brigade or Battalion in the Bengal Establishment and that of	
	Bengal ; 3 Brigades, each Brigade 4 Troops, viz. 3 European and 1 Native.	Madras ; 1 Brigade of 6 Troops, viz. 1 European and 2 Native.	Bombay ; 1 Brigade of 1 European Troops.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
<b>HORSE ARTILLERY :</b>					
Colonel .. .. .	1	2	1	The Establishment of European officers for two brigades of 1 troops each, consequent upon the reduction of 2 Native troops, and the consolidation of the remainder in 1 brigade, per G. O. 2d February 1831.	
Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	1	2	1		
Major .. .. .	1	2	1		
Captains .. .. .	5	10	5		
Lieutenants .. .. .	8	16	8		
2d ditto .. .. .	4	8	4		
<b>Commissioned Staff:</b>					
Adjutant and Quartermaster (Non-effective)	1	2	4	One adjutant and 1 quartermaster at Madras.	One adjutant and quartermaster to each troop at Bombay.
Interpreter (ditto) ..	—	—	1	.. .. .	None at Bengal or Madras.
Surgeon .. .. .	1	1	—	One assistant surgeon to each troop at Madras. A similar allowance, under the head of Extra Staff, is made at Bengal.	Vide Madras.
Assistant ditto .. .. .	1	6	4		
Veterinary Surgeon ..	1	2	1	One more at Madras.	
<b>Non-commissioned and Rank and File of European Horse Artillery :</b>					
Serjeants .. .. .	18	30	24	Six for additional European troop, and 6 for the two Native troops.	Six for additional troop.
Corporals .. .. .	18	24	24	Six for additional European troop.	Six for additional troop.
Bombardiers .. .. .	30	48	48	For additional troops, and 8 more.	As at Madras.
Trumpeters .. .. .	6	8	12	Two for additional troop.	Three for additional troop, and three more.
Gunners .. .. .	240	336	320	For additional troop, and 16 more.	For additional troop.
Farriers .. .. .	6	12	12	Three for additional troop, and 3 more.	As at Madras.
Rough-riders .. .. .	6	—	8	See Non-effective staff.	Two more for additional troop of Europeans.
(continued.)					

(continued.)

## Appendix (A.)--No. 50--continued.

		Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Brigade or Battalion in the Bengal Establishment and that of	
		Bengal ; 3 Brigades, each Brigade 1 Troop, <i>viz.</i> 3 European and 1 Native.	Madras ; 1 Brigade of 6 Troops, <i>viz.</i> 1 European and 2 Native.	Bombay ; 1 Brigade of 1 European Troops.		
					MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
Native Officers of Native Troops :						
Subadars .. ..		1	2	..	One for additional troop ..	}
Jemadars .. ..		1	4	..	One for ditto, and 2 more ..	
Native Non-commissioned and Rank and File :						
Havildars .. ..		6	12	—	For additional troop ..	}
Naicks .. ..		6	12	—	ditto .. ditto ..	
Trumpeters .. ..		2	4	—	ditto .. ditto ..	
Rough-riders .. ..		2	—	—	See Non-effective staff ..	
Farriers .. ..		5	6	4	One more .. ..	
Troopers .. ..		90	168	—	For additional troop, and 12 less.	
Recruit and Pensioned Boys .. ..		—	16	—	None at Bengal .. ..	
European Non-commissioned Staff of Horse Artillery :						
Effective :						
Riding-master, Warrant Officer .. ..		1	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Troop Quartermaster .. ..		—	6	—	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.
Staff Serjeants .. ..		4	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Serjeant-major .. ..		1	1	4	.. .. ..	One to each Troop.
Troop ditto .. ..		—	6	—	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.
Quartermaster-serjeant .. ..		1	1	4	.. .. ..	One to each troop.
Troop ditto .. ..		—	6	—	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.
Drill-serjeant .. ..		1	1	4	Riding-master-serjeant ..	Riding-master-serjeant, one to each troop.
Schoolmaster ditto .. ..		1	1	—	.. .. ..	An allowance granted at Bombay.
Hospital ditto .. ..		1	—	—	Non-effective at Madras ..	None at Bombay.
Rough-rider ditto .. ..		1	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Farrier-major .. ..		1	1	1		
Farrier-serjeant .. ..		1	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Trumpeter-major .. ..		1	1	—	.. .. ..	None at Bombay.
Drill-corporal .. ..		1	—	4	Non-effective at Madras ..	One to each troop at Bombay.
Non-effective :						
Pay-serjeants .. ..		3	4	4	One more for additional troop.	One more for additional troop.
Saddler-serjeants .. ..		3	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Drill-corporals .. ..		—	4	—	Effective at Bengal .. ..	Effective at Bombay.
Rough-riders .. ..		—	8	—	Two ditto ditto .. ..	}
Hospital-serjeant .. ..		—	1	—	ditto .. ..	

## Appendix (A.)—No. 50—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Brigade or Battalion in the Bengal Establishment and that of	
	Bengal; 3 Brigades, each Brigade 1 Troops, <i>viz.</i> 3 European and 1 Native.	Madras; 1 Brigade of 6 Troops, <i>viz.</i> 1 European and 2 Native.	Bombay, 1 Brigade of 4 European Troops.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
Native Non-commissioned Staff of Horse Artillery:					
Effective:					
Troop-havildar-major .. ..	—	2	—	} None at Bengal ..	None at Bombay.
Drill-havildars .. ..	—	2	—		
Drill-naicks .. ..	—	2	—		
Non-effective:					
Subadar-major .. ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal.	
Staff-havildars .. ..	1	—	—	<i>Vide</i> Effective staff.	
Pay ditto .. ..	1	2	—	One for additional troop at Madras.	
Rough-riders .. ..	—	4	—	Effective at Bengal.	
Gun Lascars of European Troops:					
Havildars .. ..	3	—	4	None at Madras .. ..	One more at Bombay.
Naicks .. ..	6	—	4	Ibid .. ..	2 .. ditto.
Privates .. ..	72	—	96	Ibid .. ..	24 .. ditto.
Gun Lascars of Native Troops:					
Havildars... ..	1	—	—	} None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Naicks .. ..	2	—	—		
Privates .. ..	21	—	—		
Syces .. ..	685	To be arranged according to the provisions of the G.O. of 5th Mar. 1811.		515	.. .. Including 16 mucedadums; numbers vary.
Grass-cutters .. ..	685	ditto	The Madras system to be adopted.		
Ordnance-drivers .. ..	8	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Veterinary Pupils .. ..	—	2	—	None at Bengal .. ..	Ditto .. ditto.
Native Doctors .. ..	4	—	—		
Assistant Apothecaries	Hospital establishment, arranged by separate regulations	6	1		
Medical Apprentices ..		—	4		
Toties .. ..		2	—		
Regimental Moonshee ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.
Puckallies .. ..	7	22	20	Fifteen for additional troops and additional establishment.	20 Watermen and 6 puckallies at Bombay.

(continued.)

## Appendix (A.)—No. 50—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Brigade or Battalion on the Bengal Establishment and that of	
	Bengal ; 3 Brigades, each Brigade 4 Troops, viz. 3 European and 1 Native.	Madras ; 1 Brigade of 6 Troops, viz. 1 European and 2 Native.	Bombay ; 1 Brigade of 4 European Troops.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
<b>Gnn Lascars of Native Troops—continued.</b>					
Washermen .. ..	—	—	20	None at Bengal or Madras.	
Vakeels .. ..	—	2	—	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.
Hand Bheesties .. ..	4	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	Ibid.
Grain-measuring Men .. ..	—	6	—	None at Bengal .. ..	Ibid.
Sweepers .. ..	6	—	8	None at Madras .. ..	Five hallacores and three sweepers.
Regimental Lascars .. ..	4	4	6	.. .. .	Two more at Bombay.
Lascars under Quarter- master .. ..	3	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Bazar Servants .. ..	4	5	3	One more at Madras .. ..	One less at Bombay.
Artificers .. ..	44	48	To be ar- ranged ac- cording to circum- stances.	.	
<b>FOOT ARTILLERY:</b>					
	5 Batts. 4 Compa- nies each.	3 Batts. 4 Compa- nies each.	2 Batts. 1 Compa- nies each.		
Colonel .. ..	1	1	1		
Lieutenant-colonel .. ..	1	1	1		
Major .. ..	1	1	1		
Captains .. ..	5	5	5		
Lieutenants .. ..	8	8	8		
2d Ditto .. ..	4	4	4		
<b>Commissioned Staff:</b>					
Adjutant & Quartermaster (Non-effective) .. ..	1	1	1	Adjutant at Madras	
Quartermaster (ditto) .. ..	—	1	1	Combined with Adjutancy at Bengal	Vide Madras, quartermas- ter and interpreter at Bombay.
Surgeon .. ..	1	1	1		
Assistant Surgeon .. ..	1	1	1		
<b>Non-commissioned and Rank and File:</b>					
Serjeants .. ..	24	24	16	.. .. .	Four less at Bombay.
Corporals .. ..	20	28	20	Eight more.	
Bombardiers .. ..	40	40	40		
Drummers .. ..	8	10	8	Two more.	
Gunners .. ..	320	320	320		

## Appendix (A.)—No. 50—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Brigade or Battalion on the Bengal Establishment and that of			
	Bengal ; 5 Batts. 4 Companies each.	Madras ; 3 Batts. 4 Companies each	Bombay ; 2 Batts 1 Companies each.	MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
Non-commissioned Staff, &c. :							
Effective :							
Brigade-serjeants .. ..	—	4	4	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.		
Serjeant-major .. ..	1	1	1				
Quartermaster-serjeant .. ..	1	1	1				
Drill-serjeant .. ..	1	1	1				
Hospital-serjeant .. ..	1	—	—	Non-effective at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.		
Schoolmaster-serjeant .. ..	1	1	—	.. ..	An Allowance at Bombay.		
Serjeant of Lascars .. ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.		
Drill-corporal .. ..	1	1	1				
Drum and Fife-major .. ..	2	2	2				
Non-effective :							
Pay-serjeants .. ..	4	4	4	Effective at Bengal.. ..	None at Bombay.		
Hospital ditto .. ..	—	1	—				
Staff ditto .. ..	1	—	—				
Gun Lascars :							
	*2 Companies.	2 Companies.	1 Companies.				
Subadar .. ..	2	2	4	.. ..	} Additional at Bombay for 2 additional companies.		
Jemadar .. ..	2	2	1	.. ..			
Havildars .. ..	8	8	12	.. ..			
Naicks .. ..	8	—	12	.. ..			
Privates .. ..	160	120	210	None at Madras .. ..			
Lascars and Pensioned Boys .. ..	—	16	12	Forty less at Madras .. ..			
				None at Bengal.			
Native Staff :							
Non-effective :							
Subadar-major .. ..	—	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	} None at Bengal.			
Pay-havildars .. ..	—	2	4				
Puckallies .. ..	8	8	16	.. ..	Four puckallies and twelve watermen.		
Bheesties .. ..	—	4	4	None at Bengal.			
Washermen .. ..	—	—	13				
Native Doctors .. ..	1	—	—				
2d Apothecary .. ..	Hospital establish- ment, ar- ranged by separate regulations	1	2	.. ..	Assistant Apothecaries at Bombay.		
Assistant ditto .. ..		1	—				
Apprentices .. ..		—	2				
Native Dresser .. ..		1	2	.. ..	Native hospital assistant at Bombay.		
Toties .. ..		2	—				
Vakeel .. ..	—	1	—				

(continued.)

(continued.)

\* Two Companies are not always attached in Bengal.



## Appendix (A).—No. 50.—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Brigade or Battalion on the Bengal Establishment and that of	
	Bengal ; 2 Compa- nies.	Madras ; 2 Compa- nies.	Bombay ; 1 Compa- nies.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
<b>Native Staff—continued.</b>					
<b>Non-effective :</b>					
Moonshee .. ..	—	1	1	None in Bengal .. ..	Pundit at Bombay.
Bazar Servants .. ..	3	5	3		
Quartermaster's Establish- ments .. ..	3	—	—		
Artificers .. ..	—	8	7		
Sweepers .. ..	8	—	10	.. .. .	Two hallacores and eight sweepers.
	2 Batts. 8 Compa- nies each.	1 Batt 6 Compa- nies.	1 Batt. 8 Compa- nies.		
<b>Golundauze :</b>					
Colonel .. ..	1	1	1		
Lieutenant-colonel .. ..	1	1	1		
Major .. ..	1	1	1		
Captains .. ..	5	5	5		
Lieutenants .. ..	8	8	8		
2d Ditto .. ..	4	4	4		
<b>Commissioned Staff :</b>					
Adjutant (Non-effective)..	1	1	1		
Quartermaster and Inter- preter (Non-effective) ..	1	1	1		
Surgeon .. ..	1	1	1		
Assistant Surgeon .. ..	—	1	1		
<b>Native Officers :</b>					
Subadars .. ..	8	6	8	Establishment for two com- panies less.	
Jemadars .. ..	16	12	16	Ibid.	
<b>Native Non-commissioned and Rank and File :</b>					
Havildars .. ..	61	48	48	Establishment for two com- panies less.	Sixteen less at Bombay.
Naicks .. ..	61	48	48	Ibid .. ..	Ditto .. .. Ditto.
Drummers .. ..	16	12	16	Ibid .. ..	
Privates .. ..	832	552	560	Ibid .. ..	272 less at Bombay.
Recruit and Pensioned Boys .. ..	—	70	—	None at Bengal.	
<b>European Non-commissioned Staff :</b>					
<b>Effective :</b>					
Serjeant-major .. ..	1	1	1		
Quartermaster-serjeant ..	1	1	1		
Drill-serjeant .. ..	1	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 50—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Brigade or Battalion on the Bengal Establishment and that of			
	Bengal; 2 Batts. 8 Compan- ies each.	Madras; 1 Batt. 6 Compan- ies.	Bombay; 1 Batt. 8 Compan- ies.	MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
<b>Native Staff:</b>							
<b>Effective :</b>							
Havildar-major .. ..	1	1	1	None at Madras ... ..		None at Bombay. One more at Bombay. One ditto ditto.	
Quartermaster-havildar .. ..	1	—	—				
Drill-havildar .. ..	1	1	2				
Drill-naick .. ..	1	1	2				
Drum and Fife-majors ..	2	2	2				
<b>Non-effective :</b>							
Subadar-major .. ..	1	1	—	... ..		None at Bombay.	
Pay-havildars .. ..	8	6	8	<i>Ut supra.</i>			
Colour ditto .. ..	—	6	—	None at Bengal ... ..		None at Bombay.	
Brigade ditto .. ..	8	—	—	None at Madras ... ..		Ditto.	
Native-adjutant .. ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal ... ..		Ditto.	
<b>Lascars :</b>							
Subadars .. ..	—	2	8	No Gun Lascars to Golun- dauze in Bengal.		} <i>Vide Mad ras.</i>	
Jemadars .. ..	—	2	8				
Havildars .. ..	—	12	24				
Lascars .. ..	—	120	360				
Recruit Boys .. ..	—	16	—				
Bheesties .. ..	—	4	16				
<b>Non-effective Staff of ditto:</b>							
Pay-havildars .. ..	—	8	8				
<b>Artificers, &amp;c.</b>							
Artificers, &c. .. ..	4	9	7	Five more ... ..		Three more.	
Lascars .. ..	8	14	—	Six more ... ..		None at Bombay.	
Bazar Servants .. ..	5	5	3	... ..		Two less.	
Hand Bheesties .. ..	8	12	16	Four more ... ..		Eight more.	
Vakeel .. ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal ... ..		None at Bombay.	
Native Doctors .. ..	1	—	—				
Assistant Apothecary ..	Hospital establish- ment ar- ranged by separate regulations.	1	2	... ..		1st and 2d Native Hospital Assistant at Bombay.	
Second Dresser .. ..		1					
Hospital Orderly .. ..		—					
Toties .. ..		2					
Moonshee .. ..	—	1	1	None at Bengal ... ..		Pundit at Bombay.	

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 51.

RETURN of the ESTABLISHMENT of the CORPS of ENGINEERS, BATTALION of PIONEERS, and CORPS of SAPPERS and MINERS, at *Bengal, Madras and Bombay*, in the Year 1831; with Columns showing in what particulars the Establishments at *Madras and Bombay* respectively differ from those of *Bengal*.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between Bengal and	
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
<b>ENGINEERS:</b>					
Colonels .. ..	3	2	2	The Bengal corps of Engineers has an allotment equal to three battalions. The Madras and Bombay corps to two battalions.	
Lieutenant-colonels ..	3	2	2		
Majors .. ..	3	2	2		
Captains .. ..	15	10	10		
First Lieutenants .. ..	24	16	16		
Second ditto .. ..	12	8	8		
<b>Staff:</b>					
Adjutant (Non-effective) ..	1	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
	Bengal ; 8 Companies.	Madras ; 1 Battalion of 8 Companies.	Bombay ; denomi- nated Engi- neer Corps 6 Companies.	.	
<b>PIONEERS:</b>					
<b>Commissioned Staff:</b>					
Adjutant (Non-effective) ..	1	—	1	No adjutant at Madras.	
Surgeon .. ..	1	1	1		
<b>European Non-commissioned :</b>					
Sergeants .. ..	10	—	6	None at Madras .. ..	Four less at Bombay.
<b>Native Officers :</b>					
Subadars .. ..	8	—	6	.. .. .	Two less at Bombay for two companies less.
Jemadars .. ..	8	8	6	.. .. .	Ibid.
<b>Native Non-commissioned and Rank and File :</b>					
Havildars .. ..	40	25	30	15 less at Madras ..	Diminished establishment for six companies.
Naicks .. ..	38	24	30	14 .. ditto ..	
Buglors .. ..	8	—	6	None at Madras ..	
Privates .. ..	740	640	600	100 less at Madras ..	
Recruit and Pensioned Boys	—	48	40	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.
<b>Native Commissioned Staff :</b>					
<b>European :</b>					
Serjeant-major .. ..	1	1	1	.. .. .	Non-effective at Bombay.
Quartermaster-serjeant ..	1	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 51—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between Bengal and			
	Bengal; 8 Compa- nies.	Madras; 1 Battalion of 8 Com- panies.	Bombay; denominat- ed Engineer Corps 6 Compa- nies.	MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
Native Commissioned Staff—continued.							
Native :							
Subadar-major (Non-effec- tive) .. .. .	1	—	1	None at Madras.			
Havildar-major (Non-effec- tive) .. .. .	8	1	6	Seven less at Madras ..		Two less.	
Pay-havildars (Non-effec- tive) .. .. .	8	—	6	None at Madras .. ..		Two less.	
Native Doctors .. .. .	4	} Medical establish- ment ar- ranged un- der separate regulations	4				
Assistant Apothecary ..			} See Bengal.	1			
Native Hospital Assistant				7			
Artificers .. .. .	59	—	60	None at Madras .. ..		One more.	
Lascars .. .. .	16	—	—	Ibid .. .. .		None at Bombay.	
Bheesties .. .. .	2	—	—	Ibid .. .. .		Ibid.	
Puckallies .. .. .	6	8	8	Two more .. .. .		Two more.	
Bazar Servants .. .. .	5	—	3	None at Madras .. ..		Two less.	
Establishment under Ad- jutant, viz.							
Moolvie .. .. .	1	—	—	Ibid .. .. .		None at Bombay.	
Pundit .. .. .	1	—	1	Ibid.			
Mate Porters .. .. .	2	—	—	None at Madras .. ..		Ibid.	
Porters .. .. .	28	—	—	Ibid .. .. .		Ibid.	
SAPPERS AND MINERS :							
	Bengal; 6 Comps.	Madras; 8 Comps.	Bombay; 2 Comps.				
Commissioned Staff:							
Adjutant (Non-effective) ..	1	1	1	None at Bengal.			
Quartermaster (ditto) ..	—	—	1				
Assistant Surgeon ..	1	1	1				
European Non-commissioned:							
Serjeants .. .. .	10	8	4	Two less at Madras ..		Six less.	
Corporals .. .. .	6	—	8	.. .. .		Two more.	
Privates .. .. .	—	—	20	None at Bengal .. ..		None at Bombay.	
Native Officers :							
Subadars .. .. .	6	—	2	None at Madras .. ..		Four less.	
Jemadars .. .. .	6	8	2	Two more .. .. .		Four less.	

## Appendix (A.)—No. 51—continued.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between Bengal and	
	Bengal ; 6 Comps.	Madras ; 8 Comps.	Bombay ; 2 Comps.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
Native Non-commissioned and Rank and File :					
Havildars .. ..	24	25	10	One more .. ..	} Establishment for two companies instead of six.
Naicks .. ..	48	24	10	Twenty-four less .. ..	
Buglers .. ..	12	—	2	.. ..	
Privates .. ..	720	610	100	.. ..	
Recruit and Pensioned Boys .. ..	—	48	—	None at Bengal .. ..	None at Bombay.
Non-commissioned Staff :					
European :					
Conductor .. ..	1	—	1	None at Madras .. ..	} Sub-conductor at Bombay.
Serjeant-major .. ..	1	1	1	— Non-effective at Madras.	
Quartermaster-serjeant .. ..	1	1	1	Ibid.	
Pay-serjeant(Non-effective)	—	—	1	None at Bengal.	
Native :					
Subadar-major (Non-effective) .. ..	1	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Havildar-major (ditto) .. ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal.	
Pay-havildar (ditto) .. ..	6	8	2	Two more .. ..	Four less.
Staff ditto (ditto) .. ..	6	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Native Doctors .. ..	2	—	—		
Assistant Apothecary	} Medical Establishment arranged by separate regulations. }	1	1	.. ..	} "Native Hospital Assistant" at Bombay.
Second Dresser .. ..		1	—		
Toties .. ..		2	—		
Vakeel .. ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal.	
Artificers .. ..	42	17	32	Twenty-five less .. ..	Ten less.
Lascars .. ..	24	—	—	None at Madras .. ..	None at Bombay.
Bazar Servants .. ..	5	5	—	.. ..	Ibid.
Puckallies .. ..	—	8	2	None at Bengal .. ..	Bheesties at Bombay.
Washermen .. ..	—	—	2	Ibid.	
Hallacore and Sweeper .. ..	—	—	2	Ibid.	

Military Secretary's Office,  
11th Oct. 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 52.

RETURN of the ESTABLISHMENT of a Regiment of EUROPEAN INFANTRY at *Bengal, Madras and Bombay*, in the Year 1831; with Columns showing in what particulars the Establishments at *Madras and Bombay* respectively differ from that of *Bengal*.

	Establishment in 1831.			Difference of Establishment between a Regiment of European Infantry of the Bengal Establishment and that of	
	Bengal ; 1 Regiment, 8 Comps.	Madras; 1 Regiment, 8 Comps.	Bombay; 1 Regiment, 8 Comps.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
Colonels ... ..	2	2	2		
Lieutenant-colonels ... ..	2	2	2		
Majors ... ..	2	2	2		
Captains ... ..	10	10	10		
Lieutenants ... ..	16	16	16		
Ensigns ... ..	8	8	8		
Commissioned Staff:					
Adjutant, (Non-effective) ...	1	1	1		
Quartermaster and Interpreter, (Non-effective) ... ..	1	1	1		Quartermaster at Bombay.
Interpreter, ditto ... ..	—	—	1		Combined with quartermaster in Bengal.
Surgeon ... ..	1	1	1		
Assistant Surgeon ... ..	2	2	2		
Non-commissioned and Rank and File:					
Serjeants ... ..	40	40	40		
Corporals ... ..	40	40	40		
Drummers and Fifers ... ..	16	16	16		
Privates ... ..	610	610	610		
Effective Non-commissioned Staff:					
Serjeant-major ... ..	1	1	1		
Quartermaster-serjeant ... ..	1	1	1		
Schoolmaster-serjeant ... ..	—	1	—	Vide Non-effective staff	Vide Non-effective staff.
Non-effective Non-commissioned Staff, &c. :					
Hospital-serjeant ... ..	1	1	—		None at Bombay.
Drill-serjeant ... ..	1	1	1		
Butcher-serjeant ... ..	1	—	—	None at Madras	None at Bombay.
Drill-corporal ... ..	1	1	1		
Drum-major ... ..	1	1	1		
Fife-major ... ..	1	1	1		
Pay-serjeants ... ..	8	8	8		
Colour-serjeants ... ..	8	8	8		
Head schoolmaster ... ..	1	—	—	} Allowance for the school granted at Madras.	Allowance for the school granted at Bombay.
Assistant ditto ... ..	2	—	—		
Schoolmistress ... ..	1	1	—		
Establishment under Interpreter and Quartermaster.	6	9	—	"Artificers" at Madras	Provided for by allowances at Bombay.
Bazar servants ... ..	5	5	3		Two less at Bombay.
Washermen ... ..	—	—	25	None at Madras	None at Bengal.
Watermen ... ..	—	—	25	Ditto	None at Bengal.
Puckallies ... ..	16	16	24		Eight more at Bombay.
Sweepers ... ..	16	—	—	None at Madras	None at Bombay.
Apothecary ... ..	} Provided for under the general Medical Re- gulations.	—	1		
Second ditto ... ..		1	1		
Assistant ditto ... ..		1	1		"Steward" at Bombay.
Second Dresser ... ..		1	4		"Apprentices" at Bombay.
Regimental Moonshiee ... ..	—	1	—	None at Bengal	None at Bombay.

Military Secretary's Office,  
11th October 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

## APPENDIX (A.)--No. 53.

STATEMENT showing the Number of OFFICERS withdrawn from each Regular Regiment of Cavalry and Infantry, for Staff and Detached Employment, in each Year from 1813 to 1831.

		Prior to the New Organization.										Subsequent to the New Organization.							
		1814.	1815.	1816.	1817.	1818.	1819.	1820.	1821.	1822.	1823.	1824.	1825.	1826.	1827.	1828.	1829.	1830.	1831.
BENGAL:																			
1st Regiment Cavalry	...	1	1	4	2	2	4	6	5	4	3	3	1	3	3	2	2	2	2
2d ditto	...	2	2	3	2	4	5	4	4	6	5	4	1	4	4	5	5	5	4
3d ditto	...	2	3	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	3	5	4	4	4	4	4	1
4th ditto	...	2	2	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	1	3	4	4	5	6	5	5	5
5th ditto	...	4	3	3	3	3	2	3	4	3	4	6	5	4	3	3	2	1	2
6th ditto	...	1	...	1	1	4	1	3	1	2	1	2	5	3	2	2	2	2	3
7th ditto	...	1	...	...	1	1	1	...	...	1	1	1	2	1	3	2	1	2	2
8th ditto	...	4	3	3	2	2	1	5	5	3	4	3	4	4	4	5	1	2	2
9th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	1	3	2	1	1	1
10th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	1	3	3	3	4
1st European Regiment	...	17	7	5	4	6	5	6	6	6	5	2	1	2	1	5	5	3	3
2d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
1st Regt. Native Infantry	...	3	3	3	4	5	6	9	7	9	9	4	3	3	2	1	2	1	4
2d ditto	...	10	10	10	5	5	3	7	9	14	13	6	5	4	5	5	3	2	2
3d ditto	...	8	8	7	6	6	6	6	6	12	8	9	7	4	4	3	...	2	...
4th ditto	...	12	14	10	4	5	5	4	7	10	11	7	7	5	3	3	3	3	3
5th ditto	...	11	16	8	7	6	8	10	11	9	10	7	6	3	5	5	4	4	3
6th ditto	...	11	12	12	12	13	12	11	11	11	9	5	5	5	5	4	3	2	3
7th ditto	...	8	8	8	7	8	8	10	12	14	13	6	6	6	6	5	1	5	5
8th ditto	...	10	16	10	11	10	9	9	9	11	10	7	5	5	1	4	1	1	3
9th ditto	...	7	6	6	6	6	9	10	10	11	9	7	5	4	3	4	4	4	4
10th ditto	...	10	20	14	12	13	15	15	15	21	12	9	7	5	5	3	2	3	3
11th ditto	...	9	8	3	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	6	6	3	1	3	3	4	3
12th ditto	...	11	13	5	5	5	7	6	8	12	11	9	6	6	4	5	1	4	4
13th ditto	...	11	12	7	7	9	8	12	12	11	9	4	5	3	3	1	3	1	2
14th ditto	...	14	13	11	7	8	9	12	11	11	13	6	5	3	3	4	3	3	3
15th ditto	...	9	9	8	7	7	8	12	10	11	11	2	3	4	3	7	6	4	4
16th ditto	...	9	11	1	5	4	7	8	11	8	6	5	6	3	3	3	3	3	3
17th ditto	...	10	10	8	7	9	8	10	8	8	7	5	4	5	5	4	4	3	3
18th ditto	...	7	9	7	9	8	10	11	13	11	15	9	1	2	2	4	3	4	3
19th ditto	...	6	7	5	4	8	11	5	5	12	11	6	5	2	3	3	6	4	4
20th ditto	...	7	10	6	6	8	4	5	7	5	11	7	5	4	1	3	3	4	3
21st ditto	...	14	16	9	8	8	11	13	12	12	9	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	3
22d ditto	...	12	14	9	8	10	8	10	11	14	14	5	1	4	3	3	4	4	4
23d ditto	...	11	16	7	7	8	8	14	12	14	13	8	8	5	4	4	4	4	3
24th ditto	...	9	16	5	8	10	11	11	11	12	9	6	6	3	3	4	4	3	3
25th ditto	...	8	13	8	8	8	10	12	12	9	7	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3
26th ditto	...	7	13	7	6	6	7	8	7	7	8	5	4	3	1	4	2	2	5
27th ditto	...	10	11	8	10	10	13	9	9	12	11	4	7	4	3	2	4	4	5
28th ditto	...	10	15	8	6	7	9	9	7	10	10	9	4	5	4	4	4	1	2
29th ditto	...	9	12	8	8	7	7	11	11	14	11	5	6	5	4	4	5	5	3
30th ditto	...	6	7	3	5	4	6	6	6	8	7	4	6	6	3	3	3	2	2
31st ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	7	4	5	5	4	3	3	3
32d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	5	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
33d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	4	5	2	2	3	3	3	3
34th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	4	4	5	5	4	3	3	2
35th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	1	2	1	4	3	3	2
36th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	6	4	4	3	2	2	2
37th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	4	3	3	2	4	4	3
38th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	5	4	4	5	3	3	3
39th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	8	6	4	3	2	1	1
40th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	5	2	2	3

## Appendix (A.)—No. 53—continued.

		Prior to the New Organization.										Subsequent to the New Organization.									
		1814.	1815.	1816.	1817.	1818.	1819.	1820.	1821.	1822.	1823.	1824.	1825.	1826.	1827.	1828.	1829.	1830.	1831.		
<b>BENGAL—continued.</b>																					
41st Regiment Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	7	5	4	5	3	2	2		
42d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	8	4	6	7	5	3	2		
43d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9	4	7	1	1	1	2	1		
44th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	7	7	5	6	6	5	5		
45th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	5	5	4	6	5	4	4		
46th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	5	5	5	5	3	2	2		
47th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	2	5	4	4	5	4	4		
48th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	4	5	5	5	6	1	4		
49th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	3	2	1	1	1	2	1		
50th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	5	3	5	4	5	4	3		
51st ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	3	1	1	3	2	1	3		
52d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	4	5	4	3	4	3	3		
53d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	5	5	4	3	1	3	3		
54th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	5	7	5	5	5	5	5		
55th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	5	5	5	5	4	4	4		
56th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	1	4	3	3	3	3		
57th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	4	3	4	5	4	3	3		
58th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	9	7	1	5	8	6	5		
59th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9	5	4	4	3	5	5	4		
60th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	2	5	6	5	3	3	2		
61st ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	3	6	4	2	3	3	1		
62d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	1	3	3	1	4	3		
63d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	2	3	2	2	1	2	2		
64th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	1	4	4	4	2	2	2		
65th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	4	3	3	2	3	3	1		
66th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	5	5	7	5	6	4	3		
67th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	6	5	5	3	2	1	1		
68th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	5	6	6	6	3	5	3		
69th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	5	4	5	5	6	7	6		
70th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	5	4	6	5	5	3	3		
71st ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	4	5	5	4	4	4	4		
72d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	3	5	2	3	3	3	3		
73d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	6	4	4	3	3	3	3		
74th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	1	4	4	3	4	3	2		
		313	369	245	223	219	275	310	311	359	360	399	387	317	321	315	300	272	219		
Average	...	4½	5½	3½	3½	3½	4	4½	4½	5½	4½	5½	4½	4	3½	3½	3½	3	2½		
<b>MADRAS:</b>																					
1st Regiment Cavalry	...	5	7	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	5	3	6	5	5	5	3		
2d ditto	...	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	1	1	2	3	3	5	5	5	5		
3d ditto	...	1	1	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	6	5	5	6		
4th ditto	...	2	5	5	5	5	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	3	1		
5th ditto	...	2	1	1	1	2	4	4	3	4	2	2	5	1	6	7	7	1	3		
6th ditto	...	3	3	3	3	3	4	5	5	5	4	3	2	3	3	5	3	3	3		
7th ditto	...	...	...	...	1	...	1	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	6	7	6	6	5		
8th ditto	...	...	1	2	4	5	5	5	1	5	4	1	3	3	2	3	4	4	4		
1st European Regiment	...	10	10	11	13	10	12	13	11	10	8	5	3	2	2	8	6	8	7		
2d ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	2	2	1	4	4	4	4		
1st Regiment Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	5	8	9	7	6	6	3	3	5	3	3	2	2	1		
2d ditto	...	13	13	12	11	10	13	11	11	7	8	7	6	7	3	3	2	2	4		
3d ditto	...	7	8	8	7	7	8	9	7	8	8	4	3	3	2	1	2	2	2		
4th ditto	...	4	5	7	7	9	9	9	10	7	10	8	9	8	7	7	7	5	2		
5th ditto	...	7	8	9	7	7	5	6	6	5	5	1	2	...	1	1	1	3	2		

(continued.)



## Appendix (A.)—No. 53—continued.

	Prior to the New Organization.										Subsequent to the New Organization.									
	1814.	1815.	1816.	1817.	1818.	1819.	1820.	1821.	1822.	1823.	1824.	1825.	1826.	1827.	1828.	1829.	1830.	1831.		
MADRAS—continued.																				
6th Regiment Native Infantry ...	6	7	6	5	7	6	6	6	6	9	4	7	4	5	4	4	4	4	1	
7th ditto ..	6	6	7	8	7	9	8	7	9	12	6	6	4	4	4	2	3	4		
8th ditto ..	2	4	3	3	4	7	7	8	7	7	4	5	5	4	4	3	3	2		
9th ditto ..	2	3	4	7	7	12	10	8	8	5	1	5	5	5	3	2	2	4		
10th ditto *	5	6	6	6	7	6	5	8	8	7	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	3		
11th ditto ..	5	8	8	9	8	10	9	8	7	8	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	1		
12th ditto ..	6	8	8	8	7	10	11	11	12	13	2	5	5	5	3	2	4	5		
13th ditto ..	9	9	7	8	7	8	8	7	9	10	5	9	9	7	6	4	5	3		
14th ditto ..	9	9	10	10	11	8	6	8	9	9	3	6	6	5	5	5	4	4		
15th ditto ..	9	10	10	12	10	6	5	5	6	5	3	4	2	1	...	...	...	1		
16th ditto ..	2	3	5	5	8	7	8	6	6	5	2	1	2	2	1	...	2	3		
17th ditto ..	5	6	4	3	3	9	9	9	8	6	4	4	4	3	2	2	3	2		
18th ditto ..	6	5	4	4	5	3	3	5	6	9	4	5	6	6	6	5	5	3		
19th ditto ..	5	5	6	6	7	9	9	7	3	7	5	5	2	4	4	3	2	1		
20th ditto ..	6	5	6	5	4	6	5	4	5	3	5	4	2	2	2	2	3	2		
21st ditto ..	5	5	4	3	3	8	8	11	8	10	3	6	5	5	5	5	5	5		
22d ditto ..	8	7	8	8	8	5	8	11	7	7	4	4	4	2	3	1	2	2		
23d ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	9	9	9	9	8	8	4	4	5	5	5	3	2		
24th ditto ..	6	7	6	5	...	5	4	2	3	4	8	10	7	10	9	9	7	4		
25th ditto ..	8	7	7	11	10	7	8	9	8	8	7	9	8	8	9	6	6	3		
26th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	3	2	3	3	2	2	2		
27th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	7	6	8	7	5	5	5		
28th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	2	2	3	4	4	2	1		
29th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	2	5	4	4	3	1	4		
30th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	6	4	5	3	4	4	4		
31st ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	6	4	4	4	4	4	4		
32d ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	4	6	6	6	5	5		
33d ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	7	6	6	6	6	6	5		
34th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	6	4	3	4	4	4	3		
35th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	4	1	4	3	3	3	3		
36th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	10	7	6	6	6	5	2		
37th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	5	6	4	4	3	2	2		
38th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	2	1	7	9	8	6	4		
39th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	2	1	3	3	4	3	3		
40th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	2		
41st ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	6	6	5	5	5	4	4		
42d ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	3	4	3	2	2	2	1		
43d ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	1	2	3	2	4	5		
44th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	10	6	8	7	6	4	4		
45th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	3	4	2	3	3	2		
46th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	4	7	5	6	6	6	4		
47th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	2	4	4	4	6	5	3		
48th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	4	3	5	3	3	3	2		
49th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	5	5	5	8	7	5	3		
50th ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	5	6	4	3	2	2	2		
51st ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	5	5	6	5	5	4		
52d ditto ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	5	5	6	6	6	5		
Average ...	165	183	187	195	195	231	232	229	217	223	224	275	261	272	272	249	236	190		
	3	3½	3½	3½	3½	4	4	3½	3½	3½	3½	4½	4½	4½	4½	4	3½	3		

## Appendix (A.)—No. 53—continued.

		Prior to the New Organization.										Subsequent to the New Organization.									
		1814.	1815.	1816.	1817.	1818.	1819.	1820.	1821.	1822.	1823.	1824.	1825.	1826.	1827.	1828.	1829.	1830.	1831.		
BOMBAY :																					
1st	Regiment Cavalry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	1	...	4	4	2	2	2		
2d	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	2	2	...	...	2	2	3	3	2	3		
3d	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	2	1	2	4	3	4	4	4	1	1	4		
1st	European Regiment	10	8	7	7	8	10	8	8	8	6	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3		
2d	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	4	4	3	5	3	3	3		
1st	Native Infantry	7	8	11	8	9	11	8	9	13	13	5	9	8	2	3	1	4	3		
2d	ditto	11	10	10	11	13	11	7	6	10	10	4	3	3	4	5	3	1	1		
3d	ditto	7	5	7	6	9	10	11	12	12	12	5	8	6	4	4	4	4	3		
1th	ditto	7	7	8	11	11	13	10	10	8	8	5	7	5	5	4	4	5	6		
5th	ditto	9	9	10	7	6	10	8	8	12	9	7	8	7	5	5	3	2	2		
6th	ditto	9	8	7	7	7	13	10	8	9	9	8	6	6	4	4	2	3	3		
7th	ditto	9	8	8	11	10	12	13	11	12	11	4	5	3	4	5	6	5	5		
8th	ditto	5	7	6	5	4	6	10	11	14	11	2	4	4	2	2	4	1	3		
9th	ditto	6	5	5	12	10	12	5	8	7	10	6	8	7	5	4	5	1	3		
10th	ditto	...	...	...	6	8	10	4	4	7	7	7	8	3	3	2	3	2	3		
11th	ditto	...	...	...	...	11	10	9	13	14	14	7	5	5	5	3	2	1	3		
12th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	11	9	11	13	5	9	7	5	5	6	6	5		
13th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	5	4	4	6	5	4	5		
14th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	8	7	4	5	6	3	5		
15th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	7	4	3	2	2	4	4		
16th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9	7	10	8	7	6	6	6		
17th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	6	4	6	5	6	2	3		
18th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	4	6	3	2	2	2	2		
19th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3	3	5	5	4	3	2		
20th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	1	2	4	5	4	2	3		
21st	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	6	5	5	6	8	6	6		
22d	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	6	5	2	1	1	3	4		
23d	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	8	7	6	4	5	5	5		
24th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	7	5	5	4	6	5	5		
25th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	5	5	5	3	2		
26th	ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	6	8	10	8	7		
Average		80	75	79	91	106	129	117	122	141	138	142	161	154	132	130	130	112	114		
		4	3½	3½	3½	4	5	4	4½	5	4½	5	5½	5	4½	4½	4½	3½	3½		

Military Secretary's Office,  
2d April 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 51.

Alterations in  
Establishment, &c.  
of H. M.'s Cavalry  
and Infantry in  
India.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 51.

A RETURN of the ESTABLISHMENT of a REGIMENT of DRAGOONS and of a REGIMENT of INFANTRY in the *East-Indies* in the Year 1813, and at the present time; together with the numbers of Corps of each Description, and of the Troops or Companies belonging to each Corps; and where Alterations of Establishment have intermediately taken place, showing the date of the Alteration.

## ESTABLISHMENTS OF REGIMENTS OF DRAGOONS IN INDIA.

RANKS.	In 1813.			In 1832.
	Numbers of each Rank, &c.			Numbers of each Rank, &c.
	(A.)	(B.)	(C.)	(D.)
Colonel ... ..	1	1	1	1
Lieutenant-colonels ... ..	2	2	2	2
Majors ... ..	2	2	2	2
Captains ... ..	11	11	11	9
Lieutenants ... ..	22	22	22	18
Cornets ... ..	10	10	10	8
Paymaster ... ..	1	1	1	1
Adjutant ... ..	1	1	1	1
* Quartermaster ... ..	1	1	1	1
Surgeon ... ..	1	1	1	1
Assistant Surgeons ... ..	2	2	2	2
Veterinary Surgeon ... ..	1	1	1	1
Regimental Serjeant-major ... ..	1	1	1	1
Troop-serjeant-major ... ..	11	11	11	9
Paymaster-serjeant ... ..	1	1	1	1
Armourer-serjeant ... ..	1	1	1	1
Saddler-serjeant ... ..	1	1	1	1
Schoolmaster-serjeant ... ..	1	1	1	1
Orderly-room Clerk, as Serjeant ... ..	—	—	—	1
Serjeants ... ..	48	58	58	40
Corporals ... ..	48	58	58	40
Trumpet-major ... ..	1	1	1	1
Trumpeters ... ..	13	13	13	11
Farriers ... ..	—	—	—	8
Privates ... ..	760	950	1050	627
TOTALS ... ..	941	1151	1251	789
<p>• Recruiting Troop in 1813:</p> <p>1 Captain.</p> <p>2 Lieutenants.</p> <p>1 Troop-serjeant-major.</p> <p>8 Serjeants.</p> <p>8 Corporals.</p> <p>4 Trumpeters.</p> <p>24 Total (in 1813).</p> <p>20 Privates added 25 Dec. 1826.</p> <p>44 Total (in 1832).</p>				
<p>In 1813 there were three different kinds of Establishments; one Regiment as detailed in column (A.), three Regiments as in (B.), and one Regiment as in (C.), being five in all, and consisting of 11 Troops in each Corps, of which* one is stationed in Great Britain for the purpose of recruiting.</p> <p>In all 5,645 men.</p>				
<p>consisting of 9 Troops, including the Recruiting Troop at Home.</p> <p>4 Regiments, in all 3,156 men.</p>				

## Appendix (A).—No. 54—continued.

## ESTABLISHMENTS OF INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN INDIA.

RANKS.	In 1813.				In 1832.
	Numbers of each Rank, &c.				Numbers of each Rank, &c.
	(E.) 10 Companies.	(F.) 10 Companies.	(G.) 10 Companies.	(H.) 10 Companies.	9 Companies.
Colonel ... ..	1	1	1	1	1
Lieutenant-colonels ...	2	2	2	2	2
Majors ... ..	2	2	2	2	2
Captains ... ..	10	10	10	10	9
Lieutenants ... ..	22	22	22	22	20
Ensigns ... ..	8	8	8	8	7
Paymaster ... ..	1	1	1	1	1
Adjutant ... ..	1	1	1	1	1
Quartermaster ... ..	1	1	1	1	1
Surgeon ... ..	1	1	1	1	1
Assistant Surgeons ...	1	2	2	2	2
Serjeant-major ... ..	1	1	1	1	1
Quartermaster-serjeant	1	1	1	1	1
Paymaster-serjeant ...	1	1	1	1	1
Armourer-serjeant ...	1	1	1	1	1
Schoolmaster-serjeant ...	1	1	1	1	1
Orderly-room Clerk, } as Serjeant ... }	—	—	—	—	1
Colour-serjeant ... ..	10	10	10	10	9
Serjeants ... ..	20	30	40	50	27
Corporals ... ..	30	40	50	60	36
Drum-major ... ..	1	1	1	1	1
Drummers and Fifers ...	21	21	21	21	12
Privates ... ..	570	760	950	1110	699
<b>TOTALS ...</b>	<b>707</b>	<b>913</b>	<b>1123</b>	<b>1338</b>	<b>837</b>
<b>Recruiting Company :</b>	In 1813 there were 19 Battalions, of 10 Companies in each, stationed in India, and 17 Recruiting Companies in Great Britain.				and a Depot Company at Home, consisting of
1 Captain.	The Battalions were of four different Establishments, as above detailed, and of the following Numbers; viz.				1 Captain,
2 Lieutenants.	1 as shown by column (E.) ... .. 707				2 Lieutenants,
8 Serjeants.	1 ... ditto ... (F.) ... .. 913				1 Ensign,
8 Corporals.	9 ... ditto ... (G.) each 1123 ... 10152				4 Serjeants,
—	8 ... ditto ... (H.) — 1338 ... 10701				1 Corporals,
19	—				and
—	—				1 Drummer.
	19 Battalions.				13
	Add 17 Recruiting Companies ... 323				20 Battalions of
	In all ... 22804				837 men each,
					16710
					20 Depot
					Comps. of
					13 each 260
					In all 17000

## INTERMEDIATE ALTERATIONS OF ESTABLISHMENT BETWEEN 1813 AND 1832.

25th March 1814 ; an augmentation of 10 Serjeants, 10 Corporals, and 90 Privates to the Regiment detailed in column (A.)

25th December 1814 ; a reduction of 100 Privates from one of the Regiments in column (B.), and from the Regiment in column (C.)

15th December 1816 ; the Cavalry Regiments in India were reduced to four, and their Establishments to the strength detailed in column (D.) with the exception of 20 Privates, who were added to the Recruiting Troop on the 25th December 1826, and of the Orderly-room Clerk, who was first borne upon the Establishment of each Corps from 1st January 1832, a Private being at the same time reduced in lieu of that appointment.

Two Battalions (E.) and (G.) were augmented 200 Rank and File each, and four Recruiting Companies were reduced, making an increase of 315 men from the 25th December 1813.

A Battalion of 1,000 Rank and File (G.) was added, and a Reduction of 200 Rank and File made from another Battalion (H.), causing an increase of 918 men from 25th December 1814.

Battalions increased to 21, but their Establishments reduced so as to make the total force less by 761 men than in the preceding year, from 25th December 1815.

Battalions decreased to 15 (their Establishments being as follow), from 25th December 1816 ; viz. 14 Battalions of 1,000 Rank and File each (G.) and one Battalion of 800 Rank and File (F.) being 6,347 men less than in 1816.

An Augmentation of 200 Rank and File, from 25th December 1817, took place, by which the 15 Battalions were made 1,000 Rank and File each. Two Recruiting Companies were added at the same time, causing altogether an increase of 218 men.

The Establishment consisted of 16 Battalions, from 25th December 1821 ; viz. 5 of 800 Rank and File each (F.), and 11 of 1,000 Rank and File each (G.). The Recruiting Companies were also reduced at the same time to 10. These alterations only occasioned an increase of two men.

A Recruiting Company was added 25th December 1822. \*

The forces were increased from 25th December 1824 by a Battalion of 800 Rank and File ; and on the 7th, 8th and 10th February, and 22d March 1825, by four Battalions of 1,000 Rank and File each, which, with the augmentation of five Battalions from 800 to 1,000 Rank and File, made the Establishment for 1825 as follows ; viz. 20 Battalions of 1,000 Rank and File each, and one of 800, being an increase of 6,632 men.

The force altered to 20 Battalions of 1,000 Rank and File each, and 20 Recruiting Companies, from 25th December 1825, occasioning a decrease of 899 men.

A third Assistant Surgeon was added to each Battalion from 25th December 1826, but reduced on the 25th December 1828.

From the 25th December 1828 all the Battalions were reduced to the uniform Establishment of 740 Rank and File, as detailed in the preceding column, with the exception of the Orderly-room Clerk, who was substituted for a Private, from the 1st January 1832.

One more Battalion was borne from 25th December 1829, but the Establishment was reduced again to 20 Battalions from 1st January 1832, the Supernumerary Regiment having returned to this country.

War-Office, 14th March 1832.

JOHN HOBHOUSE.

## III.—DISTRIBUTION.

## APPENDIX. (A.)—No. 55.

A RETURN shewing the DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY in India, in the Years 1813, 1820, and 1830.

BENGAL TROOPS:  BENGAL, BAHAR, and CUTTACK :	1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Fort William:									
Head-quarters Corps of Engineers ..	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—
Companies of European Artillery ..	8	957	664	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ditto of Golundauze .. ..	1	—	90	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiments of European Infantry ..	1	995	—	1	928	—	1	822	—
Dum Dum:									
Troops of European Horse Artillery ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	126	28
Companies of ditto Foot ditto ..	—	—	—	11	780	971	6	669	270
Companies of Native ditto .. ..	—	—	—	3	4	588	*7	6	865
Barrackpore:									
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	5	130	5277	4	78	4579	6	146	4299
Ballygunge:									
Governor-general's Body Guard ..	1	5	128	1	10	433	1	6	137
Allipore:									
Calcutta Native Militia .. ..	1	4	1824	1	2	1938	1	4	1217
Chinsura:									
Companies of European Infantry ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	258	—
Midnapore and Balasore:									
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	1	21	941	1	21	1084	1	24	752
Burdwan:									
Provincial Battalion .. ..	1	3	1124	1	2	1236	1	4	†966
Moorshedabad:									
Provincial Battalion .. ..	1	2	767	1	2	868	—	—	—
Cuttack:									
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	2	40	2005	2	36	2109	1	20	744
Cuttack Legion .. ..	—	—	—	1	11	791	—	—	—
Berhampore:									
Regiments of European Infantry ..	—	—	—	1	957	—	1 & 7 Comps. 1	1355	—
Ditto of Native Infantry .. ..	1	41	1040	1	23	1090			

(continued.)

\* Furnish details for Cuttack, Berhampore, Goruckpore, Dacca, Mulley, Sylhet, Assam, Chittagong and Arracan.

† Since disbanded.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.			1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
BENGAL, BAHAR, & CUTTACK—continued.											
Dacca:											
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	16	471	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	10	575	1	24	718
Dacca Provincial Battalion .. ..	..	..	1	3	1050	1	2	1104	1	3	*939
Dinapore:											
Company of European Artillery .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	114	44
Ditto of Native Artillery .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	2	191	—	—	—
Regiments of European Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	980	—	1	851	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	28	1048	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	25	1604	†2	49	1492
Kissengunge:											
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	27	941	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	9	528	—	—	—
Patna:											
Patna Provincial Battalion .. ..	..	..	1	3	902	1	2	1236	1	3	†1387
Companies of Native Invalids .. ..	..	..	3	—	321	—	—	—	—	—	—
Monghyr:											
Companies of Native Invalids .. ..	..	..	2	—	216	—	—	—	—	—	—
Baugulpore:											
Regiment of European Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	895	—
Hill Rangers .. ..	..	..	1	2	354	1	3	572	1	5	455
Mullye:											
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	23	751
Chumparun Light Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	12	1552	—	—	—
Hazareebaugh:											
Ramghur Battalion .. ..	..	..	1	15	1444	1	18	1903	1	7	999
Bidzygurh:											
Company of European Foot Artillery ..	..	..	1	84	150	—	—	—	—	—	—
Titalyah:											
Rungpore Battalion .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	12	1400	—	—	—
Purneah:											
Provincial Battalion .. ..	..	..	1	3	862	1	2	882	—	—	—
TOTALS .. ..			—	2388	21622	—	3931	27246	—	5440	16776
			—	24010		—	31177		—	22216	
Troop of Horse Artillery .. ..			—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Companies of Foot .. ..			—	10	—	—	15	—	—	14	—
Body Guard .. ..			—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Corps of European Infantry .. ..			—	1	—	—	3	—	—	5	—
Ditto of Native ditto .. ..			—	11 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	—	—	10 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	—	—	13	—
Ditto of Provincials and Locals ..			—	8	—	—	11	—	—	6	—

\* Since disbanded.

† Furnish a detachment to Monghyr.

‡ Since disbanded.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.	1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Country between BAHAR and OUDE, including Posts on the BANKS of the GANGES:									
Buxar:									
Detachment of Europeans .. .. }	—	—	—	—	—	—	1*	—	—
Artillery and Infantry Invalids .. }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Benares:									
Company of European Artillery .. ..	1	115	75	—	—	—	1	108	45
Ditto of Native ditto .. ..	—	—	—	1	1	205	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	2	47	1880	3	63	3193	3†	71	2175
Benares Provincial Battalion .. ..	—	—	—	1	2	912	—	—	—
Sultanpore (Benares):									
Regiments of Native Cavalry .. ..	1	29	563	—	—	—	1	26	496
Ditto of Native Infantry .. ..	1	25	940	—	—	—	—	—	—
Companies of Infantry Levies .. ..	—	—	—	10	5	1135	—	—	—
Ghazee pore:									
Regiment of European Infantry .. ..	1	909	—	1	824	—	1	956	—
Chunar:									
Companies of European Invalids .. ..	4	328	—	4	237	—	4	140	—
Companies of Native Invalids .. ..	5	1	547	2	6	856	—	—	—
Mirzapore:									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	1	18	940	—	—	—	1‡	27	750
Goruck pore:									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	1	22	940	—	—	—	1	23	807
Goruck pore Light Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	1	14	1606	—	—	—
Juanpoor:									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	½	11	360
TOTALS .. ..	—	1494	5885	—	1152	7907	—	1362	4633
	—	7379	—	—	9059	—	—	5995	—
Companies of Artillery .. ..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Corps of Native Cavalry .. ..	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Corps of European Infantry .. ..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Corps of Native ditto .. ..	—	5	—	—	3	—	—	5½	—
Corps of Provincials, Locals and Levies	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—

(continued.)

\* All returned under Allahabad and Chunar.

† Furnish a Detachment to Ghazee pore.

‡ Furnishes a Detachment to Azimgurh.



## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.			1st January 1813.				1st January 1820.		1st July 1830.		
			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Oude :											
Lucknow :											
Company of Native Foot Artillery ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	2	197	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	..	..	2	46	1901	2	35	2130	2	50	1624
Seetapore :											
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	..	..	1	20	940	1	20	1067	1	23	887
Scrorra :											
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	..	..	1	23	940	1	16	1040	1	22	753
Sultanpore (Oude) :											
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	..	..	1	21	1023	1	20	1124	1*	23	863
Pertaubghur :											
Regiment of Native Cavalry ..	..	..	1	23	563	1	21	739	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	..	..	1	22	942	1	15	1081	1	25	682
TOTALS ..			—	155	6309	—	129	7381	—	143	4809
			—	6464		—	7510		—	4952	
Company of Golundauze ..			—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Corps of Native Cavalry ..			—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Ditto .. Infantry ..			—	6	—	—	6	—	—	6	—
DOOAB, or Territory between the GANGES and JUMNA :											
Allahabad :											
Companies of Sappers and Miners ..	..	..	—	—	—	6	58	868	3	8	409
Companies of European Artillery ..	..	..	2	104	300	1	82	91	1	105	45
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	..	..	1	22	941	1	26	1076	1½	32	1139
Battalion of Native Invalids ..	..	..	1	7	1019	1	2	906	—	—	—
Company of European Artillery Invalids ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	26	—
Cawnpore :											
Troops of European Horse Artillery ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	238	56
Companies of Foot Artillery ..	..	..	2	157	600	2	170	180	3†	340	134
Ditto of Native ditto ..	..	..	8	5	1222	4	3	790	7	16	939
Regiment of Dragoons ..	..	..	1	711	—	1	678	—	1	598	—
Regiment of European Infantry ..	..	..	1	1114	—	1	1035	—	1	983	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry ..	..	..	1	20	564	—	—	—	1	20	485
Company of Pioneers ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	104
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	..	..	1½	35	1410	1½	29	1562	3‡	73	2329
Companies of Infantry Levies ..	..	..	—	—	—	10	6	1138	—	—	—
Cawnpore Provincial Battalion ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	2	912	1	3	956§
Rohillah Cavalry ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	1	170	—	—	—

\* Supplies a Detachment to Dwarka.

† Furnish Details for Futteghur, Lucknow, Seetapore, Scrorra, Sultanpore, Pertaubghur, Bareilly, Moradabad, Gurrawarra, Baitool and Jubbulpore.

‡ Furnish a Detachment to Calpee.

§ Since disbanded.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.			1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
DOOAB, or Territory between the GANGES and JUMNA—continued.			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Futtehghurh :											
Company of European Artillery .. ..	..	..	1	79	150	1	108	82	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	25	911	$\frac{1}{2}$	11	514	1	20	775
Local Horse .. ..	..	..	1	2	848	—	—	—	—	—	—
Furruckabad Provincial Battalion ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	3	912	1	3	843*
Mynpooree :											
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	22	950	—	—	—	1	25	842
Companies of Infantry Levies .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	10	5	1113	—	—	—
Etawah :											
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	$\frac{1}{2}$	12	470	1	19	1033	$\frac{1}{2}$	13	402
Meerut :											
Troops of European Horse Artillery ..	..	..	3	347	84	3	319	173	3	363	81
Ditto of Native ditto .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	10	133
Company of European Foot Artillery ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	103	45
Regiment of Dragoons .. ..	..	..	1	786	—	1	698	8	1	628	—
Regiment of European Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	971	—	1	1205	—	1	1068	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	..	..	1	26	565	—	—	—	1	25	528
Ditto of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	22	940	1	15	1055	2	49	1596
Alligurh :											
Companies of Sappers and Miners ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	5	273
Company of Pioneers .. ..	..	..	1	3	91	—	—	—	1	2	103
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	21	940	$\frac{1}{2}$	8	547	1	21	842
Scharunpore :											
Scharunpore Provincial Battalion ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	3	912	1	3	1065*
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	24	940	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTALS .. ..			—	4521	12975	—	4516	11072	—	1795	4124
			—	17496	—	—	18588	—	—	18919	—
Troop of Horse Artillery .. ..	..	..	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	5	—
Companies of Artillery .. ..	..	..	—	13	—	—	8	—	—	13	—
Regiments of European Dragoons ..	..	..	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	2	—
Regiments of Native Cavalry .. ..	..	..	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Regiments of European Infantry ..	..	..	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	2	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	8	—	—	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	10	—
Corps of Provincials, Locals and Levies (Infantry) .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	3	—
Corps of Local Horse .. ..	..	..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Companies of Sappers and Miners, and Pioneers .. ..	..	..	—	1	—	—	6	—	—	7	—

\* Since disbanded.

(continued.)

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.				1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
ROHILCUND :				No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Bareilly :												
Company of Native Foot Artillery	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	3	196	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Infantry	..	..	..	1	20	910	1	19	1018	1½	33	1266
Corps of Local Horse	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	6	1149	1	4	649
Bareilly Provincial Battalion	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	2	912	1	4	1121*
Moradabad :												
Regiment of Native Infantry	..	..	..	1	27	1003	½	10	524	½	11	422
Shajehanpore :												
Regiment of Native Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	½	10	524	½	12	402
TOTALS	..	..	..	—	17	1913	—	50	4353	—	64	3863
				—	1990		—	4103		—	3927	
Company of Golundauze				—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry	..	..	..	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	2½	—
Corps of Local Horse	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Corps of Provincials	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
ACQUISITIONS from NEPAUL :												
Almorah :												
Company of Pioneers	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	2	101	1	2	103
Regiment of Native Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	1½	8	517	½	9	421
Kumaon Local Battalion	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	7	1149	1	5	781
Lohoghaut :												
Regiment of Native Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	½	10	422
Dehra Doon :												
Sirmoor Battalion	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	6	1152	1	6	868
Subathoo :												
Company of Pioneers	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	3	105	1	2	103
Nussree Battalion	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	7	1152	1	7	854
TOTALS	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	33	4209	—	41	3552
				—	—		—	4212		—	3593	
Regiments of Native Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	½	—	—	1	—
Corps of Locals and Provincials (Infantry)	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—
Companies of Pioneers	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—

\* Since disbanded.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued. Country West of the JUMNA and N. W. of the CHUMBUL:	1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
<b>Delhi :</b>									
Company of Golundauze .. ..	1	—	271	1	—	371	1 & Irregulars.	2	433
Ditto of Sappers and Miners .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	135
Ditto of Pioneers .. ..	1	3	91	2	6	210	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	2½	51	2353	1	18	1022	3	69	2423
Delhi Provincial Battalion .. ..	1	—	969	1	1	1146	1	3	1062*
<b>Rewarree :</b>									
Company of European Foot Artillery ..	1	83	225	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	2½	53	2350	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Muttra :</b>									
Troop of European Horse Artillery ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	118	28
Regiments of Native Cavalry .. ..	1	22	565	1	19	745	1	28	508
Ditto of Native Infantry .. ..	2	40	2066	1	17	1079	2	42	1541
Company of Infantry Levies .. ..	—	—	—	10	6	1126	—	—	—
<b>Agra :</b>									
Company of European Foot Artillery ..	2	164	300	3	264	271	2	216	90
Troop of Native Horse ditto .. ..	—	—	—	1	8	138	—	—	—
European Regiment .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1166	—
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	3	65	2821	2	35	2080	2½	49	1900
Agra Provincial Battalion .. ..	—	—	—	1	3	1091	1	5	1062*
Company of Pioneers .. ..	3	10	273	1	3	105	—	—	—
<b>Bhurlpore :</b>									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	½	12	398
<b>Goorgawan :</b>									
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	1	20	566	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	1	16	1079	—	—	—
<b>Kurnaul :</b>									
Troop of European Horse Artillery ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	126	28
Company of ditto Foot ditto .. ..	—	—	—	2	168	180	2	206	90
Regiments of Native Cavalry .. ..	—	—	—	1	17	711	2	51	1007
Company of Pioneers .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	5	206
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	2	48	2002	1	18	1048	2	46	1612
<b>Loodianah :</b>									
Troop of Native Horse Artillery ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	11	137
Company of European Foot ditto .. ..	1	104	375	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	2	46	1880	2	31	2110	2	45	1686
Company of Pioneers .. ..	1	3	92	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	1	23	566	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Hansi :</b>									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	1	22	940	1	19	1014	1	25	802
Corps of Local Horse .. ..	1	2	889	1	5	1121	1	5	839
Company of Pioneers .. ..	1	3	91	—	—	—	—	—	—

\* Since disbanded.

(continued.)

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.				1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
Country West of the JUMNA and N. W. of the CHUMBUL—continued.				No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Hissar :												
Dromedary Corps	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	10	385	—	—	—
TOTALS	..	..	..	—	765	19688	—	661	17065	—	2233	15987
				—	20453		—	17729		—	18220	
Troop of Horse Artillery	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	3	—
Companies of Foot ditto	..	..	..	—	5	—	—	6	—	—	5	—
Regiments of Native Cavalry	..	..	..	—	3	—	—	2	—	—	3	—
Ditto of European Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Ditto of Native ditto	..	..	..	—	15	—	—	9	—	—	13	—
Corps of Local Horse	..	..	..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Corps of Infantry, Locals, Provincials and Levies	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	2	—
Companies of Pioneers and Sappers and Miners	..	..	..	—	6	—	—	3	—	—	3	—
Dromedary Corps	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
RAJPOOTHANA :												
Nussecrabad :												
Company of European Artillery	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	78	90	1	103	45
Ditto of Native ditto	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	1	195	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	18	712	1	25	539
Company of Pioneers	..	..	..	—	—	—	2	4	208	1	2	103
Regiments of Native Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	3	55	3153	4	89	3114
Rampoora Battalion	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	7	600	—	—	—
Bewar :												
Mhairwarrah Local Battalion	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	6	765
Neemuch :												
Troop of Native Horse Artillery	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	8	138	1	11	137
Company of ditto Foot ditto	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	136
Regiments of Native Cavalry	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	18	739	1	27	511
Ditto of ditto Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	2	37	2117	4	88	3070
Corps Local Horse	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	4	1125	1	4	682
Rampoora Battalion	..	..	..	—	—	—	1	7	863	—	—	—
TOTALS	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	237	9970	—	357	9102
				—	—		—	10207		—	9459	
Troop of Horse Artillery	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Companies of Foot ditto	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—
Regiments of Native Cavalry	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—
Ditto of Native Infantry	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	8	—
Corps of Local Horse	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Corps of Infantry, Locals and Provincials	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	—
Companies of Pioneers	..	..	..	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	—

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.	1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives
<b>CEDDED DISTRICTS on the NERBUDDA :</b>									
Saugor :									
Company of European Artillery ..	—	—	—	1	73	90	1	105	45
Ditto of Native Ditto .. ..	—	—	—	1	2	197	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	—	—	—	4	71	4207	3	68	2261
Corps of Local Horse .. ..	—	—	—	1	3	648	1	4	679
Gurrawarra :									
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$	12	377
Hussingabad :									
Troop of Native Horse Artillery ..	—	—	—	1	8	138	—	—	—
Companies of ditto Foot ditto ..	—	—	—	1	2	195	—	—	—
Ditto of European ditto .. ..	—	—	—	1	88	90	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	—	—	—	1	15	745	—	—	—
Company of Pioneers .. ..	—	—	—	1	2	104	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	—	—	—	6	103	6283	$\frac{1}{2}$	12	377
Baitool :									
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 <sup>+</sup>	20	751
Jubbulpore :									
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	—	—	—	1	20	1048	1	23	827
Nerbudda Sebundy Corps .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	850
<b>TOTALS .. ..</b>	—	—	—	—	390	13745	—	246	6167
					14135			6413	
Troops of Horse Artillery .. ..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Companies of Foot ditto .. ..	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	1	—
Regiments of Native Cavalry ..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Ditto of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	6	—
Corps of Local Horse .. ..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Corps of Infantry, Locals and Provincials .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Companies of Pioneers .. ..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
<b>BUNDLECUND :</b>									
Keitah :									
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	1	23	564	1	21	739	1	28	516
Ditto of ditto Infantry .. ..	1	24	940	1	19	1046	2	43	1492
Company of Miners .. ..	1	—	131	—	—	—	—	—	—
Company of Pioneers .. ..	1	3	92	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hameerpore :									
Company of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	†	—	—
Adjezglur :									
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	1	22	940	Comps. 2	2	209	†	—	—
Banda :									
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	1	23	940	1	13	1047	1‡	23	759
Bundlecund Provincial Battalion ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	921 §

(continued.)

Furnishes a detachment to Sehor.

† Furnished from Keitah.  
§ Since disbanded.

‡ Furnishes a detachment to Kallinghur.

[illegible]

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BENGAL TROOPS—continued.				1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
ASSAM, SYLHET, CHITTAGONG and ARRACAN :				No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Jumalporc:												
Regiment of Native Infantry ...	...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	23	549
Sylhet :												
Local Corps ...	...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	6	751
Jorhat :												
Assam Local Corps ...	...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	9	1118
CHITTAGONG :												
Chittagong :												
Regiment of Native Infantry ...	...			$\frac{1}{2}$	15	470	$\frac{1}{2}$	10	575	Regts. 1	22	732
Chittagong Provincial Battalion ...	...			1	3	633	1	2	1104	1	3	738
ARRACAN :												
Khyouk and Dependencies :												
Regiment of Native Infantry ...	...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	19	656
Akyab :												
Mug Sebundy Corps ...	...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	232
TOTALS ...				—	18	1103	—	12	1679	—	84	4776
				—	1121		—	1691		—	1860	
Regiments of Native Infantry ...	...			—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	3	—
Local Infantry and Provincials	...			—	1	—	—	1	—	—	4	—



## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

MADRAS TROOPS—continued. CEDED DISTRICTS—continued.	1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Gooty : Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	1	23	921	1	16	936	1	21	788
Cuddapah : Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	1	20	922	—	—	—	1	22	779
Extra Battalion of ditto .. ..	—	—	—	1	2	1004	—	—	—
TOTALS .. ..	—	1002	7588	—	1020	3937	—	1069	4472
	—	8590	—	—	4957	—	—	5541	—
Detachment of Foot Artillery ..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Ditto of European Infantry ..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Ditto of Native ditto ..	—	8	—	—	3	—	—	5	—
Ditto of Extra ditto ditto ..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Detachment of Pioneers .. ..	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MYSORE :									
Bangalore :									
Troop of Native Horse Artillery ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	95
Company of Foot ditto .. ..	1	77	99	1	64	30	1	108	74
Regiment of European Dragoons ..	1	796	—	1	737	—	1	640	—
Regiment of European Infantry ..	1	1300	—	1	921	—	1	889	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	3	68	2720	3	47	2960	4	93	3065
Extra Battalion of ditto .. ..	—	—	—	1	2	984	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	1	16	532	1	15	815	1	25	558
Rifle Corps .. ..	—	—	—	1	3	771	—	—	—
Detachment of Pioneers .. ..	1	2	370	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chittledroog :									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	1	20	900	1	16	966	—	—	—
Hurryhur :									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	22	790
Seringapatam :									
Detail of Artillery .. ..	1	43	98	1	1	11	—	—	—
Regiment of European Infantry ..	1	991	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	4	88	3662	1	16	1041	—	—	—
Local Corps .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1100
Mysore :									
Detachment of Pioneers .. ..	1	2	510	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTALS .. ..	—	3403	8891	—	1825	7578	—	1779	5682
	—	12204	—	—	9403	—	—	7461	—

## Appendix (A.)--No. 55--continued.

MADRAS TROOPS—continued.	1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
MYSORE—continued.									
Troop of Horse Artillery .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Company of Foot ditto .. ..	—	1½	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Regiment of Dragoons .. ..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Ditto of Native Cavalry .. ..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Ditto of European Infantry ..	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Ditto of Native ditto .. ..	—	8	—	—	5	—	—	5	—
Rifle Corps .. ..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Local Corps .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Detachment of Pioneers .. ..	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CARNATIC:									
Fort St. George:									
Body Guard .. ..	1	—	—	1	—	*	1	—	*
Regiment of European Infantry ..	1	845	—	1	847	—	1	994	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	4	83	3774	3	53	3056	—	—	—
Native Veteran Battalion .. ..	—	—	—	1	9	986	1	7	1716
Militia .. ..	—	—	—	1	3	1047	—	—	—
St. Thomas's Mount:									
Corps of European Horse Artillery ..	1	317	—	1	160	416	Troops. 2	312	—
Head-quarters Battalions of Foot Artillery, with Golundauze and Lascars	2	390	870	—	—	—	—	—	—
Head-quarters Battalions of Foot Artillery, with Lascars .. ..	—	—	—	2	416	1190	Comps. { 4½	482	338
Battalion of Golundauze .. ..	—	—	—	1	—		{ 4 Co.	10	795
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—		1	22	786
Palaveram:									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	104	3910
Chingleput:									
Regiment of Native Veterans .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	11	1611
Poonamallee:									
Battalion of Pioneers .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	790
Madras Volunteer Battalion .. ..	1	2	774	—	—	—	—	—	—

(continued.)

\* Details accounted for with the Regiments from which they are drawn.

[illegible]

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

MADRAS TROOPS—continued.			1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
<b>PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES :</b>											
Cabo :											
Detachment of Bombay Artillery ...			1	43	150	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiment of European Infantry ...			$\frac{1}{2}$	358	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ...			2	40	1782	—	—	—	—	—	—
Aquaddo :											
Regiment of Native ditto ...			1	23	888	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>TOTALS</b> ...			—	464	2829	—	—	—	—	—	—
			—	3284	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Detachment of Bombay Artillery...			—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiment of European Infantry ...			—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Regiments of Native ditto ...			—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>MALABAR and CANARA :</b>											
Cannanore :											
Company of Goluzdauze ...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	125
Detachment of European Artillery ...			1	49	130	1	15	35	—	—	—
Regiment of European Infantry ...			1	1016	—	1	1089	—	1	889	—
Regiment of Native ditto ...			3	61	2759	2	30	1932	2	45	1533
Detachment of Pioneers ...			1	1	187	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mangalore :											
Regiment of Native Infantry ...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	23	833
<b>TOTALS</b> ...			—	1130	3076	—	1131	1967	—	959	2491
			—	4206	—	—	3101	—	—	3150	—
Detachment of Artillery ...			—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Regiment of European Infantry ...			—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Ditto of Native ditto ...			—	3	—	—	2	—	—	3	—
Detachment of Pioneers ...			—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>TRAVANCORE :</b>											
Quilon :											
Detachment of European Foot Artillery			1	68	136	1	30	35	—	—	—
Company of Foot ditto ...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	108	77
Regiment of European Infantry ...			$\frac{1}{2}$	358	—	1	957	—	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ...			3	67	2773	2	32	2004	2	43	1569
Trivandrum :											
Regiment of Native Infantry ...			—	—	—	—	—	—	1	18	809
<b>TOTALS</b> ...			—	493	2909	—	1019	2039	—	160	2455
			—	3102	—	—	3058	—	—	2624	—
Detachment of Artillery ...			—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Regiment of European Infantry ...			—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Ditto of Native ditto ...			—	3	—	—	2	—	—	3	—

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

MADRAS TROOPS—continued.			1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
MALAY PENINSULA :											
Prince of Wales' Island, Singapore and Malacca :											
Detachment of Foot Artillery .. ..	1	37	18	—	—	—	Comp. $\frac{1}{2}$	53	38		
Company of Golundauze .. ..	1	—	120	1	2	191	$\frac{1}{2}$	2	60		
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	1	21	1500	1	22	1317	2	42	1735		
Moulmyne :											
Company of Foot Artillery .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	107	79		
Regiment of European Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	919	—		
Regiment of Native ditto .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	17	809		
Company of Pioneers .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	51		
TOTALS .. ..			{ Bengal 21 Madras 37 }	1620 18	{ Bengal 21 1503 }	Madras 1141	2772				
			—	1696	—	1532	—	3913			
Detachment of Artillery .. ..	—	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Comp.		—	1 Comp.		—	2 Comps.			
Regiment of European Infantry .. ..	—	—		—	—		—	1			
Ditto of Native ditto .. ..	—	1		—	1		—	3			
Company of Pioneers .. ..	—	—		—	—		—	1			

BOMBAY TROOPS :											
CUTCH :											
Company of European Artillery .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	97	117		
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	3	57	3342	1	19	880		
Detachment of Pioneers .. ..	—	—	—	1	2	89	1	—	108		
TOTALS .. ..			—	—	—	59	3431	—	116	1135	
			—	—	—	3490	—	1251			
Company of Artillery .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1			
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	1			
Detachment of Pioneers .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1			
KATTYWAR :											
Raujkote :											
Company of Golundauze .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	58		
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	—	—	—	1	19	420	$\frac{1}{2}$	10	307		
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	21	843		
TOTALS .. ..			—	—	—	19	420	—	32	1208	
			—	—	—	439	—	1240			
Company of Artillery .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$			
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	$\frac{1}{2}$			
Ditto of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1			

## Appendix (A.)--No. 55--continued.

BOMBAY TROOPS—continued.			1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
GUZERAT :											
Guzerat :											
Provincial Battalion .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	529
Troops of Native Cavalry .. ..	..	..	2	1	198	—	—	—	—	—	—
Battalion of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	22	1166	—	—	—	—	—	—
Deesa :											
Troop of Horse Artillery .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	123	27
Regiment of European Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	960	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	21	613
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	19	915
Hursole :											
Company of Golundauze .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	114
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	$2\frac{1}{2}$	11	308
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	11	1752
Ahmedabad :											
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	19	860
Kaira :											
Regiment of Dragoons .. ..	..	..	1	948	—	1	684	10	—	—	—
Battalion of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	1	24	1104	1	19	1098	—	—	—
Company of Pioneers .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	1	89	—	—	—
Baroda :											
Company of Golundauze .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	114
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	17	486	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	..	..	3	61	3310	2	31	2188	3	60	2706
Baroda Independent Company .. ..	..	..	1	—	112	1	—	199	—	—	—
TOTALS .. ..			—	1053	5890	—	755	4070	—	1260	7938
			—	6943	—	—	4825	—	—	9198	—
Troop of Horse Artillery .. ..			—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Companies of Foot ditto .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Regiment of Dragoons .. ..	..	..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	..	..	—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	1	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	—
Regiment of European Infantry .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Regiments of Native ditto .. ..	..	..	—	5	—	—	3	—	—	7	—
Provincial Battalion .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Independent Company .. ..	..	..	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Company of Pioneers .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—

(continued.)

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BOMBAY TROOPS—continued.			1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
<b>CANDEISH and SURAT :</b>											
Surat :											
Company of Golundauze .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	111
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	..	..	2	43	2205	1	17	1065	2	41	1721
Surat Local Corps .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	—	442	—	—	—
Malligaum :											
Company of Golundauze .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	57
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	42	1716
Asseerghur :											
Regiment of Native Infantry ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	18	817
Candeish :											
Regiment of European Infantry ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	867	—	—	—	—
Bheel Corps .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	617
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	..	..	—	—	—	2	35	2383	—	—	—
Madras Troops :											
Detail of Artillery .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	16	40	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry ..	..	..	—	—	—	2	32	2177	—	—	—
<b>TOTALS .. ..</b>			—	43	2205	Madras Bombay	48 919	2217 3890	} —	108	5042
			—	2248	—	—	7074	—	—	5150	—
Detachment of Artillery .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1½	—
Regiment of European Infantry ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Ditto of Native ditto .. ..	..	..	—	2	—	—	5	—	—	5	—
Local Corps .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
<b>BOMBAY ISLAND, &amp;c. :</b>											
Bombay :											
Head-quarters Battalion of Foot Artillery			1	710	1258	2	720	1008	1	433	292
Regiments of European Infantry ..	..	..	4	2514	—	*2	1628	—	1	888	—
Regiments of Native ditto .. ..	..	..	2	45	2052	2	37	2279	2	42	1692
Marine Battalion .. ..	..	..	1	20	1119	—	—	—	1	6	923
Head-quarters of Engineers .. ..	..	..	1	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—
Companies of Pioneers .. ..	..	..	3	4	315	3	3	264	—	—	—
Battalion of Native Invalids .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	10	1737	1	8	966
Portuguese Militia .. ..	..	..	—	—	—	1	—	501	—	—	—

On the Persian Gulf expedition.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BOMBAY TROOPS—continued. BOMBAY ISLAND, &c.—continued.			1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
			No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
Tanna :											
Company of European Veterans	...	...	1	61	—	1	76	—	1	69	—
Head-quarters of Native Invalids	...	...	1	9	949	—	—	—	—	—	—
Versorah :											
Battalion of Native Infantry	...	...	1	20	1135	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTALS			—	3383	6828	—	2474	5879	—	1446	3873
			—	10211	—	—	8353	—	—	5319	—
Head-quarters Battalions of Artillery	...	...	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	1	—
Regiments of European Infantry	...	...	—	4	—	—	2	—	—	1	—
Regiments of Native ditto	...	...	—	3	—	—	2	—	—	2	—
Marine Battalion	...	...	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Local Corps	...	...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Companies of Pioneers	...	...	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—	—
NORTHERN and SOUTHERN CONKAN :											
Bhewndee :											
Battalion of Native Infantry	...	...	—	—	—	1	17	1061	—	—	—
Nagotua :											
Battalion of Pioneers	...	...	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	567
Severndroog :											
Battalions of Native Infantry	...	...	—	—	—	2	35	2291	—	—	—
Dapoolce :											
Regiment of Native Infantry	...	...	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	20	868
Native Veteran Battalion	...	...	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	847
Malwan :											
Battalion of Native Infantry	...	...	1	24	1197	1	20	1318	1	20	862
Vingorla :											
Regiment of Native Infantry	...	...	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	23	853
TOTALS			—	24	1197	—	72	4670	—	66	3997
			—	1221	—	—	4742	—	—	4063	—
Regiments of Native Infantry	...	...	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	3	—
Battalion of Pioneers	...	...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—

(continued.)





## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

BOMBAY TROOPS—continued.	1st January 1813.			1st January 1820.			1st July 1830.		
	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.	No. of Corps.	No. of Europeans.	No. of Natives.
<b>SOUTHERN MAHRATTA COUNTRY :</b>									
Killadghee :									
Regiment of Native Cavalry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$	9	308
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	19	888
Belgaum :									
Regiment of European Infantry ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	833	—
<b>Madras Troops in the SOUTHERN MAHRATTA COUNTRY :</b>									
Detachment of European Foot Artillery	—	—	—	1	253	148	—	—	—
Ditto of Golundauze .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	114
Regiments of Light Cavalry .. ..	—	—	—	2	33	1534	—	—	—
Regiments of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	4	66	3856	1	28	754
Darwar :									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	23	758
Kolapore :									
Regiment of Native Infantry .. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	21	830
<b>TOTALS .. ..</b>	—	—	—	<b>Madras</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>5538</b>	<b>Madras</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>2456</b>
							<b>Bombay</b>	<b>861</b>	<b>1196</b>
					<b>5820</b>			<b>4588</b>	
Detachment of Foot Artillery ..	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
Regiments of Native Cavalry ..	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—
Ditto of European Infantry ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Ditto of Native ditto .. ..	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	—

## ABSTRACT DISTRIBUTION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

	In 1813.		In 1820.		In 1830.		Increase, since 1813.																					
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.																		
BENGAL TROOPS :																												
Bengal, Bahar and Cuttack .. ..	2383	21622	3931	27246	5440	16776	3052	—	—	4846																		
Country between Bahar and Oude, including Posts on the Banks of the Ganges	1494	5885	1152	7907	1362	4633	—	—	132	1252																		
Oude .. ..	155	6309	129	7381	143	4809	—	—	12	1500																		
Dooab and Territory between the Ganges and the Jumna .. ..	4521	12975	4516	14072	4795	14124	274	1149	—	—																		
Rohileund .. ..	47	1943	50	4353	64	3863	17	1920	—	—																		
Acquisitions from Nepal .. ..	—	—	33	4209	41	3552	41	3552	—	—																		
Country west of the Jumna and north-west of Chumbul .. ..	765	19688	664	17065	2233	15987	1408	—	—	3701																		
Rajpoothana .. ..	—	—	237	9970	357	9102	357	9102	—	—																		
Ceded Districts in the Nerbudda ..	—	—	390	13745	246	6167	246	6167	—	—																		
Bundleeund .. ..	144	5488	69	3877	97	3688	—	—	47	1800																		
Malwa .. ..	—	—	285	3942	340	4693	340	4693	—	—																		
Assam, Sylhet, Chittagong and Arracan	18	1103	12	1679	84	4776	66	3673	—	—																		
Penang .. ..	21	1620	24	1508	—	—	—	—	21	1620																		
TOTALS .. ..	9553	76633	11455	116954	15202	92170	5861	30256	212	14719																		
<table><tr><td>Exclusive of Troops at Java, Engineers, Escorts, Ordnance Drivers, Conductors, Staff, &amp;c.</td><td>6150</td><td>9429</td><td>Exclusive of Engineers, Fort Marlboro' Local Corps, Ordnance Drivers, Escorts, Staff, &amp;c.</td><td>218</td><td>4284</td><td>Exclusive of Engineers, Escorts, Ordnance Drivers, Conductors, Staff, &amp;c.</td><td>399</td><td>4727</td></tr><tr><td>TOTALS .. ..</td><td>15703</td><td>86062</td><td>11673</td><td>121238</td><td>15701</td><td>96897</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>											Exclusive of Troops at Java, Engineers, Escorts, Ordnance Drivers, Conductors, Staff, &c.	6150	9429	Exclusive of Engineers, Fort Marlboro' Local Corps, Ordnance Drivers, Escorts, Staff, &c.	218	4284	Exclusive of Engineers, Escorts, Ordnance Drivers, Conductors, Staff, &c.	399	4727	TOTALS .. ..	15703	86062	11673	121238	15701	96897		
Exclusive of Troops at Java, Engineers, Escorts, Ordnance Drivers, Conductors, Staff, &c.	6150	9429	Exclusive of Engineers, Fort Marlboro' Local Corps, Ordnance Drivers, Escorts, Staff, &c.	218	4284	Exclusive of Engineers, Escorts, Ordnance Drivers, Conductors, Staff, &c.	399	4727																				
TOTALS .. ..	15703	86062	11673	121238	15701	96897																						

(continued.)

## ABSTRACT DISTRIBUTION OF THE INDIAN ARMY—continued.

	In 1813.		In 1820.		In 1830.		Increase, since 1813.		Decrease,	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
<b>MADRAS TROOPS:</b>										
Nizam's Dominions ...	1136	8455	1892	9758	1347	6811	211	—	—	1614
Rajah of Berar's ditto...	—	—	678	8035	816	1001	816	1001	—	—
Northern Circars ...	594	4753	465	8888	911	6714	350	1961	—	—
Ceded Districts ...	1002	7588	1020	3937	1069	4172	67	—	—	3116
Mysore ...	3103	8891	1825	7573	1779	5682	—	—	1621	3209
Carnatic ...	4961	12246	2598	24005	3841	19571	—	7325	1120	—
Portuguese Territories	464	2820	—	—	—	—	—	—	464	2820
Malabar and Canara ...	1130	3076	1131	1967	959	2491	—	—	171	585
Travancore ...	493	2909	1019	2039	169	2155	—	—	324	151
Malay Peninsula ...	37	18	—	—	1141	2772	1104	2754	—	—
Candeish and Surat ...	—	—	48	2217	—	—	—	—	—	—
Poonah ...	20	575	46	2645	—	—	—	—	20	575
Southern Mahratta Country ...	—	—	352	5538	75	2456	75	2456	—	—
<b>TOTALS ...</b>	<b>13249</b>	<b>51331</b>	<b>11077</b>	<b>76607</b>	<b>12140</b>	<b>57125</b>	<b>2623</b>	<b>18497</b>	<b>3723</b>	<b>12103</b>
	Exclusive of Engineers, Conductors of Ordnance, Native Invalids, and Staff.		Exclusive of Engineers, Conductors, Recruiting Depôt, Staff, &c.		Exclusive of Engineers, Supernumeraries, Con- ductors, Staff, &c.					
	350	4516	256	490	841	324				
<b>TOTALS ...</b>	<b>13590</b>	<b>55847</b>	<b>11333</b>	<b>77097</b>	<b>12981</b>	<b>57749</b>				
<b>BOMBAY TROOPS:</b>										
Cutch ...	—	—	59	3131	116	1135	116	1135	—	—
Kattywar ...	—	—	19	420	32	1208	32	1208	—	—
Guzerat ...	1053	5890	755	4070	1260	7938	207	2048	—	—
Candeish and Surat ...	43	2205	919	3890	108	5042	65	2837	—	—
Bombay Island ...	3383	6828	2171	5679	1446	3873	—	—	1937	2955
Northern and Southern Conkan ...	24	1197	72	4670	66	3997	42	2800	—	—
Poonah and Sattara ...	253	7836	1169	6789	3580	7889	3327	53	—	—
Southern Mahratta Country ...	—	—	—	—	861	1196	861	1196	—	—
Malwa ...	—	—	18	1129	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>TOTALS ...</b>	<b>4756</b>	<b>23956</b>	<b>5485</b>	<b>39271</b>	<b>7469</b>	<b>32278</b>	<b>1650</b>	<b>11277</b>	<b>1937</b>	<b>2995</b>
	Exclusive of Engineer Conductors, Staff, &c.		Exclusive of Engineers, Conductors, Staff, &c.		Exclusive of Engineer Conductors, Staff, &c.					
	122	35	151	37	258	143				
<b>TOTALS ...</b>	<b>4878</b>	<b>23991</b>	<b>5636</b>	<b>39315</b>	<b>7727</b>	<b>32421</b>				

## ABSTRACT,

Showing the FORCE allotted to Territory acquired or protected since 1813, and to the Territory which had been previously occupied.

STATIONS in Territory acquired or protected since 1813.							Increase since 1813.			
							Europeans.	—	Natives.	—
<b>BENGAL TROOPS :</b>										
Acquisitions from Nepaul .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	41		3552	
Rajpoothana .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	357		9102	
Nerbudda Territories .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	246		6167	
Malwa .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	310		4693	
Assam, Sylhet and Arracan .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	66		3673	
								1050		27187
<b>MADRAS TROOPS :</b>										
Rajah of Berar's Dominions .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	816		4001	
Malay Peninsula .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	1104		2754	
Southern Mahratta Country .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	75		2456	
								1995		9211
<b>BOMBAY TROOPS :</b>										
Cutch .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	116		1135	
Kattywar .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	32		1208	
Northern and Southern Conkan .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	42		2800	
Candeish .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	64		3207	
Southern Mahratta Country .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	861		1196	
New Posts in Northern Guzerat .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	1196		4589	
New Posts in Poonah Territories .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	824		5039	
								3135		19174
Total Force allotted to New Territories, &c. .. .. .							—	6180	—	55572
<b>INCREASE OR DECREASE in Old Territories.</b>										
<b>BENGAL TROOPS :</b>							Increase.		Decrease.	
							Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Bengal, Bahar and Cuttack .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	3052	—	—	4846
Country between Bahar and Oude .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	—	—	132	1252
Oude .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	—	—	12	1500
Dooab .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	274	1149	—	—
Rohilkund .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	17	1920	—	—
West of the Jumna, and N. W. of the Chumbul .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	1468	—	—	3701
Bundelcund .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	—	—	17	1800
Penang .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	—	—	21	1620
							4811	3069	212	14719
Total Force allotted to New Territories, &c. carried forward .. .. .							—	6180	—	55572

## Appendix (A.)—No. 55—continued.

STATIONS in Territory acquired or protected since 1813—continued.						Increase since 1813.			
						Europeans.	—	Natives.	—
Total Force allotted to New Territories, &c. brought forward .. ..						—	6180	—	55572
INCREASE OR DECREASE in Old Territories—continued.									
						Increase.		Decrease.	
MADRAS TROOPS :						Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Nizam's Dominions .. ..	211	—	—	1611					
Northern Circars .. ..	350	1961	—	—					
Ceded Districts .. ..	67	—	—	3116					
Mysore .. ..	—	—	1624	3209					
Carnatic .. ..	—	7325	1120	—					
Portuguese Territories .. ..	—	—	464	2820					
Malabar and Canara .. ..	—	—	171	585					
Travancore .. ..	—	—	321	454					
Poonah .. ..	—	—	20	575					
	628	9286	3723	12103					
BOMBAY TROOPS :									
Guzerat, excluding New Northern } Posts .. ..	—	—	989	2541					
Bombay Island .. ..	—	—	1937	2955					
Poonah and Sattara, excluding } New Posts .. ..	2503	—	—	4986					
Surat .. ..	1	—	—	370					
	2504	—	2926	10852					
TOTALS .. ..	7943	12355	6861	37974					
Increase of Europeans .. ..						—	1082	—	—
Decrease of Natives .. ..						—	—	—	25619
Net Increase .. ..						—	7262	—	29953*

\* Note.—The actual strength of the Armies in 1813, 1820 and 1830, respectively, were as follow :

	Europeans.	Natives.	Both.
1813 .. ..	34171	165900	200071
1820 .. ..	28645	228650	257295
1830 .. ..	46109	187067	223176
The estimated strength of the Armies when all the Reductions which have been ordered shall have been effectuated is ..	34180	116500	190680
Decrease, as compared with 1813 .. ..	—	—	9091

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 56.IV. Casualties  
and Appointments.

## IV.—CASUALTIES AND APPOINTMENTS.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 56.

A RETURN of the Number of CASUALTIES amongst the EUROPEAN OFFICERS of the Company's Army, which have occurred in each Year from 1813 to the present time, distinguishing Presidencies and Branches of Service; whether such Casualties have occurred by Death, Resignation, Retirement, or Dismission; distinguishing also each description of Casualty, and stating the proportion per Hundred of the Casualties to the authorized Establishment of Officers; with a Note of the average of each description of Casualty.

	YEARS.	Number of Deaths.	Number of Retirements, Resignations, &c.	Number of Dismissals.	Total of Casualties in each Year.	Total of Officers on the Establishment in each Year.	Per Centage of Casualties.
BENGAL .. ..	1813	10	12	1	53	1513	3·434
	1814	41	30	—	71	1511	1·591
	1815	44	35	1	80	1529	5·232
	1816	37	25	1	63	1491	4·225
	1817	35	11	—	46	1443	3·177
	1818	73	19	—	92	1481	6·212
	1819	63	15	—	78	1469	5·309
	1820	57	21	—	78	1602	4·869
	1821	51	16	4	71	1631	1·352
	1822	48	26	1	75	1697	4·419
	1823	46	27	1	74	1737	4·260
	1824	71	24	1	96	1792	5·357
	1825	76	31	—	107	1912	5·596
	1826	73	25	2	100	2088	4·789
	1827	62	29	1	92	2119	4·341
	1828	53	32	2	87	2100	4·143
	1829	54	36	3	93	2196	4·235
	1830	51	28	7	86	2185	3·936
Average Number of Officers and Casualties per Annum }	Total Officers.	Total Casualties.	Per Cent.	Deaths.	Per Cent.	Retirement, &c.	Per Cent.
	1754	80	{ 4·568 or 1 in 22 }	54	{ 3·079 or 1 in 32 }	26	{ 1·482 or 1 in 67 }

A RETURN of the Number of CASUALTIES, &c.—*continued.*APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 56.Casualties from  
1813 to 1830.

	YEARS.	Number of Deaths.	Number of Retirements, Resignations, &c.	Number of Dismissals.	Total of Casualties in each Year.	Total of Officers on the Establishment in each Year.	Per Centage of Casualties.
MADRAS .. ..	1813	56	21	6	82	1338	6·128
	1814	31	22	—	53	1305	4·061
	1815	39	18	—	57	1248	4·567
	1816	35	27	—	62	1197	5·179
	1817	63	15	2	80	1165	6·867
	1818	69	20	—	89	1053	8·452
	1819	63	18	—	81	1063	7·620
	1820	42	7	1	50	1254	3·987
	1821	62	15	1	78	1315	5·931
	1822	42	17	—	59	1422	4·149
	1823	50	13	4	67	1421	4·715
	1824	100	19	2	121	1443	8·335
	1825	70	22	2	94	1409	6·671
	1826	69	23	3	95	1413	6·563
	1827	57	31	1	89	1502	5·924
	1828	24	15	2	41	1560	2·628
	1829	31	28	4	63	1577	3·995
	1830	33	52	2	87	1507	5·773
	Total Officers.	Total Casualties.	Per Cent.	Deaths.	Per Cent.	Retirement, &c.	Per Cent.
	1346	75	5·572 or 1 in 18	52	3·856 or 1 in 26	23	1·716 or 1 in 58
Average Number of Officers and Casualties per Annum. }							
BOMBAY .. ..	1813	13	19	2	34	524	6·488
	1814	22	8	—	30	510	5·882
	1815	17	4	1	22	494	4·494
	1816	8	10	—	18	478	3·765
	1817	17	7	—	24	465	5·161
	1818	19	3	—	22	455	4·835
	1819	31	8	—	39	502	7·768
	1820	33	5	1	39	587	6·644
	1821	40	5	—	45	566	7·950
	1822	21	9	—	30	693	4·329
	1823	22	3	2	27	680	3·970
	1824	34	5	4	43	733	5·866
	1825	28	4	—	32	737	4·328
	1826	43	4	2	49	749	6·542
	1827	38	8	6	52	717	6·958
	1828	26	5	4	35	690	5·072
	1829	21	11	5	37	818	4·523
	1830	23	8	—	31	808	3·836
	Total Officers.	Total Casualties.	Per Cent.	Deaths.	Per Cent.	Retirement, &c.	Per Cent.
	621	34	5·448 or 1 in 18	26	4·166 or 1 in 24	8	1·282 or 1 in 78
Average Number of Officers and Casualties per Annum. }							

Military Secretary's Office,  
22d February 1832.J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.



APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 57.

Cadets and  
Assistant Surgeons  
appointed from  
1796 to 1832.

### APPENDIX (A.)—No. 57.

**A RETURN showing the Number of CADETS and ASSISTANT SURGEONS appointed in each Year from 1796 to 1832, distinguishing Presidencies and Branches of Service.**

CADETS.															ASSISTANT SURGEONS.		
YEAR.	BENGAL.				MADRAS.				BOMBAY.								
	Engineers.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Engineers.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Engineers.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Bengal.	Madr.			
1796	1	2	2	28	1	—	—	54	1	—	—	25	25	—	7		
1797	3	—	—	41	2	—	—	52	—	—	—	34	2	15	12		
1798	—	—	23	160	—	—	18	149	—	—	—	58	12	12	12		
	Artillery or Engineers.				Artillery or Engineers.				Artillery or Engineers.								
1799	2		4	108	2		1	72	11			19	11	9	—		
1800	5		10	149	5		13	183	7			102	10	17	—		
1801	1		1	11	2		2	14	4			8	12	16	—		
1802	6		—	59	3		23	164	2			34	13	17	1		
1803	18		4	174	15		31	79	10			161	14	8	6		
1804	26		19	153	1		4	133	—			21	24	12	6		
1805	21		17	160	2		13	215	—			11	23	27	1		
1806	9		12	89	9		10	192	2			17	20	12	4		
1807	18		17	105	12		14	87	2			26	22	13	13		
1808	12		13	127	3		11	41	2			54	14	4	6		
1809	16		4	39	14		2	20	10			9	18	4	6		

## APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE.

111

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 57.

**Cadets and  
Assistant Surgeons  
appointed from  
1796 to 1832.**

[illegible]

(Errors excepted)

W. M. ABINGTON.

Cadet Office, East-India House,  
26th December 1832.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 58.

Men discharged  
from the Service.

### APPENDIX (A.) - No. 58.

**RETURN** showing the **TOTAL NUMBER** of **MEN** discharged from the **COMPANY'S SERVICE** during the last **Six Years**; their **Average Length of Service**, and their **Age** at the period of **Enlistment**.

Age when Enlisted.	Number of Men.	Total Number of Years' Service.		Average Length of each Man's Service.	
		Yrs.	Ms.	Yrs.	Ms.
15 to 20	983	8886	6	9	0
21 to 25	505	4113	10	8	1
26 to 30	112	1599	1	11	3
31 to 35	71	633	4	8	6
36 to 40	113	664	11	5	11
41 to 45	27	129	6	4	9
46 to 50	4	20	6	5	1

General Average, 8 Years 8 Months' Service.

**MEM.**—The Men whose ages exceed 30 are Men who have been transferred from His Majesty's Service, or Men enlisted in India.

Military Secretary's Office, East-India House,  
6th April 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 59.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 59.Length of Service  
of  
Discharged Soldiers  
since 1825.

**RETURN** showing the **AVERAGE LENGTH of SERVICE**, in the **COMPANY'S ARMY**, of **Men** transferred from His Majesty's Service, who have arrived in this Country as **Discharged Soldiers**, since the Year 1825.

Age when transferred.	Number of Men.	Total Number of Years' Service.	Average Length of each Man's Service.
		Yrs. Ms.	Yrs. Ms.
20 to 25	3	22 0	7 4
26 to 30	8	60 11	7 7
31 to 35	27	150 2	5 7
36 to 40	84	432 1	5 2
41 to 45	20	96 9	4 10
46 to 50	4	11 3	2 10

General Average, 5 Years 3 Months' Service.

Military Secretary's Office, East-India House,  
6th April 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

**Table of Pay  
and Allowances of  
European Commis-  
sioned Officers.**

## V.-PAY AND ALLOWANCES.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 60.

**A TABLE of the PAY and ALLOWANCES of EUROPEAN COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, in Sonant, Madras, or Bombay Rupees per Month of 30 Days.**

IN GARRISON OR CANTONMENT.										IN THE FIELD.				
PAY.	Gratuity.	Tent Allowance.	House-rent, if only in receipt of half Batta, Quarters.	Horse Allowance.	Half Batta.	TOTAL per Month.	PAY.	Gratuity.	Tent Allowance.	Horse Allowance.	Full Batta.	TOTAL per Month.		
EUROPEAN INFANTRY:														
Colonel, not a General Officer on the Staff .. ..														
300	100	—	—	30	750	1180 0 0	300	—	200	30	750	1280		
240	75	100	100	30	300	745 0 0	240	—	150	30	600	1020		
180	60	80	80	30	225	575 0 0	180	—	120	30	450	780		
120	36	378	50	—	90	333 8 0	120	36	75	—	180	411		
60	24	25	30	—	60	199 0 0	60	24	50	—	120	254		
48	12	25	25	—	45	155 0 0	48	12	50	—	90	200		
—	—	—	—	—	—	333 8 0	—	—	—	—	—	411		
—	—	—	—	—	—	199 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	254		
Surgeon, as Captain .. ..														
Assistant Surgeon, as Lieut. .. ..														
FOOT ARTILLERY:														
Colonel of a Battalion .. ..														
300	100	—	—	30	750	1180 0 0	300	—	200	30	750	1280		
240	75	100	100	30	300	745 0 0	240	—	150	30	600	1020		
180	60	80	80	30	225	575 0 0	180	—	120	30	500	780		
140	36	378	50	—	90	333 8 0	140	36	75	—	180	431		
70	24	25	30	—	60	209 0 0	70	24	50	—	120	264		
60	12	25	25	—	45	167 0 0	60	12	50	—	90	212		
Surgeon .. as in the .. ..														
Assist. Surgeon } Euro. Inf.														
ENGINEERS—the same as the Artillery.														
HORSE ARTILLERY—the same as the Cavalry.														

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 60.

**Table of Pay  
and Allowances of  
Military Commis-  
sioned Officers.**

NATIVE CAVALRY :																			
Colonel	..	..	397	8 0	—	200	—	120	750	1467	8 0	397	8 0	—	200	120	750	1467	8 0
Lieutenant-colonel	..	..	278	4 0	—	150	100	120	300	918	4 0	278	4 0	—	150	120	600	1148	4 0
Major	..	..	232	13 4	—	120	80	120	225	777	13 4	232	13 4	—	120	120	450	922	13 4
Captain	..	..	179	6 4	36	75	50	90	90	520	6 4	179	6 4	36	75	90	180	560	6 4
Lieutenant	..	..	109	8 0	24	50	30	60	60	333	8 0	109	8 0	24	50	60	120	363	8 0
Cornet	..	..	97	5 4	12	50	25	60	45	289	5 4	97	5 4	12	50	60	90	309	5 4
Surgeon, as Captain	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	520	6 4	—	—	—	—	—	—	560	6 4
Assistant Surgeon, as Lieut.	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	333	8 0	—	—	—	—	—	—	363	8 0
Veterinary Surgeon..	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	97	0 0	24	50	48	122	341	0 0
NATIVE INFANTRY:																			
Colonel, not a General Officer on the Staff	..	..	300	—	—	200	—	30	750	1280	—	300	—	—	200	30	750	1280	—
Lieutenant-colonel	..	..	240	—	—	150	100	30	300	820	—	240	—	—	150	30	600	1020	—
Major..	..	..	180	—	—	120	80	30	225	635	—	180	—	—	120	30	450	780	—
Captain	..	..	120	36	36	75	50	—	90	371	36	120	36	75	75	—	180	411	—
Lieutenant	..	..	60	24	24	50	30	—	60	224	24	60	24	50	50	—	120	254	—
Ensign	..	..	48	12	12	50	25	—	45	180	12	48	12	50	50	—	90	200	—
Surgeon, as Captain	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	411	—
Assistant Surgeon, as Lieut.	..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	224	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	254	—

\* Colonels of Regiments not being General Officers on the Staff, nor holding offices specially provided for, are allowed full batta at any station.

*Note.*—The officers of His Majesty's regiments serving in India draw the same aggregate amount of pay and allowances as the Company's officers of corresponding regimental rank. Their pay being issued according to the scale fixed by His Majesty's Regulations (converted at 2s. 6d. the rupee), the assimilation is preserved by adjusting the batta to meet the difference.

All officers, however employed, draw the pay of their regimental rank, which is charged in the accounts of the presidency in which his regiment may be serving. His other allowances are borne by the Government and in the department under which the officer is employed.

(Errors excepted)

**J. SALMOND,**  
Mil, Secretary.

**JAMES C. MELVILL,**  
Aud. India Accts.

East-India House,  
21st Dec. 1832.

**A TABLE of the PAY of the NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATES of the EUROPEAN ARTILLERY and INFANTRY, and the EUROPEAN NON-COMMISSIONED STAFF attached to Native Troops at each Presidency, as at present authorized.**

						Per Month.								
						BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY.		
HORSE ARTILLERY :						ST. RS.	A.	P.	RS.	A.	P.	RS.	Q.	R.
Staff-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	37	9	8	—			—		
Serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	25	12	8	35	15	5	32	3	52
Corporal	..	{	after 11 years service	..	..	—			29	4	8	26	3	5
			after 7 years	..	..	20	12	7	28	2	7	25	2	92
			under 7 years	..	..	19	12	4	27	0	6	24	2	79
Bombardier	..	{	after 11 years	..	..	—			26	12	5	21	2	17
			after 7 years	..	..	18	12	7	25	10	4	23	2	4
			under 7 years	..	..	17	12	4	21	8	3	22	1	90
Trumpeter	..	{	after 11 years	..	..	—			23	3	5	23	1	0
			after 7 years	..	..	18	0	0	22	0	87	21	0	73
			under 7 years	..	..	—			—		—	—		
Farrier	..	{	after 14 years	..	..	—			30	5	2	29	0	35
			after 7 years	..	..	22	12	2	28	0	12	26	3	98
			under 7 years	..	..	21	12	0	—		—	—		
Rough-rider	..	{	above 7 years	..	..	26	4	2	30	5	2	28	0	43
			under 7 years	..	..	25	4	0	20	15	3	19	0	57
Gunner	..	{	after 11 years	..	..	13	4	5	19	13	2	18	0	43
			after 7 years	..	..	12	4	2	18	11	0	17	0	30
			under 7 years	..	..	11	4	0	—		—			
Staff Allowances (in addition to Pay):														
Serjeant-major	..	..	..	..	..	22	0	6	17	8	0	17	2	0
Troop-serjeant-major	..	..	..	..	..	none			17	8	0	none		
Quartermaster-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	16	0	6	14	0	0	14	0	0
Troop-quartermaster-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	none			14	0	0	none		
Drill-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	14	0	0	—			none		
Hospital-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	10	0	0	10	0	0	none		
Ridingmaster-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	20	0	0	17	8	0	17	8	0
Trumpet-major	..	..	..	..	..	5	0	0	14	0	0	18	0	0
Farrier-major	..	..	..	..	..	20	0	0	21	0	0	21	0	0
						(pay as serjt.)			(pay as gunner)			(pay as serjt.)		
Schoolmaster-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	20	0	0	—			none		
Drill-corporal	..	..	..	..	..	7	0	0	7	0	0	7	0	0
Pay-serjeant	..	..	..	..	..	7	0	0	3	8	0	7	0	0
Saddler	..	..	..	..	..	7	0	0	none			none		
Rough-rider, 1st Class	..	..	..	..	..	—			—			10	2	0
Ditto 2d ditto	..	..	..	..	..	—			—			7	0	0

## Appendix (A.)—No. 61—continued.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 61.European  
Non-commissioned  
Officers.

					Per Month.								
					BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY.		
FOOT ARTILLERY :					St. Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	Q.	R.
Brigade-serjeant..	..	..	..	..	none			35	8	4	32	3	23
Serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	23	4	8	23	11	10	26	2	43
Corporal ..	{ after 14 years service			..	20	12	10	26	12	10	23	2	86
	{ after 7 years —			..	19	12	7	25	10	9	22	2	72
	{ under 7 years —			..	18	12	4	24	8	8	21	2	59
Bombardier ..	{ after 14 years —			..	18	12	10	22	14	10	19	1	39
	{ after 7 years —			..	17	12	7	21	12	9	18	1	26
	{ under 7 years —			..	16	12	4	20	10	8	17	1	13
Drummer or Fifer ..	..	..	..	..	15	0	0	15	8	7	14	0	73
Gunner ..	{ after 14 years service			..	12	10	3	17	12	2	16	0	6
	{ after 7 years —			..	11	10	0	16	10	1	14	3	93
	{ under 7 years —			..	10	9	10	15	8	0	13	3	80
Staff Allowances :													
Serjeant-major ..	..	..	..	..	22	0	6	17	8	0	14	0	0
Staff-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	5	12	0	none			none		
Quartermaster-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	16	0	6	14	0	0	20	0	0
Drill-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	14	0	0	14	0	0	11	0	0
Hospital-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	10	0	0	10	0	0	none		
Schoolmaster-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	20	0	0	—			none		
Drill-corporal ..	..	..	..	..	7	0	0	7	0	0	6	1	60
Drum and Fife-major, each ..	..	..	..	..	5	0	0	7	0	0	6	1	60
Pay-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	7	0	0	3	8	0	7	0	0
INFANTRY :													
Serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	19	4	8	21	13	10	22	2	93
Corporal ..	{ after 14 years service			..	14	12	10	20	5	6	18	2	10
	{ after 7 years —			..	13	12	7	19	3	5	17	2	26
	{ under 7 years —			..	12	12	4	18	4	4	16	2	13
Drummer or Fifer ..	..	..	..	..	11	0	0	15	8	7	14	0	83
Private ..	{ after 14 years service			..	10	10	3	15	13	2	14	1	86
	{ after 7 years —			..	9	10	0	14	11	1	13	1	73
	{ under 7 years —			..	8	9	10	13	9	0	12	1	60
Staff Allowances :													
Serjeant-major ..	..	..	..	..	22	0	6	14	0	0	11	0	0
Quartermaster-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	16	0	6	14	0	0	14	0	0
Hospital-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	10	0	0	10	0	0	none		
Drill-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	14	0	0	11	0	0	14	0	0
Butcher-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	20	0	0	none			none		
Schoolmaster-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	20	0	0	—			—		
Drill-corporal ..	..	..	..	..	7	0	0	7	0	0	6	1	0
Drum or Fife-major ..	..	..	..	..	5	0	0	5	13	4	5	0	0
Pay-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	7	0	0	3	8	0	7	0	0
Colour-serjeant ..	..	..	..	..	5	12	0	6	12	6	6	0	80



APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 61.  
Pay and  
Allowances.

Appendix (A.)—No. 61—*continued.*

							Per Month.									
EUROPEAN NON-COMMISSIONED STAFF attached to NATIVE CORPS:							BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY.			
							St. Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	Q.	R.	
Horse Artillery:																
Staff-serjeant or Troop-serjeant-major..	..	..	..	..	..	..	52	13	2	53	7	5	} There is not any Native Horse Artillery at Bombay.			
Farrier-serjeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	48	13	2	—	—	—				
Troop-quartermaster-serjeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	—	—	—	49	15	5				
Serjeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	—	—	—	35	15	5				
Foot Artillery:																
Serjeant-major .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	55	5	2	46	3	10	40	2	43	
Quartermaster-serjeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	49	5	2	42	11	10	46	2	43	
Drill-serjeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	17	4	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Infantry:																
Serjeant-major .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	51	5	2	38	13	10	36	2	93	
Quartermaster-serjeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	45	5	2	35	5	10	36	2	93	
Cavalry:																
Serjeant-major .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	52	6	4	43	6	2	40	3	46	
Quartermaster-serjeant .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	46	6	4	43	6	2	40	3	46	

*Note.*—The European Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers in Bengal are victualled in all situations in addition to the above allowances, except in the instances marked thus\* ; in these batta, at the rate of 10 rupees per month each, is granted instead of rations, and included in the sums above stated. The European Non-commissioned Officers and Privates at Madras and Bombay victual themselves out of the allowances above specified, when not in the field.

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
21st Dec. 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. Ind. Accts.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 62.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 62.Native Troops of  
each Presidency.

## NATIVE TROOPS.

A TABLE of the PAY and ALLOWANCES of the NATIVE TROOPS of each Presidency,  
as at present authorized.

						Per Month.									
						BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY.			
HORSE ARTILLERY :						St. Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	Q.	R.	
Subadar ...	...	...	...	1st Class	}	—	—	—	129	0	0	There is not any Native Horse Artillery at Bombay.			
Ditto ...	...	...	...	2d Class		80	0	0	111	8	0				
Ditto ...	...	...	...	3d Class		—	—	—	108	0	0				
Jemadar ...	...	...	...	...	32	0	0	39	8	0					
Havildar ...	...	...	...	...	20	0	0	25	0	0					
Naick ...	...	...	...	...	16	0	0	20	8	0					
Trumpeter ...	...	...	...	...	16	0	0	20	8	0					
Rough-rider ...	...	...	...	...	14	0	0	{	18	0	0				
Farrier ...	...	...	...	...	9	0	0		16	4	0				
Trooper ...	...	...	...	...	9	0	0		16	15	3				
Staff Allowances :									12	8	0				
Subadar-major ...	...	...	...	...		—	—	—	25	0	0				
Staff-havildar or Troop-havildar-major ...	...	...	...	...	2	0	0		2	0	0				
Pay-havildar ...	...	...	...	...	5	0	0		1	13	10				
Drill-havildar ...	...	...	...	...		—	—	—	10	8	0				
Drill-naick ...	...	...	...	...		—	—	—	7	0	0				
Gun Lascars attached to Horse Artillery :															
Havildar ...	...	...	...	...		9	8	0	—	—	—	10	2	0	
Naick ...	...	...	...	...		7	8	0	—	—	—	8	3	0	
Lascar ...	...	...	...	...		5	12	0	—	—	—	7	0	0	
Native Farrier ...	...	...	...	...		—	—	—	—	—	—	21	0	0	
GOLUNDAUZE, or NATIVE FOOT ARTILLERY :															
Subadar ...	...	...	...	1st Class	}	—	—	—	70	0	0	}	42	0	0
Ditto ...	...	...	...	2d Class		67	0	0	52	8	0				
Ditto ...	...	...	...	3d Class		—	—	—	42	0	0				
Jemadar ...	...	...	...	...		21	8	0	28	0	0		28	0	0
Havildar ...	...	...	...	...		14	0	0	14	0	0		14	0	0
Naick ...	...	...	...	...		12	0	0	10	8	0		10	2	0
Drummer ...	...	...	...	...		11	0	0	10	8	0		8	3	0
Private ...	...	...	...	...		7	0	0	8	4	0		8	1	0
Staff Allowances :															
Subadar-major ...	...	...	...	...		25	0	0	25	0	0	25	0	0	
Native Adjutant ...	...	...	...	...		—	—	—	17	8	0	—	—	—	
Havildar-major ...	...	...	...	...		7	0	0	10	0	0	10	0	0	
Quartermaster-havildar ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Drill-havildar ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	5	4	0	5	1	0	
Drill-naick ...	...	...	...	...		2	8	0	3	8	0	3	2	0	
Drum or Fife-major ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	5	13	4	6	1	0	
Pay-havildar ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	1	13	10	5	0	0	
Brigade or Colour-havildar ...	...	...	...	...		2	0	0	2	0	0	—	—	—	

(continued.)

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 62.

## Appendix (A.)—No. 62—continued.

						Per Month.											
COLONDAUZE, or NATIVE FOOT ARTILLERY— <i>continued.</i>						BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY.					
Gun Lascars, attached to Foot Artillery:						St. Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	Q.	R.			
Subadar ...	...	...	...	1st Class	}	—			42	0	0	42	0	0			
Ditto ...	...	...	...	2d Class		59	0	0	31	8	0	31	2	0			
Ditto ...	...	...	...	3d Class		—			24	8	0	24	2	0			
Jemadar ...	...	...	...	...		18	8	0	17	3	0	17	2	0			
Havildar...	...	...	...	...		9	8	0	8	12	0	10	2	0			
Naick ...	...	...	...	...		7	8	0	—			8	3	0			
Lascar ...	...	...	...	...		5	12	0	7	13	4	7	0	0			
NATIVE CAVALRY:																	
Subadar ...	...	...	...	1st Class	}	—			119	0	0	119	0	0			
Ditto ...	...	...	...	2d Class		80	0	0	101	8	0	101	2	0			
Ditto ...	...	...	...	3d Class		—			91	0	0	91	0	0			
Jemadar ...	...	...	...	...		32	0	0	31	8	0	31	2	0			
Havildar...	...	...	...	...		20	0	0	21	0	0	21	0	0			
Naick ...	...	...	...	...		16	0	0	17	8	0	17	2	0			
Trumpeter	...	...	...	...		16	0	0	17	8	0	17	2	0			
Farrier ...	...	...	...	...		9	0	0	16	15	3	21	0	0			
Trooper ...	...	...	...	...		9	0	0	10	8	0	10	2	0			
Staff Allowances:																	
Subadar-major ...	...	...	...	...		25	0	0	25	0	0	25	0	0			
Native Adjutant	...	...	...	...		—			17	8	0	17	2	0			
Trumpet-major ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	14	0	0	14	0	0			
Farrier-major ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	21	0	0	21	0	0			
Havildar-major ...	...	...	...	...		7	0	0	10	0	0	10	0	0			
Drill-havildar ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	10	8	0	10	2	0			
Quartermaster-havildar	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	—			—					
Drill-naick ...	...	...	...	...		2	8	0	7	0	0	7	0	0			
Riding-master ...	...	...	...	...		—			17	8	0	17	2	0			
Rough-rider (pay as Trooper) ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0	{	5	0	5	1	0			
Pay-havildar ...	...	...	...	...		5	0	0		3	8	0	3	2	0		
Troop or Colour-havildar	...	...	...	...		2	0	0		1	13	10	5	0			
															2	0	0
NATIVE INFANTRY:																	
Subadar ...	...	...	...	1st Class	}	—			70	0	0	70	0	0			
Ditto ...	...	...	...	2d Class		67	0	0	52	8	0	52	0	0			
Ditto ...	...	...	...	3d Class		—			42	0	0	42	0	0			
Jemadar ...	...	...	...	...		24	8	0	24	8	0	24	2	0			
Havildar...	...	...	...	...		14	0	0	10	8	0	10	2	0			
Naick ...	...	...	...	...		12	0	0	8	12	0	8	3	0			
Drummer or Fifer	...	...	...	...		11	0	0	8	12	0	8	3	0			
Sepoy ...	...	...	...	...		7	0	0	7	0	0	7	0	0			

Appendix (A.)—No. 62—*continued*.APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 62.Native Troops of  
each Presidency.

	Per Month.								
	BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY.		
	St. Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	Q.	R.
<b>NATIVE INFANTRY—<i>continued</i>.</b>									
<b>Staff Allowances :</b>									
Subadar-major .. .. .	25	0	0	25	0	0	25	0	0
Havildar-major .. .. .	—			10	0	0	10	0	0
Native Adjutant .. .. .	—			17	8	0	17	2	0
Drill-havildar .. .. .	5	0	0	5	4	0	5	1	0
Drill-naick .. .. .	2	8	0	3	8	0	3	2	0
Drum or Fife-major .. .. .	5	0	0	5	13	4	6	1	0
Pay-havildar .. .. .	5	0	0	1	13	10	5	0	0
Colour-havildar .. .. .	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0
<i>Note.</i> —The above are the Rates of Pay for Troops in Garrison or Cantonment; when in the Field extra Batta is issued on the following scale:—									
<b>NATIVE CAVALRY :</b>									
Sabadars .. .. .	20	0	0	30	0	0	28	0	0
Jemadars .. .. .	8	0	0	10	8	0	10	2	0
Havildars .. .. .	5	0	0	7	0	0	7	0	0
Naicks and Trumpeters .. .. .	4	0	0	3	8	0	3	2	0
Farriers .. .. .	1	8	0	7	0	0	7	0	0
Troopers .. .. .	1	8	0	3	8	0	3	2	0
<b>NATIVE INFANTRY :</b>									
Subadars .. .. .	15	0	0	14	0	0	15	0	0
Jemadars .. .. .	7	8	0	7	0	0	7	2	0
Havildars .. .. .	5	0	0	2	5	4	2	2	0
Naicks .. .. .	5	0	0	2	5	4	2	2	0
Drummers .. .. .	5	0	0	3	3	4	2	2	0
Sepoys .. .. .	1	8	0	2	5	4	2	2	0

East-India House,  
21st Dec. 1832.J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.J. C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 63.Pay and  
Allowances.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 63.

## GENERAL STAFF.

A RETURN of the ALLOWANCES drawn by the OFFICERS holding the undermentioned  
Appointments on the 30th April 1831.

	STAFF PAY, per Annum.			Regimental Pay and Allowances.
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	
	St. Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Adjutant-general .. .. .	(a) 27000	17000	18000	All staff officers on the Bengal Establishment, not specially provided for, draw the pay and full allowances of their regimental rank as in the field.
Deputy Adjutant-general .. ..	7192	8750	6000	
Assistant Adjutant-general .. ..	6000	—	—	
Deputy ditto at the Presidency .. .. .	—	2180	2100	
Assistant Adjutant-general of Artillery .. .. .	6000	—	—	In Madras and Bombay the full allowances are drawn only by those officers whose duties are considered to partake of the nature of field service, which are here distinguished by an asterisk. The others draw only their pay and half batta, &c. as in garrison.
Assistants Adjutant-general of Divisions .. .. .	4800	*3156	*1800	
Brigade-majors .. .. .	(b) 4248	(b) *2090	(b) *1818	
Additional when in charge of Bazars .. .. .	—	—	1200	
Superintendent of Cadets .. ..	2400	2400	3550	
Fort-adjutant at the Presidency ..	3924	3360	—	
Fort-adjutants .. .. .	2160	840	2160	
Cantonment-adjutants .. .. .	—	{ 3360 } 840	1440	
Line-adjutants .. .. .	—	—	2304	
Town-major .. .. .	14400	16828	5000	
Quartermaster-general .. .. .	(c) 27000	17000	18000	(a) The adjutant-general in Bengal, when not in the field, draws no regimental allowances.
Deputy Quartermaster-general ..	8500	8750	6000	(b) Brigade-majors of regimental rank inferior to captain draw in Bengal the pay and full allowances of captain; at Madras and Bombay the pay of their own rank, and the allowances only of captain.
Ditto of the Nagpore Force ..	6000	*3156	—	
Assistants Quartermaster-general	—	*3156	*6000	
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-general at the Presidency ..	—	2100	—	
Deputy Assistants Quartermaster-general (of Divisions) .. ..	{ 4800 } 3600	*1725	*2328	(c) When not in the field, draws no regimental allowances.
Commissary-general .. .. .	(d) 36000	*26274	*23000	
Deputy Commissary-general .. ..	(e) vacant	*12763	—	
Assistants Commissary-general:				
1st Class .. .. .	12000	{ *8500 }	*9600	(d) When not in the field, draws no regimental allowances.
2d ditto .. .. .	8400		*7200	
3d ditto .. .. .	—		*3600	
Deputy Assistants Commissary-general:				(e) Former salary 11,400 rupees per annum.
1st Class .. .. .	6000	{ *1274 }	—	
2d ditto .. .. .	4800		—	

## Appendix (A).—No. 63—continued.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 63.Pay and  
Allowances.

	STAFF PAY, per Annum.			Regimental Pay and Allowances.
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	
	St. Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Sub-Assistants Commissary-general	3600	*2174	—	
Additional when in charge of Military Bazaars .. ..	—	2100	—	
Agent for Gun-carriages .. ..	15048	16800	7200	
Superintendent of Gunpowder Manufactory .. ..	Appointment temporarily suspended.	16800	7200	
Principal Commissary of Ordnance	11172	Held by the Gun-carriage Agent, with- out additional Pay.	10000	
Deputy Principal Commissary of Ordnance .. ..	7200	—	4800	
Commissaries of Ordnance ..	{ 6000 } 4800	5100	4800	
Ditto of Subsidiary Forces	—	*5100	—	
Deputy Commissaries of Ordnance	3000	3000	2100	
	Not Commissioned Officers.			
Superintendent of the Foundry at Fort William .. ..	9600	—	—	
Inspecting Officer of Ordnance at Fort St. George .. ..	—	1200	—	
Auditor-general .. ..	(a) 11800	(b) *35000	27000	(a) Draws the pay of his rank only.
Deputy Auditor-general ..	8000	(b) *8100	7200	
First Assistant Auditor-general ..	6000	7560	3600	(b) These officers, though not liable to field duty, have hitherto drawn full batta, &c. which allowances are now under con- sideration.
Second ditto ditto .. ..	6000	3360	2400	
Paymaster at the Presidency ..	12540	11100	9600	
Paymaster of Subsidiary Forces ..	6270	*7200	—	
Paymasters, or Deputy Paymas- ters of Divisions, Brigades and Stations .. ..	6270	{ 7200 } 4800 2400	6000 3600	
Allowance to Officers in charge of Military Chests .. ..	2400	—	—	
Paymaster and Staff Officer at the Neilgherry Hills .. ..	—	4200	—	
Barrack-master at the Presidency	3600	*5471	3360	
Judge Advocate-general .. ..	(c) 17100	12000	12000	(c) Draws also for horse al- lowance, house and office rent, St. Rs. 5,880 per annum.
Deputy Judge Advocates-general	4800	*2300	*3000	
Members of the Military Board ..	(d) 18000	—	—	(d) Draw the pay of their rank only; two-thirds only of the staff pay is here stated, the remainder being charged on the general books.
Secretary to ditto .. ..	(d) 12000	19200	—	
Deputy Secretary to ditto ..	—	6000	—	
Assistant Secretary to ditto ..	4180	3960	—	

(continued.)

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 63.Pay and  
Allowances.

## Appendix (A.)— No. 63—continued.

	STAFF PAY, per Annum.			Regimental Pay and Allowances
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	
	St. Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Military Secretaries to Government and their Assistants; salaries charged on the Civil Establishment .. .. .	—	—	—	Draw the pay of their rank only.
Secretary to the Clothing Board, and Agents for Army Clothing; Staff Allowances charged to the Off-reckoning Funds .. ..	—	—	—	
Stud Department:				
Superintendents .. ..	12000	—	*7200	
Assistants .. ..	6000	—	—	
Sub-Assistants .. ..	{ 4800 }	—	—	
	{ 2400 }	—	—	
Supervisor; (also a Sub-Assistant Commissary-general) ..	3600	—	—	
Sub-Assistant Commissary-general .. ..	1440	—	—	
Department of Public Works:				
Superintendent of Public Works in the Lower Provinces .. ..	(a)6000	—	—	(a) One-third only of staff salary, remainder charged to the Civil Department.
Superintendent of Public Works in North-western and Central Provinces (each) ..	12000	—	—	
Chief Engineer .. ..	12000	*12000	*12000	
First Assistant .. ..	—	3314	—	
Second ditto .. ..	—	2100	—	
Executive Officer, or Superintending Engineer at the Presidency .. ..	*7200	9760	*7200	
Assistant .. ..	—	3350	—	
Inspecting Engineers ..	—	—	8400	
Executive Officers .. ..	{ 4800 }	{ *5400 }	{ 3150 }	
	{ 3600 }	{ *3786 }	{ 2400 }	
	{ 2400 }	{ *3314 }		
	{ 1200 }			
Surveyor-general of India ..	Paid in the Civil and General Departments.	—	—	Pay of his rank only.
Deputy ditto .. ..	ditto	Paid in the Civil Department.	*6000	Bengal and Madras; pay of his rank only.
Surveyors of Districts and their Assistants .. ..	—	ditto	—	Pay of their rank only.
Superintendent of Trigonometrical Survey .. ..	—	—	*6000	

## Appendix (A.)- No. 63—continued.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 63.Pay and  
Allowances.

	STAFF PAY, per Annum.			Regimental Pay and Allowances.
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	
	SL. Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Staff of the Governor-General or Governor:				
Military Secretary .. .. .	(a) 12540	Not a Military Officer, charged on the Civil Department.	4800	(a) Is also aide-de-camp, and paid as such in addition.
Aides-de-camp .. .. .	(b) 4008	(b)* 2155	(b)* 1440	(b) Aides-de-camp, being subaltern officers, draw the pay and full allowances of captain; if of higher rank, then the pay and allowances of their own rank.
Staff of the Commander-in-chief: <i>See Return of King's Staff.</i>				
Aides-de-camp to General Officers and others commanding Divisions of the Army .. .. .	(b) 2448	(b)† 2155	(b)~ 1800	

The salaries of officers employed in political situations are charged on the Civil Establishment of the Supreme Government. These, as well as officers in the service of Native Princes, draw only the pay of their regimental rank from the Military Department.

NOTE.—Staff officers absent on leave are permitted to draw, for a limited time, a moiety of their Staff Pay, the other moiety being received by the officer officiating. Such casualties are not noticed in this Account, but the full salary is stated against each office respectively.

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
21st December 1832.JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accounts.



APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 61.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 64.

Pay and  
Allowances.

A RETURN of the ALLOWANCES drawn by the OFFICERS in Command of Divisions of the Army, Subsidiary or Field Forces, Brigades and Stations, and also of Corps at each Presidency, on the 30th April 1831.

	STAFF PAY, per Annum.			Regimental Pay and Allowances.
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	
	Sa. Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Commander-in-chief. ( <i>See Return of the King's Staff</i> ) .. ..	—	—	—	
Officers in Command of the Divisions of the Army .. ..	40000	40000	40000	Pay of their rank.
Officers Commanding Subsidiary Forces .. .. .	12000	12000	12000	} Pay and full allowances as in the field.
Officers in Command of Stations or Brigades .. .. .	9000	9000	9000	
Officers in Command of Regiments and Battalions, or Brigades of Artillery .. .. .	4800	4800	4800	{ Pay and allowances according to the station of their respective corps.

(Errors excepted)

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.East-India House,  
21st December 1832.

## APPENDIX (A.)--No. 65.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 65.Pay and  
Allowances.

## MEDICAL STAFF.

A RETURN of the ALLOWANCES drawn by MEDICAL OFFICERS holding the under-mentioned Appointments.

	STAFF SALARIES, per Annum.			Regimental Pay and Allowances.
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	
	St. Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Members of the Medical Board ..	28918	29400	25666	None.
Secretary to the Medical Board ..	(a) 9600	(b) 8400	(b) 7200	(a) Full pay and allowances of their rank as in the field.
Superintending Surgeons ..	(a) 19200	(c) 18900	15600	
Ditto of the Nagpore Subsidiary Force .. .. .	(a) 15200			
	—	(d) 18900	—	
Garrison Surgeons ..	(a) 7200	(b) 6000	(c) 5040	(b) Pay and allowances as in garrison.
	(a) 6000	(b) 4800	(a) 2880	
	(a) 4800		(a) 1800	
Assistants to ditto .. .. .	(a) 1800	—	(b) 2520	(c) At Madras and Bombay draw nothing beyond the staff salary.
Garrison Assistant Surgeons ..	(b) 2760	(b) 2940	—	
Staff Surgeons .. .. .	—	(a) 6300	(a) 4560	
Dépôt ditto .. .. .	—	(b) 4800	—	
Surgeon to the General Hospital at the Presidency .. .. .	(a) 7200	—	(b) 7200	(d) Half batta of superior rank only.
Assistant Surgeons to ditto	(a) 3000	—	—	
	(a) 1800	—	—	
Apothecary to the Dispensary ..	(b) 14400	—	—	(e) Pay and allowances as in garrison, with the batta of superior rank.
Deputy ditto .. .. .	(b) 4800	—	—	
Superintendent of Native Medical Schools .. .. .	(a) 14400	—	(b)* 6000	
Hospital Storekeeper at the Presi- dency .. .. .	—	(b) 7200	(b) 3000	
Medical Storekeepers ..	(a) 4800	(b) 8400	(b) 6000	
	(a) 2400			
Deputies do (of Divisions, &c.) ..	—	(a) 2400	(b) 3000	
Surgeon (Assistant) of the Military Orphan School .. .. .	1254	—	—	.. other allowances paid in the Civil Department.
Assistant Surgeon to Stud Estab- lishment .. .. .	(a) 1800	—	—	
Superintendent of Eye Infirmary ..	—	(b) 8400	—	
Assistant Surgeon at ditto ..	—	(b) 4200	—	
Assistant Surgeon in Charge of Sick Officers at St. Thomé ..	—	(b) 4200	—	
Superintending Medical Officer at the Neilgherries .. .. .	—	(b) 6000	—	
Assistants to ditto .. .. .	—	(b) 3600	—	
Assistant Surgeon in Charge of the Hospital at Mahabaleshwar ..	—	—	(a) 3180	

\* Is also Superintendent of Native Medical Schools.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 66.

## KING'S TROOPS.

A RETURN of the ALLOWANCES drawn by the OFFICERS holding the undermentioned Staff Appointments, on the 30th April 1831.

	STAFF PAY, per Annum.			Regimental Pay and Allowances.
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	
	St. Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
GENERAL STAFF of His Majesty's Forces :				
The Commander-in-chief of King's and Company's Forces .. .. .	73144*	85648	— †	None.
Military Secretary to ditto .. .. .	18000‡	10700	7200	.. full allowances as in the field ; but not pay, being a King's officer whose regiment is not in India. See note at the foot.
Persian Interpreter to ditto .. .. .	8000	4200	4200	.. at Bengal, pay and full allowances. At Madras and Bombay, pay and allowances as in garrison.
Aides-de-camp .. .. .	3868	2155	1800	.. pay and full allowances of captain, or if higher regimental rank, then pay and full allowances of the same.
General Officers in command of Divisions of the Army .. .. .	40000	40000	40000	.. if colonels of King's regiments in India, pay of their rank.
Aides-de-camp to ditto .. .. .	2148	2155	1800	.. pay and full allowances of captain, or other higher regimental rank.
Adjutant-general of His Majesty's Forces ..	27000	—	—	Pay of his rank only.
Deputy ditto .. .. .	—	8985	—	Pay and full allowances.
Assistant-adjutant-general .. .. .	6000	—	—	Ditto.
Quartermaster-general .. .. .	27000	—	—	Pay of his rank only.
Deputy ditto .. .. .	—	8985	—	Pay and full allowances.
Brigade-major .. .. .	3448	1488	9384	Ditto.
MEDICAL STAFF of His Majesty's Forces :				
Inspector-general of His Majesty's Hospitals	30000	—	—	None.
Deputy ditto .. .. .	—	25800	22056	None.
Surgeon to the Commander-in-chief ..	6000	—	—	Pay and full allowances.

\* In addition to salary as Member of Council, which is borne on the Civil Department.

† Draws his allowances in the Civil Department.

‡ This officer also receives the Fees on King's Commissions issued by the Commander-in-chief in India.

*Note.*—No King's officer, whose regiment may not be in India, is entitled to draw pay from the Company. Such officers being Aides-de-camp or Military Secretaries, draw the regimental allowances of their rank, if appointed prior to the recent Regulation : subsequent to which they will draw their Staff pay only.

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
21st December 1832.

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

## VI.—CLOTHING, EQUIPMENT, AND OFF-RECKONINGS.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 67.

A LIST of ARTICLES of CLOTHING or EQUIPMENT, and also of the Means of CARRIAGE or other Accommodation supplied to the SOLDIERS at each Presidency, and in each Branch of Service, in the Year 1813 and at present, whether at the Public Expense, or at the charge of the Off-reckoning Fund, or provided for the Soldier at his own Cost; if not provided by himself agreeably to the Regulation, stating the probable Annual Cost of each Article; and where Alterations have intermediately occurred, the Expense or Decrease of Charge in each instance, and the Date of the General Order and of the Court's Letter, prescribing or sanctioning the Alteration.

IN 1813.			AT PRESENT.				
ARTICLES.	How supplied.		ARTICLES.	How supplied.			
BENGAL EUROPEAN HORSE ARTILLERY:							
1 Jacket ... ..	} By the Off-reckoning Fund.	... ..	1 Jacket or Overalls in alternate years. No alteration in other respects.	... ..	G. O. 29th March 1816, Court's Letter, 8th Oct. 1817.		
1 pair leather Gloves ... ..							
1 pair Boots ... ..							
1 pair leather Pantaloons (biennially) ... ..							
1 Helmet (triennially) ... ..							
1 Cloak (triennially) ... ..	} By a half-mounting allowance, payable by the Fund.		.				
Spurs (once) ... ..							
A Shirt ... ..							
EUROPEAN ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY:							
1 Jacket ... ..	} By the Fund ...	... ..	1 Jacket or 1 pair Pantaloons in alternate years. No alteration in other respects.	... ..	Ditto ditto.		
1 Cap (biennially)... ..							
Shirt ... ..	} By a half-mounting allowance, payable by the Fund.						
Shoes ... ..							
Stockings ... ..							
Nankin Trowsers and other necessities at the discretion of the Commanding Officer ... ..							
MADRAS EUROPEAN HORSE ARTILLERY:							
1 Jacket (annually) ... ..	By the Fund ...	... ..	} No alteration.	... ..			
1 pair leather Breeches (biennially) ... ..	By the State ...	... ..					
1 Helmet (triennially) ... ..	Ditto ...	... ..					
Boots ... ..	Ditto ...	... ..	Boots ... ..	By the Fund ...	Court's Letter, 31st December 1824 (10).		
Articles of half-mounting ... ..	By an allowance from the Fund to the Soldier.		No alteration.				
EUROPEAN FOOT ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY:							
1 Jacket (annually) ... ..	} By the Fund ...	... ..	No alteration.				
1 Cap (biennially) ... ..				Ditto.			
Articles of half-mounting ... ..	By an allowance from the Fund to the Soldier.						

(continued.)

## Appendix (A.) No. 67—continued.

IN 1813.		AT PRESENT.		
ARTICLES.	How supplied.	ARTICLES.	How supplied.	
<b>BOMBAY EUROPEAN HORSE ARTILLERY:</b>				
1 Jacket (annually) ...	By the Fund	1 Jacket (annually) ...	By the Fund ...	{ G. O. 4th Dec. 1823. { G. O. 8th Jan. 1831.
1 pair leather Breeches (biennially) ...		1 pair woollen Overalls (annually.) ...	By the State (cost 10s.) ...	
1 Helmet (triennially) ...		1 Helmet (triennially) ...	By the State (cost 18s.) ...	
1 pair Boots (ditto) ...		1 pair Boots (ditto) ...	By the State (cost 18s.) ...	
1 Watering Cap (quadrennially)...		1 Watering Cap (quadrennially.)	By the Fund.	
Articles of half-mounting...	By an allowance from the Fund to the Soldier.	No alteration.		
<b>EUROPEAN FOOT ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY:</b>				
1 Jacket (annually) ...	By the Fund ...	No alteration.		
1 Cap (biennially)...				
Articles of half-mounting ...	By an allowance from the Fund to the Soldier...			
<b>BENGAL NATIVE CAVALRY AND HORSE ARTILLERY:</b>				
1 Jacket (annually) ...	By the Fund ...	1 Jacket and 1 pair Overalls in alternate years.	By the Fund ...	<i>Vide</i> Native Infantry. G. O. 18th Oct. 1816.
1 Head-dress (ditto) ...	By the Fund ...	1 Head-dress (biennially)	By the Fund ...	
1 pair leather Pantaloons (biennially.)	By stoppage from Soldier's pay of 8 annas a month.	No alteration.		
2 blue linen Jackets, with the usual trimmings ...	By the Soldier...	No alteration.		
2 pair linen Pantaloons of strong Dosooty ...				
1 Watering Turban of Cossah ...				
2 Shirts ...				
1 pair Boots ...				
1 pair Spurs and Leathers ...				
1 leather Stock ...				
1 brass Stock Clasp ...				
<b>MADRAS NATIVE CAVALRY AND HORSE ARTILLERY:</b>				
1 full trimmed Jacket, or 1 plain Jacket, in alternate years ...	By the Fund...	1 Jacket and 1 pair woollen Pantaloons in three years ...	By the Fund...	<i>Vide</i> Bengal Native Infantry; also G. O. 17th February 1819.
1 Turban and Cover ...		1 Turban and Cover ...		
1 pair Boots ...	By the State ...	1 pair Boots ...	By the State.	
3 pair white Pantaloons ...	By the Soldier	2 pair white Nankin Trowsers lined, welted, and strapped ...	By the Soldier	Court's Letter, 19th July 1826 (235). Ditto, 15th July 1829 (38).
3 white under Jackets ...		2 pair loose Punjum Trowsers, lined ...		
1 pair Suspenders ...		1 pair woollen grey Cloth Trowsers...		
1 Cumley Watch-cloak, Brushes, Emery, Whitening and Blacking ...				
Pipe-clay and Combs ...				

(continued.)

## Appendix (A.)—No. 67—continued.

IN 1813.		AT PRESENT.	
ARTICLES.	How supplied.	ARTICLES.	How supplied.
1 Sword Pouch ... ..	} By the Soldier.	6 white Angrekehs or Shirts	} By the Soldier {
1 pair Spurs (supplied once by Government) ... ..		3 sets Tapes and Tassels for Turbans ... ..	
1 Boat-cloak ... ..		6 Neckcloths ... ..	
		1 Loongy Cloth ... ..	
		1 Sheet ... ..	
		2 Handkerchiefs ... ..	
		1 Carpet or Setranjee ... ..	
		2 Brushes ... ..	
		Pipe-clay, Blacking, and Emery ... ..	
		1 Samy Stone ... ..	
		1 Button-stick and Brush	
		1 pair Slippers ... ..	
		1 pair Screw Spurs (supplied once by Government)	
		1 Boat-cloak ... ..	
<b>BOMBAY NATIVE CAVALRY AND HORSE ARTILLERY :</b>			
1 Jacket (annually) ... ..	By the Fund ...	1 Jacket (annually) ...	By the Fund.
1 pair leather Pantaloons (biennially).	By stoppage of 8 annas a month from Soldier's pay.	1 pair woollen Overalls (annually.)	By the same stoppage.
Articles of half-mounting ...	By the Fund ...	Articles of half-mounting ...	By Soldier, i. e. by those who have entered the service since 1816.
<b>BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY :</b>			
1 Jacket (annually) ... ..	By the Fund ...	1 Jacket, and 1 pair woollen Pantaloons, in alternate years.	By the Fund ...
1 Turban and Cover ... ..	} By a half-mounting stoppage of 5 rupees a year from the Soldier's pay, payable to the commanding officer.	3 white linen Ungahs ...	} Court's Letter, 8th Oct. 1817 '15 to 17). Ditto, 15th July 1818 (2 to 9). G. O. 25th March 1825. Court's Letter, 16th January 1828 (2 to 4). Ditto, 28th May 1828 (108 to 110).  Court's Letter, 2d March 1831 (para. 32).  Court's Letter, 26th Feb. 1823 (paras. 31 and 32).
1 Kummerbund ... ..		3 pair white do. Trowsers	
1 white Ungah or Jacket ... ..		1 pair coloured ditto ...	
1 pair Jungbias ... ..		1 set Beads, with Clasps	
1 Ungah or Jacket ... ..	} By the Soldier ...	1 pair Shoes ... ..	
1 pair Jungbias ... ..		1 Kummerbund with Buckle and Band ...	
		1 Turban and Cover ...	
		1 Knapsack ... ..	
		1 Great Coat ... ..	
1 Breast-plate ... ..	By the Soldier ...	1 Breast-plate ... ..	By the State (cost 1s. 3d.)
Sashes for all Serjeants, Havildars, Trumpeters, Drum and Fife-majors of the regular Army.	By the Soldier ...	... ..	By the State (cost 5s. 6d.)

(continued.)

## Appendix (A.)—No. 67—continued.

IN 1813.			AT PRESENT.			
ARTICLES.		How supplied.	ARTICLES.		How supplied.	
MADRAS NATIVE INFANTRY :						
1 Jacket (annually)	...	By the Fund	2 Jackets and 1 pair wool- len Pantaloon, in three years.	By the Fund	<i>Vide</i> Bengal Na- tive Infantry; also G. O. 17th Feb. 1819.	
1 Turban, complete	...	By the Soldier.	1 Turban, complete	By the Soldier...	Court's Letter, 19th July 1826 (2 to 5). Ditto, 15th July 1829 (38).	
6 pair white Drawers	...		3 pair black and white Trowsers			
3 pair Knee-bands	...		3 white under Jackets, with Collars			
4 white under Jackets, with Stock	...		2 pair Sandals			
2 Kummerbunds	...		1 Boat-cloak and Slings			
2 pair Sandals	...		1 Knapsack and Slings			
1 Boat-cloak	...		1 set Brass-pots			
1 Purrum Knapsack	...		1 Carpet			
1 set Brass-pots	...		Blacking and Pipe-clay			
1 Carpet	...		1 Haversack			
Heel-ball and Pipe-clay	...	1 Jumboo Rope				
1 Breast-plate	...	By the Soldier	1 Breast-plate	By the State (cost 1s. 3d.)	Court's Letter, 2d March 1831.	
Sashes for Serjeants and Havil- dars	...	By the Fund	Sashes for Serjcants and Havildars.	By the State (cost 5s. 6d.)	Court's Letter, 26th Feb. 1823.	
Epaulettes for Native officers	...	By the Fund	Epaulettes for Native offi- cers.	By the State (cost 1l. 5s.)		
BOMBAY NATIVE INFANTRY :						
1 Jacket (annually)	...	By the Fund	1 Jacket (annually)	By the Fund	<i>Vide</i> Bengal Na- tive Infantry, and Letter, Secretary Clothing Board, 1827.	
1 Turban	...	By the Fund.	1 Turban, complete	By the Soldier, <i>i. e.</i> by those who entered the ser- vice after 1816.	Court's Letter, 28th October 1814 (4 & 5).	
1 yard of Kummerbund Cloth	...		3 white Angrekehs			
1 yard and 21 inches of Kummer- bund Laco	...		3 ditto Short Drawers			
1 pair Sandals	...		1 pair Suspenders			
1 yard and 24 inches of Chole- nah Cloth, and 30 inches of Cholenah Putties or a piece of Nankin	...		2 pair Knee-bands			
1 Knapsack	...	By the State	1 Cumley Watch-cloak	...		
1 Breast-plate	...	By the Soldier	Sandals	...		
Sashes for Serjeants, Havildars, &c.	...	By the Fund	1 Knapsack	By the State.	Court's Letter, 2d March 1831. Ditto, 26th Feb- ruary 1823.	
			1 Breast-plate	By the State (cost 1s. 3d.)		
			Sashes for Serjeants, Havil- dars, &c.	By the State (cost 5s. 6d.)		

Appendix (A.) No. 67—*continued.*Means of CARRIAGE or other Accommodation supplied to the SOLDIERS  
at each PRESIDENCY.APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.Means of Carriage  
or other  
Accommodation  
to Soldiers.

## EXTRACT Bengal General Orders.

By the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council.

Fort William, 2d December 1824.

No. 360 of 1824. 1. Government having reason to believe that considerable interruption has been occasioned to the commerce and agriculture of the country, by officers and troops marching more particularly from one station to another in progress of the periodical reliefs, with a quantity of baggage quite superfluous to the wants of a soldier; the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that the following tables, exhibiting the scale of carriage equipment, considered amply sufficient for each class and description of troops, be published for general information. In respect to European officers, it may not be unnecessary to observe, that it is in addition to the carriage for their camp equipage, which, when on full tentage, they must always keep complete, agreeably with existing orders.

2. The officers of the Commissariat Department where Rewarree camels are procurable, and the Collector or other Civil officer in all other cases, will be strictly guided by these tables, as exhibiting the utmost extent of carriage sanctioned by Government.

3. Individuals with families, requiring bearers, coolies, or additional carriage at a period of a general relief, are invariably to make their own arrangements; for which there is always ample time between the issue of the general order and the march of the corps.

4. Carriage is not to be supplied by the Commissariat or Civil officer, except on regular indent, countersigned by officers commanding corps. It is to be hired to a convenient stage in the adjoining district, beyond which it is not to be taken, unless the Collector of that district shall certify that a relief cannot be furnished.

5. In order to prevent delay or impediment to the public service, it will be the duty of the Collector furnishing the carriage to forward immediately to the Collector of the adjoining district, the indent or a copy thereof, in order to the preparation of the relief of cattle, &c.; that this has been done, the officer commanding the troops will satisfy himself previous to marching, by application to the Collector on every change of cattle.

6. Indents are not to be made for any detachment under the strength of a company; on account of such a detachment it is presumed no difficulty can be experienced.

7. As carriage cannot always be procured at a moment's notice, and as it is but equitable that the owners thereof should be remunerated from the date on which it may be furnished, it is hereby directed, that demurrage shall be paid at the rate of half the established hire of the district, from the day on which the carriage is procured by the Collector or other officer for military purposes, to that of marching, when the full hire is to commence. From the day succeeding the date of arrival, half hire is to be paid for the return cattle or carriage, at the rate of (8) eight kos per day. The rate of hire is to be fixed by the Civil or Commissariat officer, as may be. In the first instance, the half hire is to be paid by the Civil or Commissariat officer, and charged to Government in a contingent bill, vouched in the usual manner; in the second, it is to be paid by the parties discharging the carriage. The commanding officer will be held responsible that all claims are fairly and speedily adjusted.

8. It will be the duty of the officer commanding to see that reasonable advances are made to the owners or drivers of the cattle, both before the troops move and during the march, should a relief be unexpectedly protracted.

9. In



Appendix (A.)—No. 67—*continued*.APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.— —  
VI. Clothing,  
Equipment, and  
Off-reckonings.

9. In the event of troops passing the frontier of the British territory without having been able to effect a relief of cattle, it will be the duty of the commanding officer, from time to time, to regulate the hire in as equitable a manner as possible, in communication with the Commissariat officer, and with reference to the prices of fodder, grain, and other local considerations.

10. The establishment of a hackery and bullock chowdree, a sirdar bearer, and a sirdar cooly, authorized to Native corps of the line in general orders of the 1st May 1819, having been found not to answer the purpose intended, is to be discharged and struck off the strength of corps from the date of the receipt of this order at stations respectively.

11. His Lordship in Council relies with confidence on the united exertions of officers commanding divisions, stations and corps, for carrying these orders into full effect, and for impressing on the minds of those under their command, that the reasonable comfort and convenience of the troops are not less the object of Government in their publication, than to relieve the country from every species of inconvenience which the necessities of the service do not positively require.

Military Secretary's Office,  
8th March 1832.

J. SALMOND,  
Mil. Sec.

Appendix (A.)—No. 67—*continued*.APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.

TABLE, showing the WEIGHT of BAGGAGE allowed to be carried by the Troops on a March, and the Cattle or other Carriage necessary for its conveyance, exclusive of Camp Equipage.

Means of Carriage  
or other  
Accommodation  
to Soldiers.

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.		CARRIAGE of either Description.				
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	Or Hackeries of		
					2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.	4 Bullocks.
	Mds.	Srs.					
Rank and File, Europeans or Natives, who do not carry knapsacks .. .. .	0	15	—	—	—	—	—
Rank and File, Native Infantry, or such other Troops as carry knapsacks .. .. .	0	10	—	—	—	—	—
Married Men, Europeans, when moving with their families at a relief to have double.		.					
Serjeants, Havildars, and Native Doctors ..	0	20	—	—	—	—	—
Serjeant-majors, Quartermaster-serjeants and Staff-serjeants .. .. .	2	20	1	—	—	—	—
Warrant Officers .. .. .	3	20	2	1	—	—	—
Native Commissioned Officers .. .. .	1	20	1	—	—	—	—
Subalterns, comprehending 1st and 2d Lieutenants, Cornets, Ensigns, Assistant Surgeons, Adjutants and Quartermasters ..	5	0	2	1	—	—	—
Captains, Surgeons, Brigade-majors, Aides-de-camp and Deputy Paymasters .. ..	10	0	4	2	1	—	—
Majors and those of equal rank .. ..	20	0	8	4	2	—	1
Lieutenant-colonels and ditto .. .. .	30	0	12	6	4	2	—
Colonels .. .. .	40	0	16	8	5	3	2
For a Mess of 30 Officers, at 4 maunds each ..	120	0	48	24	15	8	6
Ditto, 25 ditto ditto .. .. .	100	0	40	20	13	7	5
Ditto, 20 ditto ditto .. .. .	80	0	32	16	10	6	4
Ditto, 15 ditto ditto .. .. .	60	0	24	12	8	5	3
Ditto, 10 ditto ditto .. .. .	40	0	16	8	5	3	2

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.VI. Clothing,  
Equipment, and  
Off-reckonings.

## FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS.

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.			
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.
	Mds. Srs.	Mds.			2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.
2 Lieutenant-colonels .. ..	30 0	60	24	12	8	4
2 Majors .. ..	20 0	40	16	8	5	3
10 Captains (including Surgeon and Paymaster) .. ..	10 0	100	40	20	12	7
29 Subalterns (including Adjutant, Quar- termaster, 2 Assistant Surgeons and 1 Veterinary Surgeon) .. ..	5 0	145	58	29	18	7
1 Riding-master .. ..	3 20	3½	2	1	}	
1 Serjeant-major and 1 Quartermaster- serjeant .. ..	2 20	5	10	5		
40 Serjeants .. ..	0 20	20	}		37	20
712 Rank and File .. ..	0 15	267			53	
TOTAL .. ..	—	640½	257	128	80	34
						32

N. B.—This provides for a Regiment when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Corps, the number and rank of the Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.

# FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE REGIMENT OF LIGHT CAVALRY.

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.				
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.	4 Bullocks.
	Mds. Srs.	Mds.					
1 Colonel .. .. .	40 0	40	16	8	5	3	2
1 Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	30 0	30	12	6	4	2	—
1 Major .. .. .	20 0	20	8	4	2	—	1
6 Captains and Surgeon .. .. .	10 0	60	24	12	8	4	3
16 Subalterns, including Adjutant, Quar- termaster and Assistant Surgeons ..	5 0	80	32	16	10	—	4
1 Riding-master .. .. .	3 20	3½	2	1	}	}	}
16 Native Commissioned Officers ..	1 20	24	9	5			
1 Serjeant-major and 1 Quartermaster- serjeant .. .. .	2 20	5	9	4	38	21	15
36 Havildars (including Trumpet-major and Native Doctor) .. .. .	0 20	18					
680 Rank and File .. .. .	0 15	258	102	51			
TOTAL .. .. .	—	538½	214	107	67	30	25

N. B.—This provides for a Regiment when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Corps, the number and rank of the European Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.  
—  
Means of Carriage  
or other  
Accommodation  
to Soldiers.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.  
VI. Clothing,  
Equipment, and  
Oil-reckonings.

# FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE TROOP OF EUROPEAN HORSE ARTILLERY.

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.				
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	Or Hackeries of		
	Mds. Srs.	Mds.	2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.	4 Bullocks.		
1 Captain .. .. .	10 0	10	4	2	3	2	—
3 Subalterns .. .. .	5 0	15	6	3			
6 Serjeants .. .. .	0 20	3	16	8	5	—	2
100 Rank and File .. .. .	0 15	37½					
Gun Lascars:							
2 Havildars, including 1 Native Doctor	0 20	1	4	2	1	—	—
26 Naicks and Gun Lascars .. .. .	0 15	9½					
TOTAL .. .. .	—	76½	30	15	9	2	2

N. B.—This provides for a Troop when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Troop, the number and rank of the European Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.

# FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE TROOP OF NATIVE HORSE ARTILLERY.

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.				
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	Or Hackeries of		
					2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.	4 Bullocks.
1 Captain	Mds. 10 0	Mds. 10	4	2	1	—	
3 Subalterns	5 0	15	6	3	2	—	
2 Native Commissioned Officers	1 20	3	2	1	}	}	
2 European Non-commissioned Officers	0 20	1					
6 Havildars	0 20	3	16	8	1	—	
100 Rank and File	0 15	37½					
Gun Lascars:							
2 Havildars, including 1 Native Doctor	0 20	1	4	2	6	3	
26 Privates, Gun Lascars	0 15	9¼					
TOTAL	—	80¾	32	16	10	3	

N. B.—This provides for a Troop of Native Horse Artillery when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Troop, the number and rank of the European Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.  
—  
Means of Carriage  
or other  
Accommodation  
to Soldiers.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.VI. Clothing,  
Equipment, and  
Off-reckonings.

## FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE COMPANY OF EUROPEAN FOOT ARTILLERY.

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.			
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks. Or Hackeries of 4 Bullocks.
1 Captain .. .. .	Mds. Srs. 10 0	Mds. 10	4	2 }	3	—
3 Subalterns .. .. .	5 0	15	6	3 }		
5 Serjeants .. .. .	0 20	2½	1 }	8	5	2
97 Rank and File .. .. .	0 15	36	14 }			
Gun Lascars :						
1 Subadar or Jemadar .. .. .	1 20	1½	}			
2 Havildars .. .. .	0 20	1				
42 Gun Lascars .. .. .	0 15	16				
TOTAL .. .. .	—	82	33	17	10	3

N. B.—This provides for a Company of European Foot Artillery when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Company, the number and rank of the European Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.

# FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE COMPANY OF NATIVE FOOT ARTILLERY.

		Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.			
				If Bullocks.	If Camels.	Or Hackeries of	
						2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks. 4 Bullocks.
1	Captain .. .. .	Mds. Srs. 10 0	Mds. 10	4	2	1	—
3	Native Commissioned Officers ..	1 20	4½	}			
8	Havildars .. .. .	0 20	4				
114	Rank and File .. .. .	0 15	43	20	10	6	—
Total .. { If with 1 Captain		—	61½	24	12	7	—
.. { If with 1 Subaltern		—	56½	22	11	7	—

N. B.—This provides for a Company of Native Foot Artillery when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Company, the number and rank of the European Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.



APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.VI.—Clothing,  
Equipment, and  
Off-reckonings.

## FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE REGIMENT OF EUROPEAN INFANTRY.

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.			
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.
	Mds. Strs.	Mds.			2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.
2 Lieutenant-colonels .. ..	30 0	60	24	12	8	4
2 Majors .. ..	20 0	40	16	8	5	3
10 Captains, 1 Paymaster, and 1 Surgeon .. ..	10 0	120	48	24	15	8
34 Subalterns (including Adjutant, Quartermaster, and 2 Assistant Surgeons)	5 0	170	68	34	21	11
1 Serjeant-major and 1 Quartermaster-serjeant .. ..	2 20	5	} 157			
50 Serjeants .. ..	0 20	25		79	49	26
970 Rank and File .. ..	0 15	363½				
TOTAL .. ..	—	783½	313	157	98	52
						11

N. B.—This provides for a Regiment when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Corps, the number and rank of the European Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.

# FORM OF INDENT FOR ONE REGIMENT OF NATIVE INFANTRY.

## APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE.

143

	Weight of Baggage allowed to each Rank.	TOTAL.	CARRIAGE of either Description.				
			If Bullocks.	If Camels.	Or Hackeries of		
					2 Bullocks.	3 Bullocks.	4 Bullocks.
1 Colonel .. .. .	Mds. Srs. 40 0	Mds. 40	16	8	5	3	2
1 Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	30 0	30	12	6	4	2	—
1 Major .. .. .	20 0	20	8	4	2	—	1
6 Captains (including Surgeon) .. .. .	10 0	60	24	12	8	4	3
16 Subalterns (including 1 Assistant Surgeon) .. .. .	5 0	80	32	16	10	—	4
20 Native Commissioned Officers .. .. .	1 20	30	}				
1 Serjeant-major and 1 Quartermaster-serjeant .. .. .	2 20	5					
52 Havildars (including Native Doctor) .. .. .	0 20	26					
970 Rank and File, and Drummers .. .. .	0 10	242½	122	61	38	20	15
TOTAL .. .. .	—	533½	214	107	67	29	25

N. B.—This provides for a Regiment when complete. Indents are invariably to state the actual strength of the Corps, the number and rank of the European Officers, and are to be made out accordingly.

(Signed) WM. CASEMENT, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Secretary to Government Military Department.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 67.  
Means of Carriage  
or other  
Accommodation  
to Soldiers.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 68.  
—  
Off-reckonings.

### APPENDIX (A.)—No. 68.

A STATEMENT of the RATES of OFF-RECKONINGS at each Presidency, and of each RANK, as they existed in 1813 and at the present time, and where alterations have intermediately occurred; showing, in separate Columns, the Increase or Decrease occasioned by each alteration, and the date of the G. O., and of the Court's Letter prescribing or sanctioning it.

#### RATES of MONTHLY OFF-RECKONINGS fixed for the different descriptions of EUROPEAN and NATIVE TROOPS.

—		1813.		1831.		Decrease.		Increase.		Date of G. O.
		St. Rs. A. P.		St. Rs. A. P.		St. Rs. A. P.		St. Rs. A. P.		
HORSE ARTILLERY:										
Serjeant	..	..	5 0 0	5 1 5	—	0 1 5				{ 7th July 1817, and 25th Janu- ary 1819. 21st Aug. 1821.
Corporal	..	..	3 12 0	4 10 6 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	—	0 14 6 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>				
Bombardier or Matross	..	..	2 8 0	3 10 1	—	1 2 1				
Farrier	..	..	2 8 0.	3 10 6 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	—	1 2 6 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>				
Gunner and Trumpeter	..	..	2 8 0	3 0 0	—	0 8 0				
Native Farrier	..	..	1 8 0	1 8 0						
Serang	..	..	3 0 0	3 0 0						
1st Tindal	..	..	1 0 0	1 0 0						
Gun Lascar	..	..	0 8 0	0 8 0						
NATIVE CAVALRY:										
Serjeant-major	..	..	—	5 10 8		5 10 8		5 10 8		{ 25th Jan. 1819.
Quartermaster-serjeant	..	..	—	5 0 0	—	5 0 0		5 0 0		
Serjeant	..	..	5 0 0	—	5 0 0	—		—		
Corporal	..	..	3 12 0	3 12 0						
Subadar	..	..	6 8 0	6 8 0						
Jemadar	..	..	4 8 0	4 8 0						
Havildar	..	..	3 8 0	3 8 0						
Naick	..	..	3 0 0	3 0 0						
Trumpeter	..	..	2 8 0	2 8 0						
Trooper and Farrier	..	..	2 0 0	2 0 0						
Tindal	..	..	1 0 0	1 0 0						
Gun Lascar	..	..	0 8 0	0 8 0						

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 68.  
—  
Off-reckonings.

FOOT ARTILLERY AND ARTILLERY INVALIDS:				15th April 1825.			
Serjeant .. .. .	4	0	0	—	6	0	0
Corporal .. .. .	3	0	0				
Bombardier, Gunner and Drummer .. .. .	2	0	0				
Subadar of Gun Lascars .. .. .	—						
Serang .. .. .	3	0	0				
1st and 2d Tindal and Sirdar of Gun Drivers .. .. .	1	0	0				
Gun Lascars and Gun Driver .. .. .	0	3	0				
EUROPEAN INFANTRY AND EUROPEAN INFANTRY INVALIDS:							
Serjeant .. .. .	4	0	0				
Corporal and Drummer .. .. .	3	0	0				
Private .. .. .	2	0	0				
Corps of Golundauze, Native Infantry of the Line, Escorts to Residents at Foreign Courts, Corps of Pioneers and Miners, Ranghar Battalion and Hill Rangers, Battalions of Infantry Invalids:							
Serjeant .. .. .	4	0	0				
Corporal .. .. .	3	0	0				
Subadar and Native Adjutant of the Hill Rangers .. .. .	8	0	0				
Jemadar and Sirdar of 1st Class Miners .. .. .	3	0	0				
Havildar, Naick, and Sirdar, of 2d Class Miners .. .. .	1	0	0				
Drummer .. .. .	2	0	0				
Private, Miner of 1st and 2d Class, and Bugler of Pioneers .. .. .	0	8	0				

(Errors excepted)

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

East-India House,  
14th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 69.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 69.

Value of Off-  
reckoning Share  
and Half Share,  
from 1814 to 1827.

A STATEMENT of the VALUE of an OFF-RECKONING SHARE and HALF SHARE, in each year from 1814 to 1827; with a Statement of the Number of Colonels at present in receipt of a Full or Half Share of Off-reckonings, and of those who have not yet come into the receipt of a Half Share, under the operation of the Court's Order of 25th November 1823, with the Sum paid as Compensation to Officers who succeeded to Off-reckoning Half Shares between 1824 and 1826, in each year from that period to 1831.

	OFF-RECKONINGS.					
	Value of Full Share.			Value of Half Share.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
1814 ... ..	813	2	0			
1815 ... ..	1206	12	3			
1816 ... ..	995	17	6			
1817 ... ..	1303	6	3			
1818 ... ..	1428	16	9			
1819 ... ..	1151	13	8			
1820 ... ..	1543	16	11			
1821 ... ..	1019	15	0			
1822 ... ..	1396	11	6			
1823 ... ..	1409	16	3			
1824 ... ..	1645	16	7	545	16	5 from 1st May.
1825 ... ..	1605	4	9	802	12	4
1826 ... ..	1752	15	2	876	7	7
1827 ... ..	1425	15	7	712	17	9½

  

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
Number of Colonels at present in receipt of a Full Share ...	45	31	17
Ditto ... .. of a Half Share ...	36	23	17
Ditto of those who have not yet come into the receipt of a } Half Share ... ..	23	18	6

  

	1826.	1827.	1828.	1829.	1830.	1831.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Sum paid as Compensation to Officers } who succeeded to Off-reckoning } Half Shares between 1824 & 1826 }	480	3199	7883	11517	9232	12925

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
14th Feb. 1832.

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

## VII.—FURLOUGH, RETIREMENT, AND PENSIONS.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 70.Rates of  
Furlough Pay.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 70.

A STATEMENT of the RATES of FURLOUGH PAY as they existed in 1813 and at present, noticing in separate Columns the Increase or Decrease in each Rank, by any alteration that intermediately may have taken place; with the Date of the Court's Letter of the G. O., prescribing or sanctioning the alteration.

	Furlough Pay in 1813.	Furlough Pay in 1832.	Increase.	Decrease.	Date of Court's Letter.
	Per Diem.	Per Diem.	Per Diem.	Per Diem.	
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	
<b>INFANTRY:</b>					
Colonel .. ..	1 5 0	1 5 0	—	—	25th Nov. 1823
Lieutenant-colonel ..	1 0 0	1 0 0	—	—	
Major .. ..	0 15 0	0 16 0	0 1 0	—	
Captain .. ..	0 10 0	0 10 6	0 0 6	—	
Lieutenant .. ..	0 5 0	0 6 6	0 1 6	—	
Ensign .. ..	0 1 0	0 5 3	0 1 3	—	
Superintending Surgeon	0 15 0	0 16 0	0 1 0	—	
Surgeon .. ..	0 10 0	0 10 6	0 0 6	—	
Assistant Surgeon ..	0 5 0	0 6 6	0 1 6	—	
<b>CAVALRY:</b>					
Colonel .. ..	1 12 8	1 12 8	—	—	25th Nov. 1823
Lieutenant-colonel ..	1 2 10	1 3 0	0 0 2	—	
Major .. ..	0 19 1	0 19 3	0 0 2	—	
Captain .. ..	0 14 9	0 14 7	—	0 0 2	
Lieutenant .. ..	0 9 0	0 9 0	—	—	
Cornet .. ..	0 8 0	0 8 0	—	—	
<b>ARTILLERY:</b>					
Colonel .. ..	1 5 0	1 5 0	—	—	25th Nov. 1823
Lieutenant-colonel ..	1 0 0	1 0 0	—	—	
Major .. ..	0 15 0	0 16 11	0 1 11	—	
	Per Month.				
Captain .. ..	17 10 0	0 11 1	—	—	
Lieutenant .. ..	8 15 0	0 6 10	—	—	
Second Lieutenant ..	7 10 0	0 5 7	—	—	

In 1813 the Furlough Pay of the Officers of Engineers was the same as that of the Infantry; in November 1823 it was assimilated to that of the Artillery Officers.—Letter to Bengal, dated 25th November 1823.

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
14th Feb. 1832.JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 71.  
VII.—Furlough,  
Retirement,  
and Pensions.

# APPENDIX (A.)—No. 71.

A RETURN of the NUMBER of OFFICERS in receipt of PAY on Furlough in this Country, with the Amount of Charges, in each year since the Furlough Regulation in 1796, to the present time.

	Number of Officers.		Amount of Charge.		Number of Officers.	Amount of Charge.
		£.		£.		
1796	...	81	15041	1814	204	65454
1797	...	107	20337	1815	227	64915
1798	...	115	23860	1816	234	61209
1799	...	93	21592	1817	269	65089
1800	...	95	26183	1818	205	67085
1801	...	100	27402	1819	292	73989
1802	...	116	32447	1820	296	83354
1803	...	157	42175	1821	301	80205
1804	...	177	43104	1822	340	92268
1805	...	171	52855	1823	350	101022
1806	...	238	58919	1824	351	106104
1807	...	209	52904	1825	365	115594
1808	...	276	65326	1826	417	129212
1809	...	258	62124	1827	430	155305
1810	...	229	61859	1828	492	150350
1811	...	213	60536	1829	532	161753
1812	...	227	62781	1830	598	178005
1813	...	237	65801	1831	639	179041

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
29th February 1832.

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

# APPENDIX (A.)—No. 72.

A STATEMENT exhibiting the Rates of RETIRING ALLOWANCES to European Commissioned Officers of the Company's Service on Full and Half-Pay in 1813 and 1832; showing the Increase which has taken place, and the Date of the Company's Order, and of the Court's Letter prescribing or sanctioning it.

	Full-Pay on Retirement in 1813.	Full-Pay on Retirement in 1832.	Increase.	Date of Court's Letter. Date of General Order.	Half-Pay on Retirement in 1813.	Half-Pay on Retirement in 1832.	Increase.	Date of Court's Letter. Date of General Order.
Colonel ... ..	1 <i>l.</i> 5 <i>s.</i> p' diem	1 <i>l.</i> 5 <i>s.</i> p' diem	—	—	10 <i>s.</i> p' diem	11 <i>s.</i> p' diem	1 <i>s.</i> p' diem	Letter, 25th Nov. 1823.
Lieutenant-colonel ... ..	1 <i>l.</i> —	1 <i>l.</i> —	—	—	—	—	—	General Order.
Member of Medical Board ... ..	500 <i>l.</i> per ann.	500 <i>l.</i> per ann.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Under 5 Years ... ..	—	500 <i>l.</i> per ann.	200 <i>l.</i> p' ann.	Letter to Bengal, 27th Aug. 1828.	—	—	—	—
Above 5 Years ... ..	—	700 <i>l.</i> —	1 <i>s.</i> p' diem	Letter, 25th Nov. 1823.	7 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> p' diem	9 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> p' diem	2 <i>s.</i> —	Ditto.
Major ... ..	15 <i>s.</i> per diem	16 <i>s.</i> per diem	—	General Order.	—	—	—	—
Superintending Surgeon Under 5 Years ... ..	300 <i>l.</i> per ann.	300 <i>l.</i> per ann.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Above 5 Years ... ..	—	365 <i>l.</i> —	65 <i>l.</i> per ann.	Letter to Bengal, 27th Aug. 1828.	5 <i>s.</i> per diem	7 <i>s.</i> p' diem	2 <i>s.</i> —	—
Captain ... ..	10 <i>s.</i> per diem	10 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> p' diem	6 <i>d.</i> p' diem	Letter, 25th Nov. 1823.	—	—	—	—
Surgeon ... ..	10 <i>s.</i> —	10 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	6 <i>d.</i> —	—	5 <i>s.</i> —	7 <i>s.</i> —	2 <i>s.</i> —	—
Lieutenant ... ..	5 <i>s.</i> —	6 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	1 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	—	2 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	4 <i>s.</i> —	1 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	—
Assistant Surgeon ... ..	5 <i>s.</i> —	6 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	1 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	—	2 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	4 <i>s.</i> —	1 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> —	—
Ensign or Cornet ... ..	5 <i>s.</i> —	5 <i>s.</i> 3 <i>d.</i> —	1 <i>s.</i> 3 <i>d.</i> —	—	2 <i>s.</i> —	3 <i>s.</i> —	1 <i>s.</i> —	—

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
14th February 1832.

JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.



APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 73.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 73.

VII.—Furlough,  
Retirement,  
and Pensions.

A RETURN of the Number of EUROPEAN COMMISSIONED OFFICERS in receipt of the FULL and HALF-PAY, with the amount of Charge in each Year, from the commencement of the Retiring Regulation, in 1796, to the present time, specifying the Proportion per Hundred of Retired Officers in a separate Column to the authorized Establishment.

				Number of Officers on Full & Half-Pay.	Amount of Charge.	Authorized Establishment.	Proportion per Hundred.
1797	...	...	...	9	£3129	2142	0.41
1798	...	...	...	22	6728	2306	0.95
1799	...	...	...	39	9656	2592	1.5
1800	...	...	...	51	17696	2859	1.78
1801	...	...	...	71	23452	3084	2.3
1802	...	...	...	78	21830	3174	2.45
1803	...	...	...	93	29040	3185	2.92
1804	...	...	...	131	33849	3378	3.87
1805	...	...	...	146	42671	3614	4.01
1806	...	...	...	157	46050	3693	4.21
1807	...	...	...	181	42053	3907	4.63
1808	...	...	...	220	58221	3907	5.64
1809	...	...	...	240	60515	3918	6.12
1810	...	...	...	260	67994	3951	6.58
1811	...	...	...	268	76301	3951	6.75
1812	...	...	...	298	77719	3951	7.54
1813	...	...	...	314	83371	3935	7.97
1814	...	...	...	323	81663	3935	8.2
1815	...	...	...	332	79968	4064	8.16
1816	...	...	...	341	83514	4120	8.27
1817	...	...	...	345	85271	3285	10.5
1818	...	...	...	353	83666	3490	10.11
1819	...	...	...	358	81169	4598	7.8
1820	...	...	...	373	83712	4628	8.6
1821	...	...	...	375	83092	4689	7.98
1822	...	...	...	377	82012	4689	8.01
1823	...	...	...	392	84594	4920	7.98
1824	...	...	...	402	82595	5011	8.02
1825	...	...	...	442	89800	5191	8.59
1826	...	...	...	447	94094	5356	8.31
1827	...	...	...	477	96099	5422	8.8
1828	...	...	...	491	101674	5430	9.04
1829	...	...	...	507	100741	4833	10.49
1830	...	...	...	520	107395	4833	10.75
1831	...	...	...	543	115798	4833	11.23

(Errors excepted)

East-India House,  
29th Feb. 1832.JAMES C. MELVILL,  
Aud. India Accts.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 74.Rates of Pensions  
from Lord Clive's  
Fund.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 74.

STATEMENT of the RATES of PENSIONS payable to EUROPEAN OFFICERS and  
SOLDIERS, and their WIDOWS from Lord CLIVE'S FUND.

RANK.	Daily Rate of Pension to Officers & Soldiers.		Daily Rate of Pension to Widows.	
	s.	d.	s.	d.
Colonels .. .. .	12	6	6	3
Lieutenant-colonels and Members of Medical Boards ..	10	0	5	0
Majors, Senior Chaplain, and Superintending Surgeons ..	7	6	3	9
Captains and Surgeons .. .. .	5	0	2	6
Lieutenants and Assistant Surgeons .. .. .	2	6	1	3
Ensigns .. .. .	2	0	1	0
Conductors of Stores .. .. .	2	0	1	0
Serjeants of Artillery .. .. .	0	9	0	4½
Ditto — having lost a limb .. .. .	1	0	—	—
Privates of Artillery .. .. .	0	6	0	3
Ditto — having lost a limb .. .. .	0	9	—	—
Non-commissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry ..	0	4½	0	2½

The following Scale of Pensions for Non-commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers was established by the Court's Resolution of the 14th of April 1819, communicated to Government of Bengal in the Court's Despatch, dated 21st July 1819, and published in General Orders, dated 5th February 1830.

All Serjeants having actually served 21 years, whereof the last eight years in the capacity of Serjeants, to be allowed 1s. a day, over and above the Pension derivable from Lord Clive's Fund.

All Serjeants having served 14 years, and discharged on account of debilitated constitutions, to be allowed 1s. a day.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 71.VII.—Furlough,  
Retirement, and  
Pensions.

All Corporals and Privates discharged at their own request, after 21 years' service, to be allowed 1s. a day.

All Corporals and Privates discharged as unfit on account of broken constitutions, having served 14 years, to be allowed 9d. a day.

If wounded and totally unable to contribute to earn a livelihood, after 21 years' service, to be allowed 1s. 10d. a day.

If wounded, but able to contribute to earn a livelihood, after 21 years' service, to be allowed 1s. 4d. a day.

If wounded and unable to contribute to earn a livelihood, after 14 years' service, to be allowed 1s. 6d. a day.

If wounded, but able to contribute to earn a livelihood, after 14 years' service, to be allowed 1s. a day.

If rendered totally unable to earn a livelihood from wounds, under 14 years' service, to be allowed 1s. 3d. a day.

If wounded, but able to contribute to earn a livelihood, under 14 years' service, to be allowed 9d. a day.

No Soldier is entitled to the benefit of the Regulations under 21 years' service, unless his discharge contain a recommendation for Pension from the Government under which he may have served.

Military Fund Office, East-India House,  
28th February 1832.

A. BRYCE,  
Paym. Military Fund.

## APPENDIX (A.)—No. 75.

APPENDIX (A.),  
No. 75.Number of  
Pensioners on  
Lord Clive's Fund.

**RETURN** of the Number of **OFFICERS** and **SOLDIERS**, and their **WIDOWS** in receipt of **PENSIONS** from **LORD CLIVE'S FUND**; with also the aggregate **Amount** of **Charge** in each Year from 1813 to the present time.

DATES.	Number of Officers.	Number of Soldiers.	Number of Widows.	Aggregate Amount of Charge.		
				£.	s.	d.
From 25 Dec. 1813 to 24 Dec. 1814	53	352	144	13421	6	6
— 1814 — 1815	50	384	144	12799	13	2
— 1815 — 1816	53	409	146	13201	10	2
— 1816 — 1817	54	414	155	13065	1	4
— 1817 — 1818	51	432	164	13742	13	10
— 1818 — 1819	56	437	179	15120	9	0
— 1819 — 1820	55	457	201	16286	14	6
— 1820 — 1821	58	480	203	16470	14	9
— 1821 — 1822	55	510	214	19314	2	1
— 1822 — 1823	59	563	233	21140	7	9
— 1823 — 1824	54	619	256	22090	3	10
— 1824 — 1825	32	666	261	22567	0	11
— 1825 — 1826	35	682	303	26215	1	4
— 1826 — 1827	35	789	333	28502	15	2
— 1827 — 1828	36	899	349	31937	8	11
— 1828 — 1829	37	1085	372	35115	3	4
— 1829 — 1830	38	1111	389	36660	16	11
— 1830 — 1831	44	1145	396	38349	0	5

(Errors excepted)

Military Fund Office, East-India House,  
17th March 1832.

A. BRYCE,  
Paym. Military Fund.

## APPENDIX (B.)

(1.)—Circular  
Letter from  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.  
2d Feb. 1832.

## APPENDIX (B.)

## CIRCULAR LETTER to OFFICERS of the Indian Service, and REPLIES thereto.

(1.)—CIRCULAR LETTER from T. HYDE VILLIERS, Esq. dated India Board,  
2d February 1832.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to inform you that it is their intention to propose your being called as a witness before the East-India Committee in the course of the inquiries which they will probably institute into the state of the military force at the three Presidencies; and I am to state that the Board will feel much obliged for any information and opinions which your experience may enable you to offer on the following points, in regard to the particular branch of the service, or department of the general staff to which you may belong, or to which your experience or information may extend, and for a specification of any papers on the subject to which it may appear to you useful to direct attention.

1. The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies.

2. The same as to the several staff and subsidiary departments.

3. The amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters, with reference to the probable occasion of their services against foreign or domestic disturbers of the peace, each arm being considered separately; and the different portions of our Indian empire which are distinguished by marked characteristics, being adverted to in their order, with reference to their mutual dependence.

4. The constitution of the several branches of the army, with reference to its experienced or probable effect—

1st, On the efficiency of our military force.

2d, On the economy with which it is provided.

3d, On the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing it.

*Note.*—The influence of the additions made to the army within the period under review, and of the employment of military men in civil stations; the suitableness of the several establishments to the purposes for which they have been, or are likely to be, needed; the fitness of the rules relative to the numbers, pay, qualification, enlistment, promotion, furlough, and retirement of the several ranks, European and Native; the expediency of the proportion of European and Native corps, will, under this head, be adverted to.

5. The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's, in respect to efficiency, good spirit, and economy, and the probable consequences of bringing the whole directly under the authority of ministers and establishments of the Crown; the several arms being separately considered, with distinction of Europeans and Natives.

6. Whether there may be grounds to infer, that if the Company's army were under the government of King's ministers, any considerable saving of expense would ensue, by the reduction, or consolidation of establishments generally, or in time of peace, by less chargeable plans of recruiting or pensioning (including under the former head arrangements for the appointment and education of cadets, and the conveyance of troops from England to India

India, and under the latter, all retiring provisions made at the expense of the Government); by the more economical provision and appropriation of stores; by cheaper freight; or by other more frugal arrangements and how far an opposite result is to be apprehended.

7. Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interests connected with the army might be expected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies.

8. What would be the probable effects of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief.

9. How far the existing system of Government direction and control, in so far as the same may depend on arrangements fixed by Parliamentary enactment, is, in its influence on the army, productive of good or evil, as compared with any changes which have been, or may be, suggested as expedient, on grounds of efficiency, economy and security.

I have the honour to be, &c.

T. HYDE VILLIERS.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(1.)—Circular  
Letter from  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.  
2d Feb. 1832.

(2.)—REPLY of Lieutenant-colonel SALMOND, dated 24th February 1832.

Q. 1. The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies.

The past and present strength, organization and distribution of the armies of the three Presidencies is shown in the Returns which have been forwarded to the Committee from the Military Secretary's Office at the India House. They are further explained by a map, which has also been forwarded.

Q. 2. The same as to the several staff and subsidiary departments.

An abstract Return of the several staff and subsidiary departments is annexed.

#### ABSTRACT RETURN.

	In 1813, Number of Officers.				At present, Number of Officers.			
	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.
Adjutant-general's department .. .. .	21	25	12	58	29	26	20	75
Quartermaster-general's ditto .. .. .	2	11	3	16	8	12	6	26
Commissariat ditto .. .. .	10	14	5	29	21	25	9	55
Stud ditto .. .. .	3	—	—	3	11	—	1	12
Audit ditto .. .. .	3	3	3	9	4	4	4	12
Pay ditto .. .. .	8	13	6	27	12	15	6	33
Judge Advocate's ditto .. .. .	3	6	1	10	8	10	3	21
Military Board .. .. .	3	3	3	9	5	3	—	8
Surveyor-general's department .. .. .	1	1	3	5	2	1	3	6
Clothing Board and Agents .. .. .	2	1	1	4	3	1	2	6
Total .. .. .	56	77	37	170	103	97	51	251

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

**Q. 3.** The amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters, with reference to the probable occasion of their services against foreign or domestic disturbers of the peace, each arm being considered separately; and the different portions of our Indian empire, which are distinguished by marked characteristics, being adverted to in their order, with reference to their mutual dependence.

An inspection of the map, before referred to, will satisfactorily explain the position of all the troops in India.

The Native infantry which are stationed in the British territories may be properly considered as the standing force of the country, by which its quiet and subjection is ensured, yet ready to be withdrawn for systematic military purposes when wanted, their places being supplied temporarily by local levies.

The Native infantry stationed in the territories of protected allies, as shown in the map, are posted there in virtue of formal treaties, their expense being paid by the several princes for whose protection they are employed. They answer the same purposes in those territories as when stationed in the British possessions, and they are at all times available to the British Government in case of foreign war, or when wanted for the suppression of vicinal commotion.

All these potentates are bound to render aid, according to their respective means, and several of them are engaged by treaty to supply specified contingents of horse and foot, to the amount of about 20,000 horse and 6,000 foot.

The horse are certainly capable of forming good light troops; but it may be doubted whether, as a matter of general policy, it would not be wiser to discountenance, rather than enforce or encourage, the retention of armies by Native princes.

One of the greatest advantages contemplated by Lord Wellesley to arise out of the establishment of paramount British authority in India was the desuetude of arms by the Native princes of the country. The embodying of contingent forces checks the operation of this principle; and it may be doubted whether the aid of such reinforcements in war (who must then be paid and fed like our own troops) is not more than counterbalanced by training men to arms, whose fidelity can never safely be trusted either in peace or war.

The corps of Native infantry posted on the frontiers of independent states, such as the Punjab, Cutch, Nepaul and Burmah, besides answering the purposes already described, must be considered as part of an army always ready to attack, or repel, the powers immediately in front of them.

With the Native infantry, or at no great distance from them, are usually posted, for reasons sufficiently obvious, some regiments of Europeans, mostly of his Majesty's service. They form the nuclei of all armies assembled for an actual campaign, upon whom the greatest dependence is placed, and whose health, discipline and efficiency are therefore always most sedulously attended to.

The European cavalry (all King's) are in the same manner stationed, as far as circumstances will permit, among, or near to, the Company's Native cavalry.

Almost the whole of the Bengal and Bombay cavalry are stationed near the north-western frontier; and it would seem to be advisable that so many of the Madras cavalry as may be judged necessary in the present state of India should be advanced as near as possible to the same position, seeing that it is there only that their services are likely to be useful.

The artillery, European and Native, horse and foot (with the exception of a few troops and companies collected at the head-quarters of each Presidency), are distributed among the several military posts, in proportion to the number of troops of the line by whom those posts are occupied, as will be seen on reference to the Returns and the map.

The whole of the cavalry and the Europeans of all arms (cavalry, infantry and artillery) may

may be considered as held in constant readiness for a campaign; their only use in peace being to overawe the Natives.

A large portion of them are posted on the frontier, which by our late conquests has been much narrowed, and is now unusually compact, extending almost in a direct line from the Himalaya mountains to the mouth of the Indus.

British India may be considered as divided into two great and well known geographical portions; Hindostan, which is occupied by the Bengal, and a portion of the Bombay, army; and the Deccan, occupied by the Madras army and the remainder of the Bombay army.

The troops of which the different armies are composed are, with the exception of Europeans, recruited each in their own districts: thus the Bengal troops are Hindostanees; the Madras, Deccanees; and the Bombay troops a mixture of both.

By the extent of our conquests since the beginning of the present century, the troops of the several Presidencies, which used to be posted far apart, are now brought into juxtaposition with each other.

It has, however, always been considered an object of policy not to intermix them unnecessarily, nor for longer periods than the actual exigencies of the service require. And it has been held to be equally advisable to confine their recruiting to the territories respectively occupied by each of them.

It is obvious that by these means furlough (an object of paramount importance to Native soldiers) is much facilitated, and (what is of far greater importance) a community of feeling and interests among the several Native armies is avoided.

The pay and allowances of all the troops of all the Presidencies, European and Native, have been equalized, as far as the Supreme Government have thought it necessary or prudent to do so, in times of peace; and in time of war, whenever they meet on conjunct service, the most favourable rates of pay and rations enjoyed by any branch are granted to the whole.

It has been suggested, with a view to the more equitable distribution of promotion, arising out of the occasional augmentations and reductions of the army, that the troops of the three Presidencies should be consolidated; but the prospect of an augmentation by regiments of an army which has been already diminished to the amount of 100,000 men without the disbandment of a single regiment, and might be re-augmented to the same extent without raising a new one, is too remote to justify any innovation upon that ground.

With respect to the reduction of regiments, a scheme has been submitted for making such reductions, when required, beneficial, rather than injurious, to the officers of the diminished establishment.

In any event, as no augmentation or reduction of whole regiments can be made without the sanction and authority of the Governor-General, he can always so arrange (as indeed he has been directed to do) that the advantages or disadvantages arising from augmentations or reductions shall be fairly apportioned among the officers of the three Presidencies.

**Q. 4.** The consideration of the several branches of the army with reference to its experienced or probable effect—

1st, On the efficiency of our military force.

2d, The economy with which it is provided.

3d, On the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing it.

**Note.**—The influence of the additions made to the army within the period under review, and of the employment of military men in civil situations; the suitability of the several establishments to the purposes for which they have been, or are, likely to be

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-Colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

be needed; the fitness of the rules relative to the numbers, pay, qualification, enlistment, promotion, furlough and retirement of the several ranks, European and Native; the expediency of the proportion of European and Native corps, will, under this head, be adverted to.

There seems to be no reason to question the efficiency of our military force in India, nor its good spirit, either among Europeans or Natives, officers or soldiers, nor the economy with which it is provided.

No permanent additions have been made to the army within the period under review, numerically considered, although there are certainly more corps, and consequently more European officers now than in 1813.

This result arises from the armies having been augmented from time to time by regiments and battalions (by which the officers gained promotion), and reduced only by companies, or the disbandment of privates.

The several establishments now existing appear to be well suited to the purposes for which they are entertained, and well proportioned each to the other. Some reduction might, however, I conceive, be made,\* so as greatly to diminish the expense without impairing, in some instances perhaps improving, our security in that distant empire.

General considerations of policy require that the most powerful weapons of war, the artillery and cavalry, those arms which enable us to command the supplies and resources of the country, ought not to be trusted in the hands of Natives, further than uncontrollable necessity exacts.

On these grounds, as well as on account of their greater proportionate expense, I should propose to reduce all the Native artillery, horse and foot.†

The irregular cavalry, five regiments, ought also to be reduced upon the same principle. The annual expense of these corps amounts to, rupees 11,00,000.

A large proportion of the Native cavalry (which, however serviceable in war, are useless in peace, and at all times dangerous) might also, I conceive, be reduced with safety and advantage.‡ I am even of opinion that it would be good policy to increase the number of European cavalry regiments in India, reducing an equal number of European infantry, and an equal number of Native cavalry; by which means not only would our security be improved, but our expenses materially decreased.§

Ten thousand European cavalry and horse artillery could command all the resources of

\* All the Indian Governments have lately admitted that they had superfluous troops.

† Bengal, three troops of Native horse artillery (each 90,000 rupees per annum) .....	Rs. 2,70,000
Madras, two ..... ditto ..... ditto .....	1,80,000
Three battalions of golundauze (one at each Presidency) .....	6,00,000
	<hr/>
	Rupees 10,50,000

Minus a provision for the European commissioned officers.

Native artillery-men were formerly employed in India only for temporary purposes, in consequence of a deficiency of European recruits, and have been, until lately, invariably disbanded as soon as the temporary pressure ceased. The brigades of European artillery are now complete at all the Presidencies.

‡ Bengal, two regiments of Native cavalry, annual expense .....	Rs. 8,00,000
Madras, four ..... ditto ..... ditto .....	16,00,000
Bombay, one ..... ditto ..... ditto .....	4,00,000
	<hr/>
	Rupees 28,00,000

§ A regiment of European infantry costs, per annum, about .....	Rs. 6,50,000
A regiment of Native cavalry, about .....	1,00,000

	<hr/>
	Rupees 10,50,000
A regiment of light dragoons, about .....	Rs. 7,50,000

of India, and could put down insurrection in any part of it almost instantaneously. Native cavalry and Native horse artillery cannot, it is obvious, be so safely trusted.

In effecting the saving contemplated in these reductions (which are calculated in the gross), a considerable allowance must be made for a provision for the European commissioned officers of the corps to be disbanded, which provision ought to be upon a scale so liberal as to induce a number of officers equivalent to the number to be disbanded to accept a commuted allowance for their respective commissions.

In that case the reduction would operate favourably, rather than injuriously, upon the interests of the officers generally. For those only would retire who wished to do so, whilst the chances of staff appointments to those who remained in the service would be improved by a reduction in the number of aspirants for those appointments, yet their promotion would not be impeded.

Thus a colonel for every regiment or battalion reduced might be offered, say 8 years' purchase of his pay and off-reckonings, that is, of his aggregate receipts, whilst in Europe

.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	Rs 76,800
A lieutenant-colonel might be offered 10 years' purchase of his retiring pay						28,800
A major 11 ditto	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	23,760
A captain 15 ditto	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	21,600
A lieutenant 17 ditto	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	12,240
An ensign, cornet, or second lieutenant 18 ditto	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	*10,368

according to their respective chances of life, and by which in a few years a very large saving would accrue to the State.†

These payments are proposed to be made in India, with a view to the relief of the Home Treasury, and should be proportionately augmented in reference to the loss by exchange and remittance to Europe.

This proposition (of paying retiring pensions in India) is but a temporary and insulated measure; but if the exclusive trade with China be withdrawn from the Company, it will probably be necessary to make all retiring allowances payable in India, by which one of the strongest ties of India to England would be broken.

Had some scheme of this kind been matured before the reductions consequent on the termination of the Burmese war took place, those reductions might have been made in a way which would have more than doubled the savings which ensued from them. In fact, the difficulty of reducing the Company's troops by regiments, when their services are no longer wanted, constitutes at this moment the greatest defect in their military arrangements.

A scheme of this kind would also be beneficial in weeding the army of many old and inefficient officers, who would be glad to retire if such an offer were made to them, but who now linger on in hopes of higher pension at a future period.

The European regiments also might be reduced to the number serving in India antecedently to the Burmese war;‡ that is, four regiments of His Majesty's service, sent to India on that occasion, might now be recalled, which would still leave a greater proportion

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

\* These rates are taken from the Government Annuity Tables, each officer being supposed to enter the service at seventeen years of age, and the annual casualties being estimated at 5 per cent. for all ages. They do not show accurate results, but approximate near enough for practical purposes.

† The payments are calculated on pay or subsistence only, but the savings to the Company would be of all Indian allowances.

† A regiment of Native cavalry costs, about	...	...	...	...	...	Rs. 1,00,000 per annum.
Ditto of Native infantry or golundauze	...	...	...	...	...	2,40,000 ditto
The commuted allowance, as proposed, would amount to	...	...	...	...	...	3,76,752 ditto

The Native officers would of course be seconded upon other regiments until absorbed by casualties.

‡ Four regiments of European infantry, annual expense, rupees 26,00,000.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

tion of Europeans to Natives than existed at the end of Lord Wellesley's government in 1807. The Native soldiers were then as six to one to the Europeans. They would now be only five to one.\*

There does not appear to be any defect in the rules relative to the pay, qualification, enlistment, promotion, furlough, or retirement of the several ranks, European or Native; and the present establishments seem to be generally well suited to the purposes for which they have been, or are likely to be, required.

With respect to the employment of military men in civil situations, these may be classed under the following heads:

Political Employments.  
Pay Department.  
Audit ditto.  
Judge Advocate's ditto.  
Military Secretary's ditto.  
Military Board ditto.  
Clothing Board ditto.  
Barrack ditto.  
Building ditto (including Canals and Roads).  
Commissariat ditto; and  
Stud ditto.

As to the employment of military men in the Political Departments, of whom

39 in Bengal,  
13 at Madras, and  
6 at Bombay,

---

Total 58,

are now so engaged, it may be observed, that in all countries some rewards must be held out to stimulate exertion and to reward merit, particularly in a service like that of India, to which no man of respectable condition would devote himself had he not a reasonable prospect, if he should escape the dangers of the climate and of his profession, of obtaining a competency wherewith to provide for a family, and pass his latter days in comfort at home.

The qualifications of many military men for political, and even for judicial and revenue offices, cannot be doubted. Experience has decided that point.

Upon all occasions of new conquest their employment has been found indispensable; but as the country subsides into peace their services are gradually dispensed with, and their places are occupied by the Company's civil servants.

As residents at Asiatic courts they are peculiarly acceptable and useful. Their military habits and character are congenial with those of the chieftains to whom they are accredited, whilst their experience in military affairs particularly qualifies them to appreciate the discipline and efficiency of the troops with which we may have to co-operate as allies, or attack as enemies.

The situation of residents at foreign courts is also an object both of honorary and pecuniary ambition, and the prospect of attaining it has the best effect in stimulating military men to employ their leisure hours in qualifying themselves for it.

#### *Pay Department.*

The appointment of military men to offices in the Pay Department is sanctioned by the practice of His Majesty's service.

Up

\* In 1825 they were as ten to one.

Up to the year 1801, the paymasterships in India were held by civil servants, but the extreme neglect of duty by those gentlemen in Bengal, and their reluctance to go on foreign service, added to the frequent defalcations in their accounts, induced me at that time to recommend to Lord Wellesley, then at the head of the Bengal Government, to transfer the office to the military. My recommendation was attended to and subsequently extended to the other Governments. No defalcations have since occurred at any of the Presidencies.\*

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

### *Audit Department.*

This is a branch, or rather the head, of the Pay Department, and requires such a knowledge of the localities of India, the habits, wants, manners, and customs both of the European and Native soldiery, of the resources of the country, and of all the orders of Government in the Military Department, that no person but an experienced officer can be qualified for such a situation.

When there is no military secretary (as at Madras and Bombay) the military auditor-general is the habitual adviser of the Government on all subjects of military finance; the adjutant and quartermasters-general being considered the personal staff of the Commander-in-chief. Upon the judicious selection for this office and that of the adjutant-general of the army, the discipline, economy, and efficiency of the Indian armies mainly depend. For however talented the Governors and Commanders-in-chief of the several Presidencies may be, they generally arrive in India quite ignorant of its localities, and must in military matters for a considerable time, rely upon the information and experience of those two functionaries, whose services indeed, for good or evil, are in unceasing requisition.

Upon the report of the military auditor-general, not only do the Indian Governments habitually rely in all cases connected with military expenditure, but the home authorities place the greatest confidence in their reports, and frequently refer to them in aid of their judgment on disputed questions of that nature.

The military auditor-general ought therefore always to be chosen from among the Company's military servants; and, as the confidence reposed in him is unusually great, his salary ought to be proportionally liberal. A deputy similarly qualified is also requisite to supply his place in case of sickness. Two assistants from the army have likewise been allowed of late years, and apparently with good results.

### *Judge Advocate-general's Department.*

The judge advocate-general might with propriety be, as at home, a barrister; but the deputy judge advocates can be more cheaply and easily furnished from the army, according to the practice in the King's service, than in any other way.

### *The Military Secretary's Department.*

These officers, three in number, are taken from the army only in Bengal. At the other Presidencies they are civil servants. The Bengal system seems preferable.

### *Military Board.*

In Bengal the Military Board is composed of two officers, especially appointed to it, with competent salaries; to whom are added the chief engineer, the commandant of artillery, and the chief magistrate in Calcutta, without separate salaries. At Madras the Board is composed of the Commander-in-chief, the chief engineer, commandant of artillery, adjutant-

---

\* The case of Colonel Carfrae is quite peculiar, hinging altogether upon the fact of whether a tumbril of treasure was, or was not, returned, during a campaign, to the Rajah of Mysore.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, and military auditor-general, all without separate salaries. At Bombay, the Military Board, which was formerly composed like that at Madras (as was the Bengal Board) of the great army functionaries, without salaries, has lately been abolished altogether.

The system may therefore be considered as experimental. The Boards in Bengal and Madras have each a secretary and assistant taken from the army.

#### *Clothing Board.*

These Boards are composed, at all the Presidencies, of the military auditor-general, commandant of artillery, chief engineer, adjutant-general, and quartermaster-general, if colonels in the army; to whom are joined any other colonels of regiments who may happen to be at any time resident at the several Presidencies, all without salaries.

The off-reckonings of all the Presidencies are thrown into a common stock, and divided equally among the colonels of the line and artillery. The colonels of engineers receive an equivalent from the public treasury. The shares amount to about £600 a year. The colonels are permitted to receive them and reside in England. A secretary to each Clothing Board is allowed from the army.

In Bengal the clothing for the army is made up under the inspection of two agents, military men. At Bombay one agent, also an officer, is found sufficient.

At Madras the clothing has of late years been supplied by contract, under the inspection of the Clothing Board; and as the system has been found both cheap and efficient, it will probably be extended to the other Presidencies.

#### *Barrack Department.*

There are but three officers withdrawn from the army for this department at all the Presidencies.

#### *Buildings, Canals, and Roads.*

Most of these works are, and all are ordered to be, executed by officers of engineers.

#### *Commissariat and Stud Departments.*

The Stud Department, except as a branch of the Commissariat, employing one or two officers at each Presidency, will probably soon be abolished. There are at present 12 officers in Bengal, and one at Bombay, employed in that line.

But the Commissariat Department absorbs no less than

21	officers in Bengal.
25	do. Madras.
9	do. Bombay.

Total	65
-------	----

The Commissariat was established in 1809. In 1828, Sir Thomas Munro recorded his opinion that it had been found economical in peace and efficient in war. The public records of Madras confirm this opinion.

In Bengal and at Bombay some frauds have been discovered; and the Court of Directors have desired the several Governments of India to review the subject, and transmit their opinion, whether, in the present tranquil state of India, the Commissariat supplies might not be obtained in a cheaper and more satisfactory manner by contract.

There are undoubtedly greatly objections to the employment of military men in a department so essentially mercantile, independently of the objection of withdrawing so many officers from military duty. But it must be considered that, in times of war, the armies in the field must have a Commissariat; that there is no class of men in India to furnish a Commissariat but the military; and that the knowledge and experience acquired

acquired by Commissariat officers in peace eminently qualifies them for the conduct of that department in war.

It should also be considered that the offices to which military men are eligible are but few in proportion to their numbers, and that the salaries attached to them afford the only means of providing for a family during their progress to a regiment.

The Return\* shows that the number of civil, political and miscellaneous offices not strictly of a military nature, held by military men, do not even now (and they are daily diminishing) withdraw much more than one officer in each regiment or battalion from his military duties.

*Secretary and Examiners in Colleges, Superintendent of Police, and an Assay Master.*

These appointments are peculiar to Bengal, and have no doubt arisen out of some supposed peculiar fitness of individual officers for the appointments respectively held by them.

Q. 5. The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's, in respect to efficiency, good spirit and economy, and the probable consequences of bringing the whole directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown, the several arms being separately considered, with distinction of Europeans and Natives.

The experience of three quarters of a century has shown that the Company's army, detached from the King's, has never been wanting in efficiency nor in good spirit; some little allowance being made for occasional ebullitions of dissatisfaction, which have been promptly attended to and removed by the home authorities. The dissatisfaction itself having always arisen from what was considered to be over-economy, sufficiently demonstrates that that principle has not been neglected in the Company's military arrangements.

To

\* Return of Officers in Civil Employment.

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Political ... ..	39	13	6	58
Paymasters ... ..	12	15	6	33
Audit ... ..	4	1	4	12
Judge Advocate ... ..	8	10	3	21
Military Secretary's Department ... ..	3	—	—	3
Military Board ... ..	5	3	—	8
Clothing Board and Agents ... ..	3	1	2	6
Barrack-master ... ..	1	1	1	3
Army Commissariat ... ..	21	25	9	55
Stud ... ..	11	—	1	12
Secretary and Examiners in Colleges, Superintendent of Police, and an Assay Master ... ..	7	—	—	7
Total ... ..	114	72	32	218

There are at the three Presidencies 206 regiments and battalions, each having 20 officers; viz.

- 1 Colonel.
- 1 Lieutenant-colonel.
- 1 Major.
- 5 Captains.
- 8 Lieutenants.
- 4 Cornets and ensigns, or second lieutenants.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)--Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

To bring the Company's army directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown, unless the Indian territory be also transferred (in which case the army must necessarily accompany it), appears to be an experiment at once hazardous and gratuitous.

No strong inducement, much less necessity for such a measure, appears to exist now more than at any other time. Indeed, the reason formerly pleaded for such a change, namely, the jealousies entertained by the King's officers of the Company's, and of the Company's of them, and of each other, at the different Presidencies, has nearly ceased to operate. The allowances have been made the same to all (King's and Company's) at all the Presidencies, and staff appointments and commands fairly apportioned among them.

If even some suppressed feeling of that kind yet remain, a question may well be raised, whether it be prejudicial to the national interest; whether it be desirable that all the officers of a colonial army of 200,000 men, serving at the distance of half the globe, in a rich and fertile country, should be united in one common feeling and interest.

The acquisition of an empire over one-eighth of the population of the world, differing from their conquerors in appearance, in manners and in religion, situated at such a distance, and retained at so small a cost to the usurping State, is perhaps the greatest political phenomenon ever exhibited to the admiration of mankind. To tamper unnecessarily with a mechanism so unusual, so delicate, and yet so powerful, would indicate a spirit of daring adventure rather than of political prudence.

It will be remembered that the fear of a transfer of the Company's army to the Crown, some 40 years ago, roused a feeling of turbulent apprehension in the minds of the Company's officers, which the arrangement of 1796 with difficulty allayed; and it is to be apprehended that a renewal of the same scheme would be followed by a revival of the same feelings.

Besides the possible objections on the part of the Company's officers to be transferred to the service of the Crown, where their interests, as a distant body, could so little compete with that of His Majesty's immediate servants, having their general residence in Europe, an objection well worthy the deliberation of a statesman presents itself in the possible action of the measure on the minds of His Majesty's officers.

The Indian service is one in which men seek fortune at least as much as honour. His Majesty's service is one of almost pure honourable ambition. The stain which the military mind may receive from a large and constant admixture of less noble feeling may be attended by consequences which no partial good could compensate or redeem.

If, notwithstanding the novelty and hazard of the experiment, it should be resolved to transfer the Company's army to the Crown, no better scheme can, I think be devised for that purpose than the one proposed by Lord Cornwallis in his letter to Mr. Dundas, dated 7th November 1794.

In that scheme his Lordship proposed that the Native army should remain a distinct body, admitting of no interchanges with the officers of the European establishment; a principle which he justly considered indispensable for the purpose of preventing the most injurious supercessions of the local officers by those of greater interest from the home army.

The character of Lord Cornwallis stands so high, his public principles were so pure, his judgment so sound, that were there not to my mind an essential difference in the relative condition of the King's and Company's officers now and in 1794, and as great difference in the state and condition of the East-India Company itself, I would not venture, whatever might be my private misgivings, to combat opinions flowing from such an authority. But, as I have already observed, the jealousies that formerly subsisted between the King's and Company's officers, which formed the main ground of Lord Cornwallis's objection to separate establishments, have been removed.

If

If a lurking jealousy also existed, though not avowed, of the too great power of the Company's army, at that time having twelve regiments of European infantry enrolled in its Returns, those regiments have since been reduced to three, and a proportionate increase made to His Majesty's troops.

If, too, an idea pervaded his mind, at that time perhaps well founded, that the Company might find it their interest to retain the territory, then yielding a large surplus revenue, and the trade, then a gaining one, notwithstanding the proposed transfer of their army to the Crown, those ideas must now be abandoned.

Instead of a surplus revenue there is a large annual deficit, and instead of a gaining, there is a losing trade. It cannot, therefore, be the interest of the East-India Company to retain the territory without the army, over whose expenses they could then exercise no effectual control.

**Q. 6.** Whether there may be grounds to infer, that, if the Company's army were under the government of King's Ministers, any considerable saving of expense would ensue, by the reduction or consolidation of establishments generally, or in time of peace; by less chargeable plans of recruiting, including under the former head arrangements for the appointment and education of cadets, and the conveyance of troops from England to India; and under the latter, all retiring provisions made at the expense of the Government, by the more economical provision and appropriation of stores; by cheaper freight, or by other more frugal arrangements; and how far an opposite result is to be apprehended?

If the Company's army were transferred to the Crown, the allowances made to a few King's staff, of the adjutant and quartermaster-general's departments, might be saved. The salaries of the medical inspector and his two deputies might also be saved.

A few thousand pounds might also, perhaps, be saved by sending the ordnance cadets, now educated at Addiscombe, to Woolwich, and the recruits now collected at Chatham to the King's depôts.

The freight of troops might also possibly be reduced; but all these savings might, if thought advisable, be made, with equal facility, under the present system of government.

It is not probable that any reduction could be made in the other charges adverted to in this paragraph.

**Q. 7.** Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interest connected with the army might be effected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies?

Whilst there is deficiency of recruits in Europe, and the Irish nursery seems inexhaustible, it does not appear that any advantage, except the saving of outward freight for the soldiers who go to India, and the homeward freight to the few who return, would, in a military point of view, be derived from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies. It must be recollected, too, that a plentiful supply of cheap land is essential to colonization, as well as a climate suited to the constitution of the proposed colonists, which, if they could be had in India, as they cannot, would, for many generations, rear up only a nation of husbandmen, a class to whom military service is proverbially ungrateful.

If even, after a great length of time, such colonists were to become sufficiently numerous to throw out military recruits to the army, they would probably be more dangerous as neighbours and allies than serviceable as mercenaries. It was the opinion of Lord Cornwallis that all the European regiments serving in India should be frequently relieved, and that no European soldier should be allowed to remain there after he became unfit for military duty, but pensioned and sent home.

It is ascertained by experience, that Englishmen cannot increase and multiply in the country

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

country properly called India, in the hot triangle included between the Himalaya mountains, the Indus, and the sea.

The East-India Company for more than half a century, have had more than 10,000 soldiers constantly stationed within those limits, of whom not one in ten have returned to Europe; yet there are not perhaps 100 men and women now living in all India the offspring of European soldiers by European women, who have been born in that country.

Even the number of adult children of European soldiers by Native women is small, barely supplying a few drummers and fifers to the Native regiments, and a few half-caste wives to the King's and Company's soldiers.

Such a race, if it were to multiply, could only assimilate with the black Portuguese of India, a race the least respected and respectable, and the least fitted for soldiers, of all the tribes that diversify that populous country.

The children of officers, of the Company's civil servants, and of all Europeans possessing adequate means, are invariably sent to Europe in childhood, and cease as effectually to be Natives as if they had been born in Europe.

In the range of hills, which form the base of the Himalaya mountains, from the Sutledge to the Burumpooter, is to be found the only country susceptible of European colonization. Of this country, mountainous, rocky and barren, but a small portion is subject to our sway, and that is already occupied by a population which must be extirpated before room can be made for British colonists.

As to the settlement of other British subjects in India, men of wealth and capital, and commercial enterprise, the question apparently has no military bearing. But if it had, I think it may be safely predicated that no man of wealth, not of a peculiar cast of mind, will ever think of transplanting himself, much less his family, from the salubrious regions of Britain to the mortal climate of India. No man, as far as my experience goes, has yet done so. Every man who makes a fortune in India, and has a family, ships first his family, and then his wealth and himself, back to his native land.

Practically there is no obstruction to the settlement of men of capital in India now; but the country is obviously suited only to adventurers, to those who have no means of comfortable existence at home. All the openings afforded by the manufacture of indigo are filled as fast as they occur. The market is even overstocked with adventurers; and so it would be in other lines of trade, if such shall ever be opened, in the production and manufacture of silk, sugar, cotton, or any other staple.

Q. 8. What would be the probable effects of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief?

The whole Indian army ought to be, and substantially is, under the Governor-General of India, who is responsible for the expenses of India, of which the military are a main branch, and the Governor-General has, in late despatches, been specially exhorted to exercise the control with which he is legally vested habitually and vigorously.

To give full effect, however, to this essential power, the Governor-General ought also to be appointed Captain-General; so that no obstacle or counteracting authority may impede or mutilate such orders as he may find it necessary to give with a view to military economy.

The Commander-in-chief in Bengal is usually Commander-in-chief of all His Majesty's forces serving in India. If he die or vacate his post, the command devolves upon the senior officer of His Majesty's army present in India. But the command of the Company's troops at the several Presidencies is vested in separate Commanders-in-chief, who are also Members of Council at their respective Presidencies; and I am not aware of any advantage that could be derived by merging their military patronage and command in that of the Bengal Commander-in-chief, who must necessarily have very inferior means

means of judging of the discipline of the armies of the other Presidencies, or of the talents and merits of their officers.

The armies of each Presidency are sufficiently numerous to require the constant and undivided superintendence of an officer of rank, who, if not called Commander-in-chief, must be commander of the forces. The designation, however, of Commander-in-chief has its value, and there does not appear to be any sufficient cause for a change either in his title, or the partial independence and extent of his authority.

**Q. 9.** How far the existing system of Government direction and control, in so far as the same may depend on arrangements fixed by Parliamentary enactments, is, in its influence on the army, productive of good or evil, as compared with any changes which have been, or may be, suggested as expedient, on grounds of efficiency, economy, and security?

The existing system of direction and control of all the affairs of India seems well calculated for, and perfectly effectual to, its object.

The division of authority between the Court of Directors and His Majesty's Commissioners for the Affairs of India establishes a mutual and salutary check on both. Perhaps some additional authority and effect might be given to the orders from home, if, when those orders were promulgated to the army in India, they bore the countersignature of the Minister for the Affairs of India; so that the King's commands might always be apparent to those who bear His commission as well as that of the East-India Company.

A further security for unhesitating obedience to the King's commands would be found in the adoption of a measure long ago proposed by Lord Cornwallis to harmonize and assimilate the Indian and British establishments. Lord Cornwallis's proposition was (and I am justified in saying that it has also had the sanction of the Duke of Wellington) that the Company's officers, when they shall have attained the rank of general officer, shall be eligible to serve His Majesty in any part of the world.

It is true that Lord Cornwallis offered this proposition as part of a scheme for transferring the Company's army to the Crown, but there does not appear to be any essential objection to introducing it into the present separate establishment.

Such a distinction, though it would cost nothing to the donor, would be of the utmost value to the receiver; it would give him rank and estimation in British society; it would, by uniting the services at a certain point, remove the jealousy felt by the Company's of the King's officers; and it would operate as a strong inducement to the most spirited and meritorious officers to remain in the service until they should attain it.

It is obvious that such a regulation would be attended with no expense, and might very possibly never go farther than the name. For the Company's general officers would have no more pretension to be employed, than have His Majesty's general officers; many of whom from age, infirmity or other causes are not thought proper persons to be put upon the general staff of the army. It is one of the anomalies of the present constitution of the Indian army, that more than 4,000 officers are brought up to the military profession, some of whom must needs be men of eminent talent, and yet that not one of them should be capable of being employed in the line of his profession in the general service and defence of the empire. Had the Duke of Wellington been a Company's instead of a King's officer, his talents, which first became known by his services in India, would have been utterly useless with reference to the safety of England, and the general liberties of Europe.

---

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(2.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Salmond,  
24th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

(3.)—REPLY of Major-general Sir JOHN MALCOLM, G. C. B., dated 12, Abingdon-street,  
13th February 1832.\*

Sir,

1. IN answering your letter of the 25th of January regarding the military establishments of India, I feel compelled to depart from an exact observation of the heads to which my attention is directed. This arises from the necessity of referring to a number of documents, in order to give you every information I can upon a subject which has occupied my mind for more than 40 years, during which I have had all the experience that could be gained by one who, entering the Indian army in boyhood, has served in every grade from an ensign to a general officer, and, besides filling almost every staff situation, has commanded divisions of troops composed of His Majesty's and the Company's service, and including corps and military establishments of the three Presidencies. Independent of my experience as a soldier, the civil and political duties I have had to perform in every quarter of India, have enabled me to judge the relation in which these stand to the military, and has led to the conclusion, that in all plans for the government of our Eastern empire, the latter must ever be entitled to primary consideration. That empire has been acquired, and must be maintained, by the sword. It has no foundation, and is not capable of having any made, that can divest it of this character; and if the local army of India, but above all, the Native branch, is not preserved in a condition which, while it maintains its efficiency, preserves its attachment, no commercial, financial, fiscal, or judicial systems we may improve or introduce can be of permanent benefit. The success of these must depend upon the continuance of internal tranquillity and exemption from foreign war. We may create happiness or misery, satisfaction or discontent, by the excellence or reverse of our civil and political rule. We may by good government diminish the elements of sedition, and in a degree disarm the hostility of Asiatic princes; but we never can expect active support in the hour of danger from the mass of the population of India. A passive allegiance is all these will ever give to their foreign masters; and even this allegiance, the more they become enlightened, and are imbued with feelings our intercourse must impart, will become more uncertain. It is therefore to the army of India we must look for the means we possess, not only of maintaining our power, but of preserving the great benefits we have already conferred, or may hereafter confer, upon the millions subject to our authority; no considerations, therefore, should ever induce us to forget for one moment the paramount and vital importance of our military power, and this conviction must lead to every effort being made to strengthen those ties by which we can alone attach an army of so singular a construction. Resting upon its high spirit and unshaken fidelity, we can proceed with confidence to every improvement in other branches of the administration of our vast possessions; but should this main pillar of our strength be impaired, the whole fabric of our strength will be in danger, and all our plans and schemes will prove abortive, leaving nothing but a record of that folly which cherished good intentions, but slighted or mismanaged the principal means, on which the power of putting them into execution, depended.

2. In my Political History of India,† published in 1826, I have given my opinions on the whole subject of the army in India.

3. The part of this subject which beyond all others demands care and consideration is the Native branch. I transmit a memorandum,‡ prepared for the late Lord Buckinghamshire when President of the Board of Control, which exhibits, on the authority of the materials I had at that time collected, the history and progress of our Native army, while it illustrates, by numerous facts, the character of the men of whom it is composed. This document is so far of consequence, as it will inform those whose attention may for the first time be now directed to this subject.

4. The

---

List of documents referred to in this Letter:

Letter to Lord W. Bentinck, and Enclosures.

Extract from Minute of the 28th October 1828, on Irregular Horse.

Minute on Suspension of Functions of Military Board, dated 1st December 1829.

Vide Vol. II., from page 201 to 245.

‡ Vide Appendix (A.)

4. The Native troops in the service of the British Government of India, who exceed 180,000 men, constitute the real strength of our empire. Some may think otherwise. I must however state, that all my recent experience confirms the opinions I have elsewhere\* stated, that "An army so constituted, and formed of men of such tempers, may appear very susceptible of being corrupted, and made instrumental to the destruction of that power which it is employed to protect; but of this there is no danger, unless in the improbable case of our becoming too presumptuous in what we may deem our intrinsic strength, confiding too exclusively in our European troops, and undervaluing our Native army. From the day of that fatal error (should we ever commit it), we may date the downfall of our Eastern empire. Its finances would not only sink under the expense of a greatly increased European force; the Natives of India in our ranks would lose the opinion which they entertain of their own consequence to the Government they serve; and their whole tone as an army would be lowered in a degree that would impair our strength far beyond any addition it could receive from the superior efficiency and energy of a few more English regiments."

5. When recently filling the station of Governor of Bombay I had an opportunity, as far as the army of that Presidency was concerned, of carrying several of the plans I had suggested for strengthening the attachment of the Native troops into successful execution, and of directing the attention of my superiors to further improvements. Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General of India, called upon me for my opinion regarding the composition, pay, and distribution of the army of India; and you no doubt have upon your records my letter in reply, under date the 28th of November 1830. This letter, with its enclosures, will convey to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India my sentiments upon all the variety of points which this subject embraces, including most of those to which my attention has been called by your letter.

6. The question regarding the expediency or policy of maintaining a body of irregular horse on the establishment of Bombay came under discussion soon after I took charge of that Government; and my Minute, under date the 28th of October 1828, and several other documents, will convey my general sentiments upon a description of force that I deem it of much importance to support as a branch of our army.

7. The military establishment upon which our army in India depends, perhaps more than any other in the world, is the regulation of its Commissariat, including bazars. The practice of billet is unknown. Houses would be defiled, and the inhabitants outraged, were it otherwise. During hostilities villages are deserted, walled towns shut. Troops must carry all their provisions, and a hundred miles or more are often marched without fresh supplies. This naturally crowds an army with followers, and makes it appear, as has been well observed, "less like a military force than a nation emigrating guarded by its troops."† I have, in a number of public documents, recorded my sentiments on the important subject of military supplies; and in a Minute, dated the 18th July 1829, I have gone into the whole detail of the Commissariat of Bombay, making such revisions as appeared necessary to correct existing abuses, and to promote the future efficiency and economy of this essential department. On the utility of submitting this document and others full of details, which are upon your records, to a Committee of the House of Commons, I cannot pronounce; but I should suppose sufficient information upon the results will be found in the contrasted view which Lieutenant-colonel Frederick has taken of the Commissariat of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in a Report which he drew up at my desire in 1830, and which is on the Board's records.

8. The next establishment, and one of equal importance to the Commissariat, is that of military stores. This subject occupied much of my attention when Governor of Bombay. My Minute of the ——— 1830, states in detail the changes introduced in order to render

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Political History, Vol. II., page 238. † General Dirom's Narrative of Lord Cornwallis's Campaign of 1790.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3).—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

render all the accounts and arrangements of this department less complicated, and to decrease expense without diminishing efficiency. This Minute is upon record, and may, if necessary, be referred to; but perhaps sufficient of its substance will be found in Colonel Frederick's Report, to which I have before alluded, and in which the system, as revised by me, is contrasted with that of Bengal and Madras; and I may refer to the same full and authentic document for a statement of the alterations made in the constitution and duties of the corps of engineers, inclusive of sappers, miners, and pioneers, agreeably to my propositions in my Minutes, under date the ———.

9. One of the most important changes made during the period I presided over the Government of Bombay was the suspension of the functions of the Military Board; a measure which I deemed alike essential to the economy and efficiency of the various military establishments of the Bombay Presidency. My Minute of the 1st December 1829, upon which this measure was adopted, will be also found upon your records, and requires much attention; for if the principles upon which it is grounded are correct, and the facts I have stated incontrovertible, arrangements of a similar nature, with reference to local circumstances, perhaps be thought advisable at other Presidencies. It is a subject of importance, as it connects with military finance and military efficiency. Colonel Frederick, in his printed Report, has noticed this change, and contrasted the system introduced with that at Bengal and Madras: in the former, I have heard some changes have been recently made.

10. I believe the documents which I transmit, or to which I have referred, include all the answers I can give his Majesty's Commissioners to those questions which relate to the character and composition of the various branches of the army of India, as well as of the construction and efficiency of its numerous establishments. With respect to the past and present strength, as well as organization, of these branches, and the amount and description of staff and subsidiary departments (subjects included in the two first queries), correct statements will no doubt be found on records and returns, to which I have not at present any access.

11. The third query is in part answered in my letter to Lord William Bentinck, which forms a number of the Appendix. With regard to other parts of it, I can at present contemplate no foreign enemy as likely to disturb the peace of India; but our exemption from such evil will always, in a great degree, depend upon the means we possess of repelling it. With regard to internal tranquillity, we can hardly expect that any one year will pass without that being interrupted in some quarter of our extended possessions, and to preserve peace in countries most exposed to such danger, it is indispensable to have small but efficient\* bodies of men ready equipped to march at a moment's notice; for the rapidity with which insurgents increase in parts of India can only be understood by those who know the habits and feelings of the different classes of our subjects, and have witnessed the effects produced by the prospect of plunder among predatory tribes, both in our own provinces and their frontiers, and the alarm of those who follow peaceable pursuits. This state of a country requires great vigilance, and the employment of troops of all descriptions. Irregular horse and local corps are often found not only the cheapest but the best of armies for this purpose, because they are usually in such countries composed of men who, if not employed in defending the peace, would be its disturbers.

12. The fourth query is answered in the documents annexed to this Letter, and in a Minute to which I have referred, on all points except that which relates to the employment of military men in civil situations, and on this I may refer to the full records in possession

\* The Madras Government established a small force of this kind at Kuledjee, in the Southern Mahratta country. It consisted of one regiment of Native cavalry, one battalion of light infantry, and one troop of Native horse artillery. They were complete in all field equipments, and the cattle are never allowed to graze beyond a few miles. On an irroad of some plunderers from the province of the Nizam, the orders for this force moving were received in the morning of one day, and the next they were forty miles from their field cantonment on march to the point where required.

session of your Board to prove, in the most incontestable manner, that in the various situations, civil and political, which military men have been called upon by emergencies to fill during the last forty years of wars and revolutions, they have rendered the greatest services to their Government and their country. How far future events may call for their employment in civil situations it is impossible to say; but in the political line, their claim, when recommended by superior qualifications, has been long recognised, and it would be the worst of policy to narrow selection to stations on the fulfilment of the duties of which, peace or war may depend.

13. The fifth and sixth queries relate to the probable effect of a transfer of the Indian army to the Crown. This is a subject upon which I can say nothing further than what is stated in the chapter\* of the Political History of India, to which I have already referred, except that, as a question of expediency or policy, it will be most materially affected by any changes or revisions that may be made in the constitution of the government of our Eastern empire at home or abroad. The reasons for this are too obvious to make it necessary to dwell upon them. With respect to any saving from such consolidation of establishments arising out of less chargeable plans of recruiting, freight, education of cadets, provisions, stores, &c., I cannot conceive how any plans of economy that could be adopted by one authority should not be practicable by another, or may not be made so; and on these grounds, therefore, I can see no reason for, or against, a transfer.

14. As to the seventh query, I confess I cannot see any advantages that could be expected to the "public interests connected with the army" that would arise from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India. I cannot think that such settlers would ever fill our ranks with recruits equal to those which are freshly imported from England, and there is no other mode in which I can contemplate any benefit to the public interest, as connected with the army, from such a colonization. They could not, I conceive, be viewed (comparatively small as their numbers would be) as an efficient aid to our military means; and I should apprehend that their superior pretensions, and the place they occupied in the community, combined with difference of habits and religion, would be likely to create feelings of jealousy and hostility in the minds of the Natives, which would far overbalance any support of a military nature that could be anticipated from such settlers. But I feel it impossible to reply fully to this query without entering upon a very wide field of speculation.

15. In answer to the eighth query, I must again refer to my Political History of India, and can only state, that all my recent experience confirms my conviction of the expediency and wisdom of uniting the armies of the three Presidencies of India into one, on the principles I have in that work suggested.

16. In reply to the ninth query, regarding the influence which existing arrangements have had upon the army, I am of opinion that the manner in which the officers and men of that great body of troops have hitherto done their duty to the Government which they serve, and the country to which they belong, is a proof that their constitution (with all its defects) is one which should not be rashly changed, or injudiciously altered. Grievances have at different times been felt by the European officers of the Indian army, discontent has prevailed, complaints have been made, and remedies, when these appeared reasonable to the authorities to which it is subject, have been applied. Further improvements in its condition may no doubt be made; and the present is a period when this important subject will receive, as it merits, the deepest consideration. I cannot better conclude my answer to this query than in the words of a work† which I published six years ago, as the sentiments therein expressed are confirmed by all my recent experience.

17. "The rise of European officers in the Native army of India must continue to be by seniority; but every measure consistent with their interests, and with those of the public, should

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.) - Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

should be taken to accelerate the attainment of rank and command for those who have gained experience in this branch of the service. The frequent stagnations of promotion which have occurred have been hitherto relieved by expedients that gave an impulse for the moment, but were followed by a reaction that often left men in a worse situation than they were before. We must not judge of the effects of such stagnation of promotion in the local army in India by what we observe from the same cause in England; there is hardly any analogy. The power of exchanging into other corps; of purchasing and selling their commissions, that of living with their relations and friends; the connexions they form, and the different walks of life open to men in their native country, place them in a situation totally different from those who are in a manner banished to a foreign land, where they may be almost considered aliens from all family ties and connexions, with their prospects limited to their profession, to which they are in fact bound, from the day they enter it, as the only means they have of subsistence. The officers of His Majesty's service, if disappointed or discontented, have generally the means of escape; and if, in effecting that, their condition becomes worse, their complaints are not heard; they produce no effect on others; young and more sanguine candidates fill the niche they occupied; nor does the State suffer by the change; for the constitution of the army to which they belong requires, in its inferior officers, no qualifications that may not be easily acquired. But how different is the situation of those who enter the Company's service! Their youth must be devoted to the attainment of acquirements, without which they are unfit even for the subaltern duties of a Native corps; they have no escape from their lot in life; discontent and disappointment in it not only corrode their own minds, but spread a baneful influence over the minds of others: their place, after they are in any degree advanced, cannot be easily supplied, for certain qualifications, which time and study alone can give, are requisite to those who succeed them. All these circumstances (and many more might be adduced) show that the question of the improvement of the Indian army should be considered on its own grounds, and not with the reference, which is too often made, to the comparative condition and pretensions of an army from which its constitution is altogether different.

18. "To give opportunity of acquiring distinction to the officers of the local army of India (without which no military body can ever attain and support a character, and least of all, a body that is in constant comparison with the troops of the same nation, regulated on other principles), high rank ought to be conferred by local commissions, while the individuals to whom it is granted are yet efficient for the duties to which it may call them. The privilege of nominating general officers to the staff must soon become as useless to any objects of ambition in the Indian army as of service to the State, under the slow progress of brevet rank in England, consequent to peace in Europe. Every general belonging to the Indian service must be superannuated before he can be employed. There would appear no objection to grant local brevets to colonels of the Indian service to serve on the staff of that country, as the same can be extended to His Majesty's service. The adoption of such a measure would of course prevent officers being permitted to proceed with regiments to India whose rank was above that of officers within the limits of selection for the general staff; but this would be attended with no injury to the service, and would be a slight sacrifice to obtain a great benefit.

19. "The sale of commissions and exchanges between the English and local branches of the army employed in India, under regulations which guarded the efficiency of the local branch, would be most beneficial, both from introducing good and effective officers, and accelerating promotion in the local army; but there is no measure so requisite for the latter as the formation of a staff corps, which would furnish the means of supplying vacancies in regiments occasioned by the removal of their officers to other duties.

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"JOHN MALCOLM."

Appendix (A.)—*referred to in p. 168.***SHORT ACCOUNT of the Rise, Progress, and Character of the Native Army of India,**  
written in 1816, at the desire of the late Lord BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.\*

ONE of the principal means by which the conquest of India has been made, and the one to which we must chiefly trust for its defence, is the Native army of the East-India Company, of the rise and progress of which I shall endeavour to give a short account, from the best materials to which I have access, being satisfied that a full knowledge of the composition and character of this branch of our army, which exceeds 150,000 men, is essential to those who are entrusted with the legislature or government of our Eastern empire. Captain Williams's published account gives the best account I have met with of the origin and formation of that part of this great army which more particularly belongs to Bengal; but I have made it my duty to look to other sources of information, that I may be able to take the most comprehensive view of a subject so vital to our Eastern empire. I shall endeavour to trace the progress of the Native troops at Madras and Bombay, before I examine the facts brought before the public by Captain Williams. A combined view of the whole may suggest some reflections on the means which appear best calculated to maintain the efficiency and preserve the attachment of the Indian army.

Though Bombay was the first possession which the English obtained in the East, the establishment on that island was for a very long period on too limited a scale to maintain more than its European garrison and a few companies of disciplined sepoys. On the Coast of Coromandel, which became towards the middle of the last century a scene of warfare between the English and French, who mutually aided and received support from the princes of that quarter, the Natives of India were first instructed in European discipline. During the siege of Madras, which took place in A. D. 1746, a number of peons, a species of irregular infantry, armed with swords and spears or matchlocks, were enlisted for the occasion; to those some English officers were attached, among whom a young gentleman of the civil service, of the name of Haliburton, was the most distinguished. This gentleman, who had been rewarded with the commission of a lieutenant, was employed in the ensuing year in training a small corps of Natives in the European manner; he did not however live to perfect that system, which he appears to have first introduced into the Madras service.

"It was by one of our own sepoys" (the Council of Fort St. David observe, in a despatch dated the 2d September 1748, in which they pass an eulogium on the character of Mr. Haliburton) "that he had the misfortune to be killed, who shot him upon his reprimanding him for some offence; the poor gentleman" (they add) "died next day, and the villain did not live so long, for his comrades that stood by cut him to pieces immediately."

It appears from other authorities, that the first sepoys who were raised by the English were either Mahomedans or Hindoos of very high caste, being chiefly Rajpoots; and the event I have related marked the two strongest feelings of the minds of these classes—resentment for real or supposed injury, and attachment to their leader. The name of Mr. Haliburton was long cherished by the Madras Native troops, and about twenty years ago, on an examination of old grants, some veterans, wearing medals, appeared as claimants, who called themselves Haliburton Sahib-ka sepoy, or Haliburton's soldiers. One of the first services on which the regular sepoys of Madras were employed was the defence of Arcot, A. D. 1751. The particulars of that siege, which forms a remarkable feature in the life of the celebrated Clive, have been given by an eloquent and faithful historian;† but he has not informed us of one occurrence that took place, and which as it illustrates the character of the Indian soldiers, well merited to be preserved. When provisions

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Lord Buckinghamshire died before this account was completed, and it was afterwards converted into a review of a work entitled, "The Narrative of the Bengal Army by Captain Williams."

† Orme.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3).—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

provisions were very low, the Hindoo sepoys entreated their commander to allow them to boil the rice (the only food left) for the whole garrison. "Your English soldiers," they said, "can eat from our hands, though we cannot from theirs; we will allot as their share every grain of the rice, and subsist ourselves by drinking the water in which it has been boiled." I state this remarkable anecdote from an authority I cannot doubt, as it refers to the most unexceptionable contemporary witnesses.

During all the wars of Clive, of Lawrence, of Smith, and of Coote, the sepoys of Madras continued to display the same valour and attachment. In the years 1780, 1781, and 1782, they suffered hardships of a nature almost unparalleled; there was hardly a corps that was not twenty months in arrears; they were supported, it is true, by a daily allowance of rice, but this was not enough to save many of their families from being the victims of that dreadful famine, which during these years wasted the Company's dominions in India. Their fidelity never gave way in this hour of extreme trial, and they repaid with gratitude and attachment the kindness and consideration with which they were treated by their European officers, who, being few in number, but, generally speaking, very efficient, tried every means that could conciliate the regard, excite the pride, or stimulate the valour of those they commanded.

In the campaigns of 1790 and 1791 against Tippoo Sultaun, the sepoys of this establishment showed their usual zeal and courage; but the number of European troops which were now intermixed with them, lessened their opportunities of distinguishing themselves, and though improved in discipline, they perhaps fell in their own estimation. The Native army in some degree became a secondary one, and the pride of those of whom it was composed was lowered. I am neither questioning the necessity of the increased number of His Majesty's troops which were employed in India at this period, nor the propriety of allotting to their superior strength and active courage services of the greatest danger, and consequently of pre-eminent honour; I only speak to the effect which the change made in the minds of the Native army. The campaigns of Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows were certainly not inferior, either in their operations or results, to those of Sir Eyre Coote; but every officer can tell how differently they are regarded by the sepoys who served in both; the latter may bring to their memory the distresses and hardships which they suffered, and perhaps the recollection of children who perished from famine, but it is associated with a sense of their own importance at that period to the Government they served, with the pride of fidelity and patient valour. The pictures of these three distinguished leaders are in the great room of the Exchange at Madras; to that (I speak of ten years ago) when a battalion comes into garrison the old sepoys lead their families. Wallis and Meadows (these are the names by which the two first commanders are known to them) are pointed out as great and brave chiefs; but it is to the image of their favourite, Coote, the pilgrimage is made, and the youngest of their children are taught to pay a respect bordering on devotion to this revered leader.

In the year 1796, new regulations were introduced into the Indian army, the whole form of which was in fact changed. Instead of single battalions of a thousand men, commanded by a captain who was selected from the European corps in the Honourable Company's service, and a subaltern to each company, they were formed into regiments of two battalions, to which officers were appointed of the same rank and nearly of the same number as to a battalion in the service of His Majesty. The good effects of this change, as far as related to the temper and attachment of the Native army of Fort St. George, have been questioned. That the appearance and discipline of these troops have been improved, there is no doubt, and they have, in the campaign against Seringapatam in 1799, and in the recent war with the Mahrattas, shown their usual patience and courage; but events have occurred to prove that their affections were not only capable of being alienated from their European officers, but that they could become their murderers. It is not meant here to enter into the particulars of the mutiny at Vellore, which came like a shock to dispel the charm of half a century, and to show by what a tenure our empire is held; but it is thought by many this event could not have taken place

place had the ties which formerly existed in the Native army not been much weakened, if not entirely broken. Of what has since occurred I forbear to speak, but I am assured that time and the efforts of great wisdom can alone afford a hope of a radical cure to the deep wounds that have been inflicted.

The general history of the Native army of Fort St. George is short. Sepoys were first disciplined, as has been stated, on that establishment in 1748; they were at that period, and for some time afterwards, in independent companies, under subadars or Native captains. Mahomed Esuf, one of the most distinguished of those officers, rose by his talents and courage to the general command of the whole; and the name of this hero, for such he was, occurs almost as often in the page of the English historian\* of India as that of Lawrence and Clive. As the numbers of the Native army increased, the form changed. In A. D. 1766 we find ten battalions of 1,000 men each, and three European officers to each corps. In 1770 there were eighteen battalions of similar strength, and in 1784 the number of this army had increased to 2,000 Native cavalry and 28,000 infantry; a considerable reduction was made at this period, but subsequent wars and conquests have caused a great increase, and the present effective strength of the Native army of Fort St. George consists of eight regiments of cavalry, and twenty-four regiments or forty-eight battalions of Native infantry. There are besides several troops of horse artillery, some battalions of gun lascars, and a very large invalid establishment.

A few remarks on the appearance and conduct of this army, with some anecdotes of remarkable individuals, will fully illustrate its character, and convey a just idea of the elements of which it is composed.

The Native cavalry of Fort St. George was originally raised by the Nabob of the Carnatic. The first corps embodied into a regiment under the command of European officers, on the suggestion of General Joseph Smith, served in the campaign of 1768 in Mysore. From 1771 to 1776 the cavalry force was greatly augmented, but then again declined both in numbers and efficiency. The proportion that was retained nominally in the service of the Nabob, but actually in that of the Company, served in the campaigns of 1780, 1781, 1782, and 1783, and was formally transferred, with the European officers attached to it, to the Company's service in 1784. The prospect of fortune which the liberality of an Indian prince offered, attracted to this corps many active and enterprising European officers, and the favour which a Native court extended to its choicest troops filled the ranks of its regiments of regular cavalry with the prime of the Mahomedan youth† of the Carnatic. When this corps was in the service of the Nabob of the Carnatic, though it was often very highly distinguished, the intrigues of a venal court and irregular payments caused frequent mutinies. Since it has been transferred to the Company's establishment, a period of more than thirty years, its career has been one of faithful service and of brilliant achievement, unstained by any example, that I can recollect, of disaffection or of defeat. The two severest trials of the courage and discipline of this corps were at Assaye and Vellore; in both these services they were associated with the 19th dragoons.

The distinguished commander‡ of that gallant regiment had, from the day of its arrival in India, laboured to establish the ties of mutual and cordial regard between the European and Native soldiers. His success was complete. His own fame while he remained in India was promoted by their combined efforts, and the friendship which he established, and which had continued for many years, was after his departure consummated upon the plains of Assaye. At the most critical moment of a battle which ranks amongst the hardest fought of those that have been gained by the illustrious Wellington, the British dragoons,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Orme.

† There cannot be men more suited, from their frame and disposition, for the duty of light cavalry than those of which this corps is composed. They are, generally speaking, from five feet five to five feet ten inches in height, of light but active make. Their strength is preserved and improved by moderation in their diet, and by exercise common to the military tribes, and which are calculated to increase the muscular force.

‡ The present General Sir John Floyd, Bart.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

dragoons, when making their extremest efforts, saw their Asiatic fellow-soldiers “keep pace for pace, and blow for every blow.” A more arduous task awaited the latter, when the battalions of Native infantry, which formed the garrison of Vellore, were led by the infatuation of the moment to rise upon and murder the Europeans of that garrison. The fidelity of the Native cavalry did not shrink from the severe trial, and after the gates of the fortress were blown open, their sabres were as deeply\* stained as those of the English dragoons with the blood of their misguided and guilty countrymen.

But a few authentic anecdotes of some of the most distinguished individuals of the Native cavalry of Madras will show better than volumes the high spirit that pervades that corps.

In the campaign of 1791, when Secunder Beg, one of the oldest subadars of the Native cavalry, was riding at a little distance in the flank of his troop, two or three horsemen of Tippoo’s army, favoured by some brushwood, came suddenly upon him; the combat had hardly commenced when the son of the subadar, who was a havildar or serjeant in the same regiment, flew to his father’s aid and slew the foremost of his opponents; the others fled; but nothing could exceed the rage of the old man at his son’s conduct; he put him instantly under a guard, and insisted upon his being brought to condign punishment for quitting his ranks without leave. It was with the greatest difficulty that Colonel Floyd, who commanded the force, could reconcile him to the disgrace he conceived he had suffered (to use his own expression) from his enemy “being taken from him by a presumptuous boy in front of his regiment.”

Cawder Beg, late subadar of the fourth regiment, may be deemed throughout his life as one of the most distinguished officers of the Native cavalry at Madras. In 1790, he was attached to Colonel Floyd as an orderly subadar, when that officer, who had been reconnoitering with a small detachment, was attacked by a considerable body of the enemy’s horse. Nothing but the greatest exertions of every individual could have saved the party from being cut off. Those of Cawder Beg were the most conspicuous, and they received a reward, of which he was proud to the last hour of his life: an English sabre was sent to him, with the name of Colonel Floyd upon it, and an inscription, stating that it was the reward of valour. But personal courage was the least quality of Cawder Beg: his talents eminently fitted him for the exercise of military command. During the campaign of 1799, it was essential to prevent the enemy’s looties, a species of Cossack horse, from penetrating between the columns and the rear guard, and plundering any part of that immense train of provisions and luggage, which it was necessary to carry to Seringapatam. Cawder Beg, with two or three of his relations from the Native cavalry and a select body of infantry, were placed under my orders. I was then political representative with the army of the Subah of the Deccan, and commanded a considerable body of the troops of that prince. I had applied for Cawder Beg on account of his reputation, and prevailed upon Meer Allum, the leader of the Subah’s forces, to place a corps of 2,000 of his best regular horse under the subadar’s orders. Two days after the corps was formed, an orderly trooper came to tell me that Cawder Beg was engaged with some of the enemy’s horsemen. I hastened to the spot with some alarm for the result, determined if Cawder Beg was victor, to reprove him most severely for a conduct so unsuited to the station in which he had been placed. The fears I entertained for his safety were soon dispelled, as I saw him advancing on foot with two swords in his hand, which he hastened to present to me, begging at the same time I would restrain my indignation at his apparent rashness till I heard his reasons; then speaking to me aside, he said, “Though the General of the Nizam’s army was convinced by your statement of my competence to the command you have entrusted me with, I observed that the high-born and high-titled leaders of the horse he placed under my orders, looked at my close jacket,† straight pantaloons and European boots, with contempt, and thought themselves

\* I state this fact upon the high authority of a respectable officer who belonged to the 19th dragoons and was with them on this memorable occasion.

† The Native troops in the English service wear a uniform very like that of Europeans.

selves disgraced by being told to obey me. I was therefore tempted, on seeing a well-mounted horseman of Tippoo's challenge their whole line, to accept a combat, which they declined. I promised not to use fire-arms, and succeeded in cutting him down; a relation came to avenge his death; I wounded him, and have brought him prisoner. You will" (he added smiling) "hear a good report of me at the durbar (court) of Meer Allum this evening, and the service will go on better for what has passed, and I promise most sacredly to fight no more single combats."

When I went in the evening to visit the Meer Allum, I found at his tent a number of the principal chiefs, and among others those that had been with Cawder Beg, with whose praises I was assailed from every quarter. "He was," they said, "a perfect hero, a Rustum;\* it was an honour to be commanded by so great a leader." The consequence was, as the subadar had anticipated, that the different chiefs who were placed under him vied in respect and obedience; and so well were the incessant efforts of this body directed, that scarcely a load of grain was lost; hardly a day passed that the activity and stratagem of Cawder Beg did not delude some of the enemy's plunderers to their destruction.

It would fill a volume to give a minute account of the actions of this gallant officer; he was the Native aide-de-camp of General Dugald Campbell when that officer reduced the Ceded districts;† he attended Sir Arthur Wellesley (the present Duke of Wellington) in the campaign of 1803, and was employed by that officer in the most confidential manner. At the end of this campaign, during which he had several opportunities of distinguishing himself, Cawder Beg, who had received a pension from the English Government, and whose pride was flattered by being created an omrah‡ of the Deccan by the Nizam, retired; but he did not long enjoy the distinction he had obtained; he died in 1806, worn out with the excessive fatigue to which he had for many years exposed himself.

The body guard of the Governor of Madras, which consists of about 100 men, has always been a very select corps, and the notice and attention with which both the Native officers and men of the corps have invariably been treated, may be adduced as one of the causes which have led to its obtaining distinction in every service on which it has been employed.

On the 13th May 1791, Lord Cornwallis returned his thanks in the warmest manner to this small corps and its gallant commanding officer, Captain Alexander Grant, for a charge made upon the enemy. It obtained still further distinction under Captain James Grant, the brother of its former commander, when employed, in the year 1801, against the Poligars, a race of warlike men who inhabit the southern part of the Madras territory. There are indeed few examples of a more desperate and successful charge than was made during that service by this small corps upon a phalanx of resolute pikemen, more than double its own numbers; and the behaviour of Shaikh Ibrahim, the senior subadar (a Native captain), on that occasion, merits to be commemorated.

This officer, who was alike remarkable for his gallantry and unrivalled skill as a horseman, anticipated, from his experience of the enemy, all that would happen. He told Captain Grant, what he thought would be the fate of those who led the charge at the same moment that he urged it, and heard with animated delight the resolution of his commander to attempt an exploit which was to reflect such glory on the corps. The leaders of the body guard and almost one-third of its number fell, as was expected; but the shock broke the order of their opponents, and they obtained a complete victory. Shaikh Ibrahim was pierced with several pikes, one was in the throat; he held his hand to this, as if eager to keep life till he asked the fate of Captain Grant. The man of whom  
he

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* The Persian Hercules.

† These districts, which were ceded to the English Government by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1799, lie between Mysore Proper and the territories of the Subah of the Deccan.

‡ He received the title of Cawder Nuaz Khan, or Cawder the favoured Lord.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

he inquired pointed to that officer, who was lying on the ground and apparently dead, with a pike through his lungs; the subadar, with an expression of regret that he had disdained to show for his own fate, pulled the pike from the wound, and instantly expired. His character and his behaviour in the last moment of existence are fully described in the following general order, which was issued on this occasion by the Government of Fort St. George:

“A rare combination of talents has rendered the character of Shaikh Ibrahim familiar to the officers of the army; to cool decision and daring valour, he added that sober judgment and those honourable sentiments that raised him far above the level of his rank in life. An exploit of uncommon energy and personal exertion terminated his career, and the last effort of his voice breathed honour, attachment, and fidelity.

“The Governor in Council, desirous of showing to the army his Lordship’s\* sense of the virtue and attainments which have rendered the death of this Native officer a severe loss to the service, has been pleased to confer on his family a pension equal to the pay of a subadar of the body guard, being thirty pagodas a month. And his Lordship has further directed that a certificate to this effect, translated into Persian and Hindoostanee, may be presented to the family, as a record of the gift, and a tribute to the memory of the brave Subadar Shaikh Ibrahim.”

The posthumous praise given to Shaikh Ibrahim appeared to have inspired others with a desire to share his fate, that they might attain his fame. A jemadar of the same corps, some days afterwards, being appointed with a few select men to watch a road, where it was thought the chief whom they were attacking might try to escape with one or two followers, determined, when a whole column came out, to make an attempt against its leader, and, such was the surprise at seeing five or six horsemen ride into a body of between 200 or 300 men, that he had cut down the chief before they had recovered from their astonishment; he succeeded in riding out of the column, but was soon afterwards shot. He had, when he meditated this attack, sent a person to inform Captain J. Grant (who had recovered of his wounds) of his intention. “The captain will discover,” he observed, “that there are more Shaikh Ibrahims than one in the body guard.” Captain Grant, when the service was over, erected tombs over these gallant officers: a constant lamp is kept at them, which is supported by a trifling monthly donation from every man in the body guard, and the noble spirit of the corps is perpetuated by the contemplation of these regimental shrines (for such they may be termed) of heroic valour.

Shaikh Moheedeen, a subadar of the body guard of Madras, who was one of the first officers appointed to the corps of Native horse artillery, recently raised on that establishment, accompanied me to Persia, and was left with a detachment of his corps, under the command of Captain Lindsay, to aid in instructing the Persians in military tactics. This small body of men and their gallant European commander were engaged in several campaigns in Georgia, and their conduct has obtained not only for the subadar, but for all the men of his party, marked honours and reward, both from the Persian Government and their own. Their exertions received additional importance from the scene on which they acted, for it is not easy to calculate the future benefits which may result from the display of the superior courage and discipline of the Native soldiers of India on the banks of the Araxes.

The Native infantry of Madras is generally composed of Mahomedans and Hindoos of good caste: at its first establishment none were enlisted but men of high military tribes. In the progress of time a considerable change took place, and Natives of every description were enrolled in the service. Though some corps that were almost entirely formed of the lowest and most despised races of men obtained considerable reputation, it was feared

\* Lord Clive (the present Lord Powis) was at this period Governor of Madras; and it is but justice to that nobleman to state, that virtue, talent, or valour, either in European or Native, were certain, under his administration, of attaining distinction and reward.

fearcd their encouragement might produce disgust, and particularly when they gained, as they frequently did, the rank of officers. Orders were in consequence given to recruit from none but the most respectable classes of society, and many consider the regular and orderly behaviour of these men as one of the benefits which have resulted from this system.

The infantry sepoy of Madras is rather a small man, but he is of an active make, and capable of undergoing great fatigue, upon a very slender diet. We find no man arrive at greater precision in all his military exercises; his moderation, his sobriety, his patience, give him a steadiness that is almost unknown to Europeans: but though there exists in this body of men a fitness to attain mechanical perfection as soldiers, there are no men whose mind it is of more consequence to study. The most marked general feature of the character of the Natives of India is a proneness to obedience, accompanied by a great susceptibility of good or bad usage; and there are few in that country who are more imbued with these feelings than the class of which we are now treating. The sepoys of Madras, when kindly treated, have invariably shown great attachment\* to the service; and when we know that this class of men can be brought, without harshness or punishment, to the highest discipline, we neither can nor ought to have any toleration for those who pursue a different system; and the Commander-in-chief is unfit for his station who grants his applause to the mere martinet, and forgets, in his intemperate zeal, that no perfection in appearance and discipline can make amends for the loss of the temper and attachment of the Native soldiers under his command.

We discover in the pages of Orme many examples of that patient endurance of privations and fatigue, and that steady valour, which has since characterized the Native infantry of Fort St. George. Their conduct in the war against Hyder Ally in 1766 was such as justly to entitle them to admiration. In the battle of Triumalee and Molwaggle they displayed all the qualifications of good and steady soldiers; and it was during this war that the 5th battalion of Native infantry, commanded by Captain Calvert, distinguished itself by the defence of Ambore, and obtained the honour of bearing a representation of that mountain fortress on one of its standards. To the campaigns of Sir Eyre Coote we have already alluded, and have spoken of the unshaken fidelity which the sepoys of Madras evinced at that trying juncture; but if a moment was to be named when the existence of the British power depended upon its Native troops, we should fix upon the battle of Portonovo. Driven to the sea shore, attacked by an enemy exulting in recent success,† confident in his numbers, and strong in the terror of his name, every circumstance combined that could dishearten the small body of men on whom the fate of the war depended: not a heart shrunk from the trial. Of the European troops it is of course superfluous to speak; but all the Native battalions appear, from every account of the action, to have been entitled to equal praise on this memorable occasion; and it is difficult to say whether they were most distinguished when suffering with a patient courage, under a heavy cannonade, when receiving and repulsing the shock of the flower of Hyder's cavalry, or when attacking in their turn the troops of that monarch, who, baffled in all his efforts, retreated

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-General  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* In old corps, that have been chiefly recruited within the territories which have been long in the possession of the Company, desertion is of very rare occurrence.

The first battalion of the 3d Native infantry marched, in 1803, from near Madura (of which district, and Trichinopoly, a great proportion of its men were Natives) to the Banks of the Taptee, a distance of above a thousand miles, without one desertion!

† The defeat of Colonel Baillie's detachment, which occurred at the commencement of this war. The defeat has been variously attributed to bad arrangements in the general plans of the campaign, to mismanagement on the part of the commanding officer, and to the misconduct of the Native troops. It is probable all these causes combined to produce this great misfortune; but we must recollect that the Native battalions that were chiefly accused of bad behaviour on this occasion were raw levies, who had never before seen service, and most of whom had hardly been in the army a sufficient time to be disciplined. The men composing these corps had been hastily raised in the Circars, or northern possessions of Madras, and their conduct created a prejudice (which experience has since proved to be unjust) against recruits from this quarter.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

retreated from this field of anticipated conquest with the loss of his most celebrated commander and thousands of his bravest soldiers.

I shall not dwell upon the different actions in the war against Tippoo and the Mahrattas in which the Madras sepoys signalized themselves, but merely state some anecdotes of corps and individuals which appear calculated to give a fair impression of the general character of this class of the defenders of our empire in India.

The Natives of India have, generally speaking, a rooted dislike to the sea; and when we consider the great privations and hardships to which Hindoos of high caste are subject on a long voyage, during which some of them, from prejudices of caste, subsist solely on parched grain, we feel less surprise at the occasional mutinies which have been caused by orders for their embarkation than at the zeal and attachment they have often shown upon such trying occasions.

A mutiny had occurred in the 9th battalion when ordered to embark for Bombay, in 1779 or 1780, which however had been quelled by the spirit and decision of its commandant, Captain Kelly. A more serious result had accompanied a similar order for the embarkation of some companies of a corps in the Northern Circars, who, when they came to Vizagapatam, the port where they were to take shipping, had risen upon their European officers, and in their violence shot all except one or two who escaped on board the vessel appointed to carry their men.

These events rendered Government averse to a repetition of experiments which had proved so dangerous; but in the year 1795, when the island of Ceylon, and the possessions of the Dutch in the Eastern Seas were to be reduced, Lord Hobart,\* who was then Governor of Fort St. George, made a successful appeal to the zeal and attachment of the Native troops, who volunteered in corps for foreign service.

A still greater call for men was necessary when an army was formed, in 1797, for the attack of Manilla, and many of the best battalions in the service showed a forwardness to be employed on this expedition. Among these, one of the most remarkable for its appearance and discipline was a battalion of the 22d regiment. This fine corps was commanded by Lieutenant-colonel James Oram,† an officer not more distinguished for his personal zeal and gallantry, than for a thorough knowledge of the men under his command, whose temper he had completely preserved, at the same time that he had imparted to them the highest perfection in their dress and discipline. When he proposed to his corps, on parade, to volunteer for Manilla, they only requested to know whether Colonel Oram would go with them: the answer was, "he would." "Will he stay with us?" was the second question. The reply was in the affirmative; the whole corps exclaimed, "To Europe, to Europe!" and the alacrity and spirit with which they subsequently embarked showed they would as readily have gone to the shores of the Atlantic as to an island of the Eastern Ocean. Not a man of the corps deserted from the period they volunteered for service till they embarked; and such was the contagion of their enthusiasm, that several sepoys who were missing from one of the battalions in garrison at Madras were found, when the expedition returned, to have deserted to join the 22d under Colonel Oram. We state this anecdote with a full impression of the importance of the lesson it conveys. It is through their affections alone that such a class of men can be well commanded.

I find in the Madras Native army many instances of unconquerable attachment to the service to which they belong. Among these none can be more remarkable than that of Syud

\* Lord Hobart, afterwards Earl of Buckinghamshire (at whose desire this Memorandum was written), was very successful in inspiring zeal in every branch of the Government under his charge, and his attention was peculiarly directed to the conciliation of the Natives. The local information he acquired at this period was subsequently matured by a study of the general interests of the Indian empire; and the life of this virtuous nobleman terminated at a moment when his services, from the high station he had attained of President of the Board of Control, were most valuable to his country.

† This officer has been dead upwards of fifteen years.

Syud Ibrahim, commandant of the Tanjore cavalry, who was made prisoner by Tippoo Sultaun in 1781. The character of this distinguished officer was well known to his enemy, and the highest rank and station were offered to tempt him to enter into the employment of the State of Mysore. His steady refusal occasioned his being treated with such rigour, and was attended, as his fellow-prisoners (who were British officers) thought, with such danger to his life, that they, from a generous feeling, contemplating his condition as a Mahomedan and a Native of India as in some essential points different from their own, recommended him to accept the offers of the Sultaun; but the firm allegiance of Syud Ibrahim would admit of no compromise, and he treated every overture as an insult. His virtuous resolution provoked at last the personal resentment of Tippoo, and when the English prisoners were released in 1784, the commandant was removed to a dungeon in the mountain fortress of Couley Droog, where he terminated his existence. His sister, who had left her home, the Carnatic, to share the captivity of her brother, was subsequently wounded in the storming of Seringapatam. She, however, fortunately recovered, and the Government of Fort St. George granted her a pension of fifty-two pagodas and a half per month, or £250 per annum, being the full pay of a Native commandant of cavalry. A tomb was also erected at the place where Syud Ibrahim died; and Government endowed it with an establishment sufficient to maintain a fakeer or priest, and to keep two lamps continually burning at the shrine of this faithful soldier.

Among the many instances of the effect which pride in themselves, and the notice of their superiors, inspire in this class of troops, I may state the conduct of the first battalion of the eighth regiment of infantry, which became, at the commencement of his career in India, a favourite corps\* of the Duke of Wellington. They were with him on every service; and the men of this corps used often to call themselves "Wellesley-ka Pulten," or Wellesley's battalion, and their conduct on every occasion was calculated to support the proud title they had assumed. A staff officer†, after the battle of Assaye, saw a number of the Mahomedans of this battalion assembled, apparently for a funeral; he asked whom they were about to inter; they mentioned the names of five commissioned and non-commissioned officers of a very distinguished family in the corps. "We are going to put these brothers‡ into one grave," said one of the party. The officer, who was well acquainted with the individuals who had been slain, expressed his regret, and was about to offer some consolation to the survivors, but he was stopped by one of the men: "There is no occasion," he said, "for such feelings or expressions; these men (pointing to the dead bodies) were sepoys (soldiers); they have died in the performance of their duties; the Government they served will protect their children, who will soon fill the ranks they lately occupied."

Though sensible I have dwelt too long upon this part of my subject, I cannot forbear recording an example of that patience with which the Native troops meet privation and distress. In 1804, the subsidiary force in the Deccan, commanded by Colonel Haliburton, was inclosed between two rivers, which became suddenly so swollen as to cut off their supplies of provisions. It was a period of general famine, and the communication was cut off with the grain dealers, from whom alone they could expect a supply. All the rice in camp was found to be barely sufficient for five days' allowance, at a very reduced rate, to the

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* This corps, some years before the period of which we are now speaking, attained very high reputation under Captain Dunwoody, an officer whose memory continues to be respected and cherished in the Native army of Fort St. George.

† The respected and distinguished officer, the late Sir Robert Barclay, to whom we owe this and the following anecdote of the Madras troops, concludes a note he has been kind enough to write on the subject with the following remark:

"I have seen (he observes) the Madras sepoys engaged in great and trifling actions more than fifty times; I never knew them behave ill, or backward, but once, when two havildars (or serjeants) that were next to me, quitted their post, from seeing the fire chiefly directed to me; but it is (he adds) but justice to state that, on other occasions, I have owed my life to the gallantry of my covering havildar."

‡ The term "brothers" extends, in India, to first cousins.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

the European part of the force. Issues to the sepoys were stopt, but while they were left to the scanty subsistence they might be able to procure for themselves, they were appointed the sole guards over that grain, from all share in which they were from necessity excluded. This duty was performed with the strictest care, and the most cheerful submission. Fortunately the waters subsided, and an ample supply prevented their feeling that extreme of famine, the prospect of which they had contemplated with an attention to discipline and a composure of mind which even astonished those best acquainted with their habits of order and obedience.

I have before stated, that it was at Bombay that the first Native corps were disciplined by the English. Of the exact date I am ignorant, but regular sepoys are noticed in the account of the transactions of that part of India some time before they were embodied at either Madras or Bengal. A corps of one hundred sepoys from Bombay, and four hundred from Tellicherry, is mentioned as having joined the army at Madras in A. D. 1747, and a company of Bombay sepoys, which had gone with troops from Madras to Bengal, were present at the victory of Plassey. The sepoys at Bombay continued long in independent companies, commanded by subadars or Native captains. As the possessions and political relations of that settlement were enlarged, its army increased. The companies were formed into battalions under European officers; and during the war with the Mahrattas, A. D. 1780, we find the establishment consisting of fifteen battalions. These, at the termination of the war with Tippoo, 1783, were reduced to six, and one battalion of marines. In 1788, its numbers were augmented to twelve battalions. In 1796, it was reformed into an establishment of four regiments, of two battalions each, from which it has been progressively raised, by the acquisition of territory and subsidiary alliances, to its present establishment of nine regiments of Native infantry, of two battalions each, one battalion of marines, and a small corps of Native cavalry.

The men of the Native infantry of Bombay are of a standard\* very near that of Madras. The lowest size taken is five feet three inches, and the average is five feet five, but they are robust and hardy, and capable of enduring great fatigue upon very slender diet.

This army has, from its origin to the present day, been indiscriminately composed of all classes, Mahomedans, Hindoos, Jews, and some few Christians. Among the Hindoos, those of the lowest tribes of Mahrattas and the Purwarrie, Soortee and Frost† sects, are much more numerous than the Rajpoots and higher castes. Jews have always been favourite soldiers in this army, and great numbers of them attain the rank of commissioned officers‡. It is probably owing to the peculiar composition, and to the local situation of the territories in which they are employed, that the sepoys of Bombay have at all periods been found ready to embark on foreign service. They are, in fact, familiar to the sea, and only a small proportion of them are incommoded in a voyage by those privations to which others are subject from prejudices of caste. But this is only one of the merits of the Bombay Native soldier: he is patient, faithful, and brave, and attached in a remarkable degree to his European officers. There cannot be a class of men more cheerful under privation and difficulties; and though desertion is very frequent among the recruits of this army, who, from the local position of Bombay, can, on the first feeling of disgust at discipline, always, in a few hours, escape to the Mahratta§ territories, where they are safe

\* Since this was written, a considerable change has taken place in the composition of the Bombay Native army, as explained in my letter to Lord William Bentinck under date the 27th November 1830.

† The Purwarrie are generally from the southward of Bombay, the Frost and Soortees from the northward. These are men of what is termed very low caste, being hardly above what are called Pariahs, on the Coast of Coromandel.

‡ I write from a memorandum of an officer of rank and experience in the Bombay army. He observes, "the Jews, are clean, obedient, and good soldiers, make excellent non-commissioned and commissioned officers, until they arrive at an advanced age, when they often fall off, and turn drunkards."

§ This was written previous to the war of 1817-1818, by the result of which these territories became subject to the English Government.

safe from pursuit, there are no men, after they become soldiers, more attached to their colours. I question, indeed, if any army can produce more extraordinary examples of attachment to the Government it served and to its officers than that of Bombay.

Towards the close of the war with Tippoo, in 1782, the whole of the force under General Mathews were made prisoners. The Sultaun, sensible of the advantages he might derive from the accession of a body of well-disciplined men, made every offer that he thought could tempt the English sepoy into his service, but in vain. He ordered them to work upon his fortifications, particularly Chittledroog, which was very unhealthy, upon a seer (two pounds) of raggy (a small grain like mustard-seed) and a pice (about a half-penny, per day. On this pittance they were rigidly kept at hard labour through the day, and in close confinement at night, subject to the continued insults of their guards; but neither insults, oppression, nor sickness, could subdue their fidelity; and at the peace of 1783, 1,500\* of the Natives of India, who had been made prisoners near the mountains of the Coast of Malabar, marched a distance of 500 miles to Madras, to embark on a voyage of six or eight weeks, to rejoin the army to which they belonged at Bombay. During the march from Mysore the guards of the Sultaun carefully separated those men, whenever they encamped, by a tank (a large reservoir) or some other supposed insurmountable obstacles, from the European prisoners, among whom were their officers. Not a night passed (I write from a paper of an officer of distinction who was a witness of what he states) that some of the sepoys did not elude the vigilance of their guards, by swimming across the tank, or by passing the sentries, that they might see their officers, to whom they brought such small sums as they had saved from their pittance, begging they would condescend to accept the little all they had to give. "We can live upon any thing (they used to say), but you require mutton and beef."

To the service in Egypt, in 1800, the Bombay troops proceeded with the same alacrity as to every other, and neither the new disorders (to them) of the ophthalmia or plague, from both of which they suffered, abated in the least degree their ardour. It happened that this force, and that from Bengal, were too late to share in the fame which our arms acquired in Egypt: but we can hardly contemplate an event in any history more calculated to inspire reflection on the character of that transcendent power which our country had attained, than the meeting of her European and Indian army on the shores of the Mediterranean.

During the progress of the war with France, subsequent to 1803, several parties of the marine battalions of Bombay sepoys were captured on board of the Company's cruizers and carried to the Isle of France, where they were treated in a manner that reflects no credit upon the local government of the island, which probably expected that the hardships they endured would make them give way to the temptations continually held out, and induce them to take service; but in this they were disappointed: not one of those men could be persuaded to enter into the employment of the enemies of Great Britain; and when the Isle of France was captured, they met with that notice which they had so well merited. The Government of Bombay granted to every individual who survived his captivity a silver medal, as a memorial of the sense which it entertained of his proved fidelity and attachment.

From the documents in my possession, many examples of individual heroism in the Bombay sepoy might be given, but I shall content myself with two, which will show in a very strong point of view the nature of their attachment to their European officers.

Four years ago, when the commanding officer† of a battalion on the Bombay establishment was proceeding along the banks of a ravine, with eight or ten men of his corps, to search for some lions, which had been seen near the cantonment of Kaira, in Guzerat, a royal tiger suddenly sprang upon him. The ground gave way, and the tiger and Major Hull rolled

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* A considerable number of the sepoys taken with General Mathews had, at the hazard of their lives, made their escape from the Sultaun, and reached Bombay, through the Mahratta territories.

† The present Lieutenant-colonel Hull.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

rolled together to the bottom of the ravine. Though this fall prevented the latter from being killed by the first assault, still his fate seemed certain; and those who know, from having witnessed it, the terror which the attack of this fierce animal inspires, can only appreciate the character of that feeling which led every sepoy who was with him to rush at once to his succour. The tiger fell under their bayonets, though not before it had wounded two of the assailants most desperately; one having lost his leg, and the other been so lacerated as to be rendered unfit for future service as a soldier. These wounds, however, were deemed trivial by those who sustained them, when they saw that the officer whom they loved had escaped unhurt from his perilous situation.

The second example of this strong feeling of duty is still more remarkable, as it was not merely encountering danger, but a devotion to certain death. I take the account of the transaction from a document\* in which it was recorded at the period of its occurrence.

In 1797, Captain Packenham, in his Majesty's ship *Resistance*, accompanied by some small vessels of war belonging to the Company, took possession of Copong, the chief Dutch settlement on the Eastern Isle of Timor. Lieutenant Frost, of the Bombay marine, commander of the *Intrepid* cruizer, who was to be appointed Governor of Copong, had taken a house on shore, where he expected Captain Packenham to meet the Dutch Governor, and make arrangements for the future administration of the place. The Malays had formed a plan, by which it was settled that the moment Captain Packenham landed to attend this meeting, they were to rise and murder all the Englishmen on shore. Fortunately something occurred to induce Captain Packenham to defer his visit; but he sent his boat, and its reaching the beach was the signal for the commencement of the massacre. Nearly twenty persons were slain. A large party had rushed to Lieutenant Frost's house. The head of his surgeon had been struck off, and his own destruction seemed inevitable, when two sepoys of the Bombay marine battalion, whom he had landed from his vessel, exclaimed to him, "Save yourself by flight, we will fight and die;" at the same time exposing themselves to the fury of their assailants, and giving their commander time to escape to a boat. The sepoys, after a resistance as protracted as they could render it, were slain, and their heads, exposed on pikes, explained their fate to their lamenting companions on board the *Intrepid*. Captain Packenham took prompt and ample vengeance of this treachery; he opened a heavy fire upon the place, under which he landed an efficient force, which defeated the Malays, who fled after losing 200 men.

The length into which I have been led in the account of the Native armies of Madras and Bombay must, in some degree, limit the observations on that of Bengal; I shall, therefore, not dwell on details connected with the progress of this army, from a few companies who landed with Lord Clive in 1756, to its present number, which is upwards of 60,000 effective Native soldiers, commanded by about 1,500† European officers, but content myself with noticing those facts which appear best calculated to illustrate the disposition and character of the materials of which it is composed.

Captain Williams has written a narrative of this army, which, though not perhaps altogether calculated to please the fastidious reader, is throughout simple and intelligible; and the authenticity of the facts is confirmed by the manner in which they are related. His plan evidently was, to give the history of each corps from the period in which it was raised to its dissolution, or till it was formed into a regiment of the present establishment; but, having been an actor in many of the scenes he describes, he is insensibly led into digressions, which, though sometimes tedious, we must pardon, from the curious and interesting matter they contain.

The first battalion raised in Bengal were 10 companies of 100 men each, commanded by a captain, with one lieutenant, one ensign and one or two serjeants. Each company had a standard of the same ground as the facings, with a different device (suited to its subadar,

\* Madras newspapers, 25th Sept. 1797.

† This is independent of the officers of artillery and engineers, and of invalid corps. In 1760, the whole of the European officers in the service of the Company in Bengal amounted to 18 captains, 20 lieutenants, and 15 ensigns.

subadar, or Native captain), of a sabre, a crescent, or a dagger. The Company's colours, with the Union in one corner, were carried by the grenadiers. The first battalions were known by the name of the captain by whom they were commanded, and though, in 1764, 19 corps received a numerical rank, corresponding with the actual rank of their commandants at that period, this did not prevent them from continuing to be known under their former appellation, or from assuming the name of a favourite leader; and it is under these names (which Captain Williams has faithfully preserved) that he gives the history of some of the most distinguished corps in the service. He commences with an account of the 15th battalion, which he informs us was raised in Calcutta in 1757, and called the "Mathews," from the name of its first commander. This corps was with Colonel Ford in 1759, when that able officer, with 346 Europeans and 1,400 sepoys, besieged and took by storm the strong fortress of Masulipatam, making prisoners a French garrison, who, both in Europeans and Natives, were nearly double his numbers. In this daring and arduous enterprise we are told by the historian of India that "the sepoys (who lost in killed and wounded on the storm, 200 men) behaved with equal gallantry as the Europeans, both in the real and false attacks."\* In 1763, in the wars with the Vizier of Oude, the "Mathews," which was with the force under the command of Major Adams, is stated, when the Company's European regiment was broken by cavalry, to have nobly supported His Majesty's 84th regiment, whose courage restored the action. Major Adams died shortly afterwards, and a general mutiny of the whole force took place, in which the sepoys at first joined, but were soon after reclaimed to their duty. Captain Williams at this part enters into a long digression respecting the events of the period. He gives an account of the battle of Buxar, which was fought in 1764, and in which all the Native corps appear to have behaved well, though the action was chiefly gained by the courage and discipline of the European part of the force.

In 1782, the "Mathews" was one of three Bengal corps who mutinied, under an apprehension of being embarked for foreign service; and though the conduct of those corps† was remarkable for the total absence of that spirit of general insubordination and disposition to outrage by which mutinies of soldiery are usually marked, they were in the ensuing year broken and drafted into some other battalions. "Thus fell the 'Mathews' (says Captain Williams,) a corps more highly spoken of during the 26 years it existed than any battalion in the service; and at this day (he adds), if you meet any of the old fellows who once belonged to it, and ask them what corps they came from, they will erect their heads and say, 'Mathews-ka Pulten,' or, 'Mathews's battalion.'"

The present second battalion of the 12th regiment appears, from Captain Williams's account, to have been raised some months before the "Mathews." He indeed calls it the first raised battalion. This corps was at the battle of Plassey. It was named by the sepoys

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Orme's History of India, vol. iii. p. 489.

† I cannot refrain from giving the following account of this mutiny, which is written by an officer who witnessed it. It is very characteristic of the Bengal sepoys—"The mutiny (this officer observes), excepting a general spirit of murmur and discontent, was confined to the single instance of refusing the service, and whilst in that state, preventing the march of two companies which were ordered to protect stores, &c. prepared for the expedition. The men were guilty of no violence of any description, and treated their officers with the usual respect. The discipline of the corps was carried on as usual; and notwithstanding some of the Native officers and men who had acted the most conspicuous part were confined in the quarter-guards of their respective regiments, no attempt was made to release them. After a lapse of several weeks, a general court-martial was held, and two subadars and one or two sepoys were sentenced to death, by being blown away from the mouth of the cannon. The sentence was carried into execution, in the presence of those troops which had mutinied, excepting one other regiment, which was at the station, without the smallest opposition, or even murmur; and the troops were marched round the spot of execution, amidst the mangled remains of their fellow soldiers, without any other apparent feeling than the horror which such a scene was calculated to excite, and pity for their fate."

The intended service was given up, and the regiments, which had mutinied were pardoned in general orders; but on the return to the Bengal provinces of General Goddard's detachment, the officers and men of the regiments which had mutinied were drafted into those old battalions.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

sepoys the Lal Pulten, or the Red \*battalion, and afterwards Gallis,† from the name of one of its first captains. It was associated with the "Mathews" in all its early service, particularly at Masulipatam, Gheretty, &c.; but in 1764 it mutinied, on the pretext of some promises which were made to it having been broken. Having no apparent object, it was easily reduced to obedience; but Major Munro (afterwards Sir Hector Munro), who then commanded the army, thought a severe example necessary, and twenty-eight of the most guilty were tried by a drum-head court-martial, and sentenced to death. Eight of these were directed to be immediately blown away from the guns of the force then at Choprah. As they were on the point of executing the sentence, three grenadiers, who happened to be amongst them, stepped forth, and claimed the privilege of being blown away from the right-hand guns. "They had always fought on the right (they said), and they hoped they would be permitted to die at that post of honour." Their request was granted, and they were the first executed. "I am sure (says Captain Williams, who then belonged to the Royal Marines employed in Bengal, and who was an eye-witness of this remarkable scene) that there was not a dry eye among the marines, although they had been long accustomed to hard service, and two of them had actually been in the execution party which shot Admiral Byng, in 1757."

This corps subsequently distinguished itself in 1776 at the battle of Korah. It had been known originally as the first battalion. It was afterwards numbered the 9th, from the rank of its captain. In a new arrangement of the army it was made the 16th, then the 17th. By the regulations of 1796, it has become the 2d of the 12th regiment; and it has of late years, as we shall hereafter have occasion to mention, far outdone its former fame.

A detachment, composed of six Native battalions, a corps of Native cavalry, and a proportion of artillery, altogether amounting to 103 European officers, and 6,624 Native troops, was in 18—sent from Bengal to the relief of the settlement of Bombay. Its first rendezvous was at Culpce, a town on the right bank of the Jumna, near Cawnpore, whence it commenced its march on the 12th June 1778. It reached Rajgurn, a town in Bundelcund, on the 17th August, where it halted so much longer than Mr. Hastings thought necessary, that he removed Colonel Leslie, the commanding officer, and appointed Lieutenant-colonel Goddard to that charge. Under this active and enterprising officer it continued its route through Malwa and Candeish to Surat, presenting the extraordinary spectacle of a corps of the Natives of Hindostan under the guidance of a few officers, marching from the banks of the Ganges to the westernmost shores of India. During the five years that they were absent from their home, the men of this detachment conducted themselves in the most exemplary manner, and acquired distinction in every service in which they were employed. I shall not repeat the warm and animated eulogium which Mr. Hastings passed upon this corps in one of the last general orders he issued to the army in Bengal, but all must subscribe to the truth of his observation, that their conduct showed that "there are no difficulties which the true spirit of military enterprise is not capable of surmounting."

The force detached to the Carnatic in 1781 was commanded by Colonel Pearse. It consisted of five regiments, of two small battalions (500 men each) of Native infantry, some Native cavalry, and a proportion of artillery. This corps, which marched about 1,100 miles along the sea-coast, through the province of Cuttack, and the Northern Circars to Madras, arrived at that Presidency at a most eventful period, and their services were eminently useful to the preservation of our power in that quarter. Among the many occasions which this detachment had of distinguishing itself, the attack on the French

\* Probably from its dress.

† The name of this officer (who is still alive) is Galliez. The Natives of India often corrupt English names in an extraordinary manner: Dalrymple is made into Dalduffe; Ochterlony, Lonyochter; Littlejohn, John Little; Shairp, Surrup, &c. &c.

French lines at Cuddalore in 1783 was the most remarkable. The Bengal sepoys that were engaged on that occasion behaved nobly. It was one of the first times that European troops and the disciplined Natives of India had met at the bayonet. The high spirit and bodily vigour of the Rajpoots of the provinces of Behar and Benares (the class of which three-fourths of this army was then composed) proved fully equal to the contest. In a partial action, which took place in a sortie made by the French, they were defeated with severe loss; and the memory of this event continues to be cherished with just pride both by the officers and men of the Bengal Native army. Had the result of this affair, and the character of these sepoys, been more generally known, some of our countrymen would have been freed from that excessive alarm which was entertained for the safety of our Eastern possessions when the late despot of Continental Europe threatened them with invasion. I trust that every event that can seriously disturb the peace of our Indian empire is at a great distance; but if an European army had crossed the Indus, I should not tremble for its fate. I well know that the approach of such a force would strike no terror into the minds of men of whom I am writing, and that acting with British troops, and led by British officers, they would advance with almost as assured a confidence of victory against a line of well-disciplined Europeans as against a rabble of their own untrained countrymen. They might fail; but they are too bold, and too conscious of their own courage and strength, ever to anticipate defeat.

I should feel hesitation in stating my sentiments so strongly on this subject, if I did not know them to be those which have been entertained and avowed by many eminent commanders,\* who have had opportunities of forming a judgment upon this question. When Colonel Pearse's detachment, which had been reduced by service from 5,000 to 2,000 men, returned to Bengal after an absence of four years, the policy of Mr. Hastings heaped every distinction upon them that he thought calculated to reward their merits, or to stimulate others to future exertion of a similar nature. He visited this corps, and his personal conduct towards both the European officers and Natives gave grace to his public measures. A lasting impression† was made on the minds of all; and every favour was doubled by the manner in which it was conferred.

The rebellion of Cheyt Singh, the Rajah of Benares, in 1781, must be familiar to all acquainted with Indian history. My purpose in mentioning it, is limited to the object of showing the conduct of the Bengal sepoys under one of the severest trials of fidelity to which they were ever exposed.

The numerous followers of the Rajah had risen upon two companies of sepoys appointed to guard the house in which he was placed under restraint, and killed and wounded the whole of them. The rashness of an European officer had led another party to slaughter in the streets of Ramnagur. Mr. Hastings, who was at Benares when these events occurred, had only a few companies of sepoys to guard his person, and even these he had no money to support. He summoned corps from different quarters to his aid; but when we reflect on the impression which the first success of Cheyt Singh had made, and consider that by far the greatest proportion of the troops with whom Mr. Hastings had overcome the dangers with which he was surrounded were men of the same tribe and country as those against whom they were to act, and that the chief, who was declared a rebel, had long been considered by many of them as their legitimate prince, we must respect the mind that remained firm and unmoved at so alarming a crisis. The know-  
ledge

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* I can particularly quote the late Lord Lake. No officer ever saw troops under more varied and severe trials than he did the Bengal sepoys. He never spoke of them but with admiration; and was forward to declare, that he considered them equal to a contest with any troops that could be brought against them.

† An officer of rank and distinction (Major-general Sir Henry Worsley), who, when a young subaltern, was an eye-witness of this scene, observes, in a letter which he has written to me on the subject, "Mr. Hastings, dressed in a plain blue coat, with his head uncovered, rode along the ranks. The troops had the most striking appearance of hardy veterans. They were all as black as ink, contrasted with the sleek olive skins of our own corps. The sight of that day (he concludes), and the feelings it excited, have never been absent from my mind; to it, and to the affecting orders (which Mr. Hastings issued), I am satisfied I, in a great degree, owe whatever of professional pride and emulation I have since possessed."

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

ledge Mr. Hastings had of the sepoys led him to place implicit trust in them on this trying occasion, and his confidence was well rewarded. Their habits of discipline, and their attachment to their officers and the service, proved superior to the ties of caste and of kindred. Not an instance of defection occurred, and the public interests were preserved and restored by their zeal and valour.

Before I make any remarks on the more recent parts of the history of the Bengal Native infantry, I must offer some observations on the composition of the army of that Presidency. The cavalry, which now consists of eight regiments, is comparatively young; its formation on the present establishment was only just completed when the Mahratta war of 1803 commenced. Their conduct, however, in the severe service that ensued has justly raised their reputation, and they at present form a most efficient and distinguished branch of the army to which they belong.\* The men are rather stouter than those in the same corps at Madras. The latter are almost all Mahomedans, and a considerable proportion of the Bengal cavalry are of the same race. The fact is, that with the exception of the Mahratta tribe, the Hindoos, are not, generally speaking, so much disposed as the Mahomedans to the duties of a trooper; and though the Mahomedans may be more dissipated and less moral in their private conduct than the Hindoos, they are zealous and high-spirited soldiers, and it is excellent policy to have a considerable proportion of them in the service, to which experience has shown they often become very warmly attached. In the Native infantry of Bengal the Hindoos are in the full proportion of three-fourths to the Mahomedans. They consist chiefly of Rajpoots, who are a distinguished race among the Khitree or military tribe. We may judge of the size of these men when we are told that the standard below which no recruit is taken is five feet six inches.† The great proportion of the grenadiers are six feet and upwards. The Rajpoot is born a soldier. The mother speaks of nothing to her infant but deeds of arms, and every sentiment and action of the future man is marked by the first impressions that he has received. If he tills the ground (which is the common occupation of this class), his sword and shield are placed near the furrow, and moved as his labour advances. The frame of the Rajpoot is almost always improved (even if his pursuits are those of civil life) by martial exercises; he is from habit temperate in his diet, of a generous, though warm temper, and of good moral conduct; he is, when well-treated, obedient, zealous, and faithful. Neither the Hindoo nor the Mahomedan soldier of India can be termed revengeful, though both are prone to extreme violence‡ in points where they deem

\* It is only to peruse the despatches of the late Lord Lake to be sensible of the excellence this corps very early obtained. I know few military exploits of cavalry more extraordinary than that which he performed with a column of three regiments of British light dragoons and three of Native cavalry, supported by some horse artillery and a small reserve of infantry. With this corps his Lordship pursued Jeswunt Row Holkar from Delhi, through the Doonab, till he came up with and defeated him at Futtyghur. Lord Lake, in a despatch dated 18th November, in which he gives an account of this operation, observes, "The troops have daily marched a distance of twenty-three or twenty-four miles. During the night and day previous to the action they marched fifty-eight miles, and from the distance to which they pursued the enemy, the space passed over, before they had taken up their ground, must have exceeded seventy miles."

† Before 1796 it was always five feet six inches and a half. By an order in 1809, men may be taken for light infantry corps as low as five feet five inches.

‡ One instance is given in Captain Williams's narrative of the action of this violent spirit. In 1772, a sepoy of the now first battalion of the 10th regiment, who had suffered what he supposed an injury, fell out of the ranks when the corps was at exercise, and going up to Captain Ewens, the commanding officer, with recovered arms, as if to make some request, took a deliberate aim, and shot him, then patiently awaited the death he had merited. I could give several examples of similar feeling; two will suffice. Captain Crook, formerly of the Madras cavalry, struck a sentry for allowing a bullock that brought water to his tent, to step over the threshold and dirty it. The man took no notice of what had occurred till relieved from his post; he then went to his lines, and a short time afterwards sought his captain, and taking deliberate aim at him, shot him dead upon the spot. He made no attempt to escape. He had avenged his honour from the blows he had received, and met with calmness and fortitude the death that was awarded as the punishment of his crime.

An officer (still living) was provoked, at some offence the man had committed, to strike a Madras Native trooper under his command. On the night of the same day, as he was sitting with another officer in his tent, the trooper came in, and, taking aim at him, fired; but, owing to the other officer striking his arm, the ball missed. As, however, he fell in the confusion, and the light was extinguished, his companion, who considered him killed, ran to obtain aid, and to seize the murderer, who had another pistol in his hand. The moment he was out of the tent, he heard the other pistol go off; and, on returning with a guard of men and some lights, he found that the trooper, conceiving that the first shot had taken effect, and that his honour was avenged by the death of the person who had insulted him, had, with the second pistol, shot himself through the head.

deem their honour, of which they have a very nice sense, to be slighted or insulted. The Rajpoots sometimes want energy, but seldom, if ever, courage. It is remarkable in this class, that even when their animal spirits have been subdued so far as to cause a cessation of exertion, they show no fear of death, which they meet in every form it can present itself with surprising fortitude and resignation. Such is the general character of a race of men, whose numbers in the army of Bengal amount to between 30,000 and 40,000, and of whom we can recruit in our provinces to any amount. But this instrument of power must be managed with care and wisdom, or that which is our strength may become our danger. It must always be recollected that minds of the caste we have described are alive to every impulse, and, from similarity of feeling, will all vibrate at the same touch. If we desire to preserve their attachment, we must continue to treat them with kindness, liberality, and justice; we must attend to the most trifling of their prejudices, and avoid rash innovations, but above all, those that are calculated to convey to their minds the most distant alarm in points connected with their usages or religion.

A detachment of Bengal Native troops shared in the glory acquired by Lord Cornwallis in his war against Tipoo Sultan, in 1790 and 1791. From that time till 1803, the only operation of any consequence in which they were engaged was a short campaign, in Rohilcund, in 1794. The rude and untrained, but fierce and hardy enemies against whom Sir R. Abercrombie had to act, were perhaps too much despised, and they took advantage of a confusion caused in his right wing, by the bad behaviour of the English commandant of a small body of half-disciplined cavalry, to make a furious charge, by which a most destructive impression was made on two battalions of sepoy and a regiment of Europeans.

Their desperate career was checked by the fire of the English artillery, by whose good conduct, and the steady valour of the other parts of the line, a victory was ultimately gained. The Native troops never, perhaps, displayed more courage than on this trying occasion, and all regretted that the infamous\* conduct of one man had caused such serious loss of officers and men in some of the most distinguished corps† of the army.

The campaigns of 1803 and 1804 present a series of actions and sieges, in every one of which the Bengal sepoy showed their accustomed valour. At the battles of Delhi and Laswarie they were as eminently distinguished as at the sieges of Agra and Deeg; and I may safely assert, that in the only two great reverses which occurred during the war, the retreat of Colonel Monson and the siege of Bhurtpore, the courage, firmness, and attachment of the Native troops were more conspicuous than in its most brilliant periods. We know sufficient of the former operations to regret that no full and faithful account of them has yet been published; nor does Captain Williams's narrative supply this blank. I can only express my conviction, founded on a perusal of a private journal kept by an officer of the detachment, that in this disastrous retreat, the Native troops (with the exception of a very few, who, after suffering almost unparalleled hardships, were deluded by the offers of the enemy to desert) behaved in the most noble manner. They endured the greatest privations and distresses, during the march from the banks of the Chumbul in Malwa, where the first retrograde movement was made, till their arrival at Agra, a distance of nearly four hundred miles. They had at once to combat the elements (for it rained almost incessantly) and the enemy. Scenes of horror‡ occurred which were hardly ever surpassed; yet, though deprived of

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* The name of this officer was Ramsay. He escaped, by desertion, from the punishment he had so amply merited.

† The corps on the right of the army was the 13th battalion, which had been eminently distinguished against the French at Cuddalore. It had earned more laurels under its well known commander, Captain Norman Macleod, in the campaigns of Lord Cornwallis. Captain Ramsay's cavalry rode unexpectedly over this fine battalion, and 5,000 Rohillas charged it, before it could recover from the confusion into which it was thrown.

‡ Particularly at the Chumbullee Nullah, a rapid torrent, at which the elephants were employed to carry the troops over. The animals becoming wearied or impatient, shook off those on their backs, numbers of whom were drowned. But a still more horrid scene ensued. The fatigued elephants could not bring over the followers. The Bheels, a mountain banditti, encouraged by Holkar, came down upon the unprotected females and children, whom they massacred in



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3).—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

of regular food and rest, and harassed with continued attacks, their spirit was unbroken. They maintained throughout the most severe discipline, and I am assured that on many occasions, when their European officers, worn down by the climate and fatigue, appeared faint or desponding, the men next them, exclaimed, "Keep up your heart, Sir, we will take you in safety to Agra."\* When in square, and sustaining charges from the enemy's horse, it more than once happened, when a musket was fired by a young soldier, that a veteran struck him with the butt end of his firelock, exclaiming, "Are you mad, to destroy our discipline and make us like the rabble that are attacking us?"

The only serious impatience that the sepoys of this detachment showed was to be led against the enemy; and the manner in which they behaved on all occasions given them of signalizing their valour showed that this feeling had its rise in no vain confidence. The flank companies, under Captain O'Donnell, were very successful in beating up the quarters of a considerable corps of the enemy on the 21st of July. On the 24th of August, when all the detachment, which consisted of five battalions and six companies of sepoys, had been sent across the Bannas river, except the 2d battalion of the 2d regiment, and some piquets, Holkar brought up his infantry and guns to attack this corps, which not only defended its position, but advanced with the utmost gallantry, and obtained possession of several pieces of the enemy's artillery. It could not, however, be supported by the other parts of the force, who were divided from it by the river, and it was almost annihilated. Those, who witnessed the attack which it made upon Holkar's line from the opposite bank of the Bannas, speak with admiration of the heroism of the European officers, and of the gallant men whom they led to a momentary but fatal victory. At the close of this affair they saw a jemadar (Native lieutenant) retiring towards the river, pursued by five or six men. He held the standard of his battalion in one hand, and a sword, with which he defended himself, in the other. When arrived at the river he seemed to have attained his object of saving the colours of his corps, and, springing with them into the current, sunk to rise no more.

There have been few officers who better understood the character of soldiers than the late Lord Lake; he had early discovered that of the Bengal sepoys; he attended to their prejudices, flattered their pride, and praised their valour. They repaid his consideration of them with gratitude and affection, and during the whole of the late Mahratta war† their zeal and devotion to the public service was increased by the regard and attachment which they entertained for the Commander-in-chief. Sufficient instances of this are recorded by Captain Williams. There is none, however, more remarkable than the conduct he pursued towards the shattered corps of Colonel Monson's detachment. He formed them into a reserve, and promised them every opportunity of signalizing themselves. No confidence was ever better repaid, and throughout the service that ensued, these corps were uniformly distinguished.

The conduct of the 2d battalion of the 12th regiment may be taken as an example of the spirit that animated the whole. This corps, which has been before noticed under its first name of "Gallis," or the Lal Pulten, had behaved with uncommon valour at the battle of Laswarie, where it had 100 men and three officers killed and wounded. It was associated on that occasion with His Majesty's 76th regiment, and shared in the praise which Lord Lake bestowed on "the handful of heroes," as he emphatically termed those whose great exertions decided that battle. It was with Colonel Monson's detachment, and maintained its high character in the disastrous retreat we have alluded to. But all its former deeds were outdone at the siege of Bhurtpore. It appears by a printed memorial which we have before us of its European commanding officer, that on the first storm of that fortress this corps lost 150 officers and men, killed and wounded, and did not retire till the last. On the  
third

in the most inhuman manner. It was on this extreme trial, that some of the gallant fellows, who had before suffered every hardship with firmness, gave way to despair. Several of them, maddened with the screams of their wives and children, threw themselves, with their firelocks, into the rapid stream, and perished in a vain attempt to aid those they loved more than life.

\* I have been informed of this fact by officers to whom these expressions were used.

† The war of 1803-4.

third attack, when joined with the 1st battalion of the same regiment (amounting together to 800 men), it became the admiration of the whole army. The 2d battalion of the 12th regiment on this occasion not only drove back the enemy who had made a sally to attack the trenches, but effected a lodgment, and planted its colours on one of the bastions of the fort. Unfortunately this work was cut off by a deep ditch from the body of the place; and after the attack had failed the 12th regiment was ordered to retire, which they did reluctantly, with the loss of 7 officers and 350 men, killed and wounded, being nearly half the number they had carried into action.

Examples of equal valour might be given of many other corps during the war, and instances of individual valour might be noticed in any number, but more is not necessary to satisfy the reader of the just title of the Bengal sepoys to the high name which they have acquired; and from late accounts\* we perceive that their conduct throughout the arduous service in Nepaul, where they had at once to contend with the natural obstacles of an almost impracticable country, and the desperate valour of a race of hardy mountaineers, has been worthy of their former fame. Since the conclusion of this war a small body of these troops has had an opportunity of exhibiting, in a most distinguished manner, that firmness, courage, and attachment to their officers and the service, which have always characterized this army. We allude to a recent occurrence of a most serious sedition at Bareilly, the capital of Rohilkund. The introduction of a police-tax, intended to provide means for the security of life and property, had spread alarm and discontent among an ignorant population, whose prejudices in favour of their ancient usages are so strong as to lead them to regard any innovation (whatever be its character) with jealousy and indignation. Acting under these feelings, the Rohillas of Bareilly, who are alike remarkable for their strength of body and individual courage, rose in a body to oppose the orders of the civil magistrate. They were influenced by a priest upwards of ninety years of age, who dug his grave, to indicate his resolution to conquer or die, and at whose orders the green flag, or standard of Mahomet, was hoisted, that religious feelings might be excited to aid the efforts which they now proclaimed themselves determined to make to effect the downfall of their European tyrants. What rendered this revolt more alarming, was the knowledge that the cause of the insurgents was popular over the whole country, and a belief that their success would be the signal for a general rise in the neighbouring provinces. All the force that could be collected to suppress this revolt was a detachment of between three and four hundred sepoys of the 27th regiment of Native infantry, and part of a provincial battalion under Captain Boscawen, with two guns, and a party of about 400 Rohilla horse belonging to a corps lately embodied under Captain Cunningham. The former received, with undismayed courage, the charge of an undisciplined, but furious and desperate rabble, who, encouraged by their numbers, which exceeded 12,000 armed men, persevered in the attack till more than 2,000 of them were slain; and the latter, though of the same class and religion as the insurgents, and probably related to many of them by the ties of kindred, proved equally firm as the sepoys to their duty. When their priest advanced and invoked them to join their natural friends, and to range themselves under the standard of their faith, only one man was found wanting in fidelity; he deserted and was soon afterwards slain by his former comrades, who continued throughout to display prompt obedience, exemplary courage, and unshaken attachment to the officer by whom they were led.

However

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* I know of few instances where more has been required from the zeal and valour of the Native troops than in the late campaign against the Goorkhas. The great successes of Major-general Sir D. Ochterlony could only have been gained by the patience and courage of the troops being equal to the skill and decision of their commander, and in the spirited and able operations of Colonel Nicolls, quartermaster-general of His Majesty's troops in India, against Almora, where 800 sepoys, aided by a few irregulars, were led against 3,000 gallant mountaineers, who occupied that mountain fortress, and the heights by which it was surrounded. Victory could only have been obtained by every sepoy partaking of the ardour and resolution of his gallant leader. Of their conduct on this occasion we may, indeed, judge by the admiration with which it inspired Colonel Nicolls, who gave vent to his feelings in an order that does honour to his character. Speaking of an attack made by a party of sepoy grenadiers, he observes, "This was an exploit of which the best troops of any age might justly have been proud."

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

However slight this affair may seem, I do not recollect any occurrence in the history of British India more calculated to show the dependence of our power on the fidelity of our Native troops, and the absolute necessity of adopting every measure by which their attachment can be confirmed and approved.

It is by treating the sepoys with kindness and consideration, by stimulating their pride, and by attending, in the most minute manner, to their feelings and prejudices, that we can command, as has been well observed, “their lives through the medium of their affections;” and so long as we can, by these means, preserve the fidelity and attachment of that proportion of the population of our immense possessions in the East, which we arm to defend the remainder, our empire may be considered as secure.

JOHN MALCOLM.

P.S. Subsequent to the date of this account, the Native arms of India have fully maintained the high reputation they had achieved.

During the campaigns against the Mahrattas and Pindaries, in 1817 and 1818, that in the territories of Ava, and the siege of Bhurtpore in 1826, these troops evinced all the military qualities of zeal, attachment to their colours, and gallantry, for which they had been so long distinguished.

JOHN MALCOLM.

DOCUMENTS referred to in Sir JOHN MALCOLM'S Letter to the Secretary of the India Board, under date the 13th February 1832.

#### LETTER to Lord W. BENTINCK (with Enclosures).

My Lord,

I HAVE been long in replying to your Lordship's letter applying for my opinion on the pay, composition and distribution of the army in India, as I wished before I did so to collect such information as would aid me in giving my opinion on points so important to the future peace and maintenance of this empire.

2. This subject divides itself into very distinct branches—the European and the Native. Of the constitution of the European branch I have given my sentiments generally, but very fully, in the second volume of the History of India. The actual state of the army of this Presidency demanding attention soon after my arrival, your Lordship will find all the information I possess, as well as my opinion upon some of the most essential points, in a copy of my minute, under date the 25th March 1828, which I annex to this letter.

3. The subject of the pay of European officers in India, has been brought forcibly to attention by the clamorous discontent occasioned by reducing several of your stations from full to half batta, and the feelings and hardships of the European corps on this establishment by the unequal operation of the order reducing half tentage. Both these facts impart a serious lesson to Government in respect to the principles that should regulate increase in the pay of armies. Full batta was originally meant to provide for field equipment and extra expenses which officers must incur when marching; but it early lost this character in Bengal when continued to officers in cantonments. The same case occurred when the mode of supplying officers of European corps on the Bombay Presidency was changed, and instead of an amount to meet a necessary but temporary expense, a monthly allowance was given, which, from strict musters being discontinued, became part of the pay. Providence for the future is a rare feature in the military character, particularly among junior officers, whose expenses will usually exceed their means. In proportion to their allowances, houses were built and furnished, horses bought,

bought, and, too often, debts incurred. Under such circumstances reductions were felt as hardships, and with reason, for what had formerly been deemed luxuries, and enjoyed by few, had, from habit, become necessities, and were deemed essential to all. It is easier to know the causes which have produced the distress that has ensued than to point out the remedy that is consistent with the public interests. I have already given my opinion upon this subject.\*

4. When I made a minute on the recent reduction of the batta of sepoys, I was only restrained from proposing a reduction of the full batta of the European officers at Dessa and Bhooj, as well as the troops, by consideration of the principle, to which our attention has been of late frequently directed, of assimilating our military allowances with those of Bengal as much as local circumstances would permit, and by the fact of there being only four corps, of the thirty-six of this establishment, the European officers of which draw full batta. If I had made this proposition, as I did in the reduction of full batta at Mhow, I should neither have anticipated discontent nor distress on the part of the European officers of this army; and under other circumstances than the present, I should certainly have deemed the measure expedient. I think it desirable that an officer should have an increase when marching, or actually in the field, because his expenses must be increased; and if he is always on field allowances he will soon acquire habits of living, which will, on extraordinary expense occurring, be certain to involve him in difficulties and embarrassments.

5. An officer, particularly of a Native corps, can live very well when on half batta if he is frugal. No State can afford to pay officers in the Indian branches of its army in a manner that will exempt them from the necessity of careful and frugal habits; and the most baneful of all consequences that has been, and will hereafter be found to result from too great liberality towards them, and which alike affects their future prospects, and the public interests, is, that this expenditure (if beyond what is strictly necessary) takes from Government the means of rewarding merit and long service.

6. An observation of the true principle, both of economy and discipline, in armies, should lead to an endeavour to habituate junior officers to privations, and to make them look forward with hope, instead of dwelling on the enjoyment of ease and comfort in their actual condition. Particular situations in an army, to which the view of every officer should be directed, require therefore all the consideration they can receive from Government; and the army in this country will never be in a healthy state till the command of a corps is a more desirable object for an officer of rank and character than any staff employ, except the head of a department; but of this I shall give my sentiments hereafter.

7. There can be no doubt that recent reductions have pressed with peculiar hardship upon the European branch of the army, the great majority of which are His Majesty's corps. The discontent this has caused will cease, but its evil operations will continue. I have fully shown in my minute of the 25th March, now transmitted to your Lordship, the embarrassing results which are occasioned by the present stagnation of rise to higher rank in the Company's army, and the effect it produces of keeping many efficient officers from accompanying the corps to India, who generally have at their head colonels and lieutenant-colonels, who come out in the certainty, from their rank being above the great majority of the field officers of the local army, of attaining general command. I know of no remedy to this evil except that which I have pointed out in my minute on the army of this Presidency. It may be out of ordinary rule, but rules should, under such circumstances as those that relate to India, be made to bend to the primary objects of maintaining the peace and prosperity of our possessions in that quarter. Our success in that, ever has been, and ever will essentially depend upon, the number, condition, and temper of our army. Every point, therefore, that affects these has much importance.

8. The

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Vide Colonel Frederick's Report, dated 23d November 1830.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

8. The arrangement I proposed would in its operation only affect the commandants of regiments in His Majesty's service serving in India who would be of junior standing to what they now are; but there is another point of serious consideration, as it affects the captains and commanders of companies in these corps, who are, I believe, under the operation of the late changes and reductions, admitted to have less means of supporting their condition with reference to local circumstances than in any part of the King's dominions. If this be the fact, the consequence is obvious: no officer that can obtain leave, or exchange without great injury to his prospects, will remain in India. The causes which formerly led to a preference being given by many to the regiments in India, are gone. The pay is diminished, the chances of promotion, which gave life to the service in this country, no longer exist; and we observe a corps, after being here some time, lose gradually almost every officer who came from England with it, while their places are supplied by others, whose circumstances, connexions in this country, or want of means to promote their advancement, or even to subsist themselves if reduced to half-pay, lead them to prefer remaining in India. Such changes in the officers of a corps must be injurious, particularly among the seniors who have served long with the regiment. This might perhaps in some degree be rendered less by more frequent reliefs, but that must involve too great an expense. The restoring the allowances of captains and officers in charge of companies to what it was before 1825, would, I think, be a proper and salutary measure; captains of troops and companies before that date, drew a personal allowance of £20 per annum, under the head of Non-effective Allowance. This allowance is not known to the Indian army, and was the only part of their allowance that King's officers serving with their regiments in India could draw in England, and as such was generally appropriated by them for the payment of dress and equipment. Calculating the disadvantageous rate of exchange at which such articles are at present paid, the value of this allowance may be fairly estimated as at least to £40 paid in India. This allowance was done away with, but an exact proportional increase of net pay was given in lieu.\* Upon this the Directors ordered, that the *King's pay* having been increased, the Company's allowances were to be proportionably reduced, so as to keep the pay and allowances of the two services equal. Thus to captains of King's regiments in India the change of non-effective allowance to pay was a positive reduction. It may be argued, that if the Court of Directors had not acted as they have done in this respect, it would have been injustice to the Company's service. But this conclusion is not correct. The captains in the Indian army have advantages, in exclusive claims to staff employ, minor commands, and many other situations that might be adduced, as far more than balancing the benefits which the captains of His Majesty's regiments derived from this increased item in their allowance; and I think that it is to be regretted the reduction was ever made, which, with that of the half-tentage before noticed, may be said to have deteriorated the allowances of a captain of a company in one of the King's regiments nearly £100 per annum.

9. Few subaltern officers in His Majesty's army serving in this country can look forward to command the corps to which they belong, but they aspire to command a troop or company; and to lessen its value is taking from them the only object (as far as improved allowances are concerned) to which they had to look, and is from this and other causes singularly calculated to destroy hope and increase discontent. A discontinuance of half the field officers, or even one in a King's regiment, serving in India, would go far to meet this expense, and be little, if any, loss to the efficiency of a corps. There are in India few of those detachments from European corps which require captains, and their places would be well supplied by an arrangement that kept captains and old subalterns with the regiment to which they belonged. In addition to the hardship which the senior captains with the King's corps in India have to compete, it may be stated that the captain regimentally, but a brevet major, has 2s. per day more than another captain at home, and in all foreign stations but India. This hardship, for such it is deemed, is felt by very few, and might be relieved at

Captains, who before drew 10. 1. 66., had their pay raised to 11s. 9d. per diem.

at small cost. I believe there is no instance in the Company's army of a captain attaining by seniority the rank of a field officer, and it could not therefore be quoted as a case of partiality.

10. I have on many occasions, and especially in the minute sent to your Lordship, given my opinion most fully on the actual necessity of the increase of allowance to commandants of corps in a degree that will render that station superior to any on the staff, except the heads of departments. This has been my earnest object for more than twenty years, and the Court of Directors had authorized an increase which would have effected it; but as almost the whole of the Bengal army were on full batta, the arrangement brought no benefit to their commandants, and their not wanting it had probably its influence in the resolution of the Supreme Government to annul the acts of Sir Thomas Munro and Mr. Elphinstone, both of whom had put the most liberal consideration on the order of the Court of Directors, and to the Presidencies at which they were the head, it was a real and essential boon.

11. The allowances for commanding a corps should, I think, be raised to 500 rupees per mensem; and if with this should be associated the modification of minor commands, and given to officers who exercised them, a superior allowance of 200 rupees, without removing him from the charge of his corps, his duties would be in no way increased beyond his power of performing them, and the ends of economy, as far as such commands were concerned, would be combined with the promotion of the efficiency of the service.

12. Two commands of the 1st class are allotted by the orders of the Court of Directors to this Presidency; six stations will remain at this Presidency, where there will probably always be at least two corps. These might remain with the allowance now assigned to the 2d class, and there are five stations which, being commands, with one corps and detachments from others, might be denominated the 3d, with 600 rupees per mensem; but, with the exception of all these commands, unless peculiar cases required the two of the 1st class, rendered necessary by peculiar circumstances, should include the allowance for commanding a corps. This would, in most cases, be very beneficial to the service, and make a saving that would enable Government to effect the desirable object of increasing the allowance to the regimental commandants. The results of it at this establishment are shown in the annexed table.

13. This arrangement, if connected with an obligation that officers should serve a certain number of years before they could be entitled to enjoy the benefit of off-reckonings, the consequences would be most beneficial to the discipline and efficiency of the army. This arrangement, however, to be just, should in a great degree be prospective, affecting in its operation none who had been more than six or seven years in the service.

14. As connected with having the most efficient officers for regimental duty, I think no situation of brigade or line staff should remain to the same individual beyond a period of three years, except on field service. The young captain or subaltern who now obtains such a situation deems himself removed altogether from regimental duty till his rank compels him to join a corps, and often till that places him at its head. The general result is, an establishment and a mode of life that often involves him in debt. This would not be the case if these officers knew they were only to hold their stations till a relief came. It would come as a temporary boon, and be taken care of as such. Men would return to regimental duty with knowledge of general duties, and the whole class of officers from whom such staff were selected would be animated to efforts to fit themselves for such stations, to which having passed in the Hindoostanee language should be an indispensable qualification. If this arrangement is made, actual incumbents might hold their situations three years, except their corps was ordered on service.

15. With regard to other staff, I need only refer to my minute in the Military department, of which I transmit a copy. I am confirmed in my opinion, that the Pay department should be separated in the manner proposed; and with reference to the police of the

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

the territories under this Presidency, I am quite satisfied that a cheap and efficient agency might be introduced in the mode proposed in pages 201 to 225 of my History of India. If there was a difficulty in obtaining officers qualified and efficient for such duties who could be prevailed upon to resign their standing in the army, their net pay might be continued, and they might have an allowance to place them on a footing with magistrates of the grade which they obtained; but they should neither be considered eligible to the promotion or pensions which were allotted to others in this line. I have been completely convinced of the necessity, in this part of India, for the improvement of our police, and among our hills and our frontiers we have now specific officers detached, to one of whom only the powers of a magistrate have been granted; but I mean to propose it should be given to another, and I view it as the commencement of a system which must be extended, and which may, if well conducted, tend greatly to the future peace and prosperity of our provinces.

16. The recent orders respecting the limitation of staff to be absent from one corps were well intended, but are singularly inapplicable to the Native army in India. Obedience to them will be found difficult and embarrassing in peace, and wholly impracticable in war. They may be followed in His Majesty's corps, who are full of officers, and in peace occupy healthy stations and have few detachments; but the exact contrary is the fact with regard to Native corps, and the rules may often limit selection where that is essential to success. Their tendency, also, is to damp the hopes of aspiring men, and check the acquirements of those qualifications which it is most essential European officers of the Native branch, should possess. The option remains with the Court of Directors to adopt the suggestion that has been frequently made of forming a staff corps, or to apply some other remedy to this evil. But I deem it essential that, with reservation as to knowledge of language and standing in the army, that the prizes of staff employment should be open to every officer of the army. But in the mean time I think your Lordship might alleviate much of the injurious application of this order, by limiting the situations which are to be considered as staff. This question has lately come under discussion at this Presidency, and I have signified my intention to refer it to your Lordship, in order that it may be clearly decided. According to my view, no European officer of the Native army, who is detached on special duty in the provinces where he commands troops of the branch to which he belongs, can be considered on the staff, nor can I consider as subject to this rule the officers who are nominated to act with bodies of the Guicowar contingent appointed to preserve the peace of the countries of Kattywar and Myhee Caunta, which are entirely under our rule and control, and for the peace of which we are exclusively responsible. These officers are employed in command of detachments of their own branch, co-operating with the Guicowar horse. They are, it is true, denominated assistants to aid the political authorities in all duties for which they may be required; but those that are not military are contingent, and were added to save considerable expense. The arrangement has fully met every subject that was contemplated. These officers should, I conceive, like others I have stated, be returned and detached on special duty, and I think that officers employed with Bheel and police corps, such as two of this establishment now are, and under whom considerable bodies of their own branch are often placed, should be returned in the same manner. They are not staff, and are much more usefully employed as officers of the Native army than with their regiments. It is not for the parade and drill duties of a corps that officers of standing are much required in the Native infantry. A good commanding officer and staff, with junior officers, will bring a Native corps into full as high order as if the whole complement of senior officers were present; but it is in the command of these troops when on service, and when detached on special duty, that good and efficient officers are required, and all those I have stated are in the daily exercise of this duty. I deem it here necessary to add, that I consider the arrangement recently made, by which three officers in military command, Sattara, Bhooj, and Baroda, fulfil political duties as well as the junior officers employed with the Guicowar contingent, to be of much importance, beyond meeting as it does the object of economy, in training persons

persons in this branch as instruments, who will be found not merely useful but indispensable in case of war.

17. Your Lordship will add to the facts stated regarding the staff, that even under ordinary circumstances the orders of the Court fall much heavier on a comparatively small army like that of the Presidency, than on a large one like that of Bengal, or even of Madras, particularly as in all the latter Presidency almost all the provinces are so settled as not to call for the specific nomination of officers, while the condition of many of our districts demands such selection; and I can only add, that there are four or five officers now employed on such duties that I neither could nor would remove, if I had legally the power to prevent it, from the situations in which they are now employed, stating my decided opinion that I deemed their services essential where they were placed. This may not be a common case, but it is one that will exist in this part of India for years; and a governor who has such heavy responsibility on him as the maintenance of the public peace, should have a latitude of employing instruments that he judged competent, and be freed from restrictions that limited his choice. There is no fear of patronage being abused in such cases. The duties are of a nature that can only be performed by men that are equal to them.

18. I should think the staff regulations might be construed to relate only to officers removed from regimental duty, or from the command of men of their line, and they might not be applied to brigade-majors or line-adjutants, if the system was introduced, which I before suggested, of giving these temporary appointments to officers belonging to corps at the station. They are not, as I said, wanted for drill, and they would be ready for all field service or special duty on which they could be required.

19. The personal staff of governor-general and governors, commanders-in-chief and officers on general staff, paymasters (until a change takes place), commissariat officers under existing rules, judge-advocates, town-majors, fort-adjutants, barrack-masters, and officers employed with corps in territories not under British control and management, are all, I conceive, that should be brought under this order. Cavalry, engineer, and artillery officers should not be eligible to hold any station in the Pay department, nor in the Commissariat, unless qualified by peculiar circumstances to be placed at the head of either of those branches of the service.

20. The few points I have to suggest regarding the pay of the staff of this Presidency will be brought to your Lordship's notice by Colonel Hough, as also many similar subjects. With respect to the pay of the European soldier, and the recent changes in many points connected with his comfort and accommodation, I can only say, such points are before you in great detail. My own opinion is that we have gone to an extreme, and that in many respects an expense has been incurred beyond what was called for by either attention to the habits or health of European troops serving in India.

21. I have changed none of the opinions I have given in my History regarding the expediency of making the three armies of India *one*, with three divisions, and as far as relates to the European officers and troops, with their establishment, regulating allowances according to remoteness from supply, and price of labour and provisions with as much uniformity of system as practicable. I am still satisfied that regimental rise to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, as I proposed in the chapter upon the army, is expedient, and that exchanges with His Majesty's corps, purchase of commissions, under the restrictions and regulations stated in that work, would be advisable and salutary. My opinion is given so strong in the minute, now sent regarding the obligations for officers to serve a certain number of years regimentally, before they became entitled to the off- reckonings allotted to colonels of these corps, that I need not here again advert to the subject. The propositions I have made regarding the brigade and line staff I deem on many grounds very essential. It should be of course prospective, and applied to none who had not been five years in the service, under which period no officer should, I think, be eligible to any staff except regimental.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

22. The origin of the Native armies of India, and their progress to their present condition and character, your Lordship will find fully given in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. xviii. page 385. That article is framed from papers of mine, and indeed was taken in substance from a memorandum prepared by me for Lord Buckinghamshire. If, in addition to this document, your Lordship peruses what I have said of the Native troops in my *History of India*, vol. ii. from page 225 to 245, you will find all I can say upon the more general parts of this subject. I can only add, that recent observations have confirmed every sentiment expressed in the volume to which I have alluded.

23. The pay of our Native troops at the different Presidencies is, I believe, the same. There is a difference in the batta, and a more considerable one in some of the pensions. This has arisen from a variety of causes referring to the class of men, the difficulty of obtaining recruits, price of provisions and labour, and the different judgments formed, with reference to local considerations, of means best adapted to form in particular quarters of India an efficient Native army.

24. The Bombay army is at present composed of

Hindoostanees	...	...	...	...	12,476
Konkanees	...	...	...	...	10,015
Deccanees	...	...	...	...	1,910

This large number of Hindoostanee men has occurred since the breaking out of the Mahratta war, and particularly during that with Burma in 1824-25. Previous to the former period, their number in the army of this Presidency did not exceed 4,000.

25. In 1824, the Hindoostanees in the Bombay army amounted to 7,465, and the following year, on an increase of its establishment to 1,000 men per battalion, with an addition of two extra battalions, the number of this class of men was greatly augmented, caused a good deal, perhaps, by the station of the Bombay troops at Mhow, where an officer was specifically employed to recruit for the army.

26. This increase of foreigners over the Natives of the Bombay territories was by no means desired by the more experienced officers of this army, and was moreover contrary to the wishes of the Court of Directors, who, in 1821, directed that the armies of the three Presidencies should be kept as distinct as possible to their respective territories. In 1823 this subject was brought to the attention of the Bombay Government by a letter from the Military Secretary, Colonel Casement; and in 1824, recruiting for the army in the Bengal provinces was positively prohibited by the Supreme Government.

27. The officers of the Bombay army generally considered it beneficial to have a mixture of *castes* in their regiments, and, among others, a proportion of Hindoostanee men, not exceeding 200 per battalion; but they consider these as only indispensable when their own provinces cannot recruit their ranks.

28. They consider the Hindoostanee men, though in size, appearance, and perhaps in a certain degree of military pride, to be superior to their own, to excel them in nothing else. The Konkanees and Deccanees they account more patient under privation and fatigue, more easily subsisted and managed, and in bravery to be fully their equals. They are the descendants of Sewajee's "Mountain Rats," whom neither the stature or military bearing of the Hindoostanee could debar from advancing to the gates of Delhi; and the early history of the Bombay army (no where better related than in Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*) shows them to be in no way degenerated from the spirit of their ancestors.

29. For the welfare of the Presidency there is another very good reason (not of a military character) why its army should be recruited from its own provinces. Not only do the men receiving pensions retire to spend them in its villages, but the sepoys on actual service remit (as is well known to every one acquainted with the kind and filial feelings of the Natives of India), a portion of their pay for the subsistence of their parents and families. This not only to a certain degree enriches the village, but affords a great inducement to the young men to enlist, with the view of following so enviable an example. With the Hindoostan

doostan sepoys all this is lost, and the inhabitants of this Presidency are discouraged from entering our ranks, not only from the want of examples of their countrymen's enjoyment of comfortable retirement, but from an impression that the superior stature, and the more soldier-like appearance of the Rajpoots, often recommended them to promotion in cases when the equally efficient Konkanees and Deccanees, in all the substantial qualities of a soldier, give them as good if not better pretensions.

30. My own opinion is, that if the encouragements now given are continued to the men of the Bombay provinces, there will not in future be occasion to have recourse to other countries for recruits. The Natives of this Presidency will early become reconciled to service in the regular army. The Hindoostanee commissioned officers and men will bring\* their families and colonize. But I am adverse to the present proportion of these men in our ranks; and if the evil of the present system is aggravated by their prejudices being admitted to have force, it would be much better that the Hindoostanees of the Bombay army were in distinct corps, than that their numbers, aided by their looks, should tend to lessen the self-esteem, and damp the hopes of men of lower caste and stature.

31. I have perused very attentively the records of the Bombay Native army before they had any men from Hindoostan, and through the severest trials they have evinced a courage, fidelity and temper under danger, privation and fatigue, that we cannot expect to see exceeded. Till within twelve years the general sentiment among these men was the pride of corps. I regret to observe that the pride of caste is now much cherished by the men and† considered by the officers. There are no prejudices and pretensions that will be found so injurious if not resisted as those minor ones of caste, if they receive more attention than is due to them. This is not the place to state my sentiments on this point as relating to our civil rule farther than as that affects the temper of the Native army. Almost all the principal Native revenue servants are Brahmins, and they are a valuable class of men. Every attention is due to the essential observances of their caste and religion, but when, as frequently happens, they solicit their European superiors to classify sepoys, and to place sentries in a manner that will prevent the inconvenience of their washing, or be offensive, they should be told, the soldier is ennobled by his occupation, and that they might leave the public service if the proximity to any of those employed in it was insufferable. This feeling when indulged increases and creates the worst of spirit amongst the men of the corps, as well as hatred in sepoys to be employed under, or have any communication with, Native servants in the civil branch. They complain, and justly, that the treatment they meet from them is often different from that they receive from their officers. "These cowardly fellows of Brahmins," said an able and old Konkanees subadar I was conversing with on this point, "who would not look at me, and would degrade a brave man of my caste (a Purwarrie), by refusing to let him stand sentry over the treasure, if in a catchery will cringe and help the collector to his shoe if it fell off, and would consider themselves the more honoured the nearer he sat to them; and yet I believe," said the old man, laughing, "you Feringees‡ are, according to their belief, as unclean and impure as we Purwarries." I have communicated with some of the Brahmins who exercised high civil and military power under the Native Government of the Deccan, and they assure me no objection would have been tolerated on this score against any soldier. Purneea, the celebrated dewan of Mysore, himself a strict

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Vide Appendix (E), containing propositions for the Widows' Fund, from which it appears that the report of this fund, added to the existing establishment of boys, led all the Native officers to apply for means of bringing their families from Hindoostan.

† A remarkable circumstance, which shows the character of this feeling, occurred in 1818. Captain McDonald, an officer on my staff, who had belonged to a Bengal corps at the siege of one of the forts of Bundelcund, where a low caste man had distinguished himself and been promoted, to the great disgust of the others, several of whom had taken their discharge, came to me one day in Malwa, and said he had met one of these Brahmins, a Naick, in the 8th Bombay infantry, and that he asked why he left his corps on a low caste man being promoted, and was now serving with a Jew subadar, a Purwarrie jemadar, and other low caste men; the man, said he, answered promptly, "Hindoostan zat-ke ghyrat, Bombay pulten-ke ghyrat:" that is, in Hindoostan, it is the pride of caste, in Bombay, that of the corps.

‡ A corruption of Frank, and used in the Native language to designate all Europeans.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

a strict Brahmin, and the ablest man I ever knew, repressed this spirit with great violence in one of two instances, in which it appeared in men of his own caste, and repeatedly told me it was calculated to make impressions dangerous to any Government, however constituted, in India. The error into which numbers fall in this respect proceeds from the best motive, that of conciliating useful and respectable men. But their pride of caste must not be gratified at the hazard of any part of the temper and respectability of that army to which the safety of the empire has been, and must continue to be, entrusted.

32. In the Madras army desertions have been long almost unknown. This has prevailed to a great extent in that of Bombay; and from 1803 to 1808, a period of five years, the desertions equalled its entire numerical strength—a loss to Government, independent of the services of the men, of seven lacs of rupees. The desertions of the next three years, from 1808 to 1812, averaged 2,500 men per annum, costing Government six lacs. From that period (1811) to 1822, the Returns show an average of desertion of 1,253 annually; but from 1822 to the present year such became the improved state (in this respect) of the Bombay army, that they have decreased, and its desertions do not in the last year exceed 300 men.

33. Many causes combined to render desertions frequent, some local and uncontrollable: the disgust taken at the system of our discipline by the recruit, the facility of desertion from the limited territories of this Presidency, and the certainty of getting service from Mahratta princes.

34. The Hindoostanee men, indeed, were after a certain period of service almost certain to desert; their view in enlisting was generally to obtain an opportunity of saving a sum of money, which their parsimonious habits enabled them to do, and they had no local bias, for they never brought their wives and families with them from Hindoostan. When their object was attained, they took the first opportunity of deserting; and the distance of their homes, which, as well as their right names, are generally unknown, secured them from subsequent detection.

35. In 1809 Government, on the suggestion of Sir John Abercrombie, adopted several measures to obviate this great evil, and these were attended with most beneficial effects.

36. An amnesty to deserters, with liberty to re-enlist, was published. Furloughs were granted, the gratuity system was abolished, and pensions\* for service and wounds were established for the sepoy, and, under certain circumstances, for his wife and children. Men were also allowed to enlist for limited periods of five, eight or ten years.

37. There was before my arrival at Bombay, a small establishment of sepoy boys with each Native corps, to which the Court of Directors had at first objected. They however afterwards assented, on the representation of the Bombay Government of the ultimate economy, as well as efficiency of the measure, to sanction it. Sir Thomas Bradford, the late Commander-in-chief, pressed the increase of the sepoy boys, which, when the reductions were made in invalids, was carried into execution, on the grounds stated in an annexed extract.† When the hill-forts were reduced in 1828, and a considerable reduction of expense effected, their commandants were remodified, and first and second class killadars established on a footing which, at a very trifling increase of expense, instituted a system of honourable rewards for old and distinguished soldiers. The annexed extracts of minutes‡ will show your Lordship my reasons for adopting this measure, and the effects by which it has been followed. I also annex extract of a minute,§ by which your Lordship will see that our local Sebundy corps are now commanded by active and distinguished Native officers, by which economy and efficiency have been promoted, and great encouragement given to the Native army.

38. A subsequent measure, which allows a trifling distinction in pay and exemption from corporal punishments, in passing through the ranks, to a limited number in each corps

\* After twenty years' service, three-fourths of his pay; and after thirty, full-pay for life.

† Vide Appendix (B).

‡ Vide Appendix (C).

§ Vide Appendix (D).

corps of the sons of Native commissioned officers, has been carried into execution at this Presidency. The grounds on which this measure was adopted, as well as the expense incurred, your Lordship will find stated in the Appendix,\* to which I have added the minute upon the proposed widows' fund for Native commissioned officers,† which would have been attended with no increase of expense to Government, but which, I regret to say, has been objected to by the Supreme Government on the same ground that exceptions have been stated to the other measures regarding killadars and boys, that there were no such usages in Bengal, and that such distinctions were calculated to create discontent among the Native troops of that establishment.

39. Each of the three Presidencies of India has succeeded in attaining, though by different means, the object of having an effective Native army. I have served with and commanded Native troops of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and I declare to your Lordship I have hardly a choice. They have different qualities, but, with good officers, they are all excellent troops. Their respective characters have been elsewhere described; and I confess I should dislike to see any serious change in their composition further than was dictated by a gradual change of circumstances. Independent of other reasons which render the change far from desirable, there is no empire in which more attention may be eventually required than that of India to the well-known maxim of the Romans, in regard to their distant conquests, which was to preserve, or restore, if disturbed, the peace of one province by troops drawn from another.

40. I have of late noticed this subject in several minutes, in reply to suggestions and instructions from your Lordship in Council, founded on general principles, of making our arrangements respecting Native troops similar at the three Presidencies, and expressing apprehension lest giving encouragement to the Native army at one Presidency might create discontent in another. That this consideration has not before met with attention is to be referred to the distance at which the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay acted, the different races of whom they were formed, and their habits of life. There has been no occasion to give that encouragement to the frugal Rajpoots, who are the cultivators of the provinces of Hindoostan, that has been found necessary to attach the Mahomedans of the Carnatic and the Hindoos‡ of the Northern Circars at Madras, and to induce the inhabitants of the Northern Konkan and Deccan to enter the ranks at Bombay; but there can be no doubt that the pensions to Native officers of distinction, the establishment of boys attached to their corps, the regimental depôts formed at the best recruiting stations at Madras, have accomplished their objects in fixing the attachment of the army to their colours, and their forwardness to march and embark on every service, as singularly evinced on the late occasion of the war in Burma.§

41. Desertions, as I have already remarked, are almost unknown in the Madras army; and I have shown that the same causes have produced the same effects at Bombay. Recent and most minute examination into this and other subjects connected with the public service of this Presidency have quite convinced me, that if the principles upon which measures are founded, and the effects produced by them, are not very carefully considered, the objects of true economy may be often sacrificed; and I have seldom known this fact more clearly elucidated than by the papers I have had to examine regarding the past and present condition of the army of this Presidency, the general results of which I have already noticed.

42. The

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

Vide Appendix (B).

† Vide Appendix (F).

‡ Thirty years elapsed before we found a supply of good recruits from the Northern Circars. Some of the finest corps, such as the 17th, or Cherola light infantry, are now wholly formed of Telingas, and not many of very high caste from that quarter; and I write with a letter before me of an experienced and distinguished officer who has commanded that and several other corps, as well as brigades and forces, in which he expresses his preference of this class of men to either the Rajpoot or Mahomedans, being equally brave, he says, and without the troublesome prejudices of the one caste, and the frequent habits of dissipation of the other.

§ Vide Sir T. Munro's Correspondence.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

42. The late approximation of our Native armies certainly requires more attention than was formerly given to similarity of measures in regard to them, but there are so many opposite usages and feelings, as well as local circumstances, to be considered, that the accomplishment of this object must be the work of time. Great care and caution are also necessary, for most serious injury may be inflicted by an order that apparently rests upon indisputable general grounds, but is inapplicable to the particular case. Before any measure connected with the improvement of our Native army is rejected at one Presidency because it has not been found necessary at another, it should be ascertained, in the first place, whether there are not local causes and considerations that render it wise and expedient where it has been adopted; and in the next, whether, judging the principles upon which it is founded, and the effects it is calculated to produce, it is not worthy of imitation.

43. On the consequence that attaches to the Native army all are agreed. That a certain proportion of European troops should always be in India is fully admitted; but there is no error more common than that of considering the latter as a check upon the Native armies. They never have, and never will prove such. Long experience has rendered my opinions upon this subject the same as those of Sir Thomas Munro. The necessity of check implies distrust that degrades. It is by complete confidence alone that the Native army of India can be preserved in efficiency and attached to the Government it serves. But this most important object will require great increased consideration when a period of successive wars and field service is succeeded by a long peace, which, besides its other effects, calls for reduction in every branch of public expenditure; but when that affects men who cannot be aware of all the bearings of this subject, and must be ignorant of the necessity which obliges the State they serve to adopt such measures, and when these men be misrepresented, every other possible motive of fidelity and attachment should be substituted, and no opportunity omitted that may still be available of strengthening the subsisting ties between the Native soldiery and Government. I have elsewhere observed, "the rigid principles of economy and the precise forms of our civil rule should both yield to the establishment of this corner stone of our strength, as without it the vast fabric which has been raised with such pains, must totter to its base at every tempest with which it is assailed."

44. On the pay of our Native army I can make no further remark, than that I think prospectively a modification might be made that would be beneficial to Government, and not unsatisfactory to the troops, by giving less to the younger sepoy and more to the older. This is the case in the British army, and I believe with every one in Europe. I know of none in which it would be more accordant with circumstances than in the Native army of India. But it is a point that merits great attention, and the scale, if it is ever adopted, should be fixed with deliberate care.

45. I cannot quit this part of my subject without stating my opinion to your Lordship, that it is not one to be intrusted to mere financiers or calculators, far less should the opinions of men not intimately acquainted with the feelings and character of our Native troops, and who have never served with them, be taken; nor can the opinions of those who have only served in one part of India be adopted as conclusive, in regard to arrangements which affect another quarter of our dominions; the considerations which are involved in every question that does or may affect the temper of our Native army, are in my mind of the highest importance. It cannot be too often repeated, this army is our safety and our danger. Every information should be sought and obtained to aid the judgment of those who have to decide upon points by which the temper, zeal, and fidelity of that class of troops can be affected. But not even what appears to be the least important of these measures should be adopted without the most serious deliberation. Every branch of this subject requires the mind of a statesman. We have, through the efforts of our Native army, triumphed in wars and rebellions. Plots and conspiracies may be formed, but they will never succeed while we maintain the good spirit and fidelity of this branch of our force. This our enemies, avowed and secret, well know; and all their efforts have been,  
and

and will hereafter be, directed to its corruption. This object has never been but very partially effected, but it is one which we must beware of aiding by any measure that impairs the confidence, that undervalues the merits, or slights the pretensions of men, who are every day becoming more sensible of their own importance, and naturally seek for participation in the benefits of a power they have so largely contributed to establish, and of which they cannot be ignorant they must continue the principal support.

46. With respect to the distribution of the armies of India, I can only state a few leading principles by which that should be regulated. Though circumstances may occasion deviations that cannot be provided for, if we fix and pursue to the utmost of our ability a settled plan we shall avoid great expense both to Government and individuals, for when that plan is fully acted upon, the distinction will be completely made between temporary and fixed stations. The plan regarding fixed stations is simple and obvious, from its principal object being the preservation of the internal peace of India and its defence against foreign invasion.

47. The recurring expediency of embarking European troops should also be borne in mind, and this, with the nature of their supplies, requires that were it is practicable a considerable proportion of that branch should be near the sea, or where there was water carriage. These corps should be distributed in ordinary times according to the proportion of the divisions of the Native army with which they serve.

48. The principles to be observed, in fixing upon permanent stations, are lines of defence and of communication. I have, in recommending such stations since I arrived, kept this steadily in view. From Bombay to Masulipatam, which cuts the Peninsula at a part very important for preserving tranquillity, the line of direct road from Bombay is Poonah, the principal station for European troops, and from that to Sholapore, our next permanent station, is 160 miles, from which it is 200 to Hydrabad and to Masulipatam. The superior road recently constructed up the Bhore Ghaut renders that not only practicable but easy for wheeled carriages, though the ascent is 2,000 feet. It completes an excellent road to Poonah, and we are gradually extending that to Sholapore, by the collectors, which, from the soil of the Deccan being so favourable, has not yet cost more than 300 rupees per mile. If the Nizam's Government can hereafter be persuaded to make the road through its territories between those of Madras and Bombay, the communication from sea to sea on this line will be complete, while the station of Belgaum is in another line by which we communicate with the Ceded Districts of Madras and Mysore. This road from Poonah will extend to the *Neera* bridge, from whence the Rajah of Sattara has promised to make it through his territories, which leaves a distance of — miles to Belgaum, from whence an excellent road to Darwar will be completed by the Madras pioneers within the next month. Little remains to finish the line; and these roads, when completed, will be found of the utmost importance, not only as they facilitate a communication between our force throughout the southern parts of India, and enable us to reduce expense by improved means of combining military resources, but as they promote intercourse and commerce. The permanent station of Belgaum has, besides the recommendation of being on this line, that of salubrity, and being well situated for an European regiment, and the additional one of being within seventy miles of the port of Vingorla, to which an excellent road has been made, that facilitates supplies from Bombay, and is favourable for this corps embarking at the shortest notice.

49. Ahmednugger, which is on the line from Poonah to Central India, and also to Aurangabad, Jaulnah, and Nagpore, must ever be deemed, in the distribution of the troops allotted to this quarter, an important permanent station. It is now the artillery depôt, and almost the whole of that corps are fixed at it. The communication between this place and Bombay can be shortened by thirty or forty miles, and it may be eventually useful to open this line of road. The engineer corps being stationed at Serroor, which is on the line, and exactly half way between this place and Poonah, will soon complete, and at no cost, a road already commenced betwixt them; and that meant to be hereafter carried to Jaulnah and

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

and Nagpore will be of much importance in improving the efficiency derived from the station of troops on that line to the Bengal territories.

50. A most excellent and permanent road has been made from Bombay to Tanna, and from that up the Jull Ghaut to Malligaum, and through the greater part of Candeish towards Sindwa. It will be of much importance this road should be extended to Mhow. The distance to be made is not great, and the soil in most parts favourable. The construction of a road and clearing the jungle would make this rout as good and as safe as other lines of communication in which such tracts are to be passed.

51. To the northward, our present permanent stations are singularly well calculated to maintain the public peace, to meet invasion, and to communicate (the most important of all points\*) with the troops of Bengal, for the protection of our North-western frontier, from the Indus to the Himalaya mountains.

52. Ahmedabad, a most central situation, is now the head-quarters of the Northern Division. It is from the Gulf of Cambay 30 miles, 70 from Dæsa, the principal permanent station on the frontier of Guzerat, 80 miles from Rajkote in Kattywar, by which it communicates in a direct line with Cutch, and 70 from Baroda. Hursole, a new station, which is 30 miles from Ahmedabad, is on the direct line to Neemuch, from which its distance is only 130 to 140 miles; and by the report of Lieutenant Holland, lately returned from the survey of a route from Hursole to Dunderpore, added to my knowledge of the Banswarrah and Pertaubghur countries, I must assume that a road sufficiently good for all military purposes might be constructed at comparatively small cost between these stations, and through it our military strength would be increased without any addition to its numerical numbers; but a line from Deesa, from Serohce to Ajmeer and Delhi, is of still more consequence. A glance at the map will satisfy your Lordship of this fact. I cannot tell you the importance I attach to opening these roads, which are to communicate and in a manner join, the only frontiers of our empire which can be exposed to invasion; but that may be termed a speculative event, and one probably so remote as not to warrant any disbursement. But there is, or I am mistaken, more proximate dangers from internal disturbances along these lines, that would be almost removed by the construction of roads, or, under all circumstances, much lessened. My inquiries and observations in Kattywar and Myhee Caunta, as well as the information I was able to obtain of the adjoining districts of Rajpootana, led me to deem these countries far from free of the seeds of future trouble. The chiefs under our direct rule, as well as those subject to our controlling management throughout our North-western frontier, are neither in a settled nor contented state. Independent of their attachment to ancient habits, and their restless minds, those of this class in our own provinces are far from being yet reconciled to the system of our judicial administration, which it has been stated by my predecessor, and has been recently† repeated by me, is in its forms and processes very unsuited to their condition. Those who are not yet subject to the Regulations, but are under protection, live in dread of the approach of our regular courts; and I really know of no other feeling that makes this class of persons view with jealousy and a spirit of hostility the extension of our power, which, whenever our system has been modified to the circumstances and condition of such classes, has been recognized and acknowledged as a blessing.

53. The Rajpoot chiefs to whom I allude are almost all connected with the highest families in Rajpootana,‡ with whom they correspond, intermarry, and no doubt at times intrigue. There may be no immediate proofs of existing danger, but this is a part of our territories

\* The success of Captain Burnes, who I deputed to Scind, and eventually to superintend in surveying the Indus, gives a prospect of communication with the Bengal N. W. frontier and other quarters, the results of which may be alike important, in a military, political, and commercial view, to the British interests in India.

† Vide Minute in Revenue department in Guzerat, dated 15th October 1830.

‡ Both the Eden and Ahmednugger chiefs are very nearly related to the Rajah of Gordpore. The son of the Ahmednugger Rajah (a fine boy) is, I believe, thought likely to succeed eventually to that great principality.

territories in which a flame once raised would be likely to spread, and not easily extinguished. The intersection of these countries by roads, and the increased intercourse consequently created, would, while it improved both their countries and ours, give us a facility of moving troops at all seasons that would tend more materially than any measure I know to preserve the general tranquillity.

54. In the present state of the finance of India, no large work of the nature proposed can be undertaken, but the object of the true economy of a State is to reduce every unnecessary expense, that it may possess the means of making those disbursements which it is compelled to do by public exigencies, or which it is wise and expedient to do on grounds that cannot be disputed, of preventive. Policy, which demands more attention in a Government like that we have established in India than in any I know in the whole world, would gain by the increased power of rapidly combining our military resources, and lead to great saving of future expenditure. I do not wish your Lordship to go farther at present than to direct the plan I have sketched, if you approve of it, to be progressively accomplished. If that is done, I should deprecate any extensive surveys, or any nominations of general superintendents, or employment of scientific officers, except to construct bridges, or other works in which science was required. The lines being decided upon by reference to past surveys, and information of local revenue and political authorities, the roads might be gradually commenced by the collectors; and princes and chiefs may be induced, by remissions, or favour, to continue it through their territories. If this was done and some aid granted, much might be effected at small comparative cost. I am by no means an advocate for these lines being made in the first instance on any great scale, though they might be constructed with a view to future improvement, when their beneficial results and the more prosperous state of our finance warranted. Practical experience upon this subject leads me to assure your Lordship, that the expense, if incurred gradually, and the work effected in the manner we are now carrying on some roads in the Deccan, will not be great. Natural obstacles will no doubt occur, which will require the application of art as well as expenditure; but these would not be numerous in any of the lines I have suggested, and when overcome, would be attended with increase of commerce, and consequently of customs, besides the cheaper conveyance of stores and provisions, even when a duty was not established to reimburse expenditure.

55. The rendering the Bhore Ghaut on the road between Bombay and Panwell practicable for wheeled carriages has long been a desirable object; but Government was deterred by the expense, it having been estimated at above two lacs of rupees. A contract was made for one lac. The annual saving upon the transport of public stores is between 6,000 and 7,000 rupees in times of profound peace. Had it been as practicable for carts as it now is, even as late as 1827 (during the Kollapore expedition), the calculated saving would have been from 40,000 to 50,000 rupees in one year: and, besides the saving actually made on stores, 12,000 rupees have been offered for the moderate duties imposed for next year. More will be given; and there can be no doubt the judicious expenditure of one lac of rupees on this work will be a certain source of revenue of 30,000 or 40,000 rupees in ordinary times; and on the occurrence of military operations the actual cost will be more than realized every year. The duties levied will be cheerfully paid, for it is as great pecuniary benefit to individuals as the public. I instance this work as one in which the outlay is very profitable, besides the many great advantages to be derived from its construction.

56. The stations at Madras have been fixed at different periods as here, to meet the changing circumstances of the territories it had to protect, and the subsidiary forces it had to furnish. The southern stations have been gradually decreased: its great line of communication with Calcutta through the Circars is one not requiring protection. The stations in the Carnatic and Mysore, which are those of its disposable troops, connect it with Malabar in one line, and with the S. M. country by another: the latter has also communication with the stations in the Ceded Districts. All these lines require attention; and fortunately the excellent roads made through various parts of Mysore, and the ability

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

and disposition of the Rajah to construct such works, will greatly aid the object in this quarter.

57. The communication from Hyderabad by Nagpore to Saugor is a military line of importance, and one on which the stations should be permanent, while that of Jaulnah is useful as communicating with Malwa.

58. From Calcutta to the station of Loodianah on the Sutledge is one direct line, on which, besides the stations, the disposable part of the army of this Presidency is cantoned. This line branching from Allahabad, or Benares, military lines might lead to Malwa, Bundelcund and Nagpore, which, with those communicating with the Bombay troops on the North-western frontier, would make not only the distribution of our force, but the means of one part giving aid to another, very complete.

59. With respect to the extent of country to be occupied, and lines to be guarded by each Presidency, I must state my opinion, that no changes can well be made, unless it is determined, as I anxiously trust it will be, that the local Indian force is to be one great army of three divisions. If that took place, the troops of this Presidency might occupy the line from Mhow to Mangalore at the South-eastern frontier, and from Cutch to Scrohee, which they now do within a few miles, at the North-western. It is, however, to be stated, that though many reasons, which I have before placed upon record, would render it more economical, as well as convenient, for the relief, stores and supplies of the station of Mhow to appertain to Bombay and Bengal, yet, unless the present separate, imperfect, and I must add fallacious, system of keeping the accounts of India is changed, the expenses of this station would be an objection, so far as tending to swell the deficit of this Presidency: but that would be made up by the transfer of Canara, which is in fact similar in language to the whole of the Southern Mahratta country, and might be placed under the same rule with considerable saving of expense. The military station at Mangalore would, particularly if an European regiment from this establishment was stationed there, be supplied with more facility and more economy from Bombay than Madras; but I beg to be distinctly understood by your Lordship as not recommending this extension of our lines of defence with the slightest view to increase the corps of this establishment to the decrease of either Bengal or Madras; on the contrary, I should deem such a measure unjust to the fair expectation and pretensions of those armies; but I state it as a desirable distribution, if the forces of the three Presidencies were so united as to clear us of the increasing embarrassment and injury to the public service, which must continue on their present footing.

60. Your Lordship has expressed a wish, to which I can have no objection, that my opinions on the subject you have referred to my consideration should be placed on record; in anticipation of your doing so, I shall likewise place a copy on the records of this Presidency.

I am, your Lordship's very faithfully,

Bombay, 27th November 1830.

(Signed) J. MALCOLM.

#### Appendix A.

MINUTE on the STATE of the BOMBAY ARMY, dated 25th March 1828, by Major-general Sir JOHN MALCOLM, G. C. B. & K. L. S.

IN the letter in the Military Department to the Honourable the Court of Directors, of the 1st of December 1827, it was stated to be the intention of Government to address the Court at an early period, and in a fuller manner, upon the state of the army.

2. In pursuance of this intention, I desire to place upon record my opinion upon this large question, which, though grounded on general experience, will have more immediate reference to the present condition of the army of this Presidency.

3. The

3. The statement in the Appendix, No. 1, will show the exact number of officers now doing duty with corps, and the number of those employed on the staff, on furlough, and on sick certificate.

4. It appears from this statement, that of the three regiments of cavalry, one is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, and two by majors. Of the two regiments of Europeans, one is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, and the other by a major.

5. Of the twenty-six regiments of Native infantry, three are commanded by lieutenant-colonels, nine by majors, and the remaining fourteen by captains, some of which latter are of very junior rank.

6. When to this is added, that the greatest part of the Native troops are scattered over an extensive country, many stations of which are unhealthy, it is difficult to conceive a state more inefficient than that of these corps, with regard to European officers. It is thought by some, from recollection of former times, that a battalion of Native infantry may be brought not only to, and maintained in discipline, by two or three officers, but be nearly as efficient for service. This opinion has gained strength by the excellent state of several extra corps which have only a European commandant and adjutant, but the conclusion here alluded to is drawn from erroneous premises. The introduction of a greater number of European officers into Native corps has totally altered their constitution, and they form, according to the existing system, a part whose inefficiency in number must include that of the whole corps. It would be needless to enumerate the obvious causes of this effect, as it relates to the regiments of the line. With regard to extra corps, though they have admirably answered the local purposes for which they have been raised, they would not, without an addition of European officers, be fit for general service.

7. It is much easier to point out the evil effects which this want of regimental officers, particularly of the higher class, must have upon the efficiency and reputation of the army, than to suggest the remedies; but the case is one which will neither admit of evasion nor delay, and if it is felt, as it is at this moment, seriously to affect the discipline of the army, during a period of profound peace, what would be the consequence in the event of war? for we must always bear in mind that our situation, on such an event occurring, has no analogy to that of any other State. The officers who are absent on furlough are almost without exception in Europe, and cannot join till the emergency is over; while the number on sick certificate is certain to be increased, without any possibility of supplying their place. This applies even to the most junior ranks, for, judging from the last twenty years, there never have been cadets more than sufficient to complete the establishment.

8. Before entering upon the means necessary to render regiments more efficient in European officers, it is essential to offer some observations upon the actual condition of this army with respect to officers required for more general command.

9. The only two major-generals, Morris and Skelton, and two colonels, Lewis and Osborne, belonging to this establishment, are in England. The youngest major-general is upwards of forty-six years in the service, and the youngest colonel thirty-seven years, and are, as is to be expected from their period of service, enjoying a liberal and comfortable retirement, and as their return to the active duties of their profession could not be anticipated, the Government have been compelled to place two lieutenant-colonels commandant upon the general staff. This measure has and must continue to excite unpleasant feelings amongst senior\* lieutenant-colonels of His Majesty's service, who are in regimental, garrison, or station commands, while their juniors are doing the duty and receiving the pay of general officers. Though the discontent they may feel, be, for reasons that will be stated,† groundless, as far as relates to the established rights and usages of the army with whom they are associated on service, its existence is an evil, and might, on the event of general operations, be attended with great loss of temper and much embarrassment.

10. This

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Commander-in-chief's letter, 19th September 1824.

† See Appendix, No. 4, Mr. Elphinstone's minute in reply to Sir C. Colville's letter of the 19th September 1824.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

10. This point, therefore, requires serious attention. No remedy (while brevets are so rare in England) suggests itself to my mind, except giving to officers of a certain standing, say twelve years as lieutenant-colonels, local brevets or commissions as brigadier-generals. If His Majesty deem it proper to issue such brevets to officers of his service employed in India on the staff, as well as to those of the Company, it could have no further injurious effect in His Majesty's service than that of preventing some old officers proceeding with their regiments to India, for if the expedient was adopted, no regimental officers of the standing of those eligible to be brigadier-generals could be employed in that country; but on the other hand, whilst it imposes no obligation to employ junior officers on the general staff, it might afford an opportunity, that a long peace would render very desirable, of bringing forward comparatively young men in duties for which they are required, and in the execution of which they might gain an experience that would prove most valuable to the country in the event of future hostilities in Europe. I speak with great diffidence when I presume to offer my observations upon the result of such an expedient as I have suggested, as far as it affects His Majesty's service, but I am quite positive in my opinion that, without this measure or some similar one is adopted, the army of this Presidency must deteriorate from that discipline and high reputation by which it has been hitherto distinguished. It cannot long support its character without the officers at its head are, in rank as well as command, on a par with the army with whom they are associated. If those are liable to constant supercession, and limited in their opportunities of acquiring fame, they will sink in their own estimation. The desire of obtaining the means of returning to England will be their sole object, and when they abandon for such feelings their hopes of military reputation, they will cease to enjoy the respect and consideration of their inferiors. The high tone and spirit of the army will degenerate, and without that is kept up no army can be efficient, and most of all one so constituted as that of the Company.

11. The late alteration in this army\* which only changed the number of battalions into as many regiments, added to the number of colonels, but not to the number of lieutenant-colonels or majors; and by the privilege granted to those who became commandants, of remaining in England, only five have been induced to stay in India, two† being nominated to the high station of the general staff of the army, one‡ acting in that station, one§ in a junior command, and one|| in command of the artillery.

12. The prospect, even of the station commands, has not been sufficient to withhold officers of this class from retiring, nor is it to be expected that persons who have served near thirty years in India will remain in expectation of such commands, when they have the power of living in complete comfort in their native country.

13. It may be urged that officers of the standing here mentioned have generally suffered in constitution, and their places in India are better filled by younger and more efficient men.

14. This would be true if such juniors attained rank, and every branch of troops employed in India was on the same footing; but it is the difference in the constitution of the King's and Company's army that creates the difficulty.

15. The oldest of the Company's lieutenant-colonels present for duty on the Bombay establishment will at a very early period, if no change takes place, be almost all junior to the majority of those in His Majesty's regiments. This is in a great degree the case at present, as will be seen by the Appendix, No. 8, which gives the number and rank of the ten senior lieutenant-colonels, King's and Company's, on the Bombay establishment. Justice to the senior officers of the Company's army, and consideration of their great local experience has led to their being appointed to several separate and important commands,

\* See Appendix, No. 7, stating the alteration and increase that actually took place.

† Lieutenant-colonel commandant Leighton, Lieutenant-colonel commandant Hessman.

‡ Lieutenant-colonel commandant Cleiland.

§ Lieutenant-colonel commandant Delamotte.

|| Lieutenant-colonel commandant Whish.

commands, and attention to this rule must frequently compel the Government to resort to expedients with regard to the distribution of its troops,\* which in time of peace are often difficult and embarrassing, and in the event of hostilities wholly impracticable. The consequence is, that His Majesty's and the Company's troops can never join in service without the senior officers of the latter (however high the separate commands they may have held) being superseded by the great proportion of the regimental officers of His Majesty's corps, who must, from their seniority, command every division, brigade, or detachment. There is no question meant to be raised as to the merits and pretensions of the officers of the two armies, but the above facts are stated as the ground of my positive opinion, that the present system, in its effects, has a direct tendency to prevent the senior officers of the Company's army, present in India, exercising high command during war, and consequently to deprive them of opportunities of distinguishing themselves in the service of their country; and it is obvious that, under such circumstances, these officers will exclusively limit their views to the preservation of their health and the completion of their period of service, in order that they may enjoy in their native country that comfort and repose which the liberality of Government has provided for them.

16. This is a fair and just object for men in the ordinary walks of life, but it is not one that will ever excite or maintain that spirit of animation among the seniors of an army, which is requisite to make them stand as they ought in the estimation of those they command. Subordinate officers will cease to consider with sentiments of deference and respect persons whom they never contemplate as likely to attain any rank in command that will enable them to confer, by their notice, benefits and distinction; and the Native troops of India, who singularly associate their fame with that of their officers, will gradually cease to regard, with that consideration they have hitherto done, persons whose names they cannot trace from the loved and honoured commander of their regiment to the successful leader of a division or army, whose victories have raised the reputation of the branch of the service to which he belonged.

17. These effects have always been, and must always continue to be, the consequence of the mixed service in India of His Majesty's and the Company's troops. Various measures have been adopted to remedy the evils which have constantly occurred from the different constitution of these armies; and whenever this subject has been agitated, the local branch (that of the Company) has had no reason to complain of want of attention to its just claims. It may indeed be stated, that the actual increase of the evil at this moment is in some degree to be traced to a desire in the Honourable the Court of Directors to benefit the condition of the officers in India. By the Regulations which divided each regiment into two, the number of retirements for commandants of corps was doubled; and though the income of the succeeding commandants was lessened, it was still however a provision so liberal, that it was not to be anticipated that many officers,† entitled to the enjoyment of such comfort in their native country, would remain in India in the distant expectation of advancement; while, on the other hand, alarm at slight indisposition even would, in times of peace, incline them to retire from the active duties of their profession; and on the occurrence of war, hostilities would be in all probability terminated before they could return.

18. It has been concluded that the division of the regiments, by doubling the number of commandants, would greatly add to promotion, but this fact may be questioned.

19. The casualties in the higher rank will, from the residence in England of a greater proportion of commandants, decrease in a ratio that will probably balance the difference of numbers calculated upon; and if not, the improved prospect of attaining this provision will prevent many from retiring on the pay of their rank, who, under the former system,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Sir C. Colville's letter, 19th September 1824, and Mr. Elphinstone's minute in reply, Appendix, No. 4.

† Twenty-eight, out of thirty-one, are in England.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

system, would have done so, either from incompetence to active duties, or from despair of obtaining the off-reckonings of a regiment.

20. It might seem to a superficial observer, that the evil stated would admit of an easy remedy, by only granting leave to a certain proportion of the commandants of corps to remain in England; but this, in the first place, would appear to be a violation of the principles of the existing Regulations; and in the next, it would be ineffective to its object, for officers of such standing in the service, when they desired to retire home, would in most cases be too certain to have the just plea of impaired health; and it may be asserted that, under the circumstances they are placed, Government\* cannot have the benefit of their services, unless arrangements are made that render these, to a limited extent, indispensable to establish their claim to the command of a corps, or that prevent them, by adding to their income, or giving them a prospect of distinction, from taking immediate advantage of their right of retirement.

21. The principle of selection to the command and emolument of a regiment can never be introduced into an army so constituted as that of the Company in India, it seems fair to the public service, however, that every individual, before he became eligible to that station, should *have served with credit for a certain period in the command of a corps*, or in stations so high in the general staff as to be *deemed of equal importance* as that charge.

22. The established principle of seniority would not be violated by such a Regulation; none would be excluded by its operation except those who, from bad health or other causes, were incompetent to the higher duties of their profession, and to such the pay of their rank would appear a sufficient reward for past services. On others it would impose no hardship beyond obliging them to serve one or two years more in the higher stations of the army than what they might otherwise do, or to abandon their claims to a regiment. This principle has been, in fact, adopted in other branches of the service. An actual period of service is necessary to a medical officer, both as a superintending surgeon and in the Medical Board, before it can establish his right to pension. The above suggestion is merely offered for consideration; if adopted, it could have no retrospective operation, and in its introduction it might be so qualified, that it should not injure the just pretensions of any meritorious officer.

23. The Court of Directors have not been inattentive to the necessity of inducing officers of rank and character to remain in India after they become entitled to return to England. By their order, under date 25th November 1823, besides the general officers on the staff, several stations† and brigades of different classes were authorized, on allowances calculated to give every fair encouragement to the senior officers of the Company's service; and had the same liberal principle been extended to the officers actually commanding corps, the evils now complained of would, as far as the field officers‡ were concerned, not have existed, for a less proportion would have solicited furlough, and none would have remained filling subordinate staff situations.

24. There is no principle connected with the efficiency of an army so universally admitted, as that its discipline depends more upon the officers commanding regiments than any other class; and it is further admitted, that to command a corps well, not only requires a knowledge of military duties, but high rank.§

25. It follows that, with the exception of the principal staff,|| the command of a corps should be the most desirable, both from allowances and respectability, that an officer can aspire to hold.

26. There

\* Appendix, No. 21, H. E. Sir Thomas Bradford's letter of the 12th December 1826.

† Appendix, No. 11, Statement of Allowances to the several Commands.

‡ Appendix, No. 12, Statement of Regimental Allowances.

§ Appendix, No. 13, Sir C. Colville's, Sir Thomas Bradford's, and Colonel Leighton's Opinions on this head.

|| Appendix, No. 27.

26. There is no subordinate staff situations which a subaltern or captain of twelve or fifteen years' standing cannot fill as well as a major or lieutenant-colonel; but the former, however otherwise qualified, cannot exercise the command of a corps except under great disadvantages. A full conviction of the truth of these facts, and of their great consequence to the efficiency of the Indian army, led the Court of Directors to take the subject into their consideration; and in consequence they sent out their orders of November 1823, which not only remodelled the armies of the three Presidencies, but settled the number of Government commands for each, with their respective allowances.

27. The Bengal Government, in forwarding the orders of the Court, stated in their instructions that the number fixed of seven Government commands at Bombay was to include all permanent Government commands, but that frontier stations and subsidiary forces were not subject to the same restrictions on the score of allowances, and that the officers placed at the head of such forces were to be selected by the Governor, without reference to seniority.

28. The orders of the Court of Directors regarding the changes in the constitution of the army, directed the allowance of rupees 400 per mensem, as increase to officers in command of corps.

29. The Governments of Madras and Bombay granted this allowance in addition to the full batta of the rank, considering such to be the Court's intention ;\* but the Governor-General in Council did not concur in this interpretation of the Court's order, and in a letter to this Government, under date the 4th February 1825, it is stated, that the corps in garrison† in Bengal, drew only half batta, and that officers commanding such corps lost by the late orders from England a sum more than equivalent to the rupees 400, and therefore the field allowances which had been continued at Bombay could not be sanctioned. Similar orders were sent to the Government of Fort St. George.

30. The existing difference between the allowances of the European officers of the Bengal establishment and those of the Coast of Coromandel, is in no instance so great as in that of full batta, which, with the exception of two or three garrisons,† is drawn throughout the territories subject to Bengal, whereas the armies of the subordinate Presidencies have the allowance at none but a few field stations.§ This difference between the establishments in this and other allowances to officers commanding corps affected the operation of the Court's orders on this point, and renders what would be a boon to the officers of Madras and Bombay not so to those of Bengal.||

31. The orders issued by the Supreme Government on this occasion reduced a lieutenant-colonel commanding a corps at Bombay at a half batta station from the monthly allowance of rupees 1,420,¶ which he had drawn under the interpretation given by the Governor in Council to the Court's order, to rupees 1,220 ;\*\* and from the diminution of this liberal augmentation of his former salary, the principal effect anticipated from the arrangement was in a great measure lost ; for the command of a regiment, though increased,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* See Mr. Elphinstone's minute, dated 2d March 1825.

† Colonel Casement's letter, and Colonel Imlach's (the auditor-general) Remark.

† Fort William, Barrackpore cantonment, and Allahabad.

§ Cutch, Deesa, and Mhow, all on the frontier.

|| Colonel Casement's letter, 12th August 1824.

<b>¶ Field Allowances</b>	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Rs. 1,020
Staff pay	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	400
										1,420
<b>** Garrison Allowances</b>		..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Rs. 820
Staff pay	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	400
										1,220

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

creased, was not sufficiently so to induce officers of high rank to remain in India, nor to tempt others to quit staff situations from which it would have been harsh and impolitic to remove them, unless for their advantage; but there appears no ground to doubt but the objects the Honourable Court had in view will be attained (as far as the army of this Presidency is affected) if the Honourable Court determine upon granting the increase of 400 rupees without striking off the additional *batta* formerly enjoyed by officers in command of regiments. According to the existing rule, lieutenant-colonel commandants under this Presidency are not considered at liberty to remain with their corps when their turn comes for Government commands. The operation of this rule may even at present be in some cases detrimental to the public service, and supposing that the increase recommended for the regimental commanding officers of corps is adopted, it might be an injury to a lieutenant-colonel instead of a benefit to remove him from his regimental charge to one of the lesser Government commands,\* for while he would receive a very trifling increase of allowance, his expenses would become greater.

32. It may be here stated, that though the number of brigades authorized by the Court of Directors is quite indispensable, as an encouragement to the senior members of the army, while the officers in command of corps are on their present allowances, the case would be altered if the proposed increase was given to the commanders of corps; it would, on such a measure being adopted, appear practicable to reduce some of the stations that are of minor importance, while the four principal frontier stations, Baroda, Mhow, Deesa, and Cutch, and the large cantonment of Poonah, might be beneficially increased. The result of such an arrangement would be to give more field officers for regimental duty, and the prospect of these higher and more desirable commands might prevent officers of rank from soliciting a furlough to England, or taking advantage of their right to retire at so early a period as they otherwise would.

33. To preserve that spirit and animation which are necessary in an army, and above all to that of India, high prizes must be presented to officers of rank. There is, when a forcible impetus is required, little if any advantage derived from those slight gradations of allowances and command, which leave individuals in doubt whether they shall benefit or lose by a change of their situations.

34. Other arrangements might be made to keep lieutenant-colonels of the Bombay army with their corps. Of the present Government commands I can only deem those I have before mentioned, Baroda, Mhow, Deesa, Cutch, and Poonah, of importance enough to require a specific officer to be nominated to them; with regard to the other stations, such as Candesh, Southern Konkan, and Kaira, there appears to me no reason why the senior regimental officer at the station might not exercise the general command, as is now the case in the garrisons of Surat and Bombay.† Such officer would have a moderate additional allowance for this duty, but he would not be separated from his corps, and though his next senior might have regimental charge, his regiment would continue under his general authority and inspection.

35. The reduction made by discontinuing some of the above stations as Government commands, might well be applied to increase the allowance now enjoyed by the officers in charge of the five important cantonments before noticed. This would constitute them into such objects that officers of rank and character would remain in the country, or return to it in hopes of attaining them. They would of course continue, as at present, to be filled by selection; and though seniority would constitute a claim, it would be destructive of principles essential to the political administration of the country, to admit it as giving any right to such command.

36. This plan would in a great degree be rendered abortive if lieutenant-colonel commandants were not allowed to command their regiments when they had no general charge,

\* Appendix, No. 11, Statement of Allowances.

† Bombay is a special appointment, generally a King's officer.

charge, but to this there can be no objection. In His Majesty's service there are generally two lieutenant-colonels present with a corps; and in the Company's, from regimental rise ceasing at the rank of major, lieutenant-colonels are always available for any corps in which they are required, and a case can hardly be anticipated in which two\* could be present with one regiment.

37. It is unnecessary to add, that the proposition I have made to diminish the number of Government commands is meant to be contingent on the increase of allowances to officers commanding corps, and of the grant of an increase to the higher commands in the army; if such a reduction was made without the adoption of these measures, the evil complained of would be aggravated instead of being remedied.

38. The above arrangements relate chiefly to field officers, but there are, and must still be, a great want of efficiency in the army till the vacancies† in corps caused by the number employed in the staff are diminished.

39. The adjutant-general's Return‡ will show the number of officers in the Bombay army employed on staff duty. The great proportion of captains will be noticed. This arises from several causes. Under the regulations and usages of the service, officers of this rank may be said to be alone eligible to many stations on the staff.

40. We shall effect no good if we merely obtain field officers for regimental duty, without these are aided with more captains than we now have.§ This rank is one of the most important in the army; and there cannot be a condition more unfavourable to military discipline than that of many corps of this Presidency, in which there is not an officer between the commander of the regiment and the subalterns. This injurious effect will in a great degree be done away by arrangements which give to those that perform regimental duty as good, if not better, prospects than upon the staff, and which render a certain portion of actual service with a corps indispensable to rise to the distinction and the emoluments accompanying its command; but further measures must be adopted to give an actual increase of officers, and particularly of captains, for regimental duty.

41. It has often been proposed to strike off the staff of the Indian army; but from the established principle of rise by seniority, and its association on service with His Majesty's troops, every plan hitherto brought forward has been found liable to what were deemed insurmountable objections; but the necessity for doing something is imperative, and we must not be withheld by ordinary difficulties and general rules from applying an unusual remedy in a case so emergent, and one which, on some points, has analogy to no other.

42. It has been proposed to form corps of officers without men, from which vacancies by appointments to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the staff or be nominated to corps proceeding on service,|| but, under all circumstances, continue to rise in the skeleton corps to which they belonged.

43. There appears to me fewer objections to this plan than to any other I have seen. It would furnish officers for regimental duty without disturbing the regular rise of regiments, or producing those just grievances, and irregularities of promotion that must result from associating in the Indian army staff employ with the attainment of permanent rank.

44. The above corps should in the first instance be raised as an augmentation. They should certainly have no ensigns in them, and perhaps the rank of lieutenant might also be dispensed with.¶ The promotion to the junior rank of these corps, whether it

was

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* *i. e.* a lieutenant-colonel commandant, and a lieutenant-colonel.

† Appendix, No. 10, H. E. Sir T. Bradford's letter, December 1826.

‡ Appendix, No. 19.

§ Appendix, No. 22, Statement of the number of captains, and how employed.

|| Appendix, No. 24.

¶ Appendix, No. 25, Statement of the Plan.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

was a lieutenant or captain, should be from the senior ensign or lieutenant of the line; and this effect would be good, so far as it repaired bad fortune in regimental rise.

45. As the proposed skeleton regiments would have no lieutenant-colonels commandant, they would consist of one lieutenant-colonel,\* one major, five captains, and ten lieutenants (if that rank was included); and two or three corps would consequently render disposable for staff, or to fill vacancies, 34 officers, all of whom would be of some standing in India.

46. Another question relating to staff employment remains to be examined, on which I shall venture some suggestions on points that I believe to be very seriously connected with the future efficiency of this army. In treating this subject, I shall divide the staff into military and civil. Under the first head is the General, the Division, the Brigade, the Garrison and the Regimental Staff. I consider, also, that in India the officers of the Commissariat department must continue on the military staff of the army.

47. Independent of many other reasons which require this department to be filled by officers educated in the army, I know no line that derives so much advantage from the information brought into it by persons well acquainted with other branches of the service, nor one that imparts more useful knowledge to officers who leave it on promotion to assume regimental or general command. The greatest difficulty in operations in India, is feeding an army, and familiarity with the details by which that is done is an incalculable advantage to an officer. I should, on that and other grounds, deem this department an essential branch of military staff; for if it takes men from regimental or general duty, it returns them more efficient, supposing always that advancement in it is not regulated by a succession by seniority, that must in a series of years make numbers forget other branches of their profession, and become fit only for office duties.

48. Officers who enter into the political line are usually selected for their talent and energy, combined with a knowledge of the languages and habits of the Natives, acquired in the course of military service, and when they return to professional duties they carry with them an experience and information that are most useful. Their occupation, indeed, in the political line, often includes much military employment; and it would be as injurious to this class as it would be detrimental to the army not to consider them as a branch of military staff.

49. Officers employed in the survey branch may also be strictly accounted military, as their pursuits and studies are calculated to improve them in science, and to fit them for the highest stations in their profession, and, above all, the quartermaster-general's department.

50. I must place under the head of civil staff the auditor-general's† department, and paymasters, collectors, magistrates, or other officers continued permanently on civil duties.

51. I think there are many and obvious reasons why persons should be selected from the army to fill the various offices in the Pay department, in which they should rise according to seniority, or merit, in the branch they had chosen. No officer should be eligible to this line that had not been eight or ten years in India, and who could not find ample security. The pay and prospects in this department would be such as fully to form compensation to satisfy officers well qualified for such appointments for what they gave up in quitting the military line; and all persons appointed permanently to this branch should be struck off the strength of the corps to which they belonged. Their promotion should cease, and they should retain no further claims upon the military line than that of a right, at the stated period, to the pension of the rank they held when they were nominated to the civil staff.

52. This separation of the auditor-general's department would not apply to any person appointed to act on periods of emergency, but only to those who were nominated to the fixed establishment.

53. When

\* Appendix, No. 26, Comparative Statement of Expense of three Skeleton Corps. † Vide Appendix, No. 27.

53. When emergencies, or urgent calls of the service, led to the appointment of military officers to be collectors, magistrates, or any other office that was strictly civil, such officer, if continued after the emergency had ceased, should be considered as upon the civil staff, and be struck off the strength of his corps, in the same manner as those belonging to the Pay department.

54. To prevent the possibility of this arrangement giving rise to any complaints with regard to the unequal promotion it might make in regiments, it should be a rule that any vacancy caused by the transfer of an officer to the civil staff, should be filled up by line, and not regimental promotion.

55. The army would gain in the number of officers with corps and in promotion\* by striking off the civil staff, and it would not lose in efficiency by their separation from the line, for though there would be no want of qualified and respectable candidates for this branch, these would not be officers whose minds were bent upon military duties, or who were ambitious of advancement in their profession.

56. If the suggestions here offered respecting the civil staff are adopted, it will be but just to the meritorious officers now in this branch to give them two or three years to make up their option whether they will remain in it or return to the military line of the service.

57. To sum up what has been stated. The superior commands proposed to be given to the senior officers, and the increased allowance to those in charge of corps, might be expected to preserve and regain the services of the most experienced and distinguished men in the army, while the other arrangements proposed would add greatly to the number of officers for regimental duty.

58. These arrangements will no doubt be attended with considerable expense, but it has been assumed that this expenditure has already been contemplated by the Honourable the Court of Directors, who have considered that it is justified by the necessity which exists of preserving and improving the efficiency of the Indian army.

59. The facts I have adduced will, I think, prove that, as far as that of this Presidency is concerned, there is a considerable danger, if some change is not made in the present system, of a deterioration from that high character it has hitherto maintained.

60. I am quite aware of the numerous and serious objections which may be offered to what I have proposed, but they are the best and most expedient that I can devise.

61. The case is surrounded with too many difficulties and embarrassments to give a hope of remedying every evil, but I must conscientiously state my conviction, that nothing short of some such measures, as I have proposed, will give health and vigour to a branch of the service, which in its decay must involve that of our empire.

RETURN

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* The period that officers served in the line would be one of probation as to character and fitness for the duties of the Pay department, and promotion would be accelerated by their transfer to this branch. This last is an important consideration; for in an army that rises, as that of India must continue to do, upon the principle of seniority, it is almost impossible to devise expedients that will save it from that stagnation into which it is so prone to seniority. Amongst others, benefit has been justly anticipated from permitting, under strict regulation, the sale of commissions and exchanges with His Majesty's army; but I have elsewhere (a) given my sentiments very fully upon both these points.

(a) Vide Political History of India, vol. ii. pp. 211, 212, 213, 222.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

(No. 1.)

RETURN of the OFFICERS belonging to Three Regiments of Light Cavalry, and Two European and Twenty-six Native Infantry, on the Bombay Establishment.

	Colonels, &c.	Lieut.- colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	TOTAL.
Native Cavalry, 3 Regiments	—	1	2	6	20	14	43
European Infantry, 2 ditto ..	—	1	1	4	13	8	27
Native ditto, 26 ditto ..	—	3	9	54	197	91	354
TOTAL .. ..	—	5	12	64	230	113	424
On the Staff:							
Native Cavalry, 3 Regiments	1	2	1	3	4	—	11
European Infantry, 2 ditto ..	—	1	—	4	3	—	8
Native ditto, 26 ditto ..	3	9	8	56	38	—	114
TOTAL .. ..	4	12	9	63	45	—	133
On Furlough, Europe:							
Native Cavalry, 3 Regiments	2	—	—	6	6	1	15
European Infantry, 2 ditto ..	2	—	1	2	4	—	9
Native ditto, 26 ditto ..	23	14	9	20	25	3	94
TOTAL .. ..	27	14	10	28	35	4	118

## ABSTRACT.

	Colonels, &c.	Lieut.- colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	TOTAL.
Effective, doing duty, with 31 Re- giments .. ..	—	5	12	64	230	113	424
On Staff employ, and other Ap- pointments .. ..	4	12	9	63	45	—	133
On Furlough } On Sick Certificate	6	6	7	19	31	3	66
to Europe: } On Private Affairs	21	8	3	9	4	1	46
TOTAL .. ..	31	31	31	156	310	117	669

(True Abstract)

Adjutant-general's Office,  
14th December 1827.

(Signed)

ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 2.)

Para. 3. "The security of our possession in this country must chiefly depend on our military power."

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

Para. 4. "The improvement of our military system is our first and most important care."  
Lord William Bentinck's Minute while Governor of Madras.

(True Extract)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 3.)

Sir THOMAS MUNRO'S Letter on the State of the Madras Army to the late President of the Board of Control.

"We must mingle the two services by permitting exchanges under certain limitations; and we must make them one, at a particular point, by rendering officers who have attained the rank of colonel or major, eligible to employment in all parts of the world; and we must show that honorary marks of distinction, and the office of the Commander-in-chief, are not exclusively reserved for one service."

(True Extract)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 4.)

Mr. ELPHINSTONE'S Minute, in reply to Sir Charles Colville's Letter, 19th September 1824, states, "that the distinctions complained of (Company's officers having the greater number of commands while many of those officers were junior to those of His Majesty's service) were not so great as apprehended by the Commander-in-chief, as the commands were as equally distributed as political circumstances rendered expedient, and had an European regiment (King's) been sent to Mhow, and the 4th Dragoons to Baroda (as was in agitation), the two best commands would be filled by King's officers."

(True Copy)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 5.)

Sir THOMAS MUNRO'S Letter on the State of the Army.

"The senior officers who have not regiments must remain from necessity in India, subjected to the mortification of seeing the commands of most importance entrusted to the King's officers of equal rank, not from partiality, but from their being younger men and fitter for the duty. The officers actually in charge of corps, by the diminution of their allowances, and by being more seldom employed than formerly in distinguished commands, have lost in the eyes, both of the junior European officers, and of the Native troops, much of that respect which they once enjoyed. The younger part of the European regimental officers, seeing their commanders obliged to give way to His Majesty's officers in almost every situation where honour is to be acquired, and knowing that after the longest course of service their own case will be no better, have lost the very hope of distinctions, and with it the most powerful incentive to honourable deeds.

"We

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

“We must quicken promotion by augmenting the number of officers in the higher, and diminishing that of those in the lower ranks.”

(True Extract)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 6.)

Sir THOMAS MUNRO'S Letter on the State of the Army.

“We must render the situation of officers commanding the Native corps more respectable by higher allowances, and a larger share of authority than they now possess. We must remove, as far as may be practicable, all distinctions between the King's and Company's officers, and we must elevate the Company's service by making their officers virtually, as well as in form, eligible to every office in India to which those of His Majesty can be appointed, and eligible, also, after attaining a certain rank, to employment in Europe or any part of the world.”

(True Copy)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 7.)

The old establishment, consisting of thirteen regiments of two battalions each (now denominated twenty-six single regiments), each with one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, and two majors, are each divided into two single regiments, with each one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and one major, consequently the increase has only been of one colonel, thus leaving each regiment or battalion with its former number of lieutenant-colonels and majors.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 8.)

The senior officers of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service present on the Bombay Establishment :

Colonel.

Fitzgerald, His Majesty's 20th Foot ; 12th August 1819.

Lieutenant-colonels.

Leighton, Company's ; 25th December 1812.

Sullivan, His Majesty's 6th Foot ; 1st July 1813.

Willshire, Queen's ; 4th December 1815.

Hessman, Artillery ; 2d February 1816.

Thomas, His Majesty's 20th Foot ; 21st January 1819.

Cleiland, Company's ; 15th April 1819.

Wilson, His Majesty's 4th Dragoons ; 12th August 1819.

Whish, Artillery ; 11th September 1820.

Rainey, His Majesty's Unattached ; 15th August 1822.

(No. 9.)

Sir THOMAS MUNRO'S Letter.

"THE conclusion which I would wish to draw from all that has been said is, that if we would wish to raise the Company's army from its present depressed state, we must make the situation of officers commanding Native corps, more fixed and respectable. We must accelerate promotion by a greater proportion of the *higher* ranks ; and we must draw home the senior officers when past the time of actual service, by securing to them a comfortable retirement."

(True Copy)

(Signed)

ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

(No. 10.)

Commander-in-chief's Letter, 12th December 1826.

Para. 3. I think it imperatively my duty to call the attention of the Honourable President and Board to the state of the regiments in regard to the number of officers for regimental duty.

Para. 4. His Excellency admits there is no other method of filling up the staff than from the line, but adds, that "besides the other vacancies, the casualties occasioned by the climate, and the propriety of listening to old and sick officers for furlough, the proposed increase would not more than meet the demands of the service." His Excellency proposes the vacant commissions (90) to be filled up by an additional major to each regiment.

Mr. ELPHINSTONE'S Minute, 15th December, replies generally to the above, and then proceeds to state :

Para. 4. "We shall find, by the adjutant-general's list, that the number of officers on the staff, and other duties, does not exceed that contemplated by the Court of Directors.

Para. 5. "I nevertheless agree with his Excellency as to the advantage of a large proportion of European officers, and therefore readily concur to recommend the whole of his suggestions to the Honourable Court."

Second Minute by Mr. ELPHINSTONE.

Para. 7. "If we refer to the state of appointments in 1817, 1818, and 1819, the average was then about five per regiment. The last Madras Army List shows the proportion, in that long settled Presidency, to be very little less.

"In Bengal also it is considerably more than four ; but the larger the army the less in proportion will be the staff."

(True Extract)

(Signed)

ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

(No. 11.)

THE following seven commands were authorized for Bombay :

Baroda	beyond frontier	Rs.
Mhow	ditto ..	1,410
Cutch .. ..	ditto ..	1,180
Sattara .. ..	ditto ..	710
Candeish .. ..	ditto ..	710
Southern Konkan	ditto } each	600
N. Division, Guzerat	ditto }	

In addition to regimental pay and allowances.

The cantonment of Poonah falls to the command of the senior King's officer ; and the garrison of Bombay is a special command, and held almost always by a King's officer also.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 12.)

Lieutenant-colonel's pay and allowances on the Bombay Presidency.	Rs.
Allowance for commanding .. .. .	820
	400
	<hr/>
	1,220

Lieutenant-colonel's pay and allowances in all situations in Bengal,	Rs.
agreeably to Colonel Imlach's (the auditor-general) statement ..	1,020
Allowance for commanding .. .. .	400
	<hr/>
	1,420

N. B.—See Pay Table and Colonel Imlach's red ink remark.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 13.)

Commander-in-chief's Letter, 12th December 1826.

“AND that the efficiency of the Native army can only be preserved by having an adequate number of European officers with each regiment.”

Commander-in-chief's Minute, 2d January 1827.

Para. 2. “Every Native regiment should have at its head a field officer, as those under that rank who fall into the command, labour under disadvantages, and are never looked up to with the same respect by the sepoys, who think it a great hardship to be commanded by officers who know little or nothing about their individual character ; and perhaps it is not too much to say, that the junior inexperienced European officers, of whom the proportion, compared with the number who know their duty is much too great, in almost every regiment, at present do not conduct themselves towards a captain in temporary command as they would towards a field officer.”

Extract from Colonel Leighton's (the late adjutant-general) letter.

(True Extract)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 14.)

Mr. ELPHINSTONE'S Minute, 2d March 1825,

STATING that it is his opinion that the rupees 400 should be in addition to the field allowances for the command of regiments, that being the case at Bengal and at Madras.

See the whole of this discussion in Council, under this date, with Mr. Chief Secretary Newnham's remarks.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

(No. 15.)

IN Bengal all stations bellow Allahabad, that is to say, Barrackpore and the garrison of Fort William, are half batta stations; and all above Allahabad, that is to say, every other station in that Presidency, are on field batta. Colonel Imlach, the auditor-general, makes the following red ink remark in his official Returns sent to Bombay under date 31st July 1827:

The allowances of commissioned officers *do not* change in any situation.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 16.)

ON the Bombay Presidency there are only three batta stations, Mhow, Cutch, and Deesa; but at the two frontier stations (which are also subsidiary forces), Baroda and Sattara, half batta only is drawn.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 17.)

	Rs.
Lieutenant-colonel, commanding a corps, draws, altogether	.. 1,220
If the proposed additional batta was given of .. ..	.. 200
	1,420

The Government commands, &c. .. ..	.. 1,660
The difference of .. ..	.. 240

therefore, between the Government command and the command of a regiment would appear a trifle.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 18.)

THE Honourable the Court clearly did not, in their orders, contemplate the probability of a regiment being commanded by a lieutenant-colonel commandant, for they most expressly direct the command allowance of rupees 400 not to be drawn by an officer in the receipt of off-reckonings.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

(No.

**RETURN of the Number of STAFF and other Appointments, not Regimental, held by  
on the Bombay Establishment during**

	1st JANUARY 1826.						
	Colonels, &c. Lieut.-colonels commandant.	Lieut.-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.
General Staff and Departments of the Army ...	3	5	4	22	3	—	37
Divisional and District Staff ... ..	4	1	—	13	9	—	27
Garrison Staff ... ..	—	1	—	2	5	—	8
Personal Staff to the Honorable the Governor, Commander-in-chief, and General Officer of the Staff ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	—	2
Attached to the Survey Department ... ..	—	1	—	5	9	2	17
Ditto to the Battalion of the Pioneers, Extra Battalions, Marine Battalion, Invalid and Sebundy Corps, Guzerat and Provincial Bat- talion, Poonah Auxiliary Horse, and Politi- cal Escorts ... ..	—	1	—	11	31	—	43
Employed in Political or Civil duties ...	—	4	1	16	1	1	23
Attached to the Troops of H. H. the Nizam } and Nagpore Auxiliary Horse ... ..	—	—	1	2	1	—	4
TOTAL ... ..	7	13	6	72	60	3	161

Adjutant-general's Office, Bombay,  
6th February 1828.(True Copy)  
(Signed)ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieut.-col., M. S.

19.)

Officers of Cavalry, European and Native Infantry, in the Honourable Company's Army  
the Years 1825, 1826, and 1827.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

1st JANUARY 1827.							1st JANUARY 1828.						
Colonels, &c. Lieut.-colonels commandant.	Lieut.-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Colonels, &c. Lieut.-colonels commandant.	Lieut.-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.
2	2	5	23	4	—	36	1	2	2	21	4	—	30
2	4	—	13	10	—	29	3	5	—	13	9	—	30
—	1	—	2	5	—	8	—	1	—	1	2	—	4
—	—	—	1	2	1	4	—	1	—	1	2	—	4
—	—	—	6	16	—	22	—	—	—	5	3	—	8
—	—	—	13	24	—	37	—	—	—	14	17	—	31
—	4	5	11	3	1	24	—	3	7	7	5	—	22
—	—	1	2	1	—	4	—	—	—	2	1	—	4
4	11	11	71	65	2	164	4	12	9	64	45	—	134

(Signed) J. W. AITCHISON,  
Adj.-gen. of the Army.

(No.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(3).—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1852.RETURN of the Number of OFFICERS belonging to each Regiment of Light  
Regiments, during the

				1st JANUARY 1826.						
				Colonels, &c. Lieut.-colonels commandant.	Lieut.-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.
Native Cavalry ..	{	1st Regiment ..	..	1	1	1	5	10	2	20
		2d ditto ..	..	—	—	1	4	8	3	16
		3d ditto ..	..	1	1	1	2	8	4	17
European Infantry..	{	1st Regiment ..	..	—	1	—	3	4	2	10
		2d ditto ..	..	—	—	—	3	9	5	17
Native Infantry ..	{	1st Regiment ..	..	—	—	1	—	7	4	12
		2d ditto ..	..	—	—	—	2	6	3	11
		3d ditto ..	..	—	1	—	2	6	3	12
		4th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	2	7	4	14
		5th ditto ..	..	—	1	1	1	7	3	13
		6th ditto ..	..	—	1	—	1	9	3	14
		7th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	1	8	2	12
		8th ditto ..	..	—	—	—	3	7	4	14
		9th ditto ..	..	—	1	—	—	7	5	13
		10th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	2	6	4	13
		11th ditto ..	..	—	—	—	2	7	2	11
		12th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	1	4	4	10
		13th ditto ..	..	—	—	—	3	8	4	15
		14th ditto ..	..	—	1	—	1	7	3	13
		15th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	1	6	5	13
		16th ditto ..	..	—	—	—	—	5	3	8
		17th ditto ..	..	—	1	—	1	7	5	14
		18th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	2	7	4	14
		19th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	4	8	4	17
		20th ditto ..	..	—	—	1	4	9	4	18
		21st ditto ..	..	—	—	1	1	7	3	12
		22d ditto ..	..	—	—	—	—	8	4	12
		23d ditto ..	..	—	—	—	1	7	5	14
		24th ditto ..	..	—	1	—	1	7	3	12
		25th ditto ..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		26th ditto ..	..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL .. ..				2	10	15	53	206	104	390

(True Copy)

Adjutant-general's Office, Bombay,  
6th February 1828.

(Signed)

ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieut.-col., M. S.

20.)

Cavalry, European and Native Infantry, on the Bombay Establishment, effective with the 1826, and 1827.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3).—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

1st JANUARY 1827.							1st JANUARY 1828.						
Colonels, &c. Lieut.-colonels commandant.	Lieut.-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Colonels, &c. Lieut.-colonels commandant.	Lieut.-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets and Ensigns.	TOTAL.
—	1	1	4	9	3	18	—	—	1	2	7	5	15
—	—	1	4	6	4	15	—	—	1	4	5	5	15
1	1	—	—	9	3	14	—	1	1	—	9	4	15
—	—	—	2	5	3	10	—	1	—	2	4	4	11
—	—	1	1	9	2	13	—	—	1	2	9	4	16
—	—	—	—	6	3	9	—	—	—	1	10	3	14
—	—	—	3	5	3	11	—	—	—	3	6	4	13
—	1	—	3	8	3	15	—	1	—	2	5	4	12
—	—	1	3	8	2	14	—	—	—	1	9	4	14
—	—	—	1	7	1	9	—	—	1	—	7	3	11
—	1	—	3	7	4	15	—	—	—	4	8	2	14
—	—	—	3	9	4	16	—	—	—	4	8	3	15
—	—	—	2	7	4	13	—	—	1	2	8	4	15
—	—	1	1	6	3	11	—	—	1	2	6	3	12
—	1	—	4	8	3	16	—	1	—	3	9	2	15
—	1	—	1	8	2	12	—	—	—	1	8	4	13
—	1	—	2	6	1	10	—	—	1	2	7	4	14
—	—	—	3	8	3	14	—	—	—	3	8	4	15
—	—	—	1	7	3	11	—	—	1	1	8	3	13
—	—	—	2	6	1	9	—	—	—	2	6	3	11
—	—	—	1	4	3	8	—	—	—	2	4	4	10
—	1	1	1	9	4	15	—	1	—	3	7	3	14
—	1	1	2	6	4	14	—	—	—	1	10	4	15
—	—	1	4	8	2	15	—	—	1	4	7	3	15
—	—	1	2	9	3	15	—	—	1	2	10	5	18
—	—	1	1	7	3	12	—	—	1	1	7	4	13
—	—	1	3	8	2	14	—	—	1	3	7	3	14
—	—	1	1	7	4	13	—	—	—	2	8	2	12
—	—	—	1	8	4	13	—	—	—	1	8	4	13
—	1	1	1	7	2	12	—	—	—	1	8	4	13
—	—	—	2	5	3	10	—	—	—	2	7	4	13
1	10	13	62	222	89	397	—	5	13	63	230	112	423

(Signed) J. W. AITCHISON,  
Adjt.-gen. of the Army.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

(No. 21.)

His Excellency the Commander-in-chief remarks, in his letter of the 12th December 1826, that it never could have been in the contemplation of the Court of Directors in the original constitution of the army that the increasing exigencies of the service, during a period of thirty years, would have created so extensive a demand for officers for the staff. Mr. Elphinstone, in reply, agrees with the general reasoning of his Excellency, and finally proposes the reduction of some staff appointments that these officers might join their corps; but the Commander-in-chief imagines this would not answer the demand, for regimental officers who lost their appointments would apply for furlough on the plea of impaired health.

(True Extract)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 22.)

In three regiments of cavalry, two of European infantry, and twenty-six of Native infantry, there are a total number of captains .. .. 155

Deduct,

Captains as deputies in offices,	..	..	..	..	..	4
Ditto .. assistants ditto,	..	..	..	..	..	14
Ditto .. brigade-majors,	..	..	..	..	..	5
Ditto .. paymasters,	..	..	..	..	..	7
Ditto .. surveyors, political agents in civil and other appointments,	..	..	..	..	..	32
						62
Ditto, sick, absent,	..	..	..	..	..	24
Ditto, for regimental duty, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ per regiment,	..	..	..	..	..	86
						69

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 23.)

Sir THOMAS MUNRO'S Letter.

If military considerations alone regulated the formation of armies, it would not be difficult to ascertain what kind of army would be best adapted to Indian service. In this view, then, the best army would be such a one as the Indian army formerly was. The whole, both European and Native, one army under the Company, receiving temporary aid in war from the King.

What cannot be done by force may now, and at all times, be effected by justice by a wise and liberal government, substituting confidence for distrust, and securing to the officers of the Native army a fair participation in all the honours and advantages of military command.

(True Extract)

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

## (No. 24.)

Sir JOHN MALCOLM'S Central India, vol. ii.

And accelerating promotion in the local army; but there is no measure so requisite for the latter as the formation of a staff corps, which would furnish the means of supplying vacancies in regiments occasioned by the removal of their officers to other duties. Under the present system the deficiency of European officers is felt, particularly on service, as a great evil. This evil must continue till the regular staff of the army are separated from that list, which it is essential to keep complete for regimental duties. If this measure is determined upon, the formation of a plan\* for carrying it into effect will not be difficult; but great care must be taken that it combines due regard for the interests of individuals with those of the public.

We must continue dependent on the fidelity and efficiency of our Native army for the preservation of India. The European officers are the links by which we must preserve its attachment and maintain its reputation. Their peculiar condition requires favour and support; and it is not too much to affirm, that any means which have a tendency to depress this body of men, or to introduce any claims but those of Indian service and complete competence into a competition for those objects of reward, will be fatal to our best hopes of preserving our Eastern empire.

## (No. 25.)

To fill up Vacancies occasioned by Staff Appointments and Absentee Field Officers.

It is not intended that the staff corps alluded to should be on the same principle as the one in England. This would involve some objections as affecting the rise by seniority.

It is meant only to offer an experiment by way of relief, which could be relinquished if found not applicable. That for a certain number of the fixed staff appointments, such as adjutant and quartermaster-general, auditor and commissary-general, with two or three of the principal commands, and a promotion of majors to lieutenant-colonels, and captains to majors, should take place as an augmentation to the aggregate number of field officers in the line, to fill up the vacancies occasioned by these appointments, which, as being permanent, would occasion no fluctuation. This would keep the operation of it strictly in the line, while it placed so many more field officers at the head of corps.

If it were necessary, the operation might be extended to captains holding the deputyships, brigade-majors and paymasters all being permanent, but not temporary appointments; so that when a lieutenant was promoted to be a captain, a captain a major, a major a lieutenant-colonel, in the place of those appointed to the permanent staff, they would run no risk of being reduced, when once promoted, by the staff person dying, retiring, or other casualty, as the vacancy must be filled up, because a certain number must be employed on the staff from the line; for an officer who had once obtained the "lance rank" would never go back to his former one, while it would have the advantage of giving the seniors of every grade the pay and rank of the duties and command they were exercising in the absence of those employed on the staff. It is necessary to contemplate a case similar to the one in existence, of a captain holding the appointment of adjutant-general. This would not influence the rule, which ought to be allowed to take its course; and though the promotion of a major incidental to it might be considered as not strictly called for, and as surcharging

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* The formation of the corps of officers without men, from whom vacancies caused by appointments to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the staff, and who could join corps with whom their services might be required, but should rise in unattached corps. There are fewer objections to this plan than any other, for it could in no degree disturb the regular rise of other corps, or produce those inequalities of promotion that must result from filling by nomination to the staff from the regiments to which they belonged. These unattached corps would be found in the first instance as an augmentation.—Note, p. 223, vol. ii.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

charging the establishment, yet as no provision is made for the vacancies of field officers absent on sick leave, it would only act as beneficial, filling up the place of a field officer in Europe; otherwise, in considering it an exception to the rule, it might operate prejudicially to meritorious individuals, and consequently injurious to the public service.

It is to be doubted whether doubling the number of officers would effect the object in view. The Native army wants more European officers, but the sepoys do not require so many in proportion as the King's regiments. One of the greatest defects is, that the communicating link between major and subaltern is so frequently broken by the absence of many, and sometimes of all, the captains of a regiment. Sir Thomas Munro thought the Indian army wanted more field officers, but not more captains and subalterns.

The plan, however, for the skeleton corps, mentioned in Appendix, No. 26, is no doubt the simplest and best.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 26.)

THE proposed augmentation of one major to each regiment would involve, monthly,	
expense of rupees .. .. .	19,685
The expense monthly, for officers at one regiment Native infantry, would be ..	9,277
The proposed plan for three skeleton would be, for three lieutenant-colonels	2,460
Three majors .. .. .	1,905
Fifteen captains .. .. .	5,565
	<hr/> 9,930

While this plan furnishes twenty-one officers in the ranks most important, it incurs no expense for off-reckonings, staff, &c. Sir Thomas Munro was decidedly of opinion that the defect of our army laid in want of officers in the *senior* not *junior* ranks.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 27.)

The adjutant and quartermaster-general's offices require to be filled by the first professional officers in the army, and should be equal to the general staff. While the situations of auditor and commissary-general should be paid more as civil officers, proportionate to their great responsibility.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

(No. 28.)

Sir THOMAS MUNRO'S Letter on the State of the Madras Army to the late President of the Board of Control.

Promotion might also in some degree be aided by giving to the officers appointed to the situations of quartermaster-general, adjutant-general, commissary-general, or military secretary to Government, one step of advanced rank, provided they had served a certain number of years in India.

There

There is another mode of accelerating promotion, which was recommended by Lord Cornwallis, namely, to permit officers who had served their full time of twenty-two years actually in India to sell their commissions. The introduction of this practice into a service where seniority is the fundamental principle of promotion, is a measure of doubtful expediency, as it might not at first be well received by the Company's officers, and if not limited by the strictest regulations, it might so extend as to destroy the rise by seniority, the very basis of the service; as it is, however, a most essential point that promotion should be facilitated whenever it can be done without injury to the present system, officers who have completed their twenty-two years' service might, I think, be allowed to sell their commissions.

(Signed) ED. FREDERICK,  
Lieutenant-colonel, M. S.

Ordered that the subject of the preceding be noticed in the next despatch to the Honourable Court, and that a copy of the paragraphs already prepared relative thereto, and the Minutes above recorded, be sent to the Supreme Government.

### Appendix B.

EXTRACT from Sir JOHN MALCOLM'S Minute, dated 4th September 1829.

I AM quite prepared to give the attention it demands to the proposition of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief regarding an increase of the number of boys to each Native regiment.

The number proposed would entail a considerable expense, and it would be difficult at the present moment to incur that without authority from the Honourable the Court of Directors, except we had stronger reasons than any that can be urged for the measure as it now comes under consideration; but as I deem it of particular importance, when we are making every reduction we can, and have effected some and contemplate more in the pay of establishments and followers, to assure our Native army, by acts, that these plans of retrenchment will not affect them, and that, on the contrary, we continue anxious to improve their condition; and as I consider their attachment to be very dependent on the feelings towards Government of the Native commissioned officers, I must desire to combine with the proposition of the Commander-in-chief an arrangement that would induce Native officers to give their sons to the service, which, false pride and alarm lest bad conduct in the son should bring disgrace upon the father, now prevents them doing. There is another reason for our offering every encouragement for Native officers bringing their sons up in the army, as it will obviate much of that distress which often falls upon their families at their death, and creates embarrassing claims on Government.

I would propose that the present number of boys be increased to thirty; but that eight more boys be added and denominated First Class Boys, with some slight distinctive mark on their dress, and receiving one rupee and a half more than other boys. This class to be exclusively composed of the sons of Native officers; and there might be eight men in every corps, who were also sons of Native officers, who received, until they were promoted, from their superior merits, to the rank of commissioned officers, the sum of two rupees extra, but to have no other privilege or claim either to promotion or favour above other men of the corps except exemption from corporal punishment. If guilty of disgraceful or improper conduct, they would, on this being reported, be discharged the service. When a vacancy occurred in this class, a best class boy, if old enough, might succeed.

The small extra pay recommended for these boys and men, and the exemption proposed, would be regarded with no envious feeling by the men of the regiment; on the contrary, it would add to the value of that rank to which they all aspired, and to which officers' sons would have no claim except on the ground of superior merit.

This

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

This arrangement, supposing it to extend to all the Native corps in the army, would be a total expense of little more than 2,000 rupees per mensem, or 24,000 rupees per annum, and less than the proposition of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief nearly 4,000 rupees per annum.

I have not entered into minute details of this plan, as these can be settled or modified if the principles on which it is grounded are approved. Of its excellent effects I can have no doubt, and I am indeed persuaded, from my knowledge of the feelings of our Native troops, acquired in a course of forty years' service with them, that no measure could be adopted more calculated to attach them to the service, and to give value to the rank they have attained.

This measure is further recommended by the actual condition of the army of Bombay. The number of Hindoostan men in the Native corps of this Presidency is, within the last nine years, 8,000 men more than it was previous to that period, and a decrease of 3,000 men has taken place of the Natives of this Presidency. Notwithstanding the superior appearance and acknowledged gallantry of the Rajpoots of Hindoostan, this change in the composition of the Native army of Bombay is far from desirable; for unless we can make the sepoys of Hindoostan settle in our provinces, they will be much more liable to desert; and many circumstances may occur to prevent their being so much depended upon as the Natives of our provinces, who from many causes, and none more than this influx of foreigners, it is now difficult to recruit.

The measure I have proposed would be a real encouragement to men born in our provinces, and a beneficial influence, as it tempted Natives from Hindoostan to settle with their families in this part of India.

#### MINUTE by Sir JOHN MALCOLM, dated 14th September 1829.

I HAVE given every consideration to the Minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief upon the introduction into our ranks of the sons of Native officers, with a small increase of pay, and with exemption, unless in capital cases, from corporal punishment; and as we differ on the latter point, I must desire, with his Excellency's acquiescence, to postpone for the present the further consideration of this subject.

I am quite positive that, under the very exigent call for reduction in all parts of our military charges and establishments, and the proof exhibited in the recent despatches of the Court of Directors of these being higher than those of either Madras or Bengal, that not only considerations of economy, but the best interests of this Presidency, imperatively demand that all expenses under the head of military charges should be avoided, unless they can be proved to be attended with a benefit of a clear and positive magnitude. Such the proposition I brought forward would, I am assured, have been; but I am also quite persuaded, that unless commissioned officers' sons were in some mode (I care not about forms) exempted except in capital cases, from disgraceful punishment, that the good effects of the measure would be so materially lessened as not to make it justifiable under the circumstances we are placed in regard to all increase of military establishments.

I am quite aware that this opinion is not only contrary to that of his Excellency, but to that of officers for whose experience and judgment I have great respect. I spoke to Brigadier-general Leighton upon the subject, and he told me that he thought with the Commander-in-chief, that the course of justice to all should, in his opinion, be equal, and he did not like the exemption suggested. Notwithstanding these opinions, I cannot resign my judgment upon a point that I may honestly say has had my anxious attention for more than forty years, during which period I have served and been in intimate and direct communication with all ranks of our Native troops, and have had under me those of every Presidency in India. I am positive, on the grounds of the knowledge, that unless the exemption from corporal punishment is in some mode secured, the proposed boon to the Native commissioned

missioned officers will be so deteriorated as not to warrant the expenditure that has been suggested.

I have very recently given a strong opinion on the operation of those general principles, attention to which limits and depresses the Natives in every branch of our service; and shall here only repeat my perfect conviction, that our unbending systems and our reluctance to grant to our Native subjects, public servants and soldiers, any exemption or privilege, however slight and unsubstantial, that interferes with our rules or forms, will tend more, if rigidly persevered in, than any other cause I know, to prevent our empire over India being of long duration. It is the constant theme (I speak from an experience on this point that cannot be mistaken) of all our Native subjects in India, and creates a brooding discontent with their condition, that increases as men are advanced in our service; for disappointment at checked ambition will, from the construction of the human mind, be too often found a stronger feeling than gratitude for past favours. Among our Native commissioned officers, of whom I now speak, I know their most corroding feeling is, that though they may found the highest claims upon the service, they can transmit none; and they die, in nine cases out of ten, with the melancholy thought of leaving starving widows and idle profligate sons, whom pride (mistaken perhaps) has led them to withhold from a career in which they have been successful, but in which they have fears, the thoughtlessness of youth or vice may lead to their disgrace in corporal punishment being inflicted on their sons.

It has been often proposed to remedy these evils by introducing the promising sons of deserving men as volunteers, and allowing them to rise to commissions without passing through the ranks. To this I have ever objected, and ever shall. It would destroy the whole constitution of our Native service. But the necessity of denying to the claims of rank and of merit such distinction, made me more anxious to grant all I could, to gratify the prejudices and natural feelings of this valuable class of men; but it is a point I cannot desire to press in opposition to the opinion of the Commander-in-chief of the army.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

### Appendix C.

EXTRACT from Sir JOHN MALCOLM'S Minute, dated 2d November 1828.

REDUCTIONS have been recently made in many branches of the Military department, and from intended reforms in the Native pension invalid establishment, very considerable savings may be anticipated in this great but essential branch of expenditure. The certainty of provision in his old age, or when disabled by wounds, forms the principal tie by which we hold the attachment of our Native army; but it is to be doubted whether, considering the changed condition of India, and the want of that action which, beyond all other causes, keeps soldiers true to their duty, we shall not now require an accession of motives to animate men upon whom we must continue dependent, and who will be every day more exposed to temptation to swerve from allegiance.

I have observed, in a recent Minute,\* that "the defect in this branch of our army which threatens gradually to undermine its attachment, is the impracticability of raising any person in it above the most subordinate military charge. To reconcile the zeal and ambition required to animate the soldier with such depression, is a problem of no easy solution." But the difficulty of effecting this in a manner that fully meets the object should not deter us from measures which have a tendency to keep alive hope, and through it to maintain the attachment of this most valuable and most important of all the classes of our Native subjects.

Subsequent

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

Subsequent to the last war this consideration led to the appointment of some distinguished commissioned and non-commissioned Native officers to the charge of hill-forts upon a small additional pay; and the recent nomination of Native officers to command the Sebundy corps in the Northern and Southern Konkans, with the appointment of a senior subadar, and the gradual introduction of deserving men from the line into the provincial corps at Ahmed-nuggur and other places, may be expected to operate gradually in a manner the most beneficial to the public service; but more is wanting to give rank and consideration to our Native soldiery in the community to which they belong. However distant the prospect, and however small the number who might reach the objects of ambition we may create, a stigma would be removed from our Government, which is now justly reproached with owing its aggrandizement and existence to a body of men to whom it denies all distinction. By conferring that upon some of the most distinguished, the whole service would be elevated, and the youngest Native soldier would be cheered and inspirited with the prospect of future honour and advancement.

According to the annexed Return,\* all the Native commissioned and non-commissioned of this army who drew any allowance extra to their regimental pay, or that received as invalids or pensioners, were four subadar-majors, five subadars, and four havildars with the rank of jemadars, who were nominated to the command of hill-forts.

The nine subadars receive each for this duty, which exposes them to expense and hazard of health, 30 rupees salary and 15 rupees half batta; and four havildars 14 rupees each, and two and a half batta, making a total amount of 473 rupees and 8 annas per mensem, or 5,061 rupees per annum; which, before the recent resolution to appoint a Native commandant to the Sebundy corps (a measure of economy, as it saved the allowances of an European officer), was literally all of extra reward to which the Natives of the Bombay army, consisting of three regiments of cavalry, a battalion of Golundauze, and twenty-six regiments of infantry, could look.†

At Madras (with the Native service of which I am better acquainted than any other) rewards to the Native officers have been frequent and liberal, consisting of palanquin allowance, horse allowance, pensions, and often grants of lands. These have been, and particularly lately, bestowed with all those imposing ceremonies that gratify the Native, and above all, those who have military habits. I do not find that any similar rewards have been granted in this army; but though I would by no means exclude them for rare and distinguished service, I prefer the mode which has been commenced (for I can deem it nothing more) at this Presidency, of instituting a fixed number of commands, which present a number of certain objects to which men may look forward as the reward of long and distinguished service. But I am decidedly of opinion that these rewards should be made of higher value. If there were no other reasons, the great changes which have lately taken place, and the efforts made and making to advance the respectability of the public servants in the civil branch of the Government, demand that some steps should be taken to grant comparative‡ consideration to those whose services are of equal, if not greater, importance.

The propositions I shall submit to Government to effect this object will be as much directed to elevate the old and faithful Native soldier in rank as in emolument. The latter will not be great, and it will be consistent with every principle of true economy, for it will reconcile men to reforms now in progress in our invalid and pension establishments, that will, I trust, produce a great annual saving in this most heavy but most indispensable branch of public expenditure.

I should propose that the present thirteen commands of hill-forts§ be reduced to six, to each of which there should be a killadar and a naick.

These

Vide Appendix (A.)

† This is besides the marine and extra battalions.

‡ More than comparative consideration cannot be granted, but the highest allowance to two subadars or killadars of the 1st staff, pay included, is not 300, while many Native servants in the civil establishments may rise to as high a salary as 500 and 600 rupees per mensem.—(Signed) J. M.

§ These forts might be Ryghur, Poorundur, Singhur, Loghur, Trimbuck, and Doorap.

These should be divided into grades :

- Two of the first class ;
- Two of the second class ;
- Two of the third class.

The killadar should not be under the rank of subadar, nor his naick under that of jemadar.

A killadar of the first class should have an extra allowance to that to which he was entitled to retire upon, of 170 rupees per mensem, and 30 rupees to keep a horse.

He would be nominated by Government, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief, and receive, on his nomination, a sunnud as killadar, a dress of honour, and a horse from the Government.

A killadar of the second class should have an extra allowance of 150 rupees per mensem, and a sunnud and dress from the Governor. Those of the third class should have 100 rupees per mensem, and a dress and sunnud in the same manner.

The naib killadars should have as follows :—

First class	...	...	...	80 rupees per mensem.
Second class	...	...	...	60 ditto ... ditto.
Third class	...	...	...	40 ditto ... ditto.

The killadars of the first class should be admitted to the third class of the privileged orders of the Deccan. The killadars might be permitted to reside at the fort to which they were nominated or not, as was expedient; but where any causes led to their being allowed to be absent, the naib must remain in charge.

The whole expense of this arrangement would amount to 1,000 rupees per mensem, or 787 rupees above that now incurred; and there cannot be a doubt that this small increase of expenditure, with the employment of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned in the provincial corps, combined with perhaps some slight changes in the constitution of the veteran battalion, will diffuse life and spirit throughout this class of our troops.

Nothing but a thorough conviction of the expediency and policy of this measure would induce me to recommend any increase of expenditure, however small, at a period like the present; but one of the motives which have recently led me to suggest reductions that might, I thought, be made without injury to the service, is to possess Government of means to meet expenditure, which, like the present, is essential to promote its best interests.

The commands I have proposed would be fixed and certain rewards, to which the oldest and most meritorious Native officers of this army might aspire in the ordinary course of service; but rare instances may occur under this Presidency where the extraordinary fidelity or gallantry of a Native officer entitles him to higher notice, and in such cases policy requires we should be forward to confer that distinction which belongs to the possession of Jand, and the jagheer or enam given to the deserving father might be, conditionally or unconditionally, given to his heirs. In cases where very extraordinary services called for such notice in an individual of the Native army, he should be elevated to the third class of privileged persons in the Deccan, and honoured in every manner that could flatter the pride of that body of men to whom he belonged.

MINUTE by Sir JOHN MALCOLM, dated 3d January 1829.

REFERRING to the Government General Order of the 14th November, regarding Native officers to be appointed to the command of certain hill-forts, I should propose that such commands should not be bestowed upon any Native officers of less than thirty years' service.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

service. Extraordinary valour or conduct will merit and receive extraordinary notice without reference to the period of service, but that will be independent of the fixed reward now instituted as powerful inducements to high military feelings and distinction in this branch of our army.

It being very desirable that the most effectual means should be taken for ascertaining the individuals who have established the best claims upon Government for the proposed appointments, I should suggest that his Excellency the Commander-in-chief be requested to lay before Government, as soon as may be convenient, a register roll of at least twelve subadar-majors, or other senior subadars, and of twelve jemadars, exhibiting the dates of promotion of each grade, and a detailed account of their services, specifying also whether wounded or not, the number of actions, sieges, and assaults of fortified places at which they may have been employed. It appears necessary that the names and services of all the Native officers now in command of hill-forts by the appointment of Government should be laid before the Board in a separate list, to enable it to judge of their pretensions to be continued in such commands, under the late Regulations, in preference to others. The dates of their appointments, and by whom originally recommended, and the manner they have conducted themselves up to the present time, should also be stated.

Native officers of thirty years' service, who may have been transferred from the effective strength of the army since the 1st of January 1828, if properly qualified by their services, are to be deemed eligible, but beyond that period the Regulation should not have a retrospective effect to pensioned or invalid officers.

It would be satisfactory that the correctness of the statement of each officer's services were ascertained by division, or other superior commanding officers, by careful inquiry and personal examination of the Native officers themselves.

The register rolls to be accompanied by a recommendation of the Commander-in-chief in favour of the officers who, in his Excellency's opinion, have best entitled themselves, by their services in the field, to reward and high distinction among their countrymen. The selection, however from the best submitted to the Board, to rest with the Governor in Council, in the same manner as that of European officers to Government commands.

The Governor will give the investiture of khilauts to the Native officers so selected, and when he cannot do that in person he will delegate his authority for this purpose; but on all occasions this honour will be conferred with those forms and observances that are calculated to add to the value of the distinctions conferred on the individual.

#### MINUTE by Sir JOHN MALCOLM, dated 3d October 1829.

HAVING fixed upon the 23d of September, the anniversary of the battle of Assaye, as an appropriate day to confer the sunnuds and khilauts upon the Native officers who have been recommended by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief to be promoted to the rank of killadar and naib killadars, the troops of Poonah were ordered under arms, and all the jagheedars and sirdars residing at that city were requested to attend. After these, with the killadars, had been received by me and his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in a tent, we adjourned to the front, where the ceremony of conferring the honours upon the parties could be witnessed by all the troops. The Native officers of the sepoy corps were directed to fall out and attend to the ceremony, at which all the European officers in the cantonment not on duty were present.

A khilaut, with a horse, was given to the six subadars, along with a sunnud, as killadar, to each, while a khilaut only was given to the six naib killadars, who received also a sunnud of their appointment.

The subadars of the first class, Bhicajee Jadow and Perseraw Sing, the two most distinguished

distinguished of these old soldiers, were admitted into the third class\* of the privileged order of the Deccan. Though this gives no immunities of which such men can be supposed desirous of availing themselves, it bestows rank and distinction in the Native community, and was, from this feeling, received by the subadar-major as the greatest honour that was conferred upon them, and appeared to give equal satisfaction to the other Native officers, one of whom observed, it was a distinction which, though given to only two of their class, elevated them all in the estimation of their countrymen.

I shall not attempt to describe the effect produced by the liberality of the Government on this occasion, further than by stating, an expenditure not exceeding 1,000 rupees per mensem, and only 787 more than was before incurred, associated as it has been with the distinctions being conferred with every ceremony that could render it impressive, has produced feelings of pride and gratification among the Native troops at this place, which I have no doubt will spread to every military station of the Presidency.

When the ceremony of investiture was completed, a royal salute was fired in honour of the occasion, and the killadars and the naibs were invited to an entertainment which was given by me in the evening, to which I had asked nearly two hundred of the principal Natives of Poonah.

I have to propose that the following Government Order be issued:—

It has been determined by Government, in order to extend its means of encouraging and rewarding the oldest and most distinguished Native officers of its army, to institute, at permanent stations, six killadars of the principal hill-fortresses under Bombay, and to give to each of the officers raised to the dignity suitable allowances. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief recommended the following officers to fill these situations:—

PRESENT RANK.	NAMES.	—	Designation.	To what Command.	Remarks.
Subadar.. ..	Bhicajee Jadow ..	15 Regt. N. I.	Killadar .. }	Ryghur ..	} 1st Class.
Local Jemadar ..	Gourojee Damajee ..	Invalid ..	Naib .. }		
Subadar-major ..	Purseram Sing ..	5 Regt. N. I.	Killadar .. }	Poorundur ..	} 1st Class.
Jemadar.. ..	Gopaljee Jadow ..	1st E. B. ..	Naib .. }		
Subadar-major ..	Khooshall .. ..	5 Regt. N. I.	Killadar .. }	Singhur ..	} 2d Class.
Jemadar.. ..	Tannae Jannae ..	Gt. P. B. ..	Naib .. }		
Subadar-major ..	Morad Khan .. ..	1st Gr. Regt.	Killadar .. }	Loghur ..	} 2d Class.
Jemadar.. ..	Baboo Ram .. ..	10 Regt. N. I.	Naib .. }		
Subadar-major ..	Ramjee Erojee ..	17 Regt. N. I.	Killadar .. }	Trimbuck ..	} 3d Class.
Jemadar.. ..	Kristna .. ..	9 Regt. N. I.	Naib .. }		
Subadar.. ..	Mirza Mahomed Ally	12 Regt. N. I.	Killadar .. }	Doorap ..	} 3d Class.
Jemadar.. ..	Shaik Mahomed ..	9 Regt. N. I.	Naib .. }		

The Honourable the Governor and his Excellency the Commander-in-chief being at Poonah, it was resolved that the ceremony of conferring this distinction should be fixed for

\* The privileges of sirdars of the second class consist in an exemption from the ordinary procedure of the zilla courts, and a right to have reports against them tried by the agent or deputy agent, who are directed to treat them with every consideration due to their rank. In certain cases, suits against persons in this class may be compromised, and an arrangement entered into for an equitable division of their property among their creditors; but in all cases their persons, and also as much of their property as is necessary to support them in a manner consistent with their rank in society, is held exempt from attachment.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

for the 23d September, that day being the anniversary of the memorable battle of Assaye, to the success of which the bravery of sepoys so greatly contributed. Khilauts, horses, sunnuds, and other marks of honour were given by the Governor to each of the old and gallant officers that had been nominated killadars and naib killadars. This ceremony was performed in front of the corps at Poonah, drawn out for the occasion, and at the close, a royal salute was fired to mark the degree to which the Government is disposed to honour those who distinguished themselves in its service.

In transmitting this order to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, he may be requested to direct its being communicated in the form he deems most impressive to the different Native corps of the army.

#### Appendix D.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR, subscribed by Mr. WARDEN and Mr. GOODWIN.

I CONCUR with Mr. Warden in deeming it inexpedient to employ European officers in command of sebundies, but I think an encouragement, which is much wanted, might be given to active and intelligent Native officers, by nominating them, with superior allowances, to such commands. It would be both a reward for past and a stimulus to future exertion, and such men, well selected, would effect more in police duties than any European officers could. Native officers so employed should be struck off the strength of the corps to which they belong, but his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, if he adopts this suggestion, could best bring forward a plan by which it might be carried into effect with benefit to deserving individuals, and to the service.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM.

To the Adjutant-general of the Army.

Sir,

I AM directed to acquaint you, for information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that the Honourable the Governor in Council has resolved to appoint subadars to be selected from the army to the command of the sebundies employed in the districts under this Presidency, and to grant them, in addition to the net pay of their rank, a staff salary of rupees (100) one hundred per mensem, with the established allowance of rupees (30) thirty, horse-money.

2. The Governor in Council, therefore, requests that his Excellency will be pleased to place an active and meritorious subadar at the disposal of Government, to be appointed on the pay above referred to, to the command of the sebundies in the Northern Konkan.

I have, &c.

Bombay Castle,  
7th May 1828.

(Signed) T. G. GARDINER,  
Secretary to Government.

#### Appendix E.

MINUTE by Sir JOHN MALCOLM, dated 27th January 1830.

I HAVE repeatedly alluded to the difficulty of recruiting the army of this Presidency from our own provinces, which will, I trust, be greatly lessened by the encouragement lately given by the nomination of Native officers to be killadars, &c. the appointment of active and intelligent Native commissioned officers to command sebundy corps, instead of European

European officers, and, above all, by allotting eight boys, and a similar number of men, the sons of subadars and jemadars, to each corps, with a slight difference of pay. This last measure has already had the anticipated effect of removing the prejudices Native officers have hitherto entertained of withholding their sons from the army.

The Governor-General in Council, in a despatch now under consideration, dwells with justice on the expediency of having our Native armies, on all points where it is practicable, similar in their frame and constitution; but local circumstances, and particularly those connected with recruiting, must create, and continue to create, distinctions. Some of the provinces of Bengal abound in recruits, and vacancies can be at once supplied by eligible men. There is greater difficulty at Madras and Bombay, and at both Presidencies it has, I believe, been found necessary to give much encouragement to obtain a superior class of men; and nothing certainly has more tended to infuse a spirit of attachment in these armies, and to prevent desertions, than the rewards given to distinguished Native officers, and the establishment of recruit boys.

It may be stated that recruits from Hindoostan will always be obtained in sufficient numbers by the Bombay army, and the number of Purdessees now in that body may be adduced as a proof of this fact. But admitting it, the oldest and most experienced officers of this Presidency are not anxious to see the numbers of this caste of men increased. They admit their eligibility from robustness of frame and military habits, but contend that they are mere mercenaries, have a dislike to those embarkations to which the troops of Bombay are so liable, and, from having no ties of family (for they seldom or ever bring their wives and children), are apt to desert. These objections would in a great degree be removed if the Hindoostances in the Bombay army could be induced to settle, and considering the numbers who have attained the rank of commissioned officers, there appears every prospect that this may be effected, if to the measures already adopted can be added a pension to their widows. The want of such a fund is with Native officers of all castes the most serious grievance. The liberality of Government is often extended to the relief of the wives of men who die on service, but no more, and as they can save little, if anything, from their pay, their widows (who have lived in comparative affluence) are left almost objects of charity. Contemplating the advantages of a fund that would remedy this evil, I applied to Lieutenant Johnson, First Assistant of the Military Auditor's Office and I gave annexed the plan of a fund framed for me by that intelligent officer, which would meet the object, without subjecting Government to any extra expense beyond a small donation at its first institution.

I have had the fullest communications with some of the most respectable Native officers of this army, and they are unanimous in their desire to see this plan adopted. Its necessity and justice, they observed, are alike obvious, and while it increases their respectability, it would, they all said, bind and attach them still more to the service.

I stated to several, the difficulty that might arise from a plurality of wives, but this they seemed to think was more ideal than real. "We soldiers," said Purseram Sing,\* one of the oldest and most distinguished Native officers of the army, "have seldom more than one wife, and if it happens otherwise, a punchayet can decide how the pension is to be allotted. I asked this Native officer whether he did not think that, however obligatory the subscription should be upon men hereafter promoted, it would not be right to leave it optional to subscribe or not with the present Native officers? "By no means" said the sensible veteran, "put the plan of the fund at once in the orderly book. You know the distress in which our families are left by daily memorials for relief; it is almost the only evil of our condition." This relates to men who are married here, and the officers and others from Hindoostan are only deterred from bringing their families from Hindoostan by the fear of leaving a wife and young children, on their death, without support, and at a thousand miles from their home and kindred. If to the distinctions

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Purseram Sing is a killadar of the first class.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

distinctions recently given to us old soldiers, and the opening made for our boys, you add the establishment of this fund, you will soon see colonies of Rajpoots in the Bombay territories, and no one can object to moderate deduction from his pay for such an object.

I found the opinions and impressions of Purseram Sing were those of other Native officers of the 23d regiment at Baroda, who are almost all Hindoostan men. On my speaking to them upon the subject, they not only expressed the same sentiments of this plan, but actually desired (as I was informed by Colonel Kennet), in anticipation of its adoption, to write immediately to their families, which I desired they should not do, till it was more matured. Some of them I found had written for their sons, on the publication of the order of the 2d December 1829 (No. 427), being unwilling, as they said, that men of the Bombay provinces should have the exclusive enjoyment of such benefits.

The above facts, and the concurring opinion of every experienced officer, whom I have consulted as to the expediency and policy of this fund, would have led me to recommend it to the Board for immediate adoption, but after the letter from Colonel Casement, under date the 20th November 1829, I deem it proper that the fund should first receive the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, who will judge its merits with reference to the peculiar manner in which the Native army of this Presidency is composed and recruited, which will, with every desire to assimilate, render some distinctions between its institutions and that of Bengal unavoidable, and particularly in cases where an encouragement is required at one settlement to induce men to enlist and remain in the service that is not found necessary at another.

The subjoined plan of a fund for pensioning widows of Native commissioned officers has been framed upon the following data:

1st. With regard to the number of subscribers. That all Native officers, as they stood on the reduced establishment, be required to contribute, *viz.*

							Subadars.		Jemadars.
Cavalry	...	...	...	...	...	...	18	...	36
Artillery—Two Battalions:									
Lascars	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	...	8
Golundauze	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	...	12
Ditto Lascars	...	...	...	...	...	...	6	...	6
Sappers	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	2
Infantry:									
Including Marine Battalion and Pioneers	...	...	...	...	...	...	226	...	226
							Subadars	266	Jemadars 290

2d. That the contributions of subscribers be made with reference to the amount of their net pay, by deduction of five per cent. from all classes and ranks, which, assuming the medium class of subadars to be the average, would give the following as the annual payments by members, and the monthly rate of stoppage from each.

## ESTIMATE Amount and Rate of Subscriptions.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

	Annual Pay of Medium Class.	Number of Subscribers.	Pay of the whole.	Deduction of Five per Cent.	Rate per Month.
<b>CAVALRY :</b>					<b>Rs. Qrs. Reas.</b>
Subadars .. ..	1218	18	21924	1096	5 0 29
Jemadars .. ..	378	36	13608	680	1 2 30
<b>ARTILLERY :</b>					
<b>Golundauze :</b>					
Subadars .. ..	624	6	3744	187	2 2 40
Jemadars .. ..	336	12	4032	201	1 1 58
<b>Lascars :</b>					
Subadars .. ..	378	14	5292	264	1 2 28
Jemadars .. ..	210	14	2940	147	0 3 50
<b>Sappers :</b>					
Subadars .. ..	624	2	1248	62	2 2 40
Jemadars .. ..	336	2	672	33	1 1 58
<b>INFANTRY :</b>					
Subadars .. ..	624	226	141024	7051	2 2 40
Jemadars .. ..	294	226	66444	3322	1 0 90
<b>Total Annual Subscriptions ..</b>				<b>13043</b>	

3d. That Government grant a donation at the outset of rupees 10,000, and a sum equal to the annual average charge on account of pensions to widows of Native officers during the last ten years, towards defraying the annual expenses of the fund.

	Rs.	Qrs.	Reas.
In 1819-20 the actual payments to this class of pensioners, were ..	8,473	3	48
1820-21 .. ..	8,233	2	50
1821-22 .. ..	9,901	0	20
1822-23 .. ..	10,152	3	0
1823-24 .. ..	9,519	0	60
1824-25 .. ..	8,894	2	20
1825-26 .. ..	7,830	1	20
1826-27 .. ..	7,725	3	60
1827-28 .. ..	7,551	0	60
1828-29 .. ..	7,880	3	80
<b>Rs. 86,163 1 18</b>			

Showing an average of rupees 8,616-1-31 annually. As Government would remain charged with the stipends of the already pensioned widows, it might be thought advisable to regulate the annual payment to the fund in proportion to the probable decrease in that charge; by which arrangement any additional expense to the public would be avoided. The average diminution in the above years is rupees 606. If, therefore, a grant of rupees 600, increased yearly by that amount till the full sum of rupees 8,600 be completed, were sanctioned,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

sanctioned, the object of Government would be fulfilled, and no extra charge most probably be incurred.

4th. That the number of deaths among the subscribers will be in proportion to the average of the last fifteen years, which has proved as undermentioned :

Subadars.				Jemadars.			
1st May							
1814-15	there were 188	of whom 11	died in that year;	213	of whom 7	died.	
1815-16	.. 197	.. 5	.. .	214	.. 2		
1816-17	.. 187	.. 3	.. .	210	.. 7		
1817-18	.. 195	.. 7	.. .	214	.. 12		
1818-19	.. 210	.. 6	.. .	248	.. 8		
1819-20	.. 222	.. 6	.. .	253	.. 6		
1820-21	.. 243	.. 19	.. .	257	.. 13		
1821-22	.. 268	.. 6	.. .	303	.. 4		
1822-23	.. 290	.. 6	.. .	313	.. 6		
1823-24	.. 298	.. 4	.. .	316	.. 0		
1824-25	.. 297	.. 5	.. .	317	.. 0		
1825-26	.. 294	.. 2	.. .	310	.. 8		
1826-27	.. 319	.. 9	.. .	347	.. 6		
1827-28	.. 335	.. 10	.. .	368	.. 5		
1828-29	.. 342	.. 8	.. .	371	.. 6		
	3,885	107		4,254	90		

It appears then that the average number of Native officers in the last fifteen years has been 259 subadars, 303 jemadars ; and that the average number of deaths in the same period has been 7·13 subadars, and 6 jemadars, or 2·71 per cent. in the former, and 2 per cent. in the latter, rank.

#### Receipts :

On the data laid down, the gross receipts in the first year would be—	Rs.
Interest on Government donation (8 per cent.)	800
Subscription by Government	600
Deduction from the pay of Native officers	13,043
	<u>14,443</u>

Increasing in the ratio of rupees 600 till the 14-15th year, when they would remain stationary at rupees 21,643.

#### Expenditure :

The widows to be provided for annually would be determined by the number of subscribers in each rank multiplied by the rate per cent. of casualties in the last fifteen years, expressed by

$$\begin{array}{r}
 266 \times 2 \cdot 71 \\
 \hline
 = 720 \text{ subadars' widows.} \\
 100 \\
 290 \times 2 \\
 \hline
 = 580 \text{ jemadars' widows.} \\
 100 \\
 \text{Total } 13
 \end{array}$$

Of which to proportion for the  
Cavalry would be ..

$$\frac{18 \times 2.71}{100} = 48 \text{ subadars' widows.}$$

$$\frac{36 \times 2}{100} = 72 \text{ jemadars' widows.}$$

Infantry

$$\frac{248 \times 2.71}{100} = 672 \text{ subadars.}$$

$$\frac{254 \times 2}{100} = 508 \text{ jemadars.}$$

Total number of widows annually

13

In estimating the expenses, the principal points for inquiry are, 1st. What sum could a fund, constituted as above, afford to pay on the death of each member; 2d. What annuity could be safely granted to the widow of such member in consideration of that sum, improving at compound interest at eight per cent.

There are no data upon which an opinion might be established as to the duration of life among Natives, or the probable average age at which wives become widows: perfect accuracy is not, therefore, to be looked for in a calculation involving those questions. If however, it be made on the general assumption that the widows will, one with another, live twenty-six years after admission on the fund, there will be little cause to dread an under estimate of expense.

It appears above, that the number of pensions annually to be provided would probably be thirteen; and it is found on calculation that thirteen pensioners of rupees 125.2 could be furnished for twenty-six years out of the annual receipts, as estimated above, or, in other words, a gross monthly pension of rupees 136.

On a subdivision of this sum made with reference to the different ranks (subadar and jemadar) and branches of the service (cavalry and infantry), the stipends of the widows might be fixed as follows:

Widows of cavalry subadars, rupees 15(	48, the number of pensions	7.20
— jemadars, ..	10(71, .. ditto ..	7.10
Widows of infantry subadars, ..	12(673, .. ditto ..	80.76
— jemadars, ..	8(508, .. ditto ..	40.64
		135.70

Forming a charge of rupees 1,629 annually for pensions. Of course any other disposition of this sum can be adopted that may seem better suited to the case, provided the aggregate amount does not exceed that laid down.

A statement, exhibiting the condition of the fund in each year up to the twenty-sixth, when it is assumed the maximum of expenditure would be attained, is annexed. It appears from it, that the institution would then be in possession of a capital, the interest of which, added to the annual contributions by members, would be sufficient at all times to pay the number of annuitants then supposed to be receiving pensions (*viz.* 338). It is indispensable that such a capital should be available when the annuitants are at their greatest

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

greatest number, regard being had to the stability of the fund. That the period is more distant than has been assumed is very probable, but in the absence of proper tables showing the rate of mortality in India, it is impracticable to form a prospective estimate of the affairs of an annuity fund, without assuming a certain term, up to which each annuitant is supposed to have an equal chance of living.

It may be proper to state, that according to the generally received theory of life in Europe, where the expectation is twenty-six years, the age is thirty-four: this is, however, inapplicable to the duration of life in India.

In the case of a fund for the benefit of widows, consisting of the number of subscribers above stated (556), the supposition that the greatest number of annuitants in life together will amount to 330, affords good reason to expect that the calculations have been made on grounds rather favourable to the institution (considered as the party insuring) than of an opposite character.

**PROSPECTIVE ESTIMATE of the Receipts and Expenditure of a NATIVE MILITARY FUND, constituted on the Principles laid down in the preceding Remarks.**

Year.	Number of Annuitants.	Annual Payment to Annuitants.	Receipts.	Interest at 8 per Cent.	Capital.	REMARKS.
1	13	1629	13643	800	22816	Inclusive of Government donation of 10,000 rupees.
2	26	3258	14243	1825	35626	
3	39	4887	11843	2850	48432	
4	52	6516	15442	3874	61233	
5	65	8145	16043	4898	74029	
6	78	9774	16643	5922	86830	
7	91	11403	17243	6946	99616	
8	104	13032	17843	7969	112396	
9	117	14661	18443	8991	125169	
10	130	16290	19043	10013	137935	
11	143	17919	19643	11034	150693	
12	156	19548	20243	12055	163443	
13	169	21177	20843	13075	176184	
14	182	22806	21443	14094	188915	
15	195	24435	21643	15113	201236	In this year the amount of the Government subscription would be completed, after which it would remain at Rs. 8,600 per annum.
16	208	26064	21643	16098	212913	
17	221	27693	21643	17033	223896	
18	234	29322	21643	17911	234128	
19	247	30951	21643	18730	243550	
20	260	32580	21643	19484	252093	
21	273	34209	21643	20167	259794	
22	286	35838	21643	20783	266382	
23	299	37467	21643	21310	271868	
24	312	39096	21643	21749	276164	
25	325	40725	21643	22093	279175	
26	338	42354	21643	22334	280798	

## EXTRACT from Minute, dated Bombay, 28th October 1828.

EVERY class of armed men that we employ have, in an empire like India, their separate value. The first is the cavalry and infantry corps, who constitute our intrinsic strength, and who by their courage, discipline, and reputation, overawe our subjects, deter the enemies of our power from attack, and secure success on the occurrence of a war. In this class may be estimated that European force which, with all its establishments, we maintain at such great cost, and with which, though we may endeavour to limit its numbers, we can never dispense, for it is the very corner stone of our power in India.

This force, however, it must be recollected, is limited in its utility to the objects stated. It cannot meet the ordinary calls for troops to maintain the peace of the country, when disturbed by refractory chiefs, petty insurrections, or banditti. The cost of moving any part of our European troops is great. Their health, which always suffers more or less from exposure, is too valuable to be hazarded for subordinate objects; and they are, from other causes, unsuited to that species of service so continually called for to maintain the peace of our extended provinces.

The impression produced by our European force upon the Natives is limited to that of dread to our enemies, and confidence to our subjects; with the latter, they neither are, nor can become, the medium of conciliation or attachment.

Our great armies of regular Native troops, cavalry and infantry, have acquired a discipline and perfection that has entitled them to fight with distinction in defence of our Indian empire in the same ranks with British soldiers, and to be considered with those as constituting, by their numbers, good order and courage, a military strength that is alike calculated to preserve peace or give success in war. But though the lesser pay and equipments of this body of men, and the climate being congenial to them, admits of their being employed on any service, there can be no doubt that their efficiency, as line troops, must be impaired, whenever the constant and multiplied calls of the magistrates in times of peace, or the nature of military operations, calls for their division and employment in small parties, or for a departure from those habits which constitute their excellence.

Our regular Native army not only inspires awe by their courage and discipline, but form a strong link with a great body of our subjects, including their relations and connections, which, however, are almost all found among the lower ranks of the castes to which they belong. The fidelity and attachment of our Native troops of the line depends upon the kind treatment of their officers, regular payment and expensive establishments that provide for their comfort in health and in sickness when effective, and support them for life when old, or disabled from wounds. The defect in this branch of our army, which threatens gradually to undermine its attachment, is the impracticability of raising any person in it above the most subordinate military charge. To reconcile the zeal and ambition required to animate the soldier, with such depression, is a problem of no easy solution.

When our military operations were limited, we wanted no other troops than those mentioned, but when they became more extended another branch was required. In the campaigns of Sir Eyre Coote in 1780-81, in that made by Sir William Meadows in 1791, and by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, the regular cavalry were so harassed by being continually employed in every duty where small parties were required, as to have their horses rendered unfit for service after one campaign. Besides this effect, it was discovered that, though admirable troops in line, their discipline was injured by their continual detachment on small duties; but though this evil was recognised, the full remedy was not found until the campaign against Dhondia in 1800, and the war with the Mahrattas in 1803, when the contingent of Mysore horse acting under the present Duke of Wellington, and the irregulars in the army of the late Lord Lake, but particularly

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

larly Colonel Skinner's corps, fully established the value of this class of troops as alike essential in their line of service to general success as any part of our army.

There was another great advantage found in the reputation these corps established. Though acting under the superintendence of European officers, their construction admitted of Natives of the highest rank finding honourable employment in them. They had no more of discipline than was calculated to preserve order, and in their mode of employment all the habits of Native warfare were preserved, deriving life and energy from that personal attachment to their leaders by which such bodies can alone be animated.

The opinions of the two great commanders under whom these corps acted, were, that without a class of such troops an army operating in India was incomplete; and it was also their opinion, that unless there was in the construction of these corps principles that attached them to the service, they were the most dangerous persons that could be employed, for perceiving they were taken up when necessity called, and cast off when it ceased, they were from natural motives the secret enemies of a State which barred them from every hope of permanent employment, in the only line in which they could serve.

This conviction led to an arrangement being made with the Government of Mysore, by which it agreed to maintain a body of 4,000 Silladar horse, who have proved on every occasion, and particularly during the late war in 1817-18, the most useful of auxiliaries to our armies.

In 1805, the desire of the provisional Governor-General, Sir George Barlow, led to the disbanding of all these corps, and notwithstanding the earnest appeal of Lord Lake, Colonel Skinner's was amongst the number, and that fine body of men, who had performed such services during the war with the Mahrattas, was discharged even without a gratuity. Fortunately the little value given at that time to some of the recent territorial acquisitions in Hindoostan caused a liberal latitude to be given in providing for some of the ressalldars and old officers and soldiers of this corps, and that being taken full advantage of, the attachment of these to the Government they had so well served was kept; but their followers, unwilling to enter into our police corps, went to join the standards of Scindia, Holkar, Ameer Khan, and the Pindarrees.

A very short period elapsed before the Government was compelled to raise this corps again, and fortunately their leader, Colonel Skinner, to whom they were personally devoted, was enabled by large advances from his private means to reassemble the greater part of his men, and to place them under the same ressalldars and officers with whom they had before acquired such high distinction.

A singular coincidence of circumstances restored that body of men to the service, with increased attachment to their leaders. Their services since need not be enumerated, they are upon record with those of all other corps of the same description, particularly Colonel Gardiner's; and though these corps have been recently reduced in numbers, they are still on a respectable footing, and capable of being increased to any strength on emergency.

While the Bengal Government has still at its disposal a considerable number of this class\* of troops, and that of Madras has the Mysore contingent of 4,000 men, that of Bombay, which owed so much during the late war to the aid of these auxiliaries, has reduced them from 7,300 to 1,000 men, and we are now deliberating whether this small body shall be broken up in those parts of its formation that constitute its value, in order to reduce it to a scale less expensive and better suited to their limited duties, when divided, as proposed, into separate police corps.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM.

\* All troops of this class of Bengal, except the 5th irregular horse, appear, by Colonel Casement's letter of the 12th October 1827, to be borne as a military charge, though these are no doubt frequently employed in aid of the civil authority, preserving the peace of the country in which they are stationed.

MINUTE by the Honourable the Governor, dated Bombay, 1st December 1829.

THE Court of Directors, in their letter to the Supreme Government, dated 15th Feb. 1829, when remarking on the multiplication and expense of Revenue Boards, observe,

"Connected with the duties of superintendence is an important general question, namely, whether Boards are the fittest instruments either of improvement or control, and whether both objects might not be more effectually attained by individual agency. It is a common but true observation, that responsibility is lessened by being divided, and there is we believe no doubt that more business can be done by the same number of persons acting separately than in conjunction. If the business of your Revenue Boards is now divided, and a distinct portion allotted to each member, then the utility of such division is already practically admitted, and the Board may be deemed to exist principally for the purpose of receiving collectively praise or blame for measures, the merit or demerit of which belongs exclusively to one of its members. If the business is not divided, it can hardly fail of being impeded in its course by incompatible tempers, conflicting opinions and the frequent occurrence of useless discussions. We feel no disposition to under-rate the benefits which may sometimes be derived from a free communication of sentiments between persons possessing different opportunities of experience and various kinds of information, associated by station and animated by the same zeal for the public good; nor do we overlook the consideration, that where great interests are at stake, and important trusts are reposed, it is not always expedient that they should be committed to the intelligence and probity of a single individual, even under the check of subordinate functionaries, but we nevertheless think it deserving of mature consideration, upon which side the balance of advantage upon the whole preponderates."

No reasoning can more strictly apply than that which the Court of Directors have used on this occasion to the Military Board of this Presidency, which has had large and, I may add, in some cases, undefined duties allotted to it, while the members, unpaid for their labour, have had each in their order separate, and to them more important, duties to perform, their very nature often rendering their attention to those of the Board impracticable.

When this Board was first constituted it was directed to consist of, 1st, the Commander-in-chief; 2d, the senior officer at the Presidency; 3d, the senior officer of artillery; 4th, the chief engineer; 5th, the adjutant-general; 6th, the quartermaster-general; 7th, the military auditor-general; and a principle was approved which directed that during the absence of the Commander-in-chief, the senior officer of the Presidency should act as Vice-president of the Board.

The same despatch\* detailed the duties of the Board, in which frequent changes have subsequently been made; a change of the most material kind took place from 4th December 1824. †

When the officer on the general staff of the Presidency division was nominated Vice-president, one of much magnitude, relating to its duties as connected with the Commissariat department, has been adopted at my suggestion,‡ for reasons elsewhere stated, and has already been attended with the happiest results.§

These subjects, as well as the consideration of the nature and character of the duties of this Board, have occupied my attention for the last twelve months, and I am quite prepared, if required, to discuss them in the fullest manner; but it will be, I trust, sufficient for

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Vide Letter from Court of Directors, dated the ———, 1785.

† Major Wilson, the major-general commanding the Presidency division of the army, was appointed to a seat at the Military Board, as Vice-president, for the purpose of relieving the Commander-in-chief from the ordinary duty of attending the Board, unless when he thinks fit to do so.

‡ See Minute in Military department, dated 15th July 1829.

§ See Minute on acting commissary-general's Report.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

for the objects I have in view, to establish that the Military Board, however useful and necessary when first instituted, has, from a variety of causes, ceased to be, in many instances, so efficient an instrument as could be desired for purposes of check and control. Abuses have in many branches of the service attained a head, which completely shows that where responsibility is not direct, and audit prompt, multiplied checks and official documents may for a period tend more to prevent than promote detection of neglect or delinquency.\*

The Military Board has been recommended by the rank, character, and information of those of whom it is composed; and it has been an additional recommendation of this institution that it has performed its duties without pay; but in examining the subject closely, it will be found, that as the army of this Presidency increased, the duties of the different heads of departments have increased to a degree that limited them more and more to particular lines, and made it almost impossible for them to give their attention to the general questions that come before the Board, while the very circumstance of not receiving pay, though it might not check zeal, must prevent the duties of the Board being deemed not so obligatory as those for which they were personally more directly responsible, and in the receipt of liberal salaries. The consequence has been that in usage each member has had the conduct almost exclusively of matters relating to his other department, and he has thus obtained for all he did or recommended to be done as an individual, the sanction of a Board of which he was a member. This is not stated in derogation of the Military Board. It has been, in my opinion, a better course than if useless discussions and controversies had impeded its proceedings and delayed, still more than its forms are calculated to do, the progress of public measures and military arrangements. But it is obvious that this practice, while it takes from the individual at the head of a department the greater part of his responsibility, has the evil effect of placing Government in a situation which exposes it to the dilemma of an apparent difference of opinion, on a military question, with a Board composed of all the principal military staff of the army, with the Commander-in-chief as its President, and a general on the staff Vice-president, in cases where, in fact, the opinions or propositions of one member of the Board were only at issue.

To understand this matter fully, it is necessary to advert to the rank and duties of those who compose the Military Board at this Presidency.

The Commander-in-chief is President, but from his various and important duties seldom attends; indeed, it cannot be desired otherwise. It would be unseemly to have him in frequent controversy with his own staff, and adverse to the principle on which the Board is constituted, to have any of its members act in a spirit of deference to the President.

Independent of these reasons for a Commander-in-chief not continuing in this Board, it appears to me to be a principle of much importance that this high officer should only

\* This has been fully stated in my Minute on the Commissariat, under date 15th July 1829, in para. 16, of which I have observed, "It is the defect of officers, and one which grows with the multiplication of their labours, that attention to forms and to the exact fulfilment of their necessary and relative duties supersedes, in a great degree, the higher object of their establishment; and never was the fact more verified than on this occasion. We find, during the protracted period of two years, the public defrauded and robbed to a great extent, under circumstances that it seems almost impossible should have escaped detection from the marks of obvious forgery on many of the vouchers, accumulated balances, and the unaccounted for disbursements; whilst the slightest departure from the usual forms, and the most trifling mistakes or irregularity in the observance of usage, are brought daily to the notice and consideration of the Government. I am far from desiring to attach blame to individuals at the head of offices; no persons can be more competent to their respective duties, or more worthy of the trust reposed in them by Government. It is, I know, impossible they should personally superintend every part of their large establishments; and I am aware of the necessity for the minor branches of these being strictly regulated by prescribed forms, the observance of which may in some cases tend for a period to conceal, instead of aiding in the detection of fraud; but I adduce the facts I have done, to prove the necessity of better regulated and more effective control than now exists upon the receipt and disbursement; and I cannot too often repeat my conviction that the object will be frustrated, and not forwarded, by the multiplication of checks, forms, and vouchers, and by every thing that creates delay, injurious to the service, while it lessens direct responsibility and prompt audit."

only consider questions that involve finance as a Member of Council, and where he to take an active part in the deliberation of the Military Board on such subjects, or in any way influence their proceedings, much inconvenience and embarrassment must result.

The circumstances above stated operate, and I think beneficially, to prevent the frequent attendance of the Commander-in-chief at the Board, and his duties at which are besides liable to be interrupted by his frequent visits to the different stations of the army. For all these reasons I deem his continuing as President, even should he remain, seems to me inexpedient.

A Vice-president has been nominated to the Military Board at Bombay, and the appointment, as a temporary measure, was no doubt expedient, and the employment of a general officer on the staff on this duty was practicable when his duties were limited to the island of Bombay and its vicinity. But I mean to propose, when an answer is received from Madras, that the Southern Mahratta country be joined to the Konkan as a division; and that the head-quarters of the general officer be removed from the island of Bombay, where he neither has nor can have one man under his command, to Belgaum.

If this arrangement is made, no duties he can have at the Military Board can be put for one moment in competition with those of the military command Brigadier-general Leighton and his successors will have to exercise. The frequent absence cannot but interfere with those of Vice-president of the Military Board, in a degree which must greatly detract even from the utility of the services of the present officer filling this situation, and would wholly destroy all value of those of one of less knowledge and experience than Brigadier-general Leighton.

The auditor-general has sufficient duty in his own department, and though he takes the contingent accounts to the Military Board, I can affirm their audit is confirmed but never entered upon by the Board, other members of which, occupied in their separate departments, having neither the information nor the leisure to enable them to attend to the subject. The same observations apply in a great degree to the chief engineer and commandant of artillery, who, having the sanction of the Board given to all their measures, become almost irresponsible heads of offices, instead of being directly amenable to Government for the conduct of their respective departments.

The quartermaster-general has also distinct duties which would be better carried on, and with more economy and less delay, if he was made directly responsible. This department is much under the Commander-in-chief, and would always be regulated by him in direct communications with Government.

Besides, the quartermaster-general and adjutant-general are officers of his staff, and liable, from his visits to the different stations of the army, to be frequently absent from the Presidency, and consequently to be of little use to the Military Board, the duties of which, I have no hesitation in stating, are chiefly, if not entirely, carried on by the heads of departments or by the secretary; the former being seldom checked in their propositions or proceedings by the other members of the Board, though relieved by it of direct responsibility, and the latter, with much the greatest proportion of actual duty, is altogether an irresponsible officer.

The exceptions that occur to this usage are rare. The nomination of a Vice-president before noticed, which has given the Board for a period the aid of Brigadier-general Leighton, has no doubt been beneficial from the knowledge this experienced officer has acquired on different stations of every branch of the service, and he has, I am satisfied, been able to effect much good by his suggestions and opinions in every department; but his other duties must frequently have interrupted his labours at the Board. Besides, the increased sphere of his command will make it quite impossible to combine the execution of his important duties as a general officer of a division with those of Vice-president of the Military Board, and if he could, we cannot hope for a successor equally qualified for both duties.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

To the reasons stated, and for many others grounded on recent inquiries, I am quite satisfied that a complete change of system, which divides among the different departments to which they belong the duties now performed by the Military Board, will essentially tend to promote both the economy and efficiency of the public service.

Such change, I am further satisfied, will immediately decrease expense and establishments, and enable Government to introduce shorter and more simplified forms, consequently much easier of check and control than they are at present. Not only the heads, but the different branches of the service will have their character associated with the success of a system which reposes a confidence which cannot be abused by an individual without, in some degree, implicating\* the branch of the army to which he belongs. Much has been done within late years to give elevation of principle to the public service of India. Great abuses have been corrected and no sources of indirect profit are now sanctioned by usage; many establishments and rules therefore, which were essential formerly, may at present be deemed not only unnecessary but calculated to have evil effects. With such impressions, and on the grounds of the facts I have stated, I shall proceed to lay before Government the plan I propose for the execution of the duties of the Military Board, merely stating, that I consider it to be quite indispensable to complete the reform so happily commenced on the Commissariat and other branches of the military expenditure of this Government. In the Ordnance branch particularly, I anticipate, for reasons I shall hereafter detail, the greatest reductions from a complete reform in this system in all that relates to its various and important duties. By the late orders of Government, the commissary-general is unfettered as far as regards his detail duties, and vested with authority for conducting his own department; the supplementary Regulations for that officer's guidance, as regards the making of all supplies suggested by the Committee, of which Brigadier-general Leighton was President, providing as far as possible against the recurrence of those irregularities by which the public interests have of late so materially suffered.

It is, in my opinion, desirable that the heads of every other department should also have a certain fixed responsibility attached to them individually, from which they consider themselves, and are in fact, relieved, by acting in the name of the Board.

The commandant of artillery might be vested with authority to control all matters connected with the Ordnance department, exercising his power over the Grand Arsenal, Gun-carriage and Gunpowder departments, holding himself responsible to Government for regulating every thing connected therewith; acting with vigour and promptitude on all occasions of need, and making his reports direct to Government for sanction or approval, transmitting only the accounts and returns of the departments in question to be audited and adjusted by an officer specifically appointed for that duty. All indents for stores for supplies for the use of the different departments countersigned by him to be considered sufficient authority for being complied with. On the aid this officer may require I shall hereafter give my sentiments.

The chief engineer, in like manner, and on the same principle, might be vested with authority for controlling all matters connected with estimates for buildings and repairs, submitting them direct to Government with his observations upon them, in the same manner as he does at present in the Civil department.

The auditor-general to be responsible to Government for conducting matters connected with the contingent expenditure; and he may forward his contingent lists to that authority direct, instead of laying them, as he has hitherto done, before the Military Board, where they never have and never can undergo any examination, and are only noticed in cases of an extraordinary nature.

The quartermaster-general also to be vested with authority for regulating, under the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, every thing connected with his and the  
Barrack

\* This to me was one.

Barrack departments, for the purpose of being submitted to Government, transmitting the usual returns as at present; and with respect to indents, acting in the same manner as noticed for the guidance of the commandants of artillery.

Such responsibility being established, all the correspondence and vouchers now received at the Military Board would be thrown into direct channels, and nothing would remain but the Audit and Account department of stores, which could be better performed by a deputy secretary and auditor of Ordnance returns and stores, subordinate to the secretary to Government in the Military department, than any other mode; and a committee at the Presidency, composed of such officers\* as Government may hereafter nominate, might sit annually for the passing of unfits, a duty now performed by the Military Board.

This change would require some increase of the power of officers in command of divisions, whose latitude of action being extended, would, I am assured, be attended with most beneficial and economical results. On this and other points connected with the present change of system I shall give my opinion hereafter; in the mean time, if my colleagues approve the arrangements I have stated, I propose the following order being issued:

“The Honourable the Governor in Council, in order to maintain the principle of direct responsibility, and to promote reforms which are alike calculated to decrease labour and to simplify and accelerate business, is pleased to suspend, until the pleasure of the Court of Directors is known, the functions of the Military Board, and to direct that the heads of departments, at present members of that Board, be henceforth severally invested with authority to regulate and control all matters connected with their different departments, to take effect from 1st January 1830, from which date the functions of the Military Board will cease, and all accounts and returns, hitherto forwarded to it, be in future transmitted to the secretary to Government in the Military department, or to his deputy, the auditor of military store accounts and returns, who is placed immediately under the secretary to Government in the Military department.

“The commandant of artillery, in exercising authority over the Grand Arsenal, Gun-carriage, and Gunpowder departments at the Presidency, is likewise to be the channel of reference, on subjects of the Ordnance department, from out-stations, and is empowered to act with promptitude and decision on all occasions that may call for it, making his reports direct to Government for sanction or approval, as the case may require.

“All indents for supplies for the use of these departments, countersigned by the commandant of artillery, to be considered sufficient authority for being complied with, he being responsible to Government for the correctness and propriety of them. In like manner, and upon the same principle, the chief engineer will regulate matters connected with buildings and repairs, submitting estimates for public works, with every requisite information thereon, direct to Government.

“The military auditor-general will, in a similar manner, forward his contingent lists direct to Government for sanction.

“The quartermaster-general is to regulate matters connected with his own and the Barrack department, in communication with his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, by which means a degree of efficiency will be introduced, and responsibility established, that cannot fail to be productive of public benefit.”

Under this Order, a transfer of such part of the establishment of the Military Board as was necessary for the duties would be made to the Military department of the secretary and auditor of the military store accounts, and returns would be placed. The writers and accountants of the Military Board, not required, would be considered according to their claims.

The immediate reduction of this arrangement will be considerable; but this saving would

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* I should suggest the town-major, agent for clothing, and barrack-master.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

would have been no motive with me for proposing the suspension even of an establishment that has been so long sanctioned by my superiors. I have been led to make this proposition, from a conviction of its being essential to promote arrangements in which both economy and efficiency are involved. I am assured it will much simplify public business, and diminish unnecessary vouchers to a great extent. I am satisfied it will, by doing so, increase our means of check and control over public expenditure; that it will prevent delays, which often add to loss of time, heavy loss of money; and that, while it is calculated to stimulate the active and honourable to exertion in their respective departments, it will bring under the more direct and early notice and correction of Government all that are wanting, either in competence or integrity.

The proceedings of Government upon this subject should be early forwarded to the Court of Directors, who will finally decide whether the Military Board is to be restored to the exercise of its functions, or abolished.

The arrival in England of Lieutenant-colonel Fearon, who has been eight years secretary to the Board, will enable the Court to make any further inquiry they may deem necessary.

That officer possesses the most minute knowledge of every part of this question, and is, from that circumstance, and his general acquaintance with the different departments of the service, competent to give the Court (to whose favourable notice he should be recommended) very valuable information.

I regret much I was not able to prepare this Minute sooner, as I desired the Board should have received the opinion of our late colleague, Lieutenant-general Sir T. Bradford; but the details I had to go through were so numerous, that I could not bring it to his consideration before he was on the point of being relieved; and he declined entering, at that period, upon the consideration of a measure of such importance. I can assure his Excellency, Lieutenant-general Sir S. Beckwith, that it is with regret I am compelled to call his attention, so soon after he has assumed the command of the army, to a proposition that makes so serious a change in the mode of controlling military expenditure, but many circumstances forbid delay; and I can only hope his Excellency will be satisfied, I would not, without the fullest deliberation, and unless I had been completely convinced of its expediency, have made a proposition of such magnitude.

(Signed) J. MALCOLM.

EXTRACT from a Minute by Sir J. MALCOLM, dated 30th November 1830.

*Military.*

56. SOON after my arrival in India in 1827, my attention was given to effect the necessary reforms in the Bombay army, and to suggest such measures as I deemed necessary to promote its efficiency. I recorded my sentiments\* most fully on its actual condition, and made such suggestions as appeared expedient to promote its discipline, to reward merit, and to maintain the high feeling and character which it had established. The subjects to which I recommended the attention of the Court of Directors in this Minute are still before them, and will, I trust, receive their early notice. They embrace matter which I must consider of much importance as connected with the efficiency of this army.

*Appointment of Killadurs, &c.*

57. At a period that it became my duty to effect reduction of numbers and establishment in the army of this Presidency, I was anxious to temper such reforms with measures that

that gave every encouragement to the Native officers, facilitated recruiting, and prevented desertion, at the same time that they confirmed the attachment of the sepoys to Government.\* The modifications of the commands of the hill-forts in the Deccan presented an opportunity of raising some of the old and most meritorious Native officers to distinction at a very trifling expense. The claim of this class of men, to whom we have owed, and must continue to owe much, to honorary reward had been treated with more neglect than at Madras, where distinctions were frequently conferred with a parade and ceremony that gratified their feelings, and was no doubt one of the causes of that military spirit and attachment to their colours which distinguishes that army, from which desertion, under any circumstances, is almost unknown. Certainty of provision in his old age, or when disabled by wounds, and a prospect of reward for long and distinguished service, must ever be the principal motives of attachment of a soldier to the Government under which he serves; and in no service are those feelings so necessary to the welfare of the empire, and in none can they be more easily engendered and maintained, than in the Native armies of India.

58. At the same time that there was an anxiety to reward merit, every care was taken to avoid abuses, and not to create unnecessary expense; and the Commander-in-chief was requested to be particular in his selections of the persons destined for the purposed honours. None under thirty years' service were admitted. They were divided into three classes. The first only was admitted into the privileged† orders of the Deccan. Most of those promoted had served the Honourable Company for forty years, and one subadar of very distinguished character had eaten and earned their salt, as he expressed it, for fifty years.

59. The anniversary of "Assaye" was chosen for the ceremony of investing the killadars in their commands. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief attended, the brigade at Poonah were drawn out, and the honours were conferred by me in person in a manner that made a deep impression upon the troops present, and rapidly spread a spirit of exultation and rejoicing through the Bombay army. This was effected at an increased expense, not exceeding 800 rupees per mensem. A still greater encouragement was given to Native officers, by granting their sons (limited to a certain number per battalion) a higher rate of pay‡ than the other sepoy boys, and granting them an exemption from corporal punishment.§

60. Deserving and old Native officers have been appointed to the command of the local sebundies of the Konkan, and also the Ahmednuggur provincial corps, a measure which promises in many ways to be attended with beneficial results.||

61. To allow the sepoys greater means of providing for their children, and to bring up a race of men attached to corps, and to consider it as their home, I concurred in a proposition of his Excellency the late Commander-in-chief¶ for making a small increase of boys to each corps, from a conviction that it would not only add to the efficiency of the army, and increase its attachment, but be an ultimate saving, from preventing desertions. All these hopes have been realized through this and similar arrangements.

#### *Native Military Fund.*

62. I proposed, in order to render stronger the attachment of the Native army towards Government, the establishment of a Native military fund, to provide pensions to the widows of Native officers.\*\* I considered that this measure would induce the Hindoostances and other

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Vide Minutes, 2d November 1828, 3d January 1829, 3d October 1829.

† This class have exemption from personal arrest in civil suits, and are called upon as evidences by a letter instead of a common summons.

‡ One rupee per mensem was the increase sanctioned.

§ Vide Minute, 14th September 1829.

|| Vide Minute, 12th November 1828.

¶ See Sir Thomas Bradford's Minute.

\*\* Vide Minute, 27th January 1830.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

other foreigners in our ranks to settle in the Bombay territories, thereby benefiting them by a considerable expenditure, which is at present sent out of our provinces, and also that it would in due time afford facilities of recruiting a fine body of men in our own districts. This measure, however, though including no additional expense, has not been sanctioned by the Supreme Government, the objection being that no such fund exists in Bengal, and that it is expedient to avoid distinctions of rewards and institutions of the Native armies of the three Presidencies.

63. I have particularly dwelt, in a letter to the Governor-General, which is upon record, upon the subject of encouraging our Native armies, and the difficulty of rendering uniform these rewards which it may be expedient to confer upon the Natives of whom they are composed.

64. "I have of late (I observed in this letter) noticed this subject in several Minutes, in reply to suggestions and instructions from your Lordship in Council founded on general principles of making our arrangement respecting Native troops similar at the three Presidencies, and expressing apprehensions lest giving encouragement to the Native army at one Presidency might create discontent in another. That this consideration has not before met with attention, is to be referred to the distance at which the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay acted, the different races of whom they were formed, and their different habits of life. There has been no occasion to give that encouragement to the frugal Rajpoots, who are the cultivators of the provinces of Hindoostan, that has been found necessary to attach the Mahomedans of the Carnatic and the Hindoos of the Northern Circars at Madras, and to induce the inhabitants of the Northern Konkan and Deccan to enter the ranks at Bombay; but there can be no doubt that the pension of Native officers of distinction, the fine establishment of boys attached to their corps, and the regimental depôt formed at the recruiting stations at Madras, have accomplished their object in fixing the attachment of the army to their colours, and their forwardness to march and embark in every service, as singularly evinced on the late occasion of the war in Burma.\*

65. "Desertions, as I have already remarked, are almost unknown in that army; and I have shown that the same causes here produced the same effect at Bombay. Recent and most minute examination into this and other subjects connected with the public service of this Presidency has quite convinced me, that if the principles upon which measures are founded, and the effects produced by them, are not very carefully considered, the objects of true economy may be often sacrificed; and I have seldom known this fact more clearly elucidated than by the papers I have had to examine regarding the past and present condition of the army of this Presidency, the general result of which I have already noticed.

"The late approximation of our Native armies certainly requires more attention than was formerly given to similarity of measures in regard to them: but there are so many opposite usages and feelings, as well as local circumstances, to be considered, that this object must be the work of time. Great care and caution are also necessary, for most serious injury may be inflicted by an order that apparently rests upon indisputable general grounds, but is inapplicable to the particular case. Before any measure connected with the improvement of our Native army is rejected at one Presidency because it has not been found necessary at another, it should be ascertained, in the first place, whether there are not local causes and considerations that render it wise and expedient where it has been adopted; and in the next, whether, judging the principles upon which it is founded, and the effects it is calculated to produce, it is not worthy of imitation."

#### *Poonah Auxiliary Horse.*

66. I found the irregular corps of "Poonah Auxiliary Horse" still retained on their original

original establishment of men. They were reduced immediately to 1,000 men, and prospectively to 800, as had been proposed by my predecessor.\*

67. With my intimate knowledge of the utility, not only in the military, but in a political view of men who are admirably fitted for all the duties of irregular troops, as well as for acting under the civil authority as police corps, it was with great regret that I carried this reduction into effect; but the necessity of decreasing the expense of our military establishment left me no alternative. In my Minute (as per margin†) I have fully entered into the consideration of our irregular force. They are most useful, as saving our regular cavalry from many of those harassing duties which so frequently destroy their efficiency before they are brought into contact with the enemy. They afford employment to Natives of higher rank than those who enter on regular service; and this adds in a great degree to the value of such corps in a political view.

68. In the same Minutes I have shown the happy results that, on like occasions, enabled Government to avail themselves of the services of Colonel Skinner's corps in Hindoostan, in consequence of according enams of Government lands on certain conditions of service, &c. to the reduced men of that corps, and proposed a similar experiment here, for inducing men of good character, and who had claim for service, to locate in the Deccan, on the frontier of Guzerat, and in Candeish.

#### *Extra Battalions abolished.*

69. The brigade at Poonah had formed their light companies into a light infantry battalion, to which a commandant and adjutant were attached. The continuance of such a corps not being required by any necessity that warranted the expense, it was discontinued; and at the same period a considerable reduction was effected by the conversion of the Ahmednuggur provincial battalion into a police corps, and placing it at the disposal of the civil authorities, a measure by which their efficiency for their actual duties was greatly promoted.‡

#### *Artillery.*

70. The battalion of artillery at Matoonga being unhealthy, that and other considerations led me to propose its being removed to the central and healthy station of Ahmednuggur, a measure that, besides other beneficial results, was attended with reduction of expense.§

71. The troops of horse artillery have been reduced from six guns to four, and the mules and horses of the foot artillery disposed of, and replaced by bullocks; animals that experience has proved equal to the service, and that are not so expensive as horses, or so difficult to be procured as mules.||

#### *Engineers.*

72. In my Minute referred to in the margin,¶ I have made several observations upon the chief engineer's revised code of that department. I have there shown that the greatest benefit will result from engineers being only employed on works requiring scientific knowledge; and that common repairs, and even the erection of ordinary buildings of limited cost, may be made over to the heads of departments. The advantages of the system are more fully stated in the reply of the letter of the Honourable the Court of Directors of the 31st of March last. I have fully detailed, in my Minute noted in the margin, the measures adopted for the revision of the Engineer department, modifying it in conformity with the directions of the Honourable the Court, and can only add, that I consider

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

\* Vide Consultation, 11th May 1828, and Minute of 17th October 1827.

† Vide Minute, 26th October 1828.

‡ Vide Consultation, 12th Nov. 1828.

§ Consultation, 10th September 1820.

|| Consultation, 18th September 1829.

¶ Minute, 14th May 1830.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

consider the good of the service has been promoted, at the same time that a very considerable saving has been made, by uniting the pioneers with the sappers and miners. This body of men combined form an engineer corps of artificers, sappers and miners, and pioneers, whose different branches will be competent to every duty of that department in peace and war. The head-quarters of the engineer corps is fixed at Scroor, where all the young officers arriving from Europe will join it, and he well qualified in the practical school of instruction for executive duties at out-stations.

#### *Gun-carriage Department.*

73. In the Gun-carriage department great reductions of expenditure have been carried into effect, at the same time that I conceive the establishment of this branch of the ordnance to be quite equal to the present demand of supply, and it can be promptly increased on the occurrence of emergency.\* My minute, noted on the margin,† exhibits very fully the modifications of the Ordnance department. These may be stated to form a re-organization of that and the Store departments in all their parts, including the distribution of arsenals and depôt, and of the different establishments connected with them. This measure I was only able to propose after a complete personal investigation of the details of this branch of the service, and by the inspection of every establishment. In making this reform I was aided by the officers at the heads of their respective branches of the department, and the results will, I trust, be found to be the introduction of more prompt and efficient check, a simplification of accounts and establishments, together with a considerable reduction of expenditure; but that reduction will be still greater progressively than immediately.

#### *Invalids — Pensioners.*

74. The invalid establishments afforded much scope for modification and retrenchment. The office of superintendent of invalids was abolished, and also the allowance for office establishment drawn by the adjutant.‡ This was followed up by a measure of considerable economy;§ the transfer of the inefficient men of the invalid corps to the pension establishments, holding out to the latter inducement to settle in their native districts, and engage in agriculture. Those that were still fit for ordinary duty were placed in a veteran battalion.||

#### *Commissariat.*

75. From my first arrival in India in 1827, I was aware the Commissariat department called for minute investigation, and a considerable reform of its establishment, and I anticipated great reductions of expenditure might be more beneficially introduced. In prosecution of the reforms made in this branch, the commissary-general was relieved from the detail duties at the Presidency.

76. All branches of the Commissariat, including supplies, labourers, carriage and dooley establishments, were reduced to a more economical scale, and great improvements introduced by a revision of office forms of returns, correspondence, &c., simplifying the routine of business;¶ but in the Minute, referred to in the margin,\*\* my views upon the organization of this department are fully detailed; and I can now assert that a saving of nearly 30 per cent. has been made upon an average of its whole expenditure.

#### *Stores and Camp Equipage.*

77. My attention having been called to the general revision in the establishments of stores and camp equipage,†† reductions were made in the number of store artificers, and of pay to tent and store Lascars. Of the respectable classes of serangs and tindals, however, it

\* Minute, 19th October 1829.

† Minute of 21st August 1830.

‡ Minute, 8th October 1829.

§ Minute, 14th October 1829.

|| Minute, 22d March 1830.

¶ Minute, 11th May; 20th May; 11th June.

\*\* Minute, 15th July 1829.

†† Minute, 22d January 1830.

it did not appear expedient to reduce the pay, although the number was lessened; but in the whole of the abovementioned reductions, notwithstanding the saving of expenditure to Government, the just claims of individuals to exemption from reduction, or reward from Government on account of service or good conduct, have never been sacrificed to measures of economy.

78. It is impossible in this place to give even an abstract of the modification and changes made in the Store department. These were rendered more necessary by the suspension of the Military Board. In referring for particulars to my Minute, quoted in the margin, I can only affirm, that no subject gave me so much anxiety and personal labour, and I am assured it will be found, that in none has that labour been more successfully applied to check and diminish expenditure.

*Reduction of Salaries of Office Clerks.*

79. A reduction of 15 per cent. was effected on the salaries of clerks in military and other offices and establishments.

*Reduction of Remounts, &c.*

80. A reduction of grain to the horses, and of dragoons, cavalry and artillery horses, made a saving to Government of 40,000 rupees per annum. The subject had previously attracted my attention, and I had long wished to bring that article of supply to its present footing, which is that of the other Presidencies; but erroneous representations that the forage generally of this Presidency was inferior had long prevented this measure being carried into effect.\*

81. Another considerable saving has been made in this branch of the army. The charges recently made in the remount are now in successful operation. Its principles are fully explained in the Minute, noted on the margin.† The prospective saving cannot be estimated at less than 30 per cent. upon this heavy charge.

*Reduction of Batta at Deesa and Bhooj.*

82. Full batta and other field allowances to the troops stationed at Deesa and Bhooj was abolished; but in conformity to the usage in Bengal, the European officers were exempted from the operation of this reduction, on the consideration of the greater expense of the European articles of consumption with which it was necessary they should supply themselves.

*Suspension of the Military Board.*

83. My most serious attention was called to the constitution of the Military Board of this establishment.‡ That it had been an useful institution there could be no doubt; but during the present well understood system of detail, it had become a real source of expense, and caused a multiplication of business which I thought would be much more effectually transacted by throwing direct responsibility upon the heads of departments, and causing them to correspond with Government or the Commander-in-chief.

84. The functions of the Board have now ceased more than a twelvemonth; and the manner in which departments conduct their duties, as now laid down, shows the system to be generally improved, and that the longer continuance of the Board would have been injurious instead of useful. Every good effect that I anticipated in my Minute, noted in the margin, from its abolition has resulted, and no inconvenience has been found from that measure in any branch of the service; on the contrary, both efficiency and economy have been essentially promoted, while a much more operative check has been placed upon public expenditure, and that check is in all cases exempt on emergency upon demand, not upon supply. The subject, however, is now before the Court of Directors, who

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(3.)—Reply  
of Major general  
Sir J. Malcolm,  
13th Feb. 1832.

who will find in its result full proof of its expediency, and that is fully confirmed by the able report lately made to Government of the comparative merits of the Military departments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, by Lieutenant-colonel Frederick, from authentic materials laid before the Military Commission assembled at Calcutta, of which he was a member.

### *Stud.*

85. The stud was established by my predecessor on most excellent principles.\* It has had my full support; and I look forward to its being the means of supplying the army with a superior breed of horses at a lower rate of expense than is at present incurred, besides its possessing the invaluable recommendation of rendering us independent of a foreign market. This was more necessary, as the various expedients restored to had greatly increased the charge of remount; and though this plan has been improved, and the expenses of remount much reduced, it is to its economical and excellent stud this Presidency must look for its future independence in that valuable military resource, an excellent breed of horses. The whole annual cost of the excellent establishment is only 20,000 rupees, and a greater proportion of that will be defrayed by the sale of colts and fillies when only a year old.†

### *General State of the Indian Army.*

86. Lord William Bentinck having desired my sentiments on the pay, composition, and distribution of the armies of India, with a view to place it upon record, I have given them very fully, and have recorded them at Bombay.‡ It contains my opinions upon the whole of the subjects on which the Governor-General desires them, but more particularly upon the composition and character of our Native armies. This document cannot be given in abstract; but the opinion I have stated will perhaps be deemed to merit attention, as formed by one who, during a period of more than forty years, has served with, and commanded troops of all the Presidencies, and been employed in every part of our Indian empire.

87. I cannot conclude this part of my subject without pressing upon the attention of the authorities in England the early remedy of some of the most serious defects of the present system of the Indian army. I cannot too often repeat, that the command of corps should be a more desired§ station than any staff appointment, except the head of a department; a certain number of years' service with a corps should be indispensable (prospectively) to the enjoyment of the off-reckonings of the regiment. The brigade and line staff should be changed with triennial reliefs; and having passed in the language, as well as having done duty for a certain period with a corps, should be requisite before any officer could hold such appointment. To these might be added as a further rule, that the commanding officer of a corps was to recommend officially to the Commander-in-chief for all regimental staff, stating in such recommendation the character and qualification of those whose names he brought forward as candidates for the vacant appointment that his Excellency might decide with full information on the person he deemed entitled to a preference.

88. There is no loss of patronage that could be affected by these arrangements, that could be regretted by any officer at the head of the Indian army who was desirous of promoting its efficiency; and there is not one proposition I have made in my Minutes to which I have alluded, or that is here stated, that is not in conformity with the usage of His Majesty's army, and in my opinion essential to the efficiency of that of India.

---

\* 3d January 1828.

† The superintendent has under his charge 64 stallions and 60 fine mares belonging to the Government; and there are within this last year upwards of 900 brood mares expected to have produce by English and Arabian horses. The prizes for the best colt, and races at fairs, have proved a great encouragement to breeders.

‡ Letter to Lord Wm. Bentinck.

§ At present excellent officers prefer being paymasters and holding subordinate stations in the Commissariat departments to commanding their regiments.

(4.)--REPLY of the Hon. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, dated 5th August 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your letter, dated March 26th, on the state of the military force of India. The information required in the two first questions, and part of the third, will appear from the Returns transmitted by the Indian Governments, and the remaining part of the third will be best answered by military officers.

4. The last remark applies to the two first heads in the fourth question; but it is impossible, after having been so long connected with the Bombay army as I was, both at Bombay and Poona, not to be strongly impressed with the excellent spirit and disposition both of men and officers. The fidelity of the sepoys was shown by the behaviour of those at Poona when the Peishwa offered large sums of money to induce them to desert from our service, and at the same time alarmed them for the safety of their families, many of which were in his power.

It does not fall within my province to speak of the professional character of the officers (except to state that it was always very favourably reported on by the military authorities), but with respect to their general spirit I can say, with perfect confidence, that no army could be better disposed, or be more free from every thing like discontent and insubordination.

The employment of military men in civil situations had, to a certain degree, an unfavourable effect, in taking officers from regimental duty; I do not mean that the diminution of numbers affected the discipline of the regiments, for there were instances of extra battalions, as they were called, attaining to the very highest pitch of discipline with only a commanding officer and an adjutant. The bad effect would be in throwing more duty on the remaining officers. It would also be felt on service, and likewise when the officers were of rank enough to command regiments, in which case, as the officers employed in the Civil department were chosen on account of their ability, their absence would doubtless be felt in a situation requiring so much steadiness and good sense.

Most of the other topics in this question relate to military detail, but some also are connected with general policy.

The allowances of young officers should be fully sufficient to maintain them in comfort without their being involved in debt. More is not desirable, as it is an object that they should be formed to frugal habits. For this reason, among others, the rule that no officer should hold a staff appointment until he has been five years with his regiment, should be strictly observed. The allowances of the higher ranks should be as liberal as circumstances permit, both in justice to them, and to hold forth something for the juniors to look to.

Every thing that keeps up the weight of senior officers is very advisable, that of regimental commanding officers in particular. This is more necessary in the Company's service than anywhere else, yet it is much less attended to; besides good allowances to the commanding officer, a share in the patronage of his regiment, and an open reference to him for the character of any officer of his corps who was thought of for the staff, would promote this object.

The Native officers should be taken from the ranks, as at present, and long service should be the chief consideration in promoting them, I do not suppose this would be recommended on military principles; but, viewing it politically, it seems desirable, as occasioning least discontent among the unsuccessful candidates, and giving least chance of ambition or turbulence among those appointed. There should be many different grades, that promotion may never stop till the men are worn out, and there should be liberal pensions and grants of land (both from lapsed jageers) to old officers of merit. Commands of hill-forts, within our own territories, are good rewards; but independent command

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(1.)—Reply of  
the Hon.  
M. Elphinstone,  
5th Aug. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(4.)—Reply of  
the Hon.  
M. Elphinstone,  
5th Aug. 1832.

command or employment, such as gives them confidence in acting without European officers, is not the sort of object they should in general be taught to look to.

5. Any advantages expected from placing the Indian army directly under the King, must, I presume, be confined to the officers; to the men it would be a matter of perfect indifference, provided it could be prevented from leading to interference with their interests or prejudices.

A complete incorporation with the King's army, and the free admission into sepoy regiments of officers unacquainted with the language or ways of thinking of the Natives, must, I conclude, be considered as quite impracticable. We must, therefore, suppose an army in all respects as it is now, but subject to the Commander-in-chief in England, or to a department of the Ministry. In that case, if the pride of the officers was for a moment flattered by a more immediate connexion with the King, that feeling would probably be altered when they discovered that, from a separate service which had a reputation and pretensions of its own, and was the sole object of attention to the Military department of its Government, they even sunk into an inferior branch of another army, and scarcely known to their Commander-in-chief. Their solid interests would gain as little by the transfer as their consequence. If there were still to be regiments belonging to the King's European army employed in India, there would then, as now, be a difference of interest between the two branches of the service, but the leaning which now is considered to be in favour of the Indian army (in appointments to staff and commands), would probably be transferred to the other branch, the members of which would have the advantage of acquaintance in England and of claims from service against European enemies. When to this is added the natural disposition of the officers at headquarters to introduce more discipline, subordination, and economy into the Indian army, and to assimilate it to the other branch of the service, I think it is much to be feared that the transfer would introduce greater and more lasting discontent than has ever been experienced yet. Respect for the King's name might check improprieties of language and conduct on ordinary occasions, but in case of extremities (if such a case be possible) it would not make the slightest difference; since even now it is perfectly understood that mutiny against the Company is rebellion against the King. There would, therefore, be more chance of discontent than there is now, and no more means of restraining it.

An intermediate arrangement, making the distinction between the armies less complete, and yet imposing some restraint on the indiscriminate admission of officers into sepoy regiments, would still be imperfect. The facilities of transfer would probably be oftenest employed to the advantage of the superior branch of the service, while the restrictions would be insufficient to secure a mutual understanding between the Native troops and their officers.

If the Indian army were under a civil Minister, more attention would probably be paid to its peculiarities. It would meet with more consideration in questions about batta, rise by seniority, and other points which affect it, and not the King's army, but it would neither be so exclusively protected as by the Court of Directors, nor so effectually kept in order as by a purely military authority.

It would no doubt effectually protect the Indian officers if all the troops, European and Native, in India, were permanently formed into one army, and no officers from Europe allowed to be employed in it; but this would increase the provincial spirit already complained of, and lessen the ties which now connect that army with their country. It is not to their holding their commissions from the Company that the peculiarities of character ascribed to the Indian army have arisen, but from their being placed in a situation to which it is not easy, in the present state of the world, to find a parallel.

The army in England is completely mixed up with the nation, of which each individual is hourly reminded that he forms a part. In India the European officers are a distinct community, entirely unconnected with the people among whom they live, and  
scarcely

scarcely ever brought into intercourse with any one beyond their own body. In this state of separation they know that they are in a country held by the sword, and that the sword is in their hands. It is not surprising that in such circumstances some of them should assume a tone of independence unusual in other armies, and it is perhaps rather to be wondered at that their conduct has, on the whole, been so little insubordinate.

I have hitherto assumed that the government is to be under the King as well as the army. The separation of the civil government from the military would probably not answer in any country, but least of all in India. The great problem there has always been to maintain the subordination of the military power to the civil, and to prevent clashing between the Governors and Commanders-in-chief. In this we have not always been successful, even when both drew their authority from the same source. The separation of the two branches of government, even if it led to no struggles between the civil and military chiefs, would soon make the former almost insignificant with Europeans, and entirely so with the Natives, who can fancy no power unconnected with military command. If the payment of the troops was to be separated from the patronage and the control, every retrenchment would have the character of an offensive interference; and if this were obviated by the Company's paying a fixed sum to the King, still the protection of its subjects from military license, and other points of duty which could never be entirely disjoined from the government of the State, would involve the civil authority in constant disputes with the military.

The only remedy would be always to unite the offices of Governor and Commander-in-chief, but it would be no small objection to the plan that it restricted the selection for so important a station to the small number of general officers who have sufficient rank for the military command.

6. I am not competent to judge of the comparative frugality of the two administrations in most of the instances specified, but I think there would always be a strong tendency in the King's government to judge of the reasonableness of allowances and pensions to Company's officers by those of His Majesty's service. This I consider among the dangers attending the transfer, for even if it were safe to reduce Indian allowances, it seems to me very far from desirable. The pay of the European officers is not now more than sufficient to enable them to maintain their rank among the Natives, and scarcely sufficient to keep up their connexion with their own country, by the prospect of revisiting it in their old age.

7. I do not see much effect the settlement of Europeans would have on the army. The sepoys would participate in any effect it had on the other Natives. It might afford employment to European soldiers worn out in the service, and it might also offer attractions to men before they could get their discharge. I do not think it would lead to more marriages among men who remained with their regiments, or that it would have much effect on their conduct in other respects. It would probably lead to many marriages among the officers, which, with the introduction of the sons of settlers into the army, would weaken the tie between it and this country.

8. The union of the armies of the three Presidencies appears to me very difficult of accomplishment. It could not be done without equalizing the allowances. It would probably be expensive to raise the inferior rates, and certainly impolitic to bring down the higher. Even on the former plan there would be difficulties in adjusting the advantages of the Native soldier under the different Presidencies.

After the change was effected, general and partial arrangements would from time to time remove officers from troops composed of one Indian nation to those of another, and even if any one language would really render an officer competent for all duties throughout all India, there are still differences of manners in the Natives which it would take time to learn, and there are great differences in the ways of commanding them, which could not be removed immediately, even if uniformity were to be wished in the treatment  
of

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(1.)—Reply of  
the Hon.  
M. Elphinstone,  
5th Aug. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(1.)—Reply of  
the Hon.  
M. Elphinstone,  
5th Aug. 1832.

of dissimilar bodies. If the consolidation were easy, I do not perceive how it would be advantageous. Bombay troops have gone to the Ganges, and Madras troops to Ava, on occasions when such exertions were required, and it can never be desirable to make a practice of stationing troops far from their own country. A Carnatic man at Dehly would be completely a foreigner in appearance and language, and would have to alter his food and change many of his habits. This could not be agreeable to the men, and would tend to discontent and desertions. They might in time get accustomed to foreign countries, and to long absence from their home and friends; but it has been remarked by Sir T. Munro, that the effect of such separations is to render men mere soldiers, and concentrate all their ideas in their camp. If our danger was from popular insurrections, this might be an advantage; as it is, it seems much more advisable to keep up the soldiers' connexion with the people, and bind him to tranquillity and regular authority by as many ties as possible.

It may be intended that each regiment should be composed of a portion of each nation. Military men will be the best judges how far this is practicable, especially the mixture of Tamul sepoys in the Bengal army. The fact of there being Hindoostan sepoys in the Bombay army affords a very imperfect solution of the question.

If troops are not to be employed in remote countries, what is the object of uniting the armies? The equalization of allowances alone (if that were practicable) would remove all jealousy between the services, and there can be no disadvantage in the emulation that would remain. It is impossible, also, to forget that there have been times when discontent existed to an alarming extent in the armies of particular Presidencies. It was surely a very fortunate circumstance that those feelings, as well as their causes, were restricted to portions of the army, and it cannot be expedient to facilitate the spreading of the infection by removing the distinctions which checked it on former occasions.

Almost all the above observations relate to the manner in which the proposed changes will affect the officers. Their effects on the sepoys are however of still greater importance: many of these may be foreseen, and some of them may be guarded against; but as the sepoys are of many different classes, and as they are all liable to be affected by circumstances which have no influence on us, it is more difficult to form anticipations about them than about our countrymen and equals, the officers. The risk of unforeseen results applies more strongly to the transfer of the Native army to the King, than to the mere consolidation into one body; and considering that our safety depends entirely on that army, and that we have a precarious hold on it even now, it would appear that we should hazard no changes at all, except to remedy obvious evils, and none of a general nature without clear and urgent necessity.

9. Nothing occurs to me in answer to this paragraph, that has not been noticed already.

I have, &c. &c.

M. ELPHINSTONE.

(5.)—REPLY of Major-general Sir THEOPHILUS PRITZLER, K.C.B., dated 17th February 1832.

Sir,

Upnor, near Rochester, February 3, 1832.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th ult., intimating to me that it is the intention of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being called as a witness before the East-India Committee, in the course of the inquiries which they will probably institute; also requesting information on certain points connected with the military establishment of India: on which I shall have great pleasure to communicate such observations as I have made during my service

(5.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.

vice in that country, but which must be confined to the Madras establishment, on which alone I have been employed.

I have the honour, &c.

THEO. PRITZLER, Major-general.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.

LETTER from Major-general PRITZLER to T. HYDE VILLIERS, Esq., dated Upnor, near Rochester, February 7, 1832.

MAJOR-GENERAL Sir Theophilus Pritzler presents his compliments to Mr. Villiers, and with reference to his letter of the 3d inst., will feel particularly obliged by being informed when it will be necessary that the replies to the several questions contained in Mr. Villiers's letter of the 25th ultimo should arrive at the India Board Office, as the Major-general would wish to give the subject all the consideration that the time will permit.

LETTER from Major-general PRITZLER to T. HYDE VILLIERS, Esq., dated Upnor, near Rochester, February 17, 1832.

Sir,

WITH reference to the subject of your letter of the 25th ultimo, I have now the honour to enclose replies to the several queries therein contained from the India Board (as far as lies in my power), which I have been obliged to make without having reference to any Returns, but which I trust will be found correct.

I should recommend the last Return of the Madras army, with its distribution, and a statement of the rate at which troops and stores have been conveyed to India, to be called for; and I am not aware of any other papers which will be useful with reference to the questions under reply.

If I have not thoroughly understood any of the questions, and you will explain them to me, I shall be happy to give any further information on the subject which I may be able to do.

I shall esteem myself obliged by your informing me that this packet has reached you; and I have the honour, &c.

THEO. PRITZLER, Major-general.

REPLIES to Questions put by the India Board to Major-general Sir T. PRITZLER.

Q. 1. "THE past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies."

The strength of the Madras army (for of that only I can speak) has varied according to the political changes which have taken place as well in India as in Europe, and its distribution has varied in the like manner. Its present strength is not greater than is required for the preservation of internal peace, for the protection of its frontier, and to allow a small disposable force, with which it must always be provided, because, from its extent of coast, embarkations are easily effected from it, and the Madras sepoys have upon all occasions shown no reluctance to be embarked; and whenever they have been employed beyond the sea, they have invariably performed their duty with much zeal and cheerfulness.

The Native part of the Madras army consists of four troops of horse artillery, one bat-  
talion



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.

talion of foot artillery,\* eight regiments of cavalry† (each six troops), fifty-two regiments of infantry (each eight companies), and two battalions of pioneers, besides one regiment of Europeans (divided into two wings), and four troops and two battalions of European artillery.

This army is formed into five divisions, and‡ three subsidiary forces, besides the garrison of Penang, Moulmain, &c. The southern division, with its head-quarters at Trichinopoly, has to protect all our southern provinces (in which there is a dense population) from Pondicherry down to Cape Cormorin; it is also required as a check on the Travancore and Tanjore Rajahs, and on the French and Danish settlements of Pondicherry and Tranquebar.

The centre division (with its head-quarters at St. Thomas's Mount) has the protection of the Presidency, and that part of the Carnatic between the southern division and the Ghauts.

The Mysore division (with its head-quarters at Bangalore) is composed of the Mysore subsidiary force and other troops; it occupies the country formerly under the dominion of Tippoo, and furnishes garrisons for the provinces of Malabar and Canara, from the Travancore country as far north as Goa.

The northern division (with its head-quarters at Vizagapatam) protects the country on the eastern coast, from the centre division up to the Bengal territory of Cuttack.

The division of the Ceded Districts§ occupies that country ceded to the Company by the Nizam, between the Mysore territory and the Tombaudra river, and, with the Mysore division, requires to have a disposable force ready at all times to pass that river, to act either in the southern Mahratta country, or in the southern part of the Nizam's territory, should it be required.

The Hyderabad subsidiary force is stationed principally in the vicinity of that city and at Jaulnah, with its head-quarters at Hyderabad, and the Nagpore subsidiary force is stationed in that territory, with its head-quarters at Kamptec, between the Bombay and Bengal territory, and requires to be always in a very effective state, because in case of any commotion in the neighbouring Native States, its services would be instantly required, and it is too distant from either Presidency speedily to receive support.

The five divisions are commanded by general officers, the Hyderabad and Nagpore subsidiary forces by colonels.

Two regiments of Native cavalry are with the Hyderabad subsidiary force (one stationed at Jaulnah and one at Hyderabad), two are stationed in the centre division at Arcot, and one in each of the other divisions, and subsidiary forces, with the exception of the northern division. An adequate proportion of artillery is placed with each division, and the head-quarters of that arm is established at St. Thomas's Mount, within a few miles of the Presidency.

The King's regiment of dragoons (the 13th) is stationed at Bangalore, and the eight regiments of infantry at Fort St. George, Arnee, Trichinopoly, Bangalore, Cannanore, Bellary, Hyderabad, and Moulmain.

The Company's European regiment is divided between Masulipatam and Kamptec.

The situation of the Madras army, by conquest and other events, has been materially altered within the last ten or twelve years, and therefore has required to be organized accordingly.

When

\* Officered from the other two battalions.

† Including the body-guard at Madras, which duty would possibly be better performed, and at less expense, by a squadron of cavalry from Arcot, and a brigade of guns from St. Thomas's Mount, to be relieved every three months.

‡ The Travancore force being abolished.

§ Head-quarters at Bellary.

When the Madras frontier was constantly threatened by hordes of Mahratta horse, cavalry and horse artillery were the arms most in requisition; but now that the Bengal and Bombay armies nearly cover the Madras frontier, in the event of a continental war in India the Madras army would probably be required to do little more (after giving its disposable force for the field) than to occupy the positions the armies of the other Presidencies now occupy, in order to relieve them for service, either in the north-west or north-east; but in case of an European war, or service beyond sea, it is that the Madras army would be particularly called into action, because its territory has a great extent of coast to defend, and because its sepoys have less objection to be embarked than those of Bengal, and care less for being removed from their native country.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, the Madras army requires a larger proportion of Europeans than either of the other Presidencies, particularly foot artillery, and perhaps a less proportion of horse artillery and cavalry than Bengal. The horse artillery has been recently reduced in some degree, and the Native cavalry has been placed on as low an establishment as the service will admit; the Native infantry has also recently been reduced from ten to eight companies per regiment.

**Q. 2. "The same as to the Staff and Subsidiary departments."**

The staff of the Madras army consists of a lieutenant-general commanding, two King's and three Company's general officers, who have charge of the several divisions of the army: at head-quarters there is an adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, commissary-general, judge advocate-general, with their deputies and usual assistants, and a Persian interpreter; and the medical establishment is regulated by a Board.

With each division and subsidiary force is a deputy assistant adjutant-general, a deputy assistant quartermaster-general, a deputy judge advocate-general, an assistant commissary, a superintending surgeon, a commissary of stores, a paymaster, and a superintending engineer.

The principal stations\* are commanded by colonels or lieutenant-colonels, who are assisted by a major of brigade or fort adjutant, and a chaplain is fixed at each of these stations.

In addition to the above, there is at Madras a King's staff, consisting of one deputy adjutant-general, one deputy quartermaster-general, one deputy inspector of hospitals, one major of brigade, and there was a deputy judge advocate-general, which has recently been discontinued by orders from the Supreme Government.

The staff of the Madras army has in general been tolerably officered.

The Quartermaster-general's department requires to be composed of more scientific men than at present; and officers to fill some of the other staff situations have been selected more with a view to benefit individuals than the service, which must ever be the case unless the selection be confined to officers of particular qualifications, talent, and service: for instance, the major of brigade being taken from officers who have held regimental staff appointments, the deputy assistant adjutant-generals from officers who have been employed as majors of brigade, &c., and the Quartermaster-general's department solely from officers who are scientifically qualified; but no rule can be made positive without checking enterprise and excluding talent.

The Medical establishment has been much improved of late, and would be much more improved if the officers composing it underwent the same examination on promotion as those in the King's army.

The Engineer department has been wonderfully improved since the officers appointed to it have studied under Colonel Paisley at Chatham, and will soon be very efficient.

Great

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.

\* Kamptee, Hyderabad, Jaulnah, Bellary, Masulipatam, Bangalore, Cannanore, Arcot, Trichinopoly, Fort St. George.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5).—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1882.

Great pains have been taken by the late Commander-in-chief at Madras to qualify officers for the situation of judge advocate, which was much required, and his exertions have been attended with success.

Commanding officers of corps have not sufficient weight in the selection of their regimental staff, and consequently some very ineligible officers have been appointed adjutants and quartermasters of regiments, to the exclusion of more efficient young officers in the corps.

Q. 3. "The amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters, with reference to the probable occasion of their services against foreign or domestic disturbers of the peace, each arm being considered separately; and the different portions of our Indian empire which are distinguished by marked characteristics being adverted to in their order, with reference to their mutual independence."

This has been answered generally in reply the first. The detailed strength of each division can only be obtained by calling for the last Return of the Madras army, with its distribution.

Q. 4. "The constitution of the several branches of the army, with reference to its experienced and probable effect."

1st. "On the efficiency of our military force."

The Madras army in general is, in my opinion, as efficient as the material of which it is composed will admit. It has in all wars, whether at home or abroad, invariably been employed, and has always acquitted itself with the greatest credit; but it has generally been ill-supplied with European regimental officers in the field, owing to the very large proportion required on the staff, the whole of which is furnished from the Company's troops, except what is termed the King's staff at Madras.

The Native infantry is in the highest possible state of discipline, and cannot, in my opinion, be improved.

The cavalry is in good order, although there is room for improvement in that arm, but I have always doubted the expediency of the Company having any European infantry, because officers educated entirely with Natives are not likely to succeed in the management of Europeans, particularly when not composed of the best material; and officers brought up in these corps are ill-suited to command sepoy regiments afterwards, which they do.

The horse artillery is in excellent order, but still more numerous than can now be required. With the Madras army at one period it consisted of eight troops (four European and four Native), with sixty-four guns. I believe it has recently very wisely been reduced to thirty-two guns, and if a further reduction of the Native part of it to twenty-four guns were made, I think it would be equal to all the demands which can be made upon it, if properly distributed, particularly if a proportion of foot artillery-men were always trained to mounted duties, by which, in case of emergency, it could be augmented.

The European foot artillery is in as good order as the description of men of which it has hitherto been composed, and the scarcity of officers, will admit; but a number of the most experienced of the latter are employed as commissaries of stores,\* and the large proportion with the Native horse and foot artillery left but few, and those the least efficient, for this most valuable arm, which should be augmented.

The recruits lately sent out have been excellent, and by reduction in the horse artillery it will be better officered in future, though not sufficiently. I have always doubted the expediency of Native artillery, because I do not think they have or ever will become very efficient, and still more the policy of making them so if it were practicable.

The

The pioneers of the Madras army are particularly good, and essentially useful, and have very deservedly been considered the best of the three Presidencies.

The sepoy of the Madras army is a light active man, not equal in appearance to the sepoy of Bengal, but certainly likely to endure much more fatigue; they never desert, because corps generally consist of an assemblage of families. They are much attached to their officers, and if properly managed and directed are not likely ever to go wrong; their courage is rather of a passive nature; they are patient under privation and fire, but require to be led on by Europeans, which it would be bad policy to alter if it were practicable. The pensions which have been given to old soldiers, and to the families of those who have distinguished themselves and been killed in action, are, and ever will be, a great tie upon their relatives in the service, and a great inducement to others to imitate their example.

The King's regiments on the Madras establishment are in the highest possible state of discipline, and very efficient in every respect.

2dly. "On the economy with which it is provided."

I am not of opinion that much reduction could with safety be made in the expenditure on the Madras army, unless by the reduction of two battalions of Native infantry,\* and in the establishment of the horse artillery, which is a most expensive arm, and requires not to be on a larger scale than is absolutely necessary, because if it be, it is injurious to both the cavalry and foot artillery.

The pension list of the Madras army is, I believe, much heavier than that of either of the other Presidencies, but the great advantages derived from it have been purchased on moderate terms.

The clothing and equipment of the army have, I have reason to believe, been provided with the greatest economy, except that I should imagine a saving would be made by the durability of European accoutrements and appointments being greater than those of Native manufacture, which are now in use.

The Commissariat provides almost every thing for the army, even to the horses of the cavalry; but as that department, as well as the Engineer department, is in no way under the inspection or control of the military authorities, I can form no opinion as to whether it is conducted with proper economy.

The Medical department is conducted with great regularity, and the greater part of the supplies are now furnished by the Commissariat.

3dly. "On the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing it."

*Note.*—"The influence of the additions made to the army within the period under review, and of the employment of military men in civil situations; the suitability of the several establishments to the purpose for which they have been, or are likely to be, needed; the fitness of the rules relative to the numbers, pay, qualifications, enlistment, promotion, furlough, &c."

Military men have certainly been employed in civil situations to great advantage, but it was at a period when the civil servants were not so well qualified as at present. The employment of military men generally in civil situations must be injurious to the army, reducing the number of its effective officers, and by rendering the officers so employed, when they return to their military duty, but little acquainted with it; at the same time there are situations that require to be filled by the greatest talent, therefore no positive restriction can be placed on those in authority not to employ military officers in civil situations when necessary; and indeed military men only are fit persons to be employed at some of the Native courts.

I verily believe that the best possible disposition prevails amongst the officers and men  
of

Which were recently raised, but, if the Bombay army continues to occupy the Doonab, are not required.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.

of the Madras army, and they have shewn the most willing spirit whenever they have been employed against the enemy. Their present pay and allowances are as low as they can possibly live upon; therefore any further reduction would distress them (as they have no private means), and consequently might shake their fidelity.

The late augmentation of the army had a good effect, by bringing forward the officers before they were too old to fill the ostensible situations of the army; but the subsequent reduction requires the surplus numbers to be absorbed, which will soon bring the junior ranks of the army to their original state; and the augmentation had a bad effect, as a number of men (perhaps more than were required) were enlisted, many of them of a bad description, who were of no service during the war, and at the peace were discharged, which caused some dissatisfaction; and threw a great many people out of employ, which created distress also. Additional companies to regiments will always be found the best augmentation in case of war, as they would do for garrison duty, and thereby prevent recruits from being sent on service, who only tend to fill the hospitals; and when the service is over, the augmentation would soon be absorbed in the corps by filling the vacancies occasioned by service.

The several establishments are well suited to the purposes for which they are and have been intended, and the rules relative to the number, pay, qualification, enlistment, promotion and furlough, appear well suited to the service.

The retirement of the European officers is absolutely necessary, unless it should be deemed expedient hereafter to introduce the purchase of commissions in the Indian army, which would render the pensions unnecessary, as the regulated price of a lieutenant-colonelcy would purchase an annuity equal to the present pension, which appears to me at present not to be fairly distributed, inasmuch as that, by the existing Regulations, the Company's officers who have served in India twenty-two years are entitled to retire on the pay of *the rank they hold*; therefore some retire on the pay of a lieutenant-colonel, whilst others are compelled to retire (after an equal period of service) on the pay of major, or even captain. Now as no exertion of the individual can promote him in the Indian army all officers who have served twenty-two years appear to be entitled to the same retiring pension; whereas, at present, the fortunate man who has received the best allowances obtains the highest pension, whilst the unfortunate man who, perhaps with equal zeal, never received any thing beyond the pay of a captain, arrives only at the lowest pension for the same length of service, which is severely felt by many, and seems only to require being brought to notice to be rectified.

The proportion of European and Native infantry corps, with the exception of the foot artillery, seems at Madras to be well balanced, so long as we are not to expect an European invading army; and as the advance of such an army must be both slow and progressive, time would be given for sending out reinforcements of Europeans from England. With regard to the cavalry, the proportion has not been so well balanced since the 25th dragoons was withdrawn, there being with eight Native corps only one regiment of dragoons, which is inadequate, because no brigade should (in my opinion) take the field unaccompanied with less than two squadrons of dragoons, and two brigades of guns manned by Europeans; and when it is considered that the difference of expense between European and Native cavalry is not so great as the difference between European and Native infantry (the horse establishment of each being the same) it is to be lamented that the 2d regiment of dragoons was withdrawn from the Madras establishment; and I am of opinion, if the two regiments now stationed at Poonah and Bangalore were formed into three, even on a lower establishment than at present, and one of them stationed at Hyderabad, great advantage would be derived from it, without incurring any very considerable expense. Bangalore, Poonah, and Hyderabad are the only stations on the Peninsula at which European cavalry could be kept in time of peace without great loss of men, and from those points they would be ready, in case of war, rapidly to be united in brigade with the Native cavalry, or to form a junction with each other, should circumstances require it; but the great objection to having only two stations is, that  
corps

corps in time of peace are never moved, which is most injurious to their discipline; whereas, if an additional corps were stationed at Hyderabad, an exchange of stations might easily be effected when required, for the three corps, by the Hyderabad corps exchanging stations alternately with the Bangalore and Poonah corps; and it should be considered that the Native cavalry can always be augmented when required, but not so easily the European cavalry.

**Q. 5.** "The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's in respect to efficiency, good spirit, and economy, and the probable consequences of bringing the whole directly under the authority of Ministers, and the establishment of the Crown, the several arms being separately considered, with the distinction of Europeans and Natives."

I have always been of opinion that the separation of the Company's army from the King's has been productive of the greatest obstacle to its efficiency, good spirit, and economy as there does not exist that feeling which should prevail between officers embarked in the same cause, and the Native army does not derive that assistance in its discipline which it might from our large European force in India; the rules and regulations of the two services being in many instances at variance, the King's officers in command are precluded from being of that service they might and ought to be to the Native army.

The bringing the whole directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown, would, in my opinion, at once remove all jealousy, and for ever banish the idea of its being possible for the officers of the Indian army to resist authority.

An army is a portion of the aristocracy of every country, and can never flourish if otherwise considered. All that the Indian officers want, in my opinion, to render them every thing that can be required, is a King only to look up to for rewards and punishments, and not to consider themselves as serving individuals under a contract; at the same time it would, I think, be desirable to keep regimental officers of the Native army (both cavalry and infantry) distinct from the European army, inasmuch as that the management of Europeans and Natives is so widely different.

The Company's European infantry is on so small a scale, that there would be no difficulty in disposing of it; and the artillery and engineers would, in my opinion, derive the greatest possible advantage by being incorporated with the royal artillery and royal engineers, as regards service, efficiency, and economy.

The varied practice of the King's artillery and engineers must insure their science; and the sending out formed officers and seasoned soldiers, in preference to cadets and recruits, would be attended with great economy, as would the reduction of establishments at home; and it has hitherto happened (particularly after the Peninsular war) whilst we were using every effort to augment the artillery in India with raw recruits, hundreds of most efficient men were discharged from the royal artillery. Another advantage would be gained, which is, that officers and soldiers now pensioned because they cannot serve in India, would be equal to service in Europe, and frequently become fit to return to India if required; but should the measure ever be carried into effect, the greatest possible care will be requisite to prevent the present Company's officers from feeling that their interests have not been most fully considered and attended to, and which, in my opinion, is not very difficult, for I am certain that hereafter the change will prove more beneficial to them all.

**Q. 6.** "Whether there may be grounds to infer, that if the Company's army were under the government of King's Ministers, any considerable saving of expense would ensue by the reduction or consolidation of establishments generally, or in times of peace, by less chargeable plans of recruiting or pensioning (including under the former head arrangements for the appointment and education of cadets, and the conveyance of troops from England to India, and under the latter

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5.)--Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.

latter, retiring pensions, made at the expense of Government); by the more economical provision and appropriation of stores; by cheaper freight; or by other more frugal arrangements; and how far an opposite result is to be apprehended?"

I am not of opinion that, if the Company's army were under the government of King's Ministers, that any very considerable saving of expense would be made at first, except by the consolidation of the King's and Company's establishments, unless the troops could be conveyed to and from India at a cheaper rate by the Transport Board than it is now done by the Company. But it must be borne in mind, that unless they are placed on board His Majesty's ships, or on the finest description of transport, the loss of life and health of the men would render the saving on the tonnage nugatory.

The recruiting of the army must be attended with nearly the same expense as at present, as well as the pensions; and no reductions could be made in the retiring pensions, without risking the fidelity of the officers, until a good system for the purchase and sale of commissions could be effected.

A reduction in the expense of educating cadets would certainly be made by consolidating the establishments of Addiscombe and Woolwich for the education of the officers of the artillery and engineers; and if the officers of the cavalry and infantry were allowed to purchase cornetcies and ensigncies at a moderate rate, I am not certain but that it would cost their friends less money than it does at present to equip and send out cadets, and the benefit to the young men and to the service would be incalculable, because if they had commissions they would do duty on board ship with whatever troops were going out, instead of living in a perfect state of idleness and independence, and no person knowing whether to treat them as officers or children, till they join their corps, perhaps 600 or 700 miles up the country, by which they imbibe habits which have ruined hundreds of very fine young men.

I am not aware that any saving could be made in the expenditure of stores; and with regard to a saving on the freight, that must depend upon the rate at which the Company now send out stores,—but of this I am certain that there is no reason to apprehend any opposite result.

Q. 7. "Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interests connected with the army might be expected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies?"

If this question applies to the settlement of discharged soldiers, I should say it would rarely be of service, because, except on the hills, no European could earn his living by labour, and consequently without a capital is not likely to succeed, added to which, the habits of old soldiers (I regret to say), particularly in India, are ill calculated to enable them to take care of themselves when released from control; but I think it would be very desirable to establish the European pensioners on the hills, where, by a little labour, they would, with their pensions, be enabled to live more comfortably, and to render their progeny a much more moral and useful race of beings than they are at present.

If the question applies to the settlement of Europeans generally in India, I should say that the army would derive little benefit therefrom, as all the articles they consume are remarkably cheap, unless beer could be brewed on terms which would enable the soldiers to drink it instead of ardent spirits, which have been the destruction of thousands.

That Europeans with capital might settle in India to advantage there can be little doubt, because, with their skill and means, and with Native labour, they would improve and increase most of the productions of the country.

Q. 8. "What would be the probable effect of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief?"

The greatest possible advantage would, in my opinion, accrue to the army by having the whole of it under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief.

At present to the Madras army are issued—

1st. General

1st. General orders by the Governor in Council at Madras, which apply to the King's as well as the Company's troops.

2dly. General orders by the Commander-in-chief in India, which apply to the King's troops only, as he takes no cognizance of the Company's troops at any Presidency but his own.

3dly. The orders of the Commander-in-chief at the Presidency, applicable to the King's troops only.

4thly. General orders by the Commander-in-chief at the Presidency, applicable to the Company's troops only.

This creates such confusion as to require no mean ability to enable an officer to comprehend which applies to himself, particularly officers employed in command, who must identify themselves equally with the King's and Company's troops.

With applications, representations, and reports, the same difficulty arises, and frequently before they reach their destination the subject is forgotten, or the object of it is no longer of any moment.

By having three Commanders-in-chief of the Company's army, the system of the three Presidencies must always vary, and when those armies are united (which must always be the case in time of war), it is productive of the worst consequences, particularly with regard to allowances.

Whereas if the control of the army of the three Presidencies were vested in the hands of one Governor and one Commander-in-chief, the same system would prevail throughout, and all orders would be much more promptly executed.

This arrangement would only require a Lieutenant-governor and a Commander of the forces at each of the *three* Presidencies, the former would execute the orders of the Governor, and the latter the orders of the Commander-in-chief, subject to the control of the Lieutenant-governor, by which means the Governor and the Commander-in-chief of India would be released from the detail of a Presidency, which must materially interfere with their more extensive and important general duties.

Q. 9. "How far the existing system of Government direction and control, in so far as the same may depend on arrangements fixed by Parliamentary enactment, is, in its influence on the army, productive of good or evil, as compared with any changes which have been or may be suggested as expedient, on grounds of efficiency, economy, and security?"

The army in England is under the control of the civil authorities, therefore the same rule appears to me also to apply to the Indian army, in a general point of view, and all supplies must be drawn therefrom.

The minute interference of the civil authorities with armies can never be productive of good, and there is no doubt but that there has been at some of the Presidencies much clashing between the high civil and military authorities in consequence, as well on military as civil questions, because, at the same time that the Governors interfere with the detail of the army, the Commander-in-chief (from being in Council) frequently interferes with civil arrangements which lie as little within the province of *his* duty.

Whereas with one Governor and one Commander-in-chief, the latter would receive his instructions from the former, and convey them to his Commanders of the forces, who would execute them *under the sanction* of the Lieutenant-governor, at the Presidency, to whose requisitions he would be instructed at all times to attend.

By releasing Commanders of the forces from forming a part of the civil government, they need no longer be tied to the Presidency (which separates them entirely from their army); but they might reside in the centre of it, and visit every part of it during the period of their command, from which it would derive incalculable benefit.

THEO. PRITZLER, Major-general.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(5.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir T. Pritzler,  
17th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(6.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-general  
Sir W. K. Grant,  
27th March 1832.

(6.)—REPLY of Lieut.-general Sir W. KEIR GRANT, K. C. B., dated 27th March 1832.  
Sir,

WITHOUT advertng to the several points of the letter, which the official Returns at the India House can alone accurately answer (such as the strength and distribution of the several arms of the military force at the three Presidencies), I proceed at once to the two points on which information seems to be most desired; and these I consider to be the transfer of the Indian army to the Crown, and the economy with which it, and the establishment connected with it, are at present managed, or susceptible of being so.

In regard to the transfer of the army to the Crown much valuable information may be obtained by reference to the discussions and minutes on this very point in the time of the late Lord Cornwallis, previous to the Regulations which took place in 1796. The measure was then, as now, much desired by the home authorities, and in consequence the Indian Government called for the opinions of the commanding officers of Native regiments, and heads of staff departments.

The opinions so collected were, it is understood, not favourable to the proposed transfer; nor is this to be wondered at, since the jealousies and apprehensions of the officers of the Indian army were naturally excited by the dread of sharing with others that patronage of which they, then as now, possess the exclusive enjoyment; and on the other hand, the Government were not prepared with any sketch as to how far the changes necessarily consequent to a transfer should go.

There can be little doubt, I imagine, that the Indian army would ultimately gain much (and the State would also gain) in the zeal, efficiency, subordination, and discipline of the troops by a transfer to the Crown; but then the measure must be guarded by many precautionary checks, or the advantages of the change might be considerably impaired.

The mischiefs that might arise (and which even at present do sometimes occur in cases of command) from the appointment of officers but little experienced in the country, or conversant in the prejudices and language of the Natives, are more easily imagined than detailed; but these might easily be guarded against by proper regulations, and ought strictly to be so under any arrangements for the future.

No subaltern, for instance, should be allowed to enter a Native corps who had not served a certain period in India with a European regiment; and a still further period of service with a Native regiment in subordinate ranks should also be insisted on before he attained the command of a regiment; and no officer should be appointed to any command in India who had not previously served with the Indian armies, as the proper management of troops in that country, whether European or Native, depends on the acquirement of some knowledge and experience of the climate, country, and people. By attention to this point, the efficiency of the European and Native armies would be promoted.

As the transfer would doubtless be regarded at first with no pleasurable feelings by the majority of the Company's officers, it would be advantageous to hold out to them some prospect of advantage as likely to result to themselves from the measure; and here many suggest themselves, attended with but little expense to the State, and which would be considered a great boon by the army, for instance, the permission to exchange from colonial regiments with officers of corresponding rank in the King's service who possessed the requisite experience and qualifications; the recognition of their rank after quitting India; their retiring pension to be on a scale of *length of service*, and not, as at present, contingent on the rank they may by chance have obtained (for promotion must always be unequal and uncertain). These, and the permission to establish among themselves a retiring fund to accelerate promotion, would be of incalculable advantage to the service, as it would be the means (particularly the latter) of bringing forward to situations of command individuals possessed of mental as well as bodily energies, which now, from the slow rate of promotion, is scarcely ever the case.

In regard to the proportion of European officers with Native corps, the number as at present

present *belonging to regiments* would be adequate, were they not withdrawn to supply the different staff establishments; but from the duties of the latter being solely performed by regimental officers, it generally happens that not a third of the officers belonging to a regiment is ever actually present with it. The consequences are obvious; a relaxed state of discipline, no connexion between the officer and sipahee, and dissatisfaction in the mind of the former from severer duties falling on him in consequence of the paucity of officers present. To this must be added a feeling universally prevalent, that from the number of officers withdrawn from regiments for staff duties, the few that remain with a corps consider the being so as a mark of degradation; the mind then becoming restless and discontented, duties are performed in a very solvenly manner, and every effort made to obtain some employment, which in many cases the officers with a King's regiment would not accept. Such a state of things must be pregnant with evil to the service, and strongly points out the necessity of the duties of the Stud, Commissariat, Building department, and such like, being provided for by the formation of a separate class of people expressly educated for these branches; or, if this be impracticable, that additional officers should be given to regiments to supply the vacancies of those withdrawn.

There do not seem grounds to infer that, if the Company's army were transferred to the Crown, any considerable saving of expense would ensue; reduction in every department on the termination of hostilities has frequently been enforced with too strict a view to temporary saving, which saving a short experience has proved to have been dearly purchased by the increased expenditure consequent to sudden demands.

In a country like India, constantly exposed to sudden political convulsions, the army should always be on such a footing in respect to number and equipment as to be capable of acting with promptitude and effect in any emergency.

So many reductions have within the last ten years been enforced in India, as well in the number as the rates of pay, both in the army and establishments, that it is scarcely possible to conceive any further reduction practicable consistent with efficiency in the several departments. It is contended by many, that efficiency has already been sacrificed in the too ardent desire to economize, and which the occurrence of any disturbance would prove by the total inadequacy of the means at hand to suppress it. From the great reduction in the strength of the several regiments, and the total abolition of local and provincial battalions, which formerly relieved the regiments of the line from the police duties, the sipahee has now no relief from duty; there are never sufficient men off duty to relieve those that are on; consequently, what is commonly called a weekly relief of guards is only an *exchange* of guards, by the party from one post moving to another, and so on in rotation.

The effects of such a system on the discipline of any army must be obvious, and particularly so on one constituted as is the Indian army.

It might be of importance to ascertain, by reference to the India House, the reduction of force which has taken place in the three Presidencies within the last five years. The amount, I am sure, would exceed belief, and instantly excite alarm, whether the present diminished force would be adequate to preserve the peace of the country, much less be available for any active offensive operations, should such be required. But it has ever been the system in India (though experience proves the error) to recruit with a lavish hand, and at an immense expense, on every probability of hostilities; the occasion over, the force so raised and disciplined is, with as lavish a hand, discharged, and either enter into the service of some Native power, or form themselves into predatory bands, and become the nucleus of Pindarree hordes. The men discharged on the reduction of the army after Lord Lake's campaigns in 1803-4 and 1805, became the Pindarrees which caused the campaigns of the Marquess of Hastings in 1818-19. A policy so short-sighted as this, so composed of shifts and expedients, can never be calculated to impress our own subjects with respect, or those hostile to us with that salutary dread of our power, which, if necessary in any country, is doubly so in India. It should never be lost sight of, that the British power in India hangs on the "breath of opinion," and to support that opinion in full vigour, no sacrifice should be considered too great if the country be worth retaining;

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(6.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-general  
Sir W. K. Grant,  
27th March 1852.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(6).—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir W. K. Grant,  
27th March 1832.

retaining; but it cannot be concealed, that the system pursued for some years has not been calculated to produce this effect; it rather implies that we consider our possession of the country as of short duration, and are resolved to extract as much as possible from it for that period without consideration of the consequences.

It is not contended that the Civil and Military establishments are not expensive and burthensome to the country, and may constitute an obstacle to those financial reforms by which the prosperity of the country might be promoted, and the condition of the people improved. The judicious reduction of the civil expenses by the more general employment of officers in political stations would be advantageous; and the gradual employment of Natives in civil situations has been already recommended by those on whose judgment and experience the greatest reliance may be placed. (See Evidence of Mr. Elphinstone before the Committee of the House of Lords.)

There may also be means by which the charges in the Military department may be reduced without injuring the efficiency of the service. The incorporation of the Ordnance department would constitute a material saving of expense in the Military department. Another resource might be found in the arrangements for the settlement of European soldiers in the country after a certain period of service, instead of sending Europeans to Europe. Situations might be appropriately selected where they might be encouraged to settle. The same privilege might be extended to the officers, and it might be politic to hold out a specific advantage to officers and soldiers, whether European or Native, by allowing them, as a reward for long services in India, to occupy a certain extent of land. Many European officers would thus be induced to settle; and if they had not served long enough to acquire pensions, they might be allowed to settle on application, receiving a premium in lieu of half-pay, or on retirement, under similar regulations to those which have been made for encouraging half-pay officers to settle on the King's colonies. These measures would be the means of securing to the country many valuable subjects possessed of real experience, and whose influence would be exerted to support the Government in any emergency. Promotion in the army would thus be accelerated, and officers, who are now discontented, would be reconciled by the prospects and resources thus opened to them; their general employment in political, and even in civil situations, would also be very encouraging to them, as it would be beneficial to the service.

The privilege to Native officers and soldiers, as a reward for their services, of holding lands free of rent, would be congenial in some respects to their habits and ideas, as it was a practice under the Native Governments to reward services by conferring *jaggheres*, or the transfer during life of the revenue of certain lands.

Native soldiers are entitled to pensions after certain periods of service; and the privilege of holding lands within the British territories, free of assessment, would be a considerable boon when regiments are reduced, and effectually prevent them from entering the Native armies, or forming predatory bands. Certain duties of police might be required from them in return for the concession.

In support of the opinion that an incorporation of the armies, and the general employment of officers of both services, would promote their efficiency, and be productive of the advantage I have anticipated, it may be useful to advert to the effect of this incorporation on several detached services where the troops have been so organized and employed. In the maritime expeditions formed for the conquest of the French and Dutch settlements a joint staff was employed, and also in the expedition against the Arab pirates in the Persian Gulf. During all these operations the utmost zeal and harmony prevailed. In Java, where the King's and Company's troops were thus employed together for several years, until the restoration of that island to the Dutch, the best spirit prevailed; all jealousies subsided, and as none of the Company's civil servants were employed, the reforms in the administration of the country were chiefly effected by a number of intelligent officers taken from both services, and who rapidly acquired a knowledge of the language and customs of the country, and who filled, with great credit to themselves, nearly all the most responsible and important civil and political stations.

In

In regard to the internal economy of the army, I do not think it would be advisable to incorporate the Native regiments of the different Presidencies, or to require them generally to serve beyond the territories in which they were raised. Their temporary removal in time of war is not liable to the same objection; and they have been found to volunteer readily for active service even in maritime expeditions.

It would be attended with public advantage in time of war if brevet rank were conferred upon officers in India as in Europe for distinguished services in the field; for at present the Commander-in-chief has no means of rewarding officers for their gallantry in the field, but by some paltry staff appointment, for which perhaps the individual is totally unfit; thus taking him from his profession, to which he is an ornament, and placing him where the pecuniary advantages are a paltry return for his devoted zeal in face of the enemy.

It is so obvious that the placing the whole of the military patronage of the army at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief, who is to lead it into the field, and is responsible for its equipment and efficiency, that I shall not enter into any argument to prove what must be so evident to the Honourable Board.

I have the honour, &c.

Bath, 27th March 1832.

W. KEIR GRANT, Lieutenant-general.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(6.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-general  
Sir W. K. Grant,  
27th March 1832.

(7.)—REPLY of Lieut.-colonel COLEBROOKE, received 4th May 1832.

Sir,

I REGRET that the duties which have engaged me since my return to this country have prevented me from giving earlier attention to the subjects which the Commissioners for the Affairs of India have been pleased to refer to me.

As an officer of the King's service, I was engaged in the discharge of various military and political duties in different parts of India, between the years 1805 and 1821. I served with the Madras army during the disturbances in 1809; I accompanied the expedition to Java in 1811, where the troops of Bengal and Madras were employed, and I served till 1816 on the general staff of that island. I served afterwards with the Bengal army in the Pindarree war, and with the Bombay troops in subsequent operations in the Concan and in the Persian Gulf.

In the course of these services, my attention has been generally drawn to the various subjects referred to in your letters, and I conceive that I shall most satisfactorily meet the views of the Commissioners by stating the most material observations which have occurred to me, and without referring specifically to the questions which have been proposed.

As our political ascendancy in India has been the immediate consequence of the successes of our arms, and still essentially depends on the character and efficiency of our forces, I will explain shortly the principle on which I consider these to have been upheld.

The discipline and economy of the Indian army has been essentially modelled on that of the European troops, modified by the peculiar habits and prejudices of the Natives.

In our early contests with the French in India the Native troops were not so regularly organized as they since have been, and their efficiency has grown up with the attention bestowed on them, and with the respect in which they have been held. I believe it is generally admitted, that the condition of the Native soldier is so highly estimated throughout India, that no difficulty has been found in recruiting the armies in the territories of the Native princes. The Hindus and Mahomedans have each their peculiarities, but have both a predilection for the military profession; they retain a traditional recollection of the services of their corps, and venerate the names of their most distinguished officers, and of those commanders, whether of the King's or Company's service, who have established claims to their respect. I believe that the character of most officers is narrowly scrutinized by them, and that their enterprise and exertions are generally proportioned to their confidence in and attachment to their leaders.

(7.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Colebrooke,  
4th May 1832.

Although

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(7.)—Reply of  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Colebrooke,  
4th May 1832.

Although the Natives are susceptible of strong attachments, they have also strong prejudices, and we must not lose sight of the principle on which they have been induced to submit to our authority.

The prejudices of the Mahomedans and Hindus have been manifested in two important occasions. At the period of the mutiny at Vellore, the Madras army was chiefly composed of Musselmen; and when the Bengal sepoys mutinied in Java, they were for the most part Hindus. The discipline of both armies has been improved by the admixture of the two classes; they neutralize the prejudices of each other, and are united by discipline in stricter dependance on their officers. In Ceylon, where the inhabitants are almost exclusively Hindus or Bhudists, it has been found necessary to raise corps of Caffres and Malays, who do not profess the religion of the country.

The European officers of the army in India acquire a great degree of intelligence and experience from the detached and desultory services on which they are employed, and the responsible situations in which they are often placed at an early age.

After the conquest of Java, it was found impossible to administer the country with the aid of the Dutch civil servants, who were attached to their corrupt system, and the reforms that were introduced were for the most part carried into effect by the officers, who were selected from the corps serving in the island, who had rapidly acquired the language of the country, and whose intelligence and zeal were in many instances conspicuous. It is proper to observe also, that the indiscriminate employment of the King's and Company's officers, as well on the general staff as in duties of a civil and political nature, produced a spirit of cordiality and co-operation in the highest degree conducive to the public interests. During a period of six years that I served in Java, these distinctions were entirely lost sight of, and I had subsequent opportunities of witnessing the same effect when officers of the different services were employed on the same staff. In India the officers of the Native army look too much to exclusive employment on the general staff; and when so employed, are maintained on the strength of their corps. At the same time many intelligent and experienced officers of the King's army are kept with their corps, whose service with the armies in Europe would have rendered their assistance in the highest degree useful in organizing those of India.

The internal discipline of the European and Native regiments has been maintained by pursuing very different systems.

Excepting when required for duty, the Natives are but little interfered with by their officers; they live in lines of temporary buildings with their families, and according to their own habits. The Europeans are generally cooped up in barracks or fortresses, and the characters of the best men are often brought down to the level of the worst. The discouragement to their marriages with the Natives is unjust and impolitic. Where the European soldiers form connexions with Native women, and live out of barracks, they are generally remarkable for their good conduct, sobriety, and attention to their duties. These women are faithful to them, and are serviceable attendants in the field. Their children would form a most valuable class, if properly attended to, and would make good soldiers. From the prejudices against them, I have heard of instances where half-caste children have been adopted by the Native officers and soldiers, and brought up as Mahomedans. The Native widows of European soldiers should be pensioned, as all others now are. These connexions would have a tendency to break down the prejudices of the European soldiery, and would enable them, when superannuated, to become useful settlers in the country.

In providing for the gradual incorporation of the European and Native armies, it is not necessary to disturb the present constitution of the services, further than to assimilate as far as possible the Regulations applying to them, and to allow of exchanges from one service to the other. As an officer of the King's service can exchange, under certain limitations, from the infantry to the cavalry, so might officers of the European and Native regiments be allowed to exchange, with the understanding that no officer should be appointed to a Native regiment who did not understand the Hindustanee language, that a field officer should have

have served at least three years, and a captain two years, with a Native corps in subordinate ranks. Officers of both services should be eligible to the general staff of the army, and the separate staff of the King's troops should be abolished. All officers appointed to the staff should understand the Native languages; but there could be no objection to encouragement being given to the Native officers and soldiers to learn the English language.

Officers of the Native army should have permanent rank in the King's service, and be eligible to serve in other parts of the world, where they would acquire experience in their profession.

All European officers and soldiers who have actually served for twenty years in India, should be allowed to retire upon pensions, but which should not be regulated by the rank they may have obtained in the service. These pensions should be payable in India or in Europe.

I have known instances where officers of the King's service have returned to England with their regiments, after being employed more than twenty years in India, but who were excluded from any advantages of retirement enjoyed by the officers of the Company's army. I have understood that, in the case of some officers of the 24th Dragoons, their claim was brought under the consideration of the Court of Directors by Lord Hastings, but I have no knowledge of the particulars.

In admitting the officers of both services to the general staff, they should invariably be taken off the strength of their regiments while holding such situations, without prejudice, however, to their promotion.

Political and civil situations should be expressly open to officers of the army on the same conditions. When troops were actually employed, casualties in the field should be filled up by the promotion of the officers who were present with their corps.

The incorporations of the Ordnance services would constitute an important part of the general arrangement. The European artillery and engineer corps at each of the Presidencies would form a separate battalion or division, and the officers of corresponding ranks might be allowed to exchange with those of the royal artillery engineers, without any limitation or restriction. The rule of promotion in each service being otherwise unchanged, the officers employed in the Civil department of the Ordnance in India being subject to the same rule that would be applied in the case of those who were appointed to other civil situations. By the principle of exchanges, the services of many valuable officers of the Indian service would be preserved and extended to other quarters, who now retire from ill health, or after acquiring a claim of pensions.

The soldiers of the artillery battalions in India might be formed at Woolwich, and the opportunity would be favourable for incorporating the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich with the establishment at Addiscombe. Formerly the cadets for the Company's artillery and engineers were educated with those of the King's service, and a connexion was thus early formed between the officers of the two services, the advantages of which I have had occasion to witness and appreciate.

The institution at Addiscombe is understood to have an advantage, in being established in some degree upon the model of the French "*Ecole Militaire*," the cadets being educated for the different branches of the service, and those who have made the greatest proficiency being appointed to the artillery and engineers.

It would be very desirable if such a principle could be introduced into an incorporated establishment. The cadets as at present would defray the expense of their own education. The advantages of instructing them at Woolwich would be considerable, being the headquarters of the royal artillery, and in the neighbourhood of the Arsenal, where professional studies may be practically as well as theoretically pursued. Amongst the advantages to be derived from gradually incorporating the armies, would be the employment of experienced officers in command of stations and divisions, who were equally acquainted with the economy and management of European and Native troops.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(7.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Colebrooke,  
4th May 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(7).—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Colebrooke,  
4th May 1832.

The want of this knowledge in officers otherwise distinguished has often produced ill consequences as well to the Europeans as to the Indians.

The situation of the Native officers of sepoy battalions is in many respects peculiar, as they are promoted entirely from the ranks.

The future appointment of Native gentlemen in common with Europeans as officers of the Native army will gradually supersede the necessity of maintaining a distinct class of subordinate Native officers; but no other provision could at present be made than for their admission as candidates for commissions when duly qualified.

The restriction imposed upon persons of colour, who are otherwise in all respects qualified, is impolitic and absurd; some distinguished officers of this class might be named, and there are often instances where brothers are of different complexion, and where one has received an appointment, while the other has not been deemed eligible.

European officers as well as soldiers should be allowed to settle in India; and, adverting to the arrangements which have been made for encouraging officers of the King's service to settle in the American and Australian colonies, some advantages, on the same principle, might be held out to officers and soldiers, whether European or Native, as a reward of their services: they might be permitted to occupy lands free from the annual payment of quit-rent, the amount of the concession being regulated according to length of service.

The practice of the Mogul Government in granting *jaghires*, or transferring the revenues of lands to individuals in consideration of their services, is analogous to this mode of recompense, and would be an enviable distinction in the estimation of the Native soldiers.

It would also remove a difficulty opposed to the effective occupation of land by a class of Europeans who are well calculated to improve the country.

By these arrangements promotion in the Indian army would be accelerated, and some prospects would be held out to those whose views might lead them to remain in the country, while those who wished to remove from it might be able to do so with advantage to themselves and to the service.

The incorporation of the establishments would lead to a great reduction of expense, as well as to the efficiency and good spirit of the army; and the security of the British possessions would be strengthened by the settlement of retired officers and soldiers in India.

It may be a question how far it may be practicable to devise a plan for the gradual reduction of the Indian army by the formation of colonies or settlements at some of the military stations, where large bodies of troops are no longer required in providing for the general defence. The extent of the buildings at those stations would facilitate the formation of such settlements where the European and Native soldiers might desire to establish themselves with their families.

There are many stations in India where the climate would be extremely favourable to Europeans; but when they had become acclimated, they might prefer to settle in other situations.

With exception of the cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, the settlements found at some of the principal military stations are the only ones which have hitherto grown up in British India; and if these had enjoyed the same institutions, and had not been subject to the restrictions imposed on the settlement of Europeans, they might have rivalled those wealthy and populous communities, and have conferred incalculable advantages on the country. A large Native population has in this manner been drawn to Cawnpore, which was at one time a village of no importance. The origin of the cities and towns of the Mogul empire may often be traced to similar causes. The rapidity of their rise and decline may be attributed to those revolutions, which have successively removed the seats of authority, and led to the formation of large military camps

camps and cantonments. The Mahomedans, although they are much less numerous than the Hindus, and extremely hostile to them, retained their power for centuries from being more concentrated. Superior advantages might be derived from the formation of European settlements, which, like the free towns in the Middle Ages, would gradually impart the benefit of improved arts and institutions to the country at large, while they gave stability to the Government.

I have the honour, &c.

W. M. S. COLEBROOKE.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(7.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Colebrooke,  
11th May 1832.

(8.)—REPLY of Lieutenant-colonel De HAVILLAND, dated Guernsey, July 7, 1832.

Right Honourable Sirs,

I HAVE the honour to state, that I am now at leisure to attend the East-India Committee of Parliament, whenever called upon; and to deliver to them such "*opinions and information*" as my experience may enable me to give, to any point submitted, as connected with the military or other service in which I have been engaged under the East-India Company.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

I have chiefly served in the Engineer department, and have been employed in all its branches; the Military, in peace and war; the Public and Civil; the Revenue and Hydraulic; and, when vested with the charge of each or either of them, have endeavoured to make myself master of the subject, never losing the occasion of conveying to the higher authorities all such information as would lead to a right understanding of the present state of things; the defects of the existing system; the occurring evils, accompanied by suggestions for prospective improvements, tending to the general good of the people; the prosperity of the country; and the more immediate advantages of its Government.

No branch of the military service, it appears to me, can be made more subservient to these objects than the engineer corps, properly organized; and no department has, I think, been more neglected, and left in a more helpless state, than that has been, from its original constitution, on military principles, about 60 years ago; a neglect which is attributable to a variety of concomitant circumstances, in the which the jealousy of other departments may be considered as having had a place. I had the honour to set them forth at large, when last I was at the head of that arm on the Madras establishment, in a Report which I submitted to that Government; and as a printed copy of that Report\* accompanies this letter, I shall here refer to the subject only in general terms.

The principal source of those disadvantages and disqualifications arises out of its having (the corps of engineers) *no men forming a body of soldiers* under their immediate command; for I do not consider the late attachment of a corps of pioneers to the engineer skeleton as in any degree answering the purpose of such a body. They are not a constituent part of the corps in effect or in reality; they still remain a body of unarmed men, which any momentary expediency may again detach from that corps; and while with it, they are placed under the command and control of a captain, in apparent exclusion of the senior officer's, or the field officer's authority, which tends to cast on those higher ranks an appearance of contempt and disrespect, and may frequently, especially on field service, lead to those senior officers being placed in the back ground to favour this junior individual, to their prejudice, and to the hurt of the service, as has too often occurred, however contrary it is to every principle of subordination, and to military etiquette and practice.

In my Report I explained that the state of things I had described, as relating to the  
above

\* Not included in this Appendix.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

above paragraph, had on more occasions than one deprived the corps, after an arduous campaign (in which it had suffered as much, or more, than any other corps in the army), of its share in those honours which have been vouchsafed to the Company's army generally by His Majesty; and it is to be feared it may too often again recur if the attachment of the pioneers continues, as it now does, exclusively under the command of a subordinate officer. Nor is it a matter of less regret that, far advanced as we are in the 19th century, those men should follow the army, and stand on its Returns as rank and file, without being armed and accoutred sufficiently well to be their own protectors, and to guard their own stores, at least against predatory horse.

I now proceed to a view of the corps on the peace establishment. It is shown, in my Report, that no part of the army earns its wages so serviceably and so effectually as the engineers, by reason of their being so variously employed in the several departments of the service; and however numerous the establishment might be, it might always be employed advantageously, and to the defraying of its own expenses, while the other arms of our military force are, as it were, lying comparatively idle at a heavy expense to Government, merely to be ready in case of need. This is not said in disparagement of other corps, but simply to show that the increase or reduction of the Engineer department, or the promotion of its officers, should not strictly be regulated by that which takes place in the other branches of the military service, because that corps stands affected by circumstances which do not govern, or apply to the rest; and nevertheless it has frequently occurred, that rather than give it superior advantages, in virtue of its uninterrupted utility, it has obviously been left in the back ground; and it is a matter of lament to them, that the jealousy of others, or motives inexplicable, have led the authorities at home, on other occasions besides, to discourage and mortify that corps, and to disregard the representations made to them in its behalf. As a proof of such discouragement at home, it may be urged, that the only two situations to which they (at home) might perhaps, in concurrence with the artillery, have legitimately aspired have been filled by officers of other corps to their prejudice.

Among the duties upon which the engineers are employed, when not required for active service, may rank uppermost the Revenue and Irrigation department, upon which the prosperity of the country and the welfare of its inhabitants so much depend. And this branch of the public service is capable of improvement to an unlimited extent; but hitherto the total insufficiency of the tank establishment has prevented any material progress being made in such improvement, at the same time that the local Governments have not given so much attention to that object, or to their officers so much encouragement and support therein as they merited; nor have the latter been honoured with that confidence which the general success of their works should have ensured to them, and which is indispensable in that stupendous department.

Hitherto, indeed, the officers of that establishment, thinly scattered over extensive regions, have scarcely had leisure, besides attending to the repairs most urgently called for, to extend their considerations to the adoption of a general system which would gradually effect a remedy of those evils which are consequent on the ignorance of past ages, when irrigation was trained along, as it were, artlessly, or at least governed by incidental circumstances more than by principles of science; much less have they been able to lay down permanent plans for economising the waters which in unfavourable seasons flow scarcely, or to restrict those waters, when brought in the midst of cultivation, to the less fertile areas, whereby to devote the *maximum* of land round each village to the influence of that irrigation. They have in fact as yet but felt their way along, contemplating that which aforesaid had been so imperfectly done; but from want of numbers (not for lack of talent or good disposition) they have not been able to open new sources for fertilization; sources so innumerable, and at present so easy of access. When, in former days, the strifes of petty chiefs, and even of villages, limited each to its own circumscribed district, no extensive plan could be undertaken, and if it could, the means might have been wanting; but the case is now altered; our rule is universal; our possessions, as it were,  
unlimited;

unlimited; our knowledge, as our means, equal to any undertaking. There is but one interest in the country, and that interest should be exerted to its general improvement; there is no venture; no speculation in it; the return is certain, and that, too, almost immediate; but I go further; humanity demands it. What better means can be devised to prevent a recurrence of famine or scarcity, which have been too frequent in those countries?

Connected with the above subject, and also of high importance, is the formation of canals for commercial purposes. Several lines have been proposed in various reports to Government, but hitherto its attention has not apparently been given to the subject. The irrigation canals and the commercial communications might be assisting to each other; and where such connexion was impracticable, railways (of easy construction in that country) might with advantage be laid.

On the whole, one general principle should be kept in view, that as much of the waters which fall from the heavens as possible should be *kept from running into the sea*, and, where practicable, stored up among the hills where the rivers take their rise, to be economically distributed afterwards into the minor reservoirs as occasion might require. It is not necessary here to state where such works might be advantageously constructed. The local engineer officers will soon discover fit places, provided they be well seconded by the collector and the other authorities of the district, and their reports be not too readily disregarded.

In the execution of all these works, the class of tank diggers will be profitably subjected to the direction of that corps, their industrious and laborious habits turned to the best advantage, and the convicts in the various gaols of the country made equally contributive to the general good of the public weal. These various aids, under proper regulation and scientific arrangements would yield to the country a result in the amount of labour of considerable importance, which, from not having been sufficiently considered, is neither understood nor duly appreciated.

Long as we have been in possession of our Indian territories, few public roads have yet been formed; and of those which have been attempted, most have either been imperfectly executed or have proved altogether a failure.

Our ports and coasts have scarcely ever been attended to; and that country would be different from every other in the civilized world, if in it they were not susceptible of improvement; but what little has been done has, by its success, been encouraging to do more. The defence of the town of Madras against a raging sea was effectually secured under difficult circumstances; and the tunnel constructed under the surf to discharge the fetid waters of that town has had a most satisfactory effect. Something has also been done lately, though but on a limited scale, to the *Paumbam* passage of the sea between the main and the island of Ceylon. This work, most essential to the commercial interests, was suggested ten or twelve years ago, but adopted lukewarmly, and procrastinated chiefly, it would appear, from the want of superintending officers.

To enumerate all that might be done in India, within the scope of that useful corps, would be an endless task; there are few parts of that country that do not afford opportunities for the exercise of its science and energies.

Reverting more immediately to the military province of that department, a few words may be said on the condition of our fortresses and depôts. Except at the Presidency itself, none are kept up in a fit condition of defence; and if some repair is annually bestowed on them, it is grudgingly done, and barely to keep them from total decay.

All these and many other useful works, hitherto grossly neglected or altogether totally disregarded, might by this time have been brought to a state of considerable perfection, if this corps had from time to time been duly encouraged, increased and upheld under suitable regulations.

One subject more must be brought to notice as immediately connected with that branch of the service, namely, the Survey department. When the Company had incurred a large

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

large expense to erect an establishment at Addiscombe, which had avowedly for its principal object the mathematical and technical education of candidates for its engineer and artillery service, and that, as a *sine qua non*, it was required that all those destined for the engineers, and who, on examination, had proved themselves well qualified thereto, should be sent first to the Chatham dépôt, and afterwards to attend the trigonometrical surveys which were in progress throughout the United Kingdom; in short, to acquire the art and practical knowledge which would enable them thereafter to apply with advantage that theory which had been taught them at the Company's seminary. When these previous measures were taken, as observed before, at considerable expense, it was natural for that corps to hope that, however neglected they appeared hitherto to have been, they would in future be placed under more favourable circumstances; and that it would not be long ere an efficient corps of soldiers would be placed at their command, to exercise the practice they had learned at Chatham, in the want of which the officers themselves might soon forget it; nor could they doubt but that when surveys should be required, they should have the preference. But on the contrary, they have been allowed to continue for a long series of years a mere skeleton, and to be held up in general estimation as an useless body, in field service at least, and ridiculed as such,—a condition so fully exemplified in the case which occurred some years ago, when the Commander-in-chief of the Madras army was called upon to head it against the enemies of the country, and that, surrounded as he was by the whole of the general staff of that army, he was pleased to appoint a young subaltern of that corps to be his commanding field engineer, when, out of two field officers and nine captains then present for duty, he might so easily have selected one of higher rank no less qualified for the task than desirous and anxious to undertake it. Nor is it a matter of little mortification to know that laurels were reaped on that occasion by the corps, and to this day remain unrequited by royal favour, in consequence of the want of rank in the officer commanding it. In like manner, with regard to the Survey branch, the engineer corps of all the Presidencies have had to contemplate the appointment of a surveyor-general, twice over, bestowed on other officers than themselves; in the one case out of the cavalry, in the other out of the infantry, who had not been prepared thereto at the Company's expense in England; and on this latter point, this treatment seemed to derive additional aggravation out of this circumstance, that the appointment of surveyor-general of India was understood to form a part of the Court of Directors' patronage, who so well knew the object and intention of the seminary and practical establishments at home.

On the present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies, I cannot give much information at present, as I have left India so many years, and that such arrangements must necessarily depend on the condition of the times, as regards the politics of the country particularly, and generally those of Europe. They have, however, appeared well devised and conducted through a long series of years, under the general superintendence of the Superior Government and the attention of the subordinate establishments of the different Presidencies of India. But it is essential to the permanence of our rule over that empire that we should never be lulled into a false security by a temporary condition of peace, so far as to allow any extensive district to remain undefended, or to be without disposable forces stationed on convenient points, to be ready for immediate movement, wherever necessity may require the presence of such forces, not only to meet the external enemy, but to keep in subordination the turbulent spirits, which might, by conspiracy or otherwise, place in danger the allegiance of the various nations and people over whom our influence is now extended.

On the constitution of the army in general, I have but few observations to make. The efficiency of our military force, both European and Native, is indispensable: its prowess and success in the acquirement and in the maintenance of our possessions in India, afford ample evidence of the truth of the assertion. With respect to the European part, little need be said, since, exclusive of the artillery and a few regiments of infantry, that force  
is

is composed of regiments in His Majesty's service, and that the Company's artillery and infantry are generally governed and disciplined under the same rules as obtained in His Majesty's army.

The Native force likewise is subject to the same arrangements, and, generally speaking, to the same military law; but it requires considerable attention to its peculiar disposition and wants, arising out of the different religious tenets which pervade their ranks, and the consequent prejudices by which they are more or less influenced; and, therefore, it behoves the Governments upon whom the protection of those troops depend to keep a constant eye on them; and while, on the one hand, order is to be preserved among them by a strict but a well-administered military discipline, they are to be indulged, when it may be done with prudence and safety, to strengthen them in their allegiance to our interests, and stimulated by suitable encouragement and prospects of distinction and remuneration for exemplary conduct and services.

To this end much has already been done; and the condition of Native officers and soldiers has been much meliorated from time to time, when opportunities have presented themselves.

To a continuance of such consideration these additional suggestions are offered: That His Majesty should be prayed to establish an order of merit for them; and that if it were thought advisable in other respects, it would enhance the honour conferred if such order could be brought in as a specific class in the existing military order of the Bath; and that these honours be conferred by titles of analogous import to those usually bestowed by Native princes on their distinguished officers. Native officers, thus distinguished, would be proud of the honour of participating with their European officers in the pre-eminent favours of His gracious Majesty.

A few words may be said on the discipline of that branch of the army. In revising the articles of war, it might be of importance to the service, as well as to the administration of justice, that in some respects a distinction should be made between the European and the Native. The habits of the sepoy are so widely different from those of the European soldier, that the same rule can scarcely be expected to suit both, or that on both branches the same punishments should be indiscriminately inflicted.

As it cannot be for the advantage of any military service that men should continue in it beyond a certain age, and that it can never be prudent, in that country especially, to turn off those who arrive at that age without some employment or provision, it appears incumbent on the local authorities to seek such employment as would be suited to them, and would secure the object in view on principles of economy. Besides the various civil branches of the service into which many might be taken, the Police department seems peculiarly well adapted to the acquired turn of mind and the disciplined spirit of the Native officer and soldier.

Under such auspices, under the tempered rule of our Governments, and a strict regard to their religion and prejudices, vouchsafed to them under solemn treaties repeatedly entered into with the Native princes, we need not fear the allegiance of our Native army; and we may trust implicitly on the strength of their arm, the result of their personal courage, and of their persevering habits to toil and hardship, when brought to the field side by side with our own troops, for the defence of the Indian empire.

With respect to the officers attached to that branch, it may be said as a general principle, that since their numbers are proportionally few (in consequence of there being Native officers besides them), they should, as much as possible, be effective in their several ranks; and to the obtaining of that object, some expedient should from time to time be devised to make extra promotion when the usual routine did not bring men to their several ranks within the age suited to them. The late promotion of colonels had some tendency to that point: but perhaps it had been wiser to have regulated the promotion so as to have ensured a greater number of field officers being with their corps, than

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-Colonel  
Do Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

than might be expected from the circumstance of the colonel being able to retire and remain at home at his pleasure.

Without making the sale of commissions general, which would be destructive of the fundamental principle of the service, permission to sell out, under established rules, might be granted from time to time, for a definite period, as has been done at home, in the Ordnance department. It does not appear that exchanges from one corps to another, as some have suggested, would answer a good purpose, much less from His Majesty's service to the Company's; because such measures would militate against the first desideratum with the latter, that the Native officers and men should long know, revere, and be attached to their European officers; and reciprocally that these, from a knowledge of their men's tempers and habits, should find a real interest in protecting them, and in keeping them under wholesome subordination. To the same end must be recommended and by the strongest terms, the extension of regimental rank, which now stops at the major, to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and for such extension many other arguments may be urged, as connected with the command and the discipline of the army.

On the good spirit and disposition of the European officers and men in that country towards their Sovereign, their Honourable Masters, or their country at large, it would be absurd even to raise a doubt. The history of India is their history; and if a few clouded days have passed over their reputation in the course of revolving years, the pages recording them may be scrutinized, and whatever may have been their faults under the goadings and privations of temporary maladministration, infidelity to their Sovereign and their country will not be found among them.

On the question of separation of the Company's army from the King's, and the probable consequences of bringing the whole directly under the authority of Ministers and the establishments of the Crown, it may not be expected that I shall speak very extensively, as that consideration seems to belong to men who have been in higher departments than that in which I have been placed; but if to an attentive consideration in my subordinate sphere, since the days of Lord Cornwallis, of the results which might follow such a change, may be attributed any importance, I would say, that from the moment the Company loses its army it will lose its influence over the whole country. The Asiatic cannot understand that respect or veneration is due to, or protection to be had from, any authority, any prince, any ruler, any agent who possesses not the power of enforcing its rule; and that power, to have its effect on the Native mind, must be absolute and *immediate*, not *borrowed* or *delegated* from higher authority, more particularly so when that authority continues at so great a distance. The Governments of India would then be considered, or would be so very soon, more as agents than as rulers. But a greater evil, and perhaps a more immediate one, would be the indiscriminate appointment of officers coming from other parts of the world to the Indian regiments, which sooner or later would follow, to the ultimate overthrow of our power in the East. The allegiance and attachment of the Native soldiers will never be secured if their European officers are not brought up with them, if they are not, by a long acquaintance, taught to rely on them for protection as well as for leading them to honour in the field; and no means to effect that great end can be devised if the Indian service be not, in the first instance, kept completely separated from the other parts of His Majesty's service, who may with advantage be employed in every other part of the world, except the Native force of our Indian empire; and such separation in our military service will never be completely effected but by keeping it under the immediate rule of the East-India Company, or other distinct Government, having an intimate and direct interest in the prosperity of those realms, which, however anomalous it may appear in the history of the world, is nevertheless an essential quality which the results of a long and eventful period have proved indispensable.

These opinions apply, of course, chiefly to the Native infantry and cavalry of the Company's establishments. But as their artillery is now composed of Native and European corps combined, and acting together in the field and in cantonment, the principle is no less applicable to that arm of the service; and if ever the Engineer department be placed on that efficient

efficient footing which has been above advocated, it will be still more imperative, on sound policy, than it is even now, that that corps should continue as it were attached to the soil, and never be liable to interlopers from other parts of the world.

The Company's European infantry, therefore, are the only corps regarding which any doubt might be entertained as to the expediency of transferring them to His Majesty's service, but of these only three or four regiments remain; and while, on the one hand, it cannot signify much, as regards His Majesty's service, whether they be transferred or not, even those few regiments tend, on the other hand, to uphold the authority of the local Governments in that empire in the minds of its people.

For these and many other reasons which need not now be detailed, I am decidedly of opinion, that if the transfer be attempted, no matter on what conditions it may be effected, it will be detrimental to the British interests in India, and lead to our downfall in that quarter of the globe.

On the score of economy I conceive that no advantage would be gained, for I am quite sure that no effective establishment on the scale now required in India, and which may yet be long required, can be recruited, entertained, provided, armed, and disciplined under more care, and under better regulations generally, than those which have ultimately brought those establishments to the effective condition at which they are now arrived.

On the subject of encouraging the settlement of a British population in India, as being advantageous, or the contrary, to the public interests connected with the army, I would say that, even if such encouragement to colonization were not expected to bring on mischiefs to a portentous extent in our Eastern politics, there appears to me to be enough of objection to the measure, as regards our immediate military establishments, to discourage it altogether. As we require our officers who are to command our Natives in India to be brought up with them after they have entered their military career, so it is essential that they should have been born, and to certain extent educated, in their own country; and if it were otherwise with the European soldiery, if they were raised in India out of an established colony, they would soon degenerate, on the one hand, to a positive amount, while the disregard, or even contempt of the Hindoo for them would increase, even in a greater ratio, from the familiarity which would grow among them and their lower classes during their years of infancy and youth. The existing system, therefore, of recruiting the European regiments from home, and of relieving them from time to time, is one of those great features in our Eastern policy which has placed us so eminently superior to other European nations who have tried their skill there unsuccessfully; and all those who have had an opportunity to judge of the energy of the British soldier in an Eastern campaign, when compared with the degenerate spirit of a colonist soldier, will readily admit that the arm of the latter possesses not that sinew, nor his mind and heart that spirit, to which our Government could, with any degree of confidence, entrust the safety of those possessions against any disaffection of the Hindoo to our rule.

A few words may be said on the education of cadets for India. The East-India Company have founded noble establishments for its improvement, and have otherwise incurred large sums to effect their object. The college at Addiscombe alluded to was erected specially for their artillery and engineers; but having been planned on too great a scale, it has since, for the sake of economy perhaps, been opened to the other branches of the military service; and nevertheless that establishment, extensive as it is, is not even now complete in its provision. The engineer officer is sent to Chatlam for a while to learn what could not be taught him at Addiscombe in the practical part of fortification: and there likewise, as I am informed, they are put through a course of architecture, though it cannot be well understood why that latter science has not always formed a part of the Addiscombe system. The young engineer is then sent to the trigonometrical survey for a while before he embarks for that country for which he is ultimately destined. At the time that this system was devised, the state of education in England, and particularly of those intended for the army, was very different from that

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

that which is established almost generally over the kingdom at the present day; and though it might have been expedient to set it up then, it may no longer be so to keep it up now. Every candidate for the Company's service may any where qualify himself in any degree necessary thereto; and therefore a fit and well-constituted Board of Examiners at the East-India House might supersede, both with advantage and economy, the Addiscombe establishment, and the architectural course at Chatham. As to the Chatham practice, it had better be carried on in India, in the climate and country wherein it may eventually be called for, and in company with those descriptions of men with whom the officer will have to work on actual service. India, likewise, is the best region for the theoretical surveyor to perfect himself in practice: he may there be employed on every kind of survey, even in the higher branches of trigonometrical operations, and corresponding astronomical observations, since for the last thirty years a survey of that order has been carrying on by Colonel Lambton and others, in a style and on principles of accuracy inferior to none that has been undertaken in any other part of the world. Nor is the pretension of acquiring a smattering of the Oriental languages a sufficient reason for keeping up that expensive college. Few that do acquire it are essentially benefitted thereby, and at any rate might have learned as much at other schools; but it cannot for one moment be doubted that those languages, like other living tongues, are better and more easily obtained in those countries where it is vernacular, and that every cadet's time in England can be far more profitably employed in other studies than in that of the Indian languages.

On the question of placing the whole Indian army under one Commander-in-chief, an arrangement I have long contemplated with beneficial expectation, I would say that such Commander-in-chief should be a member, or be himself the head of a Supreme Government—a Government which should be, from its constitution, one of general authority and control, and of appeal, and should in every respect be distinct and away from either of the Presidencies in India. It should exercise no local authority at those Presidencies; it should intermeddle with none of its details, civil, military, public, or judicial; but in it should concentrate all political considerations and authority, and all the arrangements which may in anywise be connected with the religion, manners, and prejudices of the various nations composing that vast empire. Such Government should have no influence over one Presidency more than over another. Thus situated, a Commander-in-chief or Captain-general would be a fit tribunal of *local* appeal in questions purely military, as the Government itself would be in every other.

It does not readily appear that any advantage would accrue in forming the several Indian armies into one constituted body, since then it would become necessary to re-divide it into as many parts, the various dispositions of the people, and the local circumstances of the country imperatively requiring such a measure; and therefore by keeping those armies as they now are, each composed of an appropriate strength of corps and departments, will save much expense and inconvenience, and will be more acceptable to those who compose them severally, both European and Native, and to the people of the country at large. In this view of the case, therefore, a commander of the forces will still be required at each Presidency, to act with and under the authority of the local Government, and the general control of the Captain-general, or the Commander-in-chief, or the Superior Government.

Finally, I would venture to say, so far as my experience and attention to public affairs enable me, that the existing system of our Government in India, as much as it may depend on the arrangement fixed by Parliamentary enactment, and under the general control of His Majesty's Ministers, is, in its influence on the army, productive of much good, more than can be expected from any change which I have heard suggested as expedient, besides what has occurred to me in the foregoing sheets viewed on grounds of economy, and more especially still on those of efficiency and security.

Alluding to any Parliamentary enactment which may in future be made to the improvement of the Company's Government in their Military departments, it would be a  
matter

matter of great encouragement to the army if some claim could be established on the Company's patronage, (which at present is understood to belong to the Directors *individually*, and not *collectively* to the Court,) in favour of the sons of their distinguished military officers; and as the question of the right of His Majesty's Ministers, at their Board for the Affairs of India, to entertain an appeal from the military officers of the Company, or others in their service, against the decisions of the Court, appears to be *undecided*, (some Ministers having viewed such right as positively belonging to them, while others have acknowledged that it did not,) it is obvious that in any future charter the clauses securing that object should be more explicitly defined. Such a tribunal, it may be declared, is indispensable to secure justice to every branch of the service; for without arraigning the integrity of the Directors, it may fearlessly be said that their decisions have frequently been unjust, and that those errors have pressed hard on men, their widows, or offspring, who merited a better fate; since, in probably ninety-nine of one hundred cases, the aggrieved individual has not the means of appealing to the laws of his country against his powerful superiors; but that where such appeal has been had, it has generally proved successful *against* the Company as in the case of Sherson, Hart, and others.

I have omitted above a suggestion, I had intended making, relating to the gradual promotion of the officers in the Indian service while still of an age to perform their duties in their respective ranks. It is now twelve years since the Directors of the Madras military fund had digested a well arranged plan for establishing a fund which would, under the auspices and the sanction of the higher authorities, secure *superannuations* for the older officers of the service, of or under the rank of lieutenant-colonel. But the Commander-in-chief of that day, when the plan was about to be circulated to the army, prior to its being referred to the Court of Directors, was pleased *to quash it*, and *to order that every proceeding had therein should be effaced from their Minutes of record!* As his Excellency did not then give his reasons for such proceedings, I am not able here to combat them; but as I was the person who originally suggested that plan, and have since given it much attention and reflection, I think I owe it, though now a retired officer, to my brethren in arms, to the Company's interests, and to the good of my country at large, since the opportunity is now afforded me, to bring that plan\* under the serious consideration of the Legislature.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) T. HAVILLAND, Lieutenant-colonel,  
Late of Madras Engineers, and Acting Chief Engineer.

(9.)—REPLY of Major JUSTINIAN NUTT, dated 24th August 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your address, conveying to me, by desire of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, certain queries connected with the military branch of our administration in the East, and though I regret circumstances should have interposed to preclude my giving an earlier reply to this communication, yet I shall not be deterred by the lateness of the period from endeavouring to meet the wishes of the Board by offering such observations and opinions relative to the questions submitted, as immediately present themselves to me.

Q. 1. "The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies."

Not being exactly acquainted with the numerous changes that have taken place in the several branches of our military establishment since my departure from India, I am precluded

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(8.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
De Havilland,  
7th July 1832.

(9.)—Reply  
of Major J. Nutt,  
24th Aug. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(9.)—Reply  
of Major J. Nutt,  
24th Aug. 1832.

cluded from entering into any very minute examination of this important subject, though I may be permitted to remark, that the orders lately issued directing the discharge of nearly the whole of that most useful body of men the "auxiliary horse," the extra battalions, and two companies from each regiment of the line, appears to me a very questionable policy. The auxiliary horse was a cheap description of force, and opened a most eligible and popular field for employment to the higher classes of our Native subjects; it was ready for service, however distant, at an hour's notice; it was suited for every description of warfare, and particularly for police duties, and therefore well deserving, I think, to hold a conspicuous place in the organization of our Indian military forces. The addition of this body, and of the extra and provincial battalions, admitted of the regular army being reduced to the lowest scale, as it was thereby relieved from many harassing civil duties, and afforded leisure to attend to its discipline and interior economy, and consequently to supply by its superior efficiency what it wanted in number. The late reductions, however, are I fear, calculated most seriously to defeat this object, as it will now be constantly necessary to break up the regiments of the line into small detachments for outposts, and otherwise to employ them upon civil and provincial duties, so destructive, not only to the discipline, but the moral habits of the soldier, whilst, from their diminished numbers, scarcely a station will be provided (I speak particularly of the western side of India) with more than two or three reliefs; a state of things that must not only render it difficult to assemble a field force, if required on an emergency, but, by impairing its efficiency, detract largely from the value of its services when called out. In Khandaish and other provinces, where the outpost duties are heavy, it will be found that the regiments furnishing them will hardly be able to attend a general parade *once in six months*.

Q. 2. "The same as to the several Staff and Subsidiary departments."

Q. 3. "The amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters, with reference to the probable occasion of their services against foreign or domestic disturbers of the peace, each arm being considered separately; and the different portions of our Indian empire which are distinguished by marked characteristics being adverted to in their order, with reference to their mutual dependence."

It has, I fear, been too prevalent a practice to take up ground for military cantonments, as well as to change their sites and augment their number, without due consideration or inquiry. The result of such proceedings always involves the sacrifice of much private as well as public property, no compensation being in general allowed to either officers, soldiers, or camp followers for the loss of their houses, whilst Government, to pay for the new buildings that in consequence become requisite, is perhaps led to seek its resources in the curtailment of some military allowance. By incautiously multiplying the number of cantonments, too, the troops available for service are unavoidably diminished, as guards must be provided for the protection of the public stores and barracks, whilst small scattered bodies of men are particularly liable to attack, and can never effectually defend extensive lines.

It is also of the first importance, for the sake of discipline, that as large a body of troops as practicable should be cantoned together. The duties are more strictly and correctly performed, and a spirit of emulation excited that is highly conducive to the efficiency of all.

1st. "On the efficiency of our military force."

The points to which I would more particularly advert, as detracting from the efficiency of our military force, are, 1st. The defective system of filling up vacancies amongst the European officers. 2d. The injudicious manner in which officers are often withdrawn from regiments to be employed on the staff or civil duties. 3d. The constant changes introduced throughout all branches of the administration by the local authorities, whereby every institution and establishment is being perpetually unsettled, without allowing any one a fair trial by which to judge of its merits, and thus rendering the whole

whole system a series of fanciful experiments. 4th. The discharge of the auxiliary troops, and consequent necessity of breaking up regiments of the line into small detachments, and employing them upon civil and police duties. 5th. The mode of providing the European recruits.

1st. The defective system of filling up vacancies. Instead of proceeding on a regular principle, and filling up vacancies when they occur, as in the King's army, it has happened more than once during my period of service that nearly all the ensigncies, and even many of the lieutenantcies, have been deficient, when suddenly a host of appointments have been made, and a number of cadets sent out, not only sufficient to complete the establishment, but to give two or three supernumeraries to every regiment of the line. One of the evil consequences resulting from this injudicious practice has been to destroy the connecting links between the commanding and subordinate officers, leaving the former a lieutenant-colonel, perhaps of twenty-five or thirty years' standing, at the head of a battalion, with the support of only two or three officers of eight or nine years' service, and some seven or eight young men of merely a few months'. Under such circumstances the mess is probably deprived of the presence and influence of the commanding officer, so essentially necessary to its well-being and the respectability of the corps, at least his regular attendance can hardly be expected when the members are generally so much his junior in rank and age, and their habits and pursuits in all likelihood of so different a character. In the event, also, of the lieutenant-colonel being absent from the regiment, the command perhaps devolves on a subaltern officer, who, however unexceptionable his conduct may be, yet cannot possess that weight and authority which attach to high rank. The Native officers and sepoys feel, likewise, that inexperienced young men are apt to overlook the just claims of meritorious individuals, and that being strangers, or nearly so, to their characters, manners, and customs, there is no bond of union or sympathy between them. This has been often a subject of deep complaint; and as nothing can tend to alienate the affections of our Native soldiery from the service more strongly than a disregard of or indifference to their customs, merits, and deserts, so assuredly it ought to be our special care to provide them with a succession of qualified and experienced European officers, or such as, having acquired their confidence and attachment, are likely to preserve them by taking a lively interest in all their concerns.

2d. The withdrawing of the European officers from their regiments. Very excellent Regulations were framed by the Court of Directors, and promulgated some few years since, for securing to each regiment of the line a proportion of European officers; but it is important that these orders should be more rigidly enforced, and no appointment to "act" allowed where the parties are not duly qualified to hold the situation by the prescribed rules of the service. Unless this is more strictly attended to, we may still continue to see many officers attain the rank of colonel, or ordered, as field officers, to take the command of battalions, who have never done twelve months' regimental duty, or perhaps joined a corps for twenty years.

3d. The constant changes introduced into our establishments by the local authorities. It needs only a reference, I apprehend, to the orders of every succeeding Government, to show that the administration of our Eastern empire, in almost all its various branches, is in a state of unceasing change. The advantage should be taken of acknowledged improvements no one can be more ready to admit than myself, but, on the other hand, I think innovations should not be lightly hazarded; and to restrain these it would be desirable to establish a more effectual check over the Government in India, to prevent, under ordinary circumstances, their creating, suppressing, or new-modelling departments, appointments, and establishments that have been once approved, without previous reference to the "home authorities." It is not my intention to impugn the acts of any particular administration, but it should be recollected that the Governor and Council hold their appointments for only four or five years; and if the measures, therefore, of one Government are to be indiscriminately set aside, or superseded by the next in succession, no real benefit can ever be expected to flow from the best devised system of legislation. India presents an extraordinary

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(9.)—Reply  
of Major J. Nutt,  
21th Aug. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(B.)—Reply  
of Major J. Nutt,  
21th Aug. 1832.

dinary picture at the present moment, where, after a lapse of a series of years, almost every department in the State is still experimental. This vacillating system is not only calculated to bring the Government into discredit, but seriously to impair the efficiency of every department, to abate the zeal of the public functionaries, to produce, instead of economy, an increased expenditure, and to do irreparable injury to individuals as well as to the State.

4th. The discharge of the auxiliary horse, &c. On the evil consequences to be apprehended from this order, I have already touched in the first part of this address.

5th. The mode of providing the European recruits. I would recommend that the recruiting for the European regiments should either be transferred to His Majesty's service, or, which would, I think, be even a better plan, an artillery officer should be detached from each Presidency to England for the purpose of enlisting men. The "Company's service" possesses so many advantages, that I am persuaded if the recruiting officer took the trouble to point them out, or had a personal interest in the business, there would exist no difficulty whatever in obtaining the finest young men in the country. At present it is notorious that the recruits are generally inferior to those engaged for His Majesty's regiments; and even persons unfit for any duty have occasionally contrived to gain admittance, and either put Government to the cost of their expenses out and home, including a considerable bounty, or to a permanent charge on their pension list.

2d. "On the economy with which it is provided."

A practice has obtained of late years, very prejudicial, I conceive, to the public interests, of joining two or three appointments together, or of devolving on one person a range of superintendence infinitely beyond what he can attend to, instead of dividing it into districts of convenient extent. I speak here more particularly of the Engineer department, though the remark is generally applicable to all branches of the service. The object proposed to be gained by this arrangement is, the pay of a second superintendent. Now the amount of such extra charge would rarely exceed four hundred pounds per annum, whilst the loss accruing from the absence of the controlling authority is incalculable: the frauds committed by the working up and employment of inferior materials, the false musters and reports, as regards the artificers and labourers, and speculations practised in various ways, are amongst the lamentable consequences flowing from this policy, and instead of being productive of a saving, are attended not only with heavy pecuniary loss, but also a sacrifice of the "morale" of the department. A superintendent, to be of value, should be vigilant and scrutinizing; but it must be vain to expect this, if the superintendent's mind is to be distracted by a multiplicity of duties, or if that time which should be devoted to investigation and inquiry is to be spent in travelling. These observations, however, are chiefly made with a view of showing the necessity of a strict scrutiny into every single department, and the adoption of that system which has stood the test of experience, and been found to work well. An inquiry, likewise, might be equally useful into the mode by which the military stores are supplied from England. It is generally understood that the East-India Company pay a liberal price for every article of supply, whilst the stores themselves are oftentimes of a very inferior description. The arms, accoutrements, surveying and mathematical instruments, &c. fall more particularly under this observation. There seems to me to be great inattention in not adapting the articles to the climate they are destined to be used in, by which Government sustains a heavy pecuniary loss, and the efficiency of the military equipments is seriously impaired. I would also point out the advantages of a revision of the system of supply as adopted in India, and the expediency of providing corps and departments with stores from the *nearest station*, without reference to the Presidency to which they may pertain. If this were attended to, I am convinced an immense sum of money would be annually saved to the public, and the service rendered more efficient. The Jaulna force, for instance, would draw his supplies from *Ahmednuggur*, a distance of eighty or ninety miles, or two hundred and twenty from Bombay, over an excellent road, instead of from *Madras*, a distance of eight hundred miles, over a very bad road, and which, independent of the enormous cost of transport, is most destructive to the stores in general, rendering many of them nearly unserviceable when they reach their destination.

3d. "On

## 3d. "On the spirit and disposition of the officers and men."

I have already stated, that one great source of complaint, amongst both officers and men, arises from the irregularity in filling up vacancies; and though this, on a cursory view, may appear a matter of trifling importance, it is nevertheless attended with very serious results. In addition to what I have already mentioned of the connecting link between the commanding and junior officers being broken, and there being no bond of union between the sepoys and the latter, it should be borne in recollection that the promotion of the "supernumeraries" is of necessity most painfully retarded; that in a short time after joining the regiment they are appointed to, they begin to reflect on the gloomy nature of their future prospects, and seeds of discontent are sown which are oftentimes not eradicated during the whole period of their subsequent career. Independent also of the discontent of the individuals, the public service is a deep sufferer; for a cadet under such circumstances can hardly expect his majority in much less than thirty years, and which, I think, must seriously affect, if not totally destroy, his military zeal and ardour (particularly if he goes out to India, as some do, at the age of twenty-two or twenty-three); he is nevertheless constrained to remain (*however unfit he may be, by reason of a shattered constitution*) for the command of a regiment, the pension he would be entitled to receive as a captain or major being inadequate to afford those comforts which a long residence in a tropical climate render necessary, and the allowances then become an object of consideration, and excite a hope at least that, by eight or ten years' frugal management, a small additional income may be secured. The Board of Control, however, and the Court of Directors have, I am informed, recently sanctioned the establishment of a "Retiring Fund," on principles similar to those authorised long since for the civil service, and which above all things, I apprehend, will tend to impart satisfaction to the army, and secure to the Government a succession of active and efficient officers. It is indeed indispensably necessary that some measure of this sort should be adopted, in order to relieve the army from its just fears of an almost entire suspension of promotion, and the consequent gloomy and disheartening prospect of a perpetual banishment from their native country.

Having thus offered my sentiments generally on the defects of our military establishments in India, I may perhaps be excused the liberty of submitting my ideas as to the remedy I might consider applicable, if not effectually to remove, at least greatly to diminish, them. In this view I should suggest the establishment of a Military Board in England, to be composed, in the first instance, of one officer of artillery, one of engineers, one of cavalry, and one of infantry from each of the three Presidencies, making a total of twelve, not under the rank of a field officer. The first duties of the Board should be to revise the Indian military establishments of every kind and description. Each department should be reported upon separately, and the reports as completed submitted to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control for final approval, and then despatched to India to be carried into effect. The local Governments should be positively prohibited, as also the Court of Directors, from abolishing any of the establishments or institutions after being thus sanctioned, or new-modelling them, or issuing any orders subversive of the Regulations, or the taking away of batta from the troops, or tentage, or any fixed allowances; but all instructions having reference to any changes in the fixed establishments should be first submitted to the Military Board, who should report upon the same for the information of the Court and of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India. A register of every officer's services should be strictly kept, and a copy of every order issued to the army regularly transmitted to the Board, as well as quarterly Returns from every regiment and department, stating particularly if the required number of officers have been present for duty, together with an abstract of the pay, allowances, and emoluments of each individual, and of every single disbursement, so that the Board may have an opportunity of inquiring into, examining, and ascertaining every fraction and item of military expenditure. The Board, or at least a committee of its members, composed of four persons, one from each branch of the profession, should personally inspect and be held responsible for all stores embarked for India; they should invite tenders for the freight of the same, and conveyance of troops, and the recruits should be subjected to their final approval. By this arrangement a uniformity

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(9.)—Reply  
of Major J. Nutt,  
24th Aug. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(9.)—Reply  
of Major J. Nutt,  
21st Aug. 1832.

formity of system would be gradually introduced throughout our Indian military establishments, whether as regards their administration or pay; no unnecessary appointments would be created; the Rules and Regulations of the service would be strictly observed, or if evaded the reasons for such evasion promptly required; the customs of the Natives would be attended to, and their just claims more vigilantly watched over and protected; our institutions and establishments would be secured from sudden and violent alterations, whilst real improvements would be taken advantage of; in fine, a wholesome and salutary check would be imposed on every branch of our military establishments, and a degree of efficiency infused into the whole that could not fail to be most beneficial to the public interests, whilst the saving, in point of expense, would, I am convinced, amount to many lacs of rupees annually.

The remuneration I should propose granting to the Board would be £500 per annum to each member, with an annual nomination to a cadetship. There should be a secretary, deputy secretary, and assistants, with a small establishment to aid in the examination of the stores; but the whole cost might be estimated at about £15,000 or £16,000 per annum the first five or six years, and then be reduced to £12,000 or £13,000. Our very existence as a separate power in India is so dependent on the efficiency of our military establishments, that too much care cannot be bestowed in perfecting and upholding them; and though it may be urged that there are military men amongst the Directors, yet it should be borne in remembrance that this is a mere accidental circumstance, and that by the constitution of the Court, the functions of these very persons are, for *many years* subsequent to their election, confined almost entirely to the *Marine* and *Commercial* departments, and that they have little to do with either the military or political affairs of the Company until by gradual rise they become members of the Secret Committee.

Q. 7. "British subjects in India."

The permanent residence of British subjects in India, I am decidedly of opinion, should rather be discouraged than promoted. It must be recollected that the soil in India is not like that of New South Wales, unappropriated, but, generally speaking, private property, and therefore not at the disposal of Government. It should also be our policy gradually to introduce the Natives of the country into the administration of its affairs, which would never be accomplished, at least amicably if Europeans were allowed to settle there in any considerable number, as they would naturally look, and soon become clamorous, for the introduction of English laws and an English Legislative Assembly, to the exclusion or supersession of the Hindoos and Mahomedans. The Anglo-Indians would also desire to have their representatives and share in the Government, and hence would probably ensue a contest that would be alike fatal to the interests of all, and possibly the existence of two parties out of the three.

Q. 8. "Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief."

This would be fraught, I think, with many serious objections. India is too extensive an empire for any one person to exercise such control over as is necessary to the efficiency of the troops and department. The majority would, perhaps, never be seen by the Commander-in-chief, whilst the appointments and staff situations would probably be too often bestowed on those about his Excellency's person, or who might be specially recommended to him, and a system of favouritism established highly prejudicial to the merits of such as were at a distance from head-quarters, and whose fair claims to reward might, from such circumstances, remain unknown.

As to the employment of officers in civil situations, I should imagine that the interests of Government would be best consulted by appointing to residencies and political agencies those individuals who were best qualified for the duties, without reference to which branch of the public service they might belong; and it can never, I think, be questioned, but that a knowledge of such appointments being open to the service at large must have a powerful tendency to elicit talent and encourage merit, as well in the Civil as in the Military department.

Having

Having thus (though certainly in a very imperfect manner) replied to the major portion of the queries conveyed to me in your address, I have only to hope that the information now imparted may not be unacceptable to the Board, and that it may in any the least degree tend to strengthen and preserve our empire in the East.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTINIAN NUTT, Major,  
Bombay Engineers.

Cheltenham, 24th August 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(9.)—Reply  
of Major J. Nutt,  
24th Aug. 1832.

(10.)—REPLY of Colonel PENNINGTON, c. b., dated 7th March 1832.

Q. 1. "The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies."

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

This question embraces, in point of time, I presume, more than fifty years, and, taking it in that extent, is nearly coeval with that of my service; to which my reply, limited to the Bengal Presidency alone, shall be as concise as I can make it compatible with perspicuity.

In the year 1783 the artillery, to which I was then appointed, consisted of a regiment of ten companies, each of 100 men, non-commissioned and privates, commanded by one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, ten captains, ten captain-lieutenants, twenty lieutenants, and twenty lieutenant fireworkers, now called second lieutenants. The European infantry consisted of three regiments, each of ten companies, each company of 100 men, non-commissioned and privates, commanded by one lieutenant-colonel, one major, seven captains, one captain-lieutenant, twelve lieutenants, and eight ensigns. Neither the artillery nor European infantry were ever completed in men. The Native infantry consisted of eighteen regiments, each of two battalions, commanded by a major, and to each battalion a captain, with six lieutenants, and four ensigns. The engineers had one lieutenant-colonel, one major, three captains, six lieutenants, and six ensigns. The whole army commanded in chief by a colonel with the rank of brigadier-general.

The army, so composed, was divided into three regular brigades, and an extra brigade posted at Futtyghur, to keep in awe the Nuwaub of Furruckabad and his turbulent Patans; and each brigade was commanded by a colonel.

The staff of the army at that time consisted of an adjutant-general and his deputy, a quartermaster-general and his deputy, six majors of brigade, six barrack-masters, and one commissary-general, whose functions were then limited to the audit of accounts.

In the year 1785, Lieutenant-general Sloper was appointed Commander-in-chief over all the British possessions in India, with a seat in the Council of Bengal; and about the same time orders were sent out to India for a new organization of the army at all the Presidencies, by which the three European regiments of the Bengal army were formed into six, of eight companies each; and the eighteen regiments of Native infantry into thirty-six battalions, of 600 men each, commanded by a captain, having under him eight lieutenants, one of whom was appointed adjutant. The six European regiments and thirty-six of Native infantry were formed in six brigades, each brigade having one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, and two majors. In the artillery and engineers no alteration was made. There were therefore in the Bengal army, as formed in 1786, seven colonels, fifteen lieutenant-colonels, fifteen majors, ninety captains, sixteen captain-lieutenants, 386 lieutenants, and sixty-two ensigns or lieutenant fireworkers; total 591 officers, exclusive of general staff, for the command of 26,000 men; giving a proportion of nearly one officer to fifty men, and fifteen subalterns to one field officer; reducing, at the same time,

six

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

six majors, six captains, seventy-eight lieutenants and nearly 200 ensigns, including those who had been sent out cadets in the year 1781-2 and 1783, all of whom were placed on modified allowances somewhat better than half-pay.

At this period the army stations were Barrackpore, dependent on Fort William; Berhampore, Dinapore, and Chunar, within the provinces held by the East-India Company; and Cawnpore and Futtighur provinces, under the paramount authority of the Nuwaub of Oude. These places were severally the head-quarters of brigades, where resided the colonels, having each an aide-de-camp, a major of brigade, a paymaster or deputy-paymaster, which composed the whole staff attached to each brigade, with exception to the brigade at Cawnpore, to which the deputy quartermaster-general was attached. There was a paymaster-general, a deputy paymaster-general, three paymasters, and three deputy paymasters, appointed from the civil service to this department with the army; and for some time the commissary-general was also appointed from the civil service.

The troops stationed at Barrackpore furnished two battalions of sepoys as guards for Fort William, where the head-quarters of the artillery, engineers, and one European regiment were always fixed. These guards were relieved the first of every month. Two battalions were detached to Midnapore, then the extreme point to the south-west bordering on the Nagpore territory, and two were always at Barrackpore.

The brigade, the head-quarters of which was at Berhampore, furnished one battalion to Chittagong, then the extreme point on the south-east, bordering on Arracan, one battalion at Dalla, and one at Dinapore.

From the Dinapore station one battalion was detached to Purneah, one to Kissengunge and one to Patna. Chunar detached two to Benares and two to Juanpore.

The stations in the Nuwaub's provinces had always two battalions on duty at Lucknow, which were relieved from Cawnpore every two or three months; and when the rivers subsided after the monsoon, two battalions, with a detail of artillery, took up a position a little beyond Anoopsur, in observation of the Sies, who under Bango Sing, the chief of Fennasir, occasionally made predatory incursions into the Nuwaub's provinces,

At that time all the cattle required either for draught or carriage with the army were provided by contract, excepting in the Native infantry, for whom no camp equipage was provided; and then, as now, they found means to convey their own baggage and supply their own provisions out of their pay, which, for the private soldier, was seven rupees a month in quarters, and eight and a-half when marching. The European officers serving with the Natives had an allowance proportioned to rank, out of which they found their own camp equipage, and cattle for the conveyance of *that* and their baggage.

The officers and soldiers of the European regiments were provided with quarters, and the latter with single rations by Government when in garrison or cantonments, and when marching with camp equipage, that was conveyed by the contractor's cattle. The camp equipage, as well for the officers as for the soldiers of the European army, was also provided by contract, and of the very worst quality, neither sheltering them from sun nor rain, and the cause of greater loss of lives in every campaign than was ever produced by all other causes combined.

Such were the circumstances, as above described, under which the Company's army on the Bengal establishment existed from 1786 to 1795, during which period there was one regiment of His Majesty's foot in Bengal: first, the 73d, relieved by the 76th, the latter being one of four regiments raised for the East-India Company, to be supplied with officers in equal proportion from His Majesty's and the Company's half-pay officers.

In 1795 an order for new-modelling the army was received from England, by which the artillery was formed into three battalions of seven companies each, having one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, seven captains, seven captain-lieutenants, fourteen lieutenants, and fourteen lieutenant fireworkers. To the engineers one colonel and one captain was added.

added. At the same time five out of the six regiments of European infantry were reduced, and one regiment of 1,000 formed, of ten companies, having one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, seven captains, twelve lieutenants, and eight ensigns. The thirty-six battalions were formed into twelve regiments of two battalions, each regiment having one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, seven captains, one captain-lieutenant, twenty-two lieutenants, and eight ensigns: the officers to rise in their respective regiments to the rank of major, and after that in the line.

It was at the same time resolved to increase the army by a body of regular cavalry. There had been for some years two corps of Natives, about one hundred and eighty each, commanded by captains with two subalterns to each, drawn from the infantry; and taking these as the nucleus, four regiments of six troops each, and sixty men a troop, was formed upon them; having to each regiment one lieutenant-colonel, one major, two captains, one captain-lieutenant, six lieutenants, and six cornets, with a full colonel to every two regiments.

The orders issued for the new organization produced great promotion in all the ranks of the army, all that were then colonels being promoted to the rank of major-general, the number of which in a few years was increased to forty; but four only were appointed on the staff of the Bengal Presidency, where there were two officers of His Majesty's service of the rank of major-general also appointed on the staff, although there was at that time only one regiment of foot, the 76th, at that Presidency, to which was added, in 1797, the 27th regiment of dragoons.

The major-generals on the staff had an aide-de-camp and major of brigade attached to them; and at the same time were added to the general staff of the army an adjutant-general and a quartermaster-general, officers in His Majesty's service, the general staff of the Bengal army still remaining as before stated; but from the peculiar constitution of that army the staff were retained on the strength of regiments, and military paymasters were appointed.

I have omitted to mention, that in 1795 a marine battalion was raised, and soon after detached on service to the islands; and the following additions to the Native infantry followed the new organizations in rapid succession.

In 1797, shortly after the arrival of Lord Mornington as Governor-General, in contemplation of the war which soon followed with Tippoo Sultan, two regiments, the 13th and 14th, were raised.

In 1798, three regiments, the 15th, 16th, and 17th, were raised.

In 1800, two regiments, the 18th and 19th, were raised.

In 1802, another marine battalion was raised, and, added to the former, were together numbered the 20th regiment.

In 1803, war with Scindia and the Nagpore Rajah being unavoidable, three regiments, the 21st, 22d, and 23d, were raised.

In 1804, Holkar having joined the confederacy, four regiments, 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th, were raised.

In 1815, being then engaged in war with Nepaul, three regiments, the 28th, 29th, and 30th, were raised.

In 1823, four regiments, the 31st, 32d, 33d, and 34th, were raised. The cavalry, within the same period, had been increased to ten regiments, and the artillery to four battalions.

In 1824, orders were sent out to new-model the army of Bengal, giving to each regiment of cavalry one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, five captains, ten lieutenants, and five ensigns; converting the artillery into nine battalions; three of horse and six of foot; the engineers to be formed into two battalions; the European regiment into two regiments, and the thirty-four regiments of Native infantry into sixty-eight, each of the same strength as to officers as that of the cavalry regiments: thus adding to the cavalry five colonels,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10).—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

colonels, ten captains, and twenty lieutenants, and reducing ten majors, and ten cornets; adding to the artillery five colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, eighteen captains, and reducing twenty-seven captain-lieutenants; adding to the infantry thirty-five colonels, seventy captains, thirty-five ensigns, and reducing sixty-eight lieutenants. Subsequent to the Burmese war, six volunteer battalions, which were raised on that occasion, have been formed into regiments, and embodied with the rest to No. 74. Such have been the alterations and increase in the Bengal army between 1783 and 1828.

The last organization of the army, as established in 1824, seems hardly susceptible of improvement, affording the number of officers to each regiment, so much required for the duties of the Native infantry, most especially; but various circumstances are constantly in operation to render this improvement rather apparent than real; and this view of the army would be fallacious were they not referred to.

In the year 1828, the period to which I have traced the army through all its changes, there were extra corps, staff appointments or departments, the duties of which were performed by officers withdrawn from the Native service; viz.

To the Governor-General's body-guard	...	...	...	...	...	6 Officers.
Ditto	...	...	pioneers	...	...	12 —
Ditto	...	...	ditto additional for Arracan	...	...	9 —
Ditto	...	...	hill-bildars	...	...	3 —
Employed in the drill of new levies	...	...	...	...	...	3 —
Residents' escorts	...	...	...	...	...	13 —
Seven corps of local horse	...	...	...	...	...	12 —
Sixteen corps of local infantry	...	...	...	...	...	43 —
Fourteen provincial battalions	...	...	...	...	...	21 —
Two corps	...	...	...	...	...	2 —
Military department of Government	...	...	...	...	...	3 —
Adjutant-general's department	...	...	...	...	...	10 —
Quartermaster-general's ditto	...	...	...	...	...	12 —
Majors of brigade	...	...	...	...	...	16 —
Fort-adjutants	...	...	...	...	...	7 —
Superintendents of canals and bridges	...	...	...	...	...	5 —
Commissariat department	...	...	...	...	...	30 —
Ordnance ditto	...	...	...	...	...	16 —
Public works	...	...	...	...	...	27 —
Auditor-general's office	...	...	...	...	...	4 —
Paymasters	...	...	...	...	...	11 —
Deputy judge advocates	...	...	...	...	...	7 —
Surveyor's department	...	...	...	...	...	15 —
Stud ditto	...	...	...	...	...	10 —
Military Board	...	...	...	...	...	4 —
Agents	...	...	...	...	...	5 —
						306 Officers.
On furlough, average	...	...	...	...	...	225
Absent from the regular army	...	...	...	...	...	531

The greater part of these extra corps, both of horse and foot, have been reduced, in pursuance of a system of economy; and two companies, with two lieutenants in every regiment or battalion of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, have been also reduced to the number of 170 officers supernumerary.

Q. 2. (Included in the foregoing.)

Q. 3. "The

**Q. 3.** "The amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters, with reference to the probable occasion of their services against foreign or domestic disturbers of the peace, each arm being separately considered; and the different portions of our Indian empire which are distinguished by marked characteristics being adverted to in their order, with reference to their mutual dependence."

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

Regarding the amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters of the three Presidencies, there is not any station from Capo Comorin, in 8 deg. of latitude, to Sabathod, in 31 deg., which, under the greatest emergency, could spare a force amounting to 3,000 men of all arms. The places in which the greatest number of troops are embodied are Quilon, Trichinopoly, Fort St. George, Bangulore, Hyderabad, and Jaulna, dependencies on the Madras Presidency; and the distance between Quilon and Jaulna is 10 degrees. These troops may be required to suppress domestic disturbers of the peace, but are not accessible to a foreign enemy, excepting by sea, and through the countries under the Presidencies of Bombay and Bengal. There are dependent on Bombay three stations, viz. the Castle, Sholapore, and Poonah, where there are embodied at each about 3,000 men of all arms. These places are little exposed to the attack of a foreign enemy, though occasional trifling inroads have been made on the side of Sind, from which, however, there can at no time be grounds to apprehend any serious invasion.

The stations dependent on the Bengal Presidency, whence troops could eventually be spared to repel foreign invasion, are Nagpore, Mhow, Saugur, Neemuch, Cawnpore, Nusserabad, Meerut, and Kurnaul; and from the four first of these places, as well as from Nusserabad, few of the forces now established could be withdrawn, without producing domestic disturbances, which can be kept under only by an imposing force ready to march at the shortest notice.

If this statement of the forces at the different Presidencies be but nearly accurate, it must be obvious that if an army of 20,000 men be required on the western frontier, near Loodiana, it could not be assembled there, at the most favourable season for marching, in less than four months; and the greater part would then be much exhausted, and the cattle out of condition, by long uninterrupted marches. It is in vain to disguise the fact, that war from that side, and soon, is nearly inevitable: not, however, by a Russian army, but by a power grown arrogant from success, which will have all the support that Russia can secretly afford it. The forces dependent on the Presidency of Bengal consist of—

**His Majesty's forces:**

- 2 regiments of dragoons.
- 8 regiments of foot.

**The Company's forces:**

- 12 troops of horse artillery, 6 guns each,
- 10 regiments of light cavalry,
- 6 battalions of foot artillery,
- 3 battalions of engineers and sappers,
- 2 regiments of European foot,
- 74 regiments of Native infantry,
- 4 companies of European invalids,
- 2 battalions of Native invalids,

Amounting on the whole to about 70,000 men, spread over a space in latitude exceeding 1,000 miles, and from east to west 1,500.

**Q. 4.** "The constitution of the several branches of the army, with reference to its experienced or probable effect—

1st. "On the efficiency of our Military force.

2d. "On

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)--Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

2d. "On the economy with which it is provided.

3d. "On the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing it."

It must be quite obvious, I conceive, from merely a cursory view of the map, that the forces in the three Presidencies are barely sufficient to execute the duties required of them on a peace establishment.

In every department of the army economy is carried to the greatest extent, and, in some, so far as to occasion much future expense, merely from reducing establishments necessary for the preservation of stores of great value and importance. There is, indeed, considerable parsimony, but no profusion.

In reference to the disposition of the officers, European and Native, on the strength of that army, taken on the whole, I can have no hesitation in declaring my belief, that no army was ever more attached, or more faithfully devoted to the interest of the Government; but there have been lately some grievances which have excited great dissatisfaction, especially amongst the junior ranks of the army of Bengal, who, in consequence of a reduction of allowances, feel themselves reduced to great straits. Neither is the disposition of the Native army now so favourable or so devoted to the service as it was formerly, owing to causes at once unavoidable and irremediable. Where so little is really known, it is difficult to convey to the minds of gentlemen who have never been in India any adequate knowledge regarding the various denominations of people occupying that vast country now under British dominion, stretching out from 8 to 31 degrees of latitude, and from 71 to 93 east longitude; comprising within that space more than 100,000,000 of inhabitants, of which between 70,000,000 and 80,000,000 are under the immediate rule of the British Government, and the remainder necessarily subject to be restrained by it.

Of the disposition of the Native armies dependent on Madras and Bombay, although I have served with both, yet not long enough with either to make myself acquainted with their habits or tones of thinking. I can, however, have no hesitation in asserting, that the Native armies, that of Madras especially, differ as widely in language and habits from the Native army of Bengal, as the British army differs from any other army in Europe.

The Native army of Bengal is essentially Hindoo, having only a slight mixture of Moslems among them. The Rajpoots, the flower of that army, are born soldiers, and pride themselves on being so considered. Treated justly, you may rely on their fidelity; treated kindly, you may rest assured of their devoted attachment; but you must not interfere in their religion, nor in their prejudices regarding caste. Any wrong done to them on these points cannot be atoned for by apologies or expressions of regret.

The additions and alterations made in the army, as above enumerated, having necessarily, been attended with corresponding promotion in the Native army, have no doubt attracted to the service many more than might have been disposed to enter it when promotion was slower; but I am not aware of any other influence effected by these changes. As to the employment of military men in civil situations, there is nothing that I know of either in their habits or education, to unfit them for the due discharge of civil duties, especially on the Bengal establishment, where every officer in a Native corps must acquire knowledge of the colloquial language, without which he could not discharge the duty required of him in his regiment; but probably it never would be advisable to unite the military and civil duties in the same person.

In reference to the suitableness of the several establishments to the purposes for which they have been, or are likely to be, needed, it is not obvious that any improvement could be made in the departments of the general staff of adjutant or quartermaster-general, in which the efficiency so much depends on the abilities of the officers placed at the head of those departments. Of the other departments, more knowledge of the details than I possess is necessary before an opinion should be offered concerning them. The organization of the army, as settled in 1824, would prove in all respects effective, if not enfeebled, as it commonly

commonly has been, by appointing officers from the regulars to the command of local corps, and to various departments, as before stated, for many of which invalid officers would be quite competent.

Great attention has at all times been paid by officers in the admission of recruits for the service, refusing invariably men of low case; and to that circumstance is, in great measure, to be attributed the high tone and spirit of the Bengal Native army. No less attention has, I believe, been generally paid in the selection of sepoys or non-commissioned officers for promotion; and it will no doubt be allowed to be of the utmost importance to the well-being of the service, that men of tried courage and approved fidelity should be promoted to commissioned officers.

The furlough granted to European officers is at present under as good regulations as can be reasonably desired. To similar indulgence, but of months instead of years, the Native army attaches great importance, as affording an opportunity of keeping up the communication with their nearest relatives, among whom many of the highest caste leave their wives. The difficulty of availing themselves of this indulgence for some years past has caused some discontent in the Native army, since the vast acquisition to the British territories, by which many are every year removed to such distances from their homes, that three months, the time allowed for the furlough, would be insufficient time to go and return. This irremediable evil has estranged many from the service. Neither are they allowed to retire early enough from the active service; for no matter how old a man may be, if neither lame nor blind, he cannot get removed to the invalid establishment, so strict are the rules laid down for the guidance of the invaliding committees, and the efficiency of nearly every regiment is impaired by having on its strength officers and sepoys who ought to be transferred to the invalid establishment. This evil might be obviated by the establishment of veteran battalions, to be composed entirely of old officers and sepoys, having the same proportion, as far as the means would allow, of invalid European officers. These corps, stationed in different parts of the country, would allow the same number of regiments disposable in full strength for active service. Regarding the proposition of European and Native corps, there is no other question on which there is such variety of opinion, or where there are so few divested of all prejudices and competent to give an opinion. The province of Bengal, together with the other provinces dependent on that Government, were originally conquered, and have since been chiefly held by a Native army, never having in the course of more than forty years, from 1757 to 1803, had more than one European officer or soldier to ten or twelve sepoys; and in the first campaign of the Mahratta war, there were with the army commanded by Lord Lake but two European corps, viz. His Majesty's 27th dragoons and the 70th regiment of foot, both weak in numbers. To these were united four regiments of Native cavalry and twelve battalions of infantry. At the head of this army the General took the field in the latter end of August, the hottest month in the year; and on the 3d of September drove General Perron, at the head of a large force, from under the guns of the strong fort of Allyghur, which he next day carried by assault, chiefly by escalade. On the 11th, the same day week, he came up with the enemy, strongly posted, with their flanks secure, and presenting a front bristled with ninety-six pieces of artillery, which he attacked in front with his infantry, charging the guns at the point of the bayonet, and capturing the whole. The following day Delhi opened its gates. In five weeks after, having marched one hundred and twenty-five miles from Delhi, the strong fort of Agra, deemed impregnable by the Natives, fell after a regular siege, and a severe action with an army sent to reinforce the garrisons; and on the 1st of November, with the addition only of His Majesty's 8th dragoons, was fought the hard-contested battle of Laswarree, in which seventy-four pieces of heavy artillery were taken at the point of the bayonet. On all these occasions His Majesty's 76th regiment behaved most nobly, claiming their right to lead in every action, and setting a brilliant example, which was no less nobly imitated by the sepoys. Thus in little more than ten weeks this little army, chiefly composed of Natives, marched more than four hundred miles, fought three actions in the field against superior numbers, from whom were taken one hundred and seventy pieces of artillery, and captured two strong forts, releasing from his

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(19).—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

long

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

long bondage the old emperor, who was re-placed on the throne of his ancestors by the General. What army, though wholly European, of only equal force, could have done more?

Q. 5. "The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's, in respect to efficiency, good spirit and economy, and the probable consequence of bringing the whole directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown; the several arms being separately considered, with distinction of Europeans and Natives."

To the first part of this question relative to the effect of the separation, if it may be so called, of the Company's army from the King's as it now exists, the officers being quite as much the King's as the Company's, there is no apparent circumstance in any manner to derogate from its efficiency, good spirit, or economy; but what might be the probable consequence of bringing the whole directly under the authority of the Crown, there is more difficulty in answering. That such a measure would be pregnant with extensive mischief little short of the entire disorganization of the Native army would, I apprehend, be the opinion of nine-tenths of the officers who have served with that branch of the army. Not that the sepoys would start the slightest objection to such a proposed change, being equally ignorant of who are the Court of Directors, and who the Minister, or in what the difference consists; but were they to find officers placed in authority over them not understanding a word of their language, and equally ignorant of their peculiar habits, differing as widely as their language from those of Englishmen, it might then be reasonably apprehended that the thread of opinion, on which it has been emphatically expressed that our empire in the East is suspended, would speedily be broken. Let that opinion, on which the fate of an empire rests, be once shaken by any circumstances whatever, it certainly would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to recover it. To preserve the feeling most essentially necessary for the safety of our dominions in the East the officer must be trained up with the sepoys. They must see him advance through all his stages from ensign upwards; whence having a thorough knowledge, founded on experience, of his justice and integrity, of his knowledge of his profession, and unquestionable courage, they will follow wherever he may judge it wise or necessary to lead. It was to the extraordinary change of officers which took place just at that time that may be traced the alarming desertion which prevailed through the whole army of Bengal in the year 1824, and which in effect led to what was called the mutiny of the 47th regiment; an event that did more to loosen the attachment of the Natives to the service, and fraught with more danger to our influence in the East, than any other occurrence since our establishment there; nor will the recollection of the events of that day, and the measures pursued in consequence, be soon obliterated.

Formerly there were present in the lines of every battalion from twenty to thirty young men, relations to the Native officers or sepoys, waiting there for vacancies to be admitted into the regiment, and numerous applications were made to the officers commanding companies to solicit the commanding officer for admission whenever a vacancy occurred; now, though all Central India, which most abounds with Rajpoots, is brought under our influence, there is great difficulty in finding men of good caste in sufficient numbers to keep up the strength of the army.

The consequence therefore most to be apprehended of bringing the Native army directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown, is, that Ministers, quite unaware of the mischief that would grow out of it, might be prevailed on to appoint to the command of Native regiments men who, on account of long services or personal merit, might have strong claims on their patronage, or who, on account of family interest in this country, they might feel disposed to promote, or perhaps find it necessary to serve; and although two or three instances might not break the bonds, it may be sufficient to refer to the feelings evinced by the Indian Native army in the year 1809, on the appointment of His Majesty's officers to the command of some newly-raised light battalions, to be satisfied that few steps further were all that was required to shake the empire to its base.\*

Q. 6. "Whether

\* This subject, though of infinite importance, has never been brought under the notice of the Court of Directors.

**Q. 6.** "Whether there may be grounds to infer, that if the Company's army were under the government of King's Ministers, any considerable saving of expense would ensue, by the reduction or consolidation of establishments generally, or in time of peace, by less chargeable plans of recruiting and pensioning (including under the former head, arrangements for the appointment and education of cadets, and the conveyance of troops from England to India, and under the latter, all retiring provisions made at the expense of the Government); by the more economical provision and appropriation of stores; by cheaper freight; or by other more frugal arrangements, and how far an opposite result is to be apprehended."

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

I am not aware of any ground there is to infer, that if the Company's army were under the government of King's Ministers any considerable saving of expense would ensue by the reduction or consolidation of establishments generally, or in time of peace. The establishments at present are all formed on the lowest scale, with exception of the adjutant and deputy adjutant-general and quartermaster and deputy quartermaster-general, which are all in duplicate.

In the ever-varying scene of Indian government, to which Governors and Commanders-in-chief are appointed for limited periods, the resources of the country have been, and must ever be, appropriated much in harmony with the character of the administrator, sometimes profusely squandered, and at others as much wasted by economical views, degenerating into parsimony, by which stores of great value have been destroyed, from the deficiency of an establishment to preserve them.

I have no means of affording information as to the expense attending recruiting of Europeans, nor of that attending the conveyance of stores to India; but as to the recruiting of the Native army, it is impossible to be less chargeable than by the mode now in use. Neither do I feel competent to answer the question, whether any improvement could be made on the existing arrangements for the appointment of cadets; but it seems probable that a better arrangement than that now pursued under the auspices of the Court of Directors at Addiscombe for their education could not be easily suggested.

That part of this question which relates to pensions demands a very comprehensive view of the subject, combining the past with the future, before the reply can be given, and far exceeds my limited powers to do it justice. It is already sufficiently obvious, that the organization of the Indian army, as sanctioned by the King in Parliament, in 1794, with all the improvement made in 1824, has not produced the benefit expected by the voluntary retirement of officers who, feeling too infirm to discharge the duties that might be required of them on actual service, it was supposed would avail themselves of it.

The rule of the service at that time was, that the three branches of the army as it then existed, of engineers, artillery, and infantry, should rise, even in their own corps, from cadet to colonel, and when the Act passed there were at the head of the infantry, subaltern-lieutenants who had been twenty-two years in the service; so that the benefit supposed to be conferred by allowing officers to retire upon full-pay after twenty-two years' service proved altogether nugatory, the pay of the rank not affording the means of subsistence. The Marquis Cornwallis, at that time Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, adverting to the slow promotion, proposed that pensions should be granted, not for rank, but for length of service, in proportion to twenty-two, twenty-six, and thirty years; after which he supposed that few, if any, officers would retain mental and physical powers sufficient for active service in that climate. Promotion is now carried on in each regiment instead of the line; and although the field officers are increased from thirty-seven to two hundred and ninety-four, there are now captains in the army of twenty-seven years', and lieutenants of nineteen years' standing in the service, and officers of fifty years, who have the rank of lieutenant-colonel only, as acknowledged by the rules of His Majesty's service.

**Q. 7.** "Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interests connected with the

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

the army might be expected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies."

It seems impossible to imagine any advantage to the public interests as connected with the army, from the settlement of British subjects in India, and scarcely less so to conceive how any considerable number could settle there with advantage to themselves. It is not pretended, I believe, by even the warmest advocates for this plan, that Europeans could labour as agriculturists, or subsist on the profits from agriculture, if the climate were less unfavourable to such labour; and even now, under the limitation of Europeans out of the service residing in India, several every year work their passage home as mariners, not having found the means of subsisting in that country.

**Q. 8.** "What would be the probable effects of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief?"

The Indian army is already, I conceive, for all purposes of control, under the authority of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief; the Governors and general officers in authority at the other Presidencies acknowledging, and on all occasions submitting, to the paramount authority of these officers, merely directing the details of the civil and military departments placed under their superintendence. If the question means further, what would be the effect of consolidating the three armies into one, with a view to occasional change of position, relieving a division of the Bengal army by an equal force from Madras or Bombay, or the reverse, there cannot be a doubt that it would be productive of some evil without any apparent advantage.

**Q. 9.** "How far the existing system of government, direction, and control, in so far as the same may depend on arrangements fixed by Parliamentary enactment, is, in its influence on the army, productive of good or evil, as compared with any changes which have been, or may be, suggested as expedient, on grounds of efficiency, economy, or security?"

It seems difficult to suggest any improvement on the existing system of government, care being at all times taken to select for the important office of Governor-General a statesman of approved talents and tried experience. The vast extent of empire, with its various climates and immenso population, swayed by peculiar prejudices and different religions, some of the rites of which are repugnant to European notions, and yet cannot be interfered with without endangering the stability of British influence, must never for a moment be left out of view when a Governor-General is to be appointed. As much discretionary power must necessarily be vested in him acting on his own responsibility, the importance of selecting a statesman in whom such confidence may be safely placed becomes greatly magnified; for although subject as at present, to the control of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, an unwise act on the part of Government there might produce irreparable evil before the authority of the Board of Control to remedy it could be brought into operation.

(Signed)

G. PENNINGTON, Colonel,  
Bengal Horse Artillery.

Malshanger, 7th March 1832.

**LETTER** from G. PENNINGTON, C. B., to T. HYDE VILLIERS, Esq.

Sir,

Malshanger House, 7th March 1832.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the accompanying replies to the several questions contained in your letter, under date the 2d of February. I am aware that these questions relate to matters of much importance, and lament that, in the absence of nearly all documents, having been thrown on my own unassisted memory alone, there may be some errors of detail, in the statement of which, I have endeavoured to avoid being unnecessarily prolix.

Under

Under these circumstances, the Committee will find much less information than they might reasonably expect to receive from an officer who actually served nearly forty years with the army in India; but having maturely revolved every question in my own mind, nothing occurs to me to be added, further than that I shall be in attendance on the Committee on Saturday morning, as required by their order, to elucidate any part that may seem obscure, and at the same time to lay before them, if acceptable, a map drawn out on a large scale of the whole Peninsula, extending from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya Mountains, on which the positions of the whole army of the three Presidencies may be seen in one view.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. PENNINGTON, Colonel,  
Bengal Horse Artillery.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Pennington,  
7th March 1832.

(11.)—REPLY of Colonel SHERWOOD, dated 28th February 1832.

Sir,

10, Great Cumberland-street.

I HAVE to acknowledge your letter of the 8th instant.

I request of you to state to the Honourable the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, that I have much pleasure in replying to such of their queries as come within the scope of my professional knowledge and experience.

Reply to 1st Query.—The strength of that branch of the service to which I belong, *viz.* the artillery, has been increased very considerably since the year 1784, the date of my landing in India, but not more than was required for so considerable an addition of territory and garrisons; and the necessity that always has, and always will, exist for the Indian army being maintained upon a war establishment, or nearly approximating to it. The organization and distribution of the Bengal military force was, as far as my judgment goes, unexceptionable.

2d. The several staff and subsidiary departments of the Bengal army have undergone a great, and, I will venture to assert, a most beneficial alteration, principally during the governments of Lord Minto and Marquis Hastings. I use the term “beneficial” as applying most particularly to the State; this, by the formation of the Army and Ordnance, Commissariats and the Barrack department, in lieu of contracts and army agents, for the provision of supplies; also in the formation of the Quartermaster-general’s department.

3d. I have partly answered this query in my reply to the first; but I shall add such additional matter as occurs to me. I am not in possession of any documents, or details, of the amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters; but if only the same number of regiments, &c. are allotted to each frontier post, or army of reserve, as heretofore, it is obvious that a great numerical diminution has taken place; two troops or companies having been struck off from each regiment, and what remains reduced in rank and file.

It is admitted by all officers of the Indian establishment (whether King’s or Company’s) that the artillery branch of the service is of the utmost importance, and the facility with which this arm can be moved, a most material point; but a short time has passed since we were rapidly progressing, by the introduction of horses in lieu of bullocks for field pieces; but I am sorry to learn that this system has been partially given up. I admit the difference of the expense to be great, yet the advantage is also great, and amply compensates for it.

4th. The efficiency of our military force is, I presume, considered by the higher authorities as equal to the maintenance of peace, and nothing more; for it has invariably happened that a large increase has been made upon any rupture with a Native power; this

(11.)—Reply  
of Col. Sherwood,  
28th Feb 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(11.)—Reply  
of Col. Sherwood,  
28th Feb. 1832.

this may be practicable in the infantry branch; but I deny the possibility of training a cavalry or artillery soldier with the same facility.

The economy with which our force is provided is most commendable, without being parsimonious; and such as attaches the Native soldier to our service in preference to that of any other power.

With respect to the spirit and disposition of the officers and soldiers composing the Indian army, I am satisfied that it cannot be exceeded in quality by any army in Europe: patience, perseverance, and endurance, are the grand characteristics of the Native soldier; and I may venture to assert, that my own countrymen are, in these points, not behind them. The experience of nearly half a century has served to exhibit to me, that not one in ten of the Company's officers return to more than a short life of enjoyment in their native country, and not one in a hundred of the European soldiers; yet many advantages relative to retirement of officers have been conceded within the last thirty-six years; all tending to reconcile them to a long banishment, and to attach them to a service where they are sure of a provision for their old age.

The employment of military men in civil situations is a question somewhat beyond my pursuits and observation; but I have understood that it was practised with great success and advantage to the State. Upon the remaining points in this query I have little to add; I think I have already adverted to most of them. The rules relative to enlistments, &c. &c. have existed as they are for years, and I am not aware of any requisite alteration. Promotion and furlough, I should hope, will continue as at present, as well as retirement.

I have shown how few officers live to attain the ultimatum of their expectations, *viz.* a regiment; and surely those of less robust constitutions had better be put upon a retiring pension than remain a burthen to the service. The retirement of worn-out Native officers and soldiers is amply provided for, and remains one of the noblest acts of Marquis Cornwallis's government: it is hoped that nothing may disturb it; but that it will continue, as it now is, a nursery for Native soldiers to the Indian army. With respect to the proportion of European and Native corps, I can only observe that the enormous difference of expense in these departments, and the mortality attending the former, will ever preclude the possibility of any measure approximating to a counterbalance.

5th. This is a most important question as regards the Company's army. I declare most solemnly that no bad effect has hitherto resulted by the separation, at least since the year 1788, when the introduction of His Majesty's commissions to Company's officers placed both services upon equal terms; and I shall never admit that the efficiency of the Company's army is, in any degree, inferior to that of the King's: bearing in mind the difference between Europeans and Natives of India, which I am not disposed to contest, having served all my life in a corps principally composed of Europeans. The remainder of this query comes under a separate and distinct head. A period of nearly thirty-seven years has now passed over since the Bengal, and indeed the whole of the Indian, artillery were informed that Marquis Cornwallis had proposed to the home authorities "to incorporate them with the Royal Artillery, and to relieve them regularly from Woolwich." I have a lively, and I may say a painful, recollection of the sensation produced by this promulgation. The major part of the regiment was then at Dum Dum, at their annual practice; a meeting was held upon the occasion, where the proposition was looked upon with absolute horror, as destructive of all those hopes, rights, and prospects with which we had entered the service, and had remained with every disadvantage for years; the road to Woolwich was pointed out as the road to ruin and despair. We thank God that this calamity was averted from us, and we fervently pray it may so continue.

I have now stated the feelings of my own branch of the service: and as I have reason to think that I am well acquainted with the sentiments of others on the same subject, I should neither do my duty to the Honourable Board of Commissioners, nor to the service of which I am a member, were I to shrink from this explicit declaration, that such  
a transfer

a transfer would be met with the most decided remonstrance, little short of absolute rejection, from the other branches. Having arrived at my ultimatum, I can view this matter more calmly and dispassionately than a lieutenant-colonel who is looking forward to that which fell to me after forty-one years' service. The immediate apprehension of this officer would point out something fatal to his prospects; and the conclusion to which he would arrive would be, that the expected regiment had eluded his grasp; for although the intention of interference to such extent may not now exist, yet no security can be given that it shall not be adopted at some future period.

6th. I cannot see the possibility of any saving of expense by the Company's army being placed under His Majesty's Government, but quite the reverse. Were it so, it is presumable that the European force would be occasionally relieved, as was proposed by Marquis Cornwallis. The expense of transporting officers and soldiers to and from India must be defrayed by the State; whereas, upon the present system, cadets pay for their own passage out. Officers coming home on furlough, or for retirement, do the same; and I have already stated how few of the privates return to their native country. I do not understand what is meant by "reduction or consolidation of establishments generally," unless it be contemplated to reduce a portion of present allowances, and to consolidate the three Indian establishments; neither of which measures will, I hope and trust, be attempted. In the first case, the knife has already cut to the quick; and in the second, not the smallest advantage is perceptible. With respect to the European portion, great heart-burnings and discontent would be the inevitable result, the promotion at Madras having been more rapid than that in Bengal, and that at Bombay still more rapid. The arrangements for the appointment of cadets do not come within my province to remark upon, further than as to the education of those who are so fortunate as to obtain what is called "an Addiscombe appointment," by which they are placed quite upon an equality with the establishment at Sandhurst.

Of shipping I know nothing; and as to the provision of military stores, it is not only desirable, but necessary, that they should be of the very first quality.

7th. I do not understand the precise meaning of this query, therefore will not enter upon it.

8th. The whole of the Indian army being under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief, is a question to be answered by higher authority than mine; but if done, there must be a Provincial Council and a Commander of the Forces at Madras and Bombay.

9th. The existing system of government and control is a subject which I must leave to a more able man. I shall only add, in conclusion, that I believe the less this is disturbed the better; and that it is impossible for me, even were I so disposed, to draw any comparison between what now exists, and other measures which may be suggested as expedient, beyond what appertains to the queries that have been put to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. SHERWOOD, Colonel,  
Bengal Artillery.

Feb. 28 1832.

(12.)—REPLY of Colonel LIMOND, dated 31st January 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, with the queries, and have now the honour to annex my answers to them. If the replies are not so comprehensive as the Board desire, I will be happy to give any further information that is in my power.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. LIMOND, Colonel,  
Madras Artillery.

Drayton Green, 31st Jan. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(11.)—Reply  
of Col. Sherwood  
28th Feb. 1832.

(12.)—Reply  
of Col. Limond,  
31st Jan. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(12.)—Reply  
of Col. Limond,  
31st Jan. 1832.

**Q. 1.** “The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies.”

When I went first to India in 1794, the limits of the Honourable Company's territory were much circumscribed, and the military force was proportioned accordingly; and indeed on a scale so contracted, that much difficulty and inconvenience arose from it in furnishing troops for the reduction of Ceylon and the Eastern Islands. These conquests, and the subsequent conquest of Seringapatam, and furnishing a subsidiary force with the Nizam, demanded increase to the different branches of the army. The character of that distinguished officer Sir Barry Close, then, I believe, the principal adviser of Government on these points, is a sufficient guarantee for the economy of the increase, as regards the Madras army. The Mahratta war of 1803-4 and 1805, and consequent extent of frontier, called for still further increase. It will be proper that I confine myself to that arm of the service to which my experience enables me to speak from professional acquaintance, the artillery. In 1799 gallopers were first attached to the cavalry regiments, and were found of so much service during the Mysore war, that they were continued, but on a footing too confined. General Wellesley, to remedy this defect, in 1804, strongly recommended the formation of a regular body of horse artillery, which were accordingly embodied and brought to a degree of perfection, under that excellent officer Colonel Noble, such as to claim the admiration of all that saw and could judge of their merits. It was probably to this pride of perfection that this expensive branch of the artillery owed its increase to an extent possibly more than the wants of the service called for. A corps of Golundauze or Native foot artillery was also raised. This corps, composed of the sons of old Native officers attached to the service, has answered all the purposes contemplated; and at a comparatively small expense they supply stations where artillery are absolutely necessary, and admit of the European companies being kept more together, and consequently more efficient for occasional active service. In May 1825 (I was then acting commandant of artillery) I submitted to Sir Thomas Munro a recommendation for the reduction of two guns per troop of the horse brigade. This reduction, and lately another to a much greater extent, has taken place.

**Q. 2.** “The same as to the several Staff or Subsidiary departments.”

The general staff of the army previous to the arrangements of 1796 was very limited. On that occasion general officers were placed on the staff of the different divisions of the army, and their particular duties assigned them. With that exception, and the necessary increase in the different branches to keep pace with the increase of territory and force, no material alteration has taken place, unless it is the formation of the Commissariat of provision and supply, which has proved of incalculable benefit to the service. Immediately before I was compelled by ill-health to leave India, I submitted my sentiments to Sir Thomas Munro on the utility of an Ordnance Commissariat, to be formed on the same principle, which he was disposed to consider favourably of. Since my return to this country I was called upon by Lord Ellenborough, then President of the India Board, for a memorandum on this subject, which I accordingly furnished, and which I think is alone wanting to perfect this important branch of the Indian army.

**Q. 3.** “The amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters, with reference to the probable occasion of their services against foreign or domestic disturbers of the peace, each arm being considered separately; and the different portions of our Indian empire which are distinguished by marked characteristics being adverted to in their order with reference to their mutual dependence.”

The different corps of the army are usually kept complete to the authorized establishment, unless otherwise ordered. The distribution is regulated by Government according to the circumstances of the time. It may appear unnecessary that many troops should be kept in the southern districts of the Madras establishment; but, if I may be allowed an opinion, I would be disposed to think the time is not sufficiently gone by to obliterate from  
the

the memory of the present generation the former power and importance of their Poligar ancestors, and, with every confidence in their attachment and good feeling for the English rule, I would consider it best secured by having the means of compelling it. It is also to be kept in remembrance, that the Madras establishment is the best adapted, both from situation and the disposition of the troops, to furnish a force for any service that may be required off the continent of India.

**Q. 4.** "The constitution of the several branches of the army, with reference to its experienced or probable effect.

1st. On the efficiency of our military force."

The best proof of the efficiency of the military force in India is the success that has crowned its operations in every instance that it has been called into action.

2d. "On the economy with which it is provided."

I do believe that a just economy is practical in every department of the service, but I have ever remarked that a parsimonious system in military equipment has defeated its end, and ultimately caused more expense than would have arisen under liberal arrangement. This remark is equally applicable to the description of stores provided for the service; and my experience enables me to bear testimony to the excellence of the military stores sent from England for the Honourable Company's service, as well as to the mode of their packing and preservation.

3d. "On the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing it."

I do believe there is no service where both officers and men are animated by a better feeling and disposition for the interests of the country and their employers than the Indian army. Some instances of dereliction of duty have occurred, but it has only been in a moment of forgetfulness and a return to reason has only made the soldier the more sensibly attached to the service.

*Note.*—"The employment of military men in civil situations."

With reference to the employment of military men in civil situations: in the early times of the Company's rise in India this was particularly advisable, as the Native powers, unacquainted with the nature of the civil service, did not hold it in the same estimation as they did the military. This was particularly evinced in the case of the paymaster of the army taken prisoner by Tippoo, along with many officers. The paymaster was placed in confinement along with the privates, and only at the joint intercession of the officers was he allowed to be removed to their prison. The civil branch is now better known to the Native powers, and respected accordingly. In the Revenue, Judicial and Commercial departments there is no doubt that the education of the civil branch peculiarly fit them for their occupations (Sir Thomas Munro and Colonel Read were uncommon instances of able military revenue servants); but as matter of opinion, I think the experienced military man is peculiarly competent for employment in political trusts, not only from his general information, but from the respect that his military character derives in the eyes of the princes and people of every caste.

*Note.*—"The suitableness of the several establishments to the purposes for which they have been, or are likely to be, needed."

I have already observed on the suitableness as regards the Ordnance establishment.

During the Mahratta war, under General Wellesley, the camp equipage of the army was carried by contract with the commanding officers of corps, and having been done great justice to, was particularly efficient on that occasion; that system, however, was considered expensive in time of peace, and therefore discontinued. Since that time it has been placed on an improved footing, under the quartermaster-general of the army, and is very effective.

A few years back a corps of Ordnance artificers, composed of the half-caste sons of European

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(12.)—Reply  
of Col. Limond,  
31st Jan. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(12.)—Reply  
of Col. Limond,  
31st Jan. 1832.

European soldiers, has been raised at Madras, and, under the instruction of good European artisans, promise to be a most useful body when brought to maturity.

*Note.*—"The fitness of the rules relative to pay, qualification, enlistment," &c.

The existing regulations laid down for these different objects I think are well and judiciously framed.

Q. 5. "The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's, in respect to efficiency, good spirit, and economy; and the probable consequences of bringing the whole directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown; the several arms being separately considered, with distinction of Europeans and Natives."

In former times, and particularly on the arrival of new King's corps in India, a considerable jealousy existed for a time between the officers of the two services, arising from the officers of His Majesty's service assuming a supposed superiority, which, in the eyes of the other, the distinction of the services did not warrant. This feeling, however, by degrees wore off, and after employment together on field service, entirely disappeared, and the most perfect harmony and good feeling has taken place of all sense of distinction, and the best understanding continues to subsist between the two services. When I first went out to the service, and long prior to that period, a young man taking out letters of recommendation, they were of this use to him, they procured him a few dinners, and introduced him to society; beyond this no more. It was to his own zeal, diligence, and attention to his duty, by recommending himself to the notice of his superiors, he had to look for employment and trust. It is to this system of impartial adaptation of particular talent to particular situations that, with such limited means, is to be ascribed the unparalleled rise and prosperity of the Company's power in India. When this good system first changed, it is not for me to say, even if I could, but it is now a lamentable fact that foreign influence is and has been for many years paramount to the claim of desert or length of service; that this influence, under a transfer to the Crown, would be increased, and its baneful effects extended, there can be no doubt.

Q. 6. "Whether there may be grounds to infer that, if the Company's army were under the government of King's Ministers, any considerable saving of expense would ensue, by the reduction or consolidation of establishments generally, or in time of peace, by less chargeable plans of recruiting or pensioning (including, under the former head, arrangements for the appointment and education of cadets, and the conveyance of troops from England to India, and, under the latter, all the retiring provisions made at the expense of the Government); by the more economical provision and appropriation of stores; by cheaper freight; or by other more frugal arrangements; and how far an opposite result is to be apprehended."

In the course of my service I have remarked, on the part of the Government in India, a just attention to economy, by the reduction of military posts and stations, rendered unnecessary by the advance and extent of frontier, the reduction of field establishments the moment they could be dispensed with, by the reduction of the numbers of men to companies in time of peace; these intervals, however, have been so short, that until the present time they could be hardly felt as savings. The late reductions have been upon a scale more extended; how far prudent is very problematical.

The system of recruiting, as applied to the Native army, is attended with little or no expense; in the European branch, including the education of the cadets, is an expense that can easily be ascertained from the records at the India House. The Court of Directors have the same source for procuring cadets and recruits for the service that the King's Ministers have, so that any saving in the education of the one, or the conveyance of the other to India, must arise from the comparative prudent economy of either as contrasted with regardless expenditure in the other. With reference to economy in the provision  
and

and appropriation of stores, much pains and labour have been bestowed at the different Presidencies in India in framing and compiling a system of regulations for the several branches that will be found to combine economy with efficiency; and in this respect I am not sure that even the departments in His Majesty's service might not find some useful information.

**Q. 7.** "Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interests connected with the army might be expected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or any of our Eastern colonies?"

I am not aware that any advantage could result to the public interests, as connected with the army; on the contrary, our Indian power is the government of opinion, first acquired under the impression of our being a superior race of people, confirmed by able military conquest, and followed up by kind and conciliating rule. It is to our hold on the Native mind, but more particularly on the attachment of our Native army, that we are to depend for the permanency of our power in India; this, as I said before, has been accomplished by the wisdom and system of our early rulers. The introduction of promiscuous settlers, by bringing in collision the vices of our country, would be destructive of the impression on the mind of the Native of European superiority and perfection; and, ultimately, by the increase of that description of offspring accelerate a crisis yet far distant.

**Q. 8.** "What would be the effect of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief?"

The present constitution of the Honourable Company's government places in the hands of the Governor-General a directing and controlling power over the acts and measures of the inferior Presidencies, so that, with the exception of the local patronage, the Government may be said to be under one Governor-General. Do away the distinction of Governor and Council at the minor Presidencies, the duties must be conducted by resident Commissioners, with the same local power and patronage of nomination to the different situations of trust and employment; for it is not to be supposed that a Governor-General can be acquainted sufficiently with local circumstances, and the merits and competency of the servants of the Company, in many situations so far removed from the seat of Government. It is, besides, not unworthy of consideration, is the British power throughout India so firmly established and their rights and supremacy acknowledged by the different Native powers, and the Natives themselves, to allow of dispensing with the splendour of Government, that so much imposes on, and attaches the people of, our Eastern possessions.

In reference to the office of one Commander-in-chief, this has already been carried into effect as regards the King's troops. The observations respecting the patronage of a Governor-General over the service of the inferior Presidency will more particularly apply to that of a Commander-in-chief over the three armies. Unacquainted with the merits and pretensions of the distant officers, the officers and troops of the head-quarter Presidency are the most likely to share and engross his favour; and thus the pride and spirit of the other Presidencies are destroyed.

**Q. 9.** "How far the existing system of government, direction and control, in so far as the same may depend on arrangements fixed by Parliamentary enactment, is, in its influence on the army, productive of good or evil, as compared with any changes which have been, or may be, suggested as expedient, on grounds of economy and security?"

If this query has reference to the appointment of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, and their measures as regards the army, my information is too limited to qualify me to offer any opinion on the subject.

(Signed) **JAMES LIMOND**, Colonel,  
Madras Artillery.

Drayton Green, 31st January 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(12.)—Reply  
of Col. Limond,  
31st Jan. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(13.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Hopkinson,  
15th Feb. 1832.

(13.)—REPLY of Lieutenant-colonel HOPKINSON, C. B., dated United Service Club,  
15th February 1832.

Sir,

ANNEXED to this, I do myself the honour to forward a memorandum of such replies as I am able to return to the several sections of your letter of the 2d February. I hardly know whether they are such as are expected from me. I have only to say that my wish and endeavour has been, and is, to give every information in my power; this, however, must necessarily be but little, as I have scarcely any documents to refer to. I have never been employed in any political situation, and though I have occasionally held several military appointments of various kinds, my life has been passed almost entirely as a working artillery officer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. HOPKINSON.

**MEMORANDUM** from Lieutenant-colonel HOPKINSON, C. B., late Commanding the Horse Brigade of Artillery on the Madras Establishment.

**Q. 1.** "The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies."

I am not prepared to reply to this section. The best and most accurate information can be obtained from the official Returns transmitted no doubt from the several Presidencies in India to the East-India House yearly. Some explanatory information on specific points, as far as the Madras establishment is concerned, and the artillery in particular, I might perhaps be able to give.

**Q. 2.** "The same as to the several Staff and Subsidiary departments."

The same remark as above is the only reply I can at present give to this section.

**Q. 3.** "The amount of force ordinarily embodied in different quarters, with reference to the probable occasion of their services against foreign or domestic disturbers of the peace, each arm being considered separately; and the different portions of our Indian empire which are distinguished by marked characteristics being adverted to in their order, with reference to their mutual dependence."

I feel quite incompetent to give a satisfactory reply to this section, embracing, as it appears to do, so very wide a field, and depending, as it necessarily must, on contingencies. I believe that even the officers in command of the several field forces, such as Jaulnah for instance, are not made acquainted with the specific reasons for which it is composed, and stationed. On any unforeseen emergency arising the commanding officer must be guided by his own discretion.

**Q. 4.** "The constitution of the several branches of the army, with reference to its experienced or probable effect."

I very much wish that the points for me to answer had been a little more compressed and specific. I have not the means of replying to this section; and indeed my information altogether is only that of a person never, except during the war in Ava, absent from the Madras Presidency, and having no access to Government records or reports. I am anxious it should not be supposed I wish to throw off the duty now expected from me, but at the same time I venture to hope, that should I, in my wish to do right, enter on points trifling or unnecessary, that my intentions to meet the wishes of the Board should plead my excuse.

1st. "On the efficiency of our military force."

I am not prepared to reply to this paragraph at the present moment. I presume the  
army

army must be considered fully efficient, both in number and discipline, for the duties it has to perform, or the late reductions would not have been made.

2d. "On the economy with which it is provided."

The clothing of the army generally is of the best quality *now* (I speak of Madras only), especially since the mode of providing it has been altered. The arms of every description are also of the best quality that England can produce; but I do think (as an old commissary) that the equipments, such as belts, pouches, drums, and such like, are bad; it is true a set of country-made accoutrements may cost infinitely less than those from Europe, but even this is, I think, a question; certainly, however, they do not last, even under the most favourable circumstances, one-third the time. I have, when commissary, frequently known commanding officers take back condemned *Europe* articles in preference to receiving *new country*.

3d. "On the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing it."

Search the world over, and I do not think it possible to meet with officers or men in any army superior to those of the Madras army in zeal, or a wish to do what is right. Of late years, however, the situation and consequence of officers commanding corps has been most materially changed, whether or not to the advantage of the service I will not here venture to say; but certain it is, that that power and influence they formerly had in their own corps has been taken from them, and the soldier has been taught to look for every comfort and advantage, not to his commanding or other officer, but to head-quarters. That this has broken the chain that held together the European officer and the sepoy is certain; and that it has annihilated the strong attachment that did subsist between the sepoy and his European officer is equally so. So long as a sepoy looks up to, and relies on, his commanding officer alone for his happiness and comfort, so long will he respect, and endeavour to obtain and keep his good opinion and favour, but no longer. This, however, is most delicate ground to tread on, suffice it to say, that I believe all old Indian commanding officers agree, that unless the commanding officer of a Native corps is every thing, he is nothing.

*Note.*—"The influence of the additions made to the army within the period under review, and of the employment of military men in civil situations; the suitability of the several establishments to the purposes for which they have been, or are likely to be, needed; the fitness of the rules relative to the numbers, pay, qualification, enlistment, promotion, furlough, and retirement of the several ranks, European and Native; the expediency of the proportion of European and Native corps will under this head be adverted to."

I am not quite aware of the period referred to, nor can I immediately recollect that any additions have been made to the army for many years, except that of an increase to the artillery by the addition of a brigade, consisting of four troops of Natives as horse artillery, each troop I think (for I have no official papers to refer to) of the same strength as the European brigade, *viz.* 155 effective men, to which were attached the same number of European, with the addition of Native commissioned officers, and having also European serjeants. Their efficiency has been little proved in the field, indeed I believe only once at Kittore.

I believe I am singular in the opinion, but I must say that I am averse to Natives being employed as artillery. I think they never can be made *properly* effective; they learn enough to be capable of much mischief, but are never to be made equally competent to Europeans, although I suppose the expense is not much less; but I think every thing expensive that is not of the very first quality. I can imagine hardly any case where even a picked body could be trusted on service with a brigade of six-pounders without the presence of an European; and this mental unsuitness is, I think, more especially increased from the fact, that the Natives of the Madras establishment have not bodily weight and strength sufficient to perform, as they ought, the duties of even light field artillery. I commanded for a short period the Golundauze battalion; we had present at head-quarters

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(13.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Hopkinson,  
15th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(13.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Hopkinson,  
15th Feb. 1832.

either five or six companies; when out firing blank ammunition from six-pounders, I observed that several guns constantly missed fire;\* frequently the match was applied three or four times to the same gun before the charge exploded, although on each failure the man with the sponge stepped out and rammed the cartridge, and the man at the vent went through the ceremony of inserting the pricker before he primed. On an inspection of the cause, I soon found it to be that the cartridge, even with two or three attempts, had never been properly rammed home, and which could only have occurred from the want of sufficient strength of arm and weight of body in the man at the sponge. True it is, I am told, that this is not the case with the Native horse artillery, or with the *detached* companies of Golundauze. The horse artillery on its formation selected from the five or six companies, mentioned in the former paragraph, their best and strongest men, and their places were filled up by the common recruits of the country, a description of men of very inferior size and strength; the detached companies, by their absence from head-quarters, escaped this process, and thus remain nearly as at first formed, composed of picked men.

With regard to the European artillery, I can imagine no corps better equipped in every respect, especially the horse artillery, since its formation in 1804, and at the time I left it, in the end of 1829. The only deficiency, but a serious one it is, is the want of officers; this want applies generally to the whole of the artillery, but more especially the European. It is well known that from the habits of the Europeans they require much more care and attention than the Native soldier, and yet the Native corps have nearly double the number of commissioned officers to the European; that is to say, the same number of European, with the addition of Native officers, and without any reference to the great difference in numerical strength, so that a company of Native artillery of seventy men only has a captain and three lieutenants, one subadar and one jemadar, to take care of seventy-five quiet Natives; while a troop of horse artillery, consisting of 155† Europeans, and about 450 Natives attached to it, has the same number of European officers *only*, viz. one captain and three subalterns. It surely is very hard work for the officers, and very hard on the men also. This deficiency is the more striking from the difference with which the King's regiments in India are officered.

The difference of strength between a troop and company of *artillery* in His Majesty's service and that of the East-India Company is shown in a paper at the end of this memorandum. Now, as will be seen by that paper, the King's artillery to fewer men have so many officers, we have a right to suppose the number they have is actually required for its duties; and if so, is it likely in a country like India, that the duty of the artillery there can be carried on with a less proportion without manifest hardship to those who have to perform it? and this again appears the more striking, as I said before, as the Native foot artillery, of not one-fifth the actual number of men, have, in addition to the same number of European officers, two *Native* commissioned!

The Rules and Regulations of His Majesty's forces have been established as far as possible for the guidance of the Company's army: among them, that of daily payments to the soldier is one. Now, strange as no doubt it will sound in this country, I have no hesitation in declaring, from sad experience, that the greatest enemy of man could not have devised any plan more effective to produce a complete demoralization, and a total deprivation of comfort to almost every soldier in the artillery than this.

I commanded the horse artillery at head-quarters; we had a troop of about 155 men, and the recruits, as they landed from England, for the whole corps were placed under my charge. For a period of about two years we only lost out of the whole, I think it was, three men, and scarcely ever had in hospital at the same time more than five or six. Drunkenness was little known; but no sooner was the order for daily payments put in force, than the difference was most distressingly apparent,—constant drunkenness, misery, crimes, sickness,

\* Burnt priming.

† In the field a complete troop of European horse artillery, with its horse-keepers, grass-cutters, &c., are, in numerical strength, nearly equal to a battalion or regiment of sepoy.

sickness, and death! Every means was tried to get the artillery excluded from the operation of the order, but unsuccessfully; and I deeply regret to say that my letters from India inform me that it still remains in force, and with equal detrimental effect.

I could much better explain verbally than in writing why the artillery are greater sufferers by this mode of payment than the infantry; but to both, in the Company's service, it is a serious injury. The men in the Company's service the moment they arrive in India seem at once to reconcile themselves to the country as a home; they appear to settle to it; they get Native women, who soon obtain over them as much influence, particularly where there are children, as any European wife; they keep the men in order, and make them most comfortable, and have authority sufficient to take from him his pay the moment he receives it, giving him a small portion back for his personal pleasures. But with the daily mite they cannot do this; the man will not part with it; he says, "what's the use of such a trifle?" so away he goes and gets daily drunk, instead of once a month.

Besides, when paid monthly, there was a sufficient sum to enable the woman to go to the nearest great market and lay in a sufficient stock of food and necessaries for the month. Not only did the man's pay by these means go further, but it *insured* food for the period,—no trifling consideration! Now she cannot do this. Now the sum received daily is so small, she must buy by retail in the bazaar, and much loss ensues. The soldier, accustomed to have every want relieved, has no idea of providing for himself; the consequence of this improvidence is misery and distress to his family, punishment to himself.

The question will naturally be asked, how then does it happen that the mode of "daily payments" has been so much approved of in the King's service if there are these drawbacks? Why, in the first place, a King's soldier does not so much identify himself with the country; and next, what is the object of making daily payments? It is, if I understand right, under an idea that the portion of a soldier's daily pay must be so small a sum that he cannot commit any great excess with it. True, this argument is good as far as it refers to England, where pay is small, and liquor dear, but it cannot apply to India, as there the reverse is the case. The pay of a horse artillery soldier of the first class on full batta (and half the corps are on full batta) is, I think, 24 rupees. If a family man he is not in a mess, and thus has to receive nearly a rupee a day, a sum not only amply sufficient to *make* him drunk, but to *keep* him so from the period of one payment to another.

To the European woman, who cannot so well manage as the country-born (as they are called), the distress is greater. The establishment of canteens has tended very much to do away with the illicit trade they carried on of selling liquor,\* a mode much resorted to by these poor creatures for additional means of support. It is true Government allows European married women five rupees a month so long as they behave well; this does not go far, as they cannot, as in England, eke out their pittance by washing or other such work, and they are therefore, in, alas! in too many cases, driven to vice of the worst description. As to their children they do not long trouble them,† for I may say they invariably die before they are ten years old. It is much to be regretted that a trifling increase, say two rupees additional to the five already given, is not made. The additional expense to the Government would be very trifling, nay, it might be a saving, by inducing increased good conduct on the part of the women, and the health of the soldier less injured by drinking the horrid poison sold by them.

I am not exactly aware what is the present mode of obtaining recruits for the Company's army. Those that have been received from England of late years are certainly of a superior description to what were received formerly, but still I think there are many

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(13.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Hopkinson,  
15th Feb. 1832.

\* Notwithstanding the heavy penalty, which is no less than being separated, perhaps for ever, from her husband and family by being sent to England!

† I have stated this fact, and entered more at length into the subject in my reply to paragraph 7.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(13.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Hopkinson,  
15th Feb. 1832.

many points in which the service could be benefited as well as the comfort of the recruit increased, and which I shall, as far as I can, always be ready to explain when called on, but which I imagine would be supererogation to introduce here, particularly as they refer to arrangements completely of a local nature.

Q. 5. "The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's in respect to efficiency, good spirit, and economy, and the probable consequences of bringing the whole directly under the authority of the Crown; the several arms being separately considered, with distinction of Europeans and Natives."

I do not believe that altering the constitution of the army, and placing it under the authority of the Crown, is a measure likely to give satisfaction to those at present composing it, or to be affected by the change; but this would entirely depend on how the matter was carried into effect. To become King's troops would certainly be most gratifying, but as the Company's, they have now certain privileges and advantages distinct from that of His Majesty's service, that they must, if not immediately, very soon, lose by the greater interest of officers coming from England; and besides, I cannot imagine that any alteration of the mode now in use, of bringing up the officers for the Native service in the corps they are to serve with from their early youth, can be improved. Constituted as the Company's army now is, the officers have some power to whom they can appeal and look to for protection against ill treatment.

Q. 6. "Whether there may be grounds to infer, that if the Company's army was under the government of King's Ministers, any considerable saving of expense would ensue by the reduction or consolidation of establishments, or in time of peace by less chargeable plans of recruiting or pensioning (including under the former head, arrangements for the appointment and education of cadets, and the conveyance of troops from England to India, and under the latter, all retiring provisions, made at the expense of Government); by the more economical provision and appropriation of stores; by cheaper freights; or by other more frugal arrangements; and how far an opposite result is to be apprehended."

I cannot imagine how it is possible to carry on the duties of the army efficiently with greater economy than is at present exercised; for whether under the control of the King or East-India Company, the same number of persons must, I should think, be employed, though their designations might be changed.

Q. 7. "Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interests connected with the army might be expected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies."

I am quite at a loss to conceive how, in any possible way, the public interests connected with the army could be advantaged by the settlement of British subjects in India. Much has been said and written on this subject, but I think I may safely say 99% of those acquainted with India are more or less against the measure of unrestricted intercourse and settlement in India. There is one point, however, that I believe has never been remarked on, and I will now here endeavour to state it, and if doubted, the Committee have ample means of calling for whatever returns or reports it may think fit, to establish or negative my statement, asserted, because I firmly believe it important and most true; *I mean the fact, that children born in India of European parents, in a humble rank of life, very seldom, I may perhaps say NEVER, LIVE LONG.*

It can easily be ascertained, the number of European women who have gone with regiments and detachments of recruits to India for these last fifty years. It will perhaps be more difficult to ascertain the number of children of unmixed European blood born during the same period; but every one at all acquainted with India must know that they have been most numerous. Then where are they? they could only, in very few cases, have been sent to England. In India, beyond the age of infancy, they certainly are *not*, or they would be seen or heard of; but I scarcely know, or have known of any who lived to an age capable

capable of being taken into the service as soldiers. The case frequently occurs, especially in the artillery, of young men who, having got into some scrape in England, run to India, but soon getting tired of it, want their discharge, to obtain which a substitute is almost absolutely necessary. Now, if only a few even of these European children lived, substitutes would be easily obtained; but I never remember even one instance of such a thing occurring, and I do not believe that among the whole of the King's and Company's troops on the Madras establishment there are *twenty ADULTS of pure European blood born in India* bearing arms, although during the period I have mentioned thousands have been born. So much was I impressed with this extraordinary fact, that not long before leaving India I got an order sent by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief to European corps, directing that a Return should be transmitted, showing the number of European children born in each since its arrival in India, their ages and employments. The Returns came in, and were sent to me, but I found them so inaccurate, some including the children of colour, and others the children brought to India from England, that I could make little use of them. I, in consequence, suggested, that a form I sent at the same time should be forwarded to corps to be filled in, and returned to head-quarters; and I suppose that long before now this has been done, and if so, perhaps they have been forwarded to the India House. From the Returns, however, which I did get, it appeared, that with all the additions, there were only fourteen persons capable of bearing arms, and eight employed as drum-boys.

Now if this is true as far as regards the families of soldiers, is a corresponding mortality not much more likely to occur in the families of settlers? When a soldier or recruit, with his wife, arrives in India, they are at once put under cover, and most comfortably lodged and fed; every attention is paid to preserve their health, and in a manner I hardly imagine that settlers could obtain. Is it to be supposed then, that man or woman, however depraved, would consent to settle in a country when they knew that their children would never attain maturity, unless sent to England at an early age?

**Q. 8.** "What would be the probable effects of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief?"

I am not aware that any advantage would arise from this measure; and it may, I think, be made a question, how far it is prudent to destroy the present little feeling of rivalry that I think does exist between the forces of the different Presidencies, and thus abate the wish that each now has of wishing to be considered the best and most efficient. The manners, language and customs differ also so materially from each other, that I certainly think much should be left to authorities established and residing on the spot. What may have been found to answer admirably at Calcutta or Meerut might be of serious detriment when employed at Madras or Bombay.

(Signed) C. HOPKINSON.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(13.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Hopkinson,  
15th Feb. 1832.



anything but economy not to maintain a sufficient military force at all times in such a country as our Indian empire. The distribution of the army is probably as good as can be made with the troops at disposal. The organization is on the whole excellent.

**Q. 2. "Staff and departments."**

The military staff are as few in number as can undertake the duties required; they are all effective, and there is not such a thing as a sinecure, or an office executed by a deputy. This applies also to the departments.

**Q. 3. "The amount of force embodied in different quarters."**

The forces kept on the frontiers and in advance are as large as can be furnished from the present strength of the army, and they are probably as large as would be required under any circumstances, if it was possible to reinforce them speedily when required from the nearest of our own possessions. This, however, is not the case; and when necessity compels it to be done during war, the provinces are swept of troops, and our very existence exposed to jeopardy. Were such an occurrence as the mutiny at Vellore to occur during a time of war, there is no saying what the result might be.

**Q. 4. "The constitution of the several branches of the army."**

The armies are, on the whole, most efficient. The proportion of artillery is too small. This corps is composed almost entirely of Europeans, and is in the highest order. It is a branch which cannot be increased on an emergency, and it ought therefore to be permanently augmented. The proportion of cavalry is also too small, and it cannot be quickly increased. This is a very superior corps at Madras; it is composed almost exclusively of Mahomedans, with a few (not above thirty or forty in a regiment) high-caste Hindoos and Mahrattas. A horse is the delight of a Mahomedan at all periods of life. They are chiefly raised at Arcot and Trichinopoly, our old possessions, and they are consequently accustomed to our Government. Desertion is almost unknown among them, except when regiments are kept too long beyond the frontiers, and then the young men are apt to form connexions with the inhabitants, by which the tie to their home is broken. No man is kept in this corps after having been flogged. I am inclined to think that the efficiency of our cavalry has been lessened by copying too servilely the equipments and the drill of Europe. The dress and the accoutrements of the North are not adapted for the East. The drill, too, of a country which is to contend with ten or twenty times its own number may require to be very different from that of a corps which is to meet the enemy on equal terms. This applies particularly to the frequent breaking and skirmishing of modern drill, whereas our success in the East, and even our safety, depends upon our men keeping and acting in a body. The men in the service of the Native powers are, individually, much better horsemen and swordsmen than those in our ranks. The proportion of Europeans is much too small; they do not probably constitute above a tenth or twelfth of the army. The Native troops are excellent soldiers, and have often proved themselves worthy of trust; still they cannot as yet be looked upon as British. Their real feelings will never be known till we meet with some great reverse. Judging from the events of 1806, we have no great hold on the affections, either of the troops or population at large. A conspiracy,\* extending from Cape Comorin to the Deccan, was organized and carried on, till it exploded prematurely, without a hint even of its existence having been given to any European, civil or military, except by one sepoy, who, for his reward, was put into the guard by his commanding officer, as being mad. The Native infantry are very good troops; within the last thirty years they have been much improved in dress and equipment, as also in drill and discipline. Many of the Madras corps are quite equal in these respects to those of any army.† The regimental pay and allowances of all ranks are as low as they can possibly be made. The heads of departments are also moderately paid; but considerable savings, I am inclined to think, might be made in the establishments. Were the system of contract generally introduced it would tend to much economy.‡ The enlistment of Natives is not in

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(11.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

Artillery.

Cavalry.

Proportion of  
Europeans.

Native Infantry.

Regimental Pay.

Pay of depart-  
ments.

Enlistment.

\* Appendix (A.)

† Appendix (B.)

‡ Appendix (C.)

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(14.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

Invalid Establish-  
ment.

European Pen-  
sioners.

Native Pensioners.

European Officers.

in general attended with any expense; this, however, applies only to corps recruiting for themselves. Whenever any plan for enlisting men for general service has been attempted, it has been found expensive, and the men have not turned out well.\* Good men, and well connected, like to choose their own corps. The lads attached to corps, under the name of "recruit and pension boys," furnish the best men, and if this establishment was increased, it would supply all that are wanted. They are drilled, and become accustomed to the service from their youth; they are effective from the day of their transfer to the ranks, and they form the most efficient and the most attached of our soldiers. As they get only a small pay (3½ rupees per mensem), without clothing or any other allowance whatever, the expense of a proper extension of the establishment would not be great, and it would be amply compensated for by an increased efficiency. The invalid establishments, for both Europeans and Natives, are well arranged. The European pensioners are badly provided for, and something ought to be done for them. The orders issued some years ago, to send these veterans to Europe, was a most cruel infliction upon them; few reached home, and those who did must be very miserable. The pension establishment is the great hold upon the affections of our Native army, and the certainty of a comfortable retreat in old age fills our ranks. An improvement on the present Madras plan would be to have a graduated scale of pension. At present, a man who has served the prescribed time, and who has no prospect of promotion, wishes immediately to retire. Some inducement ought to be held out to keep him in the service; this might be accomplished by giving a small increase of pay to the effectives, after certain lengths of service, or an increase of pension on similar terms. Either or both these measures would produce a saving in expense, as the men would be longer in coming on the pension list, and would live a shorter time when on it. When the nature of the service is considered, the European officers are but moderately provided for in regard to promotion, pay, and pension. Their numbers, were they all effective, would be equal to their duties; but when those on staff and furlough are withdrawn, a sufficient number is not left for regimental purposes. This, as regards the staff, is an evil of difficult remedy. Staff officers might be made supernumerary in their respective corps, their places being filled up, but their rank going on, and they being liable to be replaced in the event of their quitting the staff. Another plan might be, to have several non-effective regiments, composed of officers only, from which the places of staff officers in their corps should be supplied; the promotion of the staff officer to go on in his own regiment, and that of the officer who supplies his place in his own regiment also. The regimental rise, which now goes to the majority, ought to extend to the lieutenant-colonelcy. It is of much importance to have the officers in command of Native corps known to their men, and who are to remain with them. The regimental pay and allowances are as low as they can be made with justice, and there is no room for reduction here. The furlough regulations are very fair; some check ought, however, to be put upon an officer taking it too often, as is frequently done. By this, those officers who are actually serving are unjustly kept out of their promotion; and the person himself gets a higher pension, when he does retire, than he is by service entitled to. The retiring pension is moderate in amount. No money can now be saved by the officers in general, and after twenty-two or more years of actual service, in a foreign and distant land, they can only look to £180 or £270, or at the most £360 per annum. A fairer mode of regulating the pensions would probably be by length of service instead of rank. One officer, who has barely served the prescribed time, but who has taken one or more furloughs, gets lieutenant-colonel's pension,† or probably a regiment with £1,000 per annum; while another, whose length of actual service is precisely the same, retires upon £180. Some reduction in the number of officers who retire upon the pension might be effected, and with advantage to the service too, by allowing the sale of commissions, under certain limitations, and particularly, that it should be confined to regiments, and to the seniors of each rank, so as to preclude

preclude supercession. The officer who sells would not of course be entitled to a pension. So long as Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were insulated Governments, separated by independent and hostile States, and when the troops of the different Presidencies seldom or ever met, it might be very well to have different rates of pay, and unequal augmentations to the armies; but now, when British India forms one united State, and when the troops of the three armies are continually acting together, it is worse than absurd to continue such a system. The difference of allowances is a never-ending theme of discussion at the mess-table, and the first lesson which a cadet learns is, that he is treated with injustice by his honourable masters. The mode which has been followed of late years in making augmentations is another fertile source of discontent, and there has not been a regiment added to the Indian army for the last twenty years that has not acted as a firebrand among some of its branches. In making the augmentations of late, no regard whatever seems to have been paid either to the numbers or services of the several armies. In 1800 there were ten regiments of cavalry, four Bengal, and six Madras; now there are twenty-one, ten Bengal, eight Madras, and three Bombay, so that out of eleven new corps, Bengal has got six, Bombay three, and Madras only two. In 1823 there were eight corps of artillery, four Bengal, three Madras, and one Bombay; now there are twenty corps, ten Bengal, six Madras, and four Bombay, so that while Bengal has got six, and Bombay three, Madras has got only three. In the infantry, the case is, I believe, equally unjust to the Madras army, although I cannot state particulars. Now the Madras army is allowed to be equal in point of merit to the others, and during the period when these augmentations have been made, it has, I believe, been more engaged on service, suffered more hardships, and had more officers and men, killed in action, than both the others taken together. Can it, therefore, occasion any surprise that all ranks of it are dissatisfied? There is no possible way of putting an end to this spirit, but by uniting the whole into one army, with the same regulations and rates of pay. The principle upon which this is to be done ought to be established by the authority at home, and every endeavour ought to be used to equalize as much as possible the rank of the officers of the three Presidencies, in reference to their length of service. Were the arrangement left to the Bengal Government, it could scarcely be expected to be so fairly executed, and, at all events, it would not give such general satisfaction. The employment of military men in civil situations has been of much benefit to the country. The field from which they are selected is much larger than the civil service; and, generally speaking, they have seen a great deal more of the country, and have a much more extensive knowledge of the manners and customs of the inhabitants at large than the members of that service. The European regiments of infantry are not numerous enough. They have to furnish all the warrant officers and staff sergeants for the whole army. The artillery have the choice of all the recruits. To meet such a demand for clever and deserving men would require a much more numerous body than the present establishment. The European soldier is very well provided for in every respect, and his situation, on the whole, is probably more comfortable than that of the private in any other army. The men ought only to be enlisted for a term of years. There is little fear of their quitting the service at the end of it. The idea, however, of being enlisted for life carries banishment along with it, and is often attended with bad consequences. The men are sent from England at the very worst season of the year, as they generally reach India in the month of May, which at Madras is the hottest in the whole year. October or December are the most proper seasons for their being landed. The Native soldiery in the Company's service is composed of men of a great variety of country, caste, and disposition; they are in every thing the reverse of European soldiers; one general feature runs through them all. They are easily managed by gentle treatment, but quite unnerved by harshness. They are much attached to their old officers, and have great confidence in them, but dislike being commanded by men whom they do not know. They have a great predilection for old manners and customs, and a strong dislike to change of any kind. They are all predestinarians; they have as much of what may be called passive courage, as any people,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(11.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

Employment of  
military men in  
Civil situations.

European Soldiers.

Native Soldiers.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(14.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

people, but they have not that ardour or activity of either mind or body that qualifies men for the forlorn hope. They are very sensible of disgrace or injury, particularly the Mahomedans. They sometimes avenge themselves by shooting the officer who has injured them, but more frequently by shooting themselves. The fear of being hastily punished by some young officer, or of being flogged for some purely military offence, prevents many men from entering the service; and it is remarked that of late years few Native officers place their sons in the army. There is, I fear, no great attachment to the service. The causes for this are numerous. The prominent one, almost an unavoidable one, is the depression of the whole Native soldiery. In an army of between 200,000 and 300,000 men, no Native can rise above the rank of subadar-major, about equal to troop serjeant-major. There are many men of talent, more of spirit and ambition, among them, and these can never be satisfied with such a state of things; they have not only their own feelings to contend with, but they are continually taunted and excited by their countrymen not in the service. Could any safe opening, however small, be made for the advancement to higher office of some of the Natives, it would have a most beneficial effect. Among the lesser causes of discontent are the frequent changes in dress and drill; the greater strictness in little points of etiquette; the curtailment of liberty when off duty; the irregularity of reliefs of corps; the insults of the European soldiery; the being most frequently placed under the command of officers not acquainted with their manners and customs, and often regardless of them. The great rule in the management of such an army ought to be, that no risk whatever ought to be run, or change made, except for an evident and certain good. A man will fight as well in a coat of one colour as in that of any other, and, therefore, no risk ought to be encountered in making him change it. The uniform of the Madras cavalry was changed from red to blue, because the King's dragoons wore blue; and it was again changed from blue to grey, because the Honourable Company could buy grey cloth a little cheaper than blue! It is said to be folly to attend to such silly prejudices; but surely it is greater folly to run the risk of alienating the affections of an army for such trifles. It is not that the men prefer one colour to another, but it is that they dislike change of any kind. When a thing has been long in use they have become reconciled to it, and their countrymen have given over making remarks upon it; but the continual changes, and the minute copying of the equipments of the Europeans, expose our men to the never ceasing jeers and attacks of these men. With very few exceptions, every Commander-in-chief at Madras for the last thirty years has signalized the commencement of his command by a long general order on dress, and the general officers have followed the example in their several divisions. The frequent changes in drill have also been felt as a grievance. The men are harassed in learning one system, and have scarcely attained it when some other change is introduced. The greater strictness in little matters, and the restrictions on their liberty, when off duty, is the consequence of the formation of large cantonments. Formerly Native corps were generally stationed singly,\* under their own regimental commanding officers, and they had little to do in the shape of duty, with the exception of field exercise. They had few guards to furnish; they were indulged as much as possible when not on duty, and they lived much cheaper than they can do now. A Native, when in his uniform, is in misery. All the clothing of the East is wide and easy, whereas ours is tight, and they cannot even sit in comfort when dressed in it, far less sit down on the ground, where they all sit, or rise up. This upon the whole was, I am inclined to think, a better arrangement than the present. The irregularity in reliefs of corps is a great hardship. Regiments are left for a very long time in the field or in frontier stations; the living is expensive, duty is severe, furlough is not granted; in short, all that a Native considers as happiness is out of his power.† The men are also exposed to be tampered with by our enemies, and the young men form connexions with the families of the inhabitants. Every Native of India marries at an early age. If in their power they select their wives from among their own people, and this ought to be encouraged.

Almost

\* Appendix (F.)

† Appendix (G.)

Almost every regiment has a sort of Native place, and to this it ought to be brought as frequently as possible. The insults of the European soldiery have increased from the more frequent reliefs of His Majesty's regiments. It originates in the ignorance of, and contempt for, what the men call "black fellows," and is chiefly felt by them on their first arrival. Thirty years ago, there was no such thing as the hanging of European soldiers for shooting Natives, which is now so common; nor is there such a sight now to be seen as European and Native soldiers walking arm in arm, and frequenting each other's barracks and tents, as used then to be the case.\* The reason of the Native troops being now more frequently placed under the command of officers unacquainted with their manners, &c. is the more frequent changes in Commanders-in-chief, in general officers on the staff, and in regiments. The usual term of service of the two former classes is, at the utmost, four or five years, a term scarcely long enough to permit them to become acquainted with the nature of the troops under their command; and they then make way for other men to learn the same lesson, which none of them are ever to be allowed to turn to advantage. Almost every man in the Madras army can talk about Lawrence, Clive, or Coote,† but not one in a thousand could tell you even the name of any of the late Commanders-in-chief; and yet the former officers have all been dead for more than half a century; but then they had served long in India, spoke the language, and had made themselves known to the men.

Q. 5. "The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's."

There are no doubt some little jealousies between the King's and Company's armies in consequence of the separation. This has much increased of late years, from the greater number of His Majesty's regiments serving in India, and more particularly from their being so frequently changed. It is notorious that all Europeans arrive in India with a prejudice against, and a contempt for, the Natives, but which gradually wears off. This is bad enough in the cadet in the Company's service, but it is much worse in the officer of rank in the King's; unfortunately too, it generally lasts much longer in the latter. The King's officer comes out with high notions of his own service, and with a rooted contempt for that of the Company, and of the Natives of which it is chiefly composed. He is not only ignorant of the troops of which he takes the command, but, for a length of time, not at all disposed to listen to the advice of those who do know them. The incorporation of the two armies would manifestly be attended with advantage, if done on liberal principles; care being taken to guard the interests of the officer who is spending his life on active service in a distant land, and who is in consequence precluded from making himself known at head-quarters, and above all things, care being taken to secure to the Native troops officers who have been trained up with them. Should this arrangement take place, it would be most advisable to have a colonial European, as well as Native army. No modern change has been attended with so many evils as the more frequent reliefs of regiments from Europe. The loss of life is greater, expense much increased, and efficiency diminished. The deaths in His Majesty's troops are now much more numerous, in proportion to numbers, than formerly. The mode of living and management altogether is quite different in India from what it is in Europe. Recruits, on joining from England, are immediately distributed into messes with the old soldiers, and are thus at once initiated into all that relates to health and comfort; but it is very different with a newly arrived regiment, where all, from the commanding officer to the drummer boy, are equally ignorant, and not only ignorant, but not disposed to take advice, looking upon themselves as much fitter to give than to receive such. The misery which results from this state of things is great, and the consequent loss of life frequently very great. The new regiment is quite unfit for field service for a length of time, and sometimes scarcely fit for garrison duty. The grievance of the system is not confined to the relieving corps, but extends to the relieved one, few of whose officers or men, with the exception perhaps of those very lately

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(11.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

\* Appendix (H.)

† Appendix (I.)

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(11.)—Reply  
of Capt. Bulmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

lately arrived in India, would wish to quit the country. All the officers, however, and all the men above a certain age are obliged to quit; although for the service in India they are each of them at least equal to two of the new comers. A very great expense for passage is thus incurred, not only without any advantage, but with many and great disadvantages. It may be very well that all the officers of the King's army should have their turn of the commands and good things of India, and that the Horse Guards should have its share of patronage and of promotion occasioned by the reliefs; but even these things may be obtained at too high a price. Were Commanders-in-chief and general officers selected from those who had previously served in India, and were they continued longer in employment, and were all the troops made colonial, it would tend much to efficiency, good spirit, and economy.

Q. 6. "Whether there would be any saving of expense if the Company's army were placed under the King's Ministers?"

I do not see that the placing of the Company's army under the King's Ministers would be attended with any considerable alteration of establishments, or in the plans for recruiting, pensioning, &c. The present staff of His Majesty's forces in India would be dispensed with, but it is not numerous. The present mode of appointing and educating cadets appears to be unobjectionable.

Q. 7. "Whether advantage or disadvantage might be expected from the settlement of British subjects in India?"

I am inclined to think that advantage may be expected from the settlement of British subjects in India. At present there is no connecting link between the European official servant, whether civil or military, and the Native of India; they meet, as it were, at a point for the transaction of business; but as to what is called friendship, or even acquaintanceship, there is no such thing, and we still know almost nothing of our Indian subjects. They look upon us all as birds of passage, come among them to make money, and with no other view or desire than that of quitting them as soon as possible; a settler would be regarded in a different light, and a series of good offices would take place between them, which would soon generate kindlier feelings. The French colonised, and there is much more intimacy between them and the Natives than there is between the British and their subjects. The settlers, too, might soon be employed as justices of the peace near their respective residencies, which would tend to make justice cheap and speedy. The expense of the voyage, the nature of the climate, and the low rate of wages would effectually prevent the working classes of Europeans from emigrating, so that there is no fear of taking the bread out of the mouths of the Indian population, as is dreaded by some people: the result would therefore only be the transfer of European skill and capital to the East. The chief thing to be guarded against will be the oppression of the Natives by the settlers, particularly on their first arrival. This is an evil which will probably decrease after a time, but it must be well attended to at first. The entrance of some of the emigrants into the service of Native States, is looked upon as an evil likely to occur. It will take place to a certain extent, but I should look to it without much dread. I ascribe the rapid downfall of the Mahratta States and others chiefly to the employment of Europeans in their armies, and the consequent introduction into them of European drill and tactics. An army composed of masses of horse, such as that of Hyder, or the Mahrattas in former days, is not to be come at by a regular force; but give them infantry and guns, and they can then be brought to action. It is consequently much better for us that the Native princes should spend their time and their money in the formation of such a description of force, to the entire neglect of their horse, which is the inevitable result. The settlement of Europeans might, with advantage probably, be limited for a time to certain districts, so as to form a chain of colonies, extending gradually over our Indian empire.

Q. 8. "What would be the effect of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief?"

Nothing

Nothing but good is to be expected from having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief: efficiency and economy may be looked for as the certain result of such a measure. It would probably be necessary to have a more central seat of Government than Calcutta.

**Q. 9.** "How far the existing system of government, as fixed by Parliamentary enactment, is productive of good or evil?"

Few of the arrangements regarding the Indian army are, I believe, fixed by Parliamentary enactment. The restriction upon promotion to the rank of general officers, except upon the occurrence of a brevet at home, is injudicious. The Indian army may be considered as always employed on service, and promotion ought to be adapted to such a state of things. The limitations on the Order of the Bath are not applicable to the Indian service, where the command of a lieutenant-colonel is equal to that of a lieutenant-general in Europe; *all* the advanced and subsidiary forces are commanded by colonels or lieutenant-colonels. These consist of from 5,000 to 10,000 men each, and are always the first to be employed on active service. It would be of advantage to the army if its interests were placed more under the safeguard of Parliament.

I shall here conclude. On looking over what I have written, the information conveyed appears very meagre, but I have been obliged to limit myself as much as possible; many subjects, and those too of the most importance, have been scarcely noticed; but then they are those which have probably undergone great alteration since I quitted India. I shall affix a short Appendix, containing a few facts bearing on some of the opinions advanced.

I have, &c.

F. N. BALMAIN.

Rosebank, Roslin, 31st March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(14.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

#### Appendix (A.)

THERE is much that is inexplicable about the conduct of the Native soldiers at this time. I was with General Gillespie at the re-capture of Vellore, and the Native cavalry acted as decidedly, and, to all appearance, as zealously as the European dragoons; and yet there cannot be a doubt but that the conspiracy was known to them. We had moved from Arcot very suddenly, and some of my men had been left behind; these of their own accord followed, and joined on the line of march. The probability is, that although they had refused to join in the conspiracy, yet they would not betray it. In consequence of the transactions of that day, the Native infantry have looked upon the cavalry with no good will.

#### Appendix (B.)

I WAS in attendance on the late Sir John Abercrombie when he reviewed the 2d battalion 14th regiment of Madras Native infantry in 1813, and I heard him tell the commanding officer, Captain King, that he had never in his life witnessed so fine a performance.

#### Appendix (C.)

SOON after I was appointed superintendent of the manufactory of gunpowder at Madras, I discovered that considerable improvements and reductions might be made. On proposing them, however, to the Military Board, I met with nothing but discouragement; being told that my predecessors had been very able men, that the system worked admirably, and that I had better "let well alone." I persevered, nevertheless, and succeeded. The result was, an improvement in the quality of the powder, an increase in the quantity made, and a great decrease in the price. The increase in strength was 15 per cent., and in quantity 36 cent.; the decrease in price was from 7½d. to 4½d. per lb. The reduction in the number of people was 175, and of cattle 85. The total saving

was

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(14.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

was stated by Government to amount to rupees 99,450 per annum. I however, received no reward on this account, being actually allowed less than either my predecessors or successor. The late Sir Thomas Munro most strongly recommended to the Court of Directors that I should at least be made equal to them, but it was not attended to. This is but poor encouragement for reform and retrenchment—always a disagreeable and invidious business.

#### Appendix (D.)

A BATCH of about 120 recruits, who had been raised for general service, was made over to me for my regiment in 1806. On inspection, I deemed at least 100 of them unfit for the service. After a rigorous examination 50 were instantly discharged, and, eventually, only about 20 remained in the service. These men had received from one to three years' pay, from 10*l.* to 30*l.* each, so that 2,000*l.* were thus thrown away upon one batch of recruits for one regiment.

#### Appendix (E.)

COLONEL DICKSON, of the same regiment as myself, has not, I believe, more than completed his time; but by having taken several furloughs, he has got his regiment, and I am a captain.

#### Appendix (F.)

WHEN I joined the 6th regiment of Madras cavalry, in 1801, it was stationed by itself. It was in the highest order, and allowed, I believe, to be the smartest corps in the service. Great attention, was paid to horse exercise and discipline of all kinds, but off duty there was much indulgence. Every attention was paid to the comfort and happiness of the men; and they used to join with the officers at cricket and other amusements. The officers occasionally gave a feast to the men; and they were invited, and used to attend the feasts of the men. In short, all was good humour and happiness, such, as, I fear, does not now exist even in a single corps.

#### Appendix (G.)

THIS regiment took the field in November 1802, and served the campaigns of 1803 and 1804. It was kept in the field in the Mahratta country till the middle of 1805, without any relief; the men entirely separated from their families, exposed to all the inclemency of the weather, both in the monsoons and hot seasons, with no protection but old worn-out tents; the clothing almost falling from their backs; food scarce, bad, and dear; half the men dead, and the remainder sickly. Towards the close, I was major of brigade to a brigade of four regiments; and at one time we could only turn out on parade two European officers and 800 men. During the whole three years we had been in the midst of the troops of Native powers, friends and foes, when it was discovered that a plan for deserting to Holkar had been formed by a part of the regiment; the number was about 50, and many of them were the smartest and finest men. They were headed by a jemadar, who had been long stationed at Seringapatam. There was not a corps in the service where such a thing was less likely to have happened; the men were on the best terms with their officers, but still they had not been able to resist the long-continued attempts upon their fidelity, aided by the flattering promises of advancement which had been held out to them.

#### Appendix (H.)

ON a quarrel occurring at Arcot in 1805, between the European horse artillery and the 7th regiment of Native cavalry, the 19th dragoons turned out and took part with the Natives against the Europeans. This regiment (the 19th) was on the best and most intimate terms with all the Native cavalry. Its departure from India was much lamented by all parties. A report at one time prevailed that it was to be transferred to the Company's service, and it appeared to afford great pleasure to the corps.

Appendix

## Appendix (I.)

In 1806, I was with a large force of cavalry, under the late General Gillespie, on march to Madras; on encamping at the mount, all the Natives applied for a parade leave to pay a visit to the picture of Sir Eyre Coote. The General, who had just arrived in India, was much surprised. He went himself to the Exchange, where the picture was, a distance of eight miles, and there he saw the men arrive in crowds. They entered the room, made three low salams to the picture, stood with their eyes fixed on it for a few minutes, and then making three more salams retired. Most of them were probably grandsons of the men who had served under Sir Eyre.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(14.)—Reply  
of Capt. Balmain,  
31st Mar. 1832.

(15.)—REPLY of Major-general Sir H. WORSLEY, K. C. B., dated 30th March 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE now the honour to forward such observations as have occurred to me in reference to your communication of the 8th ultimo.

They have been delayed owing to a very impaired state of health, (which, I fear, may preclude me the honour on attending to the Committee) as well as by the diffidence I now feel on the occasion, consequent to the length of time that has elapsed since my return from India, and the gradual decay of my communications and relative associations with the service.

I can only add, that I have given to the subject all the solicitude and best attention in my power, no less influenced by a sense of duty to the Board, than by feelings of pride, gratitude, and affection, toward the most interesting, and, I believe, the most enviable military service in the world.

I have, &c.  
(Signed)HENRY WORSLEY, Major-general,  
Bengal Infantry.Shide Hill, Newport, Isle of Wight,  
30th March 1832.(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

**Q. 1.** "The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies of India."

As far as I am able to judge in my present remote retirement, the present "distribution" of the army of Bengal is well adapted to the circumstances of a time of peace (though in a geographical point of view, the post of Mhow, and perhaps of Neemuch, are more suitably contiguous to the Bombay Presidency); and the "organization" thereof may be pronounced suitable to the present times and circumstances of the world;\* but to make the scale and number of European officers real and efficient for regimental duty, further

\* It may however, I think, be safely pronounced, that the Native troops were never more efficient perhaps, and certainly never more faithful to Government, or so contented and attached to their officers, as on the old patriarchal system of times past, when corps were commanded by a captain or a major, who, being always old officers, experienced in the language, habits, and feelings of the men, and these duly appreciated, never failed to secure respect for authority and mutual attachment; the sole authority, management, payment, promotion, &c., being thus concentrated in one person (divided authority is not congenial to the usages of their country). It was under such system that they were eminently distinguished for "effective valor and incomparable fidelity, when they marched through hostile and unknown regions, from the banks of the Ganges to the western coast of India, the Coast of Coromandel," &c., with a bazaar establishment voluntarily and gratuitously attached to each corps, which amply supplied all the purposes of a commissariat, without any expense whatsoever to Government (see "Williams's Bengal N. I.," published by Murray in 1817), and often supplied the troops with provisions on credit when the exigencies of Government caused them to be four, five, or six months in arrears of pay.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

further means seem requisite to obviate, the scale being but nominally so, consequent to the number employed on the staff and out of the line of regimental duty and on furlough in Europe.

One material drain of officers from their proper regiments is the number doing duty with local corps. To remedy this, I would suggest that, the Ramgurh battalion, a very useful and necessary corps, should be officered on the scale of a regiment. In like manner, the three corps, denominated the Sirmoor and the first and second Nussaree battalions, should constitute another, or the Highland regiment.

The pioneers should also be regimented into two regiments at the least. The first to be composed of sappers and miners, and officered from the engineer corps; the other, or pioneers and artificers, by officers to be taken, in the first instance, from the several branches of the service.

The local corps on the Assam, Sylhet, and Chittagong frontiers to form another regiment.

The corps of local horse, suppose there to be now six or eight in the service, to form two regiments of light or hussar cavalry on their present footing, which renders them peculiarly adapted for desultory warfare, for which, at less expense, they are far more efficient than regular cavalry, combining a great saving in the wear and tear of the latter. Thus the number of officers now lent to, or doing duty with, the local or unofficered corps abovementioned would be restored to regimental duty; and the efficiency of those troops be materially improved and confirmed.

A further means would be, the forming the commissariat into a staff corps, on the scale of a regiment and the Quartermaster-general's department, with the Surveyor and Topographical departments into another regiment. But to this plan, objection might be urged, that it would have the effect of curtailing the range of patronage and selection, and thus diminish the incitement to emulation, by confining all those staff appointments or "good things of the service," to that limited portion thereof.

In regard to the present "strength" of the army, it occurs to me that, viewed in connexion with the sweeping reduction that has been made in the number of provincial corps,\* the rank and file of the Native infantry has been reduced to a very low scale, and unless the place and duties of the disbanded provincials has been supplied by Natives armed and employed after the manner of the country, rather than by employing the regular Native troops, on jail and convict and other civil duties, offensive to their feeling, irksome to their habits, and by the increased or incessant demand on them for duties tending to abridge the requisite portion of time for discipline and periods of relaxation, most especially that greatest of all their indulgences, a periodical routine of furlough to visit their families, to contract marriages and regulate their domestic concerns.

Any of these evils are greatly to be deprecated, and so must be the extensive disbanding of the provincial corps, or reduction in the strength of the regulars, in proportion as such measures may be conducive to them.

For the purposes of service or war I should deem it very desirable to have a larger proportion of troops armed and organized as light infantry.† Nor can I omit the opportunity for observing, that I have always considered the musket in general use for the infantry as cruelly heavy, burthensome, and unwieldy for that country, when it is recollected that the Native soldier's inferior stamina is moreover loaded with a pouch calculated to carry sixty rounds of balled cartridges (forty would be abundant for every occasion) a heavy laden knapsack, containing all his necessities, often including cooking utensils; not

\* The command of provincial corps is very properly conferred on invalid officers, and the adjutants of such corps (now taken from the line) should also be invalid subalterns, or officers seeking such appointments, from the line, should be struck off to the invalid establishment.

† In the event of war a force of excellent sharp-shooters or marksmen might be obtained by engaging the Natives of the Upper Provinces, who get their livelihood by killing game and wild animals with matchlock and ball.

not that perhaps substituting the arms generally used by the light infantry would be any great relief in point of weight; but fusils, such as artillerymen often carry, of calibre for twenty balls, instead of the present musket, of fourteen balls to the pound, would probably be a great relief, and more effectual for execution, in proportion as the men would be more master of the weight.

Considering the pioneers one of the most necessary and useful branches of the service, I am a most earnest advocate for their increase\* and permanent efficiency. In war they are of the first necessity; in peace always useful, refunding a good deal of their cost, by their labour and works performed.

Q. 4. "The constitution of the several branches of the army with reference to its experienced or probable effects :

1st. On its efficiency.

2d. On the economy with which it is provided.

3d. The spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing it."

The reply to these queries may be considered as in some measure anticipated in what has been before observed with respect to the reduced scale of the several branches of the service generally, which can be deemed, I presume, as alone adequate to a time of peace; to the present too low scale of pioneers, and the advantages of a larger light infantry force, as peculiarly adapted to warfare in that country.

With respect to the economy with which it is provided or maintained, it is, I apprehend, on the lowest possible scale, considering the vast empire over which it is employed, and there seems reason to apprehend that an overstrained attention to economy, on occasions which call for favourable consideration, is too likely to operate injuriously on "the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing the army."

In making these observations, I have in my eye the late measure of half batta, in regard to the European officers, and in reference to the Native troops, the lamentable mutiny, as it was called, of the 47th regiment of Native infantry at Barrackpore in 1824.

The saving to be derived from the former measure must be as nothing, compared with the spirit of discontent, apprehension, and dismay with which it seems to have pervaded the whole army, as well those who are liable to its operation as those who are not.

With regard to the pay and allowances of the Native soldiers, it is at this day the very same in amount as when it was first fixed, which was in so early a period of our establishment in that country, that in a code of Pay Regulations, published by the Military Auditor-general in 1810, it is stated, "that the same rates as therein stated of pay and batta have been always passed to the Native troops, but that no record of the authority establishing them in the first instance is any where to be found."†

It may be safely assumed that since the early period of time in question, all necessaries of food and raiment have risen from 50 to 100 per cent. 2dly. That the country then occupied was bounded by the Currumnassah river, progressively extended to the Vizier's dominions, and now bounded by the river Sutledge and the deserts of Bujkancer; and that in like manner have the labours and duties, and the wear and tear consequent on distant marches, in peace as well as in war, proportionally increased, with expense and inconvenience, enhanced in many cases where water carriage cannot be employed for the conveyance of the baggage, families, &c. of the troops.

I should suggest, that on all occasions of foreign war, when troops pass the boundary of

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1830.

\* The necessity for increase of this useful branch cannot perhaps be better exemplified than by the fact (and mark the delay and the expense), that during the Burmese war a portion of that small corps was drawn from Agra, &c. on the north-west frontier, to join the force assembled at Sylhet, the nether end of Bengal.

† Nor do the Native troops ever receive any bounty on enlistment, whilst on every relief or change of station they have to provide quarters at their own expense.



APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

of the Honourable Company's territories, or those of allied or protected States, one rupee per man per month should be added to the batta of the private soldier; and in proportion to the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers. This, or rather, similar benefit, by supplying grain (the food of the Native soldier) from Government store at a cheaper rate than it could be otherwise procured, has been often granted; and I believe something of the same kind was authorized for some of the troops employed in the Burmese war, but too late, perhaps, to carry with it any of that grace and gratification which would have resulted from a more gratuitous and early adoption of the measure. This might be termed marching allowance, to which indeed, as aiding the means of conveying the baggage of the troops, it is more essentially applicable and necessary.

The want of a permanent establishment of carriage cattle for the baggage of the Native troops is a great evil, and must prove a great drawback to the efficiency and comfort of the troops until provided for.

Such a measure might be readily accomplished by the twofold operation of a regimental subscription fund by the men, with some collateral aid from Government, towards which the batta of all who go on furlough, which remains with Government (that is, is never drawn for the men) and the proceeds of all deserters' arrears, and of all unclaimed estates of deceased men, which goes to the Government treasury, might be very suitably applied, as also the amount of unclaimed prize money.

With regard to the proportion of European and of Native troops, the present scale, taking into account the maximum number of 20,000 of His Majesty's troops for all India, may, I conceive, be deemed suitable to all the purposes of internal and peace arrangements, and for any warfare that may arise in India short of invasion from Europe.

The Company's European infantry has been frittered away to a very low scale, with what view I am not aware; but it would perhaps be better, rather than maintain it on such a contracted scale, to abolish it altogether. They have always, however, done their duty and the extinction of such force would be felt as plucking a feather from the cap of the Company's officers; whilst some European corps on that footing could be maintained at less expense than a corresponding number of His Majesty's infantry, as the expense of relieving them from Europe, as practised with the corps of His Majesty's service, would be saved; and they would, or might, on emergency, be found more efficient for service than His Majesty's corps, from being permanently employed in, and injured to, the climate of the country.

In the Mysore war of 1790-92, two companies of royal artillery (200 men), direct from Europe, joined the army in Mysore, under Earl Cornwallis; but on reaching Seringapatam they were reduced, by sickness and death, almost to nominal aid only.

Another word with respect to "the spirit and disposition of the men" composing the Native army.

It will be no disparagement of any other troops to say, that hitherto the Native army of India has never been surpassed for fidelity to the Government, and attachment to their officers; nor "yielded to those of any other nation in point of discipline and effective valour." But it is, I fear, too true, that there is, in some respects, a falling off from its former excellence, as it regards inclination to enter the service on the part of the same respectable classes that formerly sought it with avidity; nor does the same spirit of contentment and satisfaction seem to prevail.\* They seem to have lost much

---

\* I have now been too long absent from regimental intercourse to be able to state what may be all the causes for this unfavourable change; but I can confidently quote the frequent great pressure of duties; distant stations and long marches, precluding sufficient opportunity for furlough to visit their families; increase of expenditure for food, &c. not leaving the same means as formerly for saving from their pay, and making remittances to their families. See Williams's Bengal Native Infantry, pages 252 to 264, as to causes for change in the feelings and attachment to the service of the Native soldiery.

much of their characteristic purity and simplicity of manners, by which their moral and military virtues were formerly enhanced. They are, nevertheless, the most orderly, respectful and obedient soldiers in the world; and I fervently trust and hope they will not fail to continue so to the end of time, provided their habits and prejudices are duly attended to; by which their attachment and fidelity has hitherto been secured, and a lesson taught to after ages, "that their lives may be commanded through the medium of their affections."

It was lately observed, by a young officer embarking to join one of His Majesty's regiments in India, that they were all ordered to join, as he understood they were wanted for, and that the object and duties of His Majesty's troops in India was to keep the Native army in order. I need not say how preposterous it would be to entertain, and how dangerous to propagate, any such idea; or ever to let it enter into the calculation for apportioning the amount of His Majesty's troops for the duties of India.

The effect of the separation of the Honourable Company's army from the King's, &c.

I consider it highly beneficial that the separation as at present should be maintained. It serves to excite a mutual spirit of emulation, and thereby to promote the "efficiency and good spirit" of both.\*

The peculiar circumstances of that vast empire require that the main army for its protection and defence should be constituted with reference to local considerations, and that its officers should possess all the advantages and requisite qualifications, to be acquired by a regular gradation through all the ranks and stages of the service; nor am I aware that any more economical result could be derived in the "general provision and appropriation of supplies and army arrangements," by a transfer of the immediate management and control to His Majesty's Ministers, whilst, on the contrary, it seems fair to conclude that the undivided and habitual attention of the Court of Directors, their local knowledge and peculiar acquirements generally, combined with the especial interest they must feel in doing right, and the check and control of supervising authorities restraining them from doing wrong, bids fair to justify the belief that any fundamental change in the present system of government for that great empire, or in the organization and management of its army, is more likely to be prejudicial to its interests, or to endanger its welfare, than to produce any beneficial result whatsoever.

What the probable effect of having the whole Indian army under one Governor, and one Commander-in-chief.

The frequent change of the Commander-in-chief in India is a great bane of the Honourable Company's army. No sooner has one Commander-in-chief become sufficiently acquainted with the peculiar characteristics of the service, and the characters, qualifications, and merits of the officers, than he is succeeded by another, whose tour is again occupied in the like probationary acquirements, liable, in the mean time, to be in error, if not inclined to take advice, or in doing so to be too much dependent on the opinions, &c. of those who may constitute the general and personal staff at head-quarters.

As a remedy for this I should be disposed to suggest that there should be a Commander-in-chief for all India, appointed from His Majesty's service as at present, to exercise a general authority and control; and that there be a provincial Commander-in-chief, or Commander of the Forces, at each Presidency, to be filled by the senior officer of the Honourable Company's service, for conducting the details of the army.

The patronage, in such case, might thus be defined :

The

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

\* Whilst, on the other hand, it may be viewed as salutary to keep alive separate views and interests to a certain extent, thereby precluding a spirit of combination or collusion for any improper purpose in that remote quarter of the globe.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

The Commander-in-chief in India to have in his gift all the appointments to staff situations usually held by His Majesty's officers in India, and for the heads of the following officers or departments of the Honourable Company's service, *viz.* Adjutant-general, Quartermaster-general, Commissary-general, Military Auditor-general, Surveyor-general,\* Judge Advocate-general, and Principal Commissary of Ordnance, to be recommended by the provincial Commanders-in-chief, through the Commander-in-chief in India, to the Governments of Presidencies respectively, with which, as at present, the nomination to such appointments finally rests: or on every such vacancy, the names of two officers possessing requisite qualifications, &c. might be submitted to the Commander-in-chief in India for his selection and recommendation to the Government. The Commander-in-chief in India to pass a year, in succession, at each of the three Presidencies, and to have a seat in Council at each when present.

The remainder of the army patronage to rest with the respective provincial Commanders-in-chief, under the rules at present in force, but with this positive regulation, that every regimental staff appointment shall be made only on the recommendation of the officer commanding regiments and corps respectively, in which case also the names of two officers, with statements of their qualifications, merits, &c. might be submitted for selection by the provincial Commanders-in-chief.

By appointing the senior officer on the staff of the Honourable Company's service at each Presidency to the office of provincial Commander-in-chief, with the addition, say of a moiety of the allowances granted to major-generals on the staff, a seat in Council, and the local rank of lieutenant-general (if not already holding that rank), the disadvantages of want of local information and experience would be obviated, even if it be deemed advisable to limit the duration of such appointment to a certain period of time, perhaps five years each, as established for the major-generals on the staff; and the present expense of two out of the three Commanders-in-chief appointed from Europe would be saved, minus the additions to be made to the allowances of the provincial Commanders-in-chief.

Considering the magnitude of our possessions, the amount of our military establishments, and the vast geographical extent of the distribution and duties, I consider it utterly impossible that the offices of Government, or those of Commander-in-chief, could be beneficially and duly administered by consolidating the executive authority and duties in the hands of one Governor or one Commander-in-chief, for all India. The several duties of each, at each Presidency, require the most ardent unremitting attention, and from their manifold character and importance render the combination of local experience and executive functions indispensably necessary at each Presidency.

Although it has in some instances, and in some of its bearings, been useful to combine the offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-chief in one person, it cannot for a moment be doubted that no human capacity of mind or body is capable of giving the requisite attention to the complication of important duties and manifold details appertaining to those responsible stations.

True it is that those united offices were administered by the late illustrious Marquis of Hastings for the protracted period of nearly ten years, as well as formerly by the illustrious Marquis Cornwallis; but our dominion and political relations have been greatly enlarged since that period; and it is equally true, that no effort of human exertion, no application of zealous devotion and ardent zeal, could have surpassed his Lordship's application to the multifarious duties by which he maintained and improved the welfare and condition of the mighty empire committed to his charge. But such incessant application could not be sustained without a great sacrifice of recreation and health; and how rare

The surveyor-general in Bengal, and the deputy surveyors-general at Madras and Bombay.

rare perhaps to be found a person combining all the amiable and enviable virtues and qualifications which adorned the character of the late Marquis of Hastings !

With respect to the query as to employing "military men in civil situations" (which should have been before adverted to), it cannot, I presume, be doubted, that where capacity and qualification is equal in other respects, the habits and opportunities of military life afford many advantages for acquiring a knowledge of political relations, revenue systems of different Provinces and States, customs and opinions prevalent in the countries within and beyond the limits of their professional avocations and intercourse ; and that the combination of the military with political, legislative, and diplomatic functions is peculiarly in accordance with the habits, usages, and feelings of the inhabitants of India, and thereby calculated to give additional influence and effect to negotiations and objects for which those characters may be advantageously combined.

Such occasional employment and distinction must moreover be highly beneficial, in cherishing a spirit of pride, emulation, and improvement in the army ; and the test of experience fully justifies, I presume, the employment of military men in diplomatic and political situations, as evinced in numerous brilliant characters and services, by which the reputation of Government and the best interests of India have been promoted and secured.

#### British subjects settling in India.

I am not aware that any "advantage to the public interests connected with the army" would be likely to result from the settlement of British subjects on the continent of India ; and if I might venture an opinion, founded on long and intimate knowledge of the habits, manners, and opinions of the Native population of the interior of India, I should most earnestly recommend, as highly necessary for the well-being and contentment of the community, and the maintenance of respect for the authority of Government and the national character, that any general or promiscuous admission of European settlers should on no account be permitted. On this point my views and opinions are most perfectly in unison with those so perspicuously expressed by Rammohan Roy, in his reply to the 49th query of his communication with the Board of Control ;\* whilst the regulated admission of Europeans of "character and capital," might doubtless prove beneficial to the prosperity and welfare of the country, and more especially so perhaps in the islands of Penang and Singapore, the settlement of Malacca, and perhaps Ceylon, and the territory acquired by the Burmah war, on the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, where there is more or less a paucity of population, with plenty of scope for speculation and enterprise, and where the prejudices and differences in habits and opinions, between Europeans and the motley race of Natives and Colonists of those possessions,† are not marked by such distinctive features of character, and religious and social peculiarities, as are fondly cherished by the primitive, inoffensive inhabitants of the continent within the Ganges. Had the island of Java been retained by the British Government, there would have been a vast field, in a delightful climate (the interior) for unbounded speculations and beneficial results in colonization and productive commerce.

#### The complexity of coins, and currency in India.

The want of an uniform standard of coinage and currency in India is a most important desideratum. The multifarious variety that still prevails is a source of confusion and trouble (to all but the money-changers and bankers), and, as it regards the payment of the troops, vexatious and injurious in its operation, which it would be wise and gracious to remedy, gratuitously as it were, before the wide-spreading spirit and deluge of democratical and inquisitorial discontent calls for it in a tone of claim or demand.

There

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

\* See Asiatic Journal for March 1832, page 228.

† But for Chinese, Malay, &c. emigrants to Penang, Malacca, &c. there would be a want of population for the concerns of those settlements ; but by proper encouragement to settlers it might doubtless be increased to any extent.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

There is, I observe, a letter on this subject in the Asiatic Journal for the present month, (March 1832) which forcibly sets forth the injurious effect, as it regards the European officers at certain stations of the army under the Bengal Presidency, by being paid in a coin which is the *currency* of the *place* (the Sicca rupee), with a deduction of something more than  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., because the said rupee is called  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. better than the Sonaut rupee; the denomination, though it may be called a nominal one, in which all the pay and allowances of the army is calculated, and *that*, in reference to the currency of England, at the rate of 2s. 6d. per Sonaut rupee. Now with regard to the private sepoy (and proportionably the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers), the difference or deduction which may be fairly pronounced an actual loss, is severely felt; more especially as it operates in situations at the Presidency, and in garrison duty more particularly, where they are more liable to harassing and uncomfortable duty, to a greater degree of sickness, and to enhanced price for the necessaries, &c. of life.

The private sepoy, in all stationary situations, receives, or should receive, seven rupees per month. At all the stations below Benares, where the Sicca rupee, or the coinage of Moorshedabad and Calcutta is current, the troops being paid in that currency, with a deduction of about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. the private sepoy, instead of seven rupees, his stipulated income, receives only 6 rupees 11 annas ( $\frac{11}{16}$ ths), and a few couries or broken shells; though the officers' servants, and the dooly bearers in the pay of Government, are paid the Sicca rupee without any deduction; and in the market and outlay of the troops, they can only obtain for their nominal income of 7 rupees, the value of 6 rupees 11 annas, being about 10d. in English currency less than their stipulated income. And though this amount, small as it may otherwise appear, is of importance out of a stipend from which they have to provide food and raiment and lodging, and the incidental charges for washing and shaving, and firing for cooking, that alone is not the criterion by which we are to estimate the evil, but rather the imputation of injustice to which it exposes the Government, and the handle which it is calculated to afford to any mischievous spirit to stir up discontent and disaffection.

It may perhaps be urged, *per contra*, that in making remittances to their families in the Upper or Inland Provinces, the men derive a countervailing advantage\* by the difference between the Sicca and the Lucnow, or Benares or Furruckabad rupees, estimated as Sonauts, in which the payment of remittances to their families are paid. But this at best is but a sorry and partial corrective of the loss, especially when it is recollected, that though many do make remittances to their families, many do not; and that the loss in question is sustained at those stations where, for reasons before stated, their means of saving is curtailed in proportion to the necessity of increased expenditure. So in the case of the European officers, the loss by them sustained occurs where they can least afford to spare it; that is, at those particular stations where half batta only is received.

The abolition of such a complicated currency has, I believe, been often under consideration, but supposed to be connected with difficulties not easily to be overcome. What those may be, I am not able to state. The influence of bankers and money-changers would of course be opposed to a measure that would interfere with their trade or profits; but, omnipotent as is the authority of the East-India Company in India, and paramount as seems the necessity for a correction of the evil, it would seem advisable to make the trial: at any rate, I cannot err in the conclusion that justice and policy equally demand the attempt, and that departments and servants of the same State, and often at the same places, should not be paid in a different currency, or, what is more to be deprecated, the same currency at a different valuation. At present, the civil servants and departments of Government are paid in *Sicca* rupees, without any deduction, at least, such I believe to be the case. We have mints in Calcutta, at Benares, and at Furruckabad, all coining under a different assay and valuation.

One

\* Or, more correctly speaking, the deducted difference is made good to them on the amount of any portion so remitted through the Government offices.

One assay and intrinsic value might be established for all these—the same measure to be extended to the other Presidencies; and it might perhaps be further desirable that the King of Oude, on the Bengal side, and any other tributary States which may have the privilege of coining, in connexion with the other Presidencies, should be prevailed on to make their currency of the same standard,\* or, at all events, not superior to that which may be adopted by the Honourable Company. I believe we still coin in the name of the Emperor of Dehly, and of course any change in the value, &c. of the coin need not involve any change in that political compliment. As the established calculation for the pay, allowances, &c. &c. of the Honourable Company's service was founded on a reference to English currency, estimating the rupee at 2s. 6d., it is desirable that the new currency should be regulated by the same principle, according to which the rupee should be of the same value as 2s. 6d., and the gold coin, or gold mohur, of the value of eight rupees, or equal to a sovereign, or one pound sterling, with any fractional proportion of coins, both silver and gold, as halves, quarters, &c., that may, by the local authorities, be found suitable; the copper coin to be apportioned accordingly, making thirty-two pieces of copper, or sixteen, as may be deemed best, for each rupee: perhaps the smaller coin, or the greater number, would be most useful.

On this subject of coins and currency generally, I would suggest reference to be made to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, late Governor of Bombay, by whom (when Commissioner at Poonah, &c.) some salutary regulations were promulgated, tending to abate the evil of a mixed and complex currency, and the iniquitous trade and imposition connected with it.

In July 1826 there was a debate in the East-India Court of Proprietors, the minutes of which may throw some light on the subject.

The existing system of government, its influence on the army in so far as may depend on Parliamentary enactment, compared with any changes which have been or may be suggested, &c.

Not possessing information as to any changes that may have been of late, or may be now suggested or contemplated, I do not venture any observations on this important bearing of the inquiry, further than to state I am not aware that any fundamental change in the system of government, direction and control of the army would be likely to be beneficial to the State, or to the welfare or efficiency of the army.

I embrace this opportunity of pointing attention to the Articles of War for His Majesty's service, in which, according to the latest copy to which I have present access, see Article 2, of section 22, by which His Majesty's officers might still claim precedence of the Company's officers, although, since the year 1783, the latter have been admitted to equality of rank, according to the dates of their commissions.

I am at a loss to conceive why this Article, invidious in its aspect, and virtually abrogated by practice, should still be continued in the annual revision of that code. Occasions might occur, and an instance did come to my knowledge, that happened on board-ship, where an officer of His Majesty's service, on occasion of a court-martial, insisted on the officers of the Honourable Company's service, who were members of the court, taking rank under those of His Majesty's service, according to the tenor of that Article, although the commissions of the former were of prior date.

When in office in Bengal, I endeavoured to trace the record of the authority for admitting the Honourable Company's officers to equality of rank with those of His Majesty's service, which rule was promulgated in India in the year 1787, I think, during the government of the illustrious and noble Marquis Cornwallis, with reference of date to the  
cessation

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

\* Because a considerable portion of our troops stationed in Oude and contiguous posts, are, I believe, paid in the Lurnow rupee or Sonaut. Our relations with that country are so blended, that it is necessary there should be but one currency, or, if more, of but one and the same standard and valuation, to obviate the inconveniences of different currencies under one and the same Government.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

cessation of hostilities at Cuddalore in 1783, on which occasion, I believe, his Lordship published in general orders, a warrant or document communicating His Majesty's most gracious consideration and favour thus conferred on the Honourable Company's officers, signed by the then Secretary at War, or Secretary of State for the War Department.

It seems now time to bring these desultory observations to a close. I fear they will be deemed to partake more of the character of minor details, than the more important general features indicated by the queries proposed. But from the length of time that has elapsed since my more immediate intercourse with India, and its relative associations, and from the constant tendency to change which so especially marks the present era, I do not feel competent, in my present retirement and seclusion from public life, to offer any thing more to the purpose. But before I conclude I crave leave to add, what I have in time past advanced, as opportunity permitted, the following suggestions, as calculated to promote and cherish the fidelity and attachment of the Native army of India, no less justly due to them in reference to their long and faithful services to the British Government, now three quarters of a century, since the battle of Plassey, than called for by imperative considerations of wisdom and policy, with reference to the great changes which have taken place during that period, as essentially necessary for the maintenance and security of our mighty empire in the East.

In aid of the Native soldiers' income, I would suggest that they should be furnished with knapsacks and with watch cloaks (ten per company or troop of the latter might suffice\*), and if the Honourable Company demur at the expense, it must be defrayed by the off-reckoning fund, in aid of which, or to cover in part this additional demand on that fund, perhaps the Honourable Company would forego the ten per cent. which is at present charged on the invoice price of the woollens supplied from Europe, for the clothing of the army.

There is no scale in the Native army for increase of pay to the privates, according to length of service, as prevails in His Majesty's service. I would suggest that after ten or twelve years' service, the privates who should not then have obtained promotion should have an additional rupee per month. The increase of expense would be inconsiderable, whilst the measure would have a very beneficial influence. Generally speaking, after that period of service, men, if not promoted, become dissatisfied or indifferent, and many take their discharge. It is to be observed, they have neither bounty on first enlisting, nor any at any subsequent period in the way of renewal, however long their service. A permanent regulation for half or quarter pay to the widows (or orphans to a certain age) of all Native officers, non-commissioned and privates, who may be actually killed in action, or die of wounds.

One month's full batta should be allowed to all ranks, European and Native, whenever any post or station is relinquished (this does not often happen), as compensation for houses and huts, which, under other circumstances of relief of corps, are sold to the relieving troops.

The indulgence of furlough is of the highest importance. To provide for this, I should be disposed to suggest, as I have formerly done, that the strength of corps should be increased beyond what might be otherwise deemed an adequate scale, so as to allow of a certain number being absent throughout the year. For instance, considering the effective or necessary strength for all the duties required to be ten non-commissioned and 100 privates per company, I should propose twelve non-commissioned and 110 privates,† so as to allow of two of the former and ten of the latter to be absent in turn for nine months of the year, or the whole year, according to local circumstances and the requisite attention to discipline and periodical inspection; but when, in spite of all those considerations which influence my mind in this respect, I learn that instead of any such scale of increase, the strength

\* As articles of Government supply.

† With corresponding proportion according to the established strength of Native cavalry and other Native corps.

strength of companies is reduced to little more than half the scale I should advocate, I feel overwhelmed with despair, and disheartened as to the utility of any observations in my power to offer, which probably, as contrasted with passing events in India, resulting from what has been termed "the economizing mania that now prevails in all quarters of the globe", might reasonably be considered as influenced by delusion.

In the "Oriental Herald for August 1825,"\* there is a very succinct statement, under the head of "The Existing Discontents in the Indian Army," to which I would respectfully suggest attention. The facts and reasoning it contains appear to me for the most part to be strictly just and judicious.

But for the discouraging impressions above adverted to, I should be disposed to recommend an increased organization of Native invalid corps, by which various duties might be usefully and adequately performed, instead of a host of out-pensioners who render no service of any kind: but whilst I am writing, I am doubtful whether one or both of the only two battalions of Native invalids which appertained to the Bengal Presidency have not lately been abolished.

The foregoing observations and suggestions, it will be remarked are mainly applicable to the establishment of Bengal, as I do not feel competent to offer any particular opinions with respect to the other Presidencies.

In respect to the "present rules relative to pay, furlough, and retirement," I have little to offer. It is, doubtless, advisable that the troops of all the Presidencies should be on an equality with respect to pay and allowances: I believe they now generally are so, except that, I believe, the Madras Native troops have, when in the field, a much higher rate of pay than those of Bengal.

The furlough and retiring Regulations are liberal, and ought to be graciously recognized. I understand there was lately agitated in Bengal a plan for establishing a scale of retiring pay, according to length of service, without reference to rank alone; and that it had for its object to solicit the home authorities to adopt such plan; which was to combine an army subscription with the Government allowance, in order to improve the income, and thus induce officers to retire, thereby accelerating promotion. If the latter object should be deemed expedient, the proposition seems calculated to promote it.

In cases of tardy promotion, it might be subject for gracious consideration to allow officers who, after twenty-two years' actual service in India, should not have attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel regimentally, to retire on the full-pay of that rank.

March 30 1832.

(Signed) HENRY WORSLEY.

(16.)—REPLY of Lieutenant-colonel BAKER, dated London, 29th February 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, and before replying to the several points to which it calls my attention, I beg to submit that my experience in India, though an infantry officer, was not confined to any particular branch or department of the army in Bengal, but has extended to almost all of them; that, with exception to six years' employment, from 1811 to 1816 inclusive, in the island of Java, my service has been confined to the Bengal army and provinces. I served three years as assistant-secretary in the Military department of the Supreme Government,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(15.)—Reply  
of Major-general  
Sir H. Worsley,  
30th March 1832.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

\* This work is no longer published, and in its day was not, perhaps, generally approved; but the paper alluded to is evidently not the production of the Editor, but of a person possessing very accurate knowledge of the past and present circumstances of the service, and written, no doubt, with good intention, and a just sense of regard for, and what is due to, the best interests of the State and the army, on which that empire so mainly depends.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
20th Feb. 1832.

ment, under the Marquis of Hastings, the Honourable John Adam, and Earl Amherst from 1822 to 1825. My service has been seventeen years eleven months with various regiments; seven years nine months in diverse staff employ; three years and three months on furlough to Europe; and nine months on first and last passage out and home; or twenty-nine years eight months up to my return on retirement from the service.

2. I now proceed to answer the several heads of your inquiry, or at least to give such reference to public or other records, as will convey to the Commons' Committee on East-India Military Affairs the fullest information.

3. (I. & III.) "The past and present strength, distribution, and organization" of the armies of the three Presidencies, with the parallel question under the third head of your inquiry, can be much more satisfactorily ascertained from the Regulations of 8th January 1796, and of 1st May 1824, and from the "Annual Distribution Returns" of the several Presidencies, which are sent home from the Military department of each Government as soon as received from the adjutant-generals' offices, than from any account I could give.

4. In regard to the "distribution" of the several armies, if not their "strength and organization" also, the fluctuations have been so great and frequent, as to leave hardly a possibility of condensing this information, "past and present," into an abstract form. Every war, or rumour of war, and almost every letter in the Military department from England, has produced some change or other in all those particulars. In regard to the organization of the Bengal army, from its origin in 1756, some valuable information may be obtained from the proceedings of the East-India officers from 1793 to 1796, of which a copy has been sent to the Chairman of the Military Committee; at page 31 in particular. The paper accompanying, marked (A.), contains an abstract of the actual strength of the Bengal army since the late reductions. Its *actual organization* I shall refer to in replying to the 2d and 4th queries, regarding the staff, with the constitution and efficiency of the force.

5. (II.) "The Staff and Subsidiary departments" are almost a copy of those attached to the British forces, but on a scale comparatively much smaller than would be allotted to any European army; and with three remarkable differences from all others, arising from their peculiar position and circumstances. 1. That all the staff is borrowed from the effective officers of regiments; 2. That even the Civil departments of the army are filled by officers taken from the effective strength of regiments; 3. That the places of those officers taken for the staff, &c. are not filled up by promotions. An abstract of the Bengal Staff and Civil departments, up to my leaving it in January 1831, will be found in the enclosure marked (B.)

6. (II. & IV.) I will now try to discuss the efficiency of that staff, and what alterations, if any, are practicable or necessary, in view to the improvement and to the peculiar constitution of the Indian army as regards the officers, which may, blending your 2d and 4th queries, be summed up thus:

(a) The original appointment of all its officers, as cadets, by the Directors of the East-India Company in England.

(b) That those cadets go out at their own expense to their several Presidencies, and neither take rank nor receive pay before their arrival.

(c) That once landed they are entirely at the disposal of the local Governments and Commanders-in-chief.

(d) That they are posted to corps as 2d lieutenants, cornets, or ensigns, by the respective Commanders-in-chief, only as vacancies occur, and in strict order of seniority on the lists sent out from the India House, in the regiments of engineers, artillery, cavalry, or infantry.

(e) That, by the Regulations of 1796, those belonging to the corps of engineers and artillery rise to the rank of colonel regimentally, and by regular gradation; as those corps, whatever be their number of battalions, form each but one regiment as in England.

(f) In

(f) In the cavalry and infantry the officers rise by regimental succession only to the rank of major, when the majors of each arm form but one list, and are promoted to lieutenant-colonel and colonel by seniority on each general list of cavalry and infantry.

(g) From all this it results, that in the engineers and artillery supercession cannot occur, as all retain their primary and relative places from the lowest to the highest grades; but in the cavalry and infantry (10 regiments of the former, and 76 of the latter, in Bengal), though no officer can supercede another in his own regiment, except by the operation of the sentence of a court-martial, under the New Mutiny Act, reducing an officer so many steps, yet the officers of different regiments supercede each other; and since the General Order of 1st May 1824, dividing each regiment of two battalions into distinct regiments of one battalion, this supercession has occurred to a very great extent. But once the rank of major attained, no further supercession can occur, as all must, in each branch, retain their relative places as promoted.

(h) When an officer chooses to retire after twenty-five years' service, three years being included for a furlough, the rank he has acquired in his regiment fixes the pension to which he is entitled; and whatever be his length of service, he can never be entitled to a higher retiring pension, except for wounds. By the Regulations of 1796, this rule extended even to colonels of regiments, who were compelled to retire, or to return to India within five years; but since 1804, I think, and by a clause in the last Charter, the colonels may remain at home from the time they attain that rank, retaining rank, pay, and the off-reckonings of their regiments.

(i) Hence it will be obvious, that the system of gradation promotion, by strict regimental seniority in the whole Indian army, cannot be disturbed without great injury to the mass of officers; and that the number required for the Staff and Civil departments of the armies, has of necessity, and from the peculiar organization of that army, been taken indifferently from the effective list of officers of all regiments; and has not, as in European armies, been filled up by promotions in those regiments, so as to render them effective, for the double reason, that it would give some corps an undue promotion over others, and thus influence or affect greatly the ultimate right, common to all, of the full pay pension of their regimental rank after twenty-five years' service.

7. The result is, that all plans for the entire assimilation of the Indian staff with that of the British army, either as to numbers, or by rendering it effective, and filling up their places by promotion in their regiments, have failed. Late orders from home have remedied the only inconvenience which the Governments of India, or the service itself, ever experienced or complained of; viz. the unequal pressure upon different regiments, by the demand for staff or other useful appointments, suited to our peculiar position in that country, which has no analogy elsewhere. Since the letter from the home authorities to the Supreme Government of the 25th November 1823, several other orders have, I believe, been sent out, restricting the local Governments and Commanders-in-chief from taking more than one captain out of five, and two subalterns out of twelve per regiment, for the staff or miscellaneous appointments; and no regiment can now be called upon for a *third* officer, to fill a staff or detached situation, till all other regiments have detached *two* officers in like manner.

8. This limitation on private patronage and favour I conceive to be not only highly expedient and politic, viewing the limited number of officers to each regiment, but as corrective of the only good objection to the army staff being drawn from the effective officers of corps; viz. that it was unequal in its operation, crippling some regiments at the expense of others in regard to patronage, by the inevitable effects of favour or private interest, and leaving to others similarly situated a full complement for years together. Nor was this all; for the favoured regiment, though crippled as to discipline and useful service, continued its good luck long beyond the apparent pressure, by the superior promotion arising from the earlier retirement from the service of so many staff officers, beyond a regiment less fortunate in that respect.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

9. But now that the strict limitation of officers to be taken for the staff and miscellaneous appointments of India has been enforced, founded on an approximation to the probable demands, one year with another, of one captain and two subalterns per regiment or battalion, the only thing wanting to complete the system, and to render the staff as effective as the peculiar constitution of the Indian army will permit, is to restore the subaltern officers lately taken from all regiments, and which are now really wanting in all the infantry corps in particular, as will be obvious from the comparative state of cavalry and infantry. When the army was reduced, in May 1829, to six troops the cavalry regiments, and eight companies the infantry, the extra captain was suffered to remain in all, evidently with a view to this contingency of the general staff; but three subalterns per regiment were reduced, although in the infantry, engineers, and artillery at least, they were full as necessary as the allowance of one captain for the staff.\* For the regimental staff no allowance has ever been made in the Indian army; they are taken from the effective, and really belong to, and often command, troops and companies.

10. To speak of the efficiency of the staff of the Indian army would be to undertake a history of that army. Its actions and its discipline must determine the merits of the staff, by whom in all its various departments that force has been directed or led. Suffice it to say, that springing as it does from families of every order in England, and brought up in India expressly for that service, it must possess, generally speaking, education, zeal, and ability equal at least to any other; that in reference to the peculiar duties which the creation of a Native Indian army of such magnitude imposes on that staff, in no other way than by continuance of the present system could the requisite local knowledge, or acquaintance with the languages, habits, customs, or prejudices of the materials composing it, be supplied to guide the machine.†

11. The increase of officers to the Indian army, by the restoration of the two lieutenants and one ensign taken in May 1829 from each regiment or battalion, seems to me urgently necessary in all branches, for the following reasons:—

(a) In the engineer corps, to enable it to take, gradually, its peculiar duties now performed by the officers of the line, as exhibited in the paper marked (B.); viz.

Surveyor-general's department	..	..	..	..	†13 officers.
Pioneer corps, eight companies, and staff	..	..	..	..	10 do.
Public works, cauals, and bridges	..	..	..	..	†18 do.

Engineer appointments .. 41

in addition to those they already hold, which on an establishment of 60 officers is impossible. The places already held by engineer officers, and the total required, are—

Chief

* Regiments.					
Cavalry	..	..	..	..	6 Troops.
Infantry	..	..	..	..	8 Companies.
Officers to all.					
Captains	..	..	..	..	5
Lieutenants	..	..	..	..	8
Ensigns, &c.	..	..	..	..	4
Each Regiment					17
Deduct Staff,					
Captain	..	..	1 }	..	3
Subalterns	..	..	2 }	..	
Remain					14
Cavalry, per troop	..	..	..	..	2½
Infantry, per company	..	..	..	..	1½
Including in both the regimental staff.					

† Vide "Proceedings of 1794-6," p. 14 *et infra*, and para. 25, p. 340, to the end of this letter, for certain modification in particular cases.

		now.						
Chief engineer and staff	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	2
Superintending engineers, F. O.	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	4
Executive engineers of districts	...	14	...	...	...	...	...	16
Assistants under ditto	...	11	...	...	...	...	...	16
Miscellaneous works and surveys	...	*7	...	of 38	now employed	say	*24	
Sappers & miners, 6 companies & staff	8	...	...	and pioneer corps	...	...	18	
Actually employed		...	45	Required		...	80	

which, allowing only 12 officers for furlough and sick absent, would take four battalions at 23 officers each.

(b) In the artillery, which is mostly European horse and foot, the want is not less urgent. The brigades or battalions are of four troops or companies each, excepting two Native battalions of Golundauze of eight companies each. To each of these there are but seventeen company officers, five captains, and twelve subalterns, which includes the general as well as regimental staff, furlough, &c.: fifteen captains were on the general staff, and eight on furlough, out of fifty; and I remember the head-quarters at Dum-Dum lately, with only two field officers and three captains for the regimental duty of twenty-one companies of European and Native artillery, and not two officers per company were left on an average. Some of the companies were commanded by young second lieutenants.

(c) In the Native cavalry, of which the regiments have now only six troops each, the want is less obvious; for, like the Native infantry, they have two Native officers per troop who perform all the inferior regimental duties; and admitting that they give three officers per regiment out of seventeen for the general and miscellaneous staff, there are still fourteen officers left for six troops, or of English officers two and one-third per troop, which I conceive to be ample, if effective, for any Native regiment, in addition to the Native officers. But a cavalry regiment of six troops in such a country as India, and where so much time is taken in forming a cavalry soldier, on any emergency, is too small an establishment. A corps of eight troops, or four squadrons, admit of the equal division of a regiment on occasions where a wing would be as serviceable as a regiment of the present awkward formation; and then the cavalry would require the three additional officers.

(d) To the Native infantry, which performs nearly the whole of the real and fatiguing duties of the country, the restoration of the three officers is, I conceive, indispensable to supply the deficiencies, created by the regular and constant demand for the staff and the miscellaneous duties of the country in the Political and Civil departments, and to leave them two effective British officers per company, which, with the two Native officers, is an ample allowance for every service. Even this would give but one officer for regimental staff; but as all officers will ultimately, if the existing orders are obeyed in India, be withdrawn from all the civil duties, the average of staff, &c., taken from regiments, will soon, I think, be reduced to one captain and one lieutenant per regiment; and then two subalterns will remain, extra to two officers per company, for the regimental staff, viz. adjutant, interpreter, and quartermaster, without companies, i. e. not posted as at present.

This I consider a great desideratum in the army of India, and as the one thing needful. A higher establishment than two European officers a company, if effective, I should consider a very needless expense in the Native army. But this should be allowed as early as possible.

12. (IV. 1.) In respect to the efficiency of our military force I have no hesitation in saying, that although I think it has been unnecessarily tampered with for the last twenty or twenty-four years, and particularly in the dislocation of regiments which took place in May 1824, which left a very unpleasant feeling in all the Native regiments of Bengal, a feeling which is not

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

\* Vide "Proceedings of 1791-6," p. 14 *et infra*, and para. 25, p. 340, to the end of this letter, for certain modification in particular cases.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

is not yet extinct, I do not believe that we could create any other that would work half so well, so easily and so economically as the present. I have never witnessed any backwardness in the men of the Bengal army. Quite the reverse, indeed. I have often regretted an eagerness and rashness leading to confusion, and betraying only that want of discipline or experience, which will be explained by saying, it occurred only when the men were raw and inexperienced, or when we had not an English officer to each company. With two officers a company, and the minds of the men relieved from the perpetual terror they are under of change in something or other, the Bengal army, I am persuaded, are equal to any service, or to meet any European enemy, brigaded as usual with English troops, and commanded by English officers. I have served with them against European troops in Java. We never had a doubt of success; and the conduct of the five or six Bengal regiments there during six years would have done honour to any troops before an enemy, and removed entirely any doubts that might previously have existed in the minds of His Majesty's officers present, or in those of the French and Dutch officers to whom we were opposed. The latter preferred our Bengal soldiers to their own; and for bravery and good conduct, the late General Gillespie on all occasions (as well as Lord Lake before him, and the Marquis of Hastings since) passed the warmest eulogiums on them. The former even distinguished the corps to which I then belonged (of light infantry) equally, if not beyond all the King's regiments we had in Java. If therefore (and such instances must occur in all armies) any departure from this character should occur, I will take upon me to assert, it will easily be traced to some other motive than a want of bravery or military feeling, which is in fact the distinguishing character, carried to a fault, of the race of men composing the Bengal Native army. If the Government and the Commanders-in-chief would but "let well alone," and not disgust men so easily managed, but so childish in their simplicity, and superstitiously attached to old habits, customs, and above all, to their old officers and modes of discipline, I will answer for that army more than fulfilling the expectations which led to its formation.

13. (IV. 2.) In regard to its economy, I believe I may say, that it is the cheapest army, for its numbers and utility, in the world; and considering that it can be marched at an hour's notice complete for service, with all its camp equipage and spare ammunition (from one to two hundred rounds per man, besides forty rounds in pouch), to any distance. The last march of my own regiment, at an ordinary relief, was 1,200 miles, the Bengal Presidency extending 2,000 miles nearly from N. W. to S. E. I would refer the Board (or the Committee) to p. 78 of the Supplement to the Facts and Documents, lately sent them, in which they will find, from the pen of an old officer now in India, a statement signed "Scrutator," showing that the average of every fighting man in India, including King's and Company's troops, officers and men, costs the State, taking all the military charges into account, only £36 per annum; while Great Britain pays (in time of peace too), including the navy and its charges on both sides of the account, no less than £185 on an average for each of its defenders. Yet the former is loudly proclaimed in England to be an overpaid army: but such delusion is one of entire ignorance.

The European troops cannot take any duty in Bengal.

17. (IV. *note*.) The employment of military men in civil stations is highly objectionable; 1st. As they are seldom entirely fit for them, by education or previous habits; 2dly. As it tends to render their regiments inefficient; and lastly, As it generally unfits the individual for the future performance of his military duties. With the reservation before expressed, *i. e.* of special cases, or peculiar qualifications for *political employ*, it should be a general rule, that no military man should hold a civil station, except in cases where necessity must supercede all law.

18. The rules relative to numbers, or the proportion of ranks one to the other, have already been discussed. The strength of the army, or of each regiment, must ever fluctuate with the political state of our Government; but I do conceive that its present reduced state is really alarming. As to pay, it is a delicate subject, and should be as little tampered with as possible. Generally speaking, however, I would say, that our Native non-commissioned officers (havildars and naicks) are paid *too high* in proportion to the men, or the men *too low*

low in respect of the non-commissioned officers; but it has now existed so long that it is better to let it alone. Whenever a Native regiment, however, is obliged to hut at a new cantonment, two rupees a man should be allowed to the sepoys only; this, not because it is allowed to the troops at Madras and Bombay, whose pay also is higher, for I maintain there is or can be no analogy or comparison between the different Presidencies, which are and have always been in fact distinct kingdoms, more widely separated in all respects than France and England, or Italy and Germany, but because the sepoy on *half batta* should not on principle be made to find his own shed; or let the Government construct a long tiled double barrack for each company, divided by party-walls into forty or fifty rooms of ten or twelve feet square, the walls of masonry and rough cast, the floor of earth, raised a foot, or as necessary.

19. I would propose no change as to the "qualifications, enlistment, promotion, furlough, or retirement" of the men, European or Native, comprising the Bengal army. The rules now in existence being the result of long experience, must be practically the best; or if any alteration should be hereafter required, it may safely be left to the local Governments or Commanders-in-chief, who will be the first to discover its necessity.

20. The qualifications, enlistment, furlough, and promotions of the Bengal army are strictly defined by general rules called "Standing Orders," including the internal discipline of all regiments; and its numbers, pay, retirement, and invalid pension by the "Government Regulations." Although recruiting is now more difficult than it was thirty years since, yet no man is allowed to be taken in any infantry regiment under five feet six inches, or of inferior caste, or beyond twenty-five years of age. The retirement of the Native troops on the full invalid pay, when reported unfit by a medical committee, has always appeared to me too limited or indulgent in point of time, being after fifteen years' service, or generally at thirty-two or thirty-three years of age. The officers, in a hostile climate, are only allowed their retirement after twenty-five years' service; and I think that without any injustice, and with great benefit to the service, the period of service for the men, who serve in their own country, and see their families for months every second or third year, might prospectively (wounds always excepted) be extended to the same period, to entitle them, if unfit, to the full invalid pay; and the Regulations might be modified in some other respects.

21. The proportions of European and Native corps is a mixed and rather complicated question. *Primâ facie*, I should say that *one-eighth* of our force in India should be European, and that, I apprehend, is about the proportion actually serving there since the great reductions of the last three years in our Native armies. But when augmented, as those armies were in the governments of the Marquis of Hastings and Lord Amherst, the European force did not increase in proportion. The force then under arms in India was about 320,000 or 330,000 men, of whom at least 40,000 should have been European.

22. But a great portion of that augmented force was in its nature temporary, and consisted of what is called "local" or "provincial" corps. During the wars of 1817-18 and 1824-25, forty-four local and irregular corps were on foot in Bengal alone, extra to the regular establishment, and borrowing officers from it.\* During the former period I com-

manded

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

* Viz.—Irregular Troops :		Regular Troops :	
8	Regiments of Local Horse, 3.*	2	Regiments of Dragoons.
16	— Local Infantry, 4.*	10	— Light Cavalry.
16	— Provincial ditto, for Civil Duties.	9	— European Infantry.
3	— Invalids, 2.*	74	— Native Infantry.
1	— Pioneers.	6	— Extra ditto.*
44 Total Corps.		8	— Grenadiers.*
		8	— Light Infantry.*
		117 Corps of the Line.	

Not counting Artillery (Horse and Foot) or Engineers and Sappers.

The aggregate number under arms in Bengal was at least from 160,000 to 180,000 men.

Those disbanded are marked with a (\*); and all the rest reduced nearly one-half in number.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

manded a corps, first of three battalions borrowed from Native chieftains, and next a local corps of 1,500 men. In the latter period we had on foot eighty regiments of Native infantry in Bengal, including the six extra corps since disbanded, beside eight grenadier battalions and eight of light infantry drawn from the line, and replaced by supplementary companies, but no addition of officers. Eight regiments of local or irregular horse of 1,000 each, beside our ten regiments of regular cavalry, sixteen of local infantry, and sixteen of provincials, all in Bengal, and exclusive of the King's and European troops, and of the armies of the other Presidencies. The regiments of regular infantry averaged 1,200 each, the cavalry 800.

23. That this immense accumulation of force was necessary, we cannot doubt. The stake was the possession of India.

No one can deny that the European troops, and the European officers attached to the Native troops, form the foundation and the key-stone of the whole structure.

But any augmentation of either is a vital question. First, on account of the great expense attending it; and second, on account of the dreadful mortality amongst the European troops. That in Bengal, except in time of war or on actual service, or for the political purpose of overawing the Native army, they are entirely useless to the Government for the ordinary duties of the country. They perform no duties that can possibly be avoided, or which involve any exposure to the climate. The Governor-General's and the Commander-in-chief's guards are solely furnished by the Native regiments. Even in Fort William but half the main guard is supplied by His Majesty's regiments in garrison there, to furnish the *covered sentries*, *i. e.* in the shade of some building, veranda, or gateway. Even the orderly to carry the adjutant's orderly book is a Native soldier from Barrackpore. On a march in Bengal, a regiment of His Majesty's dragoons or infantry must have a detachment of Native infantry (generally a company under an English officer) to perform most of their duties for them in camp. The climate is such generally that were the English troops unnecessarily exposed to it, they would perish in a few months. For examples of this, see pages 18, 25, 26, 30, and many other parts of the "Collection of Facts and Documents;" and I could, of my own knowledge, supply several more striking illustrations of the awful mortality of English troops serving in India, both in cantonments and in camp, during my service. When we consider that each European costs the State £100 before he is landed in India; and that, in the emphatic language of the note to page 30 of the work just quoted, "the expense of a private European soldier in the Vizier's dominions (Upper Provinces of Bengal) is found to be equal to the pay of a subaltern officer in England, it will readily occur that any increase of that force must be matter of great difficulty and infinite expense; for which the absolute necessity of a war, in which India itself is the stake, can be the only justification.

24. But there are now in India—

4 Regiments of dragoons, and 20 of His Majesty's regiments of foot...	20,000
3 Regiments (or six half regiments) of Company's European infantry, one at each Presidency	3,000*
European artillery, horse and foot, 17 half battalions or brigades (equal to eight and a-half), at 400 each	6,800
Total European troops in India	29,800

So that, in point of fact, we have within a fraction of the number which I consider equal to the ordinary political purpose of keeping the Native army in check in time of peace, and on a low establishment.

25. I shall conclude this important head of inquiry, as to the European troops, with a few proposed alterations.

(a) That

That in Bengal was 1,370 strong when I left it a year ago.

(a) That the Bengal, Madras and Bombay regiments of European infantry, if the Charter remains to the Company, be drafted, the men to the Company's artillery or sappers as fit, or to His Majesty's if fit and willing; and the officers to two additional Native infantry regiments at each Presidency; His Majesty's Government, however, undertaking to provide the staff-serjeants for the Native regiments.

(b) That a regiment of His Majesty's foot be sent to each Presidency to replace those reduced corps; making 23 regiments of foot and four of dragoons on the Indian establishment.

(c) That one complete regiment of foot be added, at the expense of the East-India Company, to the present establishments of the King at the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, the Mauritius, and the west coast of New Holland; or three or four regiments, as may be found most convenient and least expensive, to form an available *reserve* for India on any sudden war.

26. These proposals would greatly simplify the organization of the Indian army; *i. e.* all the dragoons and European infantry would be King's troops; and all the artillery, engineers and sappers, Native cavalry and infantry, would remain Company's, not liable to relief or exchange, and educated for a permanent service in India. The three regiments of Company's European infantry are now looked upon as an isolated excrescence on the service, which they really are. The utility of a constant *reserve* must be too obvious for explanation. Not a single European should be kept in India beyond the real exigency of the service, on account of the expense, and of the dreadful waste of life, particularly in regiments newly arrived.

27. It still occurs to me, however, that all the *European establishment* for India should be a *permanent one*. The regiments longest in India have always been the most serviceable, locally considered. Instance the 8th, 19th, 22d, 24th, and 25th dragoons; the 12th, 14th, 51st, 52d, 59th, 71st to 79th, and 89th regiments of foot. Those regiments, after long service in India, were on their departure twice as serviceable for India as they were on their arrival, and the loss was felt accordingly. A slight consideration of the subject will prove that this must always be the case. They did not look well in England, of course, and were soon got rid of; but for hard service and exposure in India they were just the men, and had acquired the confidence and respect of all those they served with. It is a cruel sight to see an English regiment leaving India that has served there 20-odd years, both as regards officers and men. They come away when they are really valuable; when they have become acclimated, capable of exposure and fatigue, and have acquired the most useful experience of language, local habits, and customs. The regiments which relieve them, though much finer to the eye, are capable of no real service or exposure for some years. In short, I feel persuaded that a *separate European establishment for India* would be attended with the best effects; the officers and recruits being still regularly sent out from England, but the corps only relieving each other in India, something on the plan of the Company's artillery; and the saving of expense would be immense. The constant importations from England annually, with the return of officers retiring, exchanging, or on furlough, and of the invalids and time-expired men, wishing to return, would obviate the only solid objections that I am aware of. There is now no occasion to renew the alarm of Lord Cornwallis's era about Europeans *settling* in India. The climate precludes it more effectually than all the statutes that could be enacted.

28. I would add, that were this plan adopted it would remove the great and otherwise insuperable objection to the admission of the officers of those regiments (of His Majesty's service) to certain staff situations in India, from which they have heretofore been excluded. Although a Company's servant, I have ever considered this a grievance, in the case of those who, by long residence and intimate acquaintance with the languages and local customs, &c. were quite as eligible as any of our own army. This exclusion has, I know in some instances, borne most harshly on individuals of high merit, and cannot but have operated unfavourably for the public service in those cases. But the danger

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

danger of abuse, were the door once opened, is evident, unless strictly guarded. The Company's officers feel generally, that although their Indian servitude is *for life*, interest would then, in most cases, take the place of merit; that officers would be sent out from the Horse Guards expressly for staff situations they would be wholly incompetent to fill in a country and an army which require a distinct education, and that from early years. In short, they apprehend that merit would always be found in him who had family connexions or Parliamentary influence, to support his pretensions to office. Claims which, in general, the Indian officers must comparatively want.

29. Having already (in paragraphs 22 and 23) noticed the former augmentations of Native troops in Bengal, and particularly of the local and provincial corps to such an extent, I have only to add, that this part of our military establishment had no existence elsewhere. It was a species of anomaly at that Presidency only. All the provincial corps, formed solely for civil duties, are now disbanded; but of the local corps five regiments of horse and twelve of foot are still continued, having no establishment of European officers of their own, and excepting the 1st or Skinner's corps (which has officers with local rank, all country born), are only supplied with English officers, by borrowing a few from the regiments of the line. A note of such corps as we had under the Marquis of Hastings and Lord Amherst will be found below,\* those since disbanded being marked with a (\*), and those since raised being added with the general strength of each corps; the Governor-General's body-guard, which is borrowed only from the strength of the regular cavalry regiments, or the pioneer corps of eight companies now officered from the regular infantry, but really belonging to the engineer corps, or the two battalions of Native invalids for garrison duty, since disbanded also, not being included.

30. (V. & VI.) In reply to the fifth and sixth heads of inquiry, I conceive the separation or union of two services to be matter of perfect indifference, or rather as necessarily

\* Irregular Troops in the Bengal Army :

* Regiments of Local Horse :									
1. Skinner's	..	..	..	1,000	7. Goruckpoor	..	..	..	1,200*
2. Rohillas	..	..	..	1,000	8. 1st Nusserri	..	..	..	1,000
3. —	..	..	..	1,000	9. 2d ditto	..	..	..	1,000*
4. Mahrattas	..	..	..	1,000	10. Sirmoor	..	..	..	1,200
5. —	..	..	..	1,000	11. Kemaon	..	..	..	1,000
6. } late from Meer Khan's service .				1,000*	12. Cuttack	..	..	..	1,000*
7. }				1,000*	13. 1st Rampoor	..	..	..	1,500*
8. Skinner's 2d	..	..	..	1,000*	14. 2d ditto	..	..	..	1,500*
Regiments of Local Infantry :					15. 1st Nerbudda	..	..	..	800
1. Calcutta	..	..	..	1,800	16. 2d ditto	..	..	(Jubulpoor)	800*
2. Raughur	..	..	..	1,200	Since 1820 : {				
3. Hill Rangers	..	..	..	800					
4. Dinajpoor	..	..	..	1,200*					
5. Champaran	..	..	..	1,200*					
6. Mirzapoor	..	..	..	1,200*					
					Assam.				
					Mhairwara.				
					Mundlésir.*				
					Sylhet.				
					Gumbeer's Levy.				
					Arracan Mughls.				

The highest war establishment of privates inserted in general; the horse includes all ranks.

Provincial Corps, for Civil Duties only :

1. Burdwan	..	..	..	1,200	9. Furruckabad	..	..	..	1,000
2. Dacca	..	..	..	1,000	10. Bareilly	..	..	..	1,200
3. Chittagong	..	..	..	1,000	11. Seharanpoor	..	..	..	1,200
4. Moorshedabad	..	..	..	1,200	12. Agra	..	..	..	1,000
5. Purneah	..	..	..	1,200	13. Delhi	..	..	..	1,000
6. Patna	..	..	..	1,200	14. Orissa	..	..	..	1,000
7. Allahabad and Etawah	..	..	..	1,200	15. Bundelcund	..	..	..	1,000
8. Cawnpoor	..	..	..	1,000	16. Benares	..	..	..	1,200

All now disbanded.

necessarily to be regulated by the solution of the greater question: "Is the territory and government to be held and administered by the Crown or by the Company?" The army must, I conclude, go with either; for without the control and disposal of the army, I do not think the East-India Company, or any other instrument or medium of power, could carry on the government of India for any length of time, or with any success. The Indian army, in every view of the case, should follow the fate of the Charter and of the Company.

If the government of India come to the Crown and its Ministers, the change, I apprehend, would be merely *nominal* as regards the army; that it would still remain distinct, and governed by its own rules, as peculiar to, and applicable only to, its singular origin and position; that cadets would, as at present, be sent out expressly for that service, in all its branches, with the reservation included in paragraphs 25 to 28 perhaps; and that no exchanges would ever be permitted. But as the whole subject has been much more ably and fully discussed in the proceedings of the Indian officers in 1794 to 1796, when commenting on Lord Cornwallis's plan, I must refer to the collection of facts and documents for those discussions at length. My opinions are not precisely the same as those of the Committee of that day;\* but I can but mark the points of difference, in case the Committee should require it verbally.

31. Generally speaking, however, I do not believe that if the Company's army were placed under the *Crown*, the territory remaining to the *Company*, that a single penny would be saved, but rather the reverse. No more establishments could be reduced or consolidated than at present, for we have only what is useful. There are few jobs in *India*. Not a shilling could be saved under any of the heads stated in query 6, but rather, I apprehend, a more lavish expenditure would be the result of the transfer. The recruiting or pensioning, or the appointment and education of cadets, could hardly be altered, certainly to no reduction of general expense. The conveyance of troops to and fro could not be more cheaply conducted than at present, excepting that if entire regiments were not relieved, or sent out and home, *i. e.* if the European establishment were permanent, as suggested in the 27th clause, that branch of expense would be equally saved, under any sort of administration. The troops, *i. e.* complete regiments or recruits, are now sent out to India in the Company's large ships, the best adapted for transports of any in the world, as to health and convenience; the freight of which, as they must touch at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, to take in cotton for China (to pay part of the tea investment annually), is a commercial charge; and therefore only the charter-party, of £15 a man, is, I believe, chargeable to the Military department for their provisions. No other method could be devised for carrying troops so cheaply, so quickly, or with so much comfort to the men, which, in a voyage of 15,000 miles, is of the greatest consequence. The retiring provisions for the army could never be diminished in any rank, while in general it would perhaps be greatly augmented by the accelerated promotion which a King's Government would probably introduce for the improvement of the Indian army. The provision and appropriation of stores are distinct questions; the former belongs chiefly to the Home Government, excepting such articles as are produced in India. Of the first branch I cannot speak so particularly as the Public Accounts. Of the second, including gunpowder and field artillery, and the carriages for all descriptions of ordnance, no army in the world is so well or so cheaply provided as that of Bengal; and the appropriation (or expenditure) is subject, perhaps, to a too rigid economy. In short, the mercantile spirit which has always regulated the Company's military affairs forbids the expectation that greater economy could ensue from any change as regards the army and its general administration. In fact, the last three years they have reduced almost every establishment in the Military department to a state of inefficiency.

32. To the 7th query, though not strictly of a military nature, I must briefly repeat, that thirty years' experience compels me to say, the climate forms a much more insuperable

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

able barrier to the settlement of Europeans in Bengal than any legislative enactment that could be framed.

33. To the 8th query I can only remark, that I see no one good or valid reason, unless the saving of salaries be such, for placing "the whole of the Indian armies under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief." The territory is by far too extensive, nearly equal to all Europe, and composed of too many different nations, all varying from each other in language, caste, manners, and customs, for the efficient control of one General-in-chief, and one army staff. It would be just as feasible and politic to put the French and English armies under one chief. To all useful purposes, the effect of perfect combination in seasons of war and of great political commotion is already fully attained by the supreme authority now vested in the Governor-General and in the Commander-in-chief of Bengal over the other Presidencies and armies. That this power has always been exercised on every emergency for the safety of India, we need only refer to the governments of Lord Cornwallis, the Marquis of Wellesley, and the Marquis of Hastings, when the entire armies of India were put in motion on a combined plan of operations, directed by the supreme controlling power, and terminated their work with the most brilliant success. The present divisions of the Indian army have arisen from practical experience of its necessity; it is also politic, as it preserves that feeling of emulation which can only be useful while they are separated; but were this dissolved, and the armies thrown into one, this wholesome and mutual restraint would be lost. The consolidation of that vast army, so distant from the mother-country, would also consolidate their feelings, passions, and interests. To offend one would be to offend all; and I can easily imagine a case of hardship or unredressed grievance uniting the whole body into a firm and open resistance to the Government itself, which, under the present wise system of distinct Presidencies and armies, is impossible.

But I feel that to pursue this subject would be a work of supererogation, for it has already been too often and too ably handled by others to leave anything to be added or desired. Exclusive of much other evidence, I would refer to the "Collection" already quoted, pages 14, 27, 28, and many other parts. The facts and opinions therein stated have, to my mind, only acquired force during the interval of nearly forty years, which has elapsed since it was written.

34. On the 9th query, I have to observe, that unless I were acquainted with the "changes which have been, or may be suggested as expedient, on grounds of efficiency, economy, and security," I could hardly venture on the comparison proposed with "the existing system." If the object be to ascertain whether India, in its military government or power, could be ruled by the Ministers of the Crown or by the East-India Company with most advantage to the welfare and interests of both India and Great Britain, the subject is in a great measure *political*, and beyond the usual competency or education of military men. It involves so many considerations, each requiring a distinct and elaborate elucidation, that I see no way out of the question but by distinct queries in oral examination, or by greatly extending a written communication, already too long. Much, however, of the matter in the preceding pages, where the subject is incidentally touched on, may be applied to this query. In conclusion, however, I would say, generally, that the abolition of one of the *triple* governments or powers now existing for India would doubtless save much, both in regard to expense, simplicity, and rapidity of movement. The great and the increasing bane of India is the remoteness of the supreme, and legislative authority, with the expenses of that distant and complicated machine, which delays almost every useful measure till its value is lost or diminished. No expenses of the local Governments can, by the Native of India, be considered liable to the objections applicable *a priori* to those which are 15,000 miles off. The former money is at least spent in the country. The King, Parliament, and the Board of Control, exercise all the *real* authority at home, and there is not the least doubt that abstractedly the abolition of the *intermediate power* of the East-India Company would greatly simplify and reduce *pro tanto* the expenditure of the general government of India, which is the real incubus that weighs on its resources,

and may at last drive the people to despair. The fact speaks for itself. Formerly their government was simple though despotic, and all at home. Now India has three Governments, and all chargeable to the territory. The first, local and indispensable, the two others, remote and expensive, of which one certainly might be abolished as superfluous and costly.

35. But as the present system has grown up gradually and step by step, as the experience of seventy years has prompted each measure to the great and eminent men who have raised up the fabric from a merchant's factory to a stupendous empire, it is not without the most urgent and proved necessity that any part of the machine itself should be touched, which has produced such a result. Great caution and delicacy are peculiarly necessary in the anomalous and somewhat invidious task of legislating for such an empire, and for more than 100 millions of people, at the distance of 15,000 miles, inasmuch as one false step, taken in ignorance or prejudice, may be attended with its entire loss. The materials of which our Indian armies are composed would prove peculiarly delicate, difficult, or dangerous to manage, in such a presumption as this, for they are more wedded to prescription and habit than any people in the world, and part even from old abuses with difficulty and regret. For the very same reason, no people are more easily managed or more obedient and submissive to those who know and understand them, their character and language, and more particularly in the army, where the dependance is more strict and intimate. An officer who has once required their confidence is not simply looked up to and obeyed, but they consult him in every difficulty or distress, and will freely lay down their lives for him.

A *merely nominal change* from the Company's to the King's government, unaccompanied with any alteration of system, would probably be received throughout India without any sensation, but that being the real question, it is obviously too complicated and voluminous for a letter, and it is now time to conclude.

36. A brief abstract of the changes proposed in this letter, or thought expedient, is appended,\* as referable to the Bengal army only, but in parallel cases applicable, of course, to the others also.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. P. BAKER, Lieut.-colonel,  
Retired List, Bengal.

P. S.—Should any thing appear deficient or inconsistent in these replies to your queries, I beg it may be noted, as I can easily supply or explain such if sent to me in writing.

---

\* See paper marked (D.)

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1882.

(A.)

**OFFICERS Bengal Army, to each Battalion or Regiment, and Totals to each Arm.**

ENGINEERS, Three Battalions.	ARTILLERY Ten Battalions.	CAVALRY, Ten Regiments.	INFANTRY, Seventy-six Regiments.	TOTAL per Battalion or Regiment, and GRAND TOTAL below.
1	1	1	1	Colonels.
1	1	1	1	Lieut.-cols.
1	1	1	1	Majors.
5	5	5	5	Captains.
8	8	8	8	Lieutenants.
4	4	4	4	Ensigns.
20	20	20	20	TOTALS.
3	10	10	76	99
3	10	10	76	99
3	10	10	76	99
15	50	50	380	495
24	80	80	608	792
12	40	40	304	396
60	200	200	1520	1980
Subalterns reduced :				
9	30	30	228	297
69	430	230	1748	2277

was the Establishment of Officers fixed for the actual number of Corps in May 1824-25 ; and the upper line shows the reduced Establishment, May 1820.

(B.)

## GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS STAFF, BENGAL.

DEPARTMENTS.	General Officers.	Colonels.	Lieutenant-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.	TOTAL.
General, Division, Garrison, District, and Depôt Staff, Personal, &c. <span style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</span> of His Majesty's Service+ ..... <span style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</span> the Hon. Company's Service† <span style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</span>	3	6	1	2	6	—	18
	6	13	—	1	2	6	28
	9	19	1	3	8	6	46
Adjutant-generals of the Army ... ..	—	1	—	2	22	6	31
Quartermaster-generals ditto ... ..	—	1	1	1	6	3	12
Secretary to Government Military department	—	1	—	1	1	—	3
Military Board and Secretaries ... ..	—	—	2	—	3	—	5
Army Commissariat ... ..	—	1	—	1	12	12	26
Ordnance ditto, all Artillery officers ... ..	—	—	2	1	7	3	13
Clothing Agents and Secretary ... ..	—	—	—	—	3	—	3
Pay and Audit ... ..	—	1	1	1	10	3	16
Surveyor-generals† ... ..	—	—	—	—	6	7	13
Judge Advocate-generals ... ..	—	—	1	—	4	4	9
Public Works, Canals, Roads, and Bridges†	—	—	—	1	16	1	18
Stud and Remount ... ..	—	—	—	—	7	3	10
Attached to Local and Irregular Corps from the line ... ..	—	—	2	2	16	25	45
Attached to the Pioneer Corps ditto† ... ..	—	—	—	—	2	8	10
Miscellaneous Appointments, Political, Civil, &c.	—	—	4	4	34	8	50
<b>TOTAL ... ..</b>	—	5	13	14	149	83	264
<b>GRAND TOTAL ... ..</b>	9	24	14	17	157	89	310

N. B.—The Officers of the corps of Engineers are not included in this Abstract. 292 Officers of the Company's service are thus employed away from their corps of Cavalry, Artillery, or Infantry, 96 in number, or about three per Regiment: but 52 of them are Colonels or Field Officers; remain 240 Captains or Subalterns, or 2½ per Regiment.

## \* Of His Majesty's Service :

- 1 General commanding in chief;
- 2 Major-generals, commanding Divisions;
- 3 Colonels, commanding Stations;
- 1 Ditto, Adjutant-general, K. T.;
- 1 Ditto, Quartermaster-general, K. T.;
- 1 Ditto, Military Secretary, C. C.;
- 1 Lieut.-colonel, commanding Depôt at Chinsurah;
- 1 Major } Personal Staff;
- 6 Captains }
- 1 Major, Major of Brigade, K. T., Fort William.

## † Of Honorable Company's Service :

- 1 Lieutenant-general, commanding Allahabad;
- (This is only a temporary appointment.)
- 5 Major-generals, commanding Divisions;
- 9 Colonels, commanding Districts, Frontiers, or Field Forces;
- 2 Colonels, commanding large Cantonments;
- 2 Ditto, commanding Garrisons.

‡ The Surveyor-general's department, the Public Works, Canals, Roads, and Bridges, and the corps of Pioneers have frequently been ordered to be supplied from the Engineer corps. Total 41 officers now.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.*The Military Divisions are—*

- |                  |                |              |
|------------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1. Presidency .. | Head-quarters, | Barrackpore. |
| 2. Dinapore      | Ditto          | Dinapore.    |
| 3. Benares       | Ditto          | Secrole.     |
| 4. Saugor        | Ditto          | Saugor.      |
| 5. Cawnpore      | Ditto          | Cawnpore.    |
| 6. Meerut        | Ditto          | Meerut.      |
| 7. Sirhind       | Ditto          | Kurnaul.     |

*Districts and Frontiers :*

- |                                 |                |           |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------|
| 1. Eastern Frontier             | Head-quarters, | Dacca.    |
| 2. Rohilkund ..                 | Ditto          | Bareilly. |
| 3.*                             |                |           |
| 4. Oude ..                      | Ditto          | Lucknow.  |
| 5. Agra and Muttra              | Ditto          | (either.) |
| 6. Delhi, Frontier and Garrison |                |           |
| 7. Malwah ..                    | Ditto          | Mhow.     |
| 8. Meywar ..                    | Ditto          | Nemuch    |
| 9. Rajpootana .                 | Ditto          | Ajmere.   |
| 10. Tenasserim Coast            | Ditto          | Moulmein  |
- is a dependency of Bengal, and commanded by Col. Vigouroux, His Majesty's 45th foot, but the other troops are from Madras.

*Cantonments :*

- |                  |
|------------------|
| 11. Meerut.      |
| 12. Cawnpore.    |
| 13. Barrackpore. |
| 14. Dum-Dum.     |

*Garrisons :*

- |                       |
|-----------------------|
| 15. Allahabad.        |
| 16. Agra.             |
| 17. Buxar (Invalids). |

*Ordnance Commissariat :*

- |  |
|--|
| 1 Principal Commissary.  |
| 1 Deputy ditto ditto.  |
| 6 Commissaries.  |
| 2 Deputy ditto.  |
| 3 Directors of the Foundry, Gun-carriage Establishment, beside Warrant Officers. |
| 7 Deputy Commissaries.   |
| 5 Assistant ditto.   |
| 4 Deputy Assistant ditto.  |
| 42 Conductors.   |
| 33 Sub-conductors.   |

*The Adjutant-general's department :*

(Comprises Honourable Company's Forces.)

- |   |                   |
|---|-------------------|
| 1 Adjutant-general                                      | at Head-quarters. |
| 1 Deputy ditto  | Ditto.            |
| 2 Assistants ditto                                      | Ditto.            |
| 1 Ditto ditto   | of Artillery.     |
| 4 Ditto ditto   | of Divisions.     |
| 3 Deputy Assistant Adjutant-generals of Divisions.      |                   |
| 13 Majors of Brigade to Districts or large Cantonments. |                   |
| 6 Fort Adjutants.                                       |                   |

*Quartermaster-general's department :*

- |                         |                      |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 Quartermaster-general | at Head-quarters.    |
| 1 Deputy ditto          | .. in the Field.     |
| 2 Assistants ditto      | .. both.             |
| 8 Deputy ditto ditto    | .. to Divisions, &c. |

*Army Commissariat :*

- |                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| 1 Commissary-general .. | Calcutta.  |
| 1 Deputy ditto          | .. .. in the Field.                                  |
| 6 Assistants ditto      | } attached to Divisions,<br>Districts, and Stations. |
| 8 Deputy ditto ditto    |  |
| 10 Sub ditto ditto      |  |

Besides the Warrant Officers, Conductors, and Sub-conductors.

\* Bundelcund, as a Brigadier's command, has been abolished since this was written.

**MEMORANDUM of the Invoice Amount of the Military Stores despatched to Bengal, and received there during the years 1825-26 to 1828-29; viz.**

							£.	s.	d.
1825-26	...	...	...	...	...	...	300,002	4	7
1826-27	...	...	...	...	...	...	573,322	5	3
1827-28	...	...	...	...	...	...	343,667	5	1
1828-29	...	...	...	...	...	...	183,838	17	5
Total in four years							£1,400,830	12	4

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

Many of these stores, for want of room in Fort William, covered the whole Esplanade, beyond the Fort, at the Cooly bazar-gate, and produced the necessity of building one, or two parallelograms outside the Fort, to preserve them from plunder and the weather. I was informed that long before such an enormous supply could be used, much would be lost in a climate where corrosion and decay is so rapid, but of this the official papers will be the best test.

( D.)

**ABSTRACT of Proposed Changes or Alterations.**

1. *Bengal.* A revocation of the General Order of the Bengal Government of 29th November 1828, placing Dum-Dum, Barrackpore, Berhampore, and Dinapore on half-batta, and, from the same date, allowing the officers the arrears.

2. *General.* That the regimental pay and allowances of the officers of the Indian army, agreeably to the Regulations of January 1796 and April 1801, be confirmed to them by His Majesty, or by Parliament, as may seem meet.

3. *General.* That the original Regulation of 1796, and Act of Parliament or clause in the Charter, regarding the absence of all officers from India, be restored; and the Regulation of 1804, and the clause in the Charter of 1813, cancelled, which permits the colonels of regiments to remain in Europe more than five years, without retirement from the service. This is the real and serious cause of the want of promotion in the Indian army; and its adoption would render unnecessary all retiring funds, now so much talked of.

4. *General.* The restoration of the two lieutenants and one ensign, taken from each battalion or regiment of the Indian army, by the General Order of 5th May 1829, in order to render the general and regimental staff of that army really effective.

5. *Bengal.* Engineer corps in Bengal augmented to four battalions of officers, to enable it to perform all its peculiar duties in the departments of Survey and Public Works, and to officer the corps of pioneers.

6. *Bengal.* The local regiments of horse and foot, that are necessary to be retained in Bengal, should be officered.

7. *General.* The Native cavalry regiments at each Presidency augmented to eight troops each.

8. *Bengal.* Hutting money, or barracks, allowed to the Native troops in Bengal.

9. *General.* Compensation to officers for loss of bungalows, by any act of the Government.

10. *Bengal.* Period of service to entitle the Native troops in Bengal to the full invalid pension, when reported unfit, extended to twenty-five years prospectively, wounds, &c. excepted. Discharges under that period to be given on demand (except in time of war), with



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(16.)—Reply  
of Lieut.-colonel  
Baker,  
29th Feb. 1832.

with money donations on a graduated scale, for length of service, under twenty years, or above seven.

11. *Bengal*. Some improvement in the clothing and appointments of the Bengal army in the coats, belts, pouches, and locks of the muskets. Great coats to be issued periodically by Government to all corps, say once in eight or ten years, or on occasions of all extraordinary service.

12. *General*. European establishment for all India rendered permanent or fixed, *i. e.* by regiments formed expressly for India.

13. *Bengal*. That the present division of the Bengal army into *seven* divisions be re-modelled more equally, and formed into *eight* military divisions, each under a major-general; thus adding to the staff of that army one general officer, one deputy assistant adjutant-general, and one aide-de-camp.

14. *Bengal and Madras*. That the frontier commands in Malwah, Meywar, and Rajpootana, now included in none of the divisions, and which are independent of each other, be formed into the others, or into a separate division; *i. e.* Mhow to be placed in the Saugor command; Nemuch, and all Rajpootana, Agra, and Muttra, to form the eighth or western division, head-quarters at Ajmeer or Nuseerabad. The Madras army to take all stations, south of the Nerbudda, now occupied by Bengal troops; and the latter to take all the duties now performed by the Madras troops in Tenasserim and the Malay peninsula.

15. *General*. That the rank of colonel be given retrospectively to all the colonels promoted in India from the 5th June 1829, to the dates of their respectively attaining to the command of regiments of cavalry and infantry, or battalions of artillery and engineers; and the system of promotion settled on a fair and equal basis.

16. *Bengal*. That the General Order by the Bengal Government of 1830, *reducing* to cadets again, thirty-eight ensigns, cornets, and 2d lieutenants, who had been officially promoted to those ranks, be re-considered as a matter of equity.

17. *General*. That the command of the armies of the three Presidencies be thrown open to the Company's as well as to His Majesty's generals (with the rank of full general by seniority), but at His Majesty's judgment or selection.

#### Conclusion.

A number of other alterations occur to me, which I have notes of, in the general arrangement of the Commissariat, Pay, and Audit departments, &c. &c.; but as they rather concern the local administration of details in India, I refrain from adding to the length of this.

G. P. BAKER.

(17.)—REPLY of Colonel JOHN MUNRO, dated London, Mount Hotel, Lower Grosvenor-street, 13th March 1832.

Sir,

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you a paper containing the observations that have occurred to me on the several subjects connected with the Military department, stated in your letter of the 25th January; and I shall forward to you, in the course of this day, my remarks in reply to your letter of the 7th January.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MUNRO.

**OBSERVATIONS** in reply to the Queries contained in a Letter from the Secretary of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, under date the 25th January 1832.

1. **THE** constitution of the Company's army has experienced frequent and important alterations. Previously to 1783 all Company's officers were commanded by King's officers of the same rank; an old captain of the Company's service, for instance, was commanded on duty by the youngest captain of the King's. The extreme injustice of this arrangement produced a strong remonstrance from the Company's army assembled in the camp at Cuddalore in 1783; and orders were soon afterwards issued, granting to the Company's officers rank and authority with the King's, according to the dates of their commissions. From this period of time until 1796, the Company's armies had an independent constitution and system of promotion, that was altogether unconnected with the King's service, that produced a high military spirit and an efficient state of discipline, and that would have answered exceedingly well, if there had been no King's troops in the country; but the superior relative ranks held by the King's officers gave rise to feelings of jealousy and discontent in the minds of the Company's. During this period of time, that is until 1796, the officers of each branch of the Company's army at every Presidency rose by succession in one general line from ensign to colonel; at Madras, and the Madras army may be taken as a specimen of the others, the infantry consisted in 1796 of four regiments of Europeans, having each one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, ten captains, twelve lieutenants, and eight ensigns; and of thirty-six battalions of sepoys, having each one captain-commandant, six lieutenants, and four ensigns. The infantry was formed into six brigades, having each a lieutenant-colonel and a major. The officers of the infantry accordingly amounted to four colonels, ten lieutenant-colonels, ten majors, seventy-two captains, two hundred and sixty-four lieutenants, and one hundred and seventy-six ensigns, all rising in succession in one general line. This was an independent constitution. There were, it is true, no general officers, and far too few field officers and captains; but the system worked extremely well until the great increase that took place in the number of King's troops, and the number of superior officers attached to them, produced continual supercessions over the Company's. A captain commanding a battalion of 1,000 men was subject to be commanded on duty by a captain commanding a company of Europeans. The King's troops had, it is true, no general officers, in India, with exception of the Commanders-in-chief; but still the relative superiority of their rank over the Company's was a serious grievance to the latter. In order to remedy this evil, a new arrangement was made in 1796 of the Company's armies. The infantry at Madras was formed into two European and twelve Native regiments, the latter of two battalions each, with an establishment of officers, of one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, twenty-two lieutenants, and eight ensigns. A separate establishment of general officers was allowed to each Presidency. The officers, instead of rising as formerly in a general line, were promoted regimentally to the rank of major, and then rose in a general line to the rank of colonel, which they acquired on obtaining a regiment. They were, besides, made eligible to be included in the King's brevet promotion; and indeed the only general officers whom they have ever had, excepting the few at first appointed, have been those made by the King's brevet. This plan, although marked by some anomalies, worked sufficiently well for the Company's officers, because the advantage of obtaining the rank of full colonel with a regiment was in some degree a compensation for the extreme slowness of promotion in comparison with the King's officers, before they arrived at that rank. But in 1805, a change highly injurious to the Company's officers was effected. The King's officers complained of being superceded by the promotion of the Company's officers to the rank of colonel, on obtaining their regiments by succession; and it was ordered, that the Company's officers when advanced to regiments should have the rank of lieutenant-colonel-commandant only until they should acquire the rank of colonel by the King's brevet. This arrangement, which still virtually exists, has been extremely detrimental to the Company's army, and makes their promotion to the higher ranks depend alone upon the  
brevets

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

brevets issued by His Majesty to his own troops; and these brevets, calculated for the wants and circumstances of one army, are frequently unsuitable to the state of the other. Since 1796, the armies of all the Presidencies have been increased by successive and considerable augmentations; and in 1823, another change was effected in their internal organization and system of promotion. The regiments consisting of two battalions were constituted into separate regiments of a single battalion, with a colonel or lieutenant-colonel-commandant at their head, and the promotion from the junior rank to that of major took place in these separate corps. This was in every view an advantageous arrangement for the officers and the army. The number of regiments at the several Presidencies is stated in the margin. Their distribution varies continually, but can easily be ascertained by a reference to the latest distribution returns in the office of the Board.

2. The staff at the several Presidencies is extremely well organized, and has received successive improvements. The duties of the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general of the army correspond with those assigned to the same officers in this country. The due allotment of duties to these two principal branches of the staff has, however, been only a recent arrangement, as for many years the adjutant-generals at all the Presidencies engrossed the functions appertaining to the Quartermaster-general's department. There is a commandant of artillery and a chief engineer for the superintendence of the internal details of these arms. An auditor-general, appointed by the Government, and immediately under its orders, is charged with the control of the army accounts, and in general discharges that important duty with great ability. At every Presidency there is a Military Board, analogous in some respects to the Board of Ordnance in this country, and composed of the Commander-in-chief, the adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, chief engineer, commandant of artillery, and auditor-general, for the superintendence of the supply, distribution, and custody of the military, ordnance, and provision stores. The Commissariat department has acquired great efficiency during the last few years. Formerly, in time of peace, the paymasters in the several districts, who were civil servants, were employed in furnishing the cattle, provisions, and certain descriptions of military stores required for the use of the troops in marches, or service in the interior. When a general war took place, separate commissaries were appointed to the Cattle, the Provision, and the Ordnance departments. Those officers, without previous experience, or establishments of well-trained servants, found great difficulties in the execution of their duties; and our military operations were exposed to, and often suffered, great disasters, from the inefficiency of the system under which they acted. Since the introduction of a separate and permanent Commissariat establishment for peace and war, a degree of activity hitherto unknown has been imparted to this important branch of the service; and the rapidity of the movements of the troops during the last Mahratta war affords a proof of the goodness of the principles by which it is regulated. In the several divisions of the army suitable staff establishments are attached; and the whole of the arrangement of this department seems to be efficient and satisfactory.

3. The distribution of the army has been directed by just views, in conformity to the nature of the country, and to the changes effected in our situation by the conquests and acquisitions of territory that have been made. At Madras, the army is formed into divisions; at the principal stations bodies of troops are maintained in a state of readiness to act with promptitude against internal commotion, or to join the rest of the disposable forces in the event of a general war. These remarks apply chiefly to the local distribution of the army with respect to the internal service of the several Presidencies; but there is another and more important view of the distribution of our military force in all India, considered as a whole. The actual state of our political and military power in India renders it requisite to regard our defence of that country as a whole, and to regulate the distribution of our forces accordingly; for whatever serious danger might threaten any one point must necessarily be repelled by the combined effort of the whole of our disposable force. The distribution of our armies should be regulated on the principle of enabling us to collect the greatest possible mass of force with the greatest possible expedition at any given point.

point. In this view the central position of the Madras army gives it great advantages; for the mass of its force could be moved to either of the extremities of our line of defence in half the time that would be occupied in moving a force from one extremity to the other. This applies especially to the defence of the coast, but it applies also to the defence of the extreme northern frontier; for the Madras troops, if they could not arrive there as soon as those in the Upper Provinces of Bengal and Bombay, could at least replace the latter, and render them more available for instant movement.

4. The regimental constitution of the Company's troops seems, with some exceptions, to be sufficiently good for the several purposes specified under this head. The first exception to which I would advert, is the restriction of regimental promotion to the rank of major instead of lieutenant-colonel. The principal advantage of regimental promotion, that of continuing the same officers with the men, and producing an intimate acquaintance and confidence between them, is imperfectly realized when the officers do not rise regimentally to the command of the regiment, the post on which these effects are most necessary and useful. Again, another exception arises from the frequent deficiency of officers with regiments, occasioned by the absence of a number on furlough and staff duty. The formation of skeleton corps has been proposed as a remedy for this evil; but it is a remedy of an unmilitary character, attended with many difficulties of execution. The skeleton corps should of course consist of the same proportions of the different ranks of officers that are established in the regular corps, otherwise they would be on a different footing from the latter in regard to promotion. Now there are probably more captains than lieutenants absent from their regiments on furlough and staff duty. The establishment of a regiment is five captains and eight lieutenants; how then could any number of skeleton corps be formed having exactly that proportion, considering that there are as many captains as lieutenants to be replaced? But there are other objections. The skeleton officers have no body of men to which they are permanently attached; they fly from one corps to another according to the casualties and exigencies of the service, and can have therefore no *esprit du corps* for motives to labour in cultivating a knowledge, and gaining the affections of the men with whom they are temporarily employed. It appears to be preferable to increase the number of officers with the regular regiments to an extent sufficient to provide for the supply of staff officers, and retain an adequate number for regimental duty, and then if there should be an unusual proportion of officers absent from any regiment, their places can be supplied by others from some of the regular regiments; for it would be quite as unobjectionable to appoint an officer to do duty from one regular regiment to another, as from a skeleton to a regular regiment. The former case would be one of temporary expediency; the latter, if skeleton regiments should be formed, one of regular occurrence, and therefore of greater evil. The Native troops are raised, paid, and clothed with, I believe, as much economy as is practicable at the present moment. I am not competent to make any statement of the expenses attending the recruiting of the European part of the Company's army. The observations that occur to me regarding the spirit and disposition of the officers and men will be stated under another head. The successive augmentations made to the army have had a favourable effect on its disposition, because they have afforded advancement both to the officers and the men. The occasional employment of military men in political offices is highly expedient, in order to afford the Government a wider field of selection for those important and difficult situations, and to furnish an incitement to the officers for the acquirement of attainments useful both in military and political life. The employment of military men in civil offices, such as those of paymaster and of the commissariat, is also useful in exciting the officers to obtain a title by merit to those appointments; and incentives of this nature are most necessary in the present state of the army, and also in insuring more zeal, activity, and perhaps integrity, in the execution of their duties than could be expected from persons acting under less grave sanctions than those to which military men are subject. The rules and regulations in force under the several heads that are specified, appear, as far as I can judge, to be judicious and suitable to the nature of the service in India. Those are matters rather of detail than of a character affecting the great questions that are likely to be at issue. The query stated under this head with respect to the "expediency of the proportion of European and Native troops," is of a different description

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

description, and affects in an eminent degree the interests, or rather the existence, of the British power in India. Whether we consider the danger to which that power is exposed from European enemies, such as Russia and France, or from insurrections of the Native army, the proportion of European troops maintained in India must be deemed most insufficient.

5. This head opens a wide field for investigation. I consider the present constitution of the Company's army to be anomalous and unmilitary in several of its parts. It will be necessary to examine it. The Company's officers rise separately in their own service by seniority to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and are united then in promotion with the King's army by His Majesty's brevets. Thus two armies, of which the constitutions are quite dissimilar to each other as far as the rank of lieutenant-colonel, are from that rank subjected to the same law of promotion. The King's officers rise to be lieutenant-colonels by purchase, by selection, by seniority, by staff appointments, by brevets, and the progress of a considerable number to that rank is rapid, while the Company's officers can arrive at it only by seniority, and the progress of *all* towards it is very slow. Hitherto, with the aid of all the augmentations made to their armies, they have seldom attained it under thirty years' service, and thirty-five years' may be considered as too favourable an estimate of the time required in future. By the present march of the brevet promotion, more than twenty-five years are requisite in proceeding from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to that of major-general, so that sixty years' service will hardly bring an officer of the Company's army to the rank of major-general. A practical proof of the result of this system is afforded by the number of general officers and colonels in the two services. The number of Company's officers doing duty has, at least since the peace in 1815, been nearly equal to that of the King's officers on duty, and is probably four times greater than the number of King's officers in India. The two services have marched on together in promotion by brevet for thirty-six years, since 1796, and there are now in the King's army ninety-five generals, one hundred and ninety-seven lieutenant-generals, two hundred and three major-generals, and two hundred and twenty-six colonels; and in the Company's army, twenty-eight lieutenant-generals, and twenty-eight major-generals, and scarcely a single colonel, for the colonels made by a recent order are, in fact, as will be shown, only lieutenant-colonels. It must be borne in mind, that all regulations relative to the rank of the Company's officers, refer to India alone, for it is in India only where they have a military or official existence. The rank of colonel was lately given to the Company's officers on obtaining regiments, and this rank, which, if granted in conformity to the arrangement of 1796, when it was obtained without any reference to the King's officers or King's brevet, would have been a real boon, and placed the Company's army on a highly desirable and respectable footing, has been so arranged as to constitute an additional cause of supercession by the King's officers over the Company's, for it is ordered that when a Company's lieutenant-colonel obtains a regiment, and consequently the rank of colonel, *all* the King's officers of the same date of rank as lieutenant-colonel shall also obtain the local rank of colonel. Now the Company's cavalry, infantry, artillery, and engineers, rise separately to regiments: it may happen, it has happened, that a lieutenant-colonel of one of these branches should obtain a regiment who is junior to many lieutenant-colonels in the other arms not promoted to regiments, and *all* the King's officers of the rank of this junior lieutenant-colonel are made colonels, and supersede the lieutenant-colonels senior to them just mentioned who have not got regiments. The recent grant of the rank of colonel on gaining a regiment is in fact of no use to the Company's officers, with respect to the King's officers in India, for the latter who are, or may be there, will always exercise the rank of colonel or major-general, with reference to their lieutenant-colonels' commissions. Hence the relative deficiency of Company's officers of the higher ranks in India will hereafter continue the same that it has been for some years; a deficiency which is sufficiently shown by the statement already given of the number of general officers and colonels belonging to the two services. This is the result of the forced union, at a certain point of promotion, of two armies that have altogether dissimilar constitutions. A number of officers, while still young men, arrive at the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the King's army, and their commissions as lieutenant-colonel, colonel, and major-general, are prior to those of the Company's officers,

officers, who do not obtain a rank until they arrive at an age which obliges them to quit the theatre of active life. Hence, in some degree, on the occasion of field service, the principal commands are held by King's officers, and hence the state of inferiority in which the Company's army is placed. At Bhurtpore the Commander-in-chief and two senior major-generals were King's officers, and in the Mahratta and Birmah wars, the principal armies and divisions were commanded by King's officers, although the number of King's officers in India does not probably exceed a fourth part of the Company's. Notwithstanding this difference in numbers, no instance has yet occurred of the chief command at any of the Presidencies having been confided to a Company's officer. This cannot arise from the want of talents and claims on the part of the Company's army, for it has produced many men of distinguished character. Nor can it be supposed to arise from the alleged inexpediency of entrusting the chief command to officers, who, from long employment in India, had many local attachments and prejudices; for the situation of Governor at Madras and Bombay, a situation having more extensive duties and a wider field of patronage than that of Commander-in-chief, has been given to Company's servants, and many of the King's officers appointed Commanders-in-chief at the several Presidencies, had passed the greatest portion of their service in India. The Company's officers, on returning home, are not acknowledged by their country; not one of them, however distinguished by character and services, has been appointed Governor of a military garrison, or of a colony, or to the office of aid-de-camp to His Majesty. Officers of the navy, the army, and the marines, are appointed to these situations, but the Company's officers are continually reminded that they form no part of the national force. Here they are set aside, and in India, the remote scene of their services, and often of their sufferings, they are placed in a state of relative inferiority. Having little hope of arriving at command, they have few incentives to employ the labours requisite for the attainment of distinguished military accomplishments, and they naturally direct their views to the objects within their reach—to staff appointments and retirement from the service. In these respects, too, their situation has been sensibly deteriorated by reductions in their allowances, and by the great losses which they sustain in remitting their funds to this country.

It is the constant endeavour, at the present moment, of all the States on the Continent of Europe to render their armies as much as possible national, and to animate them with ardent feelings of patriotism and zeal. But the Company's officers can scarcely consider themselves as a national army; they hold their commissions and receive their orders from a company of merchants; the advantages which their labours and services may acquire for the public interests are supposed to be applied to the benefit of the Company, which seems interposed between them and their country; and instead of being entitled to the proud privilege of defending that country from danger in whatever quarter of the globe it may threaten it, they are confined to one part of the empire, where, although superior in numbers, they are always inferior in authority and dignity.

All nations maintaining standing armies have found it necessary to place them under the direct orders of the chief of the State, from whose person the great principle of military excellence emanates, whose orders alone possess the force and authority requisite for the maintenance of discipline and obedience in large armies, and whose duties at the head of the executive Government are essentially connected with the command and disposal of the national forces. No example has yet occurred of armies of such magnitude as the Company's having been entrusted to the direction of a body that formed no constituent part of the government of the State. The rules observed for the government of the Company's armies in the early period of their existence, are scarcely suitable to their present strength. On military principles, and also on all principles of government, it has appeared to me that the Company's armies are placed in unfavourable circumstances; and that these may account for the sensibility which they manifest to all reductions in their allowances, and for the discontent and commotions that have appeared at all the Presidencies. If they should be continued after the expiration of the present Charter under the

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

Company's

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

Company's contract, it might be advisable to give them a separate establishment of general officers and colonels independent of the King's brevet, and to show a greater degree of confidence in their zeal and capacity, by entrusting the military command at the several Presidencies to them sufficiently often to bear a fair proportion to their numbers. General principles might, however, rather recommend their transfer to the Crown; and in this case they should be incorporated at once on equal terms with His Majesty's troops; to form them into a colonial army would keep them in a state of comparative inferiority, without the feeling of independent existence which they may now in some degree possess. A few leading principles should be observed: the first, that no officer should obtain the rank of captain, major, or lieutenant-colonel in a sepoy regiment, without having served a certain number of years in India. Again, that no officer should be made colonel of a sepoy regiment unless he had served a certain period of time in India; and the same rule might be extended to the principal appointments on the staff. This would be absolutely necessary in order to protect the present Company's army from the effects of interest at home. Exchanges might be freely allowed, subject to those conditions. The system of promotion might be the same that exists at present in His Majesty's army, by purchase, &c. &c. A great imperfection of standing armies, and this is a point on which the military writers of France and Germany dwell at present with earnestness, consists in the slowness of promotion, and the consequent advanced age of officers on attaining superior rank; and the system of purchase is calculated to obviate this evil by accelerating the advancement of at least a certain number. Merit may certainly remain in the back ground; but in time of war merit is always brought forward; and in time of peace very few opportunities are afforded to officers of displaying such talents or merit as may entitle them to be promoted out of their turn. The Company's officers would, by a system of economy, be able to save, from their Indian allowances, sums sufficient for the purchase of their commissions. The retired list would necessarily be discontinued; officers could obtain, for the price of their commissions, annuities equal to the retired pensions. I do not think that the introduction of officers from the King's into Native regiments would be attended with very unfavourable effects upon the zeal and attachment of the sepoys. There are certain advantages for the formation of character peculiar to the situations of young officers in the Company's and the King's services. The former, being often sent on detachment in command of troops, are more frequently placed in circumstances that demand the exercise of their reason and judgment than the latter; and the King's officers being appointed to do duty at first with their own countrymen, are habituated to treat the soldiers with more consideration and respect than the Company's officers always manifest towards the sepoys, whom they too frequently regard as an inferior class of men; and the King's officers would bring these habits with them into the Native corps.

6. On most of the points stated under this head, I do not possess materials for forming a judgment; but I should suppose that the departments that are mentioned could be conducted with as much efficiency and economy under the King's government as they are at present.

7. I consider the free settlement of British subjects in India to be extremely important to the prosperity of that country. With respect to the army, I do not apprehend that it would have any consequences, either favourable or otherwise, for a considerable period of time. Hereafter, perhaps, recruits might be found among the descendants of the settlers, or corps of topassers might be formed—a description of force that was indeed used in the early period of our military history.

8. I have already anticipated this question by stating an opinion, that our empire in India should be considered as a whole; and it appears to be essential to the unity of purpose and action requisite in such circumstances that the whole army should be placed under one Governor and Commander-in-chief.

9. I have also in some degree anticipated this question. I do not think that the commands of the Company carry with them the force requisite for the maintenance in a state of habitual subordination of a great army serving in a remote territory, and sometimes

times placed in circumstances irritating to their feelings. I state my opinion with reference both to general principles and to the actual state of things. An army is the creation and creature of the State, and must be content to receive whatever form may be imposed upon it by its country; but it is the evident interest of the State itself that every branch of its military force, in every part of its dominions, should be constituted on the principles best calculated to maintain its national zeal and its efficiency. The conduct of the King's troops in India, in every situation, in the most difficult emergencies, has been above all praise; and it has been emulated by the Company's officers, who have in general shown themselves to be superior to the institutions under which they served.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(17.)—Reply  
of Col. J. Munro,  
13th March 1832.

(Signed) J. MUNRO.

London, 13th March 1832.

(18.)—REPLY of Major D. WILSON, dated 17, Old Cavendish Street, 29th March 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 25th January 1832, intimating that the Commissioners for the Affairs of India intended to propose my being called upon as a witness before the East-India Committee, and that the Board would be obliged by any information and opinions I might have to offer on certain points mentioned in that communication.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

I accordingly beg to transmit herewith such information as I possess, and the opinions I have formed on some of the points in question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. WILSON, Major,  
7th Regiment, Bombay Infantry.

1. The constitution of the several branches of the army with reference to its experienced or probable effect.

#### HEADS :

European Troops.  
Native Troops.  
European Officers.  
Employment of Military Men in Civil Situations.  
King's Commissions to Company's Officers.  
Brevet Rank of Colonel.

#### *European Troops.*

The European troops of the Company being derived from the same source as the British army, are consequently equally valuable in their composition, and the same system of discipline is pursued. The constitution, as it relates to the men, may therefore be considered similar to that of His Majesty's service; with regard to the constitution as respects the officers, it will be found discussed under the head of "European Officers."

#### *Native Troops.*

There are certain inherent and acquired peculiarities in a Native soldier of India likely to stand in the way of our coming to a fair estimate of his worth as a soldier, unless we bestow previously a considerable degree of reflection upon him. His complexion differs from



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

from our own ; he is an Asiatic, and we have conquered his country. The distinction of colour which nature has drawn all our prejudices maintain, and, moreover, we are accustomed to connect in our minds luxury, effeminacy, and softness, with an Asiatic ; and it is impossible to shut out altogether the idea of inferiority, and not to bestow even a portion of contempt on a people that we hold in subjection.

If a high standard either for men or things be before us, we readily become disposed to adopt it, and to pronounce all beneath it to be bad, without defining very strictly to ourselves the extent of this inferiority, which thus creates in our minds an incorrect idea of positive badness, instead only of comparative inferiority. An unjust estimate is consequently formed of what has been so compared, whereas a much more correct idea would have been obtained by making a comparison between what would approach nearer in degree.

The Native troops are constantly compared in our minds with the British, the readiest standard before us, and at the same time in many respects the highest. Thus the habit is acquired by many of considering the former as positively bad, whilst the evidence is only sufficient to prove that they are inferior to the best. But before we pronounce a decided sentence of condemnation, it is only becoming to examine well the circumstances or systems under which certain impressions have been conveyed to us, and to be satisfied that they do not arise out of these circumstances or systems themselves, and not out of the nature of the men to whom they have been applied, and who, under more favourable auspices, would have shown themselves worthy of high commendation instead of being despised.

It is more than probable, that if the Native troops were fairly and extensively compared with others, and even with the troops of Europe under the best, that they would be much better appreciated, and placed far higher in the scale than it has been the fashion to place them of late.

A parallel has been drawn, by officers who have served in India as well as in the Peninsula, between the Native troops and the Portuguese, and they have been called very similar. Both certainly have derived much in common from the confidence which the presence of British troops have given, as well as from the actual presence in their own ranks of British officers. With such an efficient support to rely on in times of difficulty, much may, no doubt, be done with our Native army.

It will be admitted that our military successes in India have proceeded from the efforts of the British and Indian troops in conjunction, as well as separately. The British there are employed in two ways, that is in distinct bodies, or as officers to Native troops. With the first they are individually connected by almost all human ties and sympathies, with the second they are connected only by power, interest, and that feeling of attachment, such as it is, which habit and dependence produce in generous minds. The chain of connexion between the two bodies of European and Native is palpable, singular, and most delicate ; and it is not assuming too much to say, that if any one of its slender links be broken, our Eastern empire will be lost, even more quickly than it has been acquired. In fact, it is only by uniting as closely as possible the two descriptions of troops, that we can hope to preserve our rule, either from internal commotion or external attack.

The greatest effort is of course required where the connexion is so little natural as that between the British officer and the Native soldier. Surely no feelings of generosity or patient indulgence and calm reasoning, with religious and all other prejudices, should be neglected with this people, whom experience has proved to be so highly capable of honourable feelings, so easily influenced by kindness, so full of ignorance, and consequently of prejudice, so very susceptible, from all these causes, of impressions good or bad, indiscriminately as they may be pressed upon them. From their very temperament they are volatile, and it is not saying too much that they are brave or timid, according to the understanding and genius of those who may lead and command them.

There

There is a strong feeling of nationality in most English bosoms, which may operate unfavourably in officers who do not serve with their countrymen, and prevents them from justly appreciating the troops they may be with, and, as I have before observed, lead to unfavourable conclusions respecting Native troops; but at all events, a due appreciation can never be made by officers serving in or with them, until that portion of nationality which is repulsive be overcome; and as men when young are more likely than those advanced in life to overcome such feelings, it seems absolutely necessary that the present system of recruiting the service generally, by young men set apart for it, should be continued. The occasional introduction of others, as suggested under another head, should be the exception, and the above should continue the general rule.

To know men well we must observe them nearly, and when pursuing their ordinary and national habits, and not when only exercising those we may have grafted upon them; but to attain this knowledge, all feelings of prejudice on the score of nationality, or any other, should be particularly guarded against, more especially by those who wish to form a correct estimate of an Indian soldier, with a view of rendering his services efficient.

What sympathy could one man have with another who took no pains to conceal that he despised him, because born under a different degree of latitude, or because it had pleased the Almighty to distinguish him with a black instead of a white face? Would he follow one with enthusiasm to death who is too proud to condescend farther than to give a brief command in a foreign tongue for him to go there? Would he, in times of difficulty and need, risk all to succour or to save a commander to whom he felt no obligation but the cold and stern one of duty, and who had never used towards him that language of courtesy and affection habitual to the Natives of India, even in the common transactions of life? Yet experience has proved that Native troops are capable of the greatest devotion when commanded with skill, confidence, and ability, and the various histories of our military transactions in India, wherever they have been impartially written, abound in such proofs.

Our safeguard in India has hitherto been, that we have struggled hard to support our Native troops; but if we now cease to do so, and put our own prejudices instead of our reason against the prejudices of our Native soldiers, then it may be truly said that our power is beyond its climax, and that our glory is about to pass away. A just and proper pride should ever be cultivated both in the men and officers of our Indian service, which can be maintained in its anomalous position only by that consideration and attention which so splendid a national object demands.

It may be worth adding here, what is most gratifying to believe, that the faith of the Native soldier in British courage is perfect, and that is natural; for he knows that when he approaches danger, if he be not actually preceded by a body of that nation, he is led by an individual of it, who is ready and able to conduct him, and to share freely, to the utmost extent, all his dangers. Indeed, one distinguishing and most honourable feature in our Indian policy has been, that on no occasion have we ever sacrificed our Native troops for the preservation of our European. Much of our success may be traced to this, and to the readiness of the Natives to follow, whenever they are duly led and conducted by men who have taken the pains to understand their peculiarities; and many experienced officers who have served along with either British or Native troops in India might be appealed to, whether the Native troops have not, when they have been commanded with judgment, emulated the courage and enterprise of the British.

The more these officers may have served with or against the troops of the different powers of Europe, the less likely will they be to mistake the aberrations that happen with, and are common to all troops, for something which happens only and belongs peculiarly to the Native troops of India.

There have been fluctuations in the character of all armies, and the Indian has not been exempt from them. If we compare the various writers on the troops composing it, and

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

and who are disposed to give such widely different accounts of its courage, capability, worth, and attachment, we can only reconcile their discrepancies by supposing that these accounts depend on various causes, partly on the prejudices of the writers, on a difference in the talent for command in the leaders of these troops at different times, on a change in their discipline or military education, or on their pride, and contentment, or otherwise, with the service. In short, to ascertain how such different statements might each be made *bonâ fide* of the same description of men, we must endeavour to discover whether the susceptibility of these men to good, and their self-confidence, had at the different times in question been duly fostered, or whether their liability to bad, and diffidence in themselves, had not been duly attended to and counteracted.

To make men good soldiers, they must be most minutely and actively superintended; their minds, as well as their bodies, must be duly instructed and disciplined, and their passions duly directed. Can all this be expected in a service constantly fluctuating in its numbers and description of officers, and passing quickly from men declining in years and constitution to crowds of untried, and consequently unknown youths?

If there be any truth in these views, it will be admitted that the utmost attention should be paid to the selection of officers sent from this country to fill high commands in the Indian army, and well-educated young men should alone fill up its vacancies, since it is of the most vital importance that a good and enlightened feeling should exist respecting the Native troops, which compose the major part of our force there.

It has been said, and said in many respects truly, that the Native soldier has little feeling of country, from the peculiar state of society in which he is born. Surely, therefore, it becomes the more necessary to cultivate to the utmost the delicate but powerful feeling of *esprit du corps* and service, and to attach him to the British, by every becoming consideration for his prejudices and interests. It is difficult to describe the strong feelings of the Native troops on these points, and the interest and enthusiasm with which they express themselves when speaking of the branch of the service or the regiment to which they may belong.

Of the three establishments, Bombay has probably been composed of men of the greatest variety of country, province, and caste; at one time also it had in its regiments a great number of men of Hindostan Proper, generally supposed to be those of all others the least likely to mix with different descriptions of men and castes, and to have the greatest dislike to general service. But this army has ever shown the utmost readiness to proceed on foreign service, where Native troops have been required, or to any stations or places, far or near, to which the regiments composing it have been ordered. It therefore may be offered, as a strong proof that the whole army of India may be generalized in its composition, and so rendered fit for the most extended services likely to be required from it, as is further noticed under another head.

It seems probable that we have not sufficiently attended to the passion which the Natives of India have for honours, distinctions, and titles. By a judicious and liberal distribution of them, a powerful stimulus might be given to our Native troops, and a royal order of merit for them would be attended with the best possible effects, in rousing and maintaining the highest military feelings and most devoted attachment. In the Austrian service, a soldier of good character obtains and wears an order of merit after a service of twenty years, independent of what other honours might otherwise have been bestowed on him for distinguished services in the field. The Emperor Napoleon, besides admission into the Legion of Honour, used to bestow swords, and even muskets of honour; and it seems probable that the Native troops are even more susceptible of being influenced than the French in these matters of distinction.

Our strict system of drill, and our particularity in dress and equipments, are foreign to the ideas and habits of the Natives of India, but there is a considerable pride of the latter, and fondness for display and finery in their dispositions, which might be turned to advantage by marks of distinction.

*European*

*European Officers.*

The rule of strict seniority promotion which has been observed in the Company's service operates disadvantageously, inasmuch as it makes an officer's advancement in regimental rank and routine general command almost entirely independent of his own qualifications and exertions, and gives the active, zealous, and accomplished, little advantage from being so over the indolent and little qualified.

At present, provided an officer be not completely and obviously non-efficient, he not only succeeds as a matter of course in being promoted, but becomes so exactly in the same manner and to the same extent as those who may have eminently qualified themselves by the study as well as practice of their professional duties.

But the promotion by seniority is no doubt productive of good, in serving as a security and encouragement to gentlemen who become soldiers with a view to obtaining by the profession an honourable and independent livelihood.

When promotion, as at present in the Company's service, is left to the operation of deaths and retirements alone, other evils besides those above contemplated arise; and it is generally so very slow as to wear out the patience and zeal of many who, under a more animating system, would have been contented and valuable all the time they might remain in the service. The evil of this slowness cannot be expected to diminish; on the contrary, it must increase, since it has been most severely felt by many, even at the present time, and after the service at all the three Presidencies has been so very much augmented as it has been within these last fifteen years. No such augmentation can be contemplated for the future, and care must be taken to model the service accordingly; otherwise the officers must become non-efficient from age. The system partially adopted lately of granting brevets to Company's officers for distinguished services will tend, to a small extent, to remedy some of the evils arising out of seniority promotion; but it has been too confined in its operation, and much restricted with regard to services that are passed, which does not appear just to the claims of many still in employment; consequently, it has not produced, at the present moment, all the good effects which such a measure is calculated to accomplish. There can be little doubt, however, of its effects hereafter being beneficial, as opening a fair road of advancement to all who may be disposed to distinguish themselves.

There is still, however, in the service more of the bad effects of pure seniority promotion than is either necessary or likely to be beneficial.

A certain number of vacancies from casualties, say one-sixth, might be reserved by the State for the reward of those in the next rank of the casualty who may show superior qualifications—these to be pronounced upon by the collective body of the Government, who should record an opinion substantiated by documents.\* The recommendation of the Commander-in-chief would probably have its due weight, whilst his motives for such would thus be investigated and controlled; but the final confirmation of the advancement should be from home.

But although every sixth casualty in each particular rank, by natural death, might, as above suggested, fall to the Government, all deaths in action should fall to seniority, provided the senior be on the spot, or at all events present, or on his way to join some portion of the army, division, force, regiment, or detachment carrying on operations; or if he should at any time during the campaign have joined, or been on his way to join, and should have been rendered incapable of continuing in the field, either from wounds or sickness, he should still retain his right of promotion; also, if he should be elsewhere employed in the field, or on foreign employment, military or political, he should be equally eligible as if on the spot. In all other cases, not specified above, the next senior on the spot

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

\* The French service, a few years ago, was, I believe, constituted as follows: One-third seniority, one-third merit, and the remaining third Government patronage

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Mr. J. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

spot should get the promotion. The above would occasion all officers, in ordinary circumstances, to proceed with their regiments on field service, unless the Government chose to say specifically that their remaining where they might be employed would be more beneficial to the service.

The arrangement of leaving one-sixth of the promotion to the Government, although it would enable it to reward the deserving, and, as such, be beneficial, the operation of the arrangement would be limited, whilst the general promotion would in no way be advanced by it, and would still remain much too slow. Some new means of expediting it should therefore be adopted.

Independent of the two sources from which promotion now arises, *viz.* death and retirement, in its present form, there are two others which offer, and which may be worth considering—purchase, which would operate in a partial manner, and annuities, which would operate generally.

I presume that a reasonably quick promotion would be advantageous both to individuals and the State, and, as such, both might be willing to obtain it at a certain cost. Annuities might have some tendency, in the beginning, to increase the expenses of the State; but if the principle of permitting the army to assist itself be once admitted, and some assistance given, as in the case of the civil service, this expense might be met by judicious management, and a fair contribution from the service at large.

Purchase, from being likely to operate in an uncertain and less general manner than annuities would do, and being less in accordance with the general principles of seniority, which is the basis on which the service is founded, seems less eligible than annuities, the operation of which would not be so capricious and uncertain; but whilst more general, it would also be more in accordance with the principle of length of service, if not of seniority. Besides, it seems at all events chosen as one means of expediting promotion by the Indian army itself; and this is one great reason for forwarding it.

Still, however, it seems possible to make use of both purchase and annuities, as an encouragement to men who sacrifice the better portion of their lives in a deleterious climate with the expectation of rising to some rank and consideration, and in hopes of having, at the end of a long period of service, a retirement sufficient to enable them to pass the latter years of their lives in a state of tolerable independence and comfort.

The introduction of purchase would also offer a fair encouragement to the acquisition of habits of economy, as demonstrating that by a due attention to them military advancement, an honourable object of ambition, might in some cases be obtained. All that might thus advance an officer in the different ranks of his profession would have a tendency to place him, during the latter years of his life, in greater pecuniary ease, whilst the sale of commissions might also realize a certain sum to officers who might be prevented by bad health from remaining in India. Every officer might therefore be permitted to sell his commission, provided he could find an individual purchaser; but it does not seem to be desirable that the Government should become the purchaser, as that would push the system to an extent beyond the natural demand of those possessing means.

All lapses in purchased commissions should fall to seniority, and not to Government nomination, in consideration of the numerous unhealthy stations in India.

In the engineers and artillery, purchase should be limited to each branch, but the Government might assist here occasionally as purchasers, where the seniority successor on whom the promotion should be bestowed might be deserving.

The cavalry and infantry should continue to be kept separate from the operation of purchase from the one to the other above the rank of field officer; below that rank there does not seem to be the same necessity for keeping the two arms apart.

Inconvenience to the service seems to arise from the circumstance of a major being considered as belonging exclusively to a particular regiment, instead of being liable to be removed

removed as a lieutenant-colonel is, or in other words, being a regimental instead of a line officer. It is frequently desirable to bring a major into the command of a regiment, either from the want of a field officer, with any particular regiment, or from his superior qualifications for command. But as the service is constituted at present, should a lieutenant-colonel command the regiment in which such a major is, it becomes necessary to remove this superior officer to make way for the inferior; whereas if the inferior were moveable, this need not take place, as the major might then be transferred. Another reason for making a major moveable is, that it frequently would be beneficial to remove (at all events for a time) a person who has reached the rank of field officer from the regiment in which he has passed through the inferior grades, as the intimacies and familiarities naturally entertained among persons of the same rank are unfavourable to discipline, and difficulties arise, and unpleasant feelings are created, when they are broken through by an officer rising into command among individuals who have long been accustomed to consider him only as of the same rank, and with whose indiscretions and weaknesses they are all familiar.

The only difficulty which appears in making a major as moveable as a lieutenant-colonel, is the question which may be considered to arise in the event of the major dying, whether the promotion should be given to the regiment with which he may be doing duty and is attached, or to the one in which he has risen to that rank.

Were he always actually doing duty and effective on the spot, it seems that the regiment he died with would be best entitled to the promotion; for it may be at an unhealthy station, full of the risk of life, on service or on special duty of an unpleasant or dangerous nature. But a regiment may be exposed to all these contingencies under the command of a lieutenant-colonel, or at all events the major on its strength may not be doing duty on the spot, as he may be absent from ill health, or he may be on the staff, or in Europe on furlough. For these reasons, it seems better to give the promotion, as it now goes, to the regiment in which the major rose to that rank.

In a service having so much of the principle of seniority in it, and one in which it is so desirable to prevent men who may be exceptionable from rising to be commanding officers of regiments, although they may be fit to continue in more subordinate ranks, in which they may have served for a great number of years in a foreign country, and so have lost their natural connexion with home, it seems most desirable to have some mode of disposing of such individuals, and that should be by transferring them to a pension, an invalid or veteran list, at the discretion of the Executive Government in India, requiring to be confirmed from home. The vacancy that might occur from such transfer should fall to seniority and not to Government nomination or purchase. The service has sustained great injury by the occasional stoppage of the supply of officers for a time, and the subsequent sending out of cadets in great numbers at one period, or in one season. Nothing can be more detrimental to any service than this great fluctuation; for to maintain discipline, not only a gradation in rank seems necessary, but also some gradation in seniority and age; men who are nearly alike in all these seldom co-operate very efficiently and cordially in support of the authority of a commanding officer, and without the co-operation of all in the scale, that authority cannot be complete. There should be rank to command, and gradations of rank, seniority, and age, to obey; but if there be great lapses in all under the head, the ideas, feelings, and sympathies of the individuals composing the body will be widely different, and their collision detrimental from their great disparities; neither can men under such differences readily combine either in the execution of their duties, or mix easily in society together, and so continue on a good footing.

Young soldiers and young men are apt to forget that they too will advance, and they require the example of those not too far removed either by age or rank to induce them to attend readily to the voice of authority, exercised by men whose rank and years make a very wide separation between them.

The Company's regiments are composed of men well advanced in years, forming the minority,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

minority, and youths hardly beyond boyhood, between which classes there is little community of feelings, and the exaction of obedience is difficult. There are also instances in which there are differences of eight and ten years in the length of service of men standing next to each other in the same regiment, which in a seniority service indicates the great lapses that must have taken place in the supplies of officers. Besides, if a considerable number of young men join a regiment together, they form a separate body, not willing to obey readily either those above them, or each other; and their pretensions are nearly alike, although there will be a considerable difference in gradation and position in the regiment. This, in a seniority service, in the end cannot fail to introduce feelings of discontent and mortification, and bad humour in those who, although starting in life at the same time and in the same regiment, have such very different prospects of advancement.

Many of these evils would be got over by the service being supplied frequently with officers by small numbers and at different periods, and not in masses of 200 or 300 at a time, followed by an interruption for years. This could easily be accomplished if quarterly Returns of casualties were sent from India, and appointments made upon them.

It seems probable that great advantage would be derived to the service from officers of the Indian army seeing the troops of other nations, and comparing them, and the military system under which they are trained, to that followed in their own army, and thereby acquiring knowledge for its improvement, as also a good and just perception of its advantages and defects.

It would likewise be of vast importance if they endeavoured to acquire a knowledge of the statistics of the countries bordering on India.

These objects are best attained by travelling, and to encourage officers to do so, leave of absence should be liberally granted; this likewise would in some measure relieve the tedium, ennui, and habits of indolence likely to arise from the monotonous life of an Indian camp, cantonment, or garrison. To induce officers to travel overland when they proceed to Europe, they should be permitted to reckon the time they may continue in Asia as service in India, without however receiving Indian allowances.

#### *Employment of Military Men in Civil Situations.*

The employment of military men in common civil situations would have a tendency to turn the attention of the service in general from the military profession, and whilst it would interrupt studies and inquiries leading to the acquisition of military knowledge, it would also break down that superior degree of discipline derived from military pursuits and habits being uninterrupted. Officers would moreover be less inclined to make sacrifices to the duties of their profession, if they saw frequent opportunities of being employed on common occasions in other branches of the public service.

The same description of evils, but in a smaller degree, arise from officers being employed in the civil branches and departments immediately belonging to the army, such as the Ordnance Store department, Commissariat, Pay and Barrack departments, &c. &c. It does not seem to be necessary to notice here the advantages which the State might derive from the occasional employment of military men in civil situations, because although the education and process an officer's mind goes through, and his habits of obedience and order would render him in many minor situations a particularly useful civil servant, it is not for such common occasions necessary to sacrifice one branch of the public service to the other. There can be little doubt, however, that many very important occasions may arise such as the occupation of a new country, the introduction of particular regulations under an established Government, or the temporary military occupation of countries bordering upon our own territories, &c. &c., when the employment to a great extent of military men in the civil administration would be most useful, but such occurrences are rare; and of course as the State would derive great benefit, it would naturally make use of the means best adapted to accomplish its objects.

In the Political department in India and the countries connected with it the employment

ment of military men of high qualifications, and who had previously made themselves conspicuous in their own profession, would be eminently useful. The military profession is looked up to in these countries with the highest respect; the ideas of military men and many of their habits accord well with those of the men holding power in Eastern States; and in times of difficulty and danger many questions arise requiring both military experience and determination, as well as general knowledge and political sagacity, in those who have to decide upon them. Many times also actual military operations are required to be conducted with political objects and views, and the service is more likely to be benefited by the chief authority and development of the proposed plans and operation being confided to the execution of one individual commander than to several functionaries, who can rarely coalesce with the necessary unity of purpose and action. The formation of a class of men combining both military and political experience is very necessary.

Military knowledge of the resources of India and the countries adjacent is also particularly requisite, and surely it could be acquired with peculiar facility by military men in political situations, which offer to them sources of information otherwise unattainable, and which could not be appreciated and rendered useful by one to whom military knowledge and experience might not be habitual.

For these reasons, it appears that the employment in high political situations of talented military men, who were also distinguished in their profession, would be extremely beneficial to the State.

With regard to the employment of military men in certain civil branches of the Military department, such as the General and Ordnance Commissariat, Pay and Barrack department, it has been advanced that the Government has a greater security for the honest and efficient discharge of the duties of these departments by the employment of men who have their character as officers, as well as their commissions, at stake, than by the employment of others; therefore it is urged that this additional security affords good grounds for employing these in preference. But it appears, if the reasoning urged in the former part of these observations on this subject be correct, that injury would probably accrue to the military service from the minds and pursuits of military men having been turned from their profession, unless under particular circumstances of magnitude; it remains to be considered whether the sacrifice required by the employment of officers in the department abovementioned be met by a sufficiently strong counterbalance of advantage.

The practice which formerly prevailed in India of employing gentlemen in the civil service in the Commissariat is objectionable, as they had no previous training in that department, and were not subject to martial law. Their habits were also those of civilians, and their ideas of obedience consequently not so strict as those of military men. For these reasons it does not appear that returning to that practice would be beneficial to the service.

But the same objections do not appear to exist to the employment of young gentlemen who may be bred up to acquire a thorough knowledge of the duties of the different branches of the Commissariat and Pay departments, and who would pass through the different gradations of their own particular branch, in constant intercourse with the army whose operations they would be so intimately connected with, they must necessarily follow nearly the same habits, and adopt many of the ideas, whilst they would be constantly under martial law. And as their appointments should be made not only respectable in point of comparative rank, but also considerable in point of emolument, in proportion to the extent of the duties and responsibility exacted from them, it appears that there would be a very similar degree of security in the honest administration of the duties to that which is obtained by the employment, as at present, of officers of the army, who have not had any previous education in these departments.

It seems, therefore, that the service would derive advantage, without the sacrifice of any great degree of security, from the formation of a General and Ordnance Commissariat, on similar principles to those in His Majesty's service.

It has already been deemed proper, throughout India, to open the lower branches of the

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

the Ordnance Commissariat to deserving conductors, and no doubt much encouragement to good and honest behaviour arises to that rank from such a prospect of advancement.

Officers on the veteran or invalid or pension establishments would be perfectly capable of performing the duties of barrack-masters; and to them such appointments should be restricted. But if, in preference to the above, it should still be deemed right to administer the duties of the abovementioned departments by military men on the strength of regiments, the services might be defended from some of the injurious effects arising from such a system, if all military men employed in such situations, on receiving a step in regimental promotion, be directed to join their regiments, and be considered as ineligible to a situation similar to that they held in the civil branch of the service, for a period of two years.

#### *King's Commissions to Company's Officers.*

The present commission granted by His Majesty to Company's officers, and which corresponds to that held from the East-India Company, is restricted to the "East-Indies only."

When it is considered that this commission is held by officers who are equally servants of the British nation as those who have the honour to bear commissions directly from the Crown, it is much to be lamented that so humiliating a distinction should be maintained, particularly as the omission of the words "in the East-Indies only" would not imply any rights to office or employment, where Company's troops might not be.

An unrestricted commission from the King to a Company's officer would only show, that in the event of its being found for the benefit of the British nation that troops from the Indian army should be employed out of the East-Indies, the rank of officers of that army would be preserved to them.

A feeling of extreme mortification at this restriction cannot fail to arise in the breast of an officer of the Indian army, when he is conscious of the readiness which exists in himself, and in all who belong to it, to extend the services due to their country to any part of the world, and that instances have occurred when they have been called upon to do so out of India, without any previous pledge being given to them that their rank and their feelings as officers would be carefully protected.

Egypt, South America, Mauritius, Arabia, and Persia, are all out of the East-Indies, yet officers in the Company's service have been combined with His Majesty's in these countries, and have been tolerated in the exercise of a corresponding rank, it being important for the interests of the British nation that they should be so combined. Surely, then, such an unnecessary and distressing restriction in the commissions they are honoured with from His Majesty, should be removed, as an encouragement to those feelings of zealous readiness to proceed wherever their services would be useful to their country, which the Company's officers have always been eager to make manifest, particularly when this abolition would not imply any undue rights, or any interference with the privileges and advantages of the King's army, where Company's troops might not be serving.

#### *Brevet Rank of Colonel.*

The present brevet commission of colonel granted to the Company's officers who may acquire it previous to His Majesty's general brevet has been conceded under peculiar restrictions, and has rendered the relations between the King's and Company's services still more complicated than they were previously.

The general corresponding commission granted by the King to the Company's officers is restricted to "the East-Indies only," as is above noticed, but the brevet granted to colonels who may anticipate His Majesty's general brevet is still further restricted, for it extends to the "territorial possessions of the East-India Company in India only."

The letter from Lord Hill respecting this brevet states, "that in order to provide for the

the interests of His Majesty's officers serving in the territorial possessions of the Company, and to take care that their fair claims are not passed over, in consequence of any particular circumstances attending the promotion of the officers of the Company's army, that the local rank of colonel by brevet be granted to any lieutenant-colonel of His Majesty's army who would without such grant be superceded by a junior officer of the Company's service, stationed in the same Presidency, on his promotion to the rank of colonel regimentally."

This grant to His Majesty's officers would not have operated in a partial manner had a similar care been taken of the fair claims of the Company's officers also, who might in like manner be superceded, which they are now, not only by the single officer of their own service who might have attained the rank of colonel regimentally, but also by all the King's officers senior to him.

This new description of brevet, besides the restriction to the territorial possessions of the East-India Company, creates a change in the rank of King's officers, according to the Presidency they may be at, and it is difficult to say how it would operate in the event of troops from two, or even the whole three Presidencies being joined, either within or without the territorial possessions of the Company, an occurrence extremely likely to take place, as, for instance, at Asseerghur at the end of the Pindarree war.

In the territorial possessions, a very junior officer in the Company's service might fortunately have attained the rank of colonel regimentally, which would of course carry him over all the lieutenant-colonels of his own service, and not only would this take place, but all the lieutenant-colonels of the Company's service previously senior to him, would be superceded in like manner by all the King's officers over whom this single individual might have passed.

Out of the territorial possessions, and in the event of troops proceeding on an expedition by sea, which never could be considered "in the territorial possessions of the East-India Company only," it does not appear exactly how the commissions of colonel would be disposed of. The only course, under such a circumstance, which seems to offer is, for all to recur to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, to which the officers of both services rise independently of each other; but this involves the evil of men who have held the rank of colonel for years being put back to lieutenant-colonels.

This brevet thus introduces an uncertainty of rank and rights of command likely to prove detrimental to the service, whilst it wounds severely the feelings of the Company's officers, as they are aware, at the same time, that the privilege of rising to the rank of colonel regimentally is possessed by the royal artillery and royal engineers.

If this privilege cannot be conceded to another service, which, however, enjoyed it for years as a part of its constitution, it seems only just that the Company's officers who are now superceded by the operation of this brevet should be considered in like manner as the King's, or in other words, that it should include all the lieutenant-colonels of both services who may be superceded by any individual rising to the rank of colonel regimentally in the Company's service.

## 2. The past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the several branches of the military force of the three Presidencies.

### HEADS:

Organization ; European Troops (Infantry).  
 Organization ; Native Troops (Infantry).  
 East-Indians.  
 Pioneers and Artificers, Regimental.  
 Followers and Camp Equipage.

APPENDIX (B.),  
 continued.

(18.)—Reply  
 of Maj. D. Wilson,  
 29th March 1832.

Respecting

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

Respecting the past and present strength and distribution of the military force of the three Presidencies, I do not feel that I possess original information sufficiently precise and valuable to render it worthy of being communicated here; I therefore pass to the organization.

*Organization; European Troops (Infantry).*

The organization of the European troops of the Company, in as far as the men are concerned, is similar to that of His Majesty's service, but as respects the officers the same general system has been pursued as in the other branches of the service, with this difference, that the number of officers, which according to the Regulations is the same for an European as for a Native regiment, having been found too few, the officers and men of each two regiments of infantry have been formed into one, but the promotion of the officers goes on exactly as if the regiments had remained separate. This, as long as the service may continue one of regimental seniority promotion, will continue to offer a great anomaly.

The disadvantage of European troops in the service of the Company remaining constantly in India might in some measure be obviated, by granting furlough to the well-behaved men of a certain number of years' service, and a portion of the passage-money might be contributed by the men themselves, to be deposited before the furlough be granted. The prospect of this furlough could not fail to have a beneficial effect on the mind of the soldier, by sustaining hope, and that ulterior prospect of happiness so eagerly sought by all. However thoughtlessly a soldier may have enlisted, he has still ample leisure for reflection on what he has left in the monotony of an Indian barrack-life.

*Organization; Native Troops (Infantry).*

The present establishment of European officers to the Native regiments of infantry appears considerably too low to enable them to meet a powerful enemy with the necessary degree of efficiency; and to introduce and maintain a permanent and vigorous system of discipline and instruction, and above all, to inspire that confidence in their officers and themselves, so necessary to render the Native troops perfectly efficient, particularly in the event of an invasion of India being attempted either by an European or any other enemy, which Native troops have not been in the habit of meeting.

Any great changes made in the organization of our army, at the time of the event above contemplated occurring, would decidedly be unfavourable, and could only be looked upon as experiments, whereas we may have time before such an event can take place, to discuss and try by the test of experience, whether any particular plan which may be proposed would be likely to confer additional power on our capability of successful resistance.

The climate, moreover, is so unfavourable to that personal exposure of officers and men, which is so absolutely necessary during a campaign, as to render it almost certain that the present establishment of officers would be so very much reduced by even one active campaign on the frontiers, that the army would be totally unfit to commence a second. And it is absolutely necessary that experienced officers, known to the Native regiments, should compose the majority with these regiments, instead of a number of young men unknown to them.

If the revenues of the State will not permit of our officering the whole of our Native troops in the manner which may be considered necessary for their entire efficiency in important field operations, it seems better, under such supposed financial inability, to have one portion of them at least in a state of complete organization for active field operations, and the other sufficiently so when mixed with a portion of the former, for the common routine duties of garrisons, detachments, escorts, &c. &c. than to have the whole in that middle and indifferent state which does not ensure anything.

The following heads of a plan are sketched for remedying the great evil of a deficiency in the number of European officers with a portion of our Native army, at the least

least possible additional expense, and also with as little alteration in the present organization as a due regard for what is required will permit.

The infantry of the Native army to be divided into regiments of two battalions each, and composed of two regiments of the present establishment.

To prevent all difficulties in the regimental promotion as at present operating, the promotion of the officers belonging to the two regiments might still, after their junction, go on separately, as it would have done had they remained divided.\* But officers who may be appointed after the day of this junction should rise as one regiment, profiting by the promotion in each of the former two indiscriminately.

The whole of the present establishment of European officers of the two regiments thus joined together to belong to the first battalions.

The whole of the present establishment of Native officers to belong to the second battalions.

The senior European officer to be considered as commanding the whole regiment, and to issue standing regimental orders, to apply to both battalions.

The first battalions to be commanded in the usual manner, by the senior officer, with the present staff of regiments. A Native officer to be selected from the second battalion as Native adjutant.

The second battalions to be commanded by a selected field officer, or captain, to give the greater scope for selection. This command should never be admitted on seniority, or any other right, except that of qualifications. First, temper; second, acquirements; third, language, should be considered. The command of the second battalion is not to be considered separate, excepting in as far as common daily routine may be concerned; and the commanding officer of either battalion should make returns and reports to the commanding officer of the regiment, who would generally be with the first battalion. The commanding officer of the second battalion to have in no way the power to alter the standing orders of the regiment, however distant from the first battalion; and in the event of local circumstances making the suspension of any of them necessary, he should report immediately to the commanding officer of the regiment the cause of this suspension.

One subaltern to be selected, for his qualifications, from the first battalion as adjutant to the second; also, in like manner, another subaltern as quartermaster, paymaster, and interpreter, each of these staff officers being qualified to act for the other.

In the event of any occasional detachment of importance leaving the regiment, one or both of these officers might be sent along with it, should an European officer be required, a case extremely likely to occur.

The two battalions to be as intimately connected as possible in all their relations; the second being considered subordinate to, and the means of supplying and keeping complete in men, the first battalion, by periodical drafts of men, perfect in their discipline and drill, or in small numbers occasionally, as if the second battalion were only a detachment from the first battalion, which, however, might also recruit, when favourably situated for so doing.

From the first battalion all promotions of Native officers to be made into the second battalion, unless the commanding officer of the regiment should concur in the recommendation of the commanding officer of the second battalion, in favour of a non-commissioned officer of that battalion.

One-sixth of the death casualties in Native officers to be reserved by the Government, for the purpose of being bestowed on the sons of deserving Native officers, who may have received

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

\* This is the practice at present in the Company's European regiments; the men of each two of which have been formed into one regiment, as noticed elsewhere.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

received a good education, and who might thus receive a commission without passing into the ranks, which is imperative at present. It would also be most important to encourage the entrance of the sons of Native gentlemen into the Native army, by bestowing commissions on such of them as might be duly educated, out of the Government patronage; but the remaining five-sixths of the commissions should continue for the encouragement of soldiers of fortune who might enter our ranks.

The system of discipline, drill, interior economy, customs, usages, and practices, to be the same in both battalions.

The second battalion to be in no way considered as a place to which individuals may be sent who are unfit for the first battalion, in any respect whatsoever. On the contrary, it is to be the source from which the first battalion is to maintain its efficiency.

The battalions to have in every respect the same rights, privileges, uniform, regimental equipments of every kind, and to be equally prepared and ready to perform the same duties.

In times of peace both battalions to fall equally into the same system of reliefs.

When the two battalions of a regiment happen to be at the same station, the same separation and system is to be maintained as if they were at a distance; but the commanding officer of the regiment would have a perfect right to interfere in the discipline and drill of both battalions, with a view to maintain the uniformity of the system.

As part of the above system, a new regulation or law would require to be passed, to enable European officers to sit on the trial of Native soldiers, who are at present tried solely by Native officers. This, it is conceived, would not in any way create unpleasant feelings in the minds of the Native troops, who seem to have confidence in the justice and independence of judgment of their European officers, and readily appeal to them, in case of disputes, even in their own families.

Corporal punishments to Native soldiers should be the very last resort for secondary offences, and its total abolition would probably bring into our ranks a much better and higher description of men than will resort to them whilst it is continued.

#### *East-Indians.*

In conjunction with the above, and as part of the same system, it is proposed to raise two experimental regiments of East-Indians, meaning indiscriminately Creoles, or mixed race, in all its degrees and shades.

The first battalions to be officered as the other regiments of the line abovementioned, and on the same establishment as to its numbers.

The second battalion to be officered by East-Indians only, two to each company, with the designation of sub-captain and sub-lieutenant, to rank according to date with subadars and jemadars (Native captains and lieutenants), and in the same manner as they do with regard to European officers.

The first and second battalions to have the same relative connexion as in the other regiments of the line, and the same system of command and staff to be observed.

The men to receive three-fourths of pay of Europeans (nine rupees); rations in the field, 1 lb. meat, 1 lb. bread, and other small articles of food, the same as Europeans, for five days in the week, and for the remaining two days the same as Native troops.

Spirits never to form any part of the ration, or to be considered in any way as a right. When it may be necessary, in cases of great fatigue, to make a small issue, it should be done as seldom as possible, and not without distinct orders from the highest authorities on the spot.

A certain allowance to be given for hutting or dividing off extensive sheds as barracks, as is the practice with regard to Native troops cantoned at Bombay, and some other stations under that Presidency.

The

The clothing to be the same fashion as that of Europeans.

It is much to be lamented, that it has been judged advisable to exclude East-Indians as officers, by positive enactment, from the military service of His Majesty and the Company.

This has undoubtedly had a great tendency to degrade in the estimation of the world a race sprung from ourselves, and who might have mixed among us without injuring or degrading the services of the State.

But this is not the place to discuss the general rights of this depressed race, and the advantages the State might derive from its elevation into useful and efficient members of a great empire, in which they are born with the rights of British subjects. Their talents, their feelings, and their acquirements can never be fully developed until they have an unrestricted admission into the service of the State, neither can we fairly count on their loyalty and attachment until they possess the full enjoyment of their birthright.

As to the exclusion of the East-Indians as officers from the military services, it appears clear, that if it be deemed expedient to exclude them from His Majesty's, it seems also necessary, but only in consequence of that, to exclude them likewise from the Company's, which it must be admitted has already a struggle for its own equal consideration with the King's.

Their admission into the Company's service alone, therefore, would not give them the highest elevation, whilst it would have a tendency to depress that service.

The raising of the two regiments above proposed would not in any way interfere with the general abolition of the enactments of exclusion of the mixed race from the two services as officers; for it will be observed, that in the second battalions of the two regiments it is contemplated that the promotion to sub-captain and sub-lieutenant to rank equally with the two grades of Native officers is to take place by men elevated from the ranks.

Men born and educated under the peculiar circumstances of the mixed race in India must have a distinct character, and if we were as anxious to obliterate, as some men are desirous to perpetuate this difference, we should certainly be unsuccessful in attempting to do so. Many of their peculiarities arise out of natural causes, which we cannot control. Our object, therefore, ought to be to give what is peculiar the most favourable shape and direction.

If we wish to be just we must not make our own estimate of our own good qualities the only standard by which we are to measure the qualities of other people. We must make allowances for their opinion of what constitutes good, and acknowledge and foster virtues, although they may not be of exactly the same quality and kind as our own.

We think ourselves full of strength, courage, and knowledge, and many are disposed to think the mixed race naturally our inferiors in these respects; but to ascertain this we must give them a fair field, and cease to indicate constantly in the most invidious manner to those whose merits we wish to try, that we look upon them as an inferior race. Such treatment has a tendency to make the weaker spirits believe they are so, and the stronger to resist our injustice.

If the great measure of raising troops composed of East-Indians be tried, it should be commenced on such a foundation as will bear a very extensive superstructure, and we should strive diligently to confer on an intermediate race the military virtues of both European and Native, whilst we carefully abstain from doing anything that would risk its being overwhelmed with the vices of both.

It is alike our interest and our duty in this case to endeavour to steer as clear as we can of our prejudices, and to give the people, for whose benefit and consolation an experiment may be tried, the best opportunities of raising themselves in general estimation; and we are, in making our arrangements, bound to show such consideration for their feelings, that what is intended as a boon may in no way be looked upon as an insult.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1882.

We should moreover look with great solicitude and minuteness to the pay, food, clothing, and lodging, of a new description of force, which may some day be a national one, and a great means of security to our power and dominion.

The success of such a measure in a military point of view will of course greatly depend upon the judgment with which these new soldiers may be committed in their first affairs or campaign. If they be judiciously brought forward, and so succeed, they probably will soon establish a character.

#### *Pioneers and Artificers (Regimental).*

It has at all times been found necessary to attach some artificers to Native regiments, and it appears that a most efficient establishment of this kind might be organized at a small expense, to combine both the duties of pioneers and artificers, by which the efficiency of the army would be most materially improved, and an opening made for the employment of that important and difficult-to-be-disposed-of portion of the community, the unmixed descendants of Europeans, and the mixed descendants of Europeans and Natives, born in India, whilst at the same time efficient Natives should in no way be excluded, the object being to fuse into one all shades and castes.

The following plan is sketched as combining the abovementioned objects, and to be applied to each regiment of infantry in the Company's service

#### *Establishment of Pioneers and Artificers:*

- 1 Master artificer and pioneer, capable of general superintendence, particularly as armourer.
- 1 Assistant to the above, capable of general superintendence, particularly as carpenter.
- 2 Armourers and pioneers, for the petty repairs of arms, sick-carts, doolies, tent-poles, &c.
- 1 Carpenter and pioneer, for the repairs of musket-stocks, sick-carts, doolies, tent-pegs, to assist in building regimental places of arms.
- 1 Tent-maker and pioneer, for the repair of tents and knapsacks, to superintend and assist in fitting men's clothing.
- 1 Shoe-maker and pioneer, for the repair of leather work of accoutrements, tents, and water-bags, and to superintend other workmen.

---

#### *7 Total artificers and pioneers.*

---

The title of artificers and pioneers is chosen, because, from being an unusual one, it might be borne by either Creole, mixed race, or Native.

The above establishment to be regularly enlisted and considered as soldiers, not followers, and to have the benefit of the pension list, and all other privileges, also to be mustered, one with each company, and paid by the officer commanding them same as the other men.

To be drilled and taught the use of a musket.

To be clothed regimentally.

To be employed under the general superintendence of the regimental quartermaster, but to be always disposable for general purposes in the arsenals, particularly in the field.

#### *Followers and Camp Equipage.*

Followers to both the European and Native troops in India should be reduced to the smallest possible number consistent with the efficiency of the troops, or the decided necessities of that part of the world, either from climate to Europeans, or from the habits and prejudices

prejudices of the Native troops, that it would be most unjust and unwise to interfere with, in any other than the indirect, but certain way of a better education and liberal encouragement.

The camp equipage also should be kept on the lowest possible scale consistent with health, and all regulations abolished which insist on a tent of a particular size, or indeed one of any kind for each officer individually. Officers might be permitted, as in Europe, with great advantage to the service, to use their own discretion in joining their camp equipage with each other, or having it separate. Such regulations at all events as tend to increase the amount of baggage, and consequently the number of followers, should be suppressed, and the officers be allowed to appropriate the money drawn under the head of tentage in the manner most conducive to their comfort, individual constitutions, and health.

### 3. The same as to the general Staff and Subsidiary departments.

There is a considerable variety of opinions respecting the manner in which the general staff of an army should be constituted in the higher branches. But there are defects so obvious in that of the army of India, it will probably be admitted, on examination, that the system requires to be ameliorated and placed on a better footing than it is at present.

The general officers of a permanent rank on the staff in India are too few in number, and require higher rank and title to maintain the influence they should possess. Officers in the Company's service who have at present attained the rank of major-general, are frequently men far past the meridian of life, and whose constitutions have suffered much from their long service in a deleterious climate, which generally produces in Europeans a premature old age.

An army to be properly regulated must be most vigilantly superintended, and every station and portion of it frequently visited and inspected by its general officers, who to perform their duty efficiently should be men in the vigour of their age, having their faculties unimpaired, and their zeal not chilled by waiting too long for advancement, which in general where it does come in India, is both too late for the benefit of the service, and the honourable gratification of individuals, whose fate it may have been to linger in the subaltern ranks of a seniority service during the greater portion of their youthful years.

To make the general officers in the Indian army more capable of performing the whole of their duties, younger men must be elevated to that rank, and as high rank, and title and gradations are great auxiliaries to commanders, it seems very desirable that generals and lieutenant-generals should compose a part of the Indian staff as well as that of every other army.

The rank of lieutenant-general has been conceded to the Company's service, but an officer of that rank employed on the staff is considered in point of command and allowances exactly on the same footing as a major-general. The title, no doubt, is some advantage, but other advantages are also necessary to maintain it, and in the event of any new disposition of the different *corps d'armée* in India this rank should find a superior place.

Of late years, the major-generals in the Company's service employed on the staff have been very few; at present there are only three at Bengal, three at Madras, and none at Bombay.

As substitutes for the major-generals of the Company's service, certain officers having the rank of "colonel in the territorial possessions of the East-India Company" have been placed on the staff, with the designation of brigadier-general. Here then are officers holding two steps of rank which they may lose immediately. This is both a possible degradation to individuals and a severe wound to discipline, as an officer who had once been placed high in command would sink into comparative insignificance, and thus lose in some measure the consideration of those over whom he had thus exercised command.

The evils of the restriction, in the present brevet commission of colonel granted to Company's officers, have been pointed out under another head.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

The



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

The Supreme Government in India has declared the "rank of brigadier-general as conferred merely for the purpose of qualifying an officer for the command of a division, and only co-existent with the command;" accordingly commissions of brigadier-general have been "recalled," a proceeding eminently calculated to lower officers so deprived of their rank in the eyes of the Native troops over whom they are principally placed. No precedent or example of this, it is believed, can be found in the British service, and the abovementioned recall of the commissions of brigadier-general is the more hurtful to the feelings of some of the Company's officers who were made colonels, together with all the other lieutenant-colonels commandant the same day, in June 1829, as they would have been major-generals if the Regulation, which prevented officers in the Company's service rising to the rank of colonel regimentally on obtaining the command of a regiment, had not existed.

Injury to the service, as well as to the feelings of individuals, have thus arisen from the recall of the commissions of brigadier-general, therefore these commissions when once conferred should never be recalled, as this proceeding occasions greater evils than if they had never been conferred; but to prevent the inconvenience that would arise from their retention, as the service is at present connected with the King's, they should be conferred on those officers only, if there be such, whose higher standing would enable them to retain these commissions without interfering with general regulations, which include as well His Majesty's service as the armies of the three Presidencies.

It seems possible to show that considerable advantage might be derived by following in India the practice adopted in the Continental armies of Europe, of uniting the departments of adjutant and quartermaster-general; but unless this practice were also adopted in the British service, it might not produce so much benefit in India, as evils would arise from rendering the Company's and the King's service still more dissimilar than they are at present, otherwise such a measure would give greater unity to the duties and operations of the staff, and put an end to the inconveniences and jealousies which exist from having the two departments separated, as they are present.

There is a very great deficiency in the numbers of the medical staff of the army in India, which is constantly felt when even trifling operations are in progress. This important department demands a very attentive review and consideration.

#### 4. What would be the probable effect of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief?

The army of India is spread over the face of an extensive empire, which is composed of a variety of climates, countries, and inhabitants, who differ very considerably in their moral and physical peculiarities.

This army is moreover not only divided by space, but has the additional disadvantage of being broken up into three distinct portions, usually termed armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, directed by separate governments and institutions, having different regulations, customs, feelings and prejudices.

This separation and these differences must be greatly adverse to that unity and perfect combination so requisite for successful military operations, and so absolutely necessary in the due accomplishment of extensive plans and movements for defence.

Each of the divisions or armies of the three Presidencies abovementioned, although they cover very considerable portions of territory, are generally confined to the limits of their respective Governments, and thus revolve in circles which may be considered as contracted, when compared with one that would embrace the whole of our empire in India.

The troops composing these armies visit only the same limited number of stations, and thus see little that is new to excite a change of ideas, they consequently continue to follow the same habits, and acquire and maintain contracted sentiments and provincial ideas, and prejudices. They are, moreover, deprived of the great advantages of  
examining

examining a variety of countries, and of coming frequently into collision with different descriptions of men, who follow different customs and practise different manners. An observation of these occurrences is eminently calculated to expand the mind, and to make both officers and men better qualified for extended and general service. Indeed, without advantages of that kind, an army becomes little more efficient for distant operations and emergencies than a militia would be.

It is by the separation of the three armies that they are mainly deprived of a great number of such advantages, which would add so naturally to their capabilities and efficiency, and it cannot be supposed that anything but absolute necessity would occasion an army to remain deprived of them. Not being aware in the present instance of any such necessity, I venture to advocate the important measure of amalgamating the whole of the Indian army into one body, to be under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief.

It is obvious that all great changes require a considerable effort, and are attended by a certain degree of risk, whilst the benefits may rest only on reasoning, and may not have been previously seen in conjunction with the particular combinations to be dealt with, and this in some respects may be the case in the instance now under discussion; but still great defects are perceptible in our present condition, and it is well to take advantage of an early opportunity of correcting them; and even although we might not be able by the sole measure of amalgamation, and the consequences arising from it, to ameliorate to the utmost possible extent the constitution of our Indian army, still it seems more than probable that we should by this measure amend it to a very great degree, and its adoption appears one grand step towards ascertaining whether there be any evils so deeply rooted, and so irremediable in the constitution and composition of this army, as to render it inadequate to the performance of the more extended and most important services which it may ere long be required to perform, against a new enemy, and under new circumstances and disadvantages.

So long as the armies remain separate there is a great chance of the benefit of the empire in general being sacrificed to the particular interests of some one of them, particularly by unnecessary local increases, or by the conflicting interests of individuals of weight and consideration, who from the present state of division have opportunities of pushing their own views and wishes, or those of the army to which they belong, overlooking the general interests of the State.

It has been urged by some that it would be dangerous to identify the interests of the whole of our Indian army, as at present the different portions of it may be useful in some measure and at some times to balance and control each other; but surely this is a narrow view of so important a question, and implies that it is not always intended to maintain those principles of strict justice, high military discipline, and the due consideration of its character and interests, which are the most perfect security for the attachment and loyalty of any military body, and without attention to which the existence of an army at all must necessarily be looked at with apprehension.

An authority must be weak indeed against either domestic discord or a foreign enemy, and not guided by sound or correct principles of any kind, that would so determine to rule as to render it advisable for its very existence to adopt the principles of disunion, instead of that of perfect unity of interests and honourable feelings, in the government of an army constituted for the preservation of a peculiar empire, and which unfortunately has in it other elements of discord so abundantly spread abroad.

It has been said, that the thoughts, habits, customs, and feelings of the Native portion of the three establishments are adverse to the extension of the various circles in which they now move. This may be true to a certain extent, but it is an evil which I firmly believe is not by any means insuperable, as may be fairly inferred from what has already occurred.

I have in another place noticed the considerable portion of men from Hindoostan Proper, or the North-west Provinces of India, who were enlisted into the Bombay army,  
nor

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
20th March 1832.

nor did they receive any particular consideration after having done so, or occasion any alteration in the system previously pursued in that army.

There is good reason to believe that the habits of these Hindoos became much more generalized from mixing among the variety of castes of which the regiments of Bombay are composed, than if they had enlisted into regiments of Bengal, the usual resort of men of that description, and of the part of India from which they came. The furlough usually granted to the men of the Bombay regiments was considerably lengthened to these Hindoostan men, to enable them, after a reasonable period of service, to revisit their relations and homes.

In any arrangements made for the Indian army, the absolute necessity of granting freely and liberally such furloughs should never be overlooked, and the gross strength of the army should be calculated so as to admit of them. But when the leave of absence is beyond a certain period, to be calculated so as to enable the most distant from their homes to be a reasonable time there, exclusive of what is required for their journey, I see no reason why a diminution should not be made to a small extent in the pay of the absentee, to serve as a check to the abuse of this indulgence.

It cannot be supposed that the men abovementioned, who had even a greater affinity to the army of Bengal than to that of Bombay, in which they were serving, could have any objection to the services of the Bombay regiments being extended to the circle in which the army of Bengal moves.

From the above it seems probable that regiments of Native troops might be so composed as to render their employment on the western as well as the eastern side of India perfectly practicable without creating any great revolution in their minds, provided reasonable periods for furlough should be granted, and such a system of changes and reliefs adopted, as would in time bring all considerable portions of the men of which the regiments might be composed near to their own countries and provinces.

I speak less confidently of such troops being employed with the same facility in the south as in the east and west, only because I am little acquainted with the description of men composing the Madras army, but I have little doubt if the individual regiments of Madras were placed in an equally favourable position as those of Bombay were for procuring Hindoostan men to mix with their own from time to time, the same general reasoning would apply to them as well as to the Bombay regiments, even although it may have been found difficult to induce some considerable numbers of Hindoostan men recruited in separate bodies to merge into Madras regiments after having been kept distinct for some time.

A considerable number of the Bengal regiments have been enlisted avowedly for general service, and little difficulty, I presume, would be found in extending this condition to the whole.

It is proper to mention here, that the batta allowance in the field, of the men of the Bombay Native infantry, is superior to that of Bengal by one rupee per month, which might be offered as one cause of the Hindoostan men entering as readily into the Bombay regiments of a variety of castes as into the Bengal, where men of the same provinces so greatly predominate. But this is only a proof that their services may be commanded to the greatest extent, provided due encouragement be held forth.

Recruiting in the Upper Provinces for the Bombay army was some time ago forbidden by the Supreme Government of Bengal, exactly as if service to the State were not equally rendered by a man entering either a Bengal or a Bombay regiment indifferently.

A stronger proof of the necessity and advantages to be derived from the amalgamation of the three armies can hardly be given than when it can be shown that they are rival candidates for the services of any description of men, as in the above instance, or for military supplies of any kind, such as remount horses, &c. &c. Respecting the latter most important

important article of supply, and on which the efficiency of an army so much depends, it may be observed, that the Government of Madras has thought it necessary to keep an officer of its commissariat for many years at Bombay to purchase them on its own account, and it is notorious that this officer is looked upon by the dealers as a rival in the market to the Bombay commissariat.

That the measure of joining the three armies would be carried into effect with due caution, and above all with the greatest consideration for the implied rights of the officers and men now in the service, is of course contemplated, and it would doubtless commence by an equalization of all pay, allowances, rations, and advantages ; but to obviate all just cause of complaint this equalization should be brought about, not by the depression of any one part, but by the elevation of the whole to one level.

It would be most advisable to consolidate under the denomination of pay alone the pay, gratuity, and half batta, drawn by European officers at present under these separate heads. The amount and the equalization of the pay of the men should also be clearly stated, as well as the circumstances under which both officers and men would be entitled to the addition known under the name of full batta. The rations of the men would require to be distinctly specified, the various articles composing it should be enumerated, the stoppage to be made for it, and the particular times and circumstances under which such issues would be made should also be specified.

The present recognised principle, that compensation in money or an issue of provisions shall be given to Native troops when the prices of grain amount to a certain maximum at the station at which they may be, seems just and necessary. There is no service in the world exposed to greater differences in the prices of provisions than the Indian, and this will be readily understood when the enormous extent of the empire and its vast variety of climate, soil, &c. is recollected, and it is only by a minute attention on the part of the local Government to such considerations, that the army can be preserved from much suffering and consequent discontent.

Where the armies under one head, the depôts for stores might be so arranged as to have the supplies sent to them from the nearest arsenal on the sea-coast, or elsewhere, which would occasion a most material reduction of expenditure. There would then, I presume, be no such anomalies as stores for the use of the troops at Jaulna in Berah, being conveyed all the way overland from Madras, with Bombay at less than half the distance ; or stores sent from Fort William in Bengal, to Mhow in Malwah, with Bombay at less than one-third the distance.

Under the present state of division it would be extremely difficult to combine any system of defence for our western and northern frontiers ; there would be difficulties in arranging military stations in due connexion and combination ; the line of defence would in a manner be cut in two ; there would be a difference in the description, and feelings and prejudices of the troops composing the army on the frontiers ; there would be a difference in and clashing of, authorities and interests ; there would be little subordination and combination among the staff ; information would circulate slowly ; and there could not be that perfect unity of plans and execution so absolutely necessary under circumstances of difficulty.

The artillery and the ordnance would be under different heads, which inevitably occasions variations in conducting these departments, sufficient to embarrass military operations, although one general system may have been laid down in orders for the whole.

The general commissariat would be differently composed, and make its supplies under different systems, and customs, and contracts in the Provisions, the Cattle, and the Ordnance departments.

Money and stores would be supplied and expended under different offices of control.

There would be a general hesitation in the whole to supply the wants of different portions, lest in time of need the part granting aid might not receive the same consideration when in difficulty itself. It is not sufficient to say that this is wrong, and would not be the case if there were proper feelings for the general good of the service ; because, under

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

under certain circumstances, to people in authority, who feel greatly their own individual responsibility, this selfish denial would be considered a virtue, for it might be construed and put forth as showing a great regard for the interests, comforts, and efficiency of those immediately under them.

At present there is no general staff nor any depository of military information of the resources of the whole of India and the neighbouring countries. There is a King's general staff, there is a Bengal, Madras, and Bombay general staff, but there is no general staff for the service of all India. There is a Surveyor-general's department, it is true, for India, where geographical, and in some cases topographical information is accumulated, but there is no general dépôt for information respecting military resources and capabilities and general statistics. There is much intelligence and information in the various departments of the staff, and many authentic and well-executed memoirs on the above subjects have been drawn up and are still in existence, but they are not in one place that they may be examined and collated, and the best information extracted and compressed from them.

The formation of a general staff for all India is therefore most necessary, and surely its composition ought not to be confined to any particular portion of the service, to King's, Bengal, Madras, or Bombay officers.

Had the armies been amalgamated, or even had there been a general staff for the whole of India, and the orders been conveyed through it, no question could ever have arisen to cause so much embarrassment as that has done, whether the Marquis of Hastings or Sir Thomas Hislop were Commander-in-chief during the campaign against the Pindarrees.

If such questions, difficult to be decided by the first authorities of the State arise out of the disunion of the various portions of our Indian army in times of peace, and much thought and consideration is found necessary to define the limits of different Indian military authorities, we surely should not be slow in believing that numerous and still more important and delicate questions and differences might arise, under circumstances far less favourable; and when any conflict of authorities might occasion an irreparable injury to an empire, which might be exposed at the same time to the vigorous efforts of a powerful and intelligent enemy.

It does not seem probable that any great difficulty would arise in adjusting the list of general and field officers of the three Presidencies. A reasonable consideration would doubtless be shown, where the good of the service would permit, to the wishes of the present field officers in allowing them to continue their services, if they wished it, in the regiments they have long been associated with; the Government would also take into its favourable consideration any particular cases in which officers near the top of the list of lieutenant-colonels or majors of the different establishments might have their promotion delayed by the amalgamation, and suffer disappointment and injury by the operation of a general system.

The amalgamation of the three armies, besides the advantages abovementioned, would certainly bring along with it a very considerable reduction of expenditure.

The certainty of this will be perceived when it is recollected that each establishment has at present a complete General Staff, an Ordnance, a Commissariat, and an Audit department, Medical Board, &c. &c.

After the junction stores would be supplied from the nearest arsenals, by which a considerable sum would be saved in their conveyance from one part of India to another.

One uniform system likely to establish greater order and control would be introduced, and the expenditure would thus be more easily brought under the notice of the officers of control in India and the home authorities.

Field establishments and dépôts of stores and provisions being more general might be less numerous when one system would be pursued, and one military authority would direct throughout the whole of the empire in India.

5. The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's, in respect to efficiency, good spirit, and economy, and the probable consequences of bringing the whole directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown.

The separation of the Company's army, on its present footing, from the King's, seems to operate to the disadvantage of the former, and to cause it to be viewed by some who know little of its real composition as an inferior service. Such an idea being in any way received, has a tendency to wound the high and honourable self-consideration, and the pride of military distinction, so eminently useful in elevating and sustaining the character of an army.

The authority of the Crown and His Majesty's Ministers will doubtless be looked up to as above all others, and they shed a superior degree of lustre on their servants. A strong feeling is created and sustained by this lustre, as, to all who serve, the position of those to whom they are immediately subordinate, is a matter of much moment, and frequently of honest pride; for their position in the minds of other men is much influenced by it. Military men are particularly acute in their feelings in this respect: they deal in subtle distinctions and nice points of honourable discrimination. There is, under these circumstances, a considerable power in the King's name. The designation of "King's" is therefore of consequence, and gives strength to those who bear it.

But His Majesty is also the fountain of honour, and his immediate servants are likely to have a preference in his mind, since they are frequently known to, and before him; or they may expect the same preference in the minds of those who have constant access to him as advisers.

The relative rank of a Company's officer is conceded under a humiliating exception, as his corresponding commission runs, that he is to hold the rank of an officer "in the King's army in the East-Indies only." He is also far distant from the fountain of honourable distinctions and military rewards.

These are strong marks of difference in the position of a King's and a Company's officer, and the latter cannot hope they will be overlooked, and that they will not influence the ideas and conduct of others towards him, although he may, with perfect justice, feel that there are no real grounds whatever for considering him, in any way or manner whatsoever, inferior.

A Company's officer has little high and confident support for his honourable ambition. He remains, comparatively speaking, unknown and little distinguished in a foreign land, and at a vast distance from Europe, that all-interesting scene of glory and fame to a King's officer. He has little scope for testifying peculiar devotion to his country, and his opportunities of performing services worthy of great commendation are few, and little appreciated in Europe, even by his own countrymen. The Indian officer has little more to excite and gratify his highest feelings, during his distant service, but the conviction of having done his duty—a source, doubtless, of infinite comfort and quiet gratification. But military men require a somewhat more powerful stimulus to carry them on to the performance of duties that demand the most perfect zeal, and an utter disregard for all selfish feelings. It is a positive impulse which is required, and that can rarely be strong in one who is left under the chilling influence of a questionable position, and, moreover, is little indulged with any lasting distinctions of honourable consideration in rank and title.

Officers who labour under such manifest disadvantages have their best feelings severely taxed. They find themselves engaged in a perpetual struggle to maintain their equality with King's officers, instead of being readily and freely admitted into it; and is there not great danger that a portion of their good spirit and temper may be expended in such a contest?

To make a service so situated perfectly efficient, and capable of rendering the utmost advantage to the State, no unnecessary exclusive spirit should be shown towards it; and surely it is but reasonable to expect that officers who alike serve their country should have no humiliating distinctions drawn between them. At the same time, it would be only justice that the fair claims of the King's service should in no way be overlooked whilst they are in India.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

There

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
20th March 1832.

There is another circumstance also most hurtful to the feelings and interests of the Company's officers; and that is, the Company's armies of the three Presidencies being always under Commanders-in-chief of another service, who frequently far from having any sympathy or numerous associations with them, are utter strangers, and have few or no relations or friends in this foreign service, of which they have not only become the head, but are moreover the official guardians of its rights, and feelings, and honour.

By the Regulations of 1795-96, officers of the Company's service are deemed equally eligible to hold the situation of Commander-in-chief as King's officers; but thirty-six years have passed away without any one of the Company's officers having been nominated to that honour at any of the three Presidencies, although certainly many of them must have been equally well qualified for such a situation as any officer of His Majesty's service.

It is hardly to be supposed that Commanders-in-chief, as at present appointed, can at once divest themselves of all feeling of partiality for their own service, with which their connexions have been intimate and numerous for a long period of years, and in which they may have reaped an abundant harvest of honours and distinctions, or, at all events, have attained a very high rank, soothed by success, and reposing with confidence on royal favour and support.

Not only are the armies thus commanded by officers of another service, but, as a Commander-in-chief usually carries out his own personal staff from England with him, he is consequently surrounded, particularly at first, by persons likely to be of the same way of thinking and feeling as himself; and his most confidential staff officer, his military secretary, is almost invariably a King's officer.

It is frequently observed that those Commanders-in-chief who remain longest in India have the fewest prejudices against the Company's service; time and frequent intercourse mellows and subdues them, and they better appreciate what is good in it after a long and careful examination; but it is most unfortunate for the Company's service that they seldom remain above a few years, after which they return home, carrying with them what is improperly and unjustly called the weight of experience to confirm their prejudices, whilst in reality they have not had sufficient time to form a correct judgment under their previous misconceptions. But indeed, if the officers of the Company's service were in any degree whatsoever inferior, for want either of due instruction or a proper and necessary cultivation of their military feelings, it could only be considered their misfortune, and the blame would be justly attached to the King's officers, who have constantly held the supreme command over them.

The numerous changes of Commanders-in-chief also occasion another evil; and that is, the perpetual change of systems, arising out of no commander remaining sufficiently long to consolidate any particular one of his own. There is on this account constant variation of general principles, and no gradual amelioration of system as in the King's service, where the regulations and institutions remain, comparatively speaking, little altered by the change of the officer placed in charge of the army, for the purpose of conveying to it the commands of His Majesty.

Great evils have been shown to arise to the service in India in its present position and relation with the King's, and it seems absolutely necessary that the most prominent of them should be remedied, otherwise the national interests may be injured. Some of the most prominent of these evils might be overcome by extending the corresponding commission of the Company's officers, which, as before explained, would not imply any right to employment where troops of the Indian army might not be.

By permitting officers of the Indian army to rise to the highest rank of general officers, by nominating them occasionally as Commanders-in-chief of the armies in India, and by permitting them to attain the rank of colonel regimentally in their own service. If the late brevet of colonel were not to be issued, the lieutenant-colonels in the King's service would be on the same footing as the lieutenant-colonels in the Company's, who may be superceded by an officer anticipating the general brevet in this rank; nor would either be more injured than they are by officers nominated as aides-de-camp to the King, or by colonels who may rise regimentally in the royal engineers and artillery to that rank.

But

But if it be not intended, on the present occasion, to go the entire length of placing and maintaining the service in India on a footing of perfect equality and consideration with that of the King, and to make an end of the recurring changes in their relations, then the necessity of the case seems to point out that the whole should be placed directly under the authority of Ministers and establishments of the Crown, that an equal degree of favour and protection may be extended to all.

Under another head, it has been suggested that many advantages would be derived from amalgamating the whole of the Indian army into one body; and it is conceived that this would take place in either case above contemplated.

If it should be determined to transfer the Company's army to the King's, exchanges to a certain extent, that is, under the rank of field officer, might be permitted between the European and the Indian army, and provided the person passing into the last had been two years in India.

This would in a great measure identify the two services of Europe and India, which is a most important point. It would, moreover, serve to maintain the same military system in both. It would secure to the Indian service the ready introduction of improvements in the military art, as practised in their most minute details in Europe. Whilst the permission to exchange would open a new field to the officers of the army of Europe, with many advantages; it would remove from the mind of the Indian officer the painful feeling, that he must spend all the better years of his life at a distance from his native country, with the honourable career of the service of Europe utterly closed against him.

Officers making exchanges into the Indian army from the European should be permitted with regard to retirement and pension, to count their former services to the State in the proportion of one and a-half year's service in Europe and one year's service in the West-Indies to one year's service in the East-Indies. The officer exchanging from the Indian army should be entitled to sell his commission when retiring from the King's service.

Even although the two services should be placed under one authority, both justice and expediency demand that the Indian army should have secured to it inviolably a certain and fair portion of the commands and staff appointments; and it is only because this has hitherto been done that it has in any way been able to maintain its ground; but if all the above-mentioned differences were abolished, the same necessity for the exclusion of King's officers from many of the staff situations would not exist. Until then, however, this exclusion is absolutely of vital importance to the Indian army.

The following reasons may be offered for a large portion of the commands and staff appointments remaining with the Indian army under any circumstances:

- 1st. The Indian army being numerically so much greater than the European in India.
- 2d. The very great probability of Governors and Commanders-in-chief having had little or no previous connexion with the Indian service, and being consequently more disposed to advance the European.
- 3d. The general qualification in the Native languages being superior in the Indian to the European army.
- 4th. The great sacrifice consequent on entering at an early period of life a service in a foreign country, where men are deprived of the society of their family and relations.
- 5th. The deleterious climate of India, which, besides the general bad effect it produces on the constitution, involves the difficulty and great expense of a visit to Europe for the recovery of health, and the necessity of returning with the like.
- 6th. The great expense consequent to the frequent necessity of sending the families of officers to Europe for their health, and their children for education.

If difficulty should be found in adjusting the rights, advantages, and rank of the corps of engineers and artillery of the European and Indian armies, the officers now in the Indian might be permitted to remain a part, and to retain the promotion in their own corps as at present, but all vacancies at the bottom should be filled by officers of the corps of Europe, which would in time produce the effect of making the services one in each branch.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
29th March 1832.

The



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(18.)—Reply  
of Maj. D. Wilson,  
20th March 1832.

The Company's army being composed of both European and Native troops, it may be necessary to notice here specifically each description of them, as connected with the question of the separation of the Company's from the King's army, and to observe that what has been said above applies to the whole, and not to any particular parts of it.

Any separation of the European troops of the Company from the Native, and placing the former under His Majesty's Ministers and the establishments of the Crown, whilst the latter might be retained under the Company, would have a direct tendency to deteriorate the latter, for the European officers, looked to as the *primum mobile* of the Native troops, even by themselves, would feel it as a deep wound from rendering the breach between the two descriptions of servants of the same country still wider than it is at present; and these feelings would certainly descend from the officers to the men, who are no inattentive observers of what befalls their European officers, their leaders, their acknowledged superiors in intellect as well as station.

There does not seem to be any grounds whatsoever to conclude that the Native troops would have the smallest objections to transfer their allegiance to His Majesty's Government, and to serve it with the same loyalty, cheerfulness, and devotion which they have done to the Company's.

6. Whether advantage or disadvantage to the public interests, connected with the army, might be expected from encouraging the settlement of British subjects in India, or in any of our Eastern colonies.

The interests of a body of British colonists in India would be much more identified with the British Government than those of any others of our subjects, consequently the talents, intelligence, and means of the colonists would be exerted most effectually to uphold the civil and military powers of the State, and to enable it to overcome both domestic and foreign disturbers of the peace.

The colonists who would proceed to India would in all probability be men of some education, and possessed of, or able to command a considerable amount of, capital, from which circumstances it seems certain that they would soon acquire an influence over the people inferior to them in these respects, and amongst whom they would settle. The colonists for their own sakes would naturally endeavour to introduce a more extended and better education, which would occasion a greater diffusion of intelligence, more industrious habits, and a greater degree of honesty than at present exists among the lower orders in India.

The artisans would thus acquire a superior degree of proficiency, and the manufactures would be greatly improved.

All descriptions of military stores might then be manufactured and readily supplied when occasion may require, instead of remaining for years in the arsenals, as at present they must do, from the necessity of having a large stock on hand.

As artificers increase in goodness, they might be diminished in numbers, and the wages of heads and superintendents become less. There would be more qualification at a cheaper rate, and the lowest servants of the departments in the military branch of the service would be thus made more efficient.

There would from colonization be a greater number, and a better description of contractors for public works and supplies, who would be individuals of greater energy and more active habits than they are at present.

There cannot be a doubt that a militia composed of colonists, or one of which colonists formed an influential part, would be a material addition to the military strength of our Government in India, and in the event of an invasion, the confidence and point of union and amalgamation their attachment would afford, would be most useful.

In time their descendants might be looked to as the most eligible description of recruits for a national army in India.

(Signed) D. WILSON, Major,  
7th Regiment, Bombay Infantry.

(19.)—REPLY of Colonel STANNUS, C. B., dated Benfield Lodge, Brackwell,  
20th February 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

Sir,

(19.)—Reply  
of Col. Stannus,  
Feb. 20th 1832.

I NOW do myself the honour to offer a few remarks, which I trust will be found in some slight degree elucidatory of the queries referred to me in your letter of the 25th January. I feel conscious, however, of my inability to throw much light on the various subjects therein adverted to, and must beg, moreover, to confine my observations to the Bombay army, having no further knowledge of the military force under the other Presidencies than may be collected from public documents accessible to all.

2. At the period when I entered the service of the East-India Company, thirty-one years ago, the Bombay army consisted of the following corps: *viz.* one European regiment, eight Native infantry regiments of two battalions each, a Native marine battalion, available for general service, with a battalion of artillery and corps of engineers amounting in the whole to 18,000 men and upwards. The establishment thus possessed a respectable numerical force when compared with its limited extent of territory, which was then confined to the provinces of Malabar and Canara, the islands of Bombay and Selsette, and, I believe, a small district in the neighbourhood of Surat. Since the year 1803, repeated augmentations have been made to the army, which at present consists of a brigade of horse and two battalions of foot artillery, three regiments of Native cavalry and one European, and twenty-six regiments of Native infantry of one battalion each; but the complement of Native corps is at present so much reduced, and the actual strength of the army so little increased, that there can be but a very small body of troops disposable for emergencies, after making a reasonable allowance for the garrisons and outposts throughout the establishment. The following appears to be the present distribution of the army. In the Deccan, that is to say, in the Poona, Sattarah, Sholapore, and Ahmednuggur districts, are stationed one regiment of cavalry and five of infantry. These troops are scattered over a wide tract of country, and there is consequently not more than a single regiment at any one station, with the exception of Poona, where a small force is collected, consisting of two Native battalions, in addition to a regiment of dragoons and one of infantry of His Majesty's troops. In Guzerat there are one cavalry, one European and five Native infantry regiments, three of which latter corps are stationed at Baroda and one at Ahmedabad, the remainder being cantoned at Deesa, a station on the north-west frontier. Four Native infantry regiments are stationed in the Southern Mahratta districts, of which two are at Kulladgee, one cavalry and three infantry regiments in Kattywar, three infantry regiments in Candeish, two in the Concan, two in Bombay garrison, and one in Cutch, complete the number of regular regiments composing the Bombay army.

The organization of these troops is modelled on that of the British army, each regiment being divided into companies, with a complement of European and Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and regimental staff. The only peculiarity in the constitution of Native regiments is, that of Native commissioned officers, under the designation of subadars and jemadars, who rank below all European officers, and are selected from those havildars or serjeants considered best qualified for promotion. This class of men possess but little influence in their corps, the men being taught to look for promotion exclusively to their European officers; the rank, however, is useful, as holding forth the strongest inducement for good behaviour throughout the inferior gradations, but as further incentive ceases on attaining the rank of jemadar, it is found that few Native officers long retain the active and zealous qualities that contributed to their advancement.

3. The employment and designation of the general staff are similar to that of the British army, nor does the system of conducting the departments of the adjutant or quartermaster-general appear to require any alteration whatever. With regard to the Commissariat department, I can only vouch for its efficiency, of which I have had most convincing proofs on field service, but of its economical merits, or the manner in which its details are conducted, I am unable to speak from personal experience; on these points, however,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(10.)—Reply  
of Col. Stannus,  
20th Feb. 1832.

however, there can be no difficulty in obtaining the fullest information, as there are many officers of that department now in England, particularly Lieutenant-colonel Bellasis, late Commissary-general at Bombay, and Colonel Hull, formerly Deputy Commissary-general to the Deccan division of the army. The Ordnance and Store department is exceedingly well supplied and conducted, but as I can only judge from effects, there may possibly be reforms required in the interior management of this as well as other departments.

4. From the distribution of the army already noticed, it would appear that there are few concentrated bodies of troops on the Bombay establishment; the change of our political relations with different Native powers having released us from the obligation of maintaining large detachments in constant readiness for service. There would seem to be no immediate cause of apprehension from any of the independent States on the western side of India, nor any probability of a combination against our interests among the Native powers; but as it is admitted that fear is our best security against aggression, it may be matter of consideration whether the army has not already been reduced to too low a scale of numerical strength consistently with the safety of our Indian empire.

5. I have already touched on the efficiency of the army, which, as far as I can judge, is complete in everything but numbers; with respect to the economy with which it is provided, I am quite incompetent to offer any opinion. The Bombay troops have always been distinguished for loyalty and subordination, even during periods when disaffection pervaded the army of the neighbouring Presidency. The number of European officers is unquestionably too limited, as it is well known that on them depends the confidence and military spirit which elevates our Native soldiery so far above those in the service of the Native powers. For this reason, great caution ought to be observed in employing them out of their own line of duty, and perhaps it might be found advisable to have separate establishments for the Commissariat, Barrack, and other branches connected with the Military department, instead of filling them up, as at present, from the effective strength of the army.

6. I am not in possession of sufficient data to form a correct judgment respecting the change alluded to in the fifth paragraph of your letter. I can only testify, as far as my experience goes, that the present system works well; that the discipline and efficiency of the army have been successfully upheld; and that the best spirit has always existed among the troops. I cannot doubt that similar results would continue to be experienced were the whole army brought directly under the authority of Ministers, but unless it were unquestionable that those essential objects could be equally well maintained under the economical arrangements consequent on the proposed change of system, it would perhaps be safe to leave the military administration in the hands of those authorities under whom it has been brought to its present flourishing condition. The effect of consolidating the Indian army with the King's would, in my opinion, prove highly prejudicial to the public interests. It would for instance, be most injurious to the discipline of Native regiments, if officers were transferred to them from the British army, as such persons being entirely ignorant of the language, customs, and prejudices of the men under their command, the whole of the interior detail and economy would consequently devolve on the Native officers. The public staff would labour under the same disadvantages if similarly appointed, and the inevitable result would be the gradual but complete disorganization of the army. In the event, therefore of its being placed under the authority of the Crown, an essential change should be made in the mode of officering it; cadets for the artillery and engineers might be educated at the military seminaries, and those for the infantry appointed by Ministers, under the same regulations as at present, but the system of regimental rise by seniority ought never to be interfered with.

7. It would require a perfect knowledge of the mode of recruiting the Company's European troops, of the rate of freight, and the relative expense of pensions and education of cadets, to enable me to offer any decided opinion on the queries contained in the 6th paragraph of your communication. With regard to the necessary establishments in India

India, the Governments there have lately directed so much of their attention to economical reforms, that it may safely be inferred that the expense of all departments has been reduced to the lowest possible scale. At all events, the power as well as the inclination to retrench exists to the fullest extent under the present system; and it is by no means obvious that any beneficial change is likely to result from a transfer of authority. The retiring pensions of both officers and men are fixed on a scale of liberality, but not more so than justice demands, or circumstances render necessary.

8. The only way in which colonization would probably affect the public interests connected with the army would be in affording greater facilities for recruiting European regiments, and of obtaining a better description of men for the Commissariat, Store, and other departments than are at present procurable from the ranks. The danger resulting from such a measure, in enabling Native powers to attach Europeans to their service with greater ease than at present, is more of a political than a military question.

9. At the first view it appears reasonable to suppose, that by placing the whole army under one Commander-in-chief, the result must prove beneficial in ensuring combination and uniformity of discipline throughout the service; but if these advantages are found to exist at present, would it not be imprudent to risk the manifold inconveniences arising from the delay which the great distance of head-quarters would occasion both to individuals and the public? Local peculiarities and prejudices, too, require particular management, which must be best understood on the spot; and it would probably be found that the same Regulations would be inapplicable to all the different descriptions of troops under the three Presidencies. In point of fact, the Supreme Government is already vested with controlling power in all cases of importance or emergency; and no inconvenience, as far as I have heard, has ever been felt from a want of zealous co-operation in the subordinate Governments, where troops of different Presidencies have been required for combined operations.

10. I regret that, being altogether ignorant of the arrangements whereby the present system of Government control is fixed by Parliamentary enactment, or in what manner the system itself operates upon the Indian army, I feel quite incompetent to offer any opinion on the query contained in the 9th paragraph of your letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. G. STANNUS, Colonel,  
Bombay Army.

(20.)—REPLY of Colonel MAYNE, C. B., dated Edinburgh, 5th March 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE been honoured with your letter of the 2d ultimo, intimating the probability of my being required as a witness before the East-India Committee, and calling on me for such information as I may be able to afford on different points stated in your letter.

The period that has elapsed since I left India, and the absence of all official documents, must necessarily render any observations that I may have to offer very limited.

On the first, second, and third points of your letter, correct information can be obtained only from official papers; I beg therefore respectfully to refer to the Military Returns from the different Presidencies, to be found in the India House.

4. 1st. "Efficiency." Past experience has proved the efficiency of the Indian army in all its branches; but to render this efficiency more perfect, it is very desirable (nay, absolutely necessary, if employed against an European enemy), that the establishment of European officers present with Native corps, should be kept more complete than has been the case of late years. How this is to be effected in the most economical and least objectionable manner becomes a matter of consideration. I would suggest, that on an officer being appointed

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(19.)—Reply  
of Col. Stannus,  
20th Feb. 1832.

(20.)—Reply  
of Col. Mayne,  
5th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(20.)—Reply  
of Col. Mayne,  
5th March 1832.

appointed to the permanent general staff, a promotion should be made in his room, he being borne upon the Returns of the regiment as supernumerary; this would in some degree remedy the existing evil.

2d. "Economy." I am of opinion that this has already been carried to the utmost limit consistent with efficiency.

3d. "Disposition and spirit of officers and men." Everything that can possibly be desired or expected, and will I doubt not continue so while their interests are properly cared for.

"Note." The employment of military men in civil situations (political excepted), I consider injudicious, and unfair to both civil and military services. In the latter, a feeling of discontent is very naturally created at seeing officers, who have passed the early part of their service in the enjoyment of lucrative civil situations, on attaining high rank brought into military command, to the prejudice of those who have gone through the whole fag of the military service.

"Of the suitableness of the several establishments for the purposes for which they have or are likely to be needed; the fitness of the rules relative to numbers, pay, qualifications, enlistment, and furlough."

I am of opinion that the present rules are as perfect as well can be, and that no advantage whatever is likely to accrue from any change.

"Retirement." It is highly desirable that means should be adopted to enable officers to retire from the service at an earlier period than they have hitherto been able to do, that some prospect of promotion may be held out to the junior branches, which at present is very discouraging. Notwithstanding the great augmentation of the army within the last twenty-five years, which cannot occur again, we have captains of twenty-five years' service, who stand only third in their regiments; from this it is reasonable to infer, that we shall hereafter have officers of twenty-five years' standing, who have not attained the rank of captain. Under such circumstances what may be expected of the field officers? they will be men incapable, from infirmity, of that exertion so essential to the well-being of the army.

"The proportion of European and Native corps." While confined to operations against a Native enemy, I should consider the present proportion of one in six or seven sufficient, but against an European enemy the proportion ought not to be less than one in three.

5. "The effect of the separation of the Company's army from the King's, and the probable consequence of bringing the whole under the authority of the Ministers of the Crown."

I have already observed on the efficiency, good spirit, and economy of the army.

On the effect of bringing the whole under the Ministers of the Crown, it is impossible to offer an opinion, unless the manner in which it would be effected is known. If the army is kept perfectly distinct, as the King's Indian army, and the present constitution and organization be strictly preserved, the objections may be few, although I can see no reason to anticipate any beneficial results from the change; but if it is intended to incorporate the two armies, and to allow indiscriminate transfer from the one to the other, there are, in my opinion, insurmountable objections to the measure.

6. As all military establishments have already been reduced to the lowest scale, and every department conducted with the most rigid economy, I see no grounds to assume that any, the smallest saving, can ensue were the Company's army brought under the Ministers of the Crown.

On the appointment of cadets I shall offer no opinion; but as to their education, I think it would be highly beneficial to themselves and the service, were all cadets, after attaining the age of sixteen, obliged to pass one year at Addiscombe, or some similar military institution,

tution, and on arrival in India they should be attached for another year to Native regiments at a large military station, to give them opportunities of acquiring a knowledge of their duty. At present many arrive in India mere children, and are immediately sent off to join their regiments, which are frequently so much detached, that not above the strength of two companies remain at head-quarters; such being the case, how is it possible for them to become efficient officers?

7. I cannot see how any advantage to the public interests, connected with the army, should be expected from encouraging the settlement of Europeans in India. A general colonization would endanger the safety of the empire. Our strength is in the high opinion the Natives entertain of the European character; weaken that high opinion, and you undermine the foundation of our power.

8. The probable effect of having the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief would be, discontent in the armies of Madras and Bombay. It is but natural to infer that the Governor and Commander-in-chief, in the exercise of their patronage, would select officers of the Bengal Presidency, with whom they might be personally acquainted, in preference to those of the other Presidencies, who were strangers; the effect on the minds of those who would consider themselves neglected by this preference is obvious.

9. How far any change in the existing system of government may be productive of good or evil in its influence on the army is doubtful, certainly inexpedient, as under the present system it has been found very efficient, and is already conducted with the greatest possible economy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MAYNE, Colonel,  
Bombay Army.

(21.)—REPLY of Captain PAGE, dated East Sheen, 12th March 1832.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ultimo, conveying an intimation that it is the intention of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being examined by the Committee of the House of Commons on the subject of the military force of the East-India Company, and at the same time requesting my opinions on various points connected therewith: and in reply I beg to state, that as I could not enter fully into some branches of your inquiry, without the possession of several documents, which it would require great time and labour to elucidate, I have confined myself to such explanations as will, I trust, enable you to pursue any further inquiries which it may be thought requisite to make with more particular bearing on those subjects that have come more immediately under my own observation during the course of my employment on the staff in India and this country.

1. The former strength of a regiment of Native infantry on the Peace establishment was 700 men; it is now reduced to 480; the first reduction made being 100 men, and the second, two companies from each regiment. The first, if made gradually, by means of death, pensions, and desertion, might have been rendered prudent by the present state of Indian affairs; but the second, of two companies, including European officers, is in my opinion a measure fraught with danger to the British interests in India, as, in the first place, the commanding officer, after the deductions are made for the sick, and the men on duty and detachment, will hardly have the means, with the remnant left at head-quarters, of preserving his corps in an efficient state of discipline; and in the second, it is likely to involve the Company in a most expensive warfare, not only by the invitation given to the Native powers to attack, but by the very injudicious mode of furnishing them with a large body

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(20.)—Reply  
of Col. Mayne,  
5th March 1832.

(21.)—Reply  
of Capt. Page,  
12th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(21.)—Reply  
of Capt. Page,  
12th March 1832.

body of disciplined troops for the purpose, whose intimacy with their own may be the means of seducing many from their allegiance, by representing how little faith could be placed on engagements of the Company, when it suited their convenience to break them. The same remarks apply to the cavalry.

2. In the staff many reductions might be made with good effect.

3. The distribution of the force under each Presidency is generally made according to circumstances. Slight bodies or detachments being placed in garrisons or stations in the heart of the Company's territories, whilst a force, consisting of the several branches, artillery, cavalry, and European and Native infantry, competent to take the field on any emergency, should be cantoned on the frontiers. The subsidiary force at Poonah, which, by the treaty with the Peishwa, was stipulated to be kept up on the full field establishment was so crippled by the reductions made in 1806-7, that when he required it to act against a rebel in 1807-8, it was found unable to move, and the delay in completing its equipment from Bombay occasioned a warfare, that might have been terminated in a few days, to be prolonged for nearly two years.

4. 1st. The force in India, upon the present reduced scale, I consider to be decidedly inefficient.

2d. The economy that has been practised is in many instances injudicious, and forms a complete contrast to the extravagance exercised in others.

3d. The spirit of the officers in India, both in His Majesty's and the Company's service, is bad. The King's officers affect a superiority, which the Company's are by no means willing to acknowledge, and, moreover, consider themselves aggrieved by not participating in many staff appointments, which they are disqualified from holding by their unacquaintance with the language and prejudices of the Natives. The Company's officers, on the other hand, though they affect to deny this assumption of superiority on the part of the King's officers, cannot disguise from themselves that they hold their principal commission from a body of men they do not respect, and of whom they generally speak in the most contemptuous language. The attachment of the Natives has hitherto been secured by the permanence of the service, and the provision made for the wounded and the veteran. If discharged, by the introduction of a new principle of economy, I think an important change will also take place in their feelings.

The constitution of India being decidedly military, the degree of every title of honour conferred by the Emperor being ascertained by the number of troops which it empowers its possessor to command, those Natives who have not yet acquired European ideas naturally consider military men as the only nobles, and as such are disposed to yield a more cheerful obedience than they would to civilians. It is no doubt in accordance with those feelings, that, with very few exceptions, officers have been selected to fill political situations of the highest importance in the country, and their services have not been less eminent in the revenue branch. In short, there are few situations in which military men may not be employed with efficiency and economy.

In regard to the rules and regulations of the service, I am of opinion that the whole require revision. On the subject of the European officers and Native troops, and particularly of the principle on which those regiments should be formed, I beg to call the attention of the Honourable Board to the enclosed copy of a Letter (B.) addressed by me to the Court of Directors in 1819.

5. The separation of the Company's army from the King's is objectionable in every point of view, and the change that would be effected by its transfer to the Crown could not but be of the most beneficial nature.

6. That a very considerable saving in expense would be the consequence of this desirable change, there can be but little doubt; but the arrangements that would be requisite to insure the full benefit of the reduction, and combine it at the same time with greater efficiency, should be the result of the most careful and deliberate investigation.

7. As

7. As to the settlement of Europeans in India, I am not aware that the interests of the army would be affected by the measure; but in a commercial point of view, great advantages would, I think, be derived by the empire at large. The success that has attended the exertions of Europeans in the cultivation of indigo, now forming one of our most valuable imports, naturally leads to the conclusion that similar advantages would be derived from their turning their attention to cotton, silk, sugar, tobacco, drugs, and other produce of India.

8. I consider the establishment of three Governments in India to have been an act of necessity, in the infancy of the Company's empire, when each Presidency was surrounded by warlike and hostile neighbours; but as that empire is now consolidated, so, in my opinion, should be the Government.

I consider that the existing system of government calls loudly for improvement; that of the direction still more so; and, with all deference to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, that their powers of control are by far too limited to be effective to the extent required.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. PAGE.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(21.)—Reply  
of Capt. Page,  
12th March 1832.

(B.)

*Alieno in loco, haud stabile regnum est.*

THOUGH the question of the policy of reducing the number of European officers attached to sepoy regiments in India must no doubt have long occupied the attention of the Court of Directors, and exhausted every argument that could be brought forward, either against or in support of a measure so important in its consequences, I cannot, under the conviction that it is pregnant with the most imminent danger to our Eastern possessions, refrain from exerting my feeble voice in an attempt to avert so signal a calamity from the empire at large. Unacquainted as I am with those arguments, which have induced the Court to adopt a resolution so highly honourable to their character, since to their sense of the public good they have sacrificed a considerable portion of their patronage and power of conferring benefits, it is with no small degree of diffidence and embarrassment that I venture on the discussion of a subject so delicate in its nature; but, impelled as I feel myself, by every sense of honour to stand forward and avow the grounds on which I presume to differ in opinion from such high authority, I respectfully beg leave to submit the result of my reflections.

Hume has justly remarked, that all empire is held by opinion; and even should the sceptic deny the general application of this principle, I think he must admit the striking illustration that is afforded of its operation in India, where a population of near 80,000,000 is governed by a handful of foreigners, differing in religion, education, manners, and complexion. If this position be granted, it seems to be of the highest importance to investigate the origin or basis of this opinion, since, unless it is clearly understood, there is a possibility that the very measures which are adopted with the view of strengthening the fabric, may, by misconception, undermine its very foundation.

Harsh as the charge may appear to those who have only superficially studied the Hindoo character, I have no hesitation in stating my conviction that the whole race are governed by the worst passions that can deform mankind — superstition, treachery, and ingratitude — few, indeed, escaping the general contagion; and it is this conviction which induces me to view with so much jealousy the smallest unnecessary concession of power to the Natives, since, instead of tending to secure their attachment, it can only operate as a temptation to call their intriguing disposition into action.

It may be said, that by talents and discipline the English have obtained that superiority which their possessors must ever maintain over undisciplined hosts; but it is proved by history, that conquered hosts have almost invariably gained experience by

discomfiture,



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(21.)—Reply  
of Capt. Page,  
12th March 1832.

discomfiture, and eventually turned the result of that dear-bought experience against their oppressors.

I must here beg leave to disclaim every idea of applying this word, in its remotest sense, to the conduct of the rulers in India, but merely under the impression that they are so deemed by the Natives, whose own princes have been dispossessed of sovereignty. Only nine years elapsed from the battle of Narva to that of Pultowa, when the Russians gave a signal proof of the benefits they had derived from the lessons taught them by Charles XII.; but in a period of sixty years, reckoning from the battle of Plassey, the Indians, even though assisted by numerous French and other European officers, have in vain brought into the field ten times the number opposed to them by the British though at least nine-tenths of their force have been composed of Natives.

From this statement, then, it appears necessary to look for some cause for this amazing disparity beyond the power of discipline; and in spite of the smile which may be occasioned by the assertion, I attribute it to that superstition which arms us with supernatural powers. The first intimation I had of this belief, on their part, was from a Mahratta of some consequence, who was introduced to me for the purpose of negotiating bills to a large amount, which was effected under the evident influence of fear and distrust. His fears removed and his confidence obtained, in the course of subsequent transactions he frequently turned the conversation to the subject of our supernatural powers, and the means by which we acquired them; nor could any explanation on my part remove the impression from his mind; our conferences generally concluding by his observing, that of course I did not deem him worthy to be informed, but that facts spoke for themselves; and that at the battle of Assaye, which he selected as a proof of the superior attainments in occult science by the Duke of Wellington, 5,000 men dispersed a body of 100,000, a great portion of which was disciplined and led by Europeans, and the whole supported by a most formidable train of artillery. Now, he would ask, what constitutes this ascendancy? Do your sepoys possess more physical force than ours? Are they not of the same caste and habits, and composed of the same flesh and blood? Does it ever occur that in the conflicts that take place between the Native powers, that great superiority of numbers fail to turn the fortune of the day in favour of their leader? No, he would add, the thing is impossible without the influence of that knowledge, the attainment of which appears confined to your countrymen.

If I am correct in tracing the leading feature of that ascendancy which we have acquired over the minds of the Natives to this impression, it follows that the unlimited confidence they place in their officers on every occasion must be ascribed to the same principle, and therefore to reduce those points of *appui* is in fact to reduce the strength of that confidence to which we owe our success.

I would reward good conduct with honour, but never with power; and this maxim brings me to the consideration of a new rank lately introduced in India, under the title of subadar-major, which appears to me to be the revival, under a different name, of the old appointment of commandant, a measure which cannot be too strongly deprecated, since the undue influence it gave them over the sepoys obliged the Government to abolish the appointment. Indeed this appointment, added to the influence which must inevitably be obtained by subadars of companies in the absence of European officers, I consider one of the most effectual modes that could possibly be devised for destroying that superiority which we have hitherto maintained over the Natives. Intrigue is the soul of their character, and our own troops at Madras have afforded us a melancholy proof of the extent to which it is carried. The small number of European officers attached to corps, must have afforded them great facilities in carrying their plans into execution, and in spite of every blessing enjoyed under the protection of the British Government by those chiefs who have been deprived of the power of meeting us in the field, they will never cease endeavouring to obtain allies in our own camp, and through their means, that success by treachery, which has been denied them in the paths of honour.

Under

Under the Mogul empire the danger was well understood of allowing a degraded chieftain to remain in the sphere of his former greatness, and he was accordingly removed to the seat of Government, whence he issued the mandates of his conqueror as the emanations of his own will, whilst his talents for intrigue had ample scope in endeavours to supplant his numerous rivals for favour, and gain distinction from that majesty to which all bowed with a species of adoration. The same spirit of rivalry in the pomp and parade which forms such a conspicuous feature in the splendour of an Asiatic court, prevented any accumulation of treasure from his ample allotment of revenue for the prosecution of more dangerous pursuits.

I need not expatiate on the very different line of policy adopted by the British Government towards the numerous princes and chieftains who have been reduced by their power; suffice it to say, that it is the reverse of the Mogul's, the system being to exalt the peasant and degrade the noble. It is very doubtful to me if this is better adapted to the security of the Government, since the Natives must view with grief and disgust the gradual extinction of all they have been taught to revere.

Wherever the Mahomedans gained the superiority in Malabar they treated the ryots with the most soothing kindness, and endeavoured, by promises of freedom and an independence, to induce them to embrace their religion; yet though the conduct of the Nairs to these people was cruel in the extreme, their limbs and lives being forfeited for the most trivial offence, the Nairs were adored and the Musselmen detested. I mention this circumstance as one proof out of many of the enthusiastic attachment that has been evinced by the Hindoos for their Native princes.

I am perfectly aware that Tippoo when he possessed Malabar oppressed the inhabitants with the most wanton cruelty, and forcibly made converts by the edge of the sword, or rather the razor, by which hundreds were sacrificed to his barbarity; but the conduct of the resident moplas was invariably as I have stated.

In order to check, as far as practicable, the possibility of a general defection on the part of our Native troops, I conceive no measure would be attended with so much likelihood of success, as attention to forming the several corps of *every variety of caste and religion*, as none would tend in an equal degree to destroy combination and make the good opinion of the European officers the chief object of the soldier's ambition. In support of this opinion I beg to remark that in no one instance have the Bombay troops, which are so formed, ever swerved from their allegiance or attachment, notwithstanding the manner in which their feelings have been outraged at different times by officers in His Majesty's service, who have been placed in commands without any knowledge of the Native character. Late events have proved that they are equally staunch when exposed to the temptation of bribery.

Two partial mutinies and one general one of the Madras troops are on record; might they not be traced to the circumstance of their being chiefly composed of one caste—Musselmen? In Bengal the Native regiments are principally formed of high-caste Hindoos, and in the memorable retreat of Colonel Monson's detachment, two companies from a corps in want of European officers deserted to Holkar. If, instead of listening to the dictates of anger, and instantly ordering these men to the hottest part of the action, where they expiated their offence by the forfeit of their lives, except a few whom he mutilated to prevent their carrying arms against him in future, he had treated them with distinction, might not others have followed their example?

I am far from wishing to attach the least slur to the character of these troops, whose bravery and gallant exploits have cast an honourable veil over partial errors, but I am not aware how I could omit the insertion of facts which seem to bear so direct on the points of my argument. Too much attention cannot be paid by officers in charge of companies to conciliate them by respecting their prejudices, and unless the thoughtless conduct of boys just emancipated from school discipline is checked by the authority of their seniors, they are very much inclined to ridicule customs which to them appear absurd and

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(21.)—Reply  
of Capt. Page,  
12th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(21.)—Reply  
of Capt. Page,  
12th March 1832.

and unaccountable. Few companies should in my opinion have less than two European officers; yet even with the establishment which it has been thought necessary to reduce when the calculation is made of those employed on the staff, those on furlough to other Presidencies or Europe, and the proportion of sick, it will be found that few corps have more than one officer to a company, and many far less.

A stronger proof of the necessity that exists for having a full complement of European officers I do not think could be selected than that afforded by the battle of Corygaum, when a corps that had been particularly injured to fatigue and privation, for on the longest march they had never been allowed even to drink water, and who had been taught by the heroism of their old commander, the late Sir George Holmes, to believe themselves invincible, were found to be in such need of the cheering influence of Europeans, that the surgeons were compelled to relinquish the care of the numerous wounded to support the courage of the sepoys, as Colonel Prother, in his official despatch, states that the presence of a single European was of the greatest consequence, as tending to inspire the troops with the hope of ultimate success. I look upon the gallant achievement of that day to be the most grateful tribute of respect that could possibly be paid to the memory of their late beloved commander, who never led them but to glory; and without derogating in the least from the merit of those officers who are justly entitled to every honour, I must attribute some portion of their success to the influence of his departed spirit.

The importance of this hard-earned victory to the affairs of the Company, at the critical period at which it took place, has been too well appreciated by that honourable body to need any illustration from my pen.

I would willingly avoid the detail of one more disadvantage attending the want of European officers; but as a physician, who is anxious to discover the seat of a disease, is obliged to take into consideration every sympathetic complaint emanating from the primary disorder, however distressing to the feelings of the patient, so, in the investigation of the important subject on which I have entered, do I deem it necessary to take into consideration every contingency which can possibly assist in producing the catastrophe I so much dread. I allude to the opportunity that is afforded to the adjutant, who generally has charge of what are termed vacant companies, of defrauding the sepoys and the Honourable Company. This, it is true, cannot be done without the sanction of the commanding officer; but *humanum est errare*, and what has happened should warn the Legislature to guard against the recurrence of. Sepoys thus defrauded have no mode of redress, and therefore the sense of their injuries must be more acute, and prepare their minds for evil impressions against a service which appears inadequate to protect them from injustice.

*Nullum imperium tutum, nisi benevolentia munitum.* The good-will of the Natives may be retained without granting them power, the semblance is sufficient; and though I abhor in private life that maxim of Rochefaucault's which recommends a man to live with his friends as if they were one day to be his enemies, I think it may be remembered with effect by the sovereigns of India.

I might hint a possibility that the Marquis of Hastings may deem it advisable to appoint officers from the numerous adventurers who have lately flocked to India to fill up some of the present vacancies in the army; but having stated the principal grounds on which I conceive the measure of reducing the number of officers attached to Native corps in India to be objectionable, I shall conclude with expressing a hope that some of my arguments may have escaped discussion, and that they may be considered of sufficient weight to induce the Honourable Court to pause before they enforce obedience to an order, which, in my humble opinion, may prove fatal to their interests and even existence.

(Signed) P. PAGE.

East-India House, April 9th 1819.

## (22.)—REPLY of Captain JAMES GRANT DUFF, dated 25th March 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

To the two first queries, which are simply of detail, I cannot reply without reference to official documents; and with regard to the third, much depends on political circumstances existing at the moment of service. These must be first explained; then accurate returns of the force, their state of health, the requisite strength of garrisons and stations, the scene of action, the means of supply, and the objects of attack or defence, must all be previously shown or supposed before this question could be categorically answered. Endeavouring, however, to comply with its intention, and confining myself chiefly to Bombay, the army of that Presidency, when I left India, consisted of—

- 1 Regiment of European dragoons (King's).
- 3 Regiments of Native cavalry.
- 1 Regiment of European artillery.
- 4 Battalions of European infantry (three being King's regiments).
- 24 Battalions of Native infantry.
- 2 Extra battalions of Native infantry.
- About 2,000 irregular horse, under European officers, a corps of pioneers, and the Engineer department.

(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

Q. 1, 2, 3.

Strength of the  
Bombay army in  
1822-23, stated  
only from recol-  
lection.

There were also sebundies or irregular infantry,\* under the collectors and judges, to assist in the duties of Revenue and Police.

Of this force, the regiment of dragoons,† two regiments of Native cavalry, and eight battalions of Native infantry, occupied various positions in Guzerat, and two battalions were in Kutch. Two European regiments were in Bombay, with two Native battalions. Two European regiments, one regiment of Native cavalry, and seven battalions of Native infantry, were in the Deccan; four battalions were in the Concan, and one battalion was in the island of Kishme, in the Persian Gulf; one extra battalion was in Guzerat, and one in the Deccan; about a fourth part of the irregular horse in Guzerat, the remainder in the Deccan. The head-quarters of the artillery is near Bombay, but detachments in proportion to the strength of the infantry are always attached to a force. Each cavalry regiment has two field-pieces or gallopers, which accompany its movements. The infantry guns are drawn by bullocks, but would be infinitely more efficient if horses were substituted.

Although at the period of which I write we were in a state of profound peace, this force was much dispersed, and certainly not more than sufficient for the maintenance of order, the preservation of tranquillity within, and prevention of aggression from without.

I shall suppose, however, a sudden emergency, and the point of defence to be the north-west of the Guzerat frontier. The regiment of dragoons, two regiments of Native cavalry, and four of the Native battalions might immediately unite. Three European regiments, one from Bombay, and two from the Deccan; three battalions Native infantry from the Concan, and two from the Deccan, to be sent forward as a reinforcement with all expedition, and if the season of the year permitted, to be embarked at Bombay, and landed at Jumbooseer. It is all but impracticable to send troops from Bombay to Guzerat during the rains. The above force, when assembled, would form a field army of ten thousand men. If the northern part of Hindoostan were assailed, this force could advance to the Chumbul or beyond it, overawe the States adjoining, and support the Bengal army.

The Madras troops, in either case, to take up the positions vacated in the Deccan, and irregulars might be raised if the local Government deemed it necessary. If the seat of war

\* Regulars ought never to be employed in the mere detail of ordinary civil duties. It is destruction to the discipline of a corps to disperse it for such purposes. Economy is the motive, but nothing can be more mistaken; the evils I have known result from it would fill the next sheet.

† Since removed to Poona.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

war were to the eastward of India, the troops must be sent from Bengal and Madras by sea; Bombay might embark a regiment of Europeans, and in the Southern Mahratta country cover the Madras posts, so as to enable that Presidency to withdraw as many of its troops as possible. But, in any case, if the service were prolonged, it would probably be necessary to raise new regiments, or to augment the corps with extra levies, and also to raise irregulars, not only for the purpose of relieving the troops from the extreme hard duty which never fails to devolve upon those who have the misfortune to be left in garrison on such occasions, but to prevent disturbances from the unemployed Native soldiery, who might seize such an opportunity for attempting gang robbery and insurrections. They are also easier got rid of afterwards, and carry no knowledge of our discipline along with them.

Q. 4. On the  
efficiency of our  
military force.

I think our military force very efficient for the purposes which seem at present likely to be required of it; but, should we ever have to repel invasion from a European power, it must be principally effected by British bayonets. It would be hazardous in the extreme to subject sepoys to the chance of a first defeat; and although I have a very high opinion of their military character throughout India, though, even within my limited experience, I have known the sepoy advance when the British grenadier more than hesitated, still I am clearly of opinion that, even if they possessed equal physical strength, which they do not, they could not be brought to oppose Europeans with their usual confidence of victory. Perhaps in some respects this is well for us, and when we consider the circumstances of the service it is not remarkable. The class of lads who go to India as cadets are admirably calculated for soldiers; when one or two of them join a Native regiment, they adopt the ideas current among their seniors, and when they go on service they soon perceive that the eyes of their men are upon them, and that much depends on their exertions. If this failed to animate, the veriest poltroon could, at all events, soon be taught that his life must pay the forfeit of his failing to encourage or to restrain his men, or in the slightest degree to hesitate in showing a becoming example. From these, combined with other causes, the sepoy officers are in general very dependable, and if they have common sense and common kindness, these men have a confidence and a respect for the white-faced leader, which no other colour can intimidate, or, in a fair field, withstand.

In the event, however, of European invasion, great bodies of irregular horse under the command of enterprising European officers, or under their direction if subsidized, should harass the advancing enemy by destroying his approaching supplies, by perpetual feints, and occasional night attacks; cutting off all small parties and stragglers, and perhaps by laying waste the country; the inhabitants of which to be afterwards, as far as practicable, reimbursed. Every European soldier in India should advance to the point of defence; their places supplied by recruits from England as fast as they could be sent out. The troops in the West-Indies, at the Cape, Ceylon, the Mauritius, in the Mediterranean, and wherever they were in any degree seasoned, should be relieved and pushed on; as many more to be sent from England as experienced officers judged expedient. With centre and flanks of Europeans, and a small proportion of choice sepoys, the latter will be a match for any thing; and backed with such real power as we have in India, it would be impossible for any mere outward danger to affect us. If European invaders lost a foot of ground it would annihilate that and every future attempt. Allies induced to join from hope of reward or plunder might then be easily turned into active foes, and treacherous enmity is irreconcilable.

On the economy  
with which it is  
provided.

Very great attention has always been paid to economy in every branch of the service with which I am acquainted. The commissariat, at all times the most expensive and wasteful accompaniment of war, is much better regulated than formerly. The officers are trained to their business, injudicious contracts are abolished, and the troops in the field are better supplied. But in this department of an army, where subordinate agents on trifling pay are frequently removed from immediate control and subjected to great temptation, it is scarcely possible to place such effectual checks as always to prevent peculation. I think, however, that the European officers of this department in India, where there are facilities

facilities for information, ought, in any ordinary circumstances, to be able to detect dishonesty. Punishment and disgrace, abroad and at home, should be made to follow up an European delinquent in the sternest manner, and every authority connected with the public service should shun even the suspected. The officers of this department, both European and Native, ought to be particularly well paid, their character and honour upheld, but every practicable check interwoven with the regulations.

As to the spirit and disposition of the officers and men composing the Indian army, speaking generally, it is no more than justice to say, they have ever proved themselves zealous, gallant, and brave, and they have always evinced the most heroic self-devotion in upholding their own high fame and the national honour and interests.

The composition of the Native battalions in Bombay is particularly good. Almost every regiment has in it a salutary mixture of castes; the preponderance has for some time been in favour of recruits from Hindoostan, tall men being more easily procured in that quarter; they are chiefly Hindoos of the same class as that of which the Bengal army is composed; but from intimate knowledge, though I am well aware of their high qualities, I would strongly recommend that the number admitted into a Bombay corps should never exceed one-fourth. A part are Mahrattas, both from above and below the Ghauts, but principally from the Southern Concan, or what used formerly to be denominated in the old charts the Pirate Coast. There are some Mahomedans from Surat and Bombay, from whom were many of the old and very respectable Native officers of this army. Of Purwarees or Dhers, a very low caste, but frequently very intelligent, excellent soldiers,\* there are considerable numbers; and many of the regiments have a portion of Canarees and Nairs from Malabar. There are also a few Jews, commonly drunken, but invariably brave men, and a few nominal Christians from the same coast. I have also known a few Kolees, Bheels, and Khattees from the province of Guzerat, one or two Parsees, and occasionally a native of Abyssinia.†

Of the principal classes all have their particular admirers, and I have heard some of the most experienced officers, in privately discussing their merits, give the preference to each of them. For my own part, I have found the Nairs and Canarees the best and most attached soldiers, and, to speak in camp phrase, they strip the finest men. From what cause I know not, but these people are said not to turn out so well in the Madras army as in the Bombay, possibly from being nearer home, and having greater facility to desertion.

It is quite natural that a Bombay officer should prefer the Bombay troops, but I am tempted to state the fact of their having been on some occasions so little noticed as to convey an impression of their inferiority; whereas some of the most remarkable trials of the Indian army have been sustained by Bombay sepoys, with unrivalled firmness and constancy; and, moreover, though I say it not invidiously but in justice, no instance of insubordination or mutiny stains the fair annals of their achievements. This circumstance may be incidental to the excellent composition above enumerated, and which, under any change, it would be most unwise to disturb.

An efficient number of European officers, the full complement at least, will always prove of incalculable advantage on service. The greatest defect I ever observed in the Company's army arose from the long period which was permitted to elapse in sending out a sufficient number of cadets between the wars of 1805 and 1817. At the close of the former the supply was too great, as there were many supernumeraries, and I believe it was purposed, from motives of economy, to permit a gradual reduction in the number of European officers below the usual complement, by allowing them to die off. In 1817, fortunately the battalions had still a fair proportion of Europeans, and even the junior lieutenants were officers of some experience. Most of them had been on some service, and few of them were of less than

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

On the spirit and dis-  
position of the officers  
and men.

Composition of the  
Bombay corps.

Character of the  
Bombay sepoys.

On the number of  
European officers.

European officers.

\* They probably derive their intelligence from their hereditary occupation in their native villages, where they are the scouts, guides, guardians of land-marks, &c. &c.

† I have heard it proposed, but I think it would be a bad plan, to have corps of that description of people, if obtainable.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.State of the army  
since last Mahratta  
war.

than twelve years' standing, when an Indian officer is perhaps at his best; and accordingly, these were the men, who, in such trials as Korygaum and Seetabuldee, did in effect sustain the troops.

By the acquisition of territory, the consequent augmentation, and the casualties resulting from war and cholera, of those who were previously junior lieutenants, some commanded battalions, and all, from their standing, were captains by brevet. Shoals of cadets arrived, many of whom on joining their corps were next in rank to these old officers. They were in general fine, well-disposed and well-educated lads; but a number of young men thus coming together, were not, as formerly, constrained by the larger body of seniors. They were too numerous to imbihe notions from men of habits different from their own, and by the number of their votes carried propositions at their mess in defiance of the influence of authority. In short, the old and the young could not assimilate; that *esprit du corps*, that kindly feeling towards the sepoys, and that high soldier-like adventurous spirit which had run through the Indian army by a sort of traditional inspiration, making every man an enthusiast in his profession, was for a time suspended. A link was broken; let us hope that it is by this time soldered, and that a like error, for it was a very great one, may never again be permitted to occur.

Sepoys, characteris-  
tics of.

Another practical measure, which I long ago heard suggested, would, I think, be attended with good effects, that of having all field officers removable from corps in which they have been brought up, and bringing them generally back to the same when they become lieutenant-colonels. The first, as useful to the discipline of the officers; and the second, as agreeable to the men. It would give the majors an opportunity of more easily breaking a familiarity injurious to requisite deference, and the men are generally pleased to get back their old officers. No one who has not witnessed it could believe how much an officer who understands them can attach sepoys. Some serve their lives and never know more than their faces and a few of their names; but sepoys discern the character of an officer even more correctly than European privates, and are more disposed than they are to be pleased with his endeavours for their comfort; they can bear to be treated with more kindness and familiarity; but strictness on duty, patiently hearing their regular complaints, and dealing out even-handed justice, is the surest means of securing their respect and attachment. I ought to add as characteristic, that, notwithstanding their extreme sensitiveness on points of honour, money is the reward they prize most, and that praise should be dealt out to individuals with reserve; collectively, it never hurts them in abundance. Lord Combermere's order, prohibiting their ever being struck without the authority of a court-martial, will, on the whole, be of much beneficial importance. Flogging, I apprehend, cannot be abolished; but every sepoy flogged should be drummed out, or at all events never kept in the regiment. This is not a mere opinion, I saw it tried in one corps for several years with the best effects, and if generally adopted it would raise the character of the service.

European officers,  
discipline of.

But, with regard to the discipline of the European officers, I think, if it were possible to strengthen the powers of commanding officers in the Company's service, it would be of great utility. To avoid the extreme measure of bringing an officer to trial, at the same time to preserve authority, often requires an address with which few are gifted; and the resource of a court-martial, not unfrequently a capricious tribunal, is in many respects dangerous to discipline, it should, by all practicable means, be avoided; but if a commanding officer temporise too much, or if a culprit brought to trial escape with impunity, the consequences are nearly equally detrimental. The error at present lies in a too great independence of authority. Some of the seniors, instead of supporting the commanding officer, are apt to become heads of parties. Young men, and especially those who fancy they have any home interest, presume on their supposed influence. I would deprecate secret and confidential reports, or delegating any power subversive of direct open dealing, or likely to generate oppression or injustice. To alter the established regular promotion according to seniority would be most injurious; but something might be devised. It is difficult to say what would be objectionable; but perhaps the necessity of a prescribed and formal recommendation from commanding officers, previously to any proposed appointments to the general



general staff might be of benefit. The fact should also be inculcated, with all the weight of authority, that no one can ever become efficient on the staff who is not, in principle and practice, a good regimental officer.

With respect to the education of cadets, although this forms part of a subsequent query, I think the present system very good, provided there were in the India House a Board of Examiners, who would strictly do their duty and prevent the passing of any cadet for the cavalry or infantry who had not received as good an education as is common to gentlemen's sons of their age. Instances, indeed, of the contrary are rare; but I have known officers so grossly illiterate, that the bare possibility should be prevented. On arriving in India, an officer of the general staff at the Presidency should always have charge of the cadets until they are posted to regiments, for which they should be fitted out as economically as possible, and immediately sent off. I am of opinion that a seminary for the instruction of a certain number of officers at each of the Presidencies is in the highest degree desirable, and that the expense to Government would be most amply repaid by the knowledge it would diffuse, and the additional power that knowledge would create for the benefit of the whole country. Even the Madras institution, confined as it was and limited in duration, had the merit of improving a set of young men, many of whom became distinguished at a very early period, and some of them who still live are ornaments to the service. So far, however, from rendering it obligatory, no officer should be admissible without a previous application of at least six months, backed by the recommendation of his commanding officer; and none should be eligible to such recommendation until they had done duty with a regiment for at least one year. Continuance beyond a certain time should only be permitted as the reward of exertion, and no very distant period should be fixed as the longest period of study. The artillery and engineers should continue to be educated in England, but not excluded from a seminary where to study Asiatic languages must always be held out as a great object, but where opportunities should be afforded of acquiring the higher branches of military instruction, and means of improving themselves in the science and literature of Europe. First-rate talent should be encouraged to seek the situations of professors, and in a very short time we shall find subalterns from an outpost making discoveries of circumstances and resources in India, which defective education and blind want of science prevented their zealous but ignorant predecessors from searching out.

Having entered on the subject of education, I may here mention, in regard to the seminary in this country for the education of writers, that I have seen proofs in India of its great utility. I have had opportunities of knowing young men of equally good natural abilities who had been at the college, and those who had not had that advantage. Whatever prejudices may exist against it, and however more perfect it may be made, those who have studied at the college are infinitely more efficient. I had the good fortune to get as assistants some who had distinguished themselves at the seminary; and in a very few months they became, from their habits of application and previous acquirements, most useful servants to the public.

As to the employment of military men in civil situations, I think that some military experience is of essential importance to all diplomatists. Of the civilians in India, most of those who have particularly distinguished themselves in political emergency have had that experience; and those of the military who have held situations in the Civil department have rarely been appointed to them, unless in newly-acquired territories, where the duties are commonly of a very mixed nature, and where civil officers, perhaps unacquainted with the language of the districts, brim-full of the infallible code of the Presidency Council-chamber Regulations, totally inapplicable in the new country, cannot be very efficient, even for the civil duties. But there may be convoys to intercept, detachments to cut up, proper positions to seize, forts to gain by negotiation, or to carry by immediate assault. The disaffected must be watched, all insurrections quelled, and conspiracies strangled. Much of this must be done or superintended personally, in addition to the duties of raising irregulars, regulating the country, establishing the police, securing the Government revenue, and protecting

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

Cadets, education  
of.

Seminaries at each  
of the Presidencies  
proposed.

East-India College,  
its advantages.

Employment of  
military officers in  
civil situations.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

protecting the people. I do not, however, suppose a case ; such were, in fact, the duties of those military officers who were appointed to civil situations in the Deccan at the close of the last Mahratta war. I have the highest respect for the civil service of India. More zeal, honour, or intelligence exist among no public functionaries. When the paucity of their number is considered, the nature, extent, and variety of their stupendous labour must astonish all who have opportunities and perseverance to investigate them. Some of those gentlemen are as fit to regulate and conduct military operations as civil details, or indeed, as has been well remarked, as most generals ; but when a civilian, without experience, has the misfortune to be placed in a half-subdued or newly-acquired district, he has too much occasion to refer, on every petty matter, to the officer commanding the troops, who, in consequence of his (the civilian's) military ignorance, very likely entertains no respect for his judgment, differs from the civil authority on an important and feasible enterprise merely because it is his suggestion ; and thus an important opportunity is lost, which diffidence prevents a man of good sense from bringing to the notice of Government : or, if an inexperienced person, confident from ignorance, take upon himself military responsibility, how disastrous have frequently been the results.

With regard to the Deccan, it being an instance in point, to have removed the military officers merely because they were military, although they had established order, and proved themselves capable of conducting the duties, would surely have been in every way unjust, injurious to their characters, as well as ruinous to the fortunes of those whose health enabled them to reap their fair reward. The countries were new, the civilians unacquainted with the language and people, whilst with the one and the other the officers appointed had long been familiar. The conquest was unexpected, and the civil service lost nothing ; on the contrary, the assistants in the Deccan were chosen from their own body.

I think the separation of the Company's army from the King's is in favour of its efficiency and good spirit. If placed under the direct authority of the Minister and the Crown, there would be more chance of influence taking the place of merit. A governing authority as distinct as possible from all party politics is of importance to India. Wherever private recommendations from home have been much attended to, the service has suffered. Public appointments, or public recommendations from His Majesty's Ministers, would no doubt be, as those from the Directors are, generally well-merited and just ; an exercise of private influence from them, if attended to, is equally pernicious ; but they have not the same temptation, or rather, as some might denominate it, necessity, for making use of patronage as a Minister of this country, who has hitherto frequently bartered it to oblige a supporter or conciliate an opponent. It can scarcely be otherwise ; under most other Governments it is still more impure. The recommendation of a Director is not considered as a Minister's would be—an order. A Governor in India, on the present footing, is, on the whole, less excusable for abuse of patronage than perhaps any other dignitary under the Crown of Great Britain.

I shall not in replying to these queries enlarge on the obvious evil of uniting the services of India and England. The Native army must be kept distinct, and its character by every fit means upheld. The officers who serve in it endure a long, and often a sickly, dreary, cheerless exile ; it must continue so ; and they are worthy of a fair share of honours from their country, and of every encouragement and reward which the State can afford.

With the present slow promotion, and the few opportunities which even the most frugal can have of saving, the retiring allowances are certainly an inadequate reward for the best of a life spent in India ; nor does it appear that the aggregate amount of half-pay and pensions are so heavy as might be expected. The objection to a retiring fund established by the officers themselves arises no doubt chiefly from the apprehension of adding too largely to the pension list. If it can be arranged in such a manner as to guard the State from any greater proportional expenditure than its present item for pensions, in which, from perhaps not understanding the details, I see no insuperable difficulty, I am persuaded the retiring fund might be recommended to the Directors with great benefit to their service. The experience of the very old officers does not in general make amends for their inefficiency.

Q. 5, and 6.  
Effect of uniting  
the King's and  
Company's service.

Home patronage.

Native army must  
always be kept  
distinct.

Retiring allow-  
ances.

Retiring fund.

ciency. Health and physical strength are indispensable in the military profession; a sickly soldier is but a burden on the public.

With regard to the provision, freight, and appropriation of stores as is now and would be, I can offer no opinion; but having been long an adjutant and quartermaster of a regiment, I can with propriety bear testimony to the general excellence of the Bombay military accoutrements and arms, which are commonly carried out in the large China ships, and admirably well kept in the arsenal of Bombay Castle. At some of the out-stations under sub-conductors the stores require to be well looked after. I have known great negligence in their department.

The settlement of British subjects in India cannot prove of much advantage or disadvantage to the army, but it is one of deep interest to the welfare of the Natives generally, and I cannot see how the British nation could sanction unrestricted intercourse, without danger to the permanency of its own dominion, and injustice to the Natives --- an injustice extending to the infraction of treaties and the usurpation of individual rights. Allowing many of those persons to mean well who argue in favour of its being permitted, it should always be borne in mind, that all hasty and untried measures with regard to India, founded upon European ideas, even when conceived in a spirit of philanthropy, have been injurious to that country, and as examples, I shall only refer to Lord Cornwallis's permanent settlement, and the removal by the Marquis of Hastings of restrictions from the press. Who can deny that a light and permanent land-tax and the free expression of men's sentiments are not desirable? But in these instances was the one judiciously applied, or the other well-timed? Or who says that skill and capital are not of the utmost importance to any country, especially to poor exhausted India? But if it appear that these cannot be employed with reciprocal benefit, that it is even doubtful if they would find their way thither, although abundance of adventure unrestrained certainly would, is it becoming or wise that all the benefit sought should be to gratify one view? If we give way to clamour or sophistry on this great question, shall we not justify the character for selfishness with which we shall be branded; and ultimately lament our weakness in the ruin of a country, which, if we properly support and foster it, will be a mine of unfailing prosperity to Britain?

I would recommend that the Natives themselves be consulted on the subject, not such Natives as have acquired English, and, from that circumstance, just enough of knowledge to be convinced by the last pamphlet or magazine they may have read, but persons following different avocations, retired statesmen, or sound-headed practical men, acquainted with the commerce, the agriculture, the history, and probable resources of the provinces where they have been, or have had transactions. I need not add, that to elicit information from a Native of India, the querist must have something more than a knowledge of the language. All our inexperienced countrymen are prone to the habit of prefacing inquiries by a declaration of their own sentiments, and very often by boasting of the superior excellence of every English law and custom. A Native of India calmly and ironically assures such a person that he is quite right; perhaps adds, if he can venture, "Master very clever gentleman; what worth or wisdom can be expected amongst us lying black fellows?"

Reverting, however, to colonization as a military question, I have heard it observed, that our greatest dangers in India are to be apprehended from three causes: first, disaffection of our Native troops; second, the increasing number of half-castes; and third, Russian invasion. If this be granted, then, say the colonists, if we are permitted to settle, we will soon render India independent of the first. With regard to the second, Europeans will not cohabit with Natives when they can intermarry with their own countrywomen; and, should we be assailed by foreign invasion, the only certain means of defence are to be found amongst us. Then, add the same reasoners, should India, in after-times, become independent, what man, wishing well to the human race, but will say, "the more Americas the better."

It is, perhaps, absurd to reply to such very shallow assertions as some of these. General disaffection amongst our Native troops is only to be dreaded by excitement on the subject of their religious prejudices, or a reduction of their pay. Colonization is more likely to engender

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

Military stores.

Q. 7. Colonization.

Recommends that  
Natives should be  
consulted.

Colonization as a  
military question;  
some arguments in  
favour of;

Replies thereto.  
Disaffection of the  
Native troops.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

engender the first than to repress it; for, if once aroused by injudicious zeal, ill-timed discussions and publications, or any other cause, it is the extreme of folly to suppose the colonists a counterpoise; they might as well talk of extinguishing a conflagration in the forests of the Western Ghauts with a bucket of Thames water, or of smothering the eruption of a volcano by the fire of a blank cartridge.

Half-castes.

As to the second, it is ludicrous to aver, that the inconvenience (for I do not in a long period estimate it as a danger) would not, in every view, be increased; and that the evil would not, in fact, be augmented by the colonists themselves, owing to their communion of interests with those East-Indians.

Colonists.

With regard to the third; what revolutions must happen before the many generations of colonists, having of course by various means ejected or brought out the Natives of India from the more productive lands; what time must elapse before they could become the defenders of the banks of the Indus? Moreover, after having admitted all these moral impossibilities, let us advert to the probability, nay certainty, of our European colonists becoming a poor, lank, puny race, inferior both to Natives and half-castes.

Of India becoming  
as America.

As to an America; as no one at least avows his wish for extirpation, we may suppose they contemplate something rather resembling a Spanish than an English America; but what is there in the condition of that society so desirable? I mean, not in allusion to what they have escaped, but in comparison with what is, or will be, the rule of British India.

Amelioration of  
India is a positive  
duty required of  
England.

I say *will be*, because in regard to a more liberal importation of its products to the country, which has ruined its manufactures and is draining its resources, a change *must* be made. It were, indeed, barbarous to think otherwise; regardless of minor obstacles, it is clearly the bounden duty of Britain to adopt those measures from which must emanate a paramount benefit to the common subjects of its realm. If, as is true, circumstances have left their great interests unrepresented and unprotected, it would be unfair and unmanly, unlike generous and honest England, to permit them to be sacrificed. That statesman adorns the annals of his country, and places an unfading laurel on his brow, who, after making himself master of the subject, in defiance of short-sighted views and selfish interests, shall successfully advocate and protect the real rights of India's Natives. But again, as to Spanish America; does our admixture with the Natives of India promise a progeny better, if so good? far be it from me to say, much less to insinuate, that there are not many worthy half-castes—men as religious, brave, and virtuous as their forefathers of England. Talent, or rather cleverness, they are universally allowed to possess; but, in general, there is an instability of character, a violence, a wickedness and weakness throughout the race, which, it is to be feared, no elevation of condition could eradicate, though hopeless depression must engrain them the more.

Half-castes.

Their real interests are equally contended for in the general amelioration of the country. Commerce is not only open to them, but circumstances seem to point to them as the future restorers of manufactures in India, since justice and good policy forbid their being extended, as occupiers of the soil.

General character  
of colonists as  
defenders.

I have been led to say more on this subject than I intended, or is perhaps becoming. I shall therefore only remark of colonists that, before they become the defenders of the commonwealth, they generally shake off the mother-country. As colonists, so far from standing forth as champions when the existing Government is in any real jeopardy, they merely look to the preservation of person and property, and, if they can, of laws. Like the passive Hindoo cultivator, they submit their necks to the yoke, on the best terms they can obtain from the victors, who, for their own sakes, will afford protection according to what may be their views of policy or convenience.

Q. 8. Army under  
one Governor and  
one Commander-in-  
chief.

To place the whole Indian army under one Governor and one Commander-in-chief more directly than they now are, might endanger the grand advantage, grown up by circumstances, of having three distinct armies, "Brethren in arms but rivals in renown." However, the general staff throughout India might perhaps be amalgamated occasionally with advantage; I mean of course, by sending officers of one Presidency to do duty in another.

This

This plan would certainly improve their knowledge, enlarge their views, and obliterate certain prejudices which I have always thought are ingredients usefully preserved in the lower grades of the military mass. To forego the benefit of wholesome rivalry and to admit facilities for combination, which can now so easily be avoided, seems to me inexpedient and unnecessary.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(22.)—Reply  
of Capt. J. G. Duff,  
25th March 1832.

Q. 9.

To the next question, I shall reply under the head of Political, as it is repeated, Qu. 10.

(23.)—REMARKS by Mr. CABELL, dated India Board, 6th August 1832.

Sir,

1. CONFORMABLY to the direction contained in your letter of the 20th February last, I have the honour to submit such observations as have occurred to me in reference to the queries which have been addressed, by order of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, to officers of His Majesty's and the Company's service, in relation to the army of India.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

2. It may be proper for me to premise, that during a period of upwards of thirty-two years, in which I have belonged to the establishment of this office, I served for the first eighteen years as junior and assistant in the Secret and Political department, under Mr. Jones; the next ten years as head of the Military department; and the last four as head of the Secret and Political department, in which my service had commenced.

3. I had consequently few, if any, opportunities of becoming acquainted with the peculiarities of the military system of India before it became my duty, in the year 1818, to take charge of the correspondence in that department, and to draw the attention of the Board to such part of the proposed replies to the despatches of the local Government as appeared to be deserving of notice or to call for particular consideration.

4. In the discharge of this duty, from my having to acquire a knowledge of the Indian system from such allusions to it as were found in the current correspondence, and from such materials in print and in MS. as were available to me, I am fully aware of the difficulties which are in the way of an individual who may attempt, for the first time, to enter into the peculiarities which prevail in the strictly seniority promotion of the Company's service, modified, as it was, by the army arrangement of 1796, which introduced the system of regimental rise into the cavalry and infantry up to the rank of major; promotion then continuing by seniority in the line of cavalry or infantry (of the particular Presidency to which the officers belong) to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and colonel.

5. I had occasion, at an early period, to investigate several claims of rank, arising out of augmentations which had been made to the army; and in order to judge of the merits of these claims, it became necessary to investigate the principles which in India has governed the selection of officers for a new regiment, founded, as it is, on the most marked respect and attention which in India are paid to the claims of officers to the benefit of promotion, or of higher regimental standing, in a newly-raised corps, according to their relative seniority.

6. The investigation of these cases necessarily led to a development of the principle and operation of the seniority regimental system, and also to the practical inconveniences which have been found to result from its introduction, as well as to a consideration of the remedies that might be applied in view to their removal. These were explained in papers prepared for the Board in 1821, from which the following statement of the peculiarities of the system of the Company's service has been principally taken, with such variations, however, as were found necessary to adapt it to the new organization of 1824.

7. The object proposed in entering into these particulars is to afford facilities to those who may, for the first time, have to enter upon the consideration of these important subjects,

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

subjects, without having previously familiarized themselves with the peculiarities of the Indian system. To such the following attempt, it is hoped, may not be unacceptable.

8. To form a clear idea of the system of regimental rise, and to elucidate the questions of rank to which it has given rise, it will be of assistance to confine the attention to an establishment only of four regiments, which shall be of infantry, and according to the organization adopted in the year 1824.

Let these be called regiments A. B. C. and D. in the following scheme of an establishment, as carried into effect in May 1824, under the Court's Orders of the 25th November 1823. The small letters of the alphabet are supposed to indicate the order in which the field officers have respectively attained to the rank of major, and consequently that of their regimental seniority. The captains and subalterns are only noticed in the scheme by figures, corresponding with the number of officers of each rank allowed by the Court's Orders of 25th November 1823, modified as they afterwards were by orders issued in December 1828, reducing two lieutenants, and one cornet, ensign or second lieutenant per regiment.

Scheme of an Establishment of Four Regiments of Infantry, according to the Court's Orders of 25th Nov. 1823, and as they were subsequently modified.

		<i>Regiments.</i>							
		A.		B.		C.		D.	
Colonels	...	<i>a</i>	..	<i>b</i>	...	<i>d</i>	<i>c</i>	} Promotion of the field officers by seniority in the line of the whole corps of infantry.	
Lieutenant-colonels		<i>h</i>	...	<i>e</i>	...	<i>g</i>	<i>f</i>		
Majors	...	<i>l</i>	...	<i>k</i>	...	<i>m</i>	<i>i</i>		
Captains	...	5	...	5	...	5	5	} Promotion to the rank of major by seniority in the regiment.	
Lieutenants	...	8	...	8	...	8	8		
Ensigns	...	4	...	4	...	4	4		
Total Officers, per regiment, 20		20		20		20		20	

10. Upon the principle of promotion, by seniority in the regiment, to the rank of major, an ensign appointed to regiment (A.) will rise by seniority in that regiment to the rank of lieutenant, captain, and major, except in the case of an augmentation by whole regiments, to be noticed hereafter. In like manner the ensigns appointed to regiments (B.), (C.), and (D.), will rise to the rank of lieutenant, captain, and major in their respective regiments.

11. The seniority of a field officer is determined by the date of his promotion to the rank of major, which constitutes what is termed in the army lists his "regimental rank;" and the term, when applied to a field officer, should always be understood as indicating the order of his promotion, in the line of the whole corps, to the command of a regiment and share of off- reckonings. In the Indian army lists there is what is termed a succession list of colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors, which list indicates the exact order in which the officers have become, or have claims to become, colonels of regiments.

12. The letters in the scheme being supposed to indicate the order in which the field officers have respectively attained to the rank of major, the mode in which their subsequent promotion proceeds, and in which the captains and subalterns are affected by it, admits of easy explanation.

13. Suppose a casualty in the rank of colonel by the death of colonel (*a*), this does not give promotion to lieutenant-colonel (*h*), who belongs to the same regiment (A.), but to lieutenant-colonel (*e*), the senior regimental lieutenant-colonel. The vacancy thereby occasioned in the rank of lieutenant-colonel is not given to major (*k*), who belongs to the same regiment as lieutenant-colonel (*e*), but to major (*i*), the senior regimental major.

14. Promotion

14. Promotion now becomes regimental, and therefore the first captain of regiment (D.), to which major (*i*) belongs, is promoted to the vacant majority, while the senior lieutenant and ensign of regiment (D.) are promoted to the rank of captain and lieutenant respectively.

15. Suppose next that colonel (*b*) occasions a vacancy in the rank of colonel, it will be evident, from what has been stated, that lieutenant-colonel (*f*) will be the new colonel, and major (*k*) the new lieutenant-colonel, and that therefore the regimental promotion will fall this time to regiment (B.), to which major (*k*) belongs.

16. If colonel (*c*) be supposed to occasion the next vacancy, lieutenant-colonel (*g*) will be the new colonel, and major (*l*) the new lieutenant-colonel, and regimental promotion will this time fall to regiment (A.), to which major (*l*) belongs.

17. The next vacancy in the rank of colonel will promote lieutenant-colonel (*h*) to the rank of colonel, and major (*m*) to that of lieutenant-colonel, and give regimental promotion to regiment (C.)

18. It will be observed that the four vacancies in the rank of colonel (and it is of no consequence to the lieutenant-colonels, majors, captains, and subalterns in what order they might have occurred) have promoted the four senior lieutenant-colonels and the four senior majors, and given regimental promotion successively to the regiments (D.), (B.), (A.), and (C.)

19. If the four vacancies had occurred by the death, resignation, or retirement of as many lieutenant-colonels instead of colonels, precisely the same consequences would have ensued in respect to the promotion of the majors, and the regimental promotion of the captains and subalterns, because the senior major for the time being, in every instance, is promoted to the vacancy in the rank of lieutenant-colonel, from whatever cause it may have arisen, whether from the promotion of a lieutenant-colonel, or from a casualty in that rank.

20. The next remark to be made is that regimental promotion has fallen to the regiments (D.), (B.), (A.), and (C.), in the order precisely of the seniority of their respective majors; and this is the operation which, in the documents received from India, is termed the "line step."

21. The "line step" has, therefore, in this instance, visited the four regiments in the order of the seniority of their respective majors; and it is easy to perceive that the line step will continue to circulate, in the same order, as long as promotion to the rank of major is not disturbed by a casualty in that rank.

22. For instance: suppose the relative seniority of the majors to be as indicated in the scheme before referred to, and that a casualty occurs in regiment (C.) by the death, removal, resignation, or retirement of major (*n*). It will be observed that major (*n*) is junior to the majors (*i*), (*k*), and (*l*), and that the line step would, under ordinary circumstances, by vacancies in the rank of lieutenant-colonel or colonel, have promoted majors (*i*), (*k*), and (*l*) before major (*n*). The first captain, therefore, of regiment (C.), in this case, obtains promotion before the first captains of regiments (D.), (B.), and (A.), who would otherwise have become majors before him, by the operation of the line step; but as he, by his promotion to a majority, represented by the seniority (*n*), is the junior of majors (*k*), (*l*), and (*m*), regiment (D.), from being the first for promotion by the operation of the line step, becomes the last, and the line step will then continue to circulate in this order among the regiments, until by the occurrence of another casualty among the majors the order of its circulation be again changed.

23. The next point to be considered is the case of an augmentation by whole regiments, and let it be required to provide officers for a fifth regiment, according to the Indian usage, to be denominated (E.)

24. If

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

24. If the relative seniority of the field officers be as indicated in the scheme before referred to, lieutenant-colonel (e) will be the colonel of the new regiment, major (i) will supply the vacancy in the rank of lieutenant-colonel occasioned by the removal and promotion of lieutenant-colonel (e), and major (k) will be the lieutenant-colonel of the new regiment. This operation will give majorities to the first captains of the regiments (D.), and (B.), and the captain who remains the senior by army rank, after these promotions, will be the major of the new regiment.

25. The relative rank of the new majors, namely, the two promoted by the operation of the line step and the one transferred into the new regiment, depends upon their seniority as captains. If the latter is junior to the former, the major of the new regiment will be junior to all the majors of the old, who will therefore be promoted before him, and consequently the line step in this case will pass through all the old regiments before it can visit the new, when the major of the new regiment comes in turn for promotion.

26. If the major of the new regiment be senior, as captain, to one or both of the captains promoted by the line step, the line step in this case will reach the new regiment before the major or majors of the old regiments, junior to him as captain, are promoted, and occasion the slight difference in the circulation of the line step implied in the statement of the fact.

27. When the major of the new regiment is junior, as captain, to the officers promoted to majorities, on the augmentation, by the operation of the line step, the first captains of all the old regiments will, in this case be in a more favourable situation for line promotion than any officer transferred into the new regiment as first captain. The senior second captain would, therefore, be selected as first captain of the new regiment, being the officer whose interest it would be to make the change, and having a preferable claim to removal, as compared with his juniors of the same class.

28. For the same reason the senior third captain would be transferred into the new regiment as second captain, the senior fourth captain as third captain, and the senior fifth captain as fourth captain. The senior first lieutenant would be the fifth captain of the new regiment, and the transfer of the remaining lieutenants would be regulated on the same principle as the captains; while the senior ensign would be promoted to the vacant or eighth lieutenantancy in the new regiment, and the other ensigns obtained and transferred on a similar principle.

29. In this explanation, it is understood that vacancies in the old regiments occasioned by the augmentation are supposed to be filled up in reckoning the class to which an officer belongs. Thus a second captain who becomes first captain in his own regiment, by the promotion of the first to a majority, would be considered as belonging to the captains of the first class, while those below him would be reckoned as belonging to a class higher than that in which they stood at the commencement of the operation, for every removal that has taken place above them.

30. If the major of the new regiment had been senior, as captain, to the captains promoted to majorities in the old regiments, the senior of the two officers who remained first captains after those promotions would stand in a better situation in the new regiment as first captain than in the regiment to which he belonged, and would therefore be transferred, unless there were any officer in another regiment belonging to the class of second captains who was senior to him, and had therefore a preferable claim to removal. There would be a corresponding variation in the transfer of the junior officers in the case supposed, into the details of which it does not appear to be of importance to enter.

31. Sufficient, it is conceived, has now been stated to show the marked respect which in India is paid to seniority, in a case in which it might be supposed that the officers for a newly-raised regiment might be selected, either in subordination to the patronage of the Commander-in-chief, as in other armies, or in reference to some principle which would have

have determined the choice of a few officers, at least peculiarly qualified for the charge of men newly-raised; but this in India would be considered as an infraction of the established seniority regimental system; and in practice this strict observance of seniority, it is believed, has not been attended with any of the inconveniences that might be supposed likely to result, from a rule which left the selection of officers for the discharge of such important duty to a sort of chance, over which the Government could exercise no control.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

32. The only officer that could be appointed to a newly-raised regiment, on a principle of selection, would be the lieutenant-colonel, who is transferable from one regiment to another; and in a case of necessity, the colonels being generally at home, the Commander-in-chief could always select a commanding officer for a new regiment from all the lieutenant-colonels of that branch of the service (cavalry or infantry) then in India. It would also be competent to the Commander-in-chief to make any selection he might think proper from among the subalterns of the new regiment for the situation of adjutant and of quartermaster and interpreter.

33. Deviations have, indeed, on some occasions, been made in India from the method above described in regard to the selection of officers on a seniority system for the new regiments, but these, it is believed, except in one instance, in the formation of a cavalry regiment from the infantry at Bombay, have never had reference to any peculiar qualification of the officer for the duties of a newly-raised corps, but merely to avert a case of hardship, in respect to rank, by adhering too exclusively to one particular rule; and in some recent instances, some of the junior lieutenants and all the ensigns were re-posted, and had to change their corps, in order that some more fortunate individuals among them should not derive the full advantage to which their regimental standing and the seniority system of selection would otherwise have entitled them. These deviations have been objected to from home as inconsistent with the existing seniority regimental system, unjust towards the individuals who had obtained promotion under it, and productive of inconvenience, by causing a number of officers unnecessarily to change their corps on no ground whatever of public expediency; and it is to be hoped that it will not be repeated.

34. Officers being selected for a new regiment according to their army and not their regimental rank, it has happened that captains with a brevet commission superior to their regimental rank and senior in the line of captains, have been promoted into a majority in a new regiment, when, if the dates of their regimental commissions had been exclusively referred to, there were officers of longer regimental standing as captains who would have been entitled to the preference.

35. This is one of the cases in which the grant of the brevet rank of captain to subalterns of fifteen years' standing has been of advantage to individual officers of the Company's service belonging to regiments in which promotion has been unusually slow, by the promotion of a captain to a majority, under the circumstances above described, and by the advantage which the officers of the regiment under him gain by his removal.

36. Another advantage gained by the Company's officers by the introduction of this system as a rule of the service in January 1816, is the claim which it will eventually give to captains so circumstanced who have not attained to regimental majorities to be included in His Majesty's brevet, as the brevet captains of 1796 and 1798 were, by the operation of former brevets, so included. This, however, could not be accomplished without injury to the King's officers of the same standing, if the local rank of major were not to be conferred upon them in virtue of their brevet commission of captain, in the same manner as the subalterns of His Majesty's regiments in India, when of fifteen years' standing, are protected by a local commission of captain, to prevent their being superseded by a Company's officer junior to them as lieutenant.

37. Casualties known at head-quarters subsequently to the date of the augmentation, though of previous occurrence, are not taken into account in the selection of officers for a new regiment, who are chosen in reference to the army list, as it stood at the date of the augmentation,



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

augmentation, which corresponds with the date of commission given to the officers promoted by the augmentation. A different practice in this respect formerly prevailed, and casualties were taken into account, in the selection of officers, nearly up to the date on which the formation of the new regiments was published in general orders. The alteration of practice, in this particular, first adopted upon occasion of a Bengal augmentation of 16th December 1814, gave rise to some claims of rank, the adjustment of which was attended with difficulty; but the system now in force appears to be the preferable one, from the certainty by which the troublesome operation of an augmentation arrangement may be performed, without the risk of an extensive revision which the accidental occurrence of a single casualty of a date anterior to the augmentation, and not known at head-quarters when the general order announcing the augmentation was published, would occasion if it were to be taken into account.

38. From what has been stated, it will be evident that the reduction of a regiment, after it has been formed for any considerable length of time, would be a work of extreme delicacy and of considerable difficulty, from the impracticability of providing for the officers of a reduced regiment, on an equitable principle, by returning and distributing them among the officers of the regiments to be retained.

39. Let it be required, for instance, to return the officers of a regiment (E.), about to be reduced, and distribute them as supernumeraries among the regiments (A.), (B.), (C.), and (D.)\*

40. Now if the major of regiment (E.) were to be assigned to regiment (A.), or to either of the other regiments, say (D.), the major of which stands first for promotion, by the operation of the line step, the captains of the remaining regiments would gain an undue advantage over the captains of the regiment in which the major was seconded, inasmuch as the line step would have to travel through as many of the regiments as there were majors senior to the major thus seconded upon them, from which retardation in their promotion all the captains of the other regiments would escape unless a first captain of one of these regiments should be junior to the first captain of regiment (E.), and he be placed above him. There would then be two regiments in which all the captains would be depressed a regimental step by the introduction of a supernumerary major into one, and a senior first captain into the other, and two regiments in which the captains (at least those standing in the position of first captain) would escape from such depression. The second captain of one of these regiments, however, if junior to the second captain of the reduced regiment, still to be provided for, would lose a regimental step by his being placed above him; and if he were senior to him, the loss of the regimental step would fall upon the third captain of the regiment and the officers under him. In the other regiment the loss of a regimental step would fall upon the third or fourth captain, according as the third captain of the reduced regiment was senior or junior to the third captain of the regiment into which he was transferred.

41. Proceeding thus far, it is clear that the four regiments are very unequally affected by the transfer of the reduced officers in the manner above described. In one regiment all the captains and subalterns lose a regimental step by the introduction of a major; in the next it might happen that the same consequence would ensue if the first captain of the reduced regiment were the senior, but if he were the junior, the first captain would remain as he was, and the loss of the regimental step would devolve upon the second captain and his juniors. In the next regiment the first and second captains would escape, and the loss affect the third and fourth captains and their juniors, unless the third captain of the reduced regiment were junior to the third captain of the regiment into which he was transferred, in which case three captains of this regiment would escape the loss of a regimental step, and in the remaining regiment four captains would escape,  
and

and the rest of the officers suffer the loss of a step unless the fourth captain of the reduced regiment were senior to the fourth captain of the regiment into which he was transferred.

42. The Bengal infantry consisting of 76 regiments, the Madras of 54, and the Bombay of 28 regiments, it is evident that in providing for the 18 officers of a reduced regiment, from the major downwards (for the colonel and lieutenant-colonel could be absorbed by a non-promotion on the occurrence of a casualty in those ranks), at either of the Presidencies, there would be several regiments that would escape altogether the loss of a regimental step; and among the 18 regiments, into each of which a reduced officer was placed, the captains and subalterns of one or perhaps two regiments might sustain the loss of a regimental step, whereas, in the remainder, as many of the captains and subalterns as were senior to the reduced officer placed among them, would sustain no loss by his introduction, while it would fall exclusively on the officers of the regiment his junior. Among, therefore, the regiments into which a reduced officer was introduced, the loss of a regimental step to the officers his juniors would in some cases affect only the ensigns, or a proportion of them; in others, only the lieutenants and ensigns, or a proportion of them; while in others, the captains and subalterns would all be affected by the loss, except in the few instances in which the captains were the seniors of the reduced officers.

43. Supposing the number of regiments to be equal to the number of reduced officers to be provided for, the difficulty would still be great of selecting, without the suspicion of partiality, the particular regiments in which all the officers would suffer the loss of a regimental step, by the introduction of a reduced officer, and those in which they would suffer, and in very different degrees, such a loss; which difficulty would not be diminished, but rather increased, where the number of regiments were in excess of the reduced officers; for in this case there would be a number of regiments, precisely equal to that excess, which would sustain no inconvenience, or only so much inconvenience as was experienced by the other regiments, by the slight retardation in line promotion, occasioned by the absorption of the supernumerary colonel and lieutenant-colonel of the reduced regiment; and where the number of regiments were less than the reduced officers to be provided for, the difficulty and hardship upon the officers would be the greater, because in some and in as many regiments as the reduced officers were in excess of the regiments into which they were to be transferred, there would be regiments in which some of the officers would sustain a loss equal to two regimental steps, and in others only one.

44. The suspicion of partiality in the choice of corps into which to introduce the reduced officers might be avoided if it were to be declared beforehand, in a general order, that the reduced officers should be provided for in the regiments in which vacancies occurred by death in positions corresponding with the regimental position of the officers to be provided for, or superior to it, so as that no officer should stand lower than he did before the occurrence of the casualty, by the introduction of an officer above him. But this expedient, though it would exonerate the Government from the performance of a task of considerable difficulty and invidiousness if they had had to make the selection, would still leave the regiments as unequally affected by the operation as before, and the officers who were deprived of the benefit of a casualty, by the introduction of a reduced officer, would feel the hardship not to be the less, when they suffered in the precise degree in which the casualty was likely to have benefited them, and that there were regiments in which a casualty, known at head-quarters only a few days later, had benefited the officers of the regiment in which it had occurred, from its having happened or become known after the reduced officers had been provided for.

45. This difficulty, however, might be provided for, if the reduced officers were not to be transferred at all into other regiments for purposes of promotion, but retained in a corps by themselves, and promoted therein regimentally as if the reduction had not taken effect, until they were severally and successively absorbed by the operation of the line step, when the corps would become extinct, by the promotion of the last officer to a majority, and he would become a supernumerary of his rank until promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The officers of such corps might be employed either upon the staff or in doing duty with regiments,

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

regiments, in lieu of officers so employed, and part of the expense\* of retaining such a corps might be met by keeping vacant as many ensigncies during the progress of the reduction as were equal to the number of reduced officers unextinguished by the plan. The length of time occupied in the accomplishment of such a reduction, the junior of the reduced officers not attaining to his majority within a period much less than about twenty-five years, has been thought an objection, to its adoption as well as the mixing of officers together on regimental duty belonging to different regimental classes, and the consequent jealousies that might arise among them from cases of apparent supercession, when a junior officer of one class obtained promotion in his regiment before the senior officer of another class who was serving with him.

46. These difficulties, and a few others in the way of the adoption of this plan, into which it is not necessary for the present purpose to enter, are completely obviated by the plan which has been suggested by Colonel Salmond, of accomplishing a reduction by whole regiments (which in point of fact has never been attempted since the introduction of regimental promotion in 1796), by offering to as many officers as are equal to the officers to be reduced, and of the corresponding ranks to purchase their commissions at such a rate as shall be equivalent to their value, and thereby hold out an inducement to as many officers to retire from the service as would provide places for the reduced officers in other regiments, without detriment to the officers among whom their future promotion would proceed, if the reduced officers themselves should not be willing to avail themselves of the terms offered to their acceptance.

47. This plan, if successfully carried into effect, would remove one of the most serious objections which in practice has been experienced from the system of regimental promotion established in 1796. The equivalent to be offered to the officer of a reduced regiment, or of another regiment, willing to exchange with him, should be so fixed as to operate as an inducement to him to come into the arrangement; and if tried in the infantry in the first instance, where there are the largest proportion of officers to whom the option might be given, and in which, from the reduction that has taken place in the strength of corps, there is a favourable opportunity to reduce their numbers without diminishing from the strength of the army, if that should be deemed objectionable, the plan would meet with a chance of success precisely in proportion to the number of officers to whom the option would have to be given, contrasted with those who would be able to avail themselves of it, while the public interests would be proportionably benefited by the saving to be effected by the reduction of as many regiments as could conveniently be spared from the present expensive scale of establishment.

48. Another inconvenience which has resulted from the introduction of regimental promotion into the seniority service of the Company is the unequal operation, upon particular regiments, of the demand of officers for staff employ, and on account of officers absent in Europe on sick leave or furlough, the number of which in different regiments also varies very considerably, some regiments, having no officer absent from regimental duty on these accounts,

\* The expense of a reduced regiment, at the commencement of the plan, would be as follows:

											<i>Per Month.</i>
1 Major	...	at	...	...	780	rupees	per	month	...	...	780
5 Captains	...	at	...	...	411	—	—	—	...	...	2,055
8 Lieutenants	...	at	...	...	254	—	—	—	...	...	2,032
4 Ensigns	...	at	...	...	200	—	—	—	...	...	800
18 Officers to be reduced, the aggregate of whose allowances amount to...											Rs. 5,667

Saving, by the non-appointment of as many ensigns as there are reduced officers, during the progress of the reduction, which at the commencement would be 18 ensigns, at 200 rupees per month ... .. 3,600

Leaving a net expense, in the first instance, equal to ... .. Rs. 2,067

To be gradually reduced as the lieutenantcies and captaincies and majority of the reduced corps become extinct.

accounts, while in others the number withdrawn has been so great as to reduce materially the efficiency of the corps; notwithstanding, if the number of these absentees could have been equalized, there was a sufficiency of officers for regimental duty, had they been properly distributed.

49. To remedy this inconvenience the Court of Directors, in their orders of the 25th Nov. 1823, prescribed the adoption of a Regulation which required that a certain number of officers only should be taken from a regiment for staff employ; and in a subsequent order, the latitude of selection for these important situations was narrowed still further, by directing, as they did on the 3d December 1828, "that no regiment of cavalry or infantry shall have three officers withdrawn for detached employment until all regiments have two, nor four until all have three."

50. The objection to these restrictions is, that it has interfered in some instances with the selection, by the local Governments, of individuals, well calculated by previous training, for duties on which it might be desirable to employ them; but this might be obviated, and it seems desirable that it should, if no other method be resorted to, to obviate the difficulty, by empowering the local Governments to exercise a discretion in the case supposed, so as to retain the particular officer in the situation the public interests required, provided the grounds on which a deviation were made from the rule in each case were to be publicly recorded at the time.

51. It has been suggested that officers for the staff might be obtained without difficulty and detriment to the efficiency of regiments by the formation of as many skeleton corps (on the principle of an augmentation arrangement) as would produce as many officers, or nearly as many, as were required for staff employ, to be employed either upon the staff, or in supplying the place of officers withdrawn from other regiments for staff employ, the strength of the regiments being reduced in a corresponding proportion, the superfluous officers only or their equivalent, after such reduction, being thrown into as many skeleton corps as were requisite for the purpose.

52. The objections to this plan, independently of the expense which it would involve, are of a nature similar to those which have been just stated to that of retaining officers of a reduced regiment in a corps for promotion, and employing them upon the staff, or in the place of staff-absentees in a regiment; in addition to which it may be observed, that officers of these corps, when employed to do duty with a regiment, would derive no advantage from casualties in the corps in which they served when employed in field operations or at unhealthy stations. These considerations seem to offer serious objection against a plan which appears, in other respects, to adapt itself to the peculiarities of the service, from its interfering in no degree whatever with the established system of a seniority regimental promotion, and to be altogether free from every objection of a serious nature, with the exception of those which have been adverted to. The cases, indeed, of apparent supercession to which reference was made in connexion with the plan of retaining officers of a reduced regiment in a corps for promotion, might however, in many instances, be provided against, by requiring an officer, on his appointment to the staff, or as the condition of his retaining his appointment, to exchange into a skeleton corps with another officer the same number of removes from promotion as himself.

53. Another remedy which has been suggested for obtaining a more enlarged sphere of selection for staff and other employ is to strike off officers on the staff, or the civil staff only, from the strength of regiments, and to make a promotion in their room.

54. The objection to this plan is, that it interferes with the regularity of promotion, by giving to corps in which there are a large number of staff absentees an undue advantage in their promotion, compared with corps in which the staff absentees are fewer, or in which there are no officers on staff employ.

55. This would be particularly felt on the first introduction of such a plan, when the officers had been withdrawn by the local Government, without contemplating at the time the effect which their being struck off from the strength of their regiments would have upon

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

upon the officers below them succeeding to their vacancies; but this difficulty might in some degree be obviated, if promotions, on the introduction of such a plan, were to be equalized by a partial transfer of officers from regiments which had no staff absentees, into regiments which, from the number of staff officers upon their strength, would otherwise benefit beyond their fair proportion by the change of system. The local Government also, if such a plan were to be acted upon, would possess the means of preventing cases of very glaring supercession, by the mode in which they exercised their discretion of selection; but to a Company's officer, it is conceived that any arrangement which interfered, or was likely to interfere, seriously with the seniority promotion to which he has been accustomed, would not be acceptable, and the reasons should be weighty to justify or require the adoption of so important a change in so favourite a feature of the Indian system.

56. Upon the whole, then, it would seem that the Regulation at present in force, the tendency of which is to equalize the number of staff absentees from regiments, if modified in some such manner as has been suggested, by leaving it discretionary with the local Government to deviate from the rule in special cases, the grounds of which to be recorded at the time, seems to be well worth a further trial; since the other remedies which have been suggested to widen the sphere of selection for staff employ are not altogether free from difficulty, and might be attended with embarrassment.

57. There are two points connected with the seniority promotion of the Company's service which remain to be adverted to.

58. The one has reference to that provision in the Articles of War which empowers a court-martial to inflict loss of rank in instances justifying such a mode of punishment, which, however, could not be carried into effect in respect to a major of cavalry or infantry of the Company's service, without injury to the officers below him, whose promotion depends upon the position which the major of their regiment occupies upon the succession list for promotion. Thus, if major (*i*) of regiment (D.) were to be depressed below the seniority represented by major (*m*) of regiment (C.), the captain of regiment (D.), who stood first for promotion, would be superceded by the captains of regiments (B.), (A.), and (C.), who, but for such depression of major (*i*), could not have attained to a majority before him.\*

59. The case, it is believed, has never yet arisen in the Company's service; but should it ever become necessary to carry such a sentence into effect, the difficulty might perhaps be obviated in some such way as this: by the non-promotion of major (*i*), when his turn for a lieutenant-colonelcy had arrived, keeping him as a supernumerary and unposted major, until entitled to promotion according to the depressed position assigned to him on the succession list, and promoting the captain of regiment (D.) to the majority of the regiment, from the date at which major (*i*) became a supernumerary major, under the circumstances above adverted to. The lieutenant-colonelcy would, in this case, remain vacant until the major who had been depressed on the succession list became entitled to his promotion.

60. The other point relates to the succession to a regiment and share of off-reckonings in the Company's service. By the Regulations of 1796, the rank of colonel was conferred upon the Company's officers, independently of the operation of His Majesty's brevet. In 1806, however, the rule was altered, and Company's officers succeeding to regiments were merely designated lieutenant-colonels "commandant," unless previously, or until promoted to the rank of colonel by the operation of His Majesty's brevet. The rule was again altered in 1829, and the lieutenant-colonels commandant were made colonels on the 5th June of that year, officers subsequently succeeding to regiments taking rank as colonels from the date at which they succeeded to a regiment.

61. To prevent the King's officers from being superceded by the promotion of the Company's

\* See the scheme before referred to.

Company's officers, the King's lieutenant-colonels of the same standing in India had conferred upon them the local rank of colonel from the same date; and it was further arranged, that on the promotion of a lieutenant-colonel of the Company's service to a regiment, the King's lieutenant-colonels of the same standing should also obtain the local commission of colonel from the same date, so as that in no case should a King's lieutenant-colonel be superceded by the promotion of a Company's lieutenant-colonel of engineers, artillery, cavalry, or infantry, to a colonelcy.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cribell,  
6th August 1832.

62. Had there been but one line of promotion in the Company's service from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to colonel, no possible inconvenience could have accrued from the practice of granting the local commission of colonel to King's lieutenant-colonels senior to the lieutenant-colonels of the Company's service succeeding to regiments; but as the Company's officers are promoted in four distinct lines of engineers, artillery, cavalry, and infantry at each Presidency, it has happened that the promotion of a junior lieutenant-colonel of one of these lines to the rank of colonel, has occasioned the supercession of lieutenant-colonels of other lines, who are senior to lieutenant-colonels of His Majesty's service, on whom the local rank of colonel has been conferred under the operation of the rule just adverted to.

63. The Company's officers complain of this, and with apparent justice, as a serious hardship inflicted upon them; and it must be admitted that the rule in its present form, unless materially modified, is calculated to inflict in its consequences the same description of injury upon the Company's officers as it was designed to prevent the King's officer in any possible case from sustaining.

64. This subject having been referred home for consideration, and being still undecided, it would perhaps be premature to enter more at length into the question in this place.

65. A question might be raised whether the seniority regimental system of the Company's service be as beneficial to the public interests as a system of promotion, which would leave the Government less fettered in respect to the selection of its officers, and afford facilities to the introduction of officers of talent not past the age of activity into the higher situations of command, which, under the present system, is in a great measure regulated by the rule of seniority, although the commands of divisions of field forces and of stations are in a measure made by selection from among the officers who, by *seniority*, have attained to the rank which qualifies them to hold such appointments.

66. To this it might be answered, that, notwithstanding the apparent force of this objection, the seniority system has worked well; and, generally speaking, there has been no deficiency of able men among the Company's officers for the discharge of these important duties. For the command of a corps also, the Government have practically the means of exercising even a species of selection, from which, by the operation of the seniority regimental system, they seem to be in a great degree precluded, inasmuch as the major of the regiment, if a good officer, could be left in command of his corps, by posting to the regiment a lieutenant-colonel employed upon the staff, and therefore disqualified from taking the command; while the major, if unfit for the exercise of such a command, could be superceded by the act of posting to the regiment a lieutenant-colonel possessing the requisite qualities for such an important station; and even such of the colonels of regiments as are in India would be available for such a purpose, if the Regulation in force, which disqualifies a colonel in receipt of off-reckonings from drawing the command-money of his corps, did not operate to discourage many good officers of that rank from remaining in India, which they probably would do if they could receive command-money and off-reckonings at the same time; and by this means there would be a larger proportion of senior officers of the Company's service present with corps and entitled to exercise the higher commands on field service than there are at present.

67. The

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

67. The facility which is obtained of removing lieutenant-colonels from regiment to regiment, under the present system, which restricts the regimental rise to the rank of major, is considered as an argument against extending the regimental rise to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, as in His Majesty's service, and as was originally proposed for the Company's service in the orders of 8th January 1796.

68. On the other hand, there are those who think that the change would be beneficial, if officers were to rise regimentally to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, by its retaining officers in command of the corps, who from having always served with it are better acquainted with the men; while officers really unfit for the exercise of such an important command as that of a regiment might be provided for by a voluntary or even a compulsory transfer to the invalids, in case of necessity.

69. Another advantage supposed to be derived from making the rise regimental to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, is the facility which it would afford of correcting, in an unobjectionable way, one of the evils of the seniority system, which prevents officers from attaining to the important rank of lieutenant-colonel, except by travelling, as at present, through a long succession list of majors; whereas, if the rise were to be regimental to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, a chance casualty in his regiment in that rank could at once promote the major to the vacant lieutenant-colonelcy; and if the Regulation at present in force, which prevents an officer about to retire from the service from receiving a sum of money from the officers below him, who benefit by, and in consideration of, his retirement, were to be repealed, a great inducement would be held out to the older officers to retire from the service, who from age may be disqualified to exercise the active duties of their profession, and to the younger officers a still stronger inducement to economize their resources, in order to provide the means of a more rapid advancement to the higher ranks, by forming among themselves a regimental fund to buy off the older officers.

70. The great objection in the way of the adoption of this suggestion, is, the increase of expense which the additional retirements would occasion, and the difficulty of providing in this country the funds requisite for such payments from the home treasury; which latter impediment might be avoided, if officers so bought off were to receive their retiring pension through the channel of the Indian treasuries instead of the home treasury, and were to make their own remittances to England for this purpose; but such a condition, even if it were to be acceptable to the officers, which is doubtful, would probably weaken, proportionably, the tie by which the Company's officers are, under the existing provisions of the retiring Regulation, connected with this country.

71. It is not at all improbable, if the impediments which discourage Europeans from settling in India were to be removed, and officers were reduced to the necessity of receiving their retiring allowances in India, or suffering the loss they would sustain upon a remittance to England, that many would relinquish the idea of returning at all to their native country, and thus weaken in that degree the inducement held out by the retiring Regulation to the Indian officers to look to an eventual return to England as the ultimate and desirable termination of their services. Different opinions may be entertained as to the advantages or disadvantages of such a result; but it hitherto has been held to be a desirable object in the administration of India to strengthen, in every possible way, the ties which connect an Indian officer with his home in this country, and both the furlough and retiring Regulations, in the point of view thus presented, have been considered as particularly advantageous on this account, independently of the individual benefit which they confer upon the officers themselves; and the expenditure which they involve may, in this point of view, be regarded as more than compensated by the home attachments which they keep alive and serve to strengthen.

72. There are a few other deviations from the established seniority system of the service which have been suggested, to which it may be desirable to advert before the remarks in reference to the rank of the Company's officers are closed.

73. One

73. One is, that a proportion of the casualties, to the extent of one-sixth, should be at the disposal of the Government, in view to the promotion of deserving officers, and qualifying them for situations which their rank, if promoted according to the ordinary rules of the service, would not entitle them to hold. This would involve a more serious departure from the seniority system of the service than has ever been attempted, and if acted upon, should be so restricted, by requiring the qualifications for which an officer was selected for promotion in preference to his juniors to be stated upon the public records, and to render each appointment so made subject to eventual revision from home, and with any other checks that might appear calculated to secure the attainment of the object, in every instance, for which such a material departure from the established rules of the service was sanctioned.

74. It seems doubtful, however, whether a rule of the description referred to, however guarded it might be against the possibility of abuse, would be acceptable to the service generally; and it is not clear that a case has been made out to justify or require the adoption of so novel an expedient, when the object of securing the advancement of younger men into the higher ranks could be attained, in a less objectionable way, by allowing officers of corps to buy off their seniors, if willing to retire, on the terms tendered to their acceptance.

75. The same remark is not applicable to the suggestion which has been made, that officers of the King's and Company's service might be allowed to exchange their commissions, provided the former had been a sufficient time in India to be safely entrusted with the charge of Native troops, and the officers exchanging were nearly of the same age, so as not to afford ground of complaint to the junior officers, that a younger and better life was substituted for the one on which their promotion depended. In the case of a major, the King's officer transferred into a Company's regiment should be the senior of the officer with whom he exchanged, in order that he might take the place on the succession list vacated by the Company's officer (the King's officer, however still retaining his superior army rank), so as to prevent the injury which the officers of the regiment would otherwise sustain, if he were, by reason of his inferior rank, to take a lower place on the succession list than that by which their promotion was previously regulated.

76. Another suggestion which has been made is this, that casualties, when a corps is employed upon service, should be supplied only by a promotion from among the officers present, or on their way to join. A rule of this description would operate with some severity upon officers on furlough in this country, who left India at a time when the military operations upon which their regiment was employed could not have been foreseen, or who were obliged to come home for health, and they had not the option, like officers upon the staff of India, of taking their chance of promotion in common with the rest, or of relinquishing their staff employment; and if such a rule were to be acted upon, the case of an officer upon furlough should be provided for, at least to the extent of a reservation in favour of such officers, who, on hearing that their regiment was likely to be employed, hastened to rejoin it, if not compelled to remain by sickness.

77. The suggestion itself seems to be deserving of some consideration, as not involving any very material deviation from the established system, and to whatever extent the deviation is carried, the operation of the rule being in favour of a class of officers who, from their exposure to the chances of war, seem to have the preferable claim to whatever benefit it might confer upon them.

78. The only other suggestion to be noticed under this head is, that Native gentlemen should be appointed as officers to corps in common with Europeans.

79. This would not involve any necessary departure from the seniority promotion of the service; but the effect which such a deviation might have upon the minds of the present Native commissioned officers, who are junior to the ensigns, and even the cadets attached to corps, ought not to be overlooked; for it would probably be more galling to their feelings to see a *Native* preferred before them, than that European commissioned officers of the

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

the lowest grades should take the precedence of the highest commissioned grade at present conferred upon Native officers, since this has always been the practice of the Company's service.

80. If these remarks be just, it seems to follow that no very essential variation should be made in the existing system, without due consideration and a clear conception of the consequences likely to follow from a change that might appear to be desirable, but upon trial might be found ill-adapted to the peculiarities of the service. In point of fact, it is conceived, whether the local army of India be a King's or Company's army, the European commissioned officers must be appointed in the first instance as cadets, like as they are at present, and rise, by a regular system of rotation, to the higher ranks. The Company's military, unlike that of the British army, is meant as a provision for the officers in it, independently of their private resources, and to secure besides the means of an eventual comfortable retirement in this country, which, with their retiring pay, should be on a scale sufficiently liberal, so as to adapt itself in some measure to the style of living in which the officers in India, from the scale of their allowances, are generally able to afford. Any regulation which would deprive an officer of the certainty of rising to the higher, and indeed the highest, ranks to which the Indian officers are eligible, provided their health is spared to them and they conduct themselves well, would be disheartening in the extreme to the officers of a local army, cut off from the society and connexions in England, and be besides prejudicial to the public interests, from depriving the officers of a strong motive to exertion, and which, during the existence of the Company's army, has produced a class of men generally distinguished by their talents and ability, and a few eminent individuals, such as the late Sir Barry Close, Sir Thoms Munro, and Sir D. Ochterlony and others, of whom the country may justly boast.

81. Any other motives beyond the certainty which a Company's officer possesses of rising to distinction may be superadded to this essential stimulus to exertion, in a local army, with great advantage. The concession of the honours of the Bath, and of personal brevets, to the Company's officers, has been productive, it is believed, of the very best effects; and any additional honours conferred upon the service in this way would be decidedly advantageous to the Indian service.

82. The suggestion that has been made, that the commissions of the Company's general officers should not be local, but extend to all parts of the empire, and that the Company's officers should occasionally be appointed to the chief command, seems strongly to recommend itself for adoption on this ground; and indeed, whatever additional honours could with propriety be conceded to the Company's officers (in this way), would, it is conceived, be well bestowed, and the public service be thereby proportionably benefited.

#### *Promotion.*

83. Another very important consideration connected with the constitution of the Company's service is, the chances of promotion afforded to the officers by the scale of relative rank, by which the probabilities of a slower or quicker rise to the higher ranks is regulated.

84. When it became my duty, some years since, to investigate this subject, in connexion with some claims of rank arising out of a recent augmentation arrangement, I was much struck by the fact, that the Company's officers had derived very essential advantages in their promotion by the large antecedent augmentations, connected as it was with another, brought into notice about the same time, that complaints were notwithstanding made of the slow progress of promotion; and the fact was so far admitted, that to relieve the subalterns of the service, the brevet rank of captain had been conferred upon all the unpromoted subalterns of fifteen years' standing and upwards.

85. It therefore appeared to me to be an object of some importance to ascertain at what rate promotion had travelled when unaided by an augmentation of the army.

86. With this view the commissions of a variety of officers in each rank were compared  
with

with those which they respectively held in the next inferior rank, and to avoid any disturbing effect from augmentations, the period selected for the comparison of these commissions was between 1804 and 1814, when no augmentation was made to the army.

87. In those ranks which occupied a longer period than ten years for promotion it was practicable to check the calculation by commissions of Madras officers, in which army there had been no increase between 1804 and 1818, and where this resource failed, other means were adopted of making the nearest approximation to the truth. The details of this calculation are given in a separate paper.

88. By this calculation\* it appeared that the average rise from—

Ensign to Lieutenant was	...	...	...	...	6 years
Ditto to Captain	...	...	...	...	21 —
Ditto to Major	...	...	...	...	33 —
Ditto to Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	39 —
Ditto to Colonel	...	...	...	...	52 —

By means of these data, the rate of casualties as they affect the rise of an officer during his progress through the service was found to be as follows. During the rise of an officer to the rank of major, the casualty rate varied four different times, and at equal periods.

89. During the first of these periods the casualties affecting the rise of an officer were at the rate annually of four per cent., or 1-25th; during the second period five per cent., or 1-20th; during the third period six per cent., or 1-17th; and during the fourth period seven per cent., or 1-14th. From the rank of major to colonel the casualties were eight per cent., or about 1-13th annually.† A calculation according to these rates differs from the preceding one only one year in the entire period, and may therefore safely be taken as an indication of the rate of casualties among the officers, from death, resignation, dismissal, or retirement, or any other cause which may have occasioned vacancies in corps during the period from which the comparison of commissions was made.

90. The preceding calculation, however, may be considered as liable to one exception. It indicates no more than the rates at which promotion would proceed after as large augmentations to the army as those which were made between 1796 and 1804, during which interval the infantry of the three Presidencies was nearly doubled. The natural consequence of such a state of circumstances was, that the officers of each rank (during the period which succeeded those augmentations) stood relatively higher in the service, than that to which they would otherwise have attained, and the average of ages in each rank was consequently

\* Promotion, from a comparison of commissions :

Ensign to Lieutenant	..	..	..	..	6 years.
Lieutenant to Captain	..	..	..	..	15 —
Captain to Major	..	..	..	..	12 —
Major to Lieut.-colonel	..	..	..	..	6 —
Lieut.-colonel to Colonel	..	..	..	..	13 —
					52

† Promotion, according to casualties, at various rates, from 4 to 8 per cent :

Ensign to Lieutenant	..	..	..	..	6 years.
Lieutenant to Captain	..	..	..	..	15 —
Captain to Major	..	..	..	..	12 —
Major to Lieut.-colonel	..	..	..	..	6 —
Lieut.-colonel to Colonel	..	..	..	..	12 —
					51
Ensign to Captain	..	..	..	..	21 years.
Ditto to Major	..	..	..	..	33 —
Ditto to Lieut.-colonel	..	..	..	..	39 —
Ditto to Colonel	..	..	..	..	51 —

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

consequently lower than it should be in a calculation intended to illustrate the progress of promotion when unaffected by augmentations. This consideration suggested the following correction in the calculation. The ensigns were supposed to be affected by casualties annually at the rate of five\* per cent., or 1-20th, instead of four per cent.; the lieutenant and captains during one-third of their rise to a majority, by casualties, at the rate of six per cent., or 1-17th; during the second-third at seven per cent., or 1-14th; and during the remaining third at seven and a-half per cent., or 1-13th; and the field officers at eight per cent., or 1-12th. The result even of this correction exhibited no more than a saving of about three years in the rise of an officer from ensign to lieutenant-colonel and colonel, and of two years in the rise to captain and major.†

91. The data thus obtained supplied a ready means of ascertaining with tolerable accuracy, if not with absolute certainty, the comparative advantage or disadvantage of any proposed scale of establishment; and a consideration of the slowness of promotion, exhibited by the preceding calculations, had considerable weight in the determination which was adopted in favour of the arrangement directed by the Court's orders of 25th November 1823.

92. Two modes of accomplishing this relief were suggested. The one on the plan of forming about as many skeleton corps as would have provided for the superfluous officers of regiments, by reducing the number of lieutenants per regiment from twenty-two to fourteen, and of ensigns from ten to six, or a reduction altogether of twelve officers per regiment.‡ The officers transferred into these skeleton corps were intended to be employed upon the staff, or to supply the places of officers so employed, and thereby to equalize the number of officers available for regimental duty with each corps in the service.

93. The other, which is the plan that was carried into effect by the Court's orders of 25th November 1823, was to divide the regiments of two battalions each, into regiments of single battalions, giving a colonel to each single battalion regiment, with an additional captain, one lieutenant per regiment being reduced, so as to retain accurately the same number of officers in the rank of captain and subaltern as before.§

94. Tho

\* It appears that the casualties actually operating upon the service between 1813 and 1830 were, upon an average, at the rate of 5·075 per cent. annually.

† Promotion, according to the corrected rate of casualties :

Ensign to Lieutenant .. .. .	5 years.	Ensign to Captain .. .. .	19 years.
Lieutenant to Captain .. .. .	14 —	Ditto to Major .. .. .	31 —
Captain to Major .. .. .	12 —	Ditto to Lieut.-colonel .. .. .	36 —
Major to Lieut.-colonel .. .. .	5 —	Ditto to Colonel .. .. .	48 —
Lieut.-colonel to colonel .. .. .	12 —		
	48		

‡ European commissioned officers to a regiment of two battalions, according to the arrangement—

	In force.	As proposed.
Colonel .. .. .	1	1
Lieutenant-colonels .. .. .	2	2
Majors .. .. .	2	2
Captains .. .. .	8	8
Lieutenants .. .. .	22	14
Ensigns .. .. .	10	6
	45	33

§ Establishment of officers for a regiment of—Two Battalions. One Battalion.

Colonel .. .. .	1	1
Lieutenant-colonels .. .. .	2	1
Majors .. .. .	2	1
Captains .. .. .	8	5
Lieutenants .. .. .	22	10
Ensigns .. .. .	10	5
	45	23

94. The manner in which promotion would have been permanently affected, according to the two schemes, was found to be as follows.\* The plan of skeleton corps would have had the advantage of a quicker rise by two years to the rank of captain and major. In the rank of lieutenant-colonel the rise would have been the same according to either scheme, but the plan actually adopted gave a quicker rise by four years to the rank of colonel, and, compared with the scheme then in force, the acceleration altogether in the rise to the rank of colonel was six years.

95. From this it will appear that the advantage in respect to promotion was decidedly in favour of the plan adopted, independently of the objections already referred to, which appeared to oppose the adoption of the skeleton arrangement; and the arrangement in the point of view here presented must be considered as of a character most beneficial to the service, and calculated to afford that degree of relief to promotion which could not be anticipated from future augmentations, and to put the service on a very improved footing.

96. Since the orders of the 25th November 1823, a further improvement has been effected, in the promotion of the service in regard to future appointments, by a reduction to the extent of two lieutenants and one ensign, cornet, or second lieutenant per regiment, ordered by the Court on the 3d December 1828. The result, according to the calculation below,† may be expected to accomplish an acceleration in the rise to each rank, from that of captain upwards, to the extent of about two years.

97. These calculations appear conclusively to show that the advocates of an increased number of European commissioned officers with Native corps lose sight of the effect which such an increase as has been proposed in the lower ranks would have upon promotion, although the officers now in the service would benefit by the change if the captains and lieutenants

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

* Promotion, according to the .. .. .	System in force previously to the Order of 25th Nov. 1823.	By the Court's Orders of 25th Nov. 1823.	By the Plan of Skeleton Corps.
Ensign to Lieutenant .. .. .	5	5	4
Lieutenant to Captain .. .. .	11	12	11
Captain to Major .. .. .	12	12	12
Major to Lieut.-colonel .. .. .	5	4	6
Lieut.-colonel to Colonel .. .. .	12	9	13
	48	42	46
Ensign to Captain .. .. .	19	17	15
Ditto to Major .. .. .	31	29	27
Ditto to Lieut.-colonel .. .. .	36	33	33
Ditto to Colonel .. .. .	48	42	46

† Promotion according to the Orders of—

	25th Nov. 1823.	3d Dec. 1828.
Ensign to Lieutenant .	5 years.	4 years.
Lieutenant to Captain .	12 —	11 —
Captain to Major .	12 —	12 —
Major to Lieut.-colonel .	4 —	4 —
Lieut.-colonel to Colonel	9 —	9 —
	42	40
Ensign to Captain	17 years.	15 years.
Ditto to Major ..	29 —	27 —
Ditto to Lieut.-colonel	33 —	31 —
Ditto to Colonel	42 —	40 —

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

lieutenants were to be increased ; but the prospects of those hereafter entering the service would be proportionably deteriorated, if such an increase were to be made to the lower ranks without a corresponding increase in the higher ranks ; and as the resources of India are not more than equal, and, indeed, are scarcely equal, to the burthen of the existing establishment, it is clear that any increase to be made to the number of officers of corps could only be made, if made at all, in the most economical form, by an addition to the lower ranks, which, to the extent to which such addition was carried, would deteriorate in a proportionate degree the prospects of those hereafter entering the service.

98. The officers who are, or have been, supernumeraries of their rank by the reductions ordered on the 3d December 1828, will be more than compensated by the loss of allowance which they sustain, from being restricted to the allowances of cadet, while serving as acting ensigns, cornets, or second lieutenants, instead of the full allowances of those ranks, by the comparatively quicker rise which intermediately will have taken place, by the reduction in the number of lieutenants in the manner before adverted to.

99. These remarks have reference to the supposition that an increase of officers with Native corps is required, which is a point by no means established. Considering that, besides the European commissioned officer with each troop or company, there are two Native commissioned officers (a subadar and jemadar), the service would appear to be sufficiently well provided for by an establishment to that extent, without any further European agency ; and when to this is added the financial considerations which oppose an increase of expense, as well as the eventual effect upon promotion, by an addition to the lower, without an increase to the higher ranks, it does seem that the existing establishment is sufficiently ample, and that an increase in the number of European officers does not appear to be necessary or desirable. It was the opinion of the late Sir Thomas Munro, that an establishment which would allow of the presence of one European officer with each troop or company is amply sufficient, and the present authorised establishment, if the number of staff absentees from corps be equalized, as will eventually be the case under the operation of the Court's restrictive Regulation, will be more than sufficient to provide for the presence of a proper number of regimental officers for that purpose.

100. Indeed in reference to the present state of the finances, and the prospective improvement which it would accomplish in respect to the promotion of officers hereafter entering the service, it may be doubted whether the reduction in the rank of subaltern might not be carried still further ; but if this be not attempted, a very considerable saving might be effected by a reduction in the number of regiments, on the plan suggested by Colonel Salmond, without any detriment whatever to the eventual promotion of the officers, while the existing numerical amount of sepoy, which it appears does not admit of further reduction, could be provided for by a proportionate addition to the strength of troops or companies in the regiments retained.

#### *Pay and Allowances.*

101. Another peculiarity in the Company's service relates to the pay and allowances of the European commissioned officers, a reference to which will serve to illustrate some questions which have an important bearing upon the constitution of the service.

102. They consist altogether of six distinct items. 1st, Pay ; 2d, Gratuity ; 3d, Tent Allowance ; 4th, House Rent ; 5th, Horse Allowance ; and 6th, Batta. The 1st, 2d, 4th, and one-half of the 6th of these items may be regarded in the light of what may properly be termed the income of the officer, and the 3d, 5th, and the remaining portion of the 6th item, partake rather of the nature of a contract, the officer in receipt of which is to provide himself with the necessary equipments, the expense of which, or when marching or in the field, the allowances last mentioned are intended to meet.

103. Of the former class of allowances, it may be observed, that the pay is according to the rates which were in force in His Majesty's service, when the army arrangement of 1796 was

was carried into effect, converted into rupees. The allowances specified below\* are for a month of thirty days, excepting those for a captain and subaltern of engineers and artillery, and those of horse artillery and cavalry, which are the same for any month.

104. "Gratuity" is an allowance peculiar to the rank of captain and subaltern, at the rate of thirty-six rupees per month to the former, twenty-four rupees to a lieutenant, and twelve rupees per month to a cornet, ensign, or second lieutenant. It was granted by the Court of Directors, and carried into effect by a Minute of Council, dated as far back as the 5th August 1779.

105. "House Rent," according to the rates specified in the Table,† is a new allowance adopted by the Court in the Pay Table which accompanied their orders of the 8th November 1814, but which Table was not carried into effect until the year 1824. House rent is drawn only by officers when in receipt only of that portion of their batta which is properly considered as belonging to their income, and the condition accordingly specified in the Table to the receipt of this allowance is, that an officer is "only in receipt of half batta and not provided with quarters."

106. The portion of the batta allowance, appropriated to an officer's income, or as it is commonly termed, "half batta,"‡ was an allowance made general throughout the service by the army arrangement of 1796. The Bengal officers had been in receipt of this allowance antecedently to this period at the stations in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, below Allahabad, and at stations, then beyond the frontier, they were on full batta; but the officers of Madras and Bombay previously to 1796 only drew batta when marching or in the field.§

107. It

* Monthly Pay of the undermentioned Officers of ... ..	Infantry.	Engineers and Artillery.	Horse Artillery and Cavalry.
Colonel ... .. Rs.	300	300	397 8 0
Lieut.-colonel ... ..	240	240	278 4 0
Major ... ..	180	180	232 13 4
Captain ... ..	120	110	179 6 4
Lieutenant ... ..	60	70	109 8 0
Ensign, Cornet, or Second Lieutenant ... ..	48	60	97 5 4

† House rent of a Lieutenant-colonel ... .. Rs. 100 per month.	
Major ... ..	80
Captain ... ..	50
Lieutenant ... ..	30
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieutenant ... ..	25

‡ Half batta of a Lieutenant-colonel ... .. Rs. 300 per month.	
Major ... ..	225
Captain ... ..	90
Lieutenant ... ..	60
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieutenant ... ..	45

Officers of the rank of Colonel are in receipt of "full batta," or Rs. 750 per month, "at any station."

### § Income of each Rank, exclusive of Pay.

	Gratuity.	House Rent.	Half Batta.	TOTAL.
Colonel ... .. Rs.	—	—	750	750
Lieutenant-colonel ... ..	—	100	300	400
Major ... ..	—	80	225	305
Captain ... ..	36	50	90	176
Lieutenant ... ..	24	30	60	114
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieutenant ... ..	12	25	45	82

(Note continued.)

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

107. It follows from this that what may properly be termed the ordinary monthly income of an Indian officer, is as follows :

						Infantry.	Engineers and Artillery.	Horse Artillery and Cavalry.
Colonel	...	...	...	...	...	1050	1050	1147 8 0
Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	...	640	640	678 4 0
Major	...	...	...	...	...	485	485	537 13 4
Captain	...	...	...	...	...	296	316	355 6 4
Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	174	184	223 8 0
Ensign, Cornet, or Second Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	130	142	179 5 4

108. Of the remaining allowances, or those out of which the officer is intended to provide himself with certain articles of equipment, or to defray the extra expenses incident to marching or in the field, it may be observed, in respect to the "tent allowance,"\* that it

15

#### Ordinary Income (per Month) of an Officer, Pay included.

(Note continued.)

						PAY.	Gratuity, House Rent, and Half Batta.	TOTAL.
Infantry :								
Colonel	...	...	...	...	Rs.	300	750	1050
Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	...	240	400	640
Major	...	...	...	...	...	180	305	485
Captain	...	...	...	...	...	120	176	296
Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	60	114	174
Ensign	...	...	...	...	...	48	82	130
Engineers and Artillery :								
Colonel	...	...	...	...	...	300	750	1050
Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	...	240	400	640
Major	...	...	...	...	...	180	305	485
Captain	...	...	...	...	...	140	176	316
Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	70	114	184
Second Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	60	82	142
Horse Artillery and Cavalry :								
Colonel	...	...	...	...	...	397 8 0	750	1147 8 0
Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	...	278 4 0	400	678 4 0
Major	...	...	...	...	...	232 13 4	305	537 13 4
Captain	...	...	...	...	...	179 6 4	176	355 6 4
Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	109 8 0	114	223 8 0
Cornet or Second Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	97 5 4	82	179 5 4

#### \* Tent Allowance (per Month) of Officers of—

						European Corps.			Native Corps.		
Colonel	...	...	...	...	Rs.	100	0	0	200		
Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	...	75	0	0	150		
Major	...	...	...	...	...	60	0	0	120		
Captain	...	...	...	...	...	37	8	0	75		
Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	25	0	0	50		
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	25	0	0	50		

is meant to cover the expences of an officer incident to the provision and carriage of camp equipage. The officers of European corps are, however, only in receipt of half tent allowance, except at remote stations, where they are liable to be called upon suddenly to move, and have therefore to provide themselves with the means of carriage for, as well as with, a tent. Officers of Native corps being always liable to move on a sudden emergency, are or should be constantly provided with a tent and the means of conveyance, and are consequently in the receipt of full tentage or tent allowance.

109. Horse allowance\* is an allowance peculiar to officers of mounted corps, and to field officers of other corps, while in the actual performance of regimental duty. Officers, however, of inferior rank, when actually in command of corps, and adjutants of corps, are permitted to draw horse allowance, the sum of thirty rupees per month being considered as equivalent to the expense of maintaining one horse; field officers of mounted corps are in receipt of an allowance equivalent to the maintenance of four horses; captains the equivalent for three; and subalterns for two horses. Field officers in the performance of regimental duty, and officers of inferior rank in the command of dismounted corps, receive an allowance equivalent to the maintenance of a single horse.

110. That portion of the allowance denominated "batta," which is intended to defray the expences of officers incident to marching or in the field, is denominated "extra batta,"† and is equivalent to half batta, of which officers in garrison or cantonment are in receipt. In the table, therefore, of regimental allowances, the "half" and "extra" batta are drawn under one head, of "full batta."

111. The following, then, are the aggregate monthly regimental allowances of which the European commissioned officers are in receipt when in garrison or cantonment, or when marching

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

\* Horse Allowance (per month) to Officers of—

									Mounted Corps.	Dismounted Corps.
									Rupees.	Rupees.
Colonel	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	120	30
Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	120	30
Major	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	120	30
Captain	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	90	—
Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	60	—
Cornet	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	60	—

† "Extra" Batta, intended to cover the expence incurred by Officers when marching or in the field.

Colonel	...	...	...	...	...	(a) Rs. — per month.
Lieutenant-colonel	...	...	...	...	...	300 —
Major	...	...	...	...	...	225 —
Captain	...	...	...	...	...	90 —
Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	60 —
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieutenant	...	...	...	...	...	45 —

(a) Colonels drawing "full batta," at any station, receive no additional allowance under this head when they take the field.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

marching or in the field,\* obtained from the particulars before enumerated, and which will be found to correspond with the results stated in the pay-table.

IN

\* ANALYSIS of the Garrison or Cantonment Allowances, from the preceding enumeration.

	Ordinary Income.	Tent Allowance.	Horse Allowance.	TOTAL.
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
<b>INFANTRY:</b>				
<b>European:</b>				
Colonel ... ..	1050 0 0	100 0 0	30 0 0	1180 0 0
Lieutenant-colonel ... ..	640 0 0	75 0 0	30 0 0	745 0 0
Major ... ..	485 0 0	60 0 0	30 0 0	575 0 0
Captain ... ..	296 0 0	37 8 0	—	333 8 0
Lieutenant ... ..	171 0 0	25 0 0	—	199 0 0
Ensign ... ..	130 0 0	25 0 0	—	155 0 0
<b>Native:</b>				
Colonel ... ..	1050 0 0	200 0 0	30 0 0	1280 0 0
Lieutenant-colonel ... ..	640 0 0	150 0 0	30 0 0	820 0 0
Major ... ..	485 0 0	120 0 0	30 0 0	635 0 0
Captain ... ..	296 0 0	75 0 0	—	371 0 0
Lieutenant ... ..	174 0 0	50 0 0	—	224 0 0
Ensign ... ..	130 0 0	50 0 0	—	180 0 0
<b>ENGINEERS AND ARTILLERY:</b>				
Colonel ... ..	1050 0 0	100 0 0	30 0 0	1180 0 0
Lieutenant-colonel ... ..	640 0 0	75 0 0	30 0 0	745 0 0
Major ... ..	485 0 0	60 0 0	30 0 0	575 0 0
Captain ... ..	316 0 0	37 8 0	—	353 8 0
Lieutenant ... ..	181 0 0	25 0 0	—	209 0 0
Second Lieutenant ... ..	142 0 0	25 0 0	—	167 0 0
<b>HORSE ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY:</b>				
Colonel ... ..	1147 8 0	200 0 0	120 0 0	1467 8 0
Lieutenant-colonel ... ..	678 4 0	150 0 0	120 0 0	948 4 0
Major ... ..	537 13 4	120 0 0	120 0 0	777 13 4
Captain ... ..	355 6 4	75 0 0	90 0 0	520 6 4
Lieutenant ... ..	223 8 0	50 0 0	60 0 0	333 8 0
Cornet or Second Lieutenant ... ..	179 5 4	50 0 0	60 0 0	289 5 4

*Note.*—The field allowances being obtained by the addition of extra or “half batta,” to the preceding totals, after the deduction of house rent, which is not drawn with full batta, it seems unnecessary to carry the illustration to any further extent, than to specify the existing differences between garrison and field allowances, which are as follows. This remark, however, applies only to the officers of Native corps on full tentage; with the officers of European corps that difference is increased by the amount of half tentage.

	Extra Batta.	House Rent.	Difference between Garrison & Field Allowances of Native Corps.	Half Tentage.	Difference between the Garrison & Field Allowances of European Corps.
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
Colonel ... ..	—	—	—	100 0 0	100 0 0
Lieutenant-colonel ... ..	300	100	200	75 0 0	275 0 0
Major ... ..	225	80	145	60 0 0	205 0 0
Captain ... ..	90	50	40	37 8 0	77 8 0
Lieutenant ... ..	60	30	30	25 0 0	55 0 0
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieut.	45	25	20	25 0 0	45 0 0

## IN GARRISON OR CANTONMENT.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(25.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

	INFANTRY.		ENGINEERS and ARTILLERY.	HORSE ARTILLERY and CAVALRY.
	European.	Native.		
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
Colonel .. .. .	1180 0 0	1280	1180 0 0	1467 8 0
Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	745 0 0	820	745 0 0	948 1 0
Major .. .. .	575 0 0	635	575 0 0	777 13 4
Captain .. .. .	333 8 0	371	353 8 0	520 0 4
Lieutenant .. .. .	199 0 0	224	209 0 0	333 8 0
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieutenant	155 0 0	180	107 0 0	289 5 4

## MARCHING OR IN THE FIELD.

	INFANTRY.	ENGINEERS and ARTILLERY.	HORSE ARTILLERY and CAVALRY.
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
Colonel .. .. .	1280	1280	1467 8 0
Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	1020	1020	1148 4 0
Major .. .. .	780	780	922 13 4
Captain .. .. .	411	431	560 0 4
Lieutenant .. .. .	254	264	363 8 0
Cornet, Ensign, or Second Lieutenant	200	212	300 5 4

112. The preceding enumeration of particulars, whilst it illustrates the present complicated nature of the system of Indian military finance, would seem to supply a strong argument, if not for concentrating the garrison and field allowances respectively into one sum (or as the Marquis Cornwallis suggested in 1794, having only two columns of charge, "British pay" and "India pay," the latter being the aggregate of the allowances before enumerated, exclusive of the pay), at least for discontinuing the enumeration of the six items of which they are composed, in as many separate columns, in the books of military establishments annually received from India, so as to limit the columns of entry for the regimental allowances of officers employed with their corps to one or two columns, according as it might be determined to enter the allowances in the aggregate, or to distinguish them as British or India pay.

113. Another convenient and less complicated division of the allowances than obtains at present would be to distinguish them, as they have here been analyzed, into those which properly belong to the income of the officer, and those which partake of the nature of a contract, or are intended to cover the extra expences of the field. On this plan the pay, gratuity, house rent, when not in garrison, and half batta, would form the aggregate of one column, and the tent allowance and horse allowance, when in garrison or cantonment, the other column; and if in the field, the second column would consist of the aggregate of the two last mentioned allowances, with the addition of extra batta.

114. The advantage of this division of allowances appears to be that each column would convey a clearer idea to the mind of the purpose for which each description of allowance is drawn than is apparent from the present mode.

115. The

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

115. The existing system of India military finance might, it is conceived, be further simplified if the items of allowance to be entered into these two columns were to be according to a daily instead of a monthly rate, like the pay-tables in use in His Majesty's service, which would greatly facilitate the calculation of allowances for broken periods, by the possession of the initial sum in a whole number. The daily rate might be made to approximate, as nearly as practicable, to the existing standard; the difference in the aggregate being given in favour of the officer when the fraction exceeds the half of a rupee, and when below that value in favour of the public. The tables published by the Madras Government, by which officers draw their allowances, are so framed as to show the sums to be drawn respectively for a month of twenty-eight, twenty-nine, thirty, and thirty-one days, which would be altogether superceded if the allowances were to be fixed at a daily rate, the sum due for each month being easily ascertained, according to the number of days of which it consists.

116. The preceding remarks have been addressed rather to the theory of the Indian allowances, as deduced from the regimental pay-table of the European commissioned officers, than to the existing usage of the service. In practice an important modification exists at the Bengal Presidency in regard to the allowance of batta, the officers of that Presidency, until lately, being generally in receipt of "full batta," though actually serving with a corps in cantonment; and according to the pay-table, they should draw no higher allowance than half batta, with house rent. There are also a few of the corps of the Madras and Bombay armies at field stations beyond the frontier, the officers of which are also in receipt of full batta. The proportion of full batta stations, however, is still greatly in favour of Bengal, notwithstanding the order which has lately been carried into effect of reducing certain stations in the Lower Provinces of Bengal from full batta to half batta, with house rent.

117. It will be seen by this, that, excepting at the stations just adverted to, the officers of Bengal are in receipt of the same allowances in cantonments as when marching or in the field, and consequently, that when employed upon service they are in receipt of no extra allowance to meet the expence incident to field operations. This has generally been considered as a serious defect in the system of the Indian service, but it is believed that in practice it is not attended with all the inconveniences that might at first be supposed to result from it. Officers of Native corps, being constantly liable to move, are generally supposed to be provided with camp equipage and the means of conveying it, and in European corps the additional tentage, when they take the field, comes in aid of the expence incident thereto; but after all these admissions there is still reason to fear that officers, generally in receipt of equal allowances in peace and in war, lay by little or none of the extra allowance received during the former period to meet the expences to which they will infallibly be exposed when suddenly called upon to engage in military operations.

118. These considerations seem strongly to suggest the propriety and advantage of revising the existing system, in the particular above referred to, provided that the interests of officers at present in service, who would be injuriously affected by the change, could be attended to and properly secured.

119. In favour of an increase to the command allowance of a corps, it may be observed, that the situation is one of great importance to the well-being of the Company's army, and that there is reason to believe the appointment is not so lucrative as it was formerly, when commanding officers were remunerated by indirect sources of emolument, such as short men, or men short of the complement of the authorized establishment, whose allowances were drawn by, and were a source of emolument to, the commanding officer, regimental bazaars and the tent contract, of which they have been deprived. The situation, besides, of a commanding officer is one to which an officer, who conducts himself well and properly discharges the duty of his profession, may with confidence aspire, although he may not possess the influence to procure profitable employment on the staff in the earlier stage of his career. In this point of view it may be regarded as the prize to which a regimental officer may look as the eventual reward of meritorious conduct in the discharge

discharge of his professional duties, and in proportion to the value of the appointment will be the stimulus afforded to an officer's exertions to deserve it, if the rules were somewhat more strict than they are at present, to transfer to the invalids, officers no longer able to discharge the active duties of their profession in such an important station with efficiency.

120. Another reason why the command of a corps should be considered as one of the prizes to which a regimental officer should aspire, next to that of the command of a division or station (which latter appointments, however, are made more by selection than succession, though seniority has an important influence in favour of a candidate even for these latter appointments), is, that the allowances of the inferior rank are generally upon a scale not more than is equivalent to the support of the style of living in the society in which a regimental officer from his earliest career is expected to mix, and consequently the possession of a good command allowance when he attains to the rank of field officer, would, in addition to the increased consideration which it would confer upon him in the eyes of those who are placed under him, supply him with the means of providing for an eventual comfortable retirement in this country, if that should be his object; or if his health allowed of his aspiring to the further reward of a colonelcy and off-reckonings, and eventual promotion to the rank of general officer, a respectable command allowance would prove an important aid in supplying him with the means of accumulating a property for his maintenance in a style suited to the possession of such advanced rank and employment.

121. It may further be observed in regard to the allowances of European commissioned officers generally, and the bearing which they have upon this part of the question, that at whatever scale the allowances of a junior officer are fixed, his style of living will be generally in that proportion, and that little is saved by an officer in the earlier part of his career, either towards the expence of a furlough to this country, or to provide for the means of an eventual comfortable retirement. Hence it is found that the Bengal officers, from being generally in receipt of full batta, adopt a style of living to which the officers of the Madras and Bombay establishments do not aspire, and there is reason to believe that the Bengal officers generally, notwithstanding their superior allowances, are more embarrassed in their circumstances than those of the other Presidencies. It has been remarked that the retirements from the Madras army are proportionably larger than those of Bengal, which may perhaps be partly attributed to the superior habits of economy engendered by a comparatively smaller scale of allowance, while the increased allowances to which they eventually succeed, on attaining to the command of a corps, turn to a better account in the way of an eventual provision (though not even then equal to the Bengal allowances), than the superior allowances of the Presidency, from which the retirements are proportionably smaller.

122. On these grounds the true principle which should govern any eventual modification in the allowances of the European commissioned officers, would seem to be, to limit those in the lower grades of the service to a sum which is not more than equal to meet the proper expences of an officer during his earlier career, and to pay the senior officers liberally, especially those entrusted with the important duties of command, who, by succeeding to the higher emoluments of the service at a time of life when a man begins to look about him, and to feel the importance of a provision for himself and family, would turn the liberality of Government to the best possible account, and, when provided with a competency, would be able to make way in his turn for the rising officers of his regiment, as his predecessors had before made way for him.

123. In this point of view, it is conceived that no better expedient could be devised to encourage the formation of economical habits among the officers than such a one as has been suggested, of allowing the officers of a regiment to buy off such of their seniors as are willing to retire, and upon whom their promotion is made to depend; and the money expended in this way by an officer, when he comes himself to retire, would be more than repaid to him by the superior allowances of which he has antecedently been in receipt.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

124. The

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

124. The finances of India not being in a condition to allow of any considerable outlay to effect the desired improvement in the situation of a commanding officer, it remains to be considered in what way the expence of such an alteration could be met. If the reasons which have already been stated why a smaller establishment of European commissioned officers with corps would prove adequate to the duties which devolve upon them, are deemed to be satisfactory, the obvious course for meeting the expence of improving the command allowance of a corps would be to make a proportionate reduction in the establishment to meet that additional expence. If the command allowance of rupees 400 per month were to be increased to 600 rupees, the reduction of the fifth captain would more than cover this increased charge; but as this would materially retard promotion to that important rank, and officers of the rank of captain are much wanted for staff and other employ, it is conceived that the reduction of a lieutenant and cornet, ensign, or second lieutenant per regiment, whose allowances are together more than equal to that of captain, would be the preferable course; while the existing cornets, ensigns, or second lieutenants might be saved from further retardation in their promotion to the rank of lieutenant, by allowing the promotions to be made according to the present establishment until they shall have become lieutenants. The saving then to meet the additional expence of the new command allowance would be in the non-appointment for a few years of as many cornets, ensigns, or second lieutenants as are equal to the annual vacancies, until the supernumeraries have become absorbed into the revised establishment.

125. The suggested division of the regimental allowances into two instead of six distinct classes would be equally applicable to the scheme of the revised as well as the existing allowances.

126. There remain two other peculiarities in the Indian service, which it may be advantageous to notice before the remarks which are to be addressed in reference to the queries contained in the circular are stated.

127. The one relates to the European non-commissioned officers of the Company's service, and the other to the Native commissioned officers.

#### *European Non-commissioned Officers.*

128. The European non-commissioned officers and privates employed in the Company's service amounted, in the year 1830 (the latest account), to 11,702. Of these 1,297 were employed as non-commissioned officers with Native corps, or as warrant officers. The manner in which these were employed was as follows :

With regular corps	...	...	...	...	...	390
With irregular corps	...	...	...	...	...	35
With the pioneers	...	...	...	...	...	18
On the general staff	...	...	...	...	...	587
As warrant officers	...	...	...	...	...	267

---

1,297

---

129. It has been urged in favour of maintaining, and indeed increasing, the European infantry in the Company's service, that considerable difficulty would otherwise be experienced in providing suitable individuals for the description of appointments above adverted to; and indeed, considering the narrow field of selection which is afforded from among the very limited number of European soldiers employed in the Company's service, an arrangement which has recently been sanctioned from this country, by which the field of selection has been enlarged, by promoting to such appointments deserving European soldiers, both of His Majesty's and the Company's service, would appear to rest on the strongest considerations of expediency, from its offering a suitable encouragement to the King's soldiers in India, and not withdrawing from the Company's European troops so large a proportion of picked men as heretofore for these appointments.

130. This

130. This, however, is not the strongest ground on which the retention, and even the increase, of the European infantry regiments in the Company's service has been recommended. Sir John Malcolm, in his evidence before the honourable House of Commons, on the 7th April 1813, remarked as follows: "I think that the character and feelings of the officers of the Company's army have been injured by a former reduction of the European part of the establishment, and that that injury to their feelings and to their character and respectability would be added to, and indeed completed by the reduction of the remainder; and that a more serious injury could not be inflicted than one which, added to a distinction which has often produced jealousy, I mean King's and Company's, that of European and Native." Major-general Alexander Kyd stated on the same occasion (8th April 1813), that "if the regiments of European infantry in the Company's service were to be reduced, and if the Company's infantry were to consist of Natives alone, it would somewhat lower it in the scale of respectability."

131. The following replies of the late Sir Thomas Munro, to questions which were addressed to him on the 12th and 15th April 1813, have also an important bearing on this subject.

Question.—"If the European regiments were to be reduced, and the infantry of the Company's army were to consist of Natives alone, what would be the effect upon the character and the efficiency of the Company's army in general, and on the European officers of Native corps and sepoy in particular?"

Answer.—"If such a separation were to take place, I am of opinion that it would tend materially to destroy the efficiency of the Company's army. It has been a part of our military policy in India to raise the European character by all possible means, to employ Europeans only in leading the assaults of all places taken by storm, and to employ them in the field in all enterprises where courage is required; by a separation of the European part of the establishment from the Native, the European part will be exclusively employed in all those services in which military renown or distinction is to be acquired. In the sepoy service the officers cannot be employed, except in all the lower drudgery and fatigue of war; they will in consequence sink in their reputation, and will become in time little better than a kind of country militia; they will become somewhat like what the sepoys of the French Government formerly were, who, being separated from the European branch of the service, were commanded by officers of an inferior description; the officers, by being excluded from all great occasions of signalizing themselves, would sink in character, and would be held in no estimation by the officers of the European part of the establishment; the sepoys, whom they commanded, would likewise lose their respectability, and the whole Native branch of the establishment would then become no better than a Native army is when commanded by Europeans under a Native prince; the European officers of the sepoy establishment, excluded from all distinction, both in India and in their own country, would become discontented, and they would most probably in time, sooner or later, by means of a civil war, effect the separation of India from this country."

Question.—"At present the distinction in the military services in India is between that of King's and Company's; do you think that the separation of the European from the Native branch of the Company's army would increase the distinction and jealousy which have prevailed between the King's and Company's officers, as the distinction would then be between an European and Native establishment, as well as between the Company's and the King's services?"

Answer.—"I am of opinion, that such a separation would greatly tend to increase the jealousies and differences which have sometimes prevailed between the King's and Company's services; the present distinction is only between the King's and the Company's army, the distinction then would be that between an European army and a Native black army. The officers of the Company's service, by being excluded from the command of armies, seem to have been regarded as a kind of Indian Roman-catholics, and subjected to

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1822.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

to the disqualification without having undergone the ceremony of conversion; this disqualification, by the separation of the Native from the European army, would be unavoidably extended, because, as the officers of the Native army would sink in character, it would be the duty of Government to exclude them, not only from the command of armies, but from the command of divisions and stations, as they could fill them by officers of a higher character from the European branch. The officer of the Indian branch of the service, by exclusion from all those superior commands, from the emoluments of which alone he could have the means of revisiting Europe, would be deprived of all hope of returning to his native country; he would relinquish Europe, and consider India as his home. A Native army commanded by officers who have no hope of returning to Europe would be a most dangerous instrument for effecting the separation of our Indian possessions from the British empire. I do not speak of a Company's army; I think the case applicable to all armies under similar circumstances, and that had there never existed such a body as the East-India Company, had the European and Native armies always belonged to the Crown yet had the Crown made a complete separation between the Indian and European branch of its army, the consequences would have been the same; that Indian army would have become dangerous to the State."

132. It might be observed, however, that the cavalry in the Company's service has always been in the situation in which the infantry would be if the Company's European regiments were to be disbanded, though the officers and men of the Native cavalry have not failed to distinguish themselves, when occasions offered, equally with the infantry. The reply to this remark seems to be, that the circumstances of the two services are not exactly parallel in regard to the particulars in which the comparison is made. The Native cavalry acting in the field have equal chances with European cavalry of acquiring distinction by valour and enterprise, the circumstances demanding their co-operation seldom admitting of selection or precedence; but it is otherwise in services, such as assaults of fortresses or defence of posts, for which infantry only are adapted, and where great occasions may offer of honourable distinction. There seems, therefore, to be some reason to fear that the tone of elevation, which it is so desirable to cherish in the Company's service, would be depressed or lost, if such occasions were to be withheld from the officers by their ceasing to be connected altogether with European troops, as the infantry officers would be if the European infantry corps in the Company's service were to be disbanded, since in India it is the practice to commit every enterprise of danger to the conduct of Europeans.

#### *Native Commissioned Officers.*

133. During the year 1830 the Native commissioned officers amounted to 3,877, and the non-commissioned and privates to 182,527, which gives the proportion of one Native commissioned officer to about 47 sepoy's.

134. The Native commissioned officers are promoted from the ranks through the grade of naick or corporal, and havildar or serjeant, to that of jemadar the lower, and subadar the higher Native commissioned grade. To these the rank of subadar-major has, under an order issued by the Court on the 8th November 1814, been latterly added.

135. These constitute the main encouragements to the Natives of the country to enter into the Company's service, and compared with the practice of other military services, in regard to enlisted soldiers, the encouragement would appear to be ample. But the case is materially altered, when it is considered that all the superior officers of Native corps are Europeans and foreigners, and that a cadet even takes precedence of the highest Native commissioned rank. It must be evident, that in a service constituted like that of the Company, where the tenure by which we hold the country mainly depends upon the fidelity of the Native army, every encouragement which can be afforded to the Native soldiers, in the shape of promotion or reward, consistently with the preservation of the requisite degree of control over them, it is our interest to bestow.

136. Among

APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

136. Among the encouragements which have been suggested, the appointment of a Native aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-chief and each general officer, to be selected from among the Native commissioned officers, and to give a promotion to the corps from which the aide-de-camp is taken, seems to be unobjectionable and desirable. It appears that a few Natives, who have been employed in this way in some instances, have rendered very important services.

137. The grant also of medals and other honorary distinctions are rewards which appear to be in much estimation among the Natives, and the expence of them, if they increased, as they probably would, their attachment to the service, and stimulated their exertions, would be more than repaid by the attainment of so important an object.

138. But the effect of these and such like alterations would influence promotion in a very small degree, and if a reduction to any extent should be made by whole regiments in the manner suggested, there would be an entire stagnation to promotion for a considerable period, unless the superfluous Native officers could be induced to retire, or some increase be made in the Native commissioned rank.

139. A partial adoption of the two methods above suggested would probably meet the difficulties of the emergency, in the most satisfactory way, and when these shall have passed over, the Native soldiery would be left in possession of a desired additional stimulus to their exertion.

140. The subadar-major of a regiment is at present numbered with the subadars, who are fixed in the proportion of one subadar to each troop or company. If the present subadar-major were to be made extra to the authorized establishment of subadars, and an additional subadar-major or subadar-captain per regiment were to be allowed, also extra to the authorized establishment, of one subadar per company, it would give an effective increase of two Native commissioned officers to each Native regiment one promotion per regiment to the rank of subadar-major, three to that of subadar, and as many to that of jemadar, which would provide for the superfluous officers of a considerable number of reduced regiments, and still leave some promotion as an encouragement to the Native soldiery.

141. If a reduction were to be made to the extent of a lieutenant and an ensign, cornet or second lieutenant per regiment, on the grounds which have been suggested,\* there might occasionally be one or two troops or companies without an European officer, of which the subadar-majors might be placed in charge, under the direction of a senior European officer who held a vacant troop or company as well as his own; the subadar-major or subadar-captain, while in the discharge of such a duty, drawing a proportion of the command allowance of the company or troop in addition to their other allowances.

142. With a reduced establishment of European commissioned officers, the Regulation at present in force, that no European officer, whether cadet or ensign, should be allowed to take charge of a troop or company until he shall have done regimental duty two years, and also qualified as a linguist, should be strictly enforced, and the inconveniences which have sometimes been experienced from young officers, recently arrived in the country exercising authority over the Natives, with whose habits and feelings they are not sufficiently acquainted, would thereby be avoided.

143. The change above suggested would be decidedly beneficial, both to the European and Native officers. To the former, in a quicker promotion to the command of the corps, and a higher command allowance; and to the latter, in an additional and no inconsiderable stimulus to promotion, but especially in the distinction conferred upon a Native occasionally to hold charge of a vacant troop or company, in the manner which has been suggested.

144. The

\* See para. 124 of this letter.



APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

144. The experiment seems to be worth the trial; it would show to what extent a Native could, with propriety, be trusted with duties of this description. It would involve a less essential departure from the existing system than is involved in the suggestion which has already been adverted to, of conferring commissions upon the sons of Native gentlemen, and it might be the means of attracting even a better description of men to the service, for the sake of eventually succeeding to the distinction attached to such a command.

145. There may be objections to such a scheme, of which I am not aware; but it strikes me as a less objectionable arrangement than the grant of the commissions now held by European officers to any description of Natives who have not passed through the ranks. I feel by no means certain how it would operate in practice, but as far as the appointment of a second subadar-major or subadar-captain, and making them exclusive and not inclusive of the subadars, I can conceive no possible objection to the arrangement; for if carried into effect in connexion with a reduction by whole corps, the arrangement, as a whole, would be economical in its results. It might be left discretionary or not with the commanding officer of the regiment to give a troop or company to a subadar-major or subadar-captain, or to withhold it, according to the character of the individual, and his ability to do justice to the command entrusted to him.

146. The above remarks appear to me, as far as I am able to judge, to supply the data requisite to a consideration of the system of the Indian service, founded on its peculiarities; and they will accordingly be kept in view in the following observations, which are submitted with great deference in reference to the queries contained in your letter now under reply.

147. The first, second, and third questions are either sufficiently illustrated already in the documents which have been laid before the Committee, or involve considerations of a professional character, of which I do not feel qualified to judge.

4th Question.

148. In reference to the fourth question I would observe, that judging from documents which have come under my observations, and from conversation with officers of the Indian service with whom I am personally acquainted, I have taken a very strong impression of the efficiency of the Indian military service.

149. The "spirit and disposition of the officers and men" appears to me, on the whole, to be good; but it is an object evidently of the first importance to increase their attachment to the service, by every suitable encouragement that can be devised. The remark is equally applicable to Europeans and Natives; and the measures which have been suggested in respect to each, in a preceding part of this letter, have been framed with this view, keeping in mind at the same time the necessity of economy, so as to improve the situations of those in the service, or hereafter entering it, in connexion with a reduction of establishment, which would not be detrimental to its efficiency.

150. Under this head, however, it may be as well to remark that the measure which has been suggested, of allowing the pay of the sepoy to increase in proportion to his length of service, even if, to meet his additional expence, future enlistments were to be made at a somewhat lower rate, seems to be deserving of consideration. Such a measure appears to be eminently calculated to attach the Natives to the service, and to check the inclination to desertion by the prospect of increased advantage with continued service. The grant also of an increased allowance or donation to Native troops, when they pass such a frontier as that of the Burmese, and are employed on a service which is peculiarly distasteful to their feelings, is a measure which seems strongly to recommend itself to repetition, in an analogous case, on similar grounds.

151. The employment of military men in civil situations, appears to be decidedly beneficial, from its enlarging the sphere of selection for suitable individuals, particularly on the acquisition of a new territory. In a military point of view the practice may be in some respects detrimental, from its tendency to unsettle the minds of the officers, and to draw them away from their appropriate duties; but the officers have shown themselves to be well qualified for such appointments; and in the instance of the late Sir Thomas

Thomas Munro, it was not found that his military character had at all suffered from his long employment in a civil capacity. All employments of this description are objects of great importance to a military man; and there are probably many situations in which officers of talent could be employed on comparatively a low salary, which it would not be worth the while of a civilian to accept, if of sufficient standing, and of talents equal to the duty.

152. The pay and allowances of the European commissioned officers have been largely considered in a preceding part of this letter, and also those of the Natives. The rules also relating to promotion and retirement have been adverted to, and do not appear to call for any additional remark. Respecting the furlough of European officers, it may be remarked that the measure is a considerate arrangement in respect to the individual, and beneficial to the public interests, from its keeping alive (what may not be inappropriately termed) the European feeling of the officer. The furloughs periodically granted to the Natives is a most beneficial arrangement.

153. In regard to the proportion which European and Native troops should bear to each other; this has varied so considerably at different periods, that nothing can be inferred from the past as to what this proportion ought to be. There are limits, however, beyond which the number of European troops could not, on financial grounds, be conveniently extended; and if these did not exist, it is essential that a very large proportion of the army should be Native for the ordinary duties of the service, which involve exposure to climate, in which duties Europeans cannot be employed.

154. The Regulation by which a certain period of service is required, in the situation of superintending surgeon and member of the Medical Board, to entitle a medical officer to a higher scale of retiring pension, has been objected to as less favourable to the medical than the military officer, who is entitled to the pension of his rank from the date of his promotion. It may also be considered as opposing an additional obstacle in the way of the selection of officers best calculated to fill these important situations, from the serious injury, in respect to retiring pension, which would be inflicted on their seniors, if they were to be passed over.

155. The existing system, in the particular above stated, would appear injuriously to fetter the discretion of the local Government in the selection of medical officers for the higher and more important situations, by securing, as it in a measure does, the practical observance of a seniority promotion, without regard to individual qualification.

156. While speaking of the medical service, it may not be out of place to remark that the appointment of an inspector-general of hospitals of His Majesty's regiments in India, and of a deputy inspector-general at each of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, appears to be calculated to improve the character of the medical service of India, by the introduction of individuals into that country who have had experience of the diseases of other climates, and are familiar with the most recent improvements that may have taken place in the science in Europe. It also forms an important link between the presiding medical authorities in this country and in India, which was before wanting.

157. Every measure should, however, be taken to prevent collision between the medical authorities of the two services; and if the inspector-general and his deputies had a seat at the Medical Board of the Presidency to which they are respectively attached, much advantage might accrue to each service, by the opportunity which would thereby be afforded for mutual communication and confidential explanation.

158. A similar remark is applicable to the officers at the head of the departments of adjutant-general and quartermaster-general at the Presidencies at which a Military Board is still in existence.

159. In reference to the fifth question, it may be observed that the advantages of a transfer of the army to the Crown, except the territory were to be taken at the same time, are not very apparent; the danger being, that if the one were to be separated

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

5th Question.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

separated from the other, the authority of the local Government would be proportionably weakened.

160. There are many and very important considerations connected with a transfer of the army; and if ever it should be determined upon, it is conceived that the details of the transfer could be best arranged in concert with a committee of the most intelligent officers of His Majesty's and the Company's service of each Presidency. It seems clear, however, that, in any case, the army must be a local army, whenever such a transfer may take place, the army of each Presidency being one of its grand divisions, the appointments, to the local force, of cadets and assistant-surgeons being regulated on some such principle as at present, though in different hands.

161. It would be dangerous in the extreme to the interests of India, if what has been termed the patronage of advancement were to be in any other hands than those of the local Government. It would indeed be advantageous to the public interests if even a proportion of the initial appointments of cadets and assistant-surgeons, and also of writers, were to be reserved for the sons of deserving officers of the civil, military, and medical service of India.

162. Should the army continue under the management of the Company, as at present, it may be as well to consider, under this head, whether there are any, and what modifications, it may be practicable to introduce into the present system, so as to remove, as far as may be practicable, the existing sources of jealousy between the two services.

163. The great grievance of which the Company's officers have to complain is the early attainment of rank by His Majesty's officers, by methods which, in the Company's service, are not allowable. This gives them a preference to appointments to commands, to which the Company's officers might otherwise aspire; but it is, notwithstanding, believed that promotion in the Company's army is generally more rapid than in the King's, and it is besides certain, which cannot be said of the subalterns, and even of the captains, of the King's service.

164. The real cause of jealousy occasioned by the comparison therefore is, that the average promotion of the Company's service, represented by the general and field officers of that establishment, is brought into immediate and avoidable comparison with the general and field officers of His Majesty's service, who represent, not the average promotion of that service, but the average of that accelerated promotion in His Majesty's service, which is obtained by purchase or exchange, in consequence of which many of the field officers of the King's army are younger men and of less standing than the captains below them.

165. If promotion had proceeded in the King's army by seniority, as well as in the Company's army, it is not at all improbable that the Company's field officers of the same standing would have had the advantage by the comparison.

166. The two schemes of promotion have their relative advantages and disadvantages. The Company's officers are certain of promotion to the highest ranks, if they remain sufficiently long in the service; and His Majesty's officers, who have influence and money to purchase the superior commissions, rapidly obtain promotion, to the serious detriment of those of longer standing to themselves who are not in possession of the requisite means of advancement; but every officer of the Company's service would deprecate the introduction of such a scheme of advancement into their service, by means of which men of property and influence would rapidly introduce themselves into situations before them, to which, if they wait with patience, they may, under the present system, reasonably hope to aspire.

6th Question.

167. It does not appear to me that any considerable saving could be effected by the transfer of the Company's army to the Crown, which is not equally practicable under the existing system. The separate staff, however, for His Majesty's troops in India might, in the case supposed, be dispensed with.

168. The

168. The encouragement of the class of European settlers from which the army could be recruited would fail, I should conceive, of answering its intended purpose, from there being no appropriate employment for European labourers, from which they are necessarily excluded by the nature of the climate, and the comparative cheapness at which Natives of the country can be obtained, and at prices on which an European could not subsist.

169. It is not clear that the armies of the three Presidencies could be united with any advantage to the public interests, if by the term "union" it be understood that the corps of one Presidency were to be rendered available for service in another; the attachment of the Natives to their home being found, under the system of different armies, a serious obstacle to their employment, for any considerable length of time, at stations remote from the districts at which they are usually raised. On the contrary, any arrangement by which the corps of each army could be so distributed as to bring them periodically, and at no very long intervals, in the neighbourhood of the respective families of the soldiers, would, on this account, effect an important improvement in the system of the service, by its tendency to promote the comfort, and increase the attachment of the Natives.

170. An assimilation, however, of the system of the three armies, so as to obviate the difficulties in the way of their serving together, on account of the differences, which still obtain, in respect to allowances and advantages, and the systems of supply peculiar to each army, is a measure apparently desirable to be kept continually in view in such alterations as may be made in the system of either army, so as to prevent the possibility of the existing differences being increased by such changes as may hereafter from time to time be made, and to secure the means of nearer approximation on occasion of every revision, general or partial, in the system of either, or of the whole army.

171. The army, however, being placed under one Commander-in-chief instead of three, as at present, would be a measure, in this point of view, well calculated to promote the attainment of this object, and a suggestion which has been made to have the army "placed under one Commander-in-chief, he himself having no particular charge, with three divisional commanders under him, two of these being invariably taken from the Company's service," appears to be deserving of attentive consideration, as a proposition calculated to provide for the fair claims of the two services and of each army, while it would obviate the objection, which has elsewhere been stated, to the army being placed under the direction of a single Commander-in-chief, on account of the extent of duty which the command of such an army as that of India would otherwise devolve upon the individual entrusted with such an important charge.

172. The staff to assist a Commander-in-chief of all India in the discharge of his important functions might be selected from officers of either service or Presidency in a fixed proportion, to be previously settled and invariably observed; and in such a case, perhaps the separate staff for conducting the discipline of His Majesty's army in India might not be required.

173. Connected also with the subject of the three armies being under the general direction of a Commander-in-chief, it may further be observed that all future augmentations or reduction of establishment should be made from each army in their relative proportions, which is a measure practicable and comparatively easy of execution, from the facility which is afforded by the approximation of the three armies to each other in Central India, to effect a mutual interchange of stations, so as to proportion the duties of each army according to their present or prospective amount.

174. There are no very material changes in the "existing system of government, direction and control, in so far as the same may depend on arrangements fixed by Parliamentary enactment," which it occurs to me as necessary to suggest in this place.

175. It might, however, perhaps be desirable that the army estimates connected with the troops of His Majesty on the Indian establishment should be prepared by the Secretary at

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832  
7th Question.

8th Question.

9th Question.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

at War, in concert with the President of the India Board; and the latter, or one of the members of the Board, would probably be the more appropriate channel of submitting such estimates annually to Parliament, from their involving a charge only upon the revenues of India, and not upon those of Great Britain.

176. Should it be thought desirable to appropriate a proportion of the appointments of cadets and assistant-surgeons, and even of writers, to the sons of the civil, military, and medical officers of the Indian establishment, the Court might either have the disposal of those appointments upon individual applications, subject to the approval of the Board, or the local Government might be allowed to recommend individuals to be appointed, at the discretion of the Court and the Board. The fittest rule in the case supposed would perhaps be for individuals in this country to apply direct to the Court, and those in India to prefer their applications through the channel of the local Government.

177. In conclusion, it may be proper for me to state, to prevent the possibility of misapprehension, that the remarks and suggestions contained in this letter, are the result of a long and anxious consideration of the subject to which it relates, and that they have been made under a full conviction of their importance, but without a previous knowledge how far their insertion is agreeable to, or in coincidence with, the views of those under whom I have the honour and happiness to serve.

178. I understood, Sir, the object of your letter to be to collect the opinions of individuals on the points to which it relates, according to their experience, and the honest and deliberate convictions of their own minds. This I have endeavoured to do to the best of my ability, and with a disposition to avoid anything like an undue bias in favour of either service, or of any particular army. The great interests involved in the consideration of the Indian question, can, I conceive, be best promoted by looking to the military system of India as a whole, avoiding, however, all changes that would be detrimental to individuals, unless their fair claims could be provided for in some other way; and I am sanguine in the expectation that the adoption of some such principles as I have ventured to recommend would be productive of the best effects.

179. The great error in the administration of India, hitherto, appears to me to consist in the employment of a larger European agency than the resources of the country can permanently bear, and the obvious and appropriate remedy seems to consist in extending the use of the comparatively cheaper agency of Natives in every practicable way; and I should conceive that the change could be effected, not only without detriment to either, but with a decided advantage to both.

180. It may also be proper for me to remark, that although many of the opinions stated in this letter are the result of such consideration of the voluminous and important documentary evidence received from India which it has been my duty to examine, they are not derived solely from this source. It has been an advantage to me, in the course of my official career, to come into contact with some intelligent officers of the Indian service, and to discuss with them the views which they themselves entertain, or I may from time to time have formed, on the Indian military system: and though none of the individuals to whom I refer are at all responsible for what I have ventured to suggest, I should perhaps have hesitated to submit what I have written, if I had not been strengthened by finding, if not in every instance a coincidence of views, yet such a concurrence in the general expediency of the measures that appear to me calculated to improve the existing system, as has emboldened me, but with the greatest deference, to submit them to the consideration and decision of my superiors.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM CABELL.

## PROMOTION CALCULATIONS.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

SOME calculations were made, in the year 1821, to ascertain the progress of promotion in the Company's service, when the rise of the officers had not been accelerated by an augmentation of the army.

These calculations were made by a comparison of the dates of commissions of the officers with those which they had held in the antecedent rank, the difference between the dates being taken as the period of service of the officers in the ranks from which they had been severally promoted, and the average of those differences being assumed as the average rate at which promotion had proceeded during the period embraced in the comparison.

The calculations extended to the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, as well as to the infantry, and had reference also to periods in which promotions had been affected by augmentations, as well as to periods in which they had had the least disturbing effect; but it would swell this paper to an unnecessary length to give the details of all the calculations; the result of the whole being fairly exhibited in the calculation obtained from a comparison of the commissions of the infantry officers during the period in which their promotion had been disturbed in the least degree by augmentations.

In comparing one commission with another, it would have been a tedious and unnecessary operation to bring the fractional parts of the year into comparison; the odd months and days are therefore in every instance omitted, and, it is conceived, without the slightest detriment to the accuracy of the calculation. The probability is, that the difference obtained by a comparison of the full dates of two commissions would be as frequently as much above as below the truth; and consequently by confining the comparison merely to the years in which the officers took rank, without regard to the odd months and days (which would unnecessarily have perplexed the calculation), the average, upon a comparison of the commissions of a variety of officers would be accurate, though the fractional parts of years in the commissions of each officer were disregarded.

The following are the additions which were made to the infantry between 1796 and the period at which the calculation was made:

	European Regiments.	Native Regiments.	TOTAL.
<b>BENGAL:</b>			
Establishment, as fixed by the Regulations of 1796 ... ..	3	12	15
1797, 30th October ... ..	—	2	18 augmented, 2 reduced, or 16 augmented.
1 European regiment reduced ... ..	1	—	
1798, 1st November ... ..	—	3	
1800, 29th May ... ..	—	2	
1802, 30th September ... ..	—	1	
1 European regiment reduced, and a Native regiment added to the establishment ... ..	1	1	
1803, — November... ..	—	2	
1804, 21st September ... ..	—	4	
1814, 16th December ... ..	—	3	
Deduct 2 European regiments reduced ... ..	2	—	
Establishment in 1821 ... ..	1	30	31

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

(continued.)

	European Regiments.	Native Regiments.	TOTAL.
<b>MADRAS:</b>			
Establishment, as fixed by the Regulations of 1796 ... ..	2	10	12
1800, 1st January, 1 European reduced ... ..	1	—	
—, between 1796 and January 1800 ... ..	1	7	} 15 augmented, 1 reduced, or 14 augmented.
—, 17th June ... ..	—	2	
1804, 21st September ... ..	—	4	
1818, 1st September ... ..	—	2	
Establishment in 1821 ... ..	1	25	26
<b>BOMBAY:</b>			
Establishment, as fixed by the Regulations of 1796 ... ..	1	4½	5½
Between 1796 and 1800 ... ..	—	4	} 7½
1803, 18th December ... ..	—	1	
1817, 1st November ... ..	—	1½	
1820, 4th May ... ..	—	1	
Establishment in 1821 ... ..	1	12	13

From this it will appear that the period in which it will be practicable to ascertain the operation of the system, when undisturbed by augmentations, will be by a comparison of commissions, dated as undermentioned:

*Infantry.***BENGAL:**

Between the augmentations of 21st September 1804 and 16th December 1814, or a period of about .. .. . 10 years.

**MADRAS:**

Between the augmentations of 21st September 1804 and 1st September 1818, or a period of about .. .. . 14 —

**BOMBAY:**

Between the augmentations of 18th December 1803 and 1st November 1817, or a period of about .. .. . 14 —

In some of the ranks this has been found to afford a period of time of sufficient extent to ascertain with precision the operation of the present system, but in others it has been necessary to make allowance for augmentations which have intermediately occurred, and have had the effect of accelerating the promotion of the officer.

The rank in which the greatest difficulty was experienced from this cause, was in that of lieutenant, which requires a longer period than fourteen years for promotion to the rank of captain. The calculation in this rank was also disturbed from another cause, for which also it was necessary to make allowance. The augmentations in 1803 and 1804 promoted all the ensigns to the rank of lieutenant, and besides left several vacancies in that rank to be filled up by cadets from Europe. Many, therefore, of these officers commenced as 19th, 18th, or 17th lieutenant, instead of 22d lieutenant, and their promotion was proportionably accelerated. The manner in which the calculation was corrected in this rank will be explained in the sequel.

The promotion from 10th ensign to that of lieutenant was scarcely less difficult to ascertain than that of lieutenant to the rank of captain, arising from the incomplete state in which the establishment of ensigns has generally been kept.

The period selected for the calculation at Bengal was from the commissions of ensign, dated in the years 1807, 1808, and 1809; at Madras, from those dated between the years 1807

1807 and 1811; and at Bombay, from those dated between the years 1807 and 1811, when the establishment of ensigns appears to have been more complete than at any former or subsequent periods, and when the calculation would be but slightly disturbed by the antecedent augmentations.

The next rank to be explained is that of promotion from captain to major. This it was found necessary to divide into two calculations, in consequence of the rank of captain-lieutenant, which corresponds with the situation of 8th captain in the then establishment, having existed in the service till the 1st January 1819, when it was abolished under instructions from the Court of Directors, as it had been long before in the King's service, and an additional or 8th captain was substituted for the captain-lieutenant.

To ascertain, therefore, what has been the period occupied in rising from the rank of captain-lieutenant to that of major is the same thing as to ascertain the rise from 8th captain to the same rank of the authorized establishment antecedent to the Court's orders of 25th November 1823.

The method, therefore, pursued in the calculation was, first, to ascertain the rise from captain-lieutenant to captain; and secondly, from 7th captain to major.

The calculation in the rank of major is free from any of the disturbing causes which interfered in the other ranks.

The calculation of promotion from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to that of colonel was disturbed at all the Presidencies by the then recent augmentations for which allowance was made in the manner that will presently be explained.

In all the calculations no notice was taken of the brevet rank of the officer, because it is only his regimental commission which gives him the pay of his rank, and because the object to be ascertained is, what was the effect of the gradations of rank in the Company's service, established by the Regulation of 1796, in accelerating or retarding the promotion of the officers.

The following is the result of the detailed calculations in each rank. The names of the officers whose commissions were compared with the dates of their commissions, and the periods in which they had respectively served, are separately stated at the conclusion of this paper.

#### ENSIGN TO LIEUTENANT.

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL and AVERAGE.
Officers who served 3 years respectively in the } rank of Ensign .. .. . }	—	1	—	1
Ditto .. ditto .. 4 years	7	12	4	23
Ditto .. ditto .. 5 —	37	33	16	86
Ditto .. ditto .. 6 —	42	25	11	78
Ditto .. ditto .. 7 —	2	10	1	13
Ditto .. ditto .. 8 —	1	1	1	3
<b>TOTAL ..</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>204</b>
Average period of service founded on a com- } parison of commission .. .. . }	Years. 5·471	Years. 5·414	Years. 5·363	Years. 5·431
Corrected average, in reference to the sub- } joined remarks .. .. . }	6·565	6·500	6·435	6·517

From

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

From the incomplete state in which the establishment of ensigns was kept, though the calculations were made from a period when the number of ensigns appears to have been the largest, it seemed probable that the averages obtained were below the truth.

If it be supposed that the ensigns during this period upon an average gained two steps upon their appointment from a deficiency of ensigns, and were accelerated in consequence in their promotion about one-fifth of the period occupied in rising from 10th ensign, the probable period of promotion from 10th ensign to lieutenant will be ascertained by adding a fifth to the average ascertained by the comparison of commissions, and this is the result exhibited in the corrected average above stated.

#### LIEUTENANT TO CAPTAIN.

					BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL and AVERAGE.
Officers who served 8 years in the rank of } Lieutenant .. .. .					—	—	2	2
Ditto .. ditto .. 9 years					—	—	2	2
Ditto .. ditto .. 10 —					—	1	4	5
Ditto .. ditto .. 11 —					1	1	11	13
Ditto .. ditto .. 12 —					2	5	11	18
Ditto .. ditto .. 13 —					10	10	19	39
Ditto .. ditto .. 14 —					25	32	25	82
Ditto .. ditto .. 15 —					24	19	13	56
Ditto .. ditto .. 16 —					4	3	11	18
Ditto .. ditto .. 17 —					—	—	4	4
TOTAL ..					66	71	102	239
Average promotion, from commissions } compared .. .. .					Years. 14.227	Years. 13.971	Years. 13.362	Years. —
Corrected average, founded on the succeeding } remarks .. .. .					15.174	14.669	15.270	15.037

The accuracy of this calculation may be affected in several ways :

1st. The promotion of all the lieutenants, whose commissions are dated in 1803 and 1804, was accelerated by the augmentation in those years.

2d. The promotion of lieutenants, whose commissions are dated in the years 1805 and 1806, was accelerated by the incomplete state of the establishment of lieutenants in those years, in consequence of the augmentations of 1803 and 1804; many officers subsequent to those augmentations having commenced the service as high as 19th, 18th, and even 17th lieutenants.

3d. The rank of captain-lieutenant was abolished on the 1st January 1819, and previous to that year the succession to the rank of captain was to 7th instead of 8th captain; the promotion therefore of captains, whose commissions are dated in 1818, or earlier, was retarded by the intermediate grade of captain-lieutenant. Many of the captains too, whose commissions are dated in 1819, were serving as captain-lieutenants, when by the abolition of that rank they became captains. The consequence is, that the succession to the situation of 8th captain, which it is the object of this calculation to ascertain, was really quicker than is apparent from a comparison of commissions.

4th. On

4th. On the other hand, the promotion to the rank of captain in the year 1819, was accelerated by the measure adopted by the Bengal Government in that year, of adding a 9th or supernumerary captain, upon the occasion of raising three volunteer battalions for service in Ceylon.

If the first, second, and fourth causes of acceleration be considered as counteracted by the cause of retardation explained under the third head, the only further disturbing cause remaining to be considered, in reference to the Bengal army, is the augmentation of three regiments to an establishment of twenty-eight regiments of infantry, which was made at Bengal in December 1814.

The promotion of every officer included in this calculation was accelerated from this cause, because his commission as lieutenant was obtained previous, and that of captain subsequent, to the augmentation.

This augmentation would promote 39 lieutenants out of 616 to the rank of captain, or rather more than one-fifteenth of the whole.

If, therefore, one-fifteenth of the period be added to the average promotion obtained by this calculation, the result will be as follows :

	Years.	Decimals.
Average promotion from lieutenant to captain, ascertained by the preceding calculation . . . . .	14	227
Add one-fifteenth, in consequence of the augmentation of 16th December 1814 . . . . .	—	947
Probable period of promotion when undisturbed by augmentations or other causes . . . . .	15	174

The promotion at Madras was affected by causes similar to those enumerated under the three first heads at Bengal.

If these also be supposed to neutralize each other, the only other circumstance to be taken into account is an augmentation of two regiments to an establishment of twenty-four regiments of infantry, which was made to the Madras army on the 1st September 1818, which, with the exceptions of two captains of 1817, and the captains of 1818, whose commissions were dated earlier than September of that year, affected the officers included in the calculation.

An increase of two regiments to an establishment of twenty-four, will promote 26 lieutenants out of 528 to the rank of captain, or about one-twentieth of the whole.

Add one-twentieth, therefore, to the average period already obtained, and the result for Madras will be—

	Years.	Decimals.
Average period from lieutenant to captain obtained by the preceding calculation . . . . .	13	971
Add one-twentieth, in consequence of the augmentation of 1st September 1818 . . . . .	—	698
Probable period of promotion when undisturbed by augmentations or other causes . . . . .	14	669

Similar causes operated at Bombay partly to accelerate and partly to retard promotion, and which as before, may be supposed to neutralize each other, leaving only the intermediate augmentations of the army to be taken into account of three regiments of cavalry, equal to about one and a half regiment of infantry, and two and a half regiments of infantry or four regiments to an establishment of ten and a half regiments.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

The

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

The reason for including the cavalry in this calculation is, that the officers for the cavalry regiments were supplied from the infantry.

The last of these augmentations, of one regiment of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, equal to about one and a half regiments, which was made in May 1820, only affected the commissions dated in that year, which are not sufficiently numerous to be taken into account.

Considering, therefore, the calculation as affected only by an addition of two and a half regiments to an establishment of ten and a half regiments, there were 32 lieutenants promoted out of an establishment of 231 lieutenants, or about one-seventh.

The corrected calculation therefore will be as follows :

						Years.	Decimals.
Average period of promotion from lieutenant to captain, obtained } by the calculation ... .. }						13	362
Add one-seventh, in consequence of the augmentation ... .. }						1	908
And the probable period of promotion, when undisturbed by } augmentations or other causes, will probably be ... .. }						15	270

### CAPTAIN TO MAJOR.

						BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.
1. Captain Lieutenant to Captain :									
Officers who served 1 year in the rank of } Captain-lieutenant .. .. }						2	3	5	10
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 2 years }						9	5	3	17
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 3 — }						4	3	4	11
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 4 — }						1	2	3	6
TOTAL ..						16	13	15	44
Average promotion ..						Years. 2·25	Years. 2·3	Years. 2·333	Years. 2·295
2. Captain to Major :									
Officers who served 7 years as Captain ... }						3	—	—	3
Ditto .. 8 .. ditto .. .. }						1	3	1	5
Ditto .. 9 .. ditto .. .. }						2	3	5	10
Ditto .. 10 .. ditto .. .. }						3	6	4	13
Ditto .. 11 .. ditto .. .. }						—	1	—	1
Ditto .. 12 .. ditto .. .. }						—	8	2	10
Ditto .. 13 .. ditto .. .. }						—	2	1	3
TOTAL ..						9	23	13	45
Average promotion ..						Years. 8·555	Years. 10·607	Years. 10	Years. 9·720

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

RESULT.	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.
Captain-lieutenant to Captain .. ..	2.25	2.3	2.333	2.205
Captain to Major .. ..	8.555	10.607	10	9.720
Captain-lieutenant to Major .. ..	10.805	12.907	12.333	12.015

## MAJOR TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL.

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.
Officers who had served 4 years in the rank of Major .. ..	—	1	2	3
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 5 years	3	7	5	15
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 6 —	10	11	4	25
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 7 —	—	—	1	1
TOTAL ..	13	19	12	44
Average promotion ..	Years. 5.769	Years. 5.526	Years. 5.333	Years. 5.615

## LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TO COLONEL.

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.
Officers who served 8 years in the rank of Lieutenant-colonel .. ..	—	—	1	1
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 9 years	—	1	—	1
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 10 —	—	—	1	1
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 11 —	—	3	1	4
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 12 —	6	—	1	7
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 13 —	—	7	—	7
Ditto .. ditto .. .. 14 —	1	1	1	3
TOTAL ..	7	12	5	24
Average promotion ..	Years. 12.285	Years. 12.25	Years. 11	Years. —
Corrected average, in reference to the sub-joined remarks .. ..	12.967	12.76	12.83	12.852

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

The promotion of the Bengal officers from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to colonel was accelerated by the augmentation, in 1814, of three regiments to an establishment of twenty-eight regiments, which promoted 3 lieutenant-colonels out of 56, making an acceleration equal to about one-eighteenth, which, added to the period already obtained, will give the probable promotion from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to colonel at Bengal.

	Years.	Decimals.
Average period of promotion from lieutenant-colonel to colonel ...	12	285
Add one-eighteenth ... ..	—	682
And the probable promotion at Bengal, from lieutenant-colonel to } colonel, will be ... ..	12	967

The promotion of some of the Madras lieutenant-colonels was accelerated by the augmentation of 1804, and of the remainder by the augmentation of 1818 of two to an establishment of twenty-four regiments, which latter augmentation promoted 2 out of 48 lieutenant-colonels.

For the purpose of simplifying the calculation, let this be taken as the average acceleration of the whole, or about one-twenty-fourth, which will give the following result :

	Years.	Decimals.
Average period of promotion, from lieutenant-colonel to colonel ...	12	25
Add one-twenty-fourth ... ..	—	51
And the probable promotion at Madras will be ... ..	12	76

The promotion of the Bombay lieutenant-colonels, with one exception, was accelerated by the augmentation, in 1817, one and a half regiments of infantry, and two regiments of cavalry, equal to one regiment of infantry, making together an augmentation of two and a half regiments to an establishment of ten and a half regiments, and promoting 3 out of an establishment of 20 lieutenant-colonels. The acceleration, must, therefore, be considered as equal to three-twentieths or about one-sixteenth, which, added to the period of eleven years already obtained, 1·83 will give 12·83, as the probable period of promotion at Bombay from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to that of colonel, and the corrected calculation will consequently stand as stated above.

### RESULT.

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL and AVERAGE.
Officers whose commissions were compared to ascertain the progress of promotion in the ranks of—				
Ensign and Lieutenant .. ..	80	82	33	204
Lieutenant and Captain .. ..	66	71	102	239
Captain-lieutenant, Captain, and Major ..	25	36	28	89
Major and Lieutenant-colonel .. ..	13	19	12	44
Lieutenant-colonel and Colonel .. ..	7	12	5	24
TOTAL ..	200	220	180	600

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1882.

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL and AVERAGE.
Average promotion, on a comparison of those commissions, and with the corrections above-mentioned, from the rank of—	Years.	Years.	Years.	Years.
Ensign to Lieutenant .. .. .	6·565	6·500	6·435	6·517
Lieutenant to Captain .. .. .	15·174	14·669	15·270	15·037
Captain to Major .. .. .	10·805	12·907	12·333	12·015
Major to Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	5·769	5·528	5·333	5·545
Lieutenant-colonel to Colonel .. .. .	12·967	12·760	12·830	12·852
Ensign to Colonel .. .. .	51·280	52·362	52·201	51·906
The same stated in the nearest approximation in whole numbers :				
Ensign to Lieutenant .. .. .	6	6	7	6
Lieutenant to Captain .. .. .	15	15	15	15
Captain to Major .. .. .	11	13	12	12
Major to Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	6	5	5	6
Lieutenant-colonel to Colonel .. .. .	13	13	13	13
Ensign to Colonel .. .. .	51	52	52	52
Ditto to Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .	38	39	39	39
Ditto to Major .. .. .	32	34	34	33
Ditto to Captain .. .. .	21	21	22	21

These results having been obtained, the next point to be ascertained was, the rate at which casualties must have affected the different ranks during the period under investigation, according to the scale of establishment then in force.

After several trials (the particulars of which it is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to repeat), it was found that the rates of casualties undermentioned would, according to the then authorized establishment, produce similar results.

To obtain these results, the casualties are supposed to affect an officer during the progress of his promotion to a majority at four different rates, at the completion of one-fourth of his progress each time. During the first of these periods, the casualties are taken at four per cent., or 1·25th annually; during the second period at five per cent., or 1·20th; during the third at six per cent., or 1·17th; and during the fourth at seven per cent., or 1·14th. From the rank of major to that of colonel, the casualties are taken at eight per cent., or about 1·13th annually.

The following calculation is worked out in detail, and will serve as a specimen of the mode in which the other results, stated in the letter to which these calculations are an accompaniment, were obtained. It is immaterial whether the calculation were to be made from the whole infantry of India or from that of any particular Presidency, the relative proportion of officers in each being the same; but as it was tried originally on the Madras infantry, it is transcribed in this place from that calculation. The officers here are supposed to be promoted in the line from the rank of major to that of colonel, and regimentally from ensign to major, according to the system in force; but the result would

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

would have been the same if the calculation were made upon the supposition of the regimental as well as the field officers being promoted by seniority in the line. The latter is probably the more accurate method of the two of obtaining a true average, from the smaller comparative value of the fractions rejected, when connected with numbers of a larger quantity, represented by the whole army, rather than the numbers of a particular regiment.

The Madras infantry then consisted of 32 colonels, including six on the senior list, who may have influenced promotion,

52 lieutenant-colonels,

or 84 colonels and lieutenant-colonels,  
and 52 majors,

or 136 field officers altogether.

The junior major on his promotion would be 136 removes from the top of the list of colonels, and 52 removes from a lieutenant-colonelcy. It would therefore be necessary that as many casualties should take place above him as would reduce the number of his seniors to 84, when he would become a lieutenant-colonel. This, by the calculation below,\* would occupy a period of about six years, which corresponds with the number ascertained by the comparison of commissions. Fifty-two more casualties must occur before this officer would be in the position to have only 32 officers above him, when he would become a colonel, and by the calculation, it appears that this operation would occupy a period of about twelve years, which is within one year of the calculation before obtained.

The establishment of regimental officers then consisted of—

2 majors,  
8 captains,  
22 lieutenants,  
10 ensigns,

or 42 officers.

The

* Casualties, at 1-13th } .. 136 annually .. 10.6	Field officers.	Brought forward .. 66.6	3d year as Lieut.-colonel.
	125.7 1st year as Major. 9.8		61.5 4th year — 4.9
	115.12 2d year — 8.11		56.9 5th year — 4.4
	107.1 3d year — 8.3		52.5 6th year — 4.
	98.11 4th year — 7.7		48.5 7th year — 3.9
	91.4 5th year — 7.		44.9 8th year — 3.5
			41.4 9th year — 3.2
Majors promoted in six } .. 84.4 years .. 6.6	84.4 6th year — 6.6		38.2 10th year — 2.12
	77.11 1st year as Lieut.-colonel. 5.12		35.3 11th year — 2.9
	71.12 2d year — 5.6		
Carried forward .. 66.6	3d year —	Lieut.-colonels promoted in } twelve years ..	32.7 12th year —

The junior ensign would then require ten casualties above him to make him a lieutenant, twenty-two more to make him a captain, and eight more to give him his majority; in other words, when the officers, above him in the regiment were reduced to thirty-one, he would be a lieutenant; when reduced to nine, he would be a captain; and when reduced to one, he would become a major.

The majors being promoted in six years, and there being two majors per regiment, the line step would visit the regiment once in three years, and consequently, when this occurs, there is an addition equal to one made to the regimental casualties, operating upon the promotion of the officer, supposed to have occurred in that year, which is noted by the line step being marked against those particular years.

By the calculation below,\* founded on the preceding data, it will be seen that the ensigns

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

* Casualties, at 1-25th annually ..	42	Regimental officers, when the junior Ensign commences service.	Brought forward ..	14	15	11th year as Lieut.
	1			1	14	Line step.
	40	8 1st year as Ensign.		13	1	12th year —
	1	15		13		
	38	18 2d year —	Casualties at 1-11th annually	12	5	13th year —
	2	13 Line step.		12		
	36	5 3d year —		11	7	14th year —
	1	11		1	11	Line step.
	31	10 4th year —	Lieutenants promoted in 15 years .. ..	9	10	15th year —
	1	9		8	10	1st year as Captain.
	33	10 5th year —		8	2	2d year —
	2	8 Line step.		1	8	Line step.
Ensigns promoted in six years	31	2 6th year —		6	8	3d year —
Casualties at 1-20th annually	1	11		6		
	29	11 1st year as Lieut.		6	2	4th year —
	1	9		6		
	28	2 2d year —		5	10	5th year —
	2	8 Line step.		1	5	Line step.
	25	14 3d year —		4	5	6th year —
	1	5		4		
	24	9 4th year —		4	1	7th year —
	1	4		4		
	23	5 5th year —		3	11	8th year —
	2	3 Line step.		1	3	Line step.
Casualties, at 1-17th annually	21	2 6th year —		2	8	9th year —
	1	4		2		
	19	15 7th year —		2	6	10th year —
	1	2		2		
	18	13 8th year —		2	4	11th year —
	2	1 Line step.		1	2	Line step.
	16	12 9th year —	Captains promoted in 12 years	1	2	12th year.
	16					
	15	13 10th year —				
	15					
Carried forward ..	14	15 11th year —				

(Note continued.)





APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

	SCHEME OF ESTABLISHMENT.	
	Antecedent to the New Organization.	According to the New Organization.
The casualty rates were changed from 1-20th to 1-17th annually, when an officer was supposed to have completed his } ..	5th year of service.	5th year of service.
They were again changed from 1-17th to 1-14th annually, when an officer was supposed to have completed his .. } ..	12th ditto.	11th ditto.
Again from 1-14th to 1-13th annually, at the officer's .. ..	18th ditto.	17th ditto.
And from 1-13th to 1-12th annually, at the officer's .. ..	31st ditto.	29th ditto.

The latter is the highest rate of casualties applied to either scheme, and it will be seen, by the comparison, that the average ages of the officers upon whom these several rates were operating could not very materially vary, although, for perfect accuracy, perhaps the casualty rates should only have been changed in the latter scheme at the same entire period of supposed service as in the former. For the first twelve years of the calculation, however, it will be seen that the same rates were operating according to either scheme; after that period they were changed a year earlier in the calculation applied to the new organization, and at the 29th year the last and highest rate was supposed to have commenced two years earlier than in the calculation applied to the antecedent system. The difference, however, is too small to have materially altered the result; but if the test had been applied to schemes of establishment which essentially differed from each other, so as to make the apparent rise to a colonelcy by one scheme extend to a period of about sixty years and by another to about thirty years, a correct result could only be obtained by applying the same rates of casualties to the same entire periods of service, and when the less favourable scheme of promotion exceeded the entire period of service required by the more favourable scheme for a colonelcy, the casualty rates, if a correct result be desired, should be proportionably increased. This consideration seems to show that there are limits beyond which an alteration of establishment, intended to be favourable to the officers, could not be made so as to produce a permanent effect in regard to the acceleration of promotion, at all in proportion to the increased charge that would be involved by an addition to the higher ranks. Officers at present in the service would doubtless derive all the advantages that could result from such a change, but their successors, after the new establishment had been completed, though they would in a degree benefit from the alteration, it would not be at all in proportion to the additional expence which it thereby entailed. It is, however, conceived that the reduction in the rank of subaltern might yet be carried still further than it has, with a decided benefit to officers hereafter entering the service; but it is not essential to the object of this paper to pursue this part of the inquiry in detail.

It may not, however, be out of place to notice particularly here the different supposed periods of service at which the several casualty rates appear to have affected promotion, during the period embraced in the calculation, founded on a comparison of commissions, as these are not prominently noticed in the detailed calculation which has been given. It appears then by this, that the casualty rates were changed—

From 1-25th to 1-20th annually, at the close of the 6th year of the supposed service of an officer.					
From 1-20th to 1-17th	...	ditto	12th	...	ditto.
From 1-17th to 1-14th	...	ditto	19th	...	ditto.
From 1-14th to 1-13th	...	ditto	33d	...	ditto.

The reasons have already been stated why a higher rate of casualties was assumed as a test by which to judge of the probable period of promotion according to the former and present

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

present organization of the army, but if the two schemes had been tried according to the rates ascertained, by a comparison of commission, the apparent result would have been more favourable to the present organization than by the calculations by which the two schemes were actually compared.

The new organization, it has been supposed, would not be so favourable to retirements as formerly, in consequence of the inducement held out by the duplication of colonelcies to officers to remain in the service, in the hope of attaining to a regiment, who, under the former system, would have retired in despair of attaining to a regiment.

This may have been the effect of the change in regard to officers, who, by the alteration, were raised very near to a colonelcy, and were consequently induced to remain in the service, when, but for the new organization, their prospect of a colonelcy would have been too distant to operate upon their hopes; but in regard to officers further removed from a regiment, it may be expected that the effect of the change of system may have been directly the reverse. For instance, to captains who had made up their minds to retire on the pension of major, and majors also on the pension of lieutenant-colonel, and who were only waiting till their promotion to those ranks, to carry their intention into effect, the change in these, and in similar instances, must have been beneficial, as the promotions consequent to the new organization of the army, would have presented an inducement to such officers to retire at an earlier period than they had calculated, and their retirement from the service would have been so much the earlier in consequence.

This conjecture seems to be corroborated by the subjoined statement from the retirements which have taken place in each army in the years undermentioned:

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.	TOTAL.	
1813 ...	12	21	19	52	Average number of retirements per annum previously to the new organization, 46.
1814 ...	30	22	8	60	
1815 ...	35	18	4	57	
1816 ...	25	27	10	62	
1817 ...	11	15	7	33	
1818 ...	19	20	3	42	
1819 ...	15	18	8	41	
1820 ...	21	7	5	33	
1821 ...	16	15	5	36	
1822 ...	26	17	9	52	
1823 ...	27	13	3	43	Average number of retirements per annum after the new organization came into operation, 62.
1824 ...	24	19	5	48	
1825 ...	31	22	4	57	
1826 ...	25	23	4	52	
1827 ...	29	31	8	68	
1828 ...	32	15	5	52	
1829 ...	36	28	11	75	
1830 ...	28	52	8	88	

By this it would appear that the average number of retirements has increased in the latter, compared with the former period, by nearly one-third; and from whatever cause this increase in the average number of retirements may have proceeded, the inference seems to be clear, that, upon the whole, the new organization cannot have been unfavourable to retirements, although it may have partially operated to retain a few officers in the service, who, but for the alteration, would have retired as lieutenant-colonels, in despair of the colonelcies which it brought within their reach.

(Signed) WILLIAM CABELL.

India Board, 6th August 1832.

NAMES of OFFICERS whose Commissions were compared; with the Dates of their respective Commissions, and their Periods of Service severally in the Ranks in which their Commissions were compared.

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

## ENSIGN TO LIEUTENANT.

BENGAL:	Ensign of	Lieut. of	Years of Service.	BENGAL—continued.	Ensign of	Lieut. of	Years of Service.
G. Wray .. ..	1807	1813	6	C. Hankin .. ..	1808	1813	5
T. T. Golding .. ..	1808	1814	6	L. Bruce .. ..	1808	1814	6
J. Marshall .. ..	1808	1814	6	E. Elkin .. ..	1809	1814	5
W. Dariser .. ..	1809	1814	5	A. Gerard .. ..	1808	1814	6
H. F. Caley .. ..	1807	1813	6	J. Bateman .. ..	1808	1814	6
T. Calley .. ..	1808	1814	6	C. T. G. Weston .. ..	1807	1813	6
R. Bruce .. ..	1808	1814	6	J. T. Lewis .. ..	1808	1814	6
J. Harles .. ..	1809	1814	5	G. H. Hutchins .. ..	1807	1812	5
H. W. Dyson .. ..	1810	1814	4	W. H. Winfield .. ..	1809	1814	5
J. J. Tillotson .. ..	1810	1814	4	W. C. Oriel .. ..	1808	1813	5
A. F. P. Macleod .. ..	1807	1812	5	F. Hodgson .. ..	1807	1812	5
R. Chalmers .. ..	1807	1813	6	J. A. Ayton .. ..	1807	1813	6
S. Swaine .. ..	1808	1814	6	J. B. Smith .. ..	1808	1813	5
J. Hogarth .. ..	1808	1804	6	S. P. C. Humphreys .. ..	1808	1813	5
A. F. Dingwall .. ..	1807	1812	5	G. Chapman .. ..	1809	1814	5
G. Mayer .. ..	1810	1814	4	J. J. Casement .. ..	1808	1814	6
T. Burkett .. ..	1810	1814	4	W. Aldores .. ..	1809	1814	5
A. Wright .. ..	1806	1811	5	R. Canty .. ..	1809	1814	5
S. Moody .. ..	1806	1814	8	W. H. Earle .. ..	1809	1814	5
R. B. Ferguson .. ..	1807	1814	7	W. L. Trueman .. ..	1807	1812	5
W. Jover .. ..	1807	1814	7	H. Burney .. ..	1808	1813	5
J. Dunlop .. ..	1808	1811	6	M. A. Bunbury .. ..	1808	1814	6
C. Rogers .. ..	1807	1813	6	J. O. Clarkson .. ..	1807	1811	4
D. Hepburn .. ..	1808	1814	6	J. C. Witherspoon .. ..	1807	1813	6
H. James .. ..	1809	1814	5	G. Gordon .. ..	1808	1814	6
G. F. Holland .. ..	1806	1811	5	J. Agnew .. ..	1807	1812	5
E. F. Strettell .. ..	1807	1812	5	J. H. Waldron .. ..	1807	1812	5
R. Bayldon .. ..	1807	1813	6	T. R. Macqueen .. ..	1808	1812	5
D. Thomas .. ..	1808	1813	5	J. Johnstone .. ..	1807	1812	4
A. Davidson .. ..	1809	1814	5	T. Bolton .. ..	1807	1813	6
H. G. Nash .. ..	1809	1814	5	J. Brett .. ..	1808	1814	6
J. Robeson .. ..	1807	1812	5	J. Parsons .. ..	1806	1812	6
H. J. Bland .. ..	1807	1812	5	D. Mann .. ..	1807	1812	5
J. Manson .. ..	1808	1814	6	A. Smith .. ..	1807	1813	6
G. Hicks .. ..	1808	1813	5	J. N. Wilson .. ..	1807	1813	6
W. Simonds .. ..	1808	1814	6	R. H. Phillips .. ..	1808	1814	6
B. Maltby .. ..	1808	1814	6	J. W. Douglas .. ..	1808	1814	6
N. Campbell .. ..	1810	1814	4	J. Price .. ..	1808	1814	6
W. Todd .. ..	1807	1812	5	R. S. Phillipp .. ..	1808	1814	6
J. A. Carrie .. ..	1807	1813	6	W. H. Hayes .. ..	1806	1811	5
J. Sommerville .. ..	1807	1813	6	T. S. Donnelly .. ..	1808	1814	6
J. Thompson .. ..	1808	1814	6	J. Hoggan .. ..	1808	1814	6
J. Wilson .. ..	1808	1813	5	W. R. Harding .. ..	1808	1814	6
J. M. Sim .. ..	1808	1813	5	W. Turner .. ..	1808	1814	6
E. Allingham .. ..	1809	1814	5				

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

Names of Officers—continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

MADRAS :			Ensign of	Lieut. of	Years of Service.	MADRAS—continued.			Ensign of	Lieut. of	Years of Service.
D. J. Ellaway ..	..	..	1809	1814	5	A. Gray ..	..	..	1808	1815	7
H. S. Gale ..	..	..	1810	1814	4	N. Spence ..	..	..	1809	1815	6
A. P. Russell ..	..	..	1809	1813	4	H. Bevan ..	..	..	1810	1816	6
J. B. Mercier ..	..	..	1809	1815	6	W. Graham ..	..	..	1810	1817	7
E. Rule ..	..	..	1807	1812	5	J. Richard ..	..	..	1811	1815	4
E. Williams ..	..	..	1809	1812	3	C. Daviniene ..	..	..	1811	1817	6
H. Wallis ..	..	..	1806	1811	5	J. Forest ..	..	..	1812	1817	5
T. Watson ..	..	..	1806	1812	6	H. Bolton ..	..	..	1810	1814	4
A. Sibbald ..	..	..	1807	1813	6	W. Macintosh ..	..	..	1810	1815	5
C. S. J. Grant ..	..	..	1807	1813	6	J. F. Palmer ..	..	..	1811	1816	5
T. Howell ..	..	..	1809	1813	4	C. M. Bird ..	..	..	1812	1816	4
A. Campbell ..	..	..	1809	1814	5	W. Allan ..	..	..	1807	1812	5
J. G. Mitford ..	..	..	1810	1816	6	S. O. Smith ..	..	..	1808	1813	5
F. Mountford ..	..	..	1809	1814	5	W. Bourdieu ..	..	..	1809	1815	6
J. H. Bennett ..	..	..	1807	1812	5	R. Gibbins ..	..	..	1809	1816	7
A. Hendrice ..	..	..	1807	1812	5	J. Ker ..	..	..	1809	1816	7
J. J. James ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	W. Macleod ..	..	..	1808	1813	5
T. Locke ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	H. W. Poole ..	..	..	1808	1811	6
W. Low ..	..	..	1809	1813	4	W. Strahan ..	..	..	1808	1814	6
R. Sheddon ..	..	..	1810	1814	4	H. R. King ..	..	..	1808	1814	6
J. B. Nottidgo ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	T. J. Master ..	..	..	1809	1816	7
G. Lee ..	..	..	1810	1816	6	N. Syme ..	..	..	1809	1816	7
R. Dunmore ..	..	..	1810	1817	7	J. Allan ..	..	..	1810	1817	7
J. Clemens ..	..	..	1809	1814	5	D. S. Maitland ..	..	..	1810	1818	8
C. Martin ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	H. Cazalet ..	..	..	1808	1814	6
C. M. Robertson ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	J. Ward ..	..	..	1808	1814	6
J. Laurie ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	J. Wright ..	..	..	1809	1815	6
T. R. C. Mantill ..	..	..	1809	1813	4	H. F. Bowness ..	..	..	1811	1816	5
M. Lawler ..	..	..	1809	1814	5	J. W. Corbould ..	..	..	1812	1817	5
T. A. Crichton ..	..	..	1809	1814	5	A. Macdonald ..	..	..	1807	1813	6
H. Strong ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	H. A. Thompson ..	..	..	1808	1813	5
A. Buncett ..	..	..	1810	1816	6	H. Serjeant ..	..	..	1808	1814	6
R. Butler ..	..	..	1807	1812	5	W. H. Baddely ..	..	..	1809	1814	5
J. Peake ..	..	..	1808	1812	4	W. Scott ..	..	..	1810	1815	5
W. Drake ..	..	..	1810	1814	4	T. B. Jones ..	..	..	1806	1812	6
L. Macdowall ..	..	..	1808	1813	5	J. Govaine ..	..	..	1807	1813	6
D. C. Stewart ..	..	..	1809	1813	4	J. Malter ..	..	..	1807	1813	6
J. S. Kensey ..	..	..	1809	1815	6	T. C. S. Hyde ..	..	..	1807	1814	7
C. Sinclair ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	R. H. Hodge ..	..	..	1807	1814	7
C. H. Gibb ..	..	..	1810	1816	6	R. Few ..	..	..	1809	1815	6
R. Gordon ..	..	..	1810	1815	5	J. Low ..	..	..	1812	1817	5

Names of Officers, &c.—*continued.*APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

BOMBAY :			Ensign of	Lieut. of	Years of Service.	BOMBAY— <i>continued.</i>			Ensign of	Lieut. of	Years of Service.
W. Henderson .. ..	1809	1813	4	T. D. Morris .. ..	1809	1814	5				
J. Rowbotham .. ..	1809	1813	4	J. Mills .. ..	1809	1814	5				
D. Mitchell .. ..	1811	1815	4	T. Leighton .. ..	1808	1814	6				
W. Inglis .. ..	1807	1812	5	W. Lean .. ..	1811	1817	6				
D. Capon .. ..	1810	1815	5	W. Clark .. ..	1811	1817	6				
A. Morse .. ..	1811	1816	5	W. F. Dunlop .. ..	1811	1817	6				
A. N. Riddell .. ..	1811	1817	6	C. Payne .. ..	1805	1810	5				
T. Gordon .. ..	1805	1811	6	G. Roe .. ..	1807	1812	5				
J. Laurie .. ..	1805	1813	8	M. F. Collis .. ..	1807	1813	6				
W. Spratt .. ..	1809	1814	5	J. S. Inadell .. ..	1809	1814	5				
J. W. Aitchison .. ..	1806	1811	5	G. Sanyster .. ..	1807	1812	5				
H. Adams .. ..	1807	1812	5	R. Waite .. ..	1807	1812	5				
A. W. Burn .. ..	1805	1812	7	C. Newport .. ..	1809	1814	5				
W. D. Robertson .. ..	1807	1813	6	J. Simpson .. ..	1809	1815	6				
T. E. Baynes .. ..	1808	1814	6	J. Worthy .. ..	1810	1815	5				
J. B. Seeley .. ..	1809	1814	5	J. Addison .. ..	1811	1817	6				
T. Lay .. ..	1811	1815	4								

## LIEUTENANT TO CAPTAIN.

BENGAL :			Lieut. of	Capt. of	Years of Service.	BENGAL— <i>continued.</i>			Lieut. of	Capt. of	Years of Service.
C. C. Smith .. ..	1804	1818	14	T. W. Raban .. ..	1804	1819	15				
G. Bolton .. ..	1804	1819	15	R. L. Dickson .. ..	1805	1819	14				
J. Patterson .. ..	1806	1819	13	F. Twine .. ..	1805	1820	15				
J. Holbrow .. ..	1808	1820	12	J. W. Jones .. ..	1808	1820	12				
T. W. Broadbent .. ..	1804	1818	14	P. Tenlon .. ..	1806	1819	13				
P. Jeremie .. ..	1804	1818	14	A. Trotter .. ..	1803	1818	15				
J. Harris .. ..	1804	1819	15	R. Asford .. ..	1803	1819	16				
W. Dechizean .. ..	1804	1818	14	R. B. Jenkins .. ..	1804	1818	14				
H. Cook .. ..	1804	1818	14	S. Swinhoe .. ..	1805	1819	14				
J. B. Pratt .. ..	1801	1819	15	D. Crichton .. ..	1805	1818	13				
G. P. Field .. ..	1804	1819	15	J. E. Wallis .. ..	1806	1819	13				
E. T. Bradby .. ..	1805	1819	14	J. W. Looker .. ..	1804	1819	15				
T. Arbuthnot .. ..	1803	1818	15	J. De Waal .. ..	1804	1820	16				
W. F. Wilson .. ..	1804	1819	15	J. J. Gordon .. ..	1804	1818	14				
R. Ross .. ..	1805	1819	14	A. Dick .. ..	1804	1820	16				
T. Maddock .. ..	1804	1819	15	W. A. Yates .. ..	1804	1818	14				
H. O'Donnel .. ..	1805	1820	15	F. Buckley .. ..	1804	1819	15				
C. E. Turner .. ..	1807	1820	13	J. Fleming .. ..	1805	1818	13				
J. Fagan .. ..	1807	1820	13	F. Grant .. ..	1805	1819	14				
T. S. Oliver .. ..	1804	1818	14	J. Seppings .. ..	1804	1818	14				
J. Thomas .. ..	1804	1819	15	C. Methuen .. ..	1805	1819	14				
A. Dunsmure .. ..	1803	1818	15	C. Dobbs .. ..	1804	1818	14				

(BENGAL *continued.*)

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

Names of Officers, &c.—*continued.*

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

BENGAL—continued.				BENGAL—continued.			
	Lient. of	Capt. of	Years of Service.		Lient. of	Capt. of	Years of Service.
T. Fiddes .. ..	1805	1819	14	J. Anderson .. ..	1804	1818	14
J. E. Webster .. ..	1805	1818	13	T. Young .. ..	1801	1818	14
O. Stubbs .. ..	1806	1819	13	W. Reding .. ..	1805	1820	15
J. N. Jackson .. ..	1805	1818	13	W. S. Webb .. ..	1803	1818	15
J. Johnson .. ..	1805	1819	14	P. M. Hay .. ..	1804	1819	15
H. M. Wheeler .. ..	1805	1819	14	C. H. Raymond .. ..	1804	1819	15
R. W. Pogson .. ..	1805	1819	14	J. Hunter .. ..	1803	1818	15
J. C. Parke .. ..	1801	1819	15	J. Macgregor .. ..	1804	1819	15
D. Presgrave .. ..	1804	1818	14	H. Morrieson .. ..	1801	1819	15
W. W. Moore .. ..	1808	1819	11	S. Land .. ..	1803	1818	15
J. Trelaway .. ..	1805	1819	14	W. Mackie .. ..	1803	1819	16
MADRAS:				MADRAS—continued.			
J. S. Spankie .. ..	1804	1818	14	J. Noble .. ..	1809	1820	11
B. Hooper .. ..	1805	1818	13	F. Robson .. ..	1805	1819	14
H. Kyd .. ..	1805	1818	13	H. Holmes .. ..	1806	1819	13
C. T. Peile .. ..	1801	1817	16	G. Jones .. ..	1806	1819	13
J. Moncrieff .. ..	1804	1819	15	J. Perry .. ..	1807	1820	13
J. Fyfe .. ..	1806	1820	14	J. J. O'Donnoghue .. ..	1804	1818	14
R. Hunter .. ..	1803	1817	14	G. Drew .. ..	1801	1818	14
H. Conway .. ..	1804	1819	15	J. Hodgson .. ..	1805	1819	14
A. French .. ..	1804	1818	14	G. J. Blair .. ..	1804	1818	14
C. Herbert .. ..	1804	1819	15	F. Norton .. ..	1805	1819	14
M. J. Harris .. ..	1804	1818	14	J. Mallandain .. ..	1805	1819	14
J. Watson .. ..	1805	1818	13	T. W. Wigan .. ..	1806	1820	14
E. Oldnall .. ..	1805	1818	13	A. Cooke .. ..	1805	1818	13
T. J. Wilkins .. ..	1805	1819	14	H. Wahab .. ..	1806	1818	12
W. Hardy .. ..	1801	1818	14	J. Michael .. ..	1807	1819	12
A. Tulloch .. ..	1804	1820	16	J. Matthews .. ..	1808	1820	12
R. Bowyer .. ..	1804	1818	14	J. Hadwen .. ..	1804	1818	14
A. Roberts .. ..	1801	1818	14	C. O. Fothergill .. ..	1804	1818	14
W. Hunter .. ..	1804	1819	15	W. T. Sneyd .. ..	1804	1819	15
G. H. Isaacke .. ..	1805	1819	14	H. Ross .. ..	1804	1818	14
J. Boles .. ..	1806	1819	13	G. Leggatt .. ..	1804	1818	14
J. Rodger .. ..	1807	1819	12	C. Waddell .. ..	1804	1819	15
G. Norman .. ..	1808	1820	12	H. Tocker .. ..	1805	1820	15
H. Walker .. ..	1804	1819	15	W. Kutzleben .. ..	1804	1818	14
J. Bayley .. ..	1804	1819	15	E. H. Leith .. ..	1804	1818	14
T. G. Newell .. ..	1805	1820	15	J. H. Talbot .. ..	1804	1819	15
J. Macdonald .. ..	1804	1818	14	G. H. Budd .. ..	1805	1819	14
J. Kitson .. ..	1805	1820	15	C. D. Dunn .. ..	1805	1820	15
W. Kelso .. ..	1804	1819	15	R. Crew .. ..	1804	1818	14
A. Bentley .. ..	1804	1819	15	B. Blake .. ..	1804	1818	14
N. Alves .. ..	1805	1820	15	W. Hendle .. ..	1805	1819	14
T. Cox .. ..	1804	1819	15	C. Newman .. ..	1805	1819	14
J. Leighton .. ..	1804	1820	16	J. Ewing .. ..	1803	1817	14
H. Ceyle .. ..	1805	1820	15	G. Ogilvie .. ..	1804	1817	13
E. Bond .. ..	1808	1818	10	J. Macdonald .. ..	1801	1818	14

Names of Officers, &c.—*continued.*APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

BOMBAY:	Lieut. of	Capt. of	Years of Service.	BOMBAY— <i>continued.</i>	Lieut. of	Capt. of	Years of Service.
J. Brough ... ..	1808	1819	11	R. Harrison ... ..	1805	1819	14
C. Parr ... ..	1809	1819	10	M. Blackall ... ..	1806	1819	13
J. Shirreff ... ..	1809	1820	11	J. H. Dunstevillo ... ..	1806	1820	14
G. P. Taylor ... ..	1809	1820	11	A. W. Browne ... ..	1807	1820	13
N. C. Maw ... ..	1801	1814	13	T. G. Stewart ... ..	1801	1814	13
J. J. Puston ... ..	1801	1815	14	R. M. Grindlay ... ..	1804	1817	13
J. Elder ... ..	1803	1816	13	J. Morse ... ..	1804	1818	14
H. Montrem ... ..	1801	1817	16	E. Davies ... ..	1805	1818	13
J. Brown ... ..	1801	1817	16	H. A. Hervey ... ..	1805	1819	14
J. Morin ... ..	1801	1817	16	J. Inverarity ... ..	1806	1820	14
J. B. Dunsterville ... ..	1801	1818	17	R. Stamper ... ..	1806	1820	14
T. Danbeney ... ..	1803	1819	16	W. H. Stanley ... ..	1802	1814	12
R. Macfarlane ... ..	1804	1819	15	A. C. H. Lamy ... ..	1803	1814	11
R. Robertson ... ..	1806	1819	13	E. Pearson ... ..	1804	1815	11
J. Grant ... ..	1811	1819	8	J. Snodgrass ... ..	1805	1816	11
J. Irving ... ..	1800	1811	11	B. Ambrose ... ..	1805	1818	13
G. P. Seward ... ..	1802	1816	14	G. Edsall ... ..	1806	1818	12
D. H. Bellasis ... ..	1802	1817	15	F. Dangerfield ... ..	1808	1820	12
C. Gray ... ..	1803	1818	15	C. Davies ... ..	1810	1820	10
C. B. James ... ..	1803	1819	16	C. Garraway ... ..	1800	1815	15
J. Hughes ... ..	1805	1820	15	W. Morrison ... ..	1801	1817	16
J. Cooke ... ..	1807	1820	13	P. W. Pedler ... ..	1803	1817	14
F. Hickes ... ..	1807	1820	13	J. Livingston ... ..	1803	1819	16
J. Stewart ... ..	1799	1812	13	W. H. Sykes ... ..	1805	1819	14
R. A. Bromley ... ..	1800	1812	12	M. Soppitt ... ..	1805	1819	14
T. Pierce ... ..	1800	1817	17	A. B. Campbell ... ..	1807	1819	12
P. Fearon ... ..	1800	1817	17	R. Heule ... ..	1809	1820	11
J. Gibbon ... ..	1802	1817	15	J. Taylor ... ..	1804	1812	8
G. Challen ... ..	1803	1818	15	W. Miles ... ..	1800	1815	15
J. Cruickshank ... ..	1806	1820	14	G. Hutchinson ... ..	1802	1817	15
R. Taylor ... ..	1807	1820	13	W. Perkins ... ..	1802	1817	15
E. Frederick ... ..	1800	1814	14	A. J. O. Browne ... ..	1804	1818	14
T. Morgan ... ..	1801	1817	16	J. S. Bamford ... ..	1805	1819	14
J. J. Barton ... ..	1801	1817	16	W. Nash ... ..	1805	1819	14
G. Tweedy ... ..	1802	1818	16	J. Jones ... ..	1807	1820	13
W. Hollis ... ..	1805	1819	14	G. B. Brooks ... ..	1800	1812	12
D. Wilson ... ..	1805	1820	15	P. Lodwick ... ..	1800	1811	11
G. Arder ... ..	1806	1820	14	J. Smith ... ..	1805	1817	12
J. Keith ... ..	1807	1820	13	F. Farquharson ... ..	1804	1817	13
C. W. Elwood ... ..	1800	1812	12	G. Noble ... ..	1805	1817	12
C. Whitehill ... ..	1801	1815	14	J. D. Crozier ... ..	1803	1819	16
R. W. Fleming ... ..	1807	1818	11	R. Campbell ... ..	1805	1820	15
G. A. Rigby ... ..	1807	1819	12	A. Grafton ... ..	1806	1822	14
S. Long ... ..	1809	1819	10	R. H. Deshamp ... ..	1800	1817	17
T. Palin ... ..	1810	1819	9	N. Betts ... ..	1801	1816	15
H. D. Robertson ... ..	1810	1820	10	D. Barr ... ..	1804	1817	13
M. L. Gallwey ... ..	1811	1820	9	R. Barewell ... ..	1803	1817	14
A. Robertson ... ..	1801	1812	11	J. P. Napier ... ..	1807	1819	12
W. Miall ... ..	1802	1816	14	M. Bagnold ... ..	1805	1819	14
W. Gordon ... ..	1803	1816	13	J. Barclay ... ..	1806	1820	14
J. W. Graham ... ..	1803	1817	14	G. J. Wilson ... ..	1807	1820	13

(continued.)



APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

## Names of Officers, &amp;c.—continued.

## CAPTAIN TO MAJOR.

## I. Captain-lieutenant to Captain.

BENGAL :	Captain Lieut. of	Captain of	Years of Service.	BENGAL—continued.	Captain Lieut. of	Captain of	Years of Service.
J. Stuart .. ..	1805	1808	3	P. Byers .. ..	1805	1807	2
J. S. Harriott .. ..	1805	1807	2	J. Hall .. ..	1805	1809	4
J. Scott .. ..	1804	1806	2	C. S. Fagan .. ..	1805	1808	3
W. P. Price .. ..	1804	1806	2	W. Innis .. ..	1804	1806	2
G. Herbert .. ..	1805	1806	1	J. Cock .. ..	1805	1807	2
J. Owen .. ..	1804	1807	3	F. Edwards .. ..	1804	1806	2
W. J. Matthews .. ..	1805	1806	1	J. Wilson .. ..	1805	1807	2
J. Lindsay .. ..	1804	1806	2	M. Keating .. ..	1804	1807	3
MADRAS :				MADRAS—continued.			
H. P. Pepper .. ..	1804	1807	3	T. Wren .. ..	1805	1809	4
J. T. Johnson .. ..	1804	1807	3	J. W. Baker .. ..	1805	1806	1
F. H. Smith .. ..	1804	1806	2	W. Preston .. ..	1805	1806	1
W. C. Fraser .. ..	1805	1807	2	A. J. Clarin .. ..	1805	1807	2
W. H. Sale .. ..	1805	1808	3	D. Mackay .. ..	1805	1807	2
E. W. Snow .. ..	1805	1806	1	J. Lindsay .. ..	1804	1806	2
J. W. White .. ..	1805	1809	4				
BOMBAY :				BOMBAY—continued.			
A. Hogg .. ..	1805	1809	4	W. Miles .. ..	1813	1815	2
W. Turner .. ..	1805	1806	1	N. Belts .. ..	1813	1816	3
F. D. Ballantine .. ..	1810	1812	2	C. Whitehill .. ..	1812	1815	3
J. Stewart .. ..	1811	1812	1	W. Meall .. ..	1813	1816	3
G. B. Boles .. ..	1809	1813	4	T. G. Stewart .. ..	1813	1814	1
J. F. Salter .. ..	1809	1812	3	W. H. Stanley .. ..	1813	1814	1
R. A. Willis .. ..	1810	1814	4	G. Garraway .. ..	1814	1815	1
N. C. Maw .. ..	1812	1814	2				

## II. Captain to Major.

BENGAL :	Captain of	Major of	Years of Service.	BENGAL—continued.	Captain of	Major of	Years of Service.
J. P. Keble .. ..	1804	1814	10	J. Sharpe .. ..	1805	1814	9
J. Shapland .. ..	1804	1811	7	H. Griffiths .. ..	1804	1814	10
J. Guiner .. ..	1805	1812	7	G. M. Popham .. ..	1805	1813	8
C. Baldock .. ..	1804	1813	9	J. Nicol .. ..	1804	1814	10
C. Fagan .. ..	1804	1811	7				

Names of Officers, &c.—*continued.*APPENDIX (B.),  
*continued.*(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1892.

MADRAS :			Captain of	Major of	Years of Service.	MADRAS— <i>continued.</i>			Captain of	Major of	Years of Service.
P. D. Maret	..	..	1805	1817	12	G. L. Lambert	..	..	1805	1817	12
A. Minin	..	..	1804	1816	12	J. P. Stewart	..	..	1806	1818	12
H. H. Pepper	..	..	1807	1815	8	T. Wren	..	..	1809	1817	8
T. Webster	..	..	1805	1817	12	J. H. Baber	..	..	1806	1818	12
H. Durand	..	..	1804	1817	13	W. Preston	..	..	1806	1816	10
J. Moadie	..	..	1804	1814	10	S. M'Dowall	..	..	1805	1814	9
W. Woodhouse	..	..	1804	1814	10	G. Dare	..	..	1805	1818	13
T. A. S. Ahmuty	..	..	1804	1814	10	R. H. Yates	..	..	1807	1815	8
J. C. Stokoe	..	..	1804	1814	10	C. M'Leod	..	..	1804	1815	11
H. G. A. Taylor	..	..	1807	1816	9	J. Dymmock	..	..	1804	1816	12
J. D. Woulfe	..	..	1805	1817	12	T. Beckett	..	..	1807	1817	10
G. Cadell	..	..	1808	1817	9						
BOMBAY :						BOMBAY— <i>continued.</i>					
W. J. Elridge	..	..	1805	1815	10	E. Kenny	..	..	1804	1814	10
W. D. Cleiland	..	..	1806	1815	9	J. F. Dyson	..	..	1805	1815	10
G. Kemp	..	..	1805	1813	8	C. F. Edwards	..	..	1804	1814	10
W. Gilbert	..	..	1805	1817	12	B. W. D. Sealy	..	..	1808	1817	9
J. S. Jerdin	..	..	1803	1815	12	T. Thatcher	..	..	1807	1816	9
J. M'Clintoch	..	..	1803	1816	13	J. Lyall	..	..	1803	1812	9
J. Cunningham	..	..	1805	1814	9						

## MAJOR TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL.

BENGAL :			Major of	Lt.-col. of	Years of Service.	BENGAL— <i>continued.</i>			Major of	Lt.-col. of	Years of Service.
J. Vanrenen	..	..	1804	1810	6	J. Burnett	..	..	1807	1812	5
J. Hodgson	..	..	1805	1811	6	J. L. Richardson	..	..	1807	1812	5
J. Dewar	..	..	1805	1811	6	D. Lyons	..	..	1807	1813	6
W. H. Cooper	..	..	1805	1811	6	H. Imlach	..	..	1807	1813	6
G. Carpenter	..	..	1805	1811	6	W. Nichols	..	..	1807	1813	6
W. A. Thompson	..	..	1806	1811	5	J. N. Smith	..	..	1808	1814	6
R. Broughton	..	..	1806	1812	6						
MADRAS :						MADRAS— <i>continued.</i>					
T. Boles	..	..	1804	1809	5	G. A. Muatt	..	..	1807	1813	6
G. Hamilton	..	..	1804	1809	5	J. De Morgan	..	..	1807	1813	6
H. Fraser	..	..	1805	1809	4	T. Steele	..	..	1807	1813	6
H. L. Scott	..	..	1805	1810	5	W. Lewis	..	..	1806	1813	Cavalry
J. Lindsay	..	..	1805	1810	5	T. A. Fraser	..	..	1808	1813	5
R. Scot	..	..	1805	1810	5	J. Vernon	..	..	1808	1813	5
A. M'Dowall	..	..	1805	1811	6	B. Dod	..	..	1808	1814	6
W. Blackburne	..	..	1806	1812	6	C. Farran	..	..	1808	1814	6
C. Deacon	..	..	1807	1813	6	E. Broadman	..	..	1808	1814	6
J. Welsh	..	..	1807	1813	6	A. M'Intosh	..	..	1808	1814	6

(continued.)

APPENDIX (B.),  
continued.

(23.)—Remarks  
by Mr. Cabell,  
6th August 1832.

Names of Officers, &c.—continued.

BOMBAY :			Major of	Lt.-col. of	Years of Service.	BOMBAY—continued.			Major of	Lt.-col. of	Years of Service.
J. Llewellyn	..	..	1803	1810	7	J. Smith	..	..	1808	1813	5
H. S. Osborne	..	..	1807	1811	4	T. Corselli	..	..	1808	1813	5
W. Boyé	..	..	1807	1811	4	J. C. Harris	..	..	1808	1814	6
W. Roome	..	..	1807	1812	5	R. Barclay	..	..	1809	1814	5
D. Leighton	..	..	1807	1813	6	F. W. Giffard	..	..	1809	1815	6
C. B. Bun	..	..	1807	1813	6	J. Lithgow	..	..	1810	1815	5

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TO COLONEL.

BENGAL :			Lt.-col. of	Colonel of	Years of Service.	BENGAL—continued.			Lt.-col. of	Colonel of	Years of Service.
J. Arnold	..	..	1805	1819	14	G. Dick	..	..	1807	1819	12
G. H. Pine	..	..	1807	1819	12	J. Cunningham	..	..	1808	1820	12
J. Tetley	..	..	1807	1819	12	T. Shuldham	..	..	1808	1820	12
L. Burrell	..	..	1807	1819	12						
MADRAS ;						MADRAS—continued.					
C. Macauley	..	..	1804	1813	9	J. Simms	..	..	1804	1817	13
J. Dighton	..	..	1804	1815	11	W. Ogg	..	..	1805	1818	13
T. Munro	..	..	1804	1815	11	J. Malcolm	..	..	1805	1818	13
W. M'Leod	..	..	1804	1815	11	J. G. Symons	..	..	1804	1818	14
H. Webber	..	..	1804	1817	13	N. Forbes	..	..	1805	1818	13
G. Bowness	..	..	1804	1817	13	J. G. Graham	..	..	1805	1818	13
BOMBAY :						BOMBAY—continued.					
S. Wilson	..	..	1805	1817	12	R. Lewis	..	..	1811	1819	8
J. W. Morris	..	..	1806	1817	11	H. P. Lawrence	..	..	1800	1814	14
J. Skelton	..	..	1807	1817	10						

**I N D E X**  
**TO THE**  
**REPORT,**  
**THE**  
**MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,**  
**AND**  
**APPENDIX.**



# INDEX.

*N. B.*—In the following Index, the Figures following the Names refer to the questions in the Evidence; App. p. to page of Appendix, and par. to paragraphs.

## A.

**ACCOUNTANT of Military Store Accounts.** See 'Military Store Accounts.'

**Accountrements.** Manner of supplying them, *Pritzler* 1211—1213—Desirable to assimilate the army equipments of the three Presidencies, *Scot* 1418—1420, 1454—In what the equipments of the Bombay troops are deficient, *Leighton* 1944—1946—Their equipments sufficient, *Smith* 2324—Inferiority of Native cavalry appointments, *Dalbiac* 1999—Grievance from difference of price paid for accountrements in England and India, *Dalbiac* 2145—Inferiority of articles and accountrements of troops of India to those regiments in Europe, and how far serviceable, *Paget* 2305—2307.

See also 'Arms.'

**Addiscombe Seminary.** Expense thereof, and number of cadets educated, *Salmond* 640—643—Number on the establishment; ages at which received, and period of remaining, *Houstoun* 1806—1811, 1859—Ages of going to India, *Houstoun* 1812, 1813, 1838, 1839—Recommendation on leaving for particular branches, from merit only, *Houstoun* 1814, 1815—Amount paid by cadets towards the establishment, *Houstoun* 1818—Period of vacations, *Houstoun* 1819, 1820—Principally educated for engineers and artillery service, *Houstoun* 1821—Number of examinations, and method of conducting them, *Houstoun* 1830—1832.

Arrangement as to drafting off for engineers and artillery service, *Houstoun* 1833—Nature of discipline and punishment, *Houstoun* 1834—1836—Number annually sent out, *Houstoun* 1841—1843—How far Native languages taught at, *Houstoun* 1848—1854—Pocket-money allowed at Addiscombe, *Houstoun* 1855—1857—Number of corporals, *Houstoun* 1858—Cadets might be made to pay the expenses of the establishment, *Houstoun* 1860, 1861—Comparison of examinations at Addiscombe and Woolwich, *Houstoun* 1862—1864—Expense thereof in 1828, *Melville* 2138.

See also 'Education.'

## ADJUTANT GENERAL:

### I.—Generally:

His duties, *Nicolls* 173—176, *Reynell* 411—413, *Munro* 1073, 1074—Comparison of duties of Adjutant-general's department at Bengal and Madras, *Nicolls* 211—Not

INDEX.  
ACC—ADJ.

INDEX.  
—  
ADV—AIT.

so necessary for Adjutant-general to have previously served in India as for Commander-in-chief, *Reynell* 346—Reason of increase in the Adjutant-general's department, *Malcolm* 682—684—How far it might be reduced, *Malcolm* 714—716—Advantages of one Adjutant-general with deputies at each station, *Pritzler* 1177—1179.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee :*

Adjutant-general and assistant Adjutant-general on the staff at Bengal, and deputy Adjutant-general at Madras, App. p. 44—Number and description of persons composing the staff of the Adjutant-general's department at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 47.

*Advocate-general.* See 'Judge Advocate-general.'

*Ages.* See 'Addiscombe Seminary.' 'Cadets.' 'Native Soldiers.' 'Schools.'

*Ahmednugger,* Collector at. Staff officer on the Bombay establishment employed as collector at Ahmednugger, App. p. 48.

*Aides-de-camp,* Number of, on the staff, and allowed the Commander-in-chief at Bengal, and lieutenants-general commanding the forces at Madras and Bombay as Commanders-in-chief of the Company's troops at those Presidencies, App. p. 44—Services to which aides-de-camp belong, of Governor-General, Commander-in-chief, and of general officers on the staff, App. p. 46—Number of staff officers, aides-de-camp to Governor, Commander-in-chief, and general officers on the staff at Madras, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 48.

See also 'Majors-general.' 'Officers, Native.'

*Aitchison, Lieut.-col. J. W.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Situations held by witness in the Bombay Presidency, 1686—1693, 1699—Discipline of the Native army, 1694—Regulations enforcing attention to religious feelings of the Natives, 1695—How far Natives attached to their officers, 1696, 1697—Officers generally attached to Native regiments on their arrival, 1698—How far health of Europeans improved in the last twenty years, 1700, 1701—Proportion of sick Natives and Europeans, 1702—1704—Period when difficulty experienced in recruiting Native regiments, 1705—Period of service of Native soldiers, 1706—Period of service for pensions, 1707, 1708—Ages of recruits, 1709—1711—Advantages of the establishment of boys, 1712—How far intercourse between Native and European officers enjoined by the Regulations, 1713—1715—How far additional advantages should be given to Native officers, 1716—1720—Difficulty of further reduction, 1722—1727—Comparison of advantages in pay and promotion in different Presidencies, 1728—1732—How far one Commander-in-chief would be advisable, 1733—How far advantageous to unite the Company's army under the King, 1734—Comparison of distinctions between King's and Company's officers, 1735—1741.

Number of European officers necessary for a Native regiment, 1742—1745—Mortality among soldiers' children, 1746—1751—Pay of Bombay sepoys, 1752—Number of men allowed to be absent on furlough, 1753, 1754—Principles of schools, and nature of instruction, 1755—1757—Military qualities, and religions of different sepoys, 1758—1760—Benefits of employing Native officers in revenue corps and police duties, 1761—1763—European regiment at Bombay; efficiency thereof; but want of officers, 1764—1767—European troops require more officers than Native, 1768, 1769—Regulation as to invaliding or pensioning Native soldiers, 1770—1772—Injurious effect of amalgamating two European regiments into two wings of one corps, 1773—Differences of Regulations as to invaliding and pensions in Bengal and Bombay, 1774—1778—General efficiency and good disposition of Native troops, 1779—How far commutation of dram allowance beneficial, 1780—1784—Period of inspection of regiments, 1785—Method of appointing staff non-commissioned officers, 1786, 1787—Decrease of desertion 1788, 1789—How far commanding officers have sufficient power of appointment of their regimental staff 1790—1796—Knowledge of Native languages indispensable to a

staff appointment, 1797, 1798—Further allowance should be given to officers to induce them to remain with their regiments instead of taking staff employment, 1799, 1800.

*Allowances.* See 'Batta.' 'Command Money.' 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Tentage.'

*Amboyna.* Expense of troops serving therein : 1813, App. p. 8, 9—1814, App. p. 10, 11—1816, App. p. 14, 15.

*Arms.* Allowance in Bengal for the repair of arms, &c., *Nicolls* 131—Establishment for that purpose at Madras, and the arms in better order, *Nicolls* 131, 132—Regulations as to the repair of arms and accoutrements, *Reynell* 364—366—Method of providing arms and accoutrements, *Leighton* 1947—1949.

Inferiority of arms, accoutrements, and clothing of Native to King's troops, *Macan* 2152—2156—King's troops take their own arms to India, which are left in store, *Macan* 2157—In what defects in the arms of the Bombay troops consist, *Smith* 2325—Opinion that the Company's arms are better than those in the King's service, and reason therefor, *Forrest* 2353, 2354.

See also 'Accoutrements.' 'Ordnance.'

*Army Agency.* Necessity for an army agency sanctioned by the Company, *Scot* 1451.

## ARMY IN INDIA :

### I.—Generally :

Making the Company's army a royal army would not be advantageous either to the officers or the public, *Nicolls* 67, 68—It will depend upon the future arrangement of the government of India, *Malcolm* 730—Three armies, as at present, is preferable to their being united, *Nicolls* 69—Inconvenience of amalgamating the three armies, *Feilding* 798—800—Advantages of troops meeting on service having all their establishments similar, *Nicolls* 241—Opinion as to uniting the Company's army under the King, *Reynell* 469—472, *Munro* 1096, *Aitchison* 1734, *Leighton* 1951, *Paget* 2297—Benefits of uniting the services, and means of accomplishing it, *Reynell* 308—310, *Watson* 1007—1011—Comparison of advantages of service in India over the Colonies, *Reynell* 350, 351.

Arrangement to be made with regard to colonial branch and staff appointments, in the event of uniting the armies, *Reynell* 482—484—Services of the army in India cannot be rendered more efficacious without increase of expenditure, *Salmond* 544, 545—Discipline of the army is good, *Salmond* 559—Indian armies cannot be assimilated too much, *Pritzler* 1143, 1144—Company's army should be made a royal army, keeping the Native regiments distinct, *Pritzler* 1162—1164—Difficulty of assembling troops in large bodies, *Scot* 1436, 1437—Reasons why the Company's army should not be incorporated under the King, *Scot* 1452, *Smith* 2337—Incorporation of the Company's army under the King not applicable to Native regiments, *Greenhill* 1567, 1568—Effect of making the Company's army a royal army upon Native troops and European officers, *Macan* 2204.

### II.—Expense thereof :

#### 1. Generally :

Expense of the Indian army, *Melville* 2043, 2044, 2140, 2141—Cost of the army at Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and St. Helena, and strength of the army therein, 1813—1831, *Melville* 2046—2065—Comparison of expense with income, *Melville* 2066—2070—Expense of the staff at each of the Presidencies, 1814—1829, *Melville* 2075—2079—Expense of an European regiment of different descriptions of troops, *Melville* 2083—2089—The like of Native regiments, *Melville* 2090—Expense of the artillery, commissariat, clothing, barracks, &c. from 1814, *Melville* 2097—2111—Expense of military stores sent out to India in 1828, *Melville* 2129—Expense of Addiscombe College in 1828, *Melville* 2138—Expense of the Military Depot in 1828, *Melville* 2139—



INDEX.  
—  
ARMY.

Arrangement between the King's government and the Company as to the expense of troops serving in India, *Melvill* 2140.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the annual expense of the military force at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7, *Synopsis*, App. p. xii—Return showing the annual charge of the armies of the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements (including provincial corps), as the same stood on the 30th April 1813, App. p. 8, 9—1814, App. p. 10, 11—1815, App. p. 12, 13—1816, App. p. 14, 15—1817, App. p. 16, 17—1818, App. p. 18, 19—1819, App. p. 20, 21—1820, App. p. 22, 23—1821, App. p. 24, 25—1822, App. p. 26, 27—1823, App. p. 28, 29—1824, App. p. 30, 31—1825, App. p. 32, 33—1826, App. p. 34, 35—1827, App. p. 36, 37—1828, App. p. 38, 39—1829, App. p. 40, 41—1830, App. p. 42, 43.

Return showing the aggregate expense of the staff and certain military departments, on 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 52—Return showing the aggregate expense of military stores sent from England in the years 1813, 1826, and 1830, App. p. 53—Calculation of the comparative expense of certain regiments on the Bengal establishment, App. p. 54, 55—The like on the Madras establishment, App. p. 56, 57—The like on the Bombay establishment, App. p. 58, 59.

III.—*Papers laid before the Committee relative to the Army generally :*

Return showing the total number of Europeans and Natives employed at each Presidency, and in all India, 1793—1830, App. p. 2—Return showing the numbers of the military force at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7, *Synopsis*, App. p. xii—Return showing the numbers of the military force at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, for the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829 App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

Return of the establishment of a regiment of Native cavalry and Native infantry at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments of regiments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 60—The like of a brigade of horse and battalion of foot artillery, App. p. 63—The like of the corps of engineers, battalion of pioneers, and corps of sappers and miners, App. p. 70—The like of a regiment of European infantry, App. p. 73—Return of the establishment of a regiment of dragoons and of a regiment of infantry, in the East-Indies, in the year 1813 and at the present time, together with the number of corps of each description, and of the troops or companies belonging to each corps, and where alterations of establishment have intermediately taken place, showing the date of the alteration, App. p. 78—Return of the distribution of the army in India in the years 1813, 1820, and 1830, App. p. 81—107.

Circular letter from T. Hyde Villiers, Esq. dated India Board, 2d February 1832, to officers of the Indian service, requesting information upon subjects connected with the Indian army, App. p. 154—Answer thereto from Lieut.-colonel Salmond, dated 24th February 1832, App. p. 155—From Major-general Sir John Malcolm, G. C. B., dated 13th February 1832, App. p. 168—From the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, dated 5th August 1832, App. p. 257—From Major-general Sir Thomas Pritzler, K. C. B., dated 17th February 1832, App. p. 260—From Lieut.-general Sir W. Keir Grant, K. C. B., dated 27th March 1832, App. p. 270—From Lieut.-colonel De Havil-

land, dated 7th July 1832, App. p. 277—From Major Justinian Nutt, dated 24th August 1832, App. p. 285—From Col. Pennington, c. b., dated 7th March 1832, App. p. 291—From Col. Sherwood, dated 28th February 1833, App. p. 301—From Col. Limond, dated 31st January 1832, App. p. 303—From Lieut.-col. Hopkinson, c. b., dated 15th February 1832, App. p. 308—From Capt. Balmain, dated 31st March 1832, App. p. 314—From Major-general Sir H. Worsley, k. c. b., dated 30th March 1832, App. p. 323—From Lieut.-col. Baker, dated 29th February 1832, App. p. 333—From Col. John Munro, dated 13th March 1832, App. p. 350—From Major D. Wilson, dated 29th March 1832, App. p. 357—From Col. Stannus, c. b., dated 20th February 1832, App. p. 383—From Col. Mayne, c. b., dated 5th March 1832, App. p. 385—From Capt. Page, dated 12th March 1832, App. p. 387—From Capt. James Grant Duff, dated 25th March 1832, App. p. 393—Remarks by Mr. Cabell, dated 6th August 1832, App. p. 401.

Considered an object of policy not to intermix the troops of the three Presidencies unnecessarily, or for longer periods than the exigencies of the service require, *Salmond*, App. p. 157—Evils of transferring the Company's army to the Crown, and whether a disaffected feeling in the Company's officers would not be raised thereby, *Salmond*, App. p. 164—Savings that might be made in the event of transferring the Company's army to the Crown might be made with equal facility under the present system of government, *Salmond*, App. p. 165—Necessity for primary consideration being given to the army in India, the empire being solely maintained by the sword, *Malcolm*, App. p. 168.

Opinion relative to transferring the Indian army to the Crown, *Malcolm*, App. p. 171—Expediency of uniting the armies of the three Presidencies of India into one, *Malcolm*, App. p. 171—Letter from Sir J. Malcolm to Lord W. Bentinck, dated 27th Nov. 1830, upon the pay, composition, and distribution of the army in India, *Malcolm*, App. p. 192—Extract from minute by Lord W. Bentinck, while Governor of Madras, upon the security of the possession of the empire depending on military power, and consequent necessity for improving the military system, *Malcolm*, App. p. 217—Extract letter from Sir Thomas Munro, upon the formation of the Indian army, *Malcolm*, App. p. 226—Observations upon the general state of the Indian army, *Malcolm*, App. p. 256.

Disadvantages of uniting the Company's army under the King, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 258, *De Havilland*, App. p. 282, *Pennington*, App. p. 298, *Sherwood*, App. p. 302, *Limond*, App. p. 306, *Hopkinson*, App. p. 312, *Worsley*, App. p. 327, *Baker*, App. p. 343, *Munro*, App. p. 351, *Stannus*, App. p. 384, *Mayne*, App. p. 386, *Page*, App. p. 388, *Duff*, App. p. 398, *Cabell*, App. p. 431—Advantages of uniting the Company's army under the King, *Pritzler*, App. p. 267, *Grant*, App. p. 270, *Balmain*, App. p. 320, *Wilson*, App. p. 379—Whether any saving of expense would take place in consequence, *Pritzler*, App. p. 268, *Grant*, App. p. 270, *Pennington*, App. p. 299, *Sherwood*, App. p. 302, *Limond*, App. p. 306, *Hopkinson*, App. p. 312, *Balmain*, App. p. 320, *Worsley*, App. p. 327, *Baker*, App. p. 343, *Munro*, App. p. 356, *Wilson*, App. p. 380, *Stannus*, App. p. 384, *Mayne*, App. p. 386, *Page*, App. p. 388, *Duff*, App. p. 398, *Cabell*, App. p. 432.

Synopsis of the evidence relative to the spirit, discipline, and efficiency of the Indian army, App. p. ix—Relative to the adequacy or inadequacy of the army, App. p. xiii—Relative to the union of the three armies, App. p. xxx—Relative to the Company's army, App. p. l—Relative to the transfer of the Company's army to the Crown, App. p. l.

See also 'Bengal Army.' 'Bombay Army.' 'Company's Service.' 'European Soldiers.' 'Madras Army.' 'Native Army.' 'Native Regiments.' 'Native Soldiers.'

Arrival in India. See 'European Regiments.'

## INDEX.

## ARTILLERY.

## ARTILLERY:

## I.—Generally:

Arrangement of the field establishment of artillery at Bengal upon a good footing, *Pennington* 821—Ages of men on joining the artillery, *Limond* 1290, 1291—Weight of guns and number of horses, *Hopkinson* 1337—1341—Description of guns, *Hopkinson* 1349—Establishment of artillery regiment of officers, men and cattle, *Hopkinson* 1342—1345, 1348—Rate of march of artillery per day, *Hopkinson* 1346, 1347—No King's artillery in India, *Scot* 1435—Artillery service at Bombay efficient, *Leighton* 1993, 1994.

## II.—European:

## 1. Generally:

Number thereof at the three Presidencies, *Salmond* 603—Efficiency of European artillery and engineer department, *Malcolm* 673, 674—Disadvantages of employing European instead of Native artillery, *Malcolm* 690—Comparative amount of European with Native artillery, *Limond* 1267—European artillery superior to Native, *Limond* 1273—Comparison of European and Native artillerymen, *Limond* 1281—1284, 1301—1304, *Hopkinson* 1313—1316.

## 2. Papers laid before the Committee:

Return showing the numbers of European horse and foot artillery at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, also the number of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, Synopsis App. p. xcv—For the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the European artillery, App. p. xcv.

## III.—Native:

## 1. Generally:

Efficiency thereof, and advantages arising from their formation, *Malcolm* 668, *Watson* 928—930, *Limond* 1273—1278—Doubts as to rendering artillery at Madras efficient; as to the policy of so doing, *Pritzler* 1126—Reasons why Native artillery should be discontinued, *Pritzler* 1207—1209—Reason of unfitness of Natives for artillery service, *Hopkinson* 1313—1316—Advantages of the Bengal men over the Madras for the artillery service, *Hopkinson* 1318, 1319—Disadvantages of putting the Indian artillery into the King's service instead of the Company's, *Hopkinson* 1354—1356—Spirit and discipline of the Native artillery, *Scot* 1388—1390—How far strength of Native artillerymen sufficient, *Scot* 1417.

## 2. Papers laid before the Committee:

Return showing the numbers of the Native horse and foot artillery at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, number of troops, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, Synopsis, App. p. xcv—For the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Synopsis of the evidence

relative to the Native artillery, App. p. xcv—Necessity for reducing the Native artillery both horse and foot, *Salmond*, App. p. 158.

See also 'Officers.' 'Reduction of Regiments.'

INDEX.  
ARTILLERY.

#### IV.—Foot :

##### 1. Generally :

Comparison of efficiency of the foot artillery, *Pennington* 819, 820.

##### 2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the number of European and Native foot artillery at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, number of troops, and expense thereof 1813—1830, App. p. 4—Return for each respective year, 1813—1830, App. p. 8—43—Calculation of the comparative expense of a battalion of Company's foot artillery, consisting of four companies, number of officers and men 570, at Bengal, App. p. 55—Calculation of the comparative expense of a battalion of Company's European foot artillery, consisting of four companies, number of officers and men 456, with four companies of gun lascars, number of officers and men, at Madras, App. p. 57—At Bombay, four companies, number of officers and men 434, with a battalion of lascars attached; four companies, number of officers and men 272, App. p. 59.

Return of the establishment of a battalion of foot artillery at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 63—Form of indent or table of weight of baggage, and description of carriage allowed one company of European foot artillery, and one company of Native foot artillery, on a march, App. p. 140, 141—Rates of monthly off-reckonings fixed for the European foot artillery and artillery invalids, 1813 and 1831, increase or decrease, and date of general order or Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning any alteration, App. p. 144.

#### V.—Horse :

##### 1. Generally :

Amount of horse artillery in Bengal, *Pennington* 810—Efficiency thereof, *Pennington* 811, 812—How far Natives in the horse artillery act as gunners, *Pennington* 813—Disadvantage of bullocks for the artillery instead of horses, *Pennington* 822—824, 829, *Watson* 930—Reduction in the horse artillery at Madras, *Munro* 1076—1078—Advantage of bullocks for the artillery, *Hopkinson* 1353—Alteration that might be made in the Madras horse artillery, *Dickson* 1624—1626.

##### 2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the numbers of European and Native horse artillery at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, number of troops, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—For each respective year 1813—1830, App. p. 8—43—Calculation of the comparative expense of a brigade of Company's horse artillery, consisting of three European and one Native troop, number of officers and men 510, at Bengal, App. p. 54—At Madras, consisting of four troops, number of officers and men 655, App. p. 57—At Bombay, a troop of Company's European horse artillery, number of officers and men 148, App. p. 49—Return of the establishment of a brigade of horse artillery at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 63.

Form of indent or table of weight of baggage, and description of carriage allowed for one troop of European horse artillery, and one troop of Native horse artillery, on a march, App. p. 138, 139—Rates of monthly off-reckonings fixed for European horse artillery, 1813 and 1831, showing increase and decrease, and date of the general order and Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning any alteration, App. p. 144—Reduction in the troop of horse artillery from six guns to four, *Malcolm*, App. p. 253.

INDEX.  
—  
ASS—BAT.

- See also 'Addiscombe Seminary.' 'Commandant of Artillery.' 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Recruiting.'
- Assay Master.* Cause of the appointment of military officers to this situation, *Salmond*, App. p. 163.
- Assistant Surgeons.* See 'Surgeons.'
- Association of Officers.* See 'Officers, Native.'
- Audit Department.* Necessity for military men being employed therein, particularly in regard to the office of auditor-general, *Salmond*, App. p. 161.
- Auditor-General.* Number and description of persons on the staff in the auditor-general's department at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 47.
- See also 'Audit Department.' 'Pay and Allowances.'
- Auditor of Military Store Accounts.* See 'Military Store Accounts.'

B.

*Baggage.* Extract from Bengal general orders of 2d December 1824, relative to the means of carriage of baggage, or other accommodation applied to the soldiers at each Presidency, App. p. 133—Table shewing the weight of baggage allowed to be carried by the troops on a march, and the cattle or other carriage necessary for its conveyance, exclusive of camp equipage, App. p. 135.

Form of indent or table of weight of baggage, and description of carriage, allowed troops on a march, viz. Indent for one regiment of dragoons, one regiment of light cavalry, App. p. 136, 137—Indent for one troop of European horse artillery, one troop of Native horse artillery, App. p. 138, 139—Indent for one company of European foot artillery, one company of Native foot artillery, App. p. 140, 141—Indent for one regiment of European infantry, one regiment of Native infantry, App. p. 142, 143.

*Baggage Animals.* Number of baggage animals employed upon a march, *Feilding* 869—871.

*Baker, Lieutenant-colonel.* Reply of Lieutenant-colonel Baker, dated 29th February 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 333.

*Balmain, Captain.* Reply of Captain Balmain, dated 31st March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 314.

*Barrack Department.* Number of officers withdrawn from the army for the service of the barrack department at the three Presidencies, *Salmond*, App. p. 162.

See also 'Army in India.' 'Engineers.'

*Barrack Establishments.* Number of barrack establishments, *Salmond* 1924—1926—Annual expense for works and repairs thereof, *Salmond* 1927—Under what direction, *Salmond* 1929.

*Barrack-Master.* Staff officer employed as barrack-master at Fort St. George, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 48.

*Barrackpoor.* See 'Mutiny.'

BATTA:

I.—Generally:

Distinction as to batta in different parts of Bengal, *Nicolls* 47—50—Comparison of the efficiency of officers upon full and half batta when ordered to march, *Nicolls* 72—75

—Proportion of corps at Bengal on full and half batta, *Nicolls* 89, *Reynell* 321—Amount of batta reduced in 1828 in Bengal, *Nicolls* 236, *Malcolm* 662, 663—Regulation as to batta, *Reynell* 289—291, *Salmond* 519—525, *Malcolm* 702, 703—Comparison as to equality of batta allowance of King's and Company's European officers, *Malcolm* 704—707.

Comparison of the amount of full batta with half batta and house rent, *Feilding* 771—Date of Regulation thereupon, assimilating Bengal with Madras and Bombay, *Feilding* 772—775—Advantages retained by the cavalry regiments over the infantry and artillery under the batta regulations, *Feilding* 776—780—Amount of saving to Government by the batta regulations, *Feilding* 781—No pecuniary compensation to the army for loss by reduction to half batta, *Feilding* 782—Instances in which the Indian Government had declined to carry the batta regulations into effect, *Feilding* 783.

## II.—Papers laid before the Committee :

Observations relative to batta allowances, *Malcolm*, App. p. 221—Full batta and other field allowances to troops stationed at Deesa and Bhooj was abolished, but in conformity with the usage in Bengal the European officers were exempted from the operation of the reduction in consideration of the greater expense of the European articles of consumption with which it was necessary they should supply themselves, *Malcolm*, App. p. 255.

*Battalion Officers.* See 'Officers.'

*Bazaar Allowance.* See 'Pay and Allowances.'

*Bencoolen.* Number of corps, and expense thereof, at Bencoolen, 1814, App. p. 10, 11—1815, App. p. 12, 13—1816, App. p. 14, 15—1817, App. p. 16, 17—1818, App. p. 18, 19—Bencoolen and Singapore, 1821, App. p. 24, 25—1822, App. p. 26, 27—1823, App. p. 28, 29—1824, App. p. 30, 31—1825, App. p. 32, 33.

See also 'Prince of Wales' Island.'

*Bengal.* Cheapness of living at, *Nicolls* 33—Officers are not expensive in their habits at Bengal; they live in greater comfort than at Madras, *Nicolls* 52—Expenses of officers at Bengal greater than at Madras and Bombay, *Nicolls* 91, 92.

Lower provinces of Bengal more expensive than the upper, *Nicolls* 90—Health of troops does not suffer from the lower provinces of Bengal, *Feilding* 792—Not inconvenient to garrison the lower provinces of Bengal with Madras troops, *Feilding* 79

See also 'Arms.' 'Batta.' 'Officers.' 'Tents.'

## BENGAL ARMY:

### I.—Generally :

Its discipline carried as high as circumstances will permit; it cannot be brought to the perfection of that of Europe, *Nicolls* 4—General efficiency thereof, *Reynell* 264, 265—Expense thereof, *Salmond* 567—573, 621—How far the Bengal army sufficient for the purposes of defence and war, and impossibility of any reduction, *Macan* 2151.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the total number of Europeans and Natives employed at the Bengal Presidency, including Prince of Wales' Island, 1793—1830, App. p. 2—Return showing the numbers of the military force at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, number of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825,

INDEX.  
BEN—BOM.

App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

Return of the number of officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, and of brigades or stations, at Bengal, App. p. 49—Comparative expense of certain regiments on the Bengal establishment, App. p. 54, 55—Return of the establishment of a regiment of Native cavalry and Native infantry at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments of regiments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 60—The like of a brigade of horse and battalion of foot artillery, App. p. 250—The like of a corps of engineers, battalion of pioneers, and corps of sappers and miners, App. p. 70—The like of a regiment of European infantry, App. p. 73—Return of the distribution of the Bengal army in the years 1813, 1820, and 1830, App. p. 81—Abstract thereof, App. p. 104.

See also 'Army in India.' 'Reduction of Regiments.'

*Bengal Military Board.* See 'Military Boards.'

*Bentinck, Lord W.* Extract from minute by, while Governor of Madras, upon the possession of the country depending on military power, and upon the improvement thereof being the first and most important care, *Malcolm*, App. p. 217.

*Bhooj.* See 'Batta.'

**BOMBAY ARMY:**

**I.—Generally :**

Discipline thereof, *Aitchison* 1694, 1779, *Leighton* 1943—Efficiency thereof, *Smith* 2323—Want of officers in the European regiment, *Aitchison* 1764—1767, *Leighton* 1945—Injurious effect of amalgamating two European regiments into two wings of one corps, *Aitchison* 1773—Dissensions among European officers therefrom, *Leighton* 1987, 1988—Necessity for their being two regiments instead of as at present, *Leighton* 2142—How far reduction might be made therein, *Salmond* 1908—1913, 1917, 1918, *Macan* 2207.

Number of troops at Bombay, *Salmond* 1914—1916—Bombay army could be easily augmented, *Leighton* 1966—Regulations against recruiting the Bombay troops from the Bengal territories, *Leighton* 1966, 1967—Bombay troops best adapted for infantry, *Leighton* 1968—How far Bombay army healthy, *Leighton* 1981, 1982—Artillery and cavalry services at Bombay efficient, *Leighton* 1993, 1994.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Return showing the total number of Europeans and Natives employed at the Presidency, 1793—1830, App. p. 2—Return showing the numbers of the military force at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, also the number of corps, and annual expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

Number of officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, and of brigades or stations, at Bombay, App. p. 49—Calculation of the comparative expense of certain regiments on the Bombay establishment, App. p. 58, 59—Return of the establishment of a regiment of Native cavalry and Native infantry at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments of regiments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App.

p. 60—The like of a brigade of horse and battalion of foot artillery, App. p. 63—The like of the corps of engineers, battalion of pioneers, and corps of sappers and miners, App. p. 70—The like of a regiment of European infantry, App. p. 73—Return of the distribution of the Bombay troops, 1813, 1820, and 1830, App. p. 97—103—Abstract thereof, App. p. 104.

Letter from Sir J. Malcolm to Lord W. Bentinck, dated 27th November 1830, relative to the pay, composition, and distribution of the Bombay army, *Malcolm*, App. p. 192—Minute on the state of the Bombay army, dated 25th March 1828, by Major-general Sir John Malcolm, G. C. B. and K. I. S., *Malcolm*, App. p. 206—Return of officers belonging to the three regiments of light cavalry, and two European and twenty-six Native infantry, on the Bombay establishment, *Malcolm*, App. p. 216—Names and rank of senior officers of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service present on the Bombay establishment, *Malcolm*, App. p. 218—Return of the number of officers belonging to each regiment of light cavalry, European and Native infantry, on the Bombay establishment, effective, with regiments, 1825—1827, App. p. 224—Excellent spirit and disposition of the Bombay army, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 257.

See also 'Army in India.' 'European Regiments.' 'Native Army.'

*Bombay Military Board.* See 'Military Boards.'

*Bounty.* See 'Native Soldiers.' 'Recruiting.'

## BOYS:

### I.—Generally:

Value of sepoy boys to the different corps, *Pritzler* 1263—Number of sepoy boys have not been increased, *Smith* 2344.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Extract from Sir John Malcolm's minute, dated 4th September 1829, relative to increasing the number of boys in Native regiments, and inducing Native officers to bring up their sons to the army, *Malcolm*, App. p. 229—Another minute, dated 14th September 1829, on the same subject, and upon the necessity of exempting them from corporal punishment, *Malcolm*, App. p. 230.

*Brahmins.* See 'Native Soldiers.'

*Brevet Rank.* Effect thereof; unpopularity of it in the Company's service, *Nicolls* 105—110—Effect of granting it, *Reynell* 338—342—Brevet rank more favourable to Company's than King's officers, *Pritzler* 1174, 1175.

*Brigade-Majors.* Brigade-majors of His Majesty's forces at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, App. p. 44.

## BRIGADIERS:

### I.—Generally:

Additions to the rank of brigadier, *Watson* 901—Reason why number of brigadiers should not be reduced, *Watson* 976, 977—Necessity of brigadiers' staff, *Watson* 978—980—Difference in the number of brigadiers at Madras and Bengal, and between King's and Company's, *Pritzler* 1249—1253.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Number of officers of the second class of brigadiers in command of brigades or stations at each Presidency, App. p. 49—Return of the allowances drawn by the officers in command of brigades or stations at each Presidency, on 30th April 1831, App. p. 126.

See also 'Commanders of Districts.'

*Buckinghamshire, Lord.* See 'Native Army.'

*Buildings.* See 'Works, Public.'



## INDEX.

## BUL—CAR.

**BULLOCKS:****I.—Generally :**

Disadvantage of bullocks for the artillery instead of horses, *Pennington* 822—824, 829, *Watson* 930—Advantage of bullocks for the artillery, *Hopkinson* 1353.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Experience has proved that bullocks are equal to the service, and not so expensive as horses, or so difficult to be procured as mules, *Malcolm*, App. p. 253.

See also ‘Artillery, V.’

*Burmese War.* Regiments sent over on account of the Burmese war might be withdrawn, *Malcolm* 677, 678—European regiments might be reduced to the number serving in India antecedently to the Burmese war, *Salmond*, App. p. 159.

See also ‘Casualties.’ ‘Reduction of Regiments.’

## C.

*Cabell, Mr.* Remarks by Mr. Cabell, dated 6th August 1832, in answer to circular of the Board of Control requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 401.

**CADETS:****I.—Generally :**

How cadets disposed of previous to joining their regiments, *Scot* 1407, *Houstoun* 1847—Selection of cadets depends upon their interest, *Dickson* 1606—Number of cadets annually sent out, *Houstoun* 1841—1843—Proportion sent out who have not been educated at Addiscombe, *Houstoun* 1844—1846—Disadvantages of there being more cadets sent out than there are vacancies for, *Leighton* 2142—Ages at which they should go out, *Leighton* 2142.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Return showing the number of cadets appointed in each year, 1796—1832, distinguishing Presidencies and branches of service, App. p. 110—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the appointment of cadets, App. p. xviii—Relative to their preparatory education in England and India to qualify them as officers for competent discharge of their duties, App. p. liii.

See also ‘Addiscombe.’ ‘Officers.’

*Camps.* See ‘Tents.’

*Canals.* See ‘Works, Public.’

*Canteens.* See ‘Drunkenness.’

*Cantonment.* See ‘Expenses.’ ‘Garrisons.’

*Captains.* Number of captains in three regiments of cavalry, two of European infantry, and twenty-six of Native infantry, at Bombay, and manner in which they are disposed of, *Malcolm*, App. p. 226.

*Captain-General.* See ‘Governor-General.’

*Carriage Equipage.* Is not kept up by King’s and Company’s European officers, *Nicolls* 76—80.

See also ‘Baggage.’

**CASUALTIES:****I.—Generally :**

Are not greater in the Company's service than the King's, *Feilding* 795—Their amount, *Feilding* 796—They are numerous, *Limond* 1292, 1293—Casualties among Europeans greater during the Burmese war than among Natives, *Hopkinson* 1317—Comparison of casualties in European and Native regiments, *Leighton* 1983, 1984, *Dalbiac* 2016, 2017.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Return of the number of casualties amongst the European officers of the Company's army which have occurred in each year, 1813—1830, distinguishing Presidencies and branches of service ; whether such casualties have occurred by death, resignation, retirement, or dismissal ; distinguishing also each description of casualty, and stating the proportion per hundred of the casualties to the authorized establishment of officers ; with a note of the average of each description of casualty, App. p. 108—Synopsis of the evidence relative to casualties and appointments, App. p. xvii.

See also 'Mortality.'

**CAVALRY:****I.—European :****1. Generally :**

Expense of a King's regiment of, *Salmond* 592, 593—Comparison of King's and Company's European cavalry with Native cavalry in the three Presidencies, *Malcolm* 666, 667—Disadvantages of employing European instead of Native cavalry, *Malcolm*, 690, *Feilding* 872—874, *Pritzler* 1261 Mode of equipment of cavalry in King's and Company's service as nearly assimilated as possible, *Feilding* 737—Proportion European cavalry should bear to Native, *Pritzler* 1258—1260 European cavalry not so well mounted as the Native, from their being heavier men, *Smith* 2327, 2328.

**2. Papers laid before the Committee :**

Return showing the number of European cavalry (King's) at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, also number of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Form of indent or table of weight of baggage and description of carriage allowed a regiment of light cavalry on a march, App. p. 137—Policy of increasing the number of European cavalry regiments in India, and reducing an equal number of European infantry and Native cavalry, *Salmond*, App. p. 158.

**II.—Native :****1. Generally :**

Expense of regiment of, *Salmond* 594—599—Difficulty of substituting Native for European cavalry, *Feilding* 875, 876—Cavalry at Madras may be improved, *Pritzler* 1126—Natives might be made better horsemen, *Pritzler* 1152—They are good horsemen, but not so expert as British cavalry, *Dalbiac* 2005—They might take better care of their horses, *Pritzler* 1153—Manner in which the Madras cavalry have suffered loss as to their horses, *Pritzler* 1154—How Native cavalry might be improved, *Scot* 1438—How far substitution might be made for the Native cavalry, *Scot* 1439—1441.

INDEX.

CAS—CAV.

INDEX.  
—  
CHA—CLI.

Expense of a cavalry Native soldier and horse, *Dickson* 1603—Not possible to substitute any other cavalry for the Native, *Dickson* 1622, 1623—How cavalry armed, *Dickson* 1629, 1630—Cavalry service at Bombay efficient, *Leighton* 1993, 1994—Native cavalry inferior to the King's, *Dalbiac* 1998—Inferiority of appointments, *Dalbiac* 1999.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the number of Company's Native regular and irregular cavalry at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, also number of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

Calculation of the comparative expense of a regiment of Company's Native cavalry consisting of six troops, number of officers and men 554, at Bengal, App. p. 54—At Madras, number of officers and men 542, App. p. 56—At Bombay, number of officers and men 532, App. p. 58—Return of the establishment of a regiment of Native cavalry at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments of regiments at Madras and Bombay differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 60—Manner in which a large proportion of Native cavalry might be reduced with safety and advantage, *Salmond*, App. p. 158.

See also 'Grass-cutters.' 'Irregular Troops.' 'Mysore Silledar Horse.' 'Reduction of Regiments.' 'Weight.'

*Chatham.* Nature of instruction at Chatham, *Houstoun* 1837.

See also 'Depôt.'

*Children of Soldiers.* Sons of Soldiers by European women are enlisted into both services, *Nicolls* 157—Mortality among children by European parents, *Hopkinson* 1327—1329, *Aitchison* 1746—1751, *Salmond*, App. p. 166.

See also 'Half-Castes.' 'Schools.'

*Civil Situations.* Number of staff officers employed in civil situations at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 47—Classification of the employment of military men in civil situations, *Salmond*, App. p. 160—Return of officers in civil employment; number of officers per regiment or battalion withdrawn from military duty by holding civil, political, or miscellaneous offices, *Salmond*, App. p. 163—Military men when employed in civil situations have rendered the greatest service to their country, *Malcolm*, App. p. 171.

See also 'Military Men.'

*Clergymen.* See 'Schools.'

*Clive, Lord.* Nature of Lord Clive's fund, and charges upon it, *Melville* 2112—2115, 2117—Statement of the rates of pensions payable to European officers and soldiers and their widows from Lord Clive's fund, App. p. 151—Scale of pensions for non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, established by the Court's Resolution of 14th April 1819, communicated to the Government of Bengal in the Court's despatch, dated 21st July 1819, and published in general orders, dated 5th February 1830, App. p. 151—Number of officers and soldiers and their widows in receipt of pensions from Lord Clive's fund, with also the aggregate amount of charge in each year, from 1813 to the present time, App. p. 153.

**CLOTHING:**

INDEX.  
CLO—COM.

**I.—Generally:**

Method of managing the clothing of the Company's troops in India, *Salmond* 616—619—Clothing of sepoys, *Salmond* 620—Method of clothing regiments, *Watson* 1013, *Munro* 1076—1078, *Pritzler* 1210—Comparison between the three Presidencies, *Watson* 1014—1017—Clothing and appointments in the three Presidencies should be similar, *Scot* 1454—Method to be adopted as to clothing, *Salmond* 1872—1874—Cost thereof, *Salmond* 1876, 1877—Inspection thereof, *Salmond* 1878—1879—Method adopted as to making up clothing, *Salmond* 1880—1883—Inferiority of clothing of Native to King's troops, *Macan* 2152—2156.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee:**

Staff officers employed as secretary to the clothing board, and agents for army clothing at Bengal, App. p. 45—Secretary to clothing board at Madras, App. p. 47—Calculation of the comparative expense of clothing certain regiments at Bengal, App. p. 54, 55—At Madras, App. p. 56, 57—At Bombay, App. p. 58, 59—List of articles of clothing or equipment, and also of the means of carriage, or other accommodation supplied to the soldiers at each Presidency and in each branch of service, in the year 1813 and at present, whether at the public expense or at the charge of the off-reckoning fund, or provided for the soldier at his own cost, if not provided for himself agreeably to the regulation; stating the probable annual cost of each article; and where alterations have intermediately occurred, the expense or decrease of charge in each instance, and the date of the general order and of the Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning the alteration, App. p. 129—Method of supplying the clothing for the army at the three Presidencies, *Salmond*, App. p. 162—Synopsis of the evidence relative to clothing and equipments, App. p. xvii.

See also 'Army in India, II. 2.' 'Off-reckonings.'

**Clothing Boards.** Composition of the clothing boards at the three Presidencies, *Salmond*, App. p. 162.

**Colebrooke**, Lieut.-col. Reply of Lieut.-col. Colebrooke, received 14th May 1832, to the circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 273.

**Collector.** See 'Ahmednugger.'

**Colleges.** Cause of the appointment of military men to the offices of secretary and examiners in colleges, *Salmond*, App. p. 163.

**Colonel's Pay.** Calculation of comparative expense of colonel's pay of certain regiments at Bengal, App. p. 54, 55—At Madras, App. p. 56, 57—At Bombay, App. p. 58, 59.

**Colonies.** See 'Army in India.' 'Staff.'

**Commandant of Artillery.** Staff officer employed as ordnance assistant to commandant of artillery at Bombay, App. p. 47.

**COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:**

**I.—Generally:**

One commander-in-chief could not manage the administration of justice of the three armies, *Nicolls* 111—Company's officers have been in the temporary, but not permanent command of the army in India for the last fifty years, *Nicolls* 114—How far Company's officers have commanded the army in India, *Reynell* 347, *Pritzler* 1182—Disadvantages of having only one commander-in-chief, *Reynell* 343, *Salmond* 1919—1921, *Smith* 2356—Commander-in-chief should previously have served in India, *Reynell* 344, 345, *Pritzler* 1180, 1181—How far advisable that commanders-in-chief

INDEX.  
COM.

should previously have served in India, *Macan* 2226—Necessity for three commanders-in-chief, with controlling power in one, *Watson* 1010, 1012.

Advantageous to have only one commander-in-chief, *Pritzler* 1165—Advantages of one commander-in-chief, with a commander of the forces for the details of each Presidency, *Pritzler* 1176—Should be but one commander-in-chief, with certain officers high in command under him, *Paget* 2296—Commanders-in-chief should visit their armies more frequently, *Pritzler* 1222—1224—How far one commander-in-chief would be expedient, *Scot* 1453, *Dickson* 1607, *Aitchison* 1733, *Leighton* 1952, *Macan* 2203—Manner in which selections should be made for commanders-in-chief, *Scot* 1455—1459—Company's officers should be appointed as commanders-in-chief, *Leighton* 2141.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee :*

Constitution of his staff at the three Presidencies, App. p. 44—Commander-in-chief in Bengal is usually commander-in-chief of all His Majesty's forces serving in India; command of the Company's troops at the three Presidencies is vested in separate commanders-in-chief, who are also members of council; not advantageous to merge their military patronage and command in that of the Bengal commander-in-chief, and reasons for the opinion; superintendence of the armies at each Presidency should be in an officer of rank, who, if not called commander-in-chief, should be commander of the forces; not expedient to change the title or extent of his authority, *Salmond*, App. p. 166, 167—Synopsis of the evidence upon the question as to one or more commanders-in-chief, App. p. xxx.

See also 'Governor-General.'

*Commanders of Districts.* Commanders of districts or divisions should previously serve as brigadiers, *Nicolls* 157.

*Commander of the Forces.* See 'Commander-in-chief.'

## COMMANDING OFFICERS:

I.—*Generally :*

Advantage of the powers formerly vested in them, *Greenhill* 1570—Powers that should be given to them, *Greenhill* 1578, 1579—How far commanding officers have sufficient power of appointment of their regimental staff, *Aitchison* 1790—1796—Necessity for encouraging commanding officers to remain with their regiments, *Smith* 2331—2333.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee :*

Return of the number of officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, and of brigades or stations, at each Presidency, App. p. 49—Return of the allowances drawn by officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, brigades and stations, and also of corps, at each Presidency, on 30th April 1831, App. p. 126—List of seven commands authorized for Bombay, *Malcolm*, App. p. 220—Synopsis of the evidence relative to commanding officers of divisions or stations, App. p. xxxii.

See also 'Courts-Martial.' 'Staff.'

## COMMAND MONEY:

I.—*Generally :*

Command money to officers in command of a regiment, and sufficiency of it, *Nicolls* 70, 71—Disadvantages that would result from allowing command money to be drawn with off-reckonings, *Nicolls* 128—130—Effect of the command money arrangement, *Reynell* 362, 363—Whether command money to officers in commutation or addition to former allowances, *Feilding* 768, 769.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee :*

Amount of allowance for commanding at Bombay and Bengal, *Malcolm*, App. p. 220  
—Extract from Mr. Elphinstone's minute of 2d March 1825, relative to increased allowances, *Malcolm*, App. p. 221—Differences between government commands and commands of regiments, *Malcolm*, App. p. 221—Synopsis of the evidence relative thereto, App. p. lix.

See also 'Pay and Allowances.'

COMMISSARIAT:

I.—*Generally :*

Beneficial effects of European soldiers being victualled by the commissariat, *Nicolls* 133, 134—Rules as to victualling European regiments, *Reynell* 367, 368—Commissariat under the control of the Governor, *Pritzler* 1216, 1217—Method of supplying provisions, *Macan* 2158—2160.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee :*

Return showing the annual expense thereof at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 7—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43—Return showing the aggregate expense of the commissariat at the three Presidencies on the 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 240—Number of military officers employed therein at the three Presidencies ; how far the department efficient ; and whether advantageous to employ military men therein, *Salmond*, App. 317.

See also Army in India.—II. 2.'

*Commissariat Staff.* Return showing the number of European officers on the commissariat staff at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 5—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43.

*Commissary-general.* Number and description of persons composing the staff of the commissary-general's department at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 47.

*Commissary of Ordnance.* Officers on the staff of the commissary of ordnance at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 47.

*Commissions.* Advantages that would be derived from allowing the sale of commissions, and exchanges, under certain regulations, *Malcolm*, App. p. 172.

*Company's Service.* Advantages and disadvantages of the Company's service, *Reynell* 301, 302—Relative condition of the two services with regard to promotions and appointments, *Reynell* 303—307, *Salmond* 539—541—Benefits of uniting the services, and means of accomplishing it, *Reynell* 308—310—Comparison of situations between King's and Company's European corps, *Malcolm* 652—654—Company's troops as efficient as the King's, *Feilding* 796—Company's regiments not relieved by entire regiments, *Scot* 1434.

See also 'Natives.' 'Officers, IX.'

INDEX.  
CON—DAL.

*Concan.* See 'Surveyor in the Concan.'

**CONTROL**, Board of. Circular letter from T. Hyde Villiers, Esq. dated Indian Board, 2d February 1832, to officers of the Indian service, App. p. 154—Answers thereto; from Lieut.-colonel Salmond, dated 24th February 1832, App. p. 155—From Major-general Sir John Malcolm, G. C. B., dated 13th February 1832, App. p. 168—From the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, dated 5th August 1832, App. p. 257—From Major-general Sir Thomas Pritzler, K. C. B. dated 17th February 1832, App. p. 260—From Lieut.-general Sir W. Keir Grant, K. C. B., dated 27th March 1832, App. p. 270—From Lieut.-colonel Colebrooke, received 4th May 1832, App. p. 273—From Lieut.-colonel De Havilland, dated 7th July 1832, App. p. 277—From Major Justinian Nutt, dated 24th August 1832, App. p. 285—From Colonel Pennington, C. B., dated 7th March 1832, App. p. 291—From Colonel Sherwood, dated 28th February 1832, App. p. 301—From Colonel Limond, dated 31st January 1832, App. p. 303—From Lieut.-colonel Hopkinson, C. B., dated 15th February 1832, App. p. 308—From Captain Balmain, dated 31st March 1832, App. p. 314—From Major-general Sir H. Worsley, K. C. B., dated 30th March 1832, App. p. 323—From Lieut.-colonel Baker, dated 29th February 1832, App. p. 333—From Colonel John Munro, dated 13th March 1832, App. p. 350—From Major D. Wilson, dated 29th March 1832, App. p. 357—From Colonel Stannus, C. B., dated 20th February 1832, App. p. 383—From Colonel Mayne, C. B., dated 5th March 1832, App. p. 385—From Captain Page, dated 12th March 1832, App. p. 387—From Captain James Grant Duff, dated 25th March 1832, App. p. 393—Remarks by Mr. Cabell, dated 6th August 1832, App. p. 401.

*Corporals.* See 'Addiscombe.'

*Corporal Punishment.* Crimes for which flogging at present used, and by what authority, *Nicolls* 249—251.

*Courts-Martial.* Method of conducting courts-martial in India, *Pritzler* 1236—Powers of punishment that should be given to commanding officers without courts-martial, *Greenhill* 1532—1539—Synopsis of evidence relative to, App. p. xviii.

*Currency.* An uniform currency would facilitate keeping the accounts, *Melvill* 2130, 2131. See also 'Rupees.'

D.

*Dalbiac*, Major-general Sir Charles. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Services in India, 1996, 1997—Native cavalry inferior to King's, 1998—Inferiority of appointments, 1999—Lighter weight of Native than European cavalry, 2000—2004—Natives good horsemen, but not so expert as British cavalry, 2005—Horses being under cover is more necessary for men than horses, 2006, 2007—Description of horses at Bombay, and method of selecting them, 2009, 210—Their cost, 2011—Period of service of horses, and on what it depends, 2012.

Opinion as to the best mode of procuring horses in India, 2013—2015—Comparison of casualties between King's and Native regiments, 2016, 2017—Drunkenness increasing among Natives, 2018—2021—Medical establishments well conducted; necessity for properly remunerating medical officers, 2023—Military service popular with the Natives, 2024, 2025—How far pay and allowances of Company's officers sufficient, 2026—Method of conducting the shoeing and farriery, 2027—2031—Different system as to the care of horses in Bengal and Bombay, 2032, 2033—Examination upon the size, breed, and diseases of horses in India, 2034—2041.

[Second Examination.]—Grievances to officers and soldiers, with regard to their pay, from different rates of exchange; also in cases of soldiers dying in India, from the charges by the registrar; also from difference in price paid for accoutrements in England and India, 2145.

*Deaths.* See 'Casualties.' 'Mortality.'

*De Havilland.* See 'Havilland, Lieut.-colonel.'

*Debt.* See 'Subaltern Officers.'

*Depôt.* Duties of the commandant of the Company's depôt in Europe, and stations thereof, *Hay* 1638—1642, 1664—How often reinforcements sent out to India, and number sent out annually, *Hay* 1643, 1644—Expense of the depôt at Chatham, *Hay* 1659, 1660—At other depôts, *Hay* 1667, 1668—Expense of the military depôt in 1828, *Melville* 2139.

See also 'Recruiting.'

*Depôt of Instruction, Bombay.* Staff officer employed as director of the depôt of instruction at Bombay, App. p. 47.

*Desertion.* When desertion usually takes place, *Reynell* 434—Whether desertion occasioned in the lower provinces of Bengal from furloughs not being frequent or long enough, *Feilding* 788—791—Desertion among sepoys less frequent than formerly, *Munro* 1032—1068, *Greenhill* 1565, 1566, *Dickson* 1675, *Aitchison* 1788, 1789.

*Detached Employment.* See 'Staff.'

*Dickson, Colonel William.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—In the cavalry service at Madras, 1580—1583—Number of officers necessary to be present with a regiment of cavalry, 1584, 1585—Duties of Native officers, 1586—Payment of troops by European officers assisted by Natives, 1527—Association of European and Native officers, 1588—1599—How far Native languages acquired by European officers, 1591—Higher rank that should be given Native officers, 1592—1595—Cavalry service preferred by Mussulmen, 1596—How far rate of pay sufficient, 1597—No difficulty in completing regiments, 1598—1600—Description of horses fully equal to the Native service, 1601, 1602—Expense of a cavalry Native soldier and horse, 1603—Good understanding between European and Native regiments, 1604—In what branch officers have the greatest advantage in promotion, 1605—Selection of cadets depends upon their interest 1606, —How far one commander-in-chief advisable, 1607—Discipline, character, and advantages of Native soldiers, 1608—1617—Company's European regiments at Madras, and how recruited, 1618—1621—Not possible to substitute any other cavalry for the Native, 1622, 1623—Alteration that might be made in the Madras horse artillery, 1624—1626—How inconveniences from staff duty to be remedied, 1627, 1628—How cavalry armed, 1629, 1630—Proportion of Europeans to Natives in cavalry and infantry, 1631—1634.

[Second Examination.]—Weight of Native and European soldiers with their accoutrements, and how far horses sufficient, 1670—1674—Few desertions, 1675—Advantages of the establishment for recruit boys, 1676—1679—Usefulness of the institution of schools, 1680, 1681—No stud establishment at Madras, 1682—Distance of forced marches, and how far horses equal to them, 1683—1685.

*Directors, Court of.* Disadvantage of the Court of Directors directing details upon practical subjects, without the possibility of their having knowledge of their effect in India, *Scot* 1454.

*Discharge.* Amount at which discharge allowed to be purchased, *Hay* 1663—Arrangement as to discharges, *Salmond* 1897—1900.

*Discharged Soldiers.* They would turn out badly, *Pritzler* 1220—How they might be profitably employed, *Pritzler* 1221—Return showing the total number of men discharged from the Company's service during the last six years; their average length of



INDEX.  
—  
DIS—ELP.

service, and their age at the period of enlistment, App. p. 112—Return showing the average length of service in the Company's army of men transferred from His Majesty's service who have arrived in this country as discharged soldiers since the year 1825, App. p. 113.

*Discipline.* See 'Bengal Army.' 'Native Soldiers.'

*Distribution of the Army.* Return of the distribution of the army in India in the years 1813, 1820, and 1830, App. p. 81—Abstract thereof, App. p. 104—Observations upon the disposition of the army in India, and purposes for which employed, App. p. 156.

*Divisions of the Army.* Number of officers in command of divisions of the army at each Presidency, App. p. 49—Return of the allowances drawn by the officers in command of divisions of the army on 30th April 1831, App. p. 126.

See also 'Pay and Allowances.'

*Doctors.* See 'Native Doctors.'

*Dragoons.* Calculation of the comparative expense of a regiment of His Majesty's light dragoons, consisting of eight troops, number of officers and men 736, at Bengal, App. p. 54—At Madras, App. p. 56—At Bombay, App. p. 58—Return of the establishment of a regiment of dragoons in the East-Indies in the year 1813 and at the present time, together with the number of corps of each description, and of the troops or companies belonging to each corps, and where alterations of establishment have immediately taken place, showing the date of the alteration, App. p. 78—Form of indent or table of weight of baggage, and description of carriage, allowed a regiment of dragoons on a march, App. p. 136.

*Dram Allowance.* See 'Pay and Allowances.'

*Drunkenness.* Increase of inebriety among the soldiers, reasons for it, and methods used for its prevention, *Nicolls* 135—140—Effect of the Canteens, *Nicolls* 141—145—Few instances of Drunkenness in the Native army at Bengal, *Nicolls* 252—Whether inebriety more or less frequent among European soldiers than formerly, *Reynell* 369—Native troops convicted of drunkenness invariably discharged, *Watson* 889—Natives less addicted to intoxication than Europeans, *Greenhill* 1487—Drunkenness increasing among Natives, *Dalbiac* 2018—2021.

*Duff, Captain James Grant.* Reply of Captain James Grant Duff, dated 25th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 303.

E.

*East-India Company.* Arrangement between the King's Government and the Company as to the expense of troops serving in India, *Melvill* 2140—Report by Messrs. Hill and Melvill on that subject, Evidence p. 244—Correspondence on the same subject, Evidence p. 260.

*Education.* Competency of the education of young men at Addiscombe and in England generally for military duties, *Malcolm* 695, 696—Education of officers of the line fits them for duties of Native regiments, *Malcolm* 697—700.

*Efficiency.* See 'Bengal army.' 'Officers.'

*Elphinstone, Mr.* Extract from Mr. Elphinstone's minute in reply to Sir Charles Colville's letter relative to distinctions between officers in the King's and Company's service, *Malcolm*, App. p. 217—Minutes by, relative to the number of officers for regimental and staff employ, *Malcolm*, App. p. 219.

*Elphinstone, The Hon. Mountstuart.* Reply of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, dated 5th August 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 257.

INDEX.  
—  
ELP—EUR.

**ENGINEERS:**

**I.—Generally:**

Establishment of engineers in the three Presidencies, *Salmond* 1922—How far in charge of the barrack department, *Salmond* 1923.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee:**

**1. Generally:**

Return showing the numbers of, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, also the number of corps, and annual expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Return of the establishment of the corps of engineers at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 70—Synopsis of evidence relative to the corps of engineers at the three Presidencies, App. p. xciii.

**2. Bombay:**

Calculation of the comparative expense of engineer corps, late corps of sappers and miners, consisting of two companies, number of officers and men 164, at Bombay, App. p. 58—Advantage of engineers being only employed on works of scientific knowledge; common repairs and erection of ordinary buildings being made over to heads of departments; measures adopted for revision of the engineer department; advantage to the service and saving of expense by uniting the pioneers with the sappers and miners, *Malcolm*, App. p. 253—Observations upon the manner in which the engineer corps has been neglected, and manner in which it might be made more useful, *Haviland*, App. p. 277.

See also 'Addiscombe.' 'Artillery.' 'Works, Public.'

*Enlisting.* See 'Native Soldiers.'

*Equipments.* See 'Accoutrements.' 'Clothing.'

*Europeans.* Those with capital only should be allowed to settle in India, *Pritzler* 1218, 1219—Promoting the settlement of Europeans in India would not be advantageous to the army, *Salmond*, App. p. 165, *Malcolm*, App. p. 171, *Pritzler*, App. p. 268, *Pennington*, App. p. 300, *Limond*, App. p. 307, *Hopkinson*, App. p. 312, *Worsley*, App. p. 329.—Those who make fortunes in India return home; no obstruction to men of capital settling in India; the country is only suited for adventurers, and is now overstocked with them, *Salmond*, App. p. 166—Effect the settlement of Europeans in India would have on the army; it might afford employment to European soldiers worn out in the service, and offer attractions to men previous to discharge, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 259.

Settlement of Europeans in India would not be of much service to discharged European soldiers; desirable to establish European pensioners on the hills; Europeans of capital might settle in India to advantage; manner in which they would improve and increase the productions of the country, *Pritzler*, App. p. 268—Disadvantage to the army in

INDEX.  
EUROPEAN.

India from the settlement of Europeans, *Havilland*, App. p. 283, *Pennington*, App. p. 300, *Limond*, App. p. 307, *Stannus*, App. p. 385, *Mayne*, App. p. 387, *Duff*, App. p. 399, *Cabell*, App. p. 433—Necessity for the permanent residence of British subjects in India to be discouraged rather than promoted; necessity for Natives being gradually introduced into the administration of affairs, which cannot be effected if Europeans allowed to settle, *Nutt*, App. p. 290—Advantages that would be derived from the settlement of Europeans in India, *Balmain*, App. p. 320, *Munro*, App. p. 356, *Wilson*, App. p. 382, *Page*, App. p. 389.

See also 'Marriages.'

*European Regiments.* Extra expense of European over Native regiments, *Malcolm* 708, *Watson* 890—894—More advantageous that they should arrive in India in the cool season, *Malcolm* 727—Number of Company's European regiments, *Feilding* 794—Necessity of keeping up a better balance between European and Native troops, *Watson* 925—927—Superiority of European over Native troops, *Munro* 1110—How Company's European regiments kept complete, *Pritzler* 1230, 1231, *Scot* 1431, *Dickson* 1598—1600—Proportion of European to Native force that should be maintained, *Scot* 1445, 1446—Good understanding between European and Native regiments, *Dickson* 1604.

Company's European regiments at Madras, and how recruited, *Dickson* 1618—1621—European regiment at Bombay; efficiency thereof, but want of officers, *Aitchison* 1764—1767—European troops require more officers than Native, *Aitchison* 1768, 1769—Injurious effect of amalgamating two European regiments into two wings of one corps, *Aitchison* 1773—Dissensions among European officers therefrom, *Leighton* 1987, 1988—Necessity for keeping up European regiments, and necessity for there being two regiments instead of as at present, *Leighton* 2142.

See also 'European Soldiers.'

EUROPEAN SOLDIERS:

I.—Generally:

Methods resorted to of diverting the minds of soldiers when not upon duty, *Nicolls* 148—They should not be permitted to remain after a certain age in India, *Nicolls* 158—160, *Watson* 994—996, *Scot* 1427, 1428, *Paget* 2318—Expense saved by their remaining in India, *Nicolls* 161—Comparison of advantages of the European over the Native soldier, *Reynell* 279—They generally volunteer to remain in India upon their regiments coming to England, *Reynell* 383—385—Ages to which European soldiers should be allowed to remain in India, *Watson* 994—996—Advantage of soldiers remaining in India, *Munro* 1079—1084, *Pritzler* 1227—1229.

Comparison of efficiency of European and Native troops on actual service, *Scot* 1415, 1416—Health of European troops generally more affected than Native, *Scot* 1421—Number of years Europeans and Natives remain fit for service, *Scot* 1422, 1423—What situations in India most healthy for Europeans, *Scot* 1429, 1430—Difference in the nature of the employment between European and Native soldiers, *Greenhill* 1486—Difference in the periods of service between them, *Greenhill* 1488—Proportion of Europeans to Natives in cavalry and infantry, *Dickson* 1631—1634—How far advantageous for men to remain in India, *Hay* 1651—1653—Average length of service to remain efficient, *Hay* 1654—1658, *Salmond* 1904—1907—Arrangement as to allowing men to remain in India, and at what ages, *Salmond* 1884—1886—Necessity of King's troops in all the Presidencies, but disadvantages from their expense, and not being employed in same duties as the sepoys, *Paget* 2315.

II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Return showing the total number of Europeans and Natives employed at each Presidency and in all India, 1793—1830, App. p. 2—Return showing the number of rank

and file in the engineers, artillery, cavalry, infantry, pioneers, and staff, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9,—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

INDEX.  
—  
EXA—FEI.

Return showing the total number of men discharged from the Company's service during the last six years, their average length of service, and their age at the period of enlistment, App. p. 112—Return showing the average length of service in the Company's army of men transferred from His Majesty's service who have arrived in this country as discharged soldiers since the year 1825, App. p. 113.

See also 'Pay and Allowances.'

*Examiners.* See 'Colleges.'

*Exchanges.* Suggestions as to the privilege of exchanges, *Scot* 1454—Arrangements for allowing exchanges, *Salmond* 1869—1871.

*Exchange, Rates of.* Injustice to different troops from different rates of exchange of coins in which they are paid, *Scot* 1454, *Dalbiac* 2145—Rates of exchange at which officers and soldiers are paid and intestate's effects remitted, *Melville* 2092—2096—Advantageous rates of exchange on remittances, *Melville* 2117—Discontent and dissatisfaction from the rate of exchange at which the rupee is paid to the soldier, *Paget* 2299—2301—Advantages that would be lost by the rate of exchange being made up to the sepoy, *Smith* 2329.

See also 'Rupees.'

*Expenses.* Officers are not expensive in their habits at Bengal; they live in greater comfort than at Madras, *Nicolls* 52—Expenses are more heavy in the field than in cantonments, *Nicolls* 53, *Reynell* 296—299—Lower provinces of Bengal more expensive than the upper, *Nicolls* 90—Rate of expenses of subalterns in the field and in quarters, *Nicolls* 93—96—Officers' habits more expensive than formerly, *Reynell* 293—295—Comparison of expense to officers in the three Presidencies, *Nicolls* 91, 92, *Reynell* 322—324, *Salmond* 527, *Watson* 947, *Pritzler* 1148, 1149.

## F.

*Families.* Portion of pay allowed to be assigned by sepoy for their families when on distant service, *Greenhill* 1561, 1562.

*Farriery.* Method of conducting shoeing and farriery, *Dalbiac* 2027—2031.

*Feilding, Lieut.-col.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness in India, 731—734—Mode of equipment of cavalry in the King's and Company's services as nearly assimilated as possible, 737—Horses supplied from the stud are the best, 740—Number of European officers that should be present with each regiment of cavalry, 741—Regulations that should be attended to for that purpose, 742—Number of European and Native officers with each regiment of cavalry, 743, 744—Method for supplying deficiency from staff appointments, 745—747—How far promotion in the Company's service regimentally or by seniority, 748—No difference in the discipline of sepoy from different districts, 749—Preference among the Mahomedans for cavalry service, 750—Careful of their horses, 751—Military service popular among the Natives, 752—Sepoy's cavalry pay superior to the agricultural wages, 753—How far pay and allowances of Company's officers sufficient, 754, 755—Political situations served by witness, 757—Service at Bhurtpore, 758, 759.

INDEX.  
—  
FIE—FOR.

Beneficial effects of new regulations as to allowances, 761—767—Whether command money to officers in commutation or addition to former allowances, 768, 769—How far half-pay of Company's officers equalized with King's officers, 770—Comparison of the amount of full batta with half batta and house rent, 771—Date of Regulation thereupon, assimilating Bengal with Madras and Bombay, 772—775—Advantages retained by the cavalry regiments over the infantry and artillery under the batta regulations, 776—780—Amount of saving to the Government by the batta regulations, 781—No pecuniary compensation to the army for loss by reduction to half batta, 782—Instances in which the Indian government had declined to carry the batta regulations into effect, 783—Amount of pay of different officers, 784—787—Whether desertion occasioned in the lower provinces of Bengal from furloughs not being frequent or long enough, 788—791.

Health of the troops does not suffer from the lower provinces of Bengal, 792—Not convenient to garrison the lower provinces of Bengal with Madras troops, 793—Number of Company's European regiments, 794—Casualties in the Company's service not greater than the King's, 795—Their amount, 796—Company's troops as efficient as the King's, 796—Inconvenience of amalgamating the three armies, 798—800—Madras men of a different caste from those recruited at Bengal, 801—Many Bengal men in the Bombay army, 802—Efficiency of irregular horse, 803.

[Second Examination.]—Means of supplying the staff without impairing the efficiency of regiments, 836—838—How far rewards to Native officers beneficial, 839—841—Number of troops of which King's regiments should consist, 842—850—Native regiment would bring more efficient men into the field than European regiment, 851—Inconvenience from sore backs of horses from badness of saddlery, 853, 854—Number of grass-cutters and grooms to a cavalry regiment, and necessity for them, 855—857—Number of horses allowed different ranks of officers, 858, 859—Method of supplying horses to cavalry regiments, 860—Establishment of studs, and divisions of them, 861—863—Cost to Government of horses, 864, 865—Expense of maintaining horses per month, 866—868—Number of baggage animals employed upon a march, 869—871—Difficulties of substituting European for Native cavalry, 872—874—And Native for European, 875, 876—Method of invaliding officers, 877, 878—Number of general officers of cavalry, 879, 880.

*Field.* See 'Expenses.'

*Field Forces.* See 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Subsidiary Field Forces.'

*Field Officers.* See 'Officers, I.' 'Promotion.'

*Financial Department.* See 'Pay and Allowances.'

*Fives Court.* Fives courts established at each station for recreation of the soldiers when not on duty, or shut up in barracks, *Reynell* 374.

*Flogging.* See 'Corporal Punishment.'

*Forage.* Saving to Government by a reduction of grain to the horses, and of dragoons, cavalry, and artillery horses at Bombay, which would have been carried into effect before but for erroneous representations that the forage of this Presidency was inferior to the others, *Mulcolm*, App. p. 255.

*Forced Marches.* Distance of forced marches, and how far horses equal to them, *Dickson* 1683—1685.

## FOREIGN INVASION:

### I.—Generally:

Danger to Madras from invasion by a foreign enemy, such as France, *Munro* 1103—How far danger to be apprehended, *Munro* 1104—Parts of India most likely to

be attacked in case of foreign invasion, *Munro* 1106—Frontiers of India, and enemies to be dreaded thereon, *Macan* 2205, 2206.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee:*

INDEX.  
FOR—GAR.

No foreign enemy at present contemplated, but the exemption therefrom will depend upon the means possessed of repelling it, *Malcolm*, App. p. 170.

*Forrest*, Colonel. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness formerly in India, 2346—Manner of supplying the demand for stores from India, and responsibility of the inspector of stores, 2347, 2348—Manner in which contracts are made for the supply, and examination as to their fulfilment, 2349—2351—Efficiency of the stores upon their arrival in India, 2352—Opinion that the Company's arms are better than those in the King's service, and reason therefore, 2353, 2354—Satisfactory to have an inspection by a committee of King's and Company's officers, 2355.

*Foundry*, Fort William. Office of superintendent of foundry at Fort William held by an engineer officer, App. p. 45.

*France*. See 'Foreign Invasion.'

*Frederick*, Lieutenant-colonel *Edward*. Extracts from different letters and documents signed by him relative to the army in India, App. p. 217, 218.

*Full Pay*. See 'Pay and Allowances.'

**FURLOUGH:**

I.—*Generally:*

Reasons why subaltern officers seldom avail themselves of the three years' furlough, *Nicolls* 122—124—Officers on furlough to Europe generally glad to return to their corps except in cases of ill-health, *Nicolls* 125—Proportion of officers availing themselves thereof, *Reynell* 355—361—Furloughs are not frequent or long enough, *Feilding* 788—791—No inconvenience in increasing the number of furloughs, *Munro* 1069, 1070—Number of men allowed to be absent on furlough, *Aitchison* 1753, 1754.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee:*

Importance of furlough to Native soldiers, and manner in which it is facilitated by the method of recruiting, and disposition of the army, *Salmond*, App. p. 157—Furlough regulations are fair, but means should be taken to prevent officers taking furlough too often; unfairness caused to officers serving with their regiments thereby, *Balmain*, App. p. 316—Regulations proposed to be adopted with regard to furlough of officers and men, *Worsley*, App. p. 332—Synopsis of evidence relative to furlough regulations, p. lxxi.

*Furlough Pay*. State of the rates of furlough pay as they existed in 1813 and at present, noticing in separate columns the increase or decrease in each rank by any alteration that immediately may have taken place; with the date of the Court's letter or general order prescribing or sanctioning the alteration, App. p. 147—Return of the number of officers in receipt of pay on furlough in this country, with the amount of charges in each year since the furlough regulation in 1796 to the present time, App. p. 148.

G.

*Gardiner*, T. G. Letter from, as secretary to the Government at Bombay, to the adjutant-general of the army, upon the appointment of subadars to the command of sebundies, *Malcolm*, App. p. 236.

INDEX.  
GAR—GOV.

**Garrisons and Cantonments.** Return showing the aggregate expense thereof at the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras, on 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 52.

**Golundauze.** Return showing the number of, in the European foot artillery, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

Calculation of the comparative expense of a battalion of Company's golundauze, consisting of eight companies; number of officers and men 1,090, at Bengal, App. p. 55—Calculation of the comparative expense of a battalion of Company's golundauze, consisting of four companies, number of officers and men 909: with ten companies of gun lascars, number 504, at Madras, App. p. 57—The like at Bombay, consisting of eight companies, number of officers and men 728; with eight companies of lascars attached, number 400, App. p. 59.

**Goorkhas.** Possibility of enlisting a greater number of Goorkhas, and in what countries they might be employed, *Mackenzie* 2267—2271—How far employment of the Goorkha force cheaper than the sepoys, *Mackenzie* 2281—2284.

**Government, His Majesty's.** Arrangement between the King's Government and the Company as to the expense of troops serving in India, *Melvill* 2140—Report of Messrs. Hill and Melvill upon the claims of the public in respect of the King's troops employed in India, *Melvill*, p. 177—Correspondence between the Treasury and the East-India Company thereupon, *Melvill*, p. 189.

See also 'King's Service.'

**Government of India.** Division of authority between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control establishes a mutual and salutary check on both; additional effect might be given to orders from home when promulgated to the army in India, if they bore the countersignature of the Minister for the Affairs of India, *Salmond*, App. p. 167—Manner in which the officers and men of the great body of troops have done their duty is a proof that their constitution should not be rashly changed or injudiciously altered, *Malcolm*, App. p. 171—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the home government as connected with the Indian army, p. xxii.

**Governor-General.** The whole Indian army substantially is under the Governor-General of India, and he has in late despatches been specially exhorted to exercise the control with which he is legally vested, habitually and vigorously; necessity for his being also appointed captain-general, *Salmond*, App. p. 166—The greatest possible advantage would accrue to the army by having the whole of it under one governor and one commander-in-chief. Number of different general orders that are issued, and disadvantages thereof, *Pritzler*, App. p. 268—Advantage of the army being under one commander-in-chief, being a member or the head of the Supreme Government; necessity for such head being vested with the controlling power, and being free from details, *Havilland*, App. p. 284—Objections to the Indian army being under one governor and one commander-in-chief, from the country being too extensive for one person to be able to exercise a sufficient control, and from a system of favouritism taking place with regard to patronage, *Nutt*, App. p. 290, *Limond*, App. p. 307.

Disadvantages of the army being under one governor and one commander-in-chief, *Pennington*, App. p. 300, *Limond*, App. p. 307, *Hopkinson*, App. p. 313, *Baker*, App. p. 344, *Wilson*, App. p. 374, *Stannus*, App. p. 385, *Mayne*, App. p. 387, *Duff*, App. p. 400, *Cabell*, App. p. 433—Nothing but good to be expected from having the whole

army under one governor and one commander-in-chief; efficiency and economy would be a certain result, *Balmain*, App. p. 321—Necessity for one commander-in-chief, and regulations that should be adopted on such an event taking place, *Worsley*, App. p. 328—Empire in India should be considered as a whole; essential to unity of purpose and action that the whole army should be placed under one governor and commander-in-chief, *Munro*, App. p. 356—Synopsis of evidence relative to placing the army under one governor and one commander-in-chief, p. xxx.

*Grant*, Lieutenant-general Sir *W. Keir*. Reply of Lieut.-general Sir *W. Keir Grant*, dated 27th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 270.

*Grants of Land*. 'Native Soldiers.'

*Grass-cutters*. Number of grass-cutters and grooms to a cavalry regiment, and necessity for them, *Feilding* 855—857.

*Greenhill*, Colonel *James David*. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Period of witness's service in the infantry at Madras, 1460—1466—Spirit, discipline and efficiency of Native troops 1467, 1468—Manner in which the discipline of Native troops is injuriously affected by their being allowed to make complaints to the commanding officer when inspecting, 1469—1482—European officers not likely to encroach on the customs of religious feelings of the Natives, 1483—Native troops paid by European officers, 1484—Difference in the nature of employment between European and Native soldiers, 1486—Natives less addicted to intoxication than Europeans, 1487—Difference in the period of service between Natives and Europeans, 1488—Native officers are sufficiently encouraged, 1490—They might be promoted out of their regiments, but should not have influence or power therein, 1491, 1492—How often Native officers are removed from one regiment to another, 1493.

How far European and Native officers associate together, 1494, 1495—Disadvantages of appointing Native officers to personal staff duties, 1496—Examination of officers in Native languages, and frequency of their appointment as interpreters without understanding the language, 1497—1515—Different rates of pay in different Presidencies, and reasons of it, 1516—1519—Services the sepoys usually prefer, 1520—Reason why as good recruits are not obtained now as formerly, 1521—1524—Rewards to Native officers should only be bestowed through commanding officers of the corps, 1525—1531—Powers of punishment that should be given to commanding officers without courts-martial, 1532—1539—Utility of the establishment for sepoy recruits, 1540—Encouragement that should be given to Native officers to induce their sons to enlist, 1541—Usual period of pensioning and invaliding Native officers, 1542—1547.

Rates of pay of non-commissioned Native officers, and how far sufficient, 1548, 1549—Disadvantages of holding out situations in the Revenue and Police to Native non-commissioned officers on retirement, 1550—1554—Memory of former mutinies effaced from the minds of Native corps, 1556—Not sufficient European officers with Native regiments, 1558—Staff officers should only be appointed on recommendation of commanding officer, 1559—European regimental officers not exchanged from one regiment or battalion to another, 1560—Portion of pay allowed to be assigned by sepoys for their families when on distant service, 1561, 1562—Certain number of letters allowed postage free from each regiment, 1563—Part of Madras territories from which best recruits obtained, 1564—Desertions at present very rare, 1565, 1566—Incorporation of the Company's army under the King, not applicable to Native regiments, 1567, 1568—Not possible to effect retrenchment in the Madras service, 1569—Advantage of the powers formerly vested in commanding officers, 1570—Method of appointment of non-commissioned officers and naigs, 1571—1576—Powers that should be given to commanding officers, 1578, 1579.

*Grooms*. See 'Grass-cutters.'



## INDEX.

## GUA—HAL.

*Guard.* See 'Infantry, Native.'

*Guicowar's Contingent.* Staff officer on the Bombay establishment employed as Guicowar's contingent, App. p. 48.

*Guns.* See 'Artillery.'

**GUN-CARRIAGES :****I.—Generally :**

Opinion as to the gun-carriage department at Madras, *Hopkinson* 1330 -Description of wood of which gun-carriages manufactured, *Hopkinson* 1334—1336 -Reason for altering the gun-carriage establishment, *Hopkinson* 1357, 1358.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Staff officers employed as agents for gun-carriages at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Bombay, App. p. 47—Deputy superintendent of gun-carriages at Madras, App. p. 35—Great reductions of expenditure have been carried into effect at Bombay in this department ; establishment quite equal to the present demand of supply, and can be promptly increased on emergency, *Malcolm*, App. p. 254.

See also ' Ordnance Department.'

*Gun Lascars.* Return showing the number of gun lascars in the European and Native horse and foot artillery ; in the Native (Company's) regular and irregular cavalry ; in the Native (Company's) regular and irregular infantry, and in the pioneers, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

Calculation of comparative expense of four companies of gun lascars, number of officers and men 301, attached to a battalion of Company's European foot artillery, at Madras, App. p. 57—The like at Bombay, of a battalion of lascars, number of officers and men 272, App. p. 59—Calculation of comparative expense of ten companies of gun lascars, number of officers and men 504, attached to a battalion of golundanze, at Madras, App. p. 57—The like at Bombay, of eight companies of lascars attached, number of officers and men 400, App. p. 59.

*Gunpowder.* Staff officer employed at Bombay as agent for gunpowder, App. p. 47.

*Gunpowder Manufactory.* Staff officer employed as superintendent of, at Madras, App. p. 47.

**II.**

*Half-Castes.* Half-caste children, as well as those by European women, educated in the same school, *Nicolls* 150, *Reynell* 375—Half-castes never enlisted into an European regiment, except as drummers or fifers, *Nicolls* 154, *Reynell* 379—382—Increase of half-caste population, *Nicolls* 155, 156, *Reynell* 379—382—Prejudice of the Natives against half-castes, *Nicolls* 247, 248.

See also ' Schools,

*Half-Pay.* Amount of Indian half-pay and pensions, and how often taken advantage of, *Salmond* 606—615—No officers on half-pay from reduction of regiments, *Salmond* 622—How far half-pay of Company's officers equalized with King's officers, *Feilding* 770.

See also ' Pay and Allowances.'

*Harrison, G., Esq.* Letter from, to the chairman and deputy chairman of the East-India Company, dated 29th March 1825, upon the subject of settling the claims of the public in respect to King's troops employed in India, *Melville*, Evidence p. 264.

*Havilland, Lieutenant-colonel De.* Reply of Lieutenant-colonel De Havilland, dated 7th July 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 277.

*Hay, Colonel Edward.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—In the Madras infantry service, 1635—1637—Duties of commandant of the Company's depôt in Europe, and stations, 1638—1642, 1664—How often reinforcements sent out to India, and number sent out annually, 1643, 1644—Bounty for recruits, 1646, 1647—Period recruits kept at the depôt, and ages at which sent out, 1648, 1649—How far advantageous for men to remain in India, 1651—1653—Average length of service to remain efficient, 1654—1658—Expense of depôt at Chatham, 1659, 1660—At other depôts, 1667, 1668—Recruiting diminished last year, 1660—Company's recruits equal to His Majesty's, 1662—Amount at which discharge allowed to be purchased, 1665—Number of officers at recruiting establishments, 1665—Greater number might have been recruited than has ever been required, 1666—Opinion as to ages of recruits, 1669.

*Health.* How far health of Europeans improved in the last twenty years, *Aitchison* 1700—1701—Proportion of sick, Natives and Europeans, *Aitchison* 1702—1704.  
See also 'Bengal.'

*Helena, St.* Return showing the number of the military force at the settlement of St. Helena, also the number of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1825, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

See also 'Army in India, II—2.'

*Herries, J. C., Esq.* Letter from, to the chairman and deputy-chairman of the East-India Company, dated 7th August 1824, relating to settling the claims of the public in respect to King's troops serving in India, *Melville*, Evidence p. 260.

*Hill Forts.* Extract minute by Sir John Malcolm, dated 2d November 1828, relative to the employing Native officers in the charge of hill forts, *Malcolm*, App. p. 231—Extract from another minute, dated 3d January 1829, upon the same subject, *Malcolm*, App. p. 233—Extract from another minute, dated 3d October 1829, containing particulars of the appointment of certain officers to the command of hill forts, *Malcolm*, App. p. 234, 251.

*Hill and Melville, Messrs.* Report from, dated 18th June 1824, upon the account of the claims of the public upon the East-India Company in respect of forces in India, *Melville*, Evidence p. 244—Extract from another report, dated 11th April 1825, *Melville*, Evidence p. 265.

*Hindoos.* See 'Native Soldiers.'

*Hindustanee Language.* Extent to which the Hindostanee language is made the medium of communication between European officers and troops throughout India, *Feilding* 801.

*Hopkinson, Colonel Charles.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Appointments of witness in the artillery, and period of service in India, 1308—1312—Comparison of European and Native artillery, and reason of unsuitness of Natives for artillery service, 1313—1316—Casualties among Europeans greater during the Burmese war than among Natives, 1317—Advantages of the Bengal men over the Madras for the artillery service, 1318, 1319—Ages of European artillery officers, and method of selecting them, 1320—

INDEX.  
HOP—HOR.

1323—Evil effects of the order for daily pay of men, 1324—1326—Mortality among children by European parents, 1327—1329—Opinion as to the gun-carriage department at Madras, 1330—Excellent description of horses for the artillery service, 1331—1333—Description of wood of which gun-carriages are manufactured, 1334—1336—Weight of guns and number of horses, 1337—1341.

Establishment of artillery regiment of officers, men, and cattle, 1342—1345, 1348—Rate of march of artillery per day, 1346, 1347—Description of guns, 1349—No local corps under the Madras establishment, 1350—1352—Advantage of bullocks for the artillery 1353—Disadvantages of putting the Indian artillery into the King's service instead of the Company's, 1354—1356—Reason for altering the gun-carriage establishment, 1357, 1358—After what period men get unfit for service and are pensioned, 1360, 1361—From whence artillery stores supplied, 1362, 1363—not a disadvantage that stores from different Presidencies are dissimilar, 1364, 1365—Method of supplying stores when troops from different Presidencies act together, 1366—1374—Efficiency of the powder manufactory at Madras, 1375—1377—Amount of annual consumption during peace can be obtained, 1378.

*Hopkinson*, Lieut.-colonel. Reply of Lieut.-colonel *Hopkinson*, c.b., dated 15th February 1882, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 308.

**HORSES:**

**I.—Generally :**

Method of providing and stabling horses, *Nicolls* 205—208, *Reynell* 440—445, *Feilding* 860, *Pritzler* 1155—Number of horses allowed to different ranks of officers, *Feilding* 858, 859—Method of supplying horses to cavalry regiments, *Feilding* 860—Healthiness of Madras horses from their not being under cover, *Pritzler* 1157—Quality of horses in India for military purposes, *Pritzler* 124—Supply of horses for the artillery, their qualities and price, *Limond* 1294—1297—Excellent description of horses for the artillery service, *Hopkinson* 1331—1333—Description of horses fully equal to the Native service, *Dickson* 1601, 1602—How far horses sufficient to sustain the weight of European and Native soldiers, with their accoutrements, *Dickson* 1670—1674.

How far horses equal to forced marches, *Dickson* 1683—1685—How far Bombay horses of inferior description at present, *Leighton* 1974—Supply of horses, their cost, and period of service, *Leighton* 1975—1979, *Dalbiac* 2011—2015—Condition of horses not better from being under cover, but their being so is essential to the health of the men during their stable duties, *Dalbiac* 2006, 2007—Description of horses at Bombay, and method of selecting them, *Dalbiac* 2009, 2010—Different system as to the care of horses in Bengal and Bombay, *Dalbiac* 2032, 2033—Examination upon the size, breed, and diseases of horses in India, *Dalbiac* 2034—2041—Fitness of the horses of the cavalry and artillery for their duties, *Paget* 2302—2304—Good quality of horses for the artillery, *Smith* 2326—European cavalry not so well mounted as the Native, from their being heavier men, *Smith* 2327, 2328.

**II.—Stud :**

Whether stud horses bred in sufficient numbers for the supply of troops, *Reynell* 446, 447—Efficiency of the stud department at Bombay, *Malcolm* 685—Horses supplied from the stud are the best, *Feilding* 740, *Pennington* 817, 818—Establishment of studs and divisions of them, *Feilding* 861—863—Comparison between stud and Native horses, *Watson* 961—969—No stud establishment at Madras, *Dickson* 1682.

**III.—Cost of them, and of their keep :**

**1. Generally :**

Cost to government of horses, *Feilding* 864, 865, *Watson* 960, *Limond* 1294—1297, *Leighton* 1975—1979, *Dalbiac* 2011—Expense of maintaining horses per month

*Feilding* 866—868—Cost price of cavalry horses, *Watson* 960—Average price of a troop horse, *Pritzler* 1156—Annual per-centage of expenditure for horses in all the services, *Pritzler* 1158—Price of artillery horses, *Limond* 1294—1297—Purchase of horses, *Leighton* 2142.

INDEX.  
—  
HOR—INF.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Calculation of comparative expense of feeding horses of certain regiments at Bengal, App. p. 54, 55—At Madras, App. p. 56, 57—The Bombay accounts include the expense of feeding horses as a regimental charge, App. p. 56, 57, *note*.

See also 'Stud Department.'

*Horse Appointments.* See 'Saddlery.'

**HOSPITALS:**

I.—Generally :

Method of conducting the hospital establishments, and supply of medicines thereto, *Pritzler* 1191—1196.

II.—Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the number on the hospital establishments at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 5—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43.

See also 'Inspectors of Hospitals.' 'Medical Department.'

*Houstoun*, Colonel. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Lieut.-governor of Addiscombe seminary, 1802—Cavalry situations held by witness in India, 1804, 1805—Number on establishment, ages at which received, and period of remaining, 1806—1811, 1859—Ages of going to India, 1812, 1813, 1838, 1839—Recommended on leaving for particular branches from merit only, 1814, 1815—Amount paid by cadets towards the establishment, 1816—Number of officers in the establishment, 1818—Period of vacations, 1819, 1820—Principally educated for engineers and artillery service, 1821—Comparison of weight between European and Native cavalry soldiers, 1826—1829—Number of examinations at Addiscombe, and method of conducting them, 1830—1832.

Arrangement as to drafting off for engineers and artillery service, 1833—Nature of discipline and punishment, 1834—1836—Nature of instruction at Chatham, 1837—Number annually sent out, 1841—1843—Proportion of cadets sent out who have not been educated at Addiscombe, 1844—1846—Disposal of cadets on their arrival in India, 1847—Necessity of acquiring Native languages, and how far taught at Addiscombe, 1848—1854—Pocket-money allowed at Addiscombe, 1855—1857—Number of corporals, 1858—Cadets might be made to pay the expenses of the establishment, 1860, 1861—Comparison of examinations at Addiscombe and Woolwich, 1862—1864.

I.

*Indents.* See 'Baggage.'

*Inebriety.* See 'Drunkenness.'

**INFANTRY:**

I.—European :

1. Generally :

Expense of a King's regiment of European infantry, *Salmond* 587, 588—Number of European regiments of infantry at each Presidency and their expense, *Salmond* 600—602

INDEX.  
INFANTRY.

-Comparison of expense between a King's regiment of infantry and Company's European or Native corps, *Malcolm* 650, 651—Comparison of King's and Company's infantry with Native infantry, *Malcolm* 666, 667—Relative proportions of European and Native infantry, *Munro* 1110—European infantry should be increased instead of reduced, *Scot* 1454.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the number of European infantry (King's and Company's) at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements ; also number of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Calculation of the comparative expense of a regiment of His Majesty's infantry, consisting of ten companies, number of officers and men 844, at Bengal, App. p. 55—At Madras, App. p. 57—At Bombay, App. p. 59.

Calculation of the comparative expense of a regiment of Company's European infantry, consisting of eight companies, number of officers and men 783, at Bengal, App. p. 55—At Madras, number of officers and men 782, App. p. 57—At Bombay, number of officers and men 781, App. p. 59—Return of the establishment of a regiment of European infantry at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831, with columns showing in what particulars the establishments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from that at Bengal, App. p. 73—Return of the establishment of a regiment of infantry in the East-Indies, in 1813 and at the present time, together with the number of corps of each description, and of the troops or companies belonging to each corps, and where alterations of establishment have intermediately taken place, showing the date of the alteration, App. p. 79.

Form of indent, or table of weight of baggage, and description of carriage, allowed for one regiment of European infantry on a march, App. p. 142—Rates of monthly off-reckonings fixed for European infantry and European infantry invalids, 1813 and 1831, with increase or decrease, and date of the general order or Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning any alteration, App. p. 144—Advantage of reducing European infantry, and increasing European cavalry, *Salmond*, App. p. 158—Observations upon the organization of the European infantry, *Wilson*, App. p. 368—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the Company's European infantry, p. lxxxix—Relative to the number and expense of infantry maintained at the three Presidencies, p. cvii.

See also 'Reduction of Regiments.'

II.—Natives :

1. Generally :

Expense of a regiment of, *Salmond* 594—599—In what way the Native infantry have been employed in services not military, *Malcolm* 691—692—Employment of Native infantry on guard over European, and how far harassing to Natives, *Watson* 902—905—Good state of infantry at Madras, *Pritzler* 1126—Spirit of the infantry better than that of the cavalry, *Scot* 1388—Disadvantage of doing away with Company's infantry, *Leighton* 2144.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the number of Company's regular and irregular infantry, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements ; also number of corps and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—

For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Calculation of the comparative expense of a regiment of Company's Native infantry, consisting of eight companies, number of officers and men 792, at Bengal, App. p. 55—At Madras, consisting of four companies, number of officers and men 776, App. p. 57—The like at Bombay, App. p. 59.

Return of the establishment of a regiment of Native infantry at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831; with columns showing in what particulars the establishments of regiments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 60—Form of indent, or table of weight of baggage, and description of carriage, allowed for one regiment of Native infantry on a march, App. p. 143—They may be considered the standing force of the country; purposes for which they may be employed; their expense paid by Native princes, when employed for their protection, *Salmond*, App. p. 156—The Native infantry are good troops; within the last thirty years they have been much improved in dress and equipment, as also in drill and discipline; many of the Madras corps are quite equal in these respects to those of any army, *Balmain*, App. p. 315—Observations upon the organization of the Native infantry, *Wilson*, App. p. 368.

See also 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Recruits.'

*Inspection.* Period of inspection of regiments, *Aitchison* 1785.

## INSPECTORS OF HOSPITALS:

### I.—Generally:

Benefits from the introduction of inspectors of hospitals, *Nicolls* 233—235—Their duties and qualifications, *Reynell* 463—468.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Inspector-general of His Majesty's hospitals, at Bengal, with an assistant, and deputy inspectors-general at Madras and Bombay, on the staff of those Presidencies, App. p. 44.  
*Inspector of Stores.* See 'Stores.'

*Insurrection.* Manner in which insurrection may be expected in some part of our Indian dominions, and troops that will be of most use in repelling such, *Malcolm*, App. p. 170.

*Interpreter.* His duties, *Nicolls* 176, *Reynell* 411—413—Staff officer employed as interpreter to commander-in-chief at Bombay, App. p. 48.

*Intestates.* See 'Registrar.'

## INVALIDS:

### I.—Generally:

Invalid battalions of sepoys at Bengal and Madras, *Watson* 1005—Observations upon the practice of paying men sent home from regiments on foreign service invalided, *Melville*, Evidence p. 248.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Return showing the number of invalids, European and Native, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33

## INDEX.

## IRR—JUD.

—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Rates of monthly off- reckonings fixed for foot artillery invalids and European infantry invalids, 1813 and 1831, with increase or decrease, and date of the general order and Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning any alteration, App. p. 144.

Abolition of the office of superintendent of invalids, and the allowance for office establishment drawn by the adjutant; inefficient men of the invalid corps transferred to the Pension establishment, holding out inducement to them to settle in their native districts, and engage in agriculture; those still fit for ordinary duty being placed in a veteran battalion, *Malcolm*, App. p. 254—Invalid establishments for both Europeans and Natives are well arranged, *Balmain*, App. p. 316—Synopsis of the evidence relative to invalids, p. cix.

See also 'Irregular Troops.' 'Native Soldiers.'

**IRREGULAR TROOPS:****I.—Generally:**

Efficiency of the irregular horse, *Feilding* 803—Irregular corps reduced, *Pritzler* 1237—How far irregular cavalry commanded by European officers, *Scot* 1442—Efficiency of the irregular troops, and opinion as to their being kept up at the expense of the regular cavalry, *Macan* 2208—2218.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee:**

Returns showing the number of irregulars and invalids, European and Native, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 5—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43—Necessity for reducing the irregular cavalry; annual saving of expense thereby, *Salmond*, p. 158.

Necessity for maintaining a body of irregular horse, *Malcolm*, App. p. 169—Utility of irregular force in saving regular cavalry from harassing duties, which destroy their efficiency before they are brought into contact with the enemy; they afford employment to Natives of higher rank than those who enter on regular service, *Malcolm*, App. p. 253—Disadvantage of recent orders for discharging the auxiliary horse; their usefulness in relieving the regular troops from detached duties, which hurts their discipline, *Nutt*, App. p. 286—Synopsis of evidence relative to the irregular corps, p. cvii.

See also 'Mysore Silledar Horse.'

**J.**

*Java.* Expense of troops serving therein, 1813, App. p. 8, 9—1814, App. p. 10, 11—1815, App. p. 12, 13—1816, App. p. 14, 15.

*Judge Advocate General.* Number in this department on the staff at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 48.—The judge advocate general might with propriety be a barrister, but the deputy judge advocate can be more cheaply and easily furnished from the army, *Salmond*, App. p. 161.

K.

INDEX.

KAI—LEI.

*Kaira*, in Guzerat. Unhealthiness of the climate, and great extent of mortality of King's troops there, *Dalbiac* 2016.

*Killahdars*. See 'Hill Forts.'

*King's Regiments*. Number of troops of which the King's regiments should consist, *Feilding* 842—850.

*King's Service*. Whether the King's forces in India exceed the amount agreed upon between the Government and Company, *Malcolm* 718—Report by Messrs. Hill and Melvill upon the claims of the public upon the East-India Company in respect of forces employed in India, *Melvill*, Evidence p. 244—Correspondence relating thereto, Evidence p. 260.

See also 'Company's Service.' 'Government.'

L.

*Land*. See 'Native Soldiers.'

*Languages*. See 'Native Languages.'

*Lascars*. See 'Gun Lascars.'

*Leighton*, Brigadier-general *David*, C. B. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Infantry service at Bombay, 1937—1942—Efficiency of the Bombay troops, 1943—In what the equipments are deficient, 1944—1946—Necessity for a greater number of officers, 1945—Their pay insufficient, 1945—Method of providing arms and accoutrements, 1947—1949—Military stores are assimilated as near as possible, 1950—Opinion as to forming the Company's army into a Royal army, 1951—How far advisable to have one commander-in-chief, 1952—Reduction cannot be made in staff officers, 1953—Arrangements necessary for securing the fidelity and attachment of the Natives, 1954—1958—Higher rank than their present should not be given to Native officers, 1959—Encouragement and rewards that should be given them, 1960—Bad effect of regulation as to education of sepoys upon enlistment, 1960, 1961—Enlistment of the sons of Native officers, 1962—1964—European officers of Native corps are always prepared with camp equipage, 1965—Bombay army could be easily augmented, 1966.

Regulations against recruiting the Bombay troops from the Bengal territories, 1966, 1967—Bombay troops best adapted for infantry, 1968—Description of the cavalry recruits, 1969—They have sufficient strength and stamina for artillerymen, 1970, 1971—Advisable to increase pay of Native troops, but not with less pay on enlistment, 1972, 1973—How far Bombay horses of inferior description at present, 1974—Supply of horses, their cost, and period of service, 1975—1979—Average service of a Native soldier, 1980—How far the Bombay army healthy, 1981, 1982—Comparison of casualties in European and Native regiments, 1983, 1984—Benefit of the establishment for recruit boys, 1985, 1986—Dissensions among European officers from forming the two European regiments into two wings of one corps, 1987, 1988—Alterations necessary with regard to promotion, 1989—1992—Artillery and cavalry services at Bombay efficient, 1993, 1994.

[Second Examination.]—Disadvantages from more cadets being sent out than there are vacancies for; ages at which they should go out; purchase of horses; necessity for keeping up the European regiments, and necessity for there being two regiments instead of as at present; alterations that should be made with regard to rank and commissions of officers; Company's officers should be appointed as commanders-in-chief, 2142—Regulations as to off-reckonings, 2143—Disadvantages of doing away with the



INDEX.  
—  
LET—MAC.

Company's infantry; inconvenience of general officers being speedily relieved after getting acquainted with the nature of the Indian army, 2144.

*Letters.* See 'Postage.'

*Length of Service.* See 'Discharged Soldiers.' 'Native Soldiers.'

*Libraries.* Effect of soldiers' libraries sent out by the Company, *Nicolls* 146, 147, *Reynell* 370, 371.

*Lieutenant-colonels.* Number of lieutenant-colonels of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service at present on the Bombay establishment, *Malcolm*, App. p. 218—Amount of pay and allowances at Bombay and Bengal, *Malcolm*, App. p. 220.

See also 'Officers, European.'

*Lieutenant-generals.* Commanding the forces at Madras and Bombay; constitution of their staff, and extra officers allowed them in their joint capacities of commanders-in-chief of the Company's troops at those Presidencies, App. p. 44.

*Light Dragoons.* See 'Dragoons.'

*Limond, Colonel James.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Appointments, 1264—1266, 1298, 1299—Amount of European and Native artillery, 1267—Artillery officers educated at home, 1268—Attached to European battalions upon their arrival, 1269—Regulations as to promotion, 1270—1272—Efficiency of Native artillery, 1273—1278—Supply of artillery stores, 1279, 1280—Comparison of European and Native artillerymen, 1281—1284, 1301—1304—Manner of selecting officers for the Native artillery corps, 1285, 1286—Instruction of officers in Native languages, 1287, 1288, 1289—Ages of officers and men on joining artillery, 1290, 1291—Casualties, 1292, 1293—Supply of horses, and price, 1294—1297—Daily pay of soldiers, 1300—Artillery service preferred by Mussulmans, 1305—Selection of recruits by the artillery, 1306, 1307.

*Limond, Colonel.* Reply of Colonel Limond, dated 31st January 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 303.

*Local Corps.* Manner in which the place of local corps may be supplied, *Pritzler* 1255—1257—No local corps under the Madras establishment, *Hopkinson* 1350—1352.

## M.

*Macan, Captain.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness in the Bengal Presidency, and periods of service, 2146—2150—How far the Bengal army sufficient for the purposes of defence and war, and impossibility of any reduction, 2151—Discipline of Native troops, and how far deteriorated; instances of mutiny, and causes of deterioration in Native troops, 2151, 2152—Inferiority of arms, accoutrements, and clothing of Native to King's troops, 2152—2156—King's troops take their own arms to India which are left in store, 2157—Method of supplying provisions and stores, 2158—2160—Reductions that might be made in stations in the Bengal Presidency, 2161, 2163—2167—Reductions that may be made in the staff, and method of effecting them, 2162, 2168—2173—Reduction of allowances to European officers prevents their ingratiating themselves as much with the Natives as they formerly did, 2174, 2175—2182.

Reasons why as good class of Natives are not enlisted now as were formerly, 2176—2181—Necessity for officers having a knowledge of Native languages, 2182, 2183—Interest principally attaches Native soldiers to the English government, 2184—Native army superior to that of any other that ever existed in India, 2185—How far Natives have conformed to European system of discipline, 2186—2188—Comparative situation of European officers infinitely inferior to that of civilians, 2189—Dependence of European government upon Native troops, and how far dependence securely placed, 2190—2193—Danger from the Native army might occur from trifling causes, 2194—2196—Brahmins work upon trifling causes to prejudice Natives; they should not have been enlisted, and are being got rid of, 2196, 2197.

Attention to Native habits, customs and feelings, and judicious distribution of rewards, may secure their fidelity and attachment, 2198—Number of officers that should be present with their regiments, 2199—2202—How staff officers to be supplied, 2201, 2202—How far one commander-in-chief advantageous, 2203—Necessity for improving the situation of battalion officers, 2203—Effect of making the Company's army a Royal army upon Native troops and European officers, 2204—Frontiers of India, and enemies to be dreaded thereon, 2205, 2206—How far armies of Madras and Bombay may be farther reduced, 2207—Efficiency of irregular troops, and opinion as to their being kept up at the expense of the regular cavalry, 2208—2218—Cause of the mutiny at Barrackpore, 2219—Appointments and promotions of Native non-commissioned officers, 2220—Good effect of increasing sepoy's pay in proportion to their length of service, 2221—Not sufficient encouragement to Native officers to retire after length of service, 2222—2224—How far higher ranks and rewards should be given to Native officers, 2225—How far advisable that commanders-in-chief should previously have served in India, 2226.

*Mackenzie, Holt.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness in India, 2254—2257—Opinion as to efficiency of the Native army, 2258—2261—Attachment of Native sepoys to the service consists in the regularity of their pay, 2262—2264—Superiority of our Native army over that of Native princes, 2265—Part of the Bengal Presidency from which the best sepoys are drawn, 2266—Possibility of enlisting a greater number of Goorkhas, and in what countries they might be employed, 2267—2271—How far strictness of military discipline suitable to sepoys, 2272—Causes of the diminution of attachment between sepoys and European officers, 2273, 2274—Officers not so well acquainted with Native languages as necessary, 2275—2277—How far danger to be apprehended from the Native army, 2278—2280—How far the employment of the Goorkha force cheaper than sepoys, 2281, 2284—Grants of land to retired sepoys advisable, 2285—2294.

*Madras.* Nature of the country of Madras, *Munro* 1097—Danger to Madras from the invasion of a foreign enemy, such as France, *Munro* 1103—How far danger to be apprehended, *Munro* 1104.

See also 'Arms.' 'Officers, Native.'

## MADRAS ARMY:

### I.—Generally :

Higher in point of discipline, but inferior in efficiency, to that of Bengal, *Nicolls* 5—Proportions of infantry and cavalry attached thereto, *Munro* 1098—How far Madras army a reserve to the armies of the other Presidencies, *Munro* 1105—Little reduction could be made in the Madras army, *Munro* 1107—From what part reduction could be made if required, *Munro* 1108—Divisions of the Madras army, *Munro* 1111—Number of general officers and brigadiers' commands, *Munro* 1112.

Allowances to the Madras army, *Munro* 1114—Spirit, discipline, and efficiency of the Madras army, *Pritzler* 1124—How far reduction might be made in the Madras army, *Pritzler* 1185—1187, *Salmond* 1908—1913, 1917, 1918, *Macan* 2207—Reduction cannot be made in the staff; of what it consists, *Pritzler* 1186—Not possible to effect retrenchment in the Madras service, *Greenhill* 1569—Number of troops at Madras, *Salmond* 1914—1916.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the total number of Europeans and Natives at the Presidency, 1793—1830, App. p. 2—Return showing the numbers of the military force at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, also the number of corps, and annual expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, 7—For the year 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For

INDEX.  
—  
MAD—MAL.

1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19,—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—  
For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27  
—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32,  
33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p.  
38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Return of the  
number of officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, and of  
brigades or stations, at Madras, App. p. 49.

Calculation of the comparative expense of certain regiments on the Madras establish-  
ment, App. p. 56, 57—Return of the establishment of a regiment of Native Cavalry,  
and Native infantry at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay in the year 1831, with columns  
showing in what particulars the establishments of regiments at Madras and Bombay  
differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 60—The like of a brigade of horse and battalion  
of foot artillery, App. p. 63—The like of the corps of engineers, battalion of pioneers,  
and corps of sappers and miners, App. p. 70—The like of a regiment of European  
infantry, App. p. 73—Return of the distribution of the Madras troops in the years  
1813, 1820, and 1830, App. p. 92—Abstract thereof, App. p. 106—Observations  
upon the past and present strength, distribution, and organization of the Madras army,  
*Pritzler*, App. p. 261.

See also 'Army in India, II. 2.'

*Madras Military Board.* See 'Military Boards.'

*Major-Generals.* Advantageous if Company's major-generals were eligible to the staff of  
either Presidency, *Munro* 1090—Number of major-generals on the staff of each Pre-  
sidency in command of divisions of the army, and number of their aides-de-camp, App.  
p. 44.

See also 'Staff.'

*Mahomedans.* See 'Native Soldiers.'

*Malacca.* See 'Prince of Wales' Island.'

*Malcolm*, Major-general Sir *John*. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness in  
India, 646—648—Expense of a King's regiment of infantry and Company's European  
or Native corps, 650, 651—Comparison of situations between King's and Company's  
European corps, 652—654—Scale of pay and allowances to officers, 655—658—Neces-  
sity for their being assimilated in all the Presidencies, 659, 660—Principle upon which  
allowances regulated, 661—Difference in batta allowance in 1828, 662, 663—Revision  
of the store department at Bombay, 664, 665—Comparison of King's and Company's  
European cavalry and infantry with Native cavalry and infantry, 666, 667—Efficiency  
of Native artillery, and advantages arising from their formation, 668—Discipline and  
character of Native troops, 669—672—Efficiency of the European artillery and engineer  
department, 673, 674—Further reduction would impair the efficiency of the army in  
India, 675, 676—Regiments sent over on account of the Burmese war might be with-  
drawn, 677, 678—Increase of the staff since 1813, and whether it could be further re-  
duced, 679—681—Reasons of increase in the adjutant-general's department, 682—684  
—Efficiency of the stud department at Bombay, 685.

Plan for the formation of a skeleton corps to supply deficiency of officers, 686—Dis-  
advantages of recent orders, limiting number of officers on staff duty, 686—Difficulty of  
reducing the Company's troops by regiments, 687—Method of reducing the Indian army,  
and distress occasioned thereby, 688—Necessity for keeping up the complement of  
officers upon the reduction of troops, 689—Disadvantages of employing European in-  
stead of Native cavalry and artillery, 690—Employment of Native infantry in services  
not military, 691, 692—Political and civil stations in which military men have been  
and should be employed, 693, 694—Competency of the education of young men at Ad-  
discombe and in England generally for military duties, 695, 696.

Education of officers of the line fits them for duties of Native regiments, 697—700—  
Means taken for obliging officers to study the Native languages, 701—Regulation as  
to full and half batta, 702, 703—Comparison as to equality of batta and tentage  
allowances of King's and Company's European officers, 704—707—Plan that should be  
adopted with regard to tentage allowance, 707, 708.

[Second Examination.]—Extra cost of European over Native regiments, 708—Further  
reduction would impair the efficiency of the army, 709—711—Reasons why reducing  
the present staff would impair efficiency, 712, 713—How far adjutant-generals might be  
reduced, 714—716—Disadvantages of further reducing Native regiments, 717—  
Whether the King's forces in India exceed the amount agreed upon between Government  
and the Company, 718—Reductions within the last two years, 719—Necessity for  
two lieut.-colonels of a regiment, 720, 721—Beneficial effects of Native aides-de-camp,  
722, 723—Rewards to Native officers as encouragement for good conduct, 724—  
Offices in the magistracy and police to which they might be promoted, 725, 726—More  
advantageous that troops from England should arrive in the cool season, 727—Neces-  
sity for making the command of a regiment more advantageous than the command of a  
station, 728, 729—Making the army in India a Royal army will depend upon the future  
arrangement of the Government of India, 730.

*Malcolm*, Major-general Sir John. Reply of Major-general Sir John Malcolm, G. C. B.,  
dated 13th February 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information  
relative to the army in India, App. p. 168—Letter from Sir John Malcolm to Lord W.  
Bentinck, dated 27th November 1830, relative to the pay, composition, and distribution  
of the army in India, *Malcolm*, App. p. 192—Minute of the state of the Bombay army,  
dated 25th March 1828, by Major-general Sir John Malcolm, App. p. 206—Another  
minute by, dated 4th September 1829, relative to increasing the number of boys belong-  
ing to Native regiments, App. p. 229.

Another minute by, dated 14th September 1829, relative to introduction into the ranks  
of the sons of Native officers, and as to privileges that should be granted them, App. p.  
230—Another minute, dated 2d November 1828, relative to rewards to be granted to  
Native officers, and particularly as to giving them the charge of hill forts, App. p. 231  
—Another minute, dated 3d January 1829, upon the same subject, and particularly  
as to length of service of Native officers to entitle them to the distinction, App. p. 233  
—Another minute, dated 3d October 1829, containing particulars of the appointment  
of certain officers to the command of hill forts, App. p. 234—Another minute upon  
the inexpediency of employing Europeans, and upon the necessity of employing Native  
officers in the command of *sehundies*, App. p. 236—Another minute, dated 27th January  
1830, upon the necessity of forming a pension or military fund for the widows of Native  
officers, App. p. 236.

Another minute, dated 28th October 1828, relative to the European and Native army,  
and upon the raising the troop of Mysore Silladar horse, App. p. 243—Another minute,  
dated 1st December 1829, upon the constitution of the Military Board at Bombay, and  
upon the advantages of individual agency over a Board, App. p. 245—Another minute,  
dated 30th November 1830, upon the changes proposed and carried into effect by Sir  
John Malcolm in the Bombay army, App. p. 250.

*March*. See 'Officers.'

*Marriages*. Settlement of Europeans in India would not lead to more marriages among  
those who remained with their regiments; it would lead to many marriages among the  
officers, which, with the introduction of the sons of settlers into the army, would weaken  
the tie between it and this country, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 259.

*Mayne*, Colonel. Reply of Colonel Mayne, C. B., dated 5th March 1832, to circular of the  
Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 385.

*Medical Department*. Return showing the annual expense thereof at the three Presidencies

INDEX.  
—  
MED—MEL.

and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 7—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43—Return showing the aggregate expense of the medical department at the three Presidencies, on the 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 52.

See also 'Hospitals.'

*Medical Officers.* Comparison of the duties of medical officers in European and Native regiments, *Nicolls* 221—223, *Reynell* 457, 458—Benefits of substituting specific allowances to medical officers instead of medical contracts, *Nicolls* 224—226—How far putting Company's medical officers on the same footing as the King's service, as to retiring pensions, would be beneficial, *Nicolls* 227—232, *Reynell* 462—Nature of medical contracts, *Reynell* 460—Revisions of medical establishments lately, *Salmond* 564—Company's medical officers should be examined in a similar manner to the King's, *Pritzler* 1202—Medical establishments well conducted; necessity for properly remunerating medical officers, *Dulbiac* 2023—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the medical department, p. cxv.

*Medical Staff.* Return of the medical staff of His Majesty's forces on the Indian establishment, App. p. 44—Return of the medical staff appointments of the three Presidencies, App. p. 50—Return of the allowances drawn by medical officers holding certain staff appointments, App. p. 127.

See also 'Pay and Allowances.'

*Medicines.* See 'Hospitals.'

*Melville, James Cosmo.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Expense of the Indian army, 2043, 2044—Cost of the army at Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and St. Helena, and strength of the army therein, from 1813—1831, 2046—2065—Comparison of expense with income, 2066—2070—Expense of the staff, 1814—1829, at each of the three Presidencies, 2075—2079—Expense of an European regiment of different description of troops, 2083—2089—The like of Native regiments, 2090—Comparative statement of pay of Company's Native troops at the three Presidencies, 2091—Rates of exchange at which officers and soldiers are paid, and intestates' effects remitted, 2092—2096—Expense of artillery, commissariat, clothing, barracks, &c. from 1814, 2097—2111—Nature of Lord Clive's fund, and charges upon it, 2112—2115, 2117—Funds from which officers' widows and children are provided for, 2116—Assistance of the Company thereto, and advantages from high interest on balances, and advantageous rates of exchange on remittances, 2117.

Number of officers receiving retired allowances, and increase therein, 2118—2120—Charge for pensions to European non-commissioned officers and men, and number receiving them, 1814, 1822, and 1828; the like to Native officers and men, 2126, 2127—Additional allowances granted by the Company in cases of distress, 2128—Expense of military stores sent out to India in 1828, 2129—An uniform currency would facilitate keeping the accounts, 2130, 2131—Expense of equalizing the pay at the different Presidencies would be considerable, 2132—2134—Military boards correspond with the local governments, and those with the Court of Directors, 2135—Accounts of the different military boards are sent direct home, 2136—Amount of damages to military stores since 1814, 2137—Expense of Addiscombe College in 1828, 2138—Expense of the military dépôt in 1828, 2139—Arrangement between the King's Government and the Company as to the expense of troops serving in India, 2140—Annual expense thereof, 2140, 2141.

*Melville, J. C. Esq.* Report from Messrs. Hill and Melville on the claims of the public upon

the East-India Company in respect of forces serving in India, Evidence p. 244—Extract from the Report of Messrs. Hill and Melvill upon the claims of the paymaster-general for 1822, dated 11th April 1825, Evidence p. 265.

INDEX.  
—  
MILITARY.

# MILITARY BOARDS:

## I.—Generally:

Constitution of the Bengal military board, and its duties; *Watson* 1019, 1020—How far business thereof efficiently conducted, *Watson* 1021—1026—Constitution of the Madras military board, *Munro* 1116—Necessity for its being reconstructed, *Munro* 1117, 1118—It might be done away with, *Pritzler* 1254—Military board abolished at Bombay, *Salmond* 1930—Modifications in the military board at Bengal, and how far beneficial, *Salmond* 1931—1936—Military boards correspond with the local governments, and those with the Court of Directors, *Melvill* 2135—Accounts of the different military boards are sent direct home, *Melvill* 2136.

## II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Number and description of staff officers of the military board at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 47—Constitution of the military boards at the three Presidencies, *Salmond*, App. p. 161—Observations upon suspending the powers of the military board at Bombay, *Malcolm*, App. p. 170—Minute by Sir John Malcolm, dated 1st December 1829, upon the constitution of the military board at Bombay, and upon the advantages of individual agency over a board, *Malcolm*, App. p. 245—Reasons for suspending the military board at Bombay, and transferring the duties to the heads of departments, causing them to correspond with Government or the Commander-in-chief; improvement in the system in consequence, *Malcolm*, App. p. 255—Proposition for establishing a military board in England; how it should be composed; its duties; how to be remunerated, *Nutt*, App. p. 289.

*Military Charges.* Return showing the annual expense of military charges, not included under particular heads, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 7—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43.

*Military Fund.* Minute by Sir John Malcolm, dated 27th January 1830, upon the expediency of forming a pension or military fund for the widows and families of Native officers, and containing plan for the formation of such a fund, *Malcolm*, App. p. 238—Prospective estimate of the receipts and expenditure of a Native military fund, constituted on the principles laid down in the above minute, *Malcolm*, App. p. 242—Extract from minute by Sir John Malcolm, dated 30th November 1830, upon the advantages to be derived from the establishment of a military fund, *Malcolm*, App. p. 251.

*Military Offices.* Return showing the aggregate expense of military offices at the three Presidencies, on 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 52.

*Military Secretary.* Allowance of a military secretary on the staff of the commander-in-chief, in his joint capacity as commander-in-chief of the Company's army; also to the lieutenant-generals commanding the forces at Madras and Bombay, in their joint capacities of commanders-in-chief of the Company's troops at those Presidencies, App. p. 44—Number of officers on the staff in the department of the military secretary at Bengal, App. p. 45—Military secretary to the Governor and Commander-in-chief at Madras, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 48—Service to which military secretary to Commander-in-chief belongs, App. p. 46—Advantage of the military secretaries being selected from the army, *Salmond*, App. p. 161.

INDEX.  
MIL—MUN.

*Military Store Accounts.* Staff officer employed as auditor and accountant of military store accounts and returns at Bombay, App. p. 47.

See also 'Stores.'

*Miners.* See 'Sappers and Miners.'

*Miscellaneous Situations.* Number of staff officers employed in miscellaneous situations at Bengal, App. p. 46—At Madras, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 48.

*Mortality.* Proportion of deaths in Native regiments per annum, *Pritzler* 1197, 1198—Also of officers in King's regiments, *Pritzler* 1199.

See also 'Casualties.' 'Children.'

*Munro, Colonel John.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Appointments held by witness in the Madras Presidency, 1027—1030—Variation at different periods in the spirit, discipline, and efficiency of the Native army, 1031—Desertions among sepoys less frequent than formerly, 1032—Native soldiers in a better condition than the same description of persons out of service, 1033—No difficulty in recruiting and completing, establishments at present, 1034—Foundation of the difference in pay between Madras and Bombay sepoys, 1034, 1035—How far matter of complaint, 1042, 1043—Why Madras sepoys better calculated for service than Bengal, 1036, 1037—Cavalry service preferred by sepoys, 1038—Less efficient as artillerymen than its other branches, 1039—Comparison of pay of sepoys with price for labour, 1040—Extent of difference of allowance between King's and Company's officers, 1041—Connexion of European officers of Native regiments with their men, 1044—Minute superintendence left to Native officers, 1045—Additional encouragement that should be given to Native officers, 1046—1048.

Pay and allowances to Company's European officers of lower ranks sufficient; those of higher ranks should be increased, 1049—Necessity for different rates of allowance in the field and in cantonment, 1050—Why the Native regiments will bring more effectives into the field than European, 1052—Officers necessary to be present with Native regiments, 1053—Inconvenience to regimental service from officers absent on staff duty, 1054—Impracticability of a skeleton corps to supply deficiency, 1055—Inconvenience of limiting the number of officers to be absent on staff duty, 1056—Method to be adopted of filling up vacancies, 1056, 1057—Assistants in the quartermaster-general's department, 1058—Necessity for officers doing regimental duty previous to staff employment, 1059, 1060—Extent to which officers of regiments should be increased, 1061, 1062—Superior commands given to King's officers; staff appointments to Company's, 1063—Advantage of occasionally employing a Native officer on the staff of a general officer, 1064—Also in the adjutant and quartermaster-general's departments, 1065—Difficulties of association at table between European and Native officers, 1066.

Staff pay and allowances the same to King's as Company's officers, 1067—Desertion not now frequent among Madras sepoys, 1068—No inconvenience in increasing the number of furloughs, 1069, 1070—Difficulty in reducing the amount of pay upon enlistment to make additions for length of service, 1071, 1072—Duties of adjutant and quartermaster-general at Madras, and how far satisfactory, 1073, 1074—Reductions in the horse artillery at Madras, 1075—Method of clothing the army at Madras, 1076—1078—Advantages of soldiers remaining in India, 1079—1084—Instances of dissatisfaction in the Native army, 1085, 1086—More attached to the service at present, 1087—Alterations that should be made with regard to rank between King's and Company's officers, 1088, 1089—Advantageous if Company's major-generals were eligible to the staff of either Presidency, 1090—How far necessary to equalize allowances at the three Presidencies, 1091—1095—How far making the Company's army a King's army would be advantageous, 1096—Nature of the country of Madras, 1097—Proportions of infantry and cavalry attached to the Madras army, 1098—How far Native powers in possession of the Company, 1099, 1100—How far danger to be apprehended from them, 1101.

Danger to Madras from invasion by a foreign enemy, such as France, 1103—How far other danger to be apprehended, 1104—How far the Madras army a reserve to the armies of the other Presidencies, 1105—Parts of India most likely to be attacked in case of foreign invasion, 1106—Little reduction could be made in the Madras army, 1107—From what part reduction would be made if required, 1108—Excellent state of discipline of Native troops, but superiority of European, 1109—Relative proportions of European and Native infantry, 1110—Divisions of the Madras army, 1111—Number of general officers and brigadiers commands, 1112—Allowances to the Madras army, 1114—Constitution of the military board, 1116—Necessity for its being re-constructed, 1117, 1118.

*Munro, Colonel John.* Reply of Colonel John Munro, dated 13th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 350.

*Munro, Sir Thomas.* Extract from letters from Sir Thomas Munro on the state of the Madras army to the late President of the Board of Control, upon the necessity of mingling the two services, by permitting exchanges under certain limitations, by making colonels or majors eligible to employment in all parts of the world, and that honorary marks of distinctions, and the office of commander-in-chief, are not reserved for one service, *Malcolm*, App. p. 217, 218—Extract from letter from Sir Thomas Munro upon the formation of the Indian army, and upon securing to Native officers a participation in honours and advantages of military command, *Malcolm*, App. p. 226—Extract from another letter relative to advancing the rank of certain staff officers, and allowing sale of commissions after a certain period of service, *Malcolm*, App. p. 228.

*Mutiny.* Memory of former mutinies effaced from the minds of Native corps, *Greenhill* 1556—Instances of mutiny of Native troops, *Macan* 2151, 2152—Cause of the mutiny at Barrackpoor, *Macan* 2219—Insubordination in the army, *Paget* 2297, 2298.

*Mysore Silladar Horse.* Efficiency thereof, and description of their officers, *Scot* 1443, 1444—Minute by Sir John Malcolm upon the raising these troops, upon their efficiency and distinguished services during the Mahratta war, and other particulars respecting them, *Malcolm*, App. p. 243.

## N.

*Naigs.* See 'Officers, VII.'

*Natives.* Military service popular with them, *Reynell* 268, 269, *Feilding* 752, *Pritzler* 1128, *Dalbiac* 2024, 2025—Reasons why the Company's service not so popular with the Natives as it was, *Scot* 1391—1393—Company's regulations sufficiently explicit to make young officers respect the feelings of the Natives, *Scot* 1412, 1413—European officers not likely to encroach on the customs or religious feelings of the Natives, *Greenhill* 1483—Regulations enforcing attention to religious feelings of the Natives, *Aitchison* 1695.

## NATIVE ARMY:

### I.—Generally:

Efficiency, spirit, and discipline of the Native army, *Salmond* 493, 494, *Malcolm* 669—672, *Scot* 1385, 1386, *Greenhill* 1467, 1468, *Aitchison* 1694, *Mackenzie* 2258—2261, *Smith* 2323—Variation at different periods in the spirit, discipline, and efficiency of the Native army, *Munro* 1031—Native army superior to that of any other that ever existed in India, *Macan* 2185, *Mackenzie* 2265—Native army should be let alone, *Smith* 2345.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Necessity for keeping up the character of the Native army, and of not confiding too



INDEX.  
—  
NATIVE.

exclusively in European troops, *Malcolm*, App. p. 169—Short account of the rise, progress, and character of the Native army in India, written in 1816, at the desire of the late Lord Buckinghamshire, *Malcolm*, App. p. 173—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the Native army, p. lxxxiii.

See also 'Army in India.' 'Native Regiments.' 'Native Soldiers.'

*Native Artillery.* See 'Artillery, III.' 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Reduction of Regiments.'

*Native Cavalry.* See 'Cavalry, II.' 'Reduction of Regiments.'

*Native Doctors.* Return showing the number of in the hospital department, in the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 5—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43.

See also 'Surgeons.'

*Native Languages.* Staff employment an inducement to officers to study Native languages, *Nicolls* 177, 178, *Reynell* 417, 418—Means taken for obliging officers to study the Native languages, *Malcolm* 701, *Limond* 1287—Regulations for the instruction of artillery officers, *Limond* 1288, 1289—Not sufficient encouragement to officers to study the Native languages, *Scot* 1408—1411—Native language indispensable to a staff appointment, *Scot* 1414, *Aitchison* 1797, 1798.

Examination of officers in Native languages, and frequency of their appointment as interpreters without understanding the language, *Greenhill* 1497—1515—How far Native languages acquired by European officers, *Dickson* 1591—Necessity of acquiring Native languages, and how far taught at Addiscombe, *Houstoun* 1848—1854—Necessity for officers having a knowledge of Native languages, *Macan* 2182, 2183—Officers not so well acquainted with Native languages as necessary, *Mackenzie* 2275, 2277—Study of Native languages is sufficiently encouraged, *Smith* 2338.

*Native Powers.* How far Native powers in possession of the Company, *Munro* 1099, 1100—How far danger to be apprehended from them, *Munro* 1101.

*Native Princes.* They pay the expense of Native infantry when employed for their protection. They are bound to render aid according to their respective means, and several of them are engaged by treaty to supply specified contingents of horse and foot; extent of such supply; policy of discountenancing rather than encouraging the retention of armies by Native princes, *Salmond*, App. p. 156.

*Native Regiments.* General strength thereof, *Reynell* 476—478—Native regiments at Madras and Bombay are more expensive than at Bengal, *Salmond* 645—Native regiment would bring more efficient men into the field than European regiment, *Feilding* 851—Reason therefor, *Watson* 981, *Munro* 1052—Good understanding between European and Native regiments, *Dickson* 1604—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the Native corps, p. lxxxiii.

See also 'Officers.' 'Removal.'

## NATIVE SOLDIERS:

### I.—Generally:

From what part the sepoys are drawn, *Nicolls* 6, 7, 242—244—Degree of popularity of the Native service, *Nicolls* 8—11—Native soldiers, more easily managed than the European, *Nicolls* 12, 13—Feeling of Native soldiers towards their officers, *Nicolls* 14, 15, *Reynell* 272, 273, *Salmond* 499, 500, *Pritzler* 1130, *Aitchison* 1696, 1697—Pay and allowances of sepoys in Bengal, *Nicolls* 16—19—European soldier and

sepoys treated much the same ; sepoy's treatment superior to that of soldiers, in any other part of the world, *Nicolls* 22—Officers have been deprived of their commissions for breach of orders in not treating Natives with kindness and attention to their prejudices, *Nicolls* 104.

Objections by the Bengal sepoy's to serve at a distance from their homes, *Nicolls* 253, 254—Difference between Bengal and Madras sepoy's as to their families accompanying them, *Nicolls* 258, 259—Difference in work between sepoy's from different districts, *Reynell* 268, 269—Habits of the Native soldier as compared with the European, *Reynell* 270, 271—On what impression of the necessity of respecting prejudices of the Native soldiers depends, *Reynell* 337—Usual system to mix Mahomedans and Hindoos in the same regiments, *Reynell* 480, 481—They are well affected to the service, *Salmond* 495—497—They are orderly and easily managed, *Salmond* 498.

No difference in the discipline of sepoy's from different districts, *Feilding* 749—Preference among the Mahomedans for cavalry service, *Feilding* 750—Careful of their horses, *Feilding* 751—Madras men of a different caste from those recruited at Bengal, *Feilding* 801—Many Bengal men in the Bombay army, *Feilding* 802—No danger in instructing Natives to be artillerymen, *Pennington* 814—Training and discipline of Native troops, *Pennington* 815, 816, *Watson* 885—887—Necessity of increasing Native troops, and keeping up a better balance between European and Native troops, *Watson* 925—927—Natives well adapted for cavalry service, *Watson* 938—941.

No bounty paid to sepoy's on enlisting, *Watson* 959—Native soldiers in a better condition than the same description of persons out of service, *Munro* 1033—Why Madras sepoy's better calculated for service than Bengal, *Munro* 1036, 1037—Cavalry service preferred by sepoy's, *Munro* 1038—Less efficient as artillerymen than other branches, *Munro* 1039—Instances of dissatisfaction in the Native army, *Munro* 1085, 1086—More attached to the service at present, *Munro* 1087—Excellent state of discipline of Native troops, *Munro* 1110—Difference between sepoy's from different districts, *Pritzler* 1125—Sepoy's generally well satisfied with their condition, *Pritzler* 1127—They are temperate in their habits and easy of management, *Pritzler* 1129.

Artillery service preferred by Mussulmans, *Limond* 1305—Reason of unsuitness of Natives for artillery service, *Hopkinson* 1313—1316—Advantages of the Bengal men over the Madras for the artillery service, *Hopkinson* 1318, 1319—Encouragement that should be given to Native sepoy's and officers, *Scot* 1394, 1395—Sons of Native officers do not so frequently enlist as privates now as formerly, *Scot* 1396—Manner in which discipline of Native troops is injuriously affected by their being allowed to make complaints to the commanding officer when inspecting, *Greenhill* 1469—1482—Native troops paid by European officers, *Greenhill* 1484—Difference in the nature of the employment between European and Native soldiers, *Greenhill* 1486—Difference in the period of service between them, *Greenhill* 1488—Services the sepoy's usually prefer, *Greenhill* 1520.

Inducements that should be given to Native officers to induce their sons to enlist, *Greenhill* 1541—Discipline, character, and advantages of Native soldiers, *Dickson* 1608—1617—Proportion of Europeans to Natives in cavalry and infantry, *Dickson* 1631—1634—Period of service of Native soldiers, *Aitchison* 1706, *Salmond* 1904—1907, *Leighton* 1980—Period of service for pensions, *Aitchison* 1707, 1708—Military qualities and religions of different sepoy's, *Aitchison* 1758—1760—Regulation as to invaliding or pensioning Native soldiers, *Aitchison* 1770—1772—Difference of regulations as to invaliding and pensions in Bengal and Bombay, *Aitchison* 1774—1778—General efficiency and good disposition of Native troops, *Aitchison* 1779—Arrangements necessary for securing the fidelity and attachment of the Natives, *Leighton* 1954—1958.

Bad effect of regulation as to education of sepoy's upon enlistment, *Leighton* 1960, 1961—Enlistment of the sons of Native officers, *Leighton* 1962—1964—Bombay

INDEX.  
—  
NICOLLS.

troops best adapted for infantry, *Leighton* 1968—They have sufficient strength and stamina for artillerymen, *Leighton* 1970, 1971—Discipline of the Native troops, and how far deteriorated; instances of mutiny, and causes of deterioration in Native troops, *Macan* 2151, 2152—Reasons why as good class of Natives are not enlisted now as were formerly, *Macan* 2176—2181—Disadvantages of changing certain arrangements of the sepoy, *Russell* 2232—Interest principally attaches Native soldiers to the English government, *Macan* 2184—How far Natives have conformed to European system of discipline, *Macan*, 2186—2188, *Mackenzie* 2272—Dependence of European government upon Native troops, and how far dependence securely placed, *Macan* 2190—2193—Danger from Native troops might occur from trifling causes, *Macan* 2194—2196, *Russell* 2231, 2232.

Brahmins work upon trifling causes to prejudice the Natives; they should not have been enlisted, and are being got rid of, *Macan* 2196, 2197—Attention to Native habits, customs, and feelings, and judicious distribution of rewards, may secure their fidelity and attachment, *Macan* 2198—Whether danger greater or less now than at former periods, *Russell* 2233—How far danger arises from feelings peculiar to the Natives, and what description of Natives, *Russell* 2234—No peculiar indication of danger at present, *Russell* 2235—How far danger to be apprehended, *Mackenzie* 2278—2280—Method of avoiding the danger, *Russell* 2236.

Advantages of grants of land to Native soldiers instead of retiring pensions, *Russell* 2249—2253, *Mackenzie* 2285—2294—Attachment of Native sepoy to the service consists in the regularity of their pay, *Mackenzie* 2262—2264—Part of the Bengal Presidency from which the best sepoy are drawn, *Mackenzie* 2266—Causes of diminution of attachment between sepoy and European officers, *Mackenzie* 2273, 2274—Efficiency of the sepoy for artillery service, *Paget* 2310—Efficiency of Native troops for any Native enemy they may have to contend with, *Paget* 2316—With attention to their wants, Natives are faithful, and when well managed have never been beaten, *Smith* 2343.

II.—*Papers laid before the Committee :*

Return showing the total number of Natives employed at each Presidency, and in all India, 1793—1830, App. p. 2—Return showing the total number of rank and file in the engineers, artillery, cavalry, infantry, pioneers, and staff at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830; also showing the number of Natives attached to the European horse artillery and the European cavalry, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—General observations relative to the Native soldiers, *Balmain*, App. p. 429, *Duff*, App. p. 396—Appendices attached to Captain Balmain's letter upon the same subject, *Balmain*, App. p. 321.

See also 'Clothing.' 'Goorkhas.' 'Mutiny.' 'Pay and Allowances.'

*Nicolls*, Major-general Sir *Gaspar*. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Discipline of the Bengal army carried as high as circumstances will permit; it cannot be brought to the perfection of that in Europe, 4—Discipline of the Madras army higher than that of Bengal: in efficiency it is inferior to Bengal, 5—From what part the sepoy soldiers are drawn, 6, 7—Degree of popularity of the Native service, 8—11—Native soldiers more easily managed than European, 12, 13—Feeling of the Native soldiers towards their officers, 14, 15—Pay and allowances of sepoy in Bengal, 16—19—No difference between the different provinces in Bengal except as to currency, 20, 21—European soldier and

sepoys treated much the same in India; sepoys' treatment superior to that of soldiers in any other part of the world, 22—No difference in pay between the different Presidencies; many different allowances, 23—Allowances in the field are the same in all the Presidencies, 24—No open complaint as to allowances, 25—Differences of advantages and allowances particularized in the three Presidencies, 26—28—No difference in allowances between the King's and European troops in the three Presidencies, 30—Difficulty of equalizing the advantages, 31, 32—Cheapness of living at Bengal, 33.

Connexion of European and Native officers with their men, 34—37—Condition and rank of Native officers, 38—40—Comparison of the names of the different ranks of officers between the European and Native regiments, 41—46—Distinction as to batta in different parts of Bengal, 47—50—Pay and allowances of Company's European officers sufficient, 51—Officers are not expensive at Bengal; they live in greater comfort than at Madras, 52—Expenses are more heavy in the field than in cantonments, 53—Time the equal allowances in peace and war have prevailed in Bengal, 54—For what reason granted, 55—Effect of order of 1828 upon the feelings of European officers in the Company's service, 57, 58—Company's officers possess all the advantages of His Majesty's service, and some superadded, 59.

Advantages latterly granted, 60—Method of promotion, and different periods and ranks, 61—63—Proportion of divisional or stationary commands of field officers and staff appointments according to relative numbers on the establishment to which they belong, 64—66—Making the Company's army a Royal army would not be advantageous either to the officers or the public, 67, 68—Three armies, as at present, is preferable to their being united, 69—Command-money to officers in command of a regiment, and sufficiency of it, 70, 71—Comparison of the efficiency of officers upon full and half batta when ordered to march, 72—75—Native officers keep up their full tent equipage; the King's and Company's European officers do not keep up their carriage equipage, 76—80.

[Second Examination.]—Order of the Court limiting the number of officers to be absent on staff employ not complied with, 81—83—Opinion as to plan for filling up the vacancies occasioned by staff employment, 84—86—Difference in the number of officers serving in a King's regiment in India and in the Colonies, from the difference in the voyage from India, 87, 88—Proportion of corps at Bengal on full and half batta and full and half tentage, 89—Lower provinces of Bengal more expensive than the upper, 90—Expenses of officers at Bengal greater than at Madras and Bombay, 91, 92—Rate of expenses of subalterns in the field and in quarters, 93—96—Subalterns generally in debt, 97.

Advantages or otherwise of commuting allowances, 98, 99—Camp equipage of European officers is never mustered, 100—Reason for Native officers keeping up their camp equipage, 101—Preference of Company's officers for Native corps, and method of appointment, 102, 103—Officers have been deprived of their commissions for breaches of orders for not treating the Natives with kindness and attention to their prejudices, 104—Effect of brevet rank; unpopularity of it in the Company's service, 105—110—One commander-in-chief could not manage the administration of justice of the three armies, 111—Staff officers in each Presidency are selected from the Company's service in the same Presidency, 112—Officers should have served in India before they are appointed to the staff in the Indian army, 113—Company's officers have been in the temporary but not permanent command of the army in India for the last fifty years, 114—Difficulties in reducing a whole regiment of cavalry or infantry in the Company's service, 115—117—Removal of regiments from one Presidency to another, 118—120.

Pay and allowances of King's officers in command of stations of superior army but inferior regimental rank to Company's officers, 121—Reasons why subaltern officers seldom avail themselves of the three years' furlough, 122—124—Officers on furlough to Europe generally glad to return to their corps, except in cases of ill health, 125—

INDEX.  
—  
NICOLLS.

Inducements which generally influence officers to avail themselves of the retiring regulations after sixteen or eighteen years' service, 126, 127—Disadvantages that would result from allowing command money to be drawn with off-reckonings, 128—130—Allowance in Bengal for the repair of arms, &c., 131—Establishment for that purpose at Madras, and the arms in better order, 131, 132—Beneficial effects of European soldiers being victualled by the commissariat, 133, 134—Increase of inebriety among the soldiers, reasons of it, and methods used for its prevention, 135—140—Effect of the canteens, 141—145—Good effect of soldiers' libraries sent out by the Company, 146, 147—Methods resorted to for diverting the minds of the soldiers when not upon duty, 148—Efficient state of the regimental schools, 149—Clergyman of the station visits and superintends the schools, 151.

Half-caste children as well as those by European women educated in the same school, 150—Age that boys belonging to the Company's regiments are removed to the orphan school of the Presidency; those of the King's regiments complete their education at the regimental school, 152—After leaving school boys get employment; girls marry early, 153—Half-castes never enlisted into an European regiment except as drummers or fifers, 154—Increase of half-caste population, 155, 156—Sons of soldiers by European women are enlisted in both services, 157.

[Third Examination.]—Commanders of districts or divisions should previously serve as brigadiers, 157—Soldiers not permitted to remain after a certain age in India, 158—160—Expense saved by soldiers remaining in India, 161—Number of European officers necessary to be effective with certain Native regiments, 162—165—Duties discharged by European and Native officers, 166, 168, 170—Communication between European officers and their troops, 167—With Native officers, 169—European officers submit complaints to commanding officer, 171, 172—Duties of adjutant, quartermaster, and interpreter, 173—176—Staff employment an inducement to European officers to study Native languages, 177, 178—Number of effective officers ordinarily present with regiments, 179.

Regulations as to promotions in Native regiments, 180—186—Opinion as to further promotions as encouragement to Native officers, 187—194—Distinctions conferred at Madras should be extended to Bengal, 195—Advantage of increasing pay for length of service, 196—198—Officers whose allowances should be increased, 199—Method of supplying saddlery and horse appointments in the Presidency of Bengal, 200—204—Method of providing and stabling horses, 205—208—Comparison of the duties of generals' staff at Bengal and other parts of the world, 209—At Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, 210—Of the adjutant and quartermaster-general's department at Bengal and Madras, 211—Rule of promotion in the staff at Bengal, 212, 213—Method of supplying military stores to India, 214, 215—Tents in the three Presidencies not of one pattern, 216—219—Articles in the ordnance department should be of the same description in each Presidency, 220—Comparison of the duties of medical officers in European and Native regiments, 221—223.

Benefits of substituting specific allowances to medical officers instead of medical contracts, 224—226—How far putting Company's medical officers on the same footing as the King's service as to retiring pension would be beneficial, 227—232—Benefits from the introduction of inspectors of hospitals, 233—235—Amount of batta reduced in 1828 in Bengal, 236—Pay of a subadar sufficient for support of his family, 237—Inducements that should be given to Native commissioned officers to place their sons in the ranks, 238, 239—Difficulty of establishing a fund for support of families of Native officers, 240—Advantage of troops meeting on service having all their establishments similar, 241—Provinces from which sepoys are taken, 242—244—Method of recruiting in Bengal, 245, 246—Prejudice of Natives against half-castes, 247, 248—Crimes for which flogging at present used, and by what authority, 249—251—Few instances of drunkenness in the Native army at Bengal, 252—Objections by the Bengal

sepoys to serve at a distance from their homes, 253, 254—Native officers like to command Native regiments if on service, 255—Character of Native officers does not weigh so much with the men as income, 256—Benefit of rewarding good conduct in Native officers by civil appointments, 257—Difference between Bengal and Madras sepoys as to their families accompanying them, 258, 259—Bengal officers mostly selected from their merit and qualities, 260, 261.

*Nizam.* Number of staff officers employed in Nizam's, and such service in Bengal, App. p. 46—In Madras, App. p. 47—In Bombay, App. p. 48.

*Non-Commissioned Officers.* See 'Officers, VII.'

*Nutt, Major Justinian.* Reply of Major Justinian Nutt, dated 24th August 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 285.

## O.

## OFFICERS:

## I.—Generally:

Comparison of the efficiency of officers upon full and half batta when ordered to march, *Nicolls* 72—75—Number of effective officers ordinarily present with their regiments, *Nicolls* 179, *Reynell* 419, *Feilding* 743, 744—Number of officers necessary to be present with regiments of cavalry, infantry, and horse artillery, *Nicolls* 162—165, *Reynell* 394—402, 473—475, 477—479, *Feilding* 741, 742, *Watson* 906—915, *Munro* 1053, *Pritzler* 1166, 1167, *Dickson* 1584, 1585, *Aitchison* 1742—1745, *Macan* 2199—2202—How far field and other officers generally efficient for their duties, *Reynell* 486, 487—Political and civil stations in which military men have been and should be employed, *Malcolm* 693, 694—Increase of officers that should be made, *Pennington* 830, 831, *Munro* 1061, 1062, *Leighton* 1945.

## II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Return showing the number of officers in the engineers; in the artillery, European and Native, horse and foot; in the cavalry, European (King's), Native (Company's), regular and irregular; in the infantry, European (King's and Company's), Native (Company's), regular and irregular; pioneers and staff; at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, 7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Return of the number of officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, and of brigades or stations, at each Presidency, App. p. 49.

Extract from the Commander-in-chief's letter of 12th December 1826, and Mr. Elphinstone's minutes of 15th December, relative to officers on staff and regimental duty, *Malcolm*, App. p. 219, 220—226—Officers Bengal army to each battalion or regiment, and totals of each arm, *Baker*, App. p. 346—Unfavourable effect, from employment of military men in civil situations, in taking officers from regimental duty and throwing more duty on those remaining, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 257, *Pritzler*, App. p. 265, *Baker*, App. p. 338—Interest of Government would be best consulted by appointing to residencies and political agencies those best qualified for the duties, without reference to which branch of service they might belong, *Nutt*, App. p. 290—How far employment of military men in civil situations advisable, *Limond*, App. p. 305, *Wilson*, App. p. 364, *Duff*, App. p. 397—Employment of military men in civil situations has been of benefit to the country from their having a more extended knowledge of the country and its manners and customs, *Balmain*, App. p. 317.

INDEX.  
OFFICERS.

III.—*European :*

1. Generally :

Connexion of European officers with their men, *Nicolls* 34—37, 167, *Salmond* 510—512  
—With Native officers, *Nicolls* 169, *Reynell* 403—406, *Salmond* 510—512, *Munro* 1044  
—Pay and allowances of Company's European officers sufficient, *Nicolls* 51—Effect  
of the order of 1828 upon the feeling of European officers in the Company's service,  
*Nicolls* 57, 58—Company's officers possess all the advantages of His Majesty's service,  
and some superadded, *Nicolls* 59—Advantages lately granted, *Nicolls* 60—Do not  
keep up their carriage equipage, *Nicolls* 76—80—Difference in the number of officers  
serving in a King's regiment in India and in the Colonies, from the difference in the voyage  
from India, *Nicolls* 87, 88—Preference of Company's officers for Native corps, and  
method of appointment, *Nicolls* 102, 103.

Number of European officers necessary to be effective with certain Native regiments,  
*Nicolls* 162—165—Duties discharged by them, *Nicolls* 166, 168, 170, *Reynell* 403—406  
—They submit complaints to commanding officer, *Nicolls* 171, 172—European officers  
of Indian corps should be trained up with them, *Reynell* 282—Recent orders have ren-  
dered the Company's officers dissatisfied, *Reynell* 300—Preference of officers to Euro-  
pean regiments, *Reynell* 334—Desirable they should first serve with European regi-  
ments, *Reynell* 335, 336—Regiments paid through European officer, *Reynell* 407, 408  
—Investigation of complaints by commanding officers, *Reynell* 409, 410—Advantages  
possessed by European officers, and how far satisfied with their condition, *Salmond* 534—  
538—Statement of the relative difference of commands held by King's and Company's  
officers, *Salmond* 542.

Necessity for two lieutenant-colonels to a regiment, *Malcolm* 720, 721—Necessity for  
making the command of a regiment more advantageous than the command of a station,  
*Malcolm* 728, 729—How far cadets on arrival in India have to do duty with Native regi-  
ments, *Watson* 999—1001—Advisable that cadets should first serve with European  
regiments, *Watson* 1004—European officers of Native regiments should be trained up  
with them, and not put into European regiments, *Pritzler* 1134—1136—Preference of  
Company's officers for Native corps, *Pritzler* 1172—Officers remain in the regiment to  
which first appointed till they attain a certain rank, *Pritzler* 1173—Rank at which  
Company's officers should be eligible for service at either of the Presidencies, *Pritzler*  
1183—India not preferable to the Colonies for a King's officer unless of very high rank,  
*Pritzler* 1188—Manner in which officers in the European foot artillery should be  
increased, *Pritzler* 1203—1206.

Not sufficient European officers with Native regiments, *Greenhill* 1558—European  
regimental officers not exchanged from one regiment or battalion to another, *Greenhill*  
1560—Native troops paid by European officer, *Greenhill* 1484—Payment of troops  
by European officers assisted by Natives, *Dickson* 1587—Officers generally attached to  
Native regiments on their arrival, *Aitchison* 1698—Dissension among European officers  
from forming two European regiments into two wings of one corps, *Leighton* 1987, 1988  
—Comparative situation of European officers infinitely inferior to that of civilians,  
*Macan* 2189—Necessity for improving the situation of battalion officers, *Macan* 2203  
—Period since which the command of a Native corps has ceased to be an object of  
ambition with European officers, and reasons for it, *Russell* 2245, 2246—Inconsistent  
spirit of independence among the Company's officers, *Paget* 2297, 2298—Alterations  
that should be made to enable officers' situations to be better with their regiments than  
on staff or other duty, *Paget* 2312—No necessity for increasing officers in Native  
regiments, *Smith* 2330, 2331.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the number of, in the horse and foot artillery, in the King's cavalry  
and in the King's and Company's infantry, at the three Presidencies and subordinate set-

lements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, 5—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43—Return of the number of casualties amongst the European officers of the Company's army which have occurred in each year, 1813—1830, distinguishing Presidencies and branches of service; whether such casualties have occurred by death, resignation, retirement, or dismissal; distinguishing also each description of casualty, and stating the proportion per hundred of the casualties to the authorized establishment of officers; with a note of the average of each description of casualty, App. p. 108.

Table of the pay and allowances of European commissioned officers, in Sonaut, Madras, or Bombay rupees, per month of thirty days, App. p. 114—Names and rank of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's officers present on the Bombay establishment, *Malcolm*, App. p. 218—Return of the number of officers belonging to each regiment of light cavalry, European and Native infantry, on the Bombay establishment, effective with the regiments, 1825—1827, App. p. 224—They are but moderately provided for in regard to promotion, pay, and pension; number not sufficient for duty when those on staff and furlough withdrawn; general remarks relative to officers, *Balmain*, App. p. 316—Observations on the number of European officers, and upon supply of vacancies, *Duff*, App. p. 395.

See also *infra*, IV. 'Pay and Allowances.'

#### IV.—Native :

##### 1. Generally :

Connexion of Native officers with their men, *Nicolls* 34—37—Condition and rank of Native officers, *Nicolls* 38—40—Comparison of the names of the different ranks of officers between European and Native regiments, *Nicolls* 41—46—Keep up their full tent equipage, *Nicolls* 76—80—Duties discharged by them, *Nicolls* 166, 168, 170—Opinion as to further promotion as encouragement to Native officers, *Nicolls* 187—194—No advantage in admitting Native officers to a higher rank than subadar-major, *Reynell* 287, 288—Distinctions conferred at Madras should be extended to Bengal, *Nicolls* 195—Inducements that should be given to Native commissioned officers to place their sons in the ranks, *Nicolls* 238, 239—Difficulty of establishing a fund for support of families of Native officers, *Nicolls* 240—Native officers like to command Native regiments if on service, *Nicolls* 255.

Character of Native officers does not weigh so much with men as income, *Nicolls* 256—Benefit of rewarding good conduct in Native officers by civil appointments, *Nicolls* 257—Bengal officers most selected from their merit and qualities, *Nicolls* 260, 261—Encouragement that should be given to Native officers, *Reynell* 283—286, *Malcolm* 724—Their duties, *Reynell* 403—406—Customary rewards of distinguished Native officers, *Reynell* 428—430—Rank to which Native officers can be raised, *Salmond* 512—518—Beneficial effect of Native aides-de-camp, *Malcolm* 722, 723—Officers in the magistracy and police to which they might be promoted, *Malcolm* 725, 726.

Necessity for further rewards as encouragement to Native officers, *Pennington* 832—835—How far rewards to Native officers beneficial, *Feilding* 839—841—No advantage in employing Native officers on staff duties, *Watson* 919—923—No advantage in giving them higher rank than they now obtain, *Watson* 924—Minute superintendence left to Native officers, *Munro* 1045—Additional encouragement that should be given to Native officers, *Munro* 1046—1048—Advantage of occasionally employing a Native officer on the staff of a general officer, *Munro* 1064, *Smith* 2341, 2342—Also in adjutant and quartermaster-general's departments, *Munro* 1065.



INDEX.  
OFFICERS.

Difficulties of association at table between European and Native officers, *Munro* 1066—Present Native officers have risen from non-commissioned officers, and are sufficiently rewarded by their commissions, *Pritzler* 1137, 1138—Advantage of appointing Native aides-de-camp as a reward to Native officers, *Pritzler* 1243, 1244—Essential to give marks of distinction to Native officers, *Pritzler* 1262—Higher ranks and advantages that might be given as encouragement to Native officers, *Scot* 1397—1400—Native officers are sufficiently encouraged, *Greenhill* 1490—They might be promoted out of their regiments, but should not have influence or power therein, *Greenhill* 1491, 1492—How often Native officers are removed from one regiment to another, *Greenhill* 1493.

How far European and Native officers associate together, *Greenhill* 1494, 1495—Disadvantages of appointing Native officers to personal staff duties, *Greenhill* 1496—Rewards to Native officers should only be bestowed through commanding officers of the corps, *Greenhill* 1525—1531—Duties of Native officers, *Dickson* 1586—Association of European and Native officers, *Dickson* 1588—1590—Higher rank that should be given to Native officers, *Dickson* 1592—1595—How far intercourse between Native and European officers enjoined by the regulations, *Aitchison* 1713—1715—How far additional advantages should be given to Native officers, *Aitchison* 1716—1720.

Benefits of employing Native officers in revenue corps and police duties, *Aitchison* 1761—1763—Higher rank than their present should not be given to Native officers, *Leighton* 1959—Encouragement and rewards that should be given them, *Leighton* 1960—Not sufficient encouragement to Native officers to retire after length of service, *Macan* 2222—2224—How far higher ranks and rewards should be given to Native officers, *Macan* 2225—Further advantages that should be held out to Native officers to prevent their dissatisfaction, *Russell* 2237—Difficulty of giving Native officers higher rank, but their retiring pension should be increased, *Smith* 2339, 2340—Arrangements that have been made for improving the condition of retired Native officers, *Smith* 2344.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Return showing the number of, in the artillery, cavalry, and infantry, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, 5—For each respective year 1813—1830, App. p. 8—43.

Extracts of minutes by Sir John Malcolm upon the introduction of the sons of Native officers into the ranks ; the privileges they should be entitled to ; the advantage of giving encouragement to Native officers by rewards, and particularly as to the command of hill forts ; length of service to entitle officers to that distinction ; appointment of certain officers to the command of hill forts, *Malcolm*, App. p. 229—236—Native officers should be taken from the ranks, and long service should be the chief consideration in promoting them ; degrees of promotion, and description of rewards that should be granted to them, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 257.

See also *supra*, III. *infra*, VII. ' Military fund.' ' Native Soldiers.'

V.—General Officers :

1. Generally :

Limit of general officers in India, *Salmond* 605—Number of general officers of cavalry, *Feilding* 879, 880—Number of general officers, *Watson* 900—General officers should have previously served in India, *Pritzler* 1180, 1181—Inconvenience of general officers being speedily relieved after getting acquainted with the nature of the Indian army, *Leighton* 2144—Advantage from the Company's general officers being allowed to serve in any of the Presidencies, *Paget* 2317.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Advantage of an arrangement being carried into effect for the Company's officer, after

attaining the rank of general officer, being eligible to serve His Majesty in any part of the world, *Salmond*, App. p. 167.

# VI.—Subaltern Officers:

## 1. Generally:

Their rate of expenses in the field and in quarters, *Nicolls* 93—96—They are generally in debt, *Nicolls* 97—Reasons why they seldom avail themselves of three years' furlough, *Nicolls* 122—124—They generally live up to their income, *Reynell* 325—329.

## 2. Papers laid before the Committee:

Establishment of subaltern officers fixed for the actual number of corps in May 1824, and reduced establishment in May 1829, *Baker*, App. p. 346.

# VII.—Non-Commissioned Officers:

## 1. Generally:

Duties of serjeants-major and quartermaster-serjeants of Native regiments, *Reynell* 386—388—Relative situations of non-commissioned officers in European and Native regiments, *Reynell* 389—393—Method of obtaining staff serjeants, and why inefficient, *Pritzler* 1233, 1234—Non-commissioned European officers to a Native regiment, *Pritzler* 1235—Disadvantages of holding out situations in the revenue and police to Native non-commissioned officers on retirement, *Greenhill* 1550—1554—Method of appointment of non-commissioned officers and naigs, *Greenhill* 1571—1576—Method of appointing staff non-commissioned officers, *Aitchison* 1786, 1787—Appointments and promotions of Native non-commissioned officers, *Macan* 2220.

## 2. Papers laid before the Committee:

Return showing the number of non-commissioned officers and rank and file in the European and Native horse and foot artillery; in the cavalry, European (King's), and Native (Company's), regular and irregular; in the infantry, European (King's and Company's), and Native (Company's), regular and irregular; in the pioneers and on the staff; at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 45—For each respective year 1813—1830, App. p. 8—43—Table of the pay of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the European artillery and infantry and the non-commissioned staff attached to Native troops, at each Presidency, as at present authorized, App. p. 116—Observations as to numbers, and generally respecting European and Native non-commissioned officers, *Cabell*, App. p. 426, 428.

See also *infra*, VIII. 'Pay and Allowances.'

# VIII.—Warrant-Officers:

## Papers laid before the Committee:

Return showing the number of European warrant-officers in the Native foot artillery, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, 5—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

# IX.—Comparison between King's and Company's Officers:

## 1. Generally:

Manner in which officers in the Company's artillery should be placed on a level with those in the King's service, *Pennington* 831—Superior commands given to King's

INDEX.  
—  
OFF—OPI.

officers, staff appointments to Company's, *Munro* 1063—Alterations that should be made with regard to rank between King's and Company's officers, *Munro* 1088, 1089—Comparison of advantages with respect to promotion in the King's and Company's services, *Pritzler* 1159, 1160—Comparison of divisional and stational commands in the two services, *Pritzler* 1161—How far jealousies arise between King's and Company's officers, *Pritzler* 1225—Company's officers have a fair share of high commands, *Pritzler* 1226—Comparison of distinctions between King's and Company's officers, *Aitchison* 1735—1741.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Extracts from letters from Sir Thomas Munro relative to mingling the two services, *Malcolm*, App. p. 217—219—Extract from Mr. Elphinstone's minute in reply to Sir Charles Colville's letter on the same subject, *Malcolm*, App. p. 217.

X.—Invalids :

Method of invaliding officers, *Feilding* 877, 878—Usual period of invaliding Native officers, *Greenhill* 1512—1517.

XI.—Artillery :

1. Generally :

Artillery officers educated at home, *Limond* 1268—Attached to European battalions upon their arrival, *Limond* 1269—Regulations as to promotion, *Limond* 1270—1272—Manner of selecting officers for the Native artillery corps, *Limond* 1285, 1286, *Hopkinson* 1320—1323—Regulations as to instruction of artillery officers in Native languages, *Limond* 1288, 1289—Ages of officers on joining the artillery, *Limond* 1290, 1291, *Hopkinson* 1320—1323.

2. Papers laid before the Committee :

Number of officers in the European and Native horse and foot artillery, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, 5—For each respective year 1813—1830, App. p. 8—43—Artillery officers on the staff in the department of the commissary of ordnance at Bengal, App. p. 45.—At Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 47—Number of battalions of artillery at Bengal, and number of officers to each battalion or regiment, and totals to each arm, *Baker*, App. p. 346.

See also 'Education.' 'Expenses.' 'European Regiments.' 'Furlough.' 'Native Languages.' 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Promotion.' 'Rank.' 'Recruiting.' 'Reduction of Regiments.' 'Retiring Regulations.' 'Skeleton Corps.' 'Staff.' 'Tents.'

*Off-Reckonings.* Comparison of off-reckonings in the three Presidencies, *Watson* 1017, 1018—Regulations as to off-reckonings, *Leighton* 2142.

Statement of the rates of off-reckonings at each Presidency, and of each rank, as they existed in 1813 and at the present time, and where alterations have intermediately occurred, showing, in separate columns, the increase and decrease occasioned by each alteration and the date of the general order and of the Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning it, App. p. 144—Statement of the value of an off-reckoning share and half share in each year, 1814—1827 ; with a statement of the number of colonels at present in receipt of a full or half share of off-reckonings, and of those who have not yet come into the receipt of a half share, under the operation of the Court's order of 25th November 1823, with the sum paid as compensation to officers who succeeded to off-reckoning half shares between 1824 and 1826, and in each year from that period to 1831, App. p. 146—Distribution of the off-reckoning fund at the three Presidencies, *Salmond*, App. p. 162.

See, also 'Clothing.' 'Command Money.'

*Opium.* Only three cases of drunkenness among 28,000 men in the Native army at Bengal, and two of those from the immoderate use of opium, *Nicolls* 252.

*Ordnance Assistant.* See 'Commandant of Artillery.'

*Ordnance.* Articles in the ordnance department should be of the same description in each Presidency, *Nicolls* 220—Method of managing the ordnance establishment in India, *Salmond* 628—630—Quantity of powder usually in store, *Salmond* 631—634—Small arms and shot are supplied from India, *Salmond* 635, 636—Agency for the manufacture of gun-carriages, *Salmond* 637—639.

*Ordnance Department.* Return showing the aggregate expense of the ordnance department at the three Presidencies, on the 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and the 30th April 1830, App. p. 52—Modifications that have taken place in the ordnance department at Bombay; re-organization of that and the store departments, including distribution of arsenals and depôt and of the different establishments connected therewith, *Malcolm*, App. p. 254.

See also 'Commissary of Ordnance.'

*Ordnance Drivers.* Return showing the number of, in the Native foot artillery and Native regular cavalry, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, 1813—1830, App. p. 4, 5—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—For 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—For 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

*Organization of the army in India*, App. p. 60.

*Orphan Schools.* See 'Schools.'

## P.

*Page, Captain.* Reply of Captain Page, dated 12th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 387.

*Paget, General the Honourable Sir Edward.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Should be but one commander-in-chief, with certain officers high in command under him, 2296—How far advantageous to unite the Indian army as a Royal army, 2297—Insubordination in the army, and inconsistent spirit of independence among the Company's officers, 2297, 2298—Discontent and dissatisfaction from the rate of exchange at which the rupee is paid to the soldier, 2299—2301—Fitness of the horses of the cavalry and artillery for their duties, 2302—2304—Inferiority of articles and accoutrements of troops in India to those of regiments in Europe, and how far serviceable, 2305—2307—Stores sent out are good, but climate makes them deteriorate, 2308—2309—Efficiency of the sepoys for artillery service, 2310—Reductions that might be made in stations and staff appointments, 2311.

Alterations that should be made to enable officers' situations to be better with their regiments than on staff or other duty, 2312—Bad effect of reduction of Company's officers from regiments upon staff employment when there are too few in the first instance, 2313, 2314—Necessity of King's troops in all the Presidencies, but disadvantages from their expense, and not being employed in same duties as the sepoys, 2315—Efficiency of Native troops for any Native enemy they may have to contend with, 2316—Advantage from Company's general officers being allowed to serve in any of the Presidencies, 2317—Disadvantage of allowing soldiers to volunteer to remain in India after a certain period, 2318.

*Passage to and from India.* Extract from report of Messrs. Hill and Melvill, relative to advance of pay to regiments on their return from India; on the pay and passage of

INDEX.  
 —  
 PAT—PAY.

officers and men belonging to regiments in India proceeding to India, *via* New South Wales, in charge of convicts; passage money to officers, *Melvill*, Evidence 247—249 — Calculation of the comparative expense of passage to India, whole regiments and recruits; also reliefs and return of invalids (as respects European troops) for regiments at Bengal, App. p. 54—At Madras, App. p. 56—At Bombay, App. p. 58.

*Patronage.* Proposed distribution of patronage in the event of the army in India being placed under one commander-in-chief, *Worsley*, App. p. 328.

**PAY AND ALLOWANCES:**

**I.—Generally:**

Pay and allowances of sepoy, *Nicolls* 16—19, *Watson* 985, 986—No difference between the different provinces in Bengal except as to the currency, *Nicolls* 20, 21—No difference in pay between the different Presidencies, but many different allowances, *Nicolls* 23—Allowances in the field the same in all the Presidencies, *Nicolls* 24—No open complaint as to allowances, *Nicolls* 25—Differences of allowances and advantages particularized in the three Presidencies, *Nicolls* 26—28—No difference in allowances between the King's and European troops in the three Presidencies, *Nicolls* 30—Difficulty of equalizing the advantages, *Nicolls* 31, 32—Time equal allowances in peace and war have prevailed in Bengal, *Nicolls* 54—For what reason granted, *Nicolls* 55—Advantages or otherwise of commuting allowances, *Nicolls* 98, 99—Pay and allowances of King's officers in command of stations of superior army but inferior regimental rank to Company's officers, *Nicolls* 121.

Advantages of increasing pay for length of service, *Nicolls* 196—198—Officers whose allowances should be increased, *Nicolls* 199—Pay of a subadar sufficient for support of his family, *Nicolls* 237—Pay of sepoy as compared with the price of labour, *Regnell* 274—278, 431—433, *Salmond* 501—508, *Feilding* 753, *Munro* 1040, *Pritzler* 1131, 1132—Allowances in the three Presidencies should be equalized, *Reynell* 280; 281, 352—354, *Malcolm* 659, 660—Pay of Company's European officers not more than sufficient, *Reynell* 292—Necessity for different rates of allowance in peace and war, and in the field and in cantonments, *Reynell* 296—299, *Salmond* 528—533, *Munro* 1050, *Pritzler* 1150—Suggestions for the improvement of the pay of Native officers, *Reynell* 435—How far pay and allowances in the three Presidencies have been equalized, *Salmond* 509—Sufficiency of pay of Company's European officers, *Salmond* 526—Process of the pay departments of regiments in India, *Salmond* 623—626.

Financial part of the army is under the auditor-general, *Salmond* 627—Scale of pay and allowances to officers, *Malcolm* 655—658—Principle upon which allowances regulated, *Malcolm* 661—How far pay and allowances of Company's officers sufficient, *Feilding* 754, 755—Beneficial effects of new regulations as to allowances, *Feilding* 761—767—Amount of pay of different officers, *Feilding* 784—787—Pay and allowances of staff officers, *Watson* 942—946—Pay and allowances of regimental officers the same in all the Presidencies, *Watson* 948—Pay and allowances of Madras and Bombay sepoy more than the Bengal, *Watson* 949—951—Assimilation while acting together, *Watson* 951, 952—Difficulty of assimilating the three Presidencies with regard to pay and allowances, *Watson* 953—958—Arrangements therefor, *Watson* 997, 998—How far equalization thereof necessary, *Munro* 1091—1095—Deductions from pay of sepoy for clothes and accoutrements, *Watson* 987—990.

Sepoy should not be enlisted at a lower rate than his present pay, *Watson* 993—Foundation of the difference in pay between Madras and Bombay sepoy, *Munro* 1034, 1035—How far matter of complaint, *Munro* 1042, 1043—Extent of difference in allowance between King's and Company's officers, *Munro* 1041—Pay and allowances of Company's European officers of lower ranks sufficient, those of higher ranks should be increased, *Munro* 1049—Staff pay and allowances the same to King's as Company's

officers, *Munro* 1067—Difficulty in reducing the amount of pay upon enlistment to make addition for length of service, *Munro* 1071, 1072—Pay of officers is just sufficient for their expenses, *Pritzler* 1139—1142—Allowances at the three Presidencies should be equalized, *Pritzler* 1146, 1147.

Rule as to daily pay of soldiers, *Limond* 1300—Evil effects of the order for the daily pay of the men, *Hopkinson* 1324—1326—Desirable to assimilate the pay in the three Presidencies, and difficulty of accomplishing it, *Scot* 1401—1403—Advisable to increase pay after a certain period of service, *Scot* 1404, 1405—How far pay proportionate to expense in the three Presidencies, *Scot* 1406—Different rates of pay in different Presidencies, and reasons for it, *Greenhill* 1516—1519—Rates of pay of non-commissioned Native officers, and how far sufficient, *Greenhill* 1548, 1549—How far rate of pay sufficient, *Dickson* 1597—Comparison of advantages of pay in different Presidencies, *Aitchison* 1728—1732—Pay of Bombay sepoys, *Aitchison* 1752.

How far commutation of dram allowance beneficial, *Aitchison* 1780—1784—Further allowance should be given to officers to induce them to remain with their regiments instead of taking staff employment, *Aitchison* 1799, 1800—Beneficial to increase sepoy's pay after a certain period of service, *Salmond* 1888—1891—Pay of officers insufficient, *Leighton* 1945—Advisable to increase pay of Native troops, but not with less pay on enlistment, *Leighton* 1972, 1973—How far pay and allowances of Company's officers sufficient, *Dalbiac* 2026—Comparative statement of pay of Company's Native troops at the three Presidencies, *Melville* 2091—Expense of equalizing the pay at the different Presidencies would be considerable, *Melville* 2132—2134.

Reduction of allowances to European officers prevents their ingratiating themselves as much with the Natives as they formerly did, *Macan* 2174, 2175, 2182—Disadvantage from reduction of emoluments of European officers, *Russell* 2232—Good effect of increasing sepoy's pay in proportion to their length of service, *Macan* 2221—Advantage of bazar allowance being continued to officers in command, *Russell* 2238—2244—Subalterns are worse off than in other parts of the world as to pay, *Smith* 2334.

Report of Messrs. Hill and Melville upon the account of claims of the public upon the East-India Company, in respect of His Majesty's forces serving in India, as regards the pay of officers, colonels, brevet officers, officers belonging to regiments upon the East-India establishment, and serving in staff situations elsewhere; advance of pay to regiments on their return from India; pay and passage of officers and men belonging to regiments in India, who proceed to India, *via* New South Wales, in charge of convicts; pay of invalids; and other payments relative to forces serving in India, *Melville*, Evidence p. 244—259.

## II.—Papers laid before the Committee :

Pay of Madras European troops considerably higher than those in Bengal, App. p. 56, 57, *note*—The like at Bombay, App. p. 58, 59, *note*—Table of the pay and allowances of European commissioned officers in Sonaut, Madras, or Bombay rupees per month of thirty days, App. p. 114—Table of the pay of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the European artillery and infantry, and the non-commissioned staff attached to Native troops at each Presidency, as at present authorized, App. p. 116—Table of the pay and allowances of the Native troops of each Presidency, as at present authorized, App. p. 119—Return of the allowances drawn by the officers holding certain staff appointments on the 30th April 1831, App. p. 122.

Return of the allowances drawn by the officers in command of divisions of the army, subsidiary or field forces, brigades and stations, and also of corps, at each Presidency, on the 30th April 1831, App. p. 126—Return of the allowance drawn by medical officers holding certain staff appointments, App. p. 127—Return of the allowances drawn by the officers of King's troops holding certain staff appointments, on 30th April 1831, App. p. 128—Statement of the rates of furlough pay, as they existed in 1813 and at

INDEX.  
—  
PAY—PEN.

present, noticing in separate columns the increase or decrease in each rank by any alteration that intermediately may have taken place, with the date of the Court's letter or the general order prescribing or sanctioning the alteration, App. p. 147—Return of the number of officers in receipt of pay on furlough in this country, with the amount of charges in each year since the furlough regulation in 1796 to the present time, App. p. 148—Statement exhibiting the rates of retiring allowances to European commissioned officers of the Company's service on full and half pay, in 1813 and 1832; showing the increase which has taken place, and the date of the general order and of the Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning it, App. p. 149.

Return of the number of European commissioned officers in receipt of the full and half pay, with the amount of charge in each year from the commencement of the retiring regulation in 1796 to the present time, specifying the proportion per hundred of retired officers in a separate column to the authorized establishment, App. p. 150—Allowance to young officers should be sufficient to maintain them in comfort, without their being involved in debt; allowances to higher ranks should be as liberal as circumstances permit, both in justice to them, and to hold out something for juniors to look to, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 257—The regimental pay and allowances of all ranks are as low as they can possibly be made, *Balmain*, App. p. 315, 316—Necessity for the pay and allowances of all the Presidencies being equalized, *Balmain*, App. p. 317—Observations upon pay and allowances, and suggestions for improvement therein, *Cabell*, p. 418—Synopsis of the evidence taken by the Committee relative to pay and allowances of European officers, p. xxii—Relative to allowances of European troops, and equalization of allowances to Native troops, p. xxxviii, xxxix.

See also 'Arms.' 'Batta.' 'Colonels' Pay.' 'Command Money.' 'Families.' 'Furlough Pay.' 'Officers, IV. 1.' 'Staff.'

*Pay Department.* Appointment of military men to offices in the pay department is sanctioned by the practice of His Majesty's service; cause of the transfer of paymasterships from civil servants to military, *Salmond*, App. p. 160—The heads of departments are moderately paid, but considerable savings might be made in these establishments, *Balmain*, App. p. 315.

*Paymaster-General.* Report of Messrs. Hill and Melvill upon claims of the paymaster-general upon the East-India Company in respect of forces serving in India, *Melvill*, Evidence p. 244—259—Correspondence between the Treasury and East-India Company thereupon, *Melvill*, Evidence p. 260—Extract from another report, *Melvill*, Evidence p. 192—Number and description of officers composing the staff in the paymaster-general's department at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 47.

*Pennington, Colonel.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Period of service in India, 804—807—In the Bengal artillery, 808, 809—Amount of horse artillery in Bengal, 810—Efficiency thereof, 811, 812—How far Natives in the horse artillery act as gunners, 813—No danger in instructing Natives to be artillerymen, 814—Training and discipline of Native troops, 815, 816—Superiority of stud horses over field horses, 817, 818—Comparison of efficiency of the foot artillery, 819, 820—Arrangement of the field establishment of artillery at Bengal upon a good footing, 821—Disadvantage of bullocks for the artillery instead of horses, 822—824, 829—Necessity for the store departments in all the Presidencies being assimilated, 825—Disadvantages from their being different, 826—828—Increase of officers that should be made, 830, 831—Manner in which officers in Company's artillery should be placed on a level with those in the King's service, 831—Necessity for further rewards as encouragement to Native officers, 832—835.

*Pennington, Colonel.* Reply of Col. Pennington, C.B., dated 7th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 291.

**PENSIONS :****I.—Generally :**

Invalid pension to sepoy after a certain period of service, *Watson* 991, 992—After what period men get unfit for service and are pensioned, *Hopkinson* 1360, 1361—Difficulty of making alterations in the pension establishment, *Scot* 1447—1449—Method to be adopted to prevent inducements being privately held out to officers to retire on the pension of their rank, *Scot* 1454—Usual period of pensioning Native officers, *Greenhill* 1542—1547.

Increase of pensions to Native troops, and causes, *Salmond* 1892—1896—Pensions paid according to ranks, *Salmond* 1902, 1903—Charge for pensions to European non-commissioned officers and men, and number receiving them, 1814, 1822, and 1828 ; the like to Native officers and men, *Melville* 2126, 2127—Additional allowances granted by the Company in cases of distress, *Melville* 2128.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Calculation of comparative expense of proportion of pensions, &c. of certain regiments at Bengal, App. p. 54, 55—At Madras, App. p. 56, 57—At Bombay, App. p. 58, 59.

See also 'Clive, Lord.' 'Half Pay.' 'Invalids.' 'Military Fund.' 'Native Soldiers.'

**PENSIONERS :****I.—European :**

European pensioners are badly provided for, and something ought to be done for them ; orders issued for sending them to England was a cruel infliction on them, few reached home, and those who did were miserable, *Balmain*, App. p. 316.

**II.—Native :**

Pension establishment a great hold on the affections of the Native army ; improvement in having a graduated scale of pension ; inducement necessary to keep men in the service when entitled to retire, which might be done by increasing pension according to service, *Balmain*, App. p. 316.

*Persia.* Number of staff officers on the Madras establishment employed in Persia, App. p. 47.

*Persian Interpreter.* Allowed on the staff of the commander-in-chief, and lieutenants-general commanding the forces at Madras and Bombay, App. p. 44, 45.

*Pioneers.* Return showing the number of, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements ; also number of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 5—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43—Return of the establishment of a battalion of pioneers at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the year 1831 with columns showing in what particulars the establishments at Madras and Bombay respectively differ from those of Bengal, App. p. 70—Necessity for attaching artificers to Native regiments, and plan for the organization of a corps combining the duties of pioneers and artificers ; advantage thereof in improving the efficiency of the army, and making an opening for the employment of descendants of Europeans and Natives, *Wilson*, App. p. 372.

INDEX.

PEN—PIO.



INDEX.  
—  
POC—PRI.

Synopsis of the evidence relative to the corps of pioneers of the three Presidencies, p. xciii.

See also 'Engineers, II. 2.'

*Pocket-Money.* See 'Addiscombe.'

### POLITICAL SITUATIONS :

#### I.—Generally :

Disadvantages from the circumstance of any young man of ability ranking as captain being placed in a political situation and rising therein, afterwards having to be remanded to his corps as captain, from his superior officer being placed on the staff, *Feilding* 837 —Military men have shown themselves more competent for situations in the political department, from political and military situations being more analagous to each other as far as relates to Asiatic courts and Eastern diplomacy, *Watson* 972.

#### II.—Papers laid before the Committee :

Number of staff officers employed in political situations at Bengal, App. p. 46—At Madras, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 48—Necessity for the employment of military men in political situations, *Salmond*, App. p. 160.

See also 'Civil Situations.' Officers, I.'

*Poona Auxiliary Horse.* Reduction of this troop; regret thereof; utility of this corps, being fitted for all the duties of irregular troops as well as for acting under the civil authority as police corps, *Malcolm*, App. p. 252—Abolition of light infantry battalion at Poona, necessity of such a corps not warranting the expense, *Malcolm*, App. p. 253.

*Postage.* Certain number of letters allowed postage free from each regiment, *Greenhill* 1563.

*Powder.* Efficiency of the powder manufactory at Madras, *Hopkinson* 1375—1377—Amount of annual consumption during peace can be ascertained, *Hopkinson* 1378.

See also 'Ordnance.'

*Prince of Wales' Island.* Return showing the numbers of the military force at the settlements of Prince of Wales' Island; also the numbers of corps, and expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 4—7—For 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1814, App. p. 10, 11—For 1815, App. p. 12, 13—For 1816, App. p. 14, 15—For 1817, App. p. 16, 17—For 1818, App. p. 18, 19—For 1821, App. p. 24, 25—For 1822, App. p. 26, 27—For 1823, App. p. 28, 29—For 1824, App. p. 30, 31—For 1825, App. p. 32, 33—At Prince of Wales' Island and Bencoolen: for 1813, App. p. 8, 9—For 1819, App. p. 20, 21—For 1820, App. p. 22, 23—At Prince of Wales' Island, including Singapore: for 1826, App. p. 34, 35—For 1827, App. p. 36, 37—At Prince of Wales' Island, Singapore, and Malacca: for 1828, App. p. 38, 39—For 1829, App. p. 40, 41—For 1830, App. p. 42, 43.

See also 'Bengal.'

*Pritzler, Sir Theophilus.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Appointments held by witness in the Madras Presidency, 1119, 1123—Spirit, discipline, and efficiency of the Madras army, 1124—Difference between sepoys from different districts, 1125—Infantry good; cavalry may be improved; doubt as to rendering artillery efficient, and as to the policy of so doing, 1126—Sepoys generally well satisfied with their condition, 1127—Military service popular with Natives, 1128—Temperate in habits, and easy of management, 1129—Their feelings towards European officers, 1130—Pay of sepoy as compared with the price of labour, 1131, 1132—European Officers of Native regiments should be trained up with them, and not put into European regiments, 1134—1136—Present Native officers have risen from non-commissioned officers, and are sufficiently rewarded by their commissions, 1137, 1138—Pay of officers is just sufficient for their expenses, 1139—1142—Indian armies cannot be assimilated too much, 1143, 1144—Difficulty of removing Native corps away from home, 1144, 1145—Allowances at the

three Presidencies should be equalized, 1146, 1147—Comparison of expense at the three Presidencies, 1148, 1149.

Necessity for higher allowance in the field than in cantonment, 1150—Natives might be made better horsemen, 1152—And might take better care of their horses, 1153—Manner in which the Madras cavalry have suffered loss as to their horses, 1154—Manner in which horses are provided in Madras, 1155—Average price of a troop horse, 1156—Healthiness of Madras horses from their not being under cover, 1157—Annual per-centage of expenditure for horses in all the services, 1158—Comparison of advantages with respect to promotion in the King's and Company's services, 1159, 1160—Comparison of divisional and stational commands in the two services, 1161—Company's army should be made a Royal army, keeping the Native regiments distinct, 1162—1164—Advantageous to have only one commander-in-chief, 1165—Number of officers necessary to be present with Native regiments, 1166, 1167—Inconvenience to regiments from number of officers on staff duty, 1168—How far remedied by late regulations, 1168—1170—Reasons for Native officers being in receipt of full tent allowance, 1171—Preference by Company's officers for Native corps, 1172.

Officers remain in the regiment to which first appointed till they attain a certain rank, 1173—Brevet rank more favourable to Company's than King's officers, 1174, 1175—Advantages of one commander-in-chief, with a commander of the forces for the details of each Presidency, 1176—Also one adjutant and quartermaster-general, with deputies at each station, 1177—1179—Necessity for commanders-in-chief and general officers to have previously served in India, 1180, 1181—Instances in which Company's officers have been in the chief command in India, 1182—Rank at which Company's officers should be eligible for service at either of the Presidencies, 1183—How far reductions might be made in the Madras army, 1185—1187—Reduction cannot be made in the staff; of what it consists, 1186—India not preferable to the Colonies for a King's officer, unless of very high rank, 1188—No difficulty in removing King's regiments from one Presidency to another, 1189, 1190—Method of conducting the hospital establishments, and supply of medicines thereto, 1191—1196.

Proportion of deaths in Native regiments per annum, 1197, 1198—Also of officers in a King's regiment, 1199—Suggestions for the improvement of the quartermaster-general's department, 1200, 1201—Company's medical officers should be examined in a similar manner to the King's, 1202—Manner in which officers in the European foot artillery should be increased, 1203—1206—Reasons why Native artillery should be discontinued, 1207—1209—Manner of clothing the army, 1210—Manner of supplying accoutrements, 1211—1213—Manner of supplying saddlery, 1214, 1215—Commisariat under the control of the governor, 1216, 1217—Europeans with capital only should be allowed to settle in India, 1218, 1219—Discharged soldiers would turn out badly, 1220—How they might be profitably employed, 1221—Commanders-in-chief should visit their armies more frequently, 1222—1224—How far jealousies arise between King's and Company's officers, 1225—Company's officers have a fair share of high commands, 1226—How far advantageous for soldiers to remain in India upon regiments coming home, 1227—1229.

How Company's European regiments kept complete, 1230, 1231—Bad effects of the artillery having choice of recruits from England before the infantry, 1232—Method of obtaining staff serjeants, and why inefficient, 1233, 1234—Non-commissioned European officers to a Native regiment, 1235—Method of conducting courts-martial in India, 1236—Irregular corps reduced, 1237—Commanding officers should have more influence in the appointment of the regimental staff, 1238—1242—Advantage of appointing Native aides-de-camp as a reward to Native officers, 1243, 1244—Quality of horses in India for military purposes, 1245, 1246—Reasons for difference in the number of staff officers at Madras and Bengal, 1247, 1248—Difference in the number of brigadiers at those Presidencies, and between King's and Company's, 1249—1253—Military board might be done away with, 1254—Manner in which the place of local corps may

INDEX.  
PRITZLER.

INDEX.  
—  
PRI—QUA.

be supplied, 1255—1257—Proportion European cavalry should bear to Native, 1258—1260—Not desirable to substitute Native for European cavalry, 1261—Essential to give marks of distinction to Native officers, 1262—Value of sepoy boys to the different corps, 1263.

*Pritzler*, Major-general Sir *Thomas*, Reply of Major-general Sir *Thomas Pritzler*, K.C.B., dated 17th February 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 260.

**PROMOTION:**

**I.—Generally :**

Method of promotion, and different periods and ranks, *Nicolls* 61—63—Proportion of divisional or stational commands of field officers and staff appointments according to relative numbers on the establishment to which they belong, *Nicolls* 64—66—Regulations as to promotion in Native regiments, *Nicolls* 180—186, *Reynell* 420—427—How far promotion in the Company's service regimentally or by seniority, *Feilding* 748—Arrangements as to promotion in the event of uniting the Company's army under the King, *Watson* 1008, 1009.

Regulations as to promotion, *Limond* 1270—1272—Alterations that should be made in the present rules of promotion, *Scot* 1454, *Leighton* 1989—1992, 2142—In what branch officers have the greatest advantage in promotion, *Dickson* 1605—Comparison of advantages in promotion in different Presidencies, *Aitchison* 1728—1732.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Observations upon the promotion of officers in the Native army, *Malcolm*, App. p. 172, 227, *Cabell* p. 414—Calculations upon promotion made in the year 1821, and statements showing the rise of different ranks of officers according to their standing in the army, *Cabell* p. 435—448—Statement of the names of officers whose commissions were compared, with the dates of their respective commissions, and their periods of service severally in the ranks in which their commissions were compared, *Cabell*, App. p. 449.

Synopsis of the evidence taken before the Committee relative to promotion, p. lvi.

See also 'Officers, IV. 1.' 'Skeleton Corps.'

*Provisional Battalion*. Observations contained in the report of Messrs. Hill and Melvill upon the claims of the public upon the East-India Company for forces serving in India, relative to the provisional battalion formed in 1821, *Melvill*, Evidence p. 255.

*Punishment*. See 'Courts-Martial.'

Q.

**QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL:**

**I.—Generally :**

His duties, *Nicolls* 173—176, *Reynell* 411—413, *Munro* 1073, 1074—Comparison of duties of quartermaster-general's department of Bengal and Madras, *Nicolls* 211—Not so necessary for quartermaster-general to have served in India as commander-in-chief, *Reynell* 346—Assistants in the quartermaster-general's department, *Munro* 1058—Advantages of one quartermaster-general, with deputies at each station, *Pritzler* 1177—1179—Suggestions for the improvement of the quartermaster-general's department, *Pritzler* 1200, 1201.

**II.—Papers laid before the Committee :**

Quartermaster-general on the staff at Bengal and deputy-quartermaster-general at Madras, App. p. 44—Number and description of persons composing the staff of the

quartermaster-general's department at Bengal, App. p. 45—At Madras, App. p. 46  
—At Bombay, App. p. 47.

INDEX.

*Quartermaster-Sergeant.* See 'Officers, VII. 1.'

QUA—RED.

## R.

**Rank.** Regimental rank of officers holding staff appointments, *Watson* 895—899—  
Disadvantages of the Company's officers not being admitted on an equal footing with  
regard to rank with those in the King's service, *Worsley*, App. p. 331—Synopsis of  
the evidence taken before the Committee relative to rank and promotion, p. lvi—lxix.

See also 'Brigadiers.' 'Officers, IV. 1.'

**Rations.** A calculation of the comparative expense of rations for certain regiments in  
Bengal, App. p. 54, 55—Soldiers at Madras provide themselves with rations in garri-  
son, and at half batta stations, App. p. 56, 57, *note*—The like at Bombay, App. p.  
58, 59, *note*.

See also 'Victualling.'

## RECRUITING:

### I.—Generally:

Method of recruiting in Bengal, *Nicolls* 245, 246—In Madras, *Dickson* 1618—  
1621—No difficulty in recruiting and completing establishments at present, *Munro* 1034,  
*Scot* 1433—Bad effects of the artillery having choice of recruits from England before  
the infantry, *Pritzler* 1232—Preference of selection of recruits by the artillery, *Limond*  
1306, 1307, *Scot* 1432—Periods during which there has been a difficulty in recruiting,  
*Scot* 1450, 1451, *Aitchison* 1705—Reason why good recruits are not obtained now as  
formerly, *Greenhill* 1521—1524—Utility of the establishment for sepoy recruits,  
*Pritzler* 1263, *Greenhill* 1540, *Dickson* 1676—1679, *Aitchison* 1712, *Leighton* 1985,  
1986—Part of Madras territories from which the best recruits are obtained, *Greenhill*  
1564.

Bounty for recruits, *Hay* 1646, 1647—Period recruits kept at the dépôt, and ages  
at which sent out, *Hay* 1648, 1649—Recruiting diminished last year, *Hay* 1660—  
Company's recruits equal to His Majesty's, *Hay* 1662—Number of officers at recruit-  
ing establishments, *Hay* 1665—Greater number might have been recruited than has  
ever been required, *Hay* 1666—Opinion as to ages of recruits, *Hay* 1669, *Aitchison*  
1709—1711—Regulations against recruiting Bombay troops from Bengal territories,  
*Leighton* 1966, 1967—Description of cavalry recruits, *Leighton* 1969—Observations  
contained in the report of Messrs. Hill and Melvill upon the claims of the public on the  
East-India Company for forces serving in India, relative to the charge for recruiting,  
*Melvill*, Evidence p. 249—255.

### II.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Calculation of the comparative expense of recruiting of certain regiments at Bengal,  
App. p. 54, 55—At Madras, App. p. 56, 57—At Bombay, App. p. 58, 59—  
The troops of which the different armies are composed are, with the exception of Euro-  
peans, recruited each in their own districts; advantages of such a plan, *Salmond*, App.  
p. 157.

**Reduction of Regiments.** Difficulties in reducing a whole regiment of cavalry or infantry  
in the Company's service, *Nicolls* 115—117—Method adopted in reducing Company's  
regiments of cavalry and infantry, *Reynell* 348, 349—Savings that might be effected  
by the reduction of troops, *Salmond* 546—Advisable to reduce the Native artillery, and  
reasons for it, *Salmond* 547—550, 604—Rate of reduction necessary in Native cavalry

INDEX.  
—  
REG—RET.

in the three Presidencies, *Salmond* 551—557, 644—Reductions that might be effected in the European infantry, *Salmond* 558, 589—591—Reductions should be equal in King's and Company's regiments, *Salmond* 563—Method of acting with officers in the event of reduction, *Salmond* 566.

Reductions that have been made in the Bengal army, *Salmond* 574—583—Reductions cannot be carried further in point of numbers, *Salmond* 584—Officers of reduced regiments kept as supernumeraries, *Salmond* 586—Further reduction would impair the efficiency of the army in India, *Malcolm* 675, 676, 709—711, 717—Regiments sent over on account of the Burmese war might be withdrawn, *Malcolm* 677, 678—In what the difficulty consists of reducing Company's troops by regiments, *Malcolm* 687—Method of reducing the Indian army, and distress to officers thereby, *Malcolm* 688—Necessity for keeping up the complement of officers after reduction of troops, *Malcolm* 689.

Reductions within the last two years, *Malcolm* 719—Difficulty of further reduction, *Aitchison* 1722—1727—Arrangement for reducing Native regiments, *Salmond* 1866—1868—How far reduction might be made in the Bombay and Madras armies, *Salmond* 1908—1913, 1917, 1918—Impossibility of any reduction in the Bengal army, *Macan* 2151—Reductions that might be made in stations in the Bengal Presidency, *Macan* 2161, 2163—2167—How far armies of Madras and Bombay may be further reduced, *Macan* 2207—Reductions that might be made in stations and staff appointments, *Paget* 2311—Manner in which reductions might be made in the Indian army, *Salmond*, App. p. 158—Synopsis of the evidence taken before the Committee, relative to the augmentation and reduction of the army by whole regiments, and alteration of establishments affecting rank, p. lxix.

See also 'Madras Army.'

*Registrar.* Grievances, in cases of soldiers dying in India, from the charges of the registrar, *Dalbiac* 2145.

*Reinforcements.* See 'Depôt.'

*Reliefs.* Observations contained in the report of Messrs. Hill and Melvill on the claims of the public on the East-India Company for forces serving in India, relative to the charge of reliefs, *Melvill*, Evidence p. 249.

*Remounts.* Considerable saving that has been made in this branch of the army; the changes recently made in the remount being in successful operation at Bombay, *Malcolm* App. p. 255.

*Removal of Regiments.* From one Presidency to another, *Nicolls* 118—120—No difficulty in the removal of Native regiments from the feelings of the sepoys, *Reynell* 485—Difficulty of removing Native corps away from home, *Pritzler* 1144, 1145—No difficulty in removing King's regiments from one Presidency to another, *Pritzler* 1189, 1190—Expense attending the removal of an European regiment in India is sufficient reason for keeping troops stationary, *Scot* 1430.

*Residents.* Number of staff officers employed as residents at Bengal, App. p. 46—At Madras, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 48—Advantage of the employment of military men as residents in Asiatic courts, *Salmond*, App. p. 160—Situation of residents at foreign courts is also an object both of honorary and pecuniary ambition, and the prospect of attaining it has the best effect in stimulating military men to employ their leisure hours in qualifying themselves for it, *Salmond*, App. p. 160.

*Retiring Allowances.* Number of officers receiving them, and increase therein, *Melvill* 2118—2120—Statement exhibiting the rates of retiring allowances to European commissioned officers of the Company's service on full and half pay in 1813 and 1832, showing the increase which has taken place, and the date of the general order and of the Court's letter prescribing or sanctioning it, App. p. 149—Return of the number of European commissioned officers in receipt of the full and half pay, with the amount of charge in each year from the commencement of the retiring regulation in 1796 to the present

time, specifying the proportion per hundred of retired officers in a separate column to the authorized establishment, App. p. 150—Scale of retiring allowances that should be offered to officers in the event of reducing regiments, *Salmond*, App. p. 159—Unfairness of retiring allowances, and necessity for their being better regulated, *Balmain*, App. p. 316—Slow promotion and few opportunities of saving, cause the retiring allowances to be an inadequate reward for the best of life spent in India; manner in which a retiring fund might be formed, *Duff*, App. p. 398.

See also 'Native Soldiers.'

*Retiring Regulations.* Inducement which generally influence officers to avail themselves of the retiring regulations after sixteen or eighteen years' service, *Nicolls* 126, 127—Proportion of officers availing themselves of, *Reynell* 355—361—Synopsis of the evidence taken before the Committee relative to retiring regulations, p. lxxi.

*Retrenchment.* See 'Madras Army.'

*Return from India.* See 'Passage to and from India.'

*Reynell*, Major-general Sir Thomas. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Rank in the army, and situations held by witness in India, 263—General efficiency of the Bengal army, 264, 265—Difference in work between sepoys from different districts, 266, 267—Military service popular with the Natives, 268, 269—Habits of the Native soldier, and as compared with the European, 270, 271—Their feelings towards European officers, 272, 273—Pay of the sepoys, and as compared with the price of labour, 274—278—Comparison of advantages of the European over the Native soldier, 279—Allowances in the three Presidencies should be equalized, 280, 281—European officers of Indian corps should be trained up with them, 282—Encouragement that should be given to Native officers, 283—286—No advantage from admitting Native officers to a higher rank than subadar-major, 287, 288—Regulations as to batta, 289—291—Pay of the Company's European officers not more than sufficient, 292—Officers' habits more expensive than formerly, 293—295—Necessity for different rates of allowance in the field and in cantonment, 296—299—Recent orders have rendered Company's officers dissatisfied, 300—Advantages and disadvantages of the Company's service, 301, 302.

Relative condition of the two services with regard to promotions and appointments, 303—307—Benefits of uniting the services, and means of accomplishing it, 308, 310—Means of supplying deficiency of officers absent on staff employment, 311—315—How promotion would be affected by the formation of a skeleton corps, 316—318—Qualifications that should be requisite for staff employment, 319, 320—Proportion of the corps on full and half batta and tentage in Bengal, 321—Comparison of expense to officers in the different provinces, 322—324—Subalterns generally live up to their income, 325—329—Desirable to equalize rates of batta, 330—How far officers are always provided with the requisite camp equipage, 331—333—Preference by officers to European regiments, 334—Desirable they should first serve with European regiments, 335, 336—On what the impression of necessity of respecting the prejudices of the Native soldier depends, 337—Effect of granting brevet rank, 338, 342—Disadvantages if only one commander-in-chief, 343—Commander-in-chief should previously have served in India, 344, 345—Not so necessary that adjutant and quartermaster-general should have so served, 346—How far Company's officers have commanded the army in India, 347—Method adopted in reducing Company's regiments of cavalry and infantry, 348, 349—Comparison of advantages of service in India over the Colonies, 350, 351.

The three armies should be put on a similar footing as to allowances, 352—354—Proportion of officers who avail themselves of the furlough and retirement regulations, 355—361—Effect of the command-money arrangement, 362, 363—Regulations as to repairs of arms and accoutrements, 364—366—Rules as to victualling European regiments, 367, 368—Whether inebriety more or less frequent among European soldiers

INDEX.  
—  
ROA—RUS.

than formerly, 369—Effect of soldiers' libraries, 370, 371—Regimental schools well attended, 372, 373—Fives-courts established at each station, 374—Half-castes taught in the same school as children of European women, 375—Superintendence of clergyman over the schools, 376—Employment of children after removal from orphan school, 377, 378—Increase of half-caste population, and whether enlisted into European regiments, 379—382—Upon regiments coming to England most soldiers volunteer to remain in India, 383—385—Duties of serjeants-major and quartermaster-serjeants of Native regiments, 386—388—Relative situations of non-commissioned officers in European and Native regiments, 389—393—Number of officers necessary to be present with regiments of cavalry, infantry, and horse artillery, 394—402—Duties of European and Native officers, and their communications with each other, 403—406—Regiments paid through the European officer, 407, 408—Investigation of complaints by commanding officers, 409, 410.

[Second Examination.]—Duties of adjutants of Native corps, 411—413—Duties of quartermaster and interpreter, 414, 415—Staff employment an inducement to officers to study the Native languages, 417, 418—Number of effective officers usually present with Native regiments, 419—Regulations for the promotion of Native officers, and suggestions for amending it, 420—427—Customary rewards of distinguished Native officers, 428—430—Pay of sepoys, and proportion to the wages of labour in India, 431—433—When desertions usually take place, 434—Suggestions for improvement in the pay of Native officers, 435—Regulations for the supply and repair of saddlery in Bengal, 436—439—Arrangements for providing horses, 440—442—Usual method of stabling horses, 443—445—Whether stud horses bred in sufficient numbers for the supply of troops, 446, 447—Comparison of staff appointments in India and the Colonies, as to duty and emoluments, 448—450.

How far arrangement of certain staff appointments might be altered, 451—453—What military stores can be best supplied from England, 454, 455—Necessity for uniformity in the patterns of tents in the three Presidencies, 455, 456—Duties of European and Native surgeons, 457, 458—Nature of medical contracts, 460—Majors-general should be eligible to serve on the staff of any of the Presidencies, 461—Arrangement as to retiring pension of medical officers, 462—Duties and qualifications of inspectors of hospitals, 463—468—Opinion as to uniting the Company's army under the King, 469—472—Proportion of effective officers necessary for a regiment, 473—475, 477—479—General strength of Native regiments, 476—478—Usual system to mix Mahomedans and Hindoos in the same regiment, 480, 481—Arrangements to be made with regard to colonial branch and staff appointments in the event of uniting the armies, 482—484—No difficulty on the removal of Native regiments from the feelings of the sepoys, 485—How far field and other officers generally efficient for their duties, 486, 487.

*Roads.* See 'Works, Public.'

*Rupees.* Different rates of value of rupees, and injustice done to the army thereby when troops from different Presidencies employed on the same duty, *Scot* 1454—Necessity for an uniform standard of coins and currency, and disadvantages from the difference in the nominal value of rupees, *Worsley*, App. p. 329.

*Russell, Henry.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness in India, 2227—2230—Danger to be feared from the Native army, 2231, 2232—Disadvantages from reduction of emoluments of European officers; and from changing certain arrangements of the sepoys, 2232—Whether danger greater or less now than at former periods, 2233—How far danger arises from feelings peculiar to the Natives, and what description of Natives, 2234.

No peculiar indication of danger at present, 2235—Method of avoiding the danger, 2236—Further advantages that should be held out to Native officers to prevent their dissatisfaction, 2237—Advantages of the bazar allowance being continued to officers in

milate the army equipments of the three Presidencies, 1418—1420—Health of European troops generally more affected than Native, 1421—Number of years Europeans and Natives remain fit for service, 1422, 1423—Ages after which Europeans should not be allowed to remain in India, 1427, 1428—What situations in India most healthy for Europeans, 1429, 1430—Method of completing Company's European regiments, 1431—Artillery have the first choice of recruits, 1432—Recruits to be had at present without difficulty, 1433—Company's regiments not relieved by entire regiments, 1434—No King's artillery in India, 1435—Difficulties of assembling troops in large bodies, 1436, 1437—How the Native cavalry might be improved, 1438—How far a substitution might be made for the Native cavalry, 1439—1441—How far irregular cavalry commanded by European officers, 1442.

Efficiency of the Mysore Silladar horse, and description of their officers, 1443, 1444—Proportion of European to Native force that should be maintained, 1445, 1446—Difficulty of making alterations in the pension establishment, 1447—1449—Periods during which there has been a difficulty in recruiting, 1450, 1451—Reasons why the Company's army should not be incorporated under the King, 1452—How far one commander-in-chief would be expedient, 1453—Alterations that should be made in the present rules of promotion; suggestions as to the privilege of exchanges; European infantry should be increased instead of reduced; methods to be taken for increasing officers for filling up vacancies occasioned by staff and other duties; injustice to different troops from different rates of exchange of coins in which they are paid; clothing and appointments in the three Presidencies should be similar; disadvantage of the Court of Directors directing details upon practical subjects without the possibility of their having knowledge of their effects in India; necessity for an army agency sanctioned by the Company; method to be adopted to prevent inducements being privately held out to officers to retire on the pension of their rank, 1454—Manner in which selections should be made for commanders-in-chief, 1455—1459.

*Sebundies.* Minute by Sir John Malcolm, subscribed by Mr. Warden and Mr. Goodwin, upon the inexpediency of employing European officers in command of sebundies, and upon the necessity of employing Native officers therein, *Malcolm*, App. p. 236—Letter from the secretary to Government at Bombay to the adjutant-general of the army, stating that the Governor in Council had resolved to appoint subadars to be selected from the army to the command of sebundies, *Malcolm*, App. p. 236.

See also 'Irregular Troops.'

*Secretaries.* See 'Colleges.'

*Sepoys.* See 'Native Soldiers.'

*Sergeants.* See 'Officers, VII. 1.'

*Service.* See 'Discharged Soldiers.'

*Sherwood, Colonel.* Reply of Colonel Sherwood, dated 28th February 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 301.

*Shot.* See 'Ordnance.'

*Singapore.* See 'Prince of Wales' Island.'

*Skeleton Corps.* How promotion would be affected by formation of, *Reynell* 316—318—Advantages of the formation of a skeleton corps for the supply of vacancies from staff and civil appointments, *Feilding* 838, *Scot* 1454—Impracticability of a skeleton corps to supply deficiencies of officers on staff appointments, *Munro* 1055—Formation of a staff corps requisite for accelerating promotion in the local army, *Malcolm*, App. p. 227.

See also 'Staff.'

*Small Arms.* See 'Ordnance.'

*Smith, Major-general Sir Lionel.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness



INDEX.  
SOL—STA.

in India on the Bombay establishment, 2319—2322—Efficiency of the Bombay army, 2323—Their equipments sufficient, 2324—In what defects in their arms consist, 2325—Good quality of horses for the artillery, 2326—European cavalry not so well mounted as the Native, from their being heavier men, 2327, 2328—Advantages that would be lost by the rate of exchange being made up to the sepoy, 2329—No necessity for increasing officers in Native regiments, 2330, 2331—Necessity of encouraging commanding officers to remain with their regiments, 2331—2333—Subalterns are worse off than in other parts of the world as to pay, 2334—Stores in the three Presidencies should be assimilated, 2335—Disadvantage of having only one commander-in-chief, 2336.

Disadvantage of making the Company's army a Royal army, 2337—Study of the Native languages is sufficiently encouraged, 2338—Difficulty of giving Native officers higher rank, but their retiring pensions should be increased, 2339, 2340—Benefits of attaching a Native officer to the staff of each general officer, 2341, 2342—With attention to their wants Natives are faithful, and when well managed have never been beaten, 2343—Arrangements that have been made for improving the condition of retired Native officers; number of sepoy boys have not been increased, 2344—Native army should be let alone, 2345.

*Soldiers.* See 'European Soldiers.' 'Native Soldiers.'

STAFF:

I.—Generally:

Order of the Court, limiting the number of officers to be absent on staff employ, not complied with, *Nicolls* 81—83—Opinion as to plan for filling up the vacancies occasioned by staff employment, *Nicolls* 84—86, *Reynell* 311—315—Staff officers in each Presidency are selected from the Company's service in the same Presidency, *Nicolls* 112—Officers should have served in India before they are appointed to the staff in the Indian army, *Nicolls* 113—Comparison of the duties of general's staff at Bengal and other parts of the world, *Nicolls* 209—At Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, *Nicolls* 210—Rule of promotion in the staff at Bengal, *Nicolls* 212, 213—Qualifications that should be requisite for staff employment, *Reynell* 319, 320—Comparison of staff appointments in India and the Colonies as to duty and emoluments, *Reynell* 448—450—How far arrangement of certain staff appointments might be altered, *Reynell* 451—453—Major-generals should be eligible to serve on the staff of any of the Presidencies, *Reynell* 461.

Increase of the staff since 1813, and whether it could be further reduced, *Malcolm* 679—681, 712, 713—Plan for the formation of a skeleton corps to supply deficiency of officers on staff employment, *Malcolm* 686—Disadvantage of recent orders limiting the number of officers to be employed on staff duty, *Malcolm* 686—Method of supplying deficiency from staff appointments, *Feilding* 745—747—Means for supplying the staff without impairing the efficiency of regiments, *Feilding* 836—838—No fixed rule of selection for staff employment, *Watson* 916—918—Reason of increase in the staff since 1813, *Watson* 974, 975—Arrangement to be made as to staff officers in the event of reducing European infantry in Bengal, *Watson* 1002, 1003—Difficulties of officers being eligible for staff duty at either Presidency, *Watson* 1006—Advantageous if Company's major-generals were eligible to the staff of either Presidency, *Munro* 1090—Inconvenience to regimental service from officers absent on staff duty, *Watson* 970—973, *Munro* 1054, *Pritzler* 1168, *Paget* 2313, 2314—Impracticability of a skeleton corps to supply the deficiency, *Munro* 1055—Inconvenience of limiting the number of officers to be absent on staff duty, *Munro* 1056—Method to be adopted to fill up vacancies, *Munro* 1056, 1057—Necessity for officers doing regimental duty previous to staff appointment, *Munro* 1059, 1060.

How far regimental inconveniences from staff duty remedied by the late regulations, *Pritzler* 1168—1170—Commanding officers should have more influence in the appoint-

ment of the regimental staff, *Pritzler* 1238—1242—Reasons for difference in the number of staff officers at Madras and Bengal, *Pritzler* 1247, 1248—Methods to be taken for increasing officers for filling up vacancies occasioned by staff and other duties, *Scot* 1454—Staff officers should only be appointed on recommendation of commanding officer, *Greenhill* 1559—How inconveniences from staff duty to be remedied, *Dickson* 1627, 1628—How far commanding officers have sufficient power of appointment of their regimental staff, *Aitchison* 1790—1796—Reduction cannot be made in staff officers, *Leighton* 1953—Reductions that may be made in the staff, and method of effecting them, *Macan* 2162, 2168—2173—How staff officers to be supplied, *Macan* 2201, 2202—Staff situations not so valuable as commands of corps were formerly, *Russell* 2247, 2248.

## II.—Papers laid before the Committee :

### 1. Generally :

Proposition for filling up vacancies occasioned by staff appointments and absentee field officers, *Malcolm*, App. p. 227, *Balmain*, App. p. 316—Necessity for the rule being strictly observed, that no officer should hold a staff appointment until he has been five years with his regiment, *Elphinstone*, App. p. 257—Proposition for filling up staff appointments in the event of there being one commander-in-chief, *Worsley*, App. p. 328—Limitations as to the number of officers allowed to be drawn from regiments for staff appointments, *Baker*, App. p. 335—Observations upon the organization of the staff at the several Presidencies, *Munro* 454, *Cabell*, App. p. 409.

Return showing the number on the staff at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, also expense thereof, 1813—1830, App. p. 5—For 1813, App. p. 9—For 1814, App. p. 11—For 1815, App. p. 13—For 1816, App. p. 15—For 1817, App. p. 17—For 1818, App. p. 19—For 1819, App. p. 21—For 1820, App. p. 23—For 1821, App. p. 25—For 1822, App. p. 27—For 1823, App. p. 29—For 1824, App. p. 31—For 1825, App. p. 33—For 1826, App. p. 35—For 1827, App. p. 37—For 1828, App. p. 39—For 1829, App. p. 41—For 1830, App. p. 43—Return of the general and medical staff of His Majesty's forces on the Indian establishments, App. p. 44—Return showing the aggregate expense of the staff, and certain military departments, at each of the three Presidencies, as the same stood on the 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 52.

Statement showing the number of officers withdrawn from each regular regiment of cavalry and infantry for staff or detached employment, in each year 1813—1831, App. p. 74—77—Table of the pay of non-commissioned staff attached to Native troops at each Presidency, as at present authorized, App. p. 116—Return of the allowances drawn by the officers holding certain staff appointments, on 30th April 1831, App. p. 122—Return of the allowances drawn by the officers of King's troops holding certain staff appointments, on 30th April 1831, App. p. 128—Abstract return of the several staff and subsidiary departments at the three Presidencies, 1813—1829, *Salmond*, App. p. 155—Statement of the general and miscellaneous staff at Bengal, *Baker*, App. p. 347—Synopsis of the evidence upon the general staff, p. cx.

### 2. Relating to Bengal :

Constitution thereof, App. p. 44, 45—Aggregate expense of the general staff, staff attached to army stations, and staff of His Majesty's forces, on 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 52—Statement of the number of officers withdrawn from each regular regiment of cavalry and infantry at Bengal, for staff and detached employment, 1813—1831, App. p. 74.

### 3. Relating to Madras :

Constitution thereof, App. p. 44, 46, *Pritzler*, App. p. 263—Return of the aggregate expense of the general staff, staff attached to army stations, and staff of His Majesty's troops at Madras, on 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830,

INDEX.  
—  
STA—STO.

App. p. 52—Statement showing the number of officers withdrawn from each regular regiment of cavalry and infantry, at Madras, for staff and detached employment, 1813—1831, App. p. 75.

4. Relating to Bombay:

Constitution thereof, App. p. 44, 47—Observations upon the organization of the staff at the Bombay Presidency, *Stannus*, App. p. 383—Return showing the aggregate expense of the general staff, divisional, district, and brigade staff, garrison staff, and staff of His Majesty's troops at Bombay, on 30th April 1813, 30th April 1826, and 30th April 1830, App. p. 52—Statement showing the number of officers withdrawn from each regular regiment of cavalry and infantry, at Bombay, for staff and detached employment, 1813—1831, App. p. 77—Return of the number of staff and other appointments, not regimental, held by officers of cavalry, European and Native infantry, in the Honourable Company's army, on the Bombay establishment, 1825—1827, App. p. 222.

See also 'Army in India.' 'Commissariat Staff.' 'Medical Staff.' 'Native Languages.' 'Officers.' 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Promotion.' 'Rank.'

*Staff Corps.* See 'Skeleton Corps.'

*Staff Serjeants.* See 'Officers, VII. 1.'

*Stannus*, Colonel. Reply of Colonel Stannus, c. B., dated 20th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 383.

*Stations.* See 'Brigadiers.' 'Pay and Allowances.'

**STORES:**

I.—Generally:

Method of supplying military stores to India, *Nicolls* 214, 215, *Macan* 2158—2160—What military stores can be best supplied from England, *Reynell*, 454, 455—Revision of the store department at Bombay, *Malcolm* 664, 665—Necessity for the store departments in all the Presidencies being assimilated, *Pennington* 825—828, *Smith* 2335—Not a disadvantage that stores from different Presidencies are dissimilar, *Hopkinson* 1364, 1365—Method of supplying stores when troops from different Presidencies act together, *Hopkinson* 1366—1374—Military stores are assimilated as nearly as possible, *Leighton* 1950.

Amount of damages to military stores since 1814, *Melvill* 2137—Stores sent out are good, but deteriorated by the climate, *Paget* 2308, 2309—Manner of supplying the demand for stores from India, and responsibility of inspector of stores, *Forrest* 2347, 2348—Manner in which contracts are made for the supply, and examination as to their fulfilment, *Forrest* 2349—2351—Efficiency of stores upon their arrival in India, *Forrest* 2352—Satisfactory to have an inspection by a committee of King's and Company's officers, *Forrest* 2355.

II.—Artillery:

From whence artillery stores supplied, *Watson* 931—933, *Hopkinson* 1362, 1363—Necessity for assimilating artillery stores in the three Presidencies, *Watson* 934—937—Supply of artillery stores, and quantity kept in store, *Limond* 1279, 1280.

III.—Papers laid before the Committee:

Return of the aggregate expense of military stores sent from England, 1813, 1826, and 1830, App. p. 53—General revision of the establishments of stores and camp equipment; saving of expenditure thereby; changes therein rendered more necessary by the abolition of the military board, *Malcolm*, App. p. 254—Memorandum of the

invoice amount of the military stores dispatched to Bengal, and received there during the years 1825-26—1828-29, *Baker*, App. p. 349—General excellence of the Bombay accoutrements and arms, *Duff*, App. p. 399—Synopsis of the evidence relative to the assimilation in respect to stores and supplies, p. xlii.

See also 'Army in India, II. 2.' 'Military Store Accounts.' 'Saddlery.'

**Stud Department.** Number of staff officers employed in this department at Bengal, App. p. 46—Staff officer employed as superintendent of the stud at Bombay, App. p. 48—Intention of abolishing this department except as a branch of the commissariat; number of military officers at present employed therein, *Salmond*, App. p. 162—Manner in which the stud is looked forward to as the means of supplying the army with a superior breed of horses at a lower rate of expense, besides the advantage of being independent of a foreign market; cost of the stud department partly defrayed by the sale of colts and fillies when a year old, *Malcolm*, App. p. 256.

See also 'Horses.'

**Subadars.** See 'Pay and Allowances.' 'Sebundies.'

**Subaltern Officers.** See 'Officers, VI.'

**Subsidiary or Field Forces.** Number of officers in command of subsidiary or field forces at the three Presidencies, App. p. 49—Return of allowances drawn by officers in command of subsidiary or field forces on 30th April 1831, App. p. 126.

See also 'Pay and Allowances.'

**Superintendent of Police.** Cause of the appointment of military officers to this situation, *Salmond*, App. p. 163.

**Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons.** Return showing the number of, in the hospital department, at the three Presidencies and subordinate settlements, for each year 1813—1830, App. p. 9—43—Surgeon allowed the commander-in-chief at Bengal in his joint capacity of commander-in-chief of the Company's army, App. p. 44—Return showing the number of assistant surgeons appointed in each year, 1796—1832, App. p. 110.

See also 'Medical Officers.'

**Survey Department.** Number of staff officers, and of what services, engaged in this department at Bengal, App. p. 46.

**Surveyor in the Concan.** Staff officer of Bombay establishment employed as assistant to surveyor in the Concan, App. p. 48.

**Surveyor-General.** Staff officers employed as deputy surveyor-general and assistants surveyors-general at Madras, App. p. 46—At Bombay, App. p. 48.

## T.

**Tents.** Kept up by Native, but not by European officers, *Nicolls* 76—80—Proportion of corps at Bengal on full and half tentage, *Nicolls* 89, *Reynell* 321—Camp equipage of European officers never mustered, *Nicolls* 100—Reason for European officers keeping up their camp equipage, *Nicolls* 101—Tents in the three Presidencies not of one pattern, *Nicolls* 216—219—How far officers always provided with the requisite camp equipage, *Reynell* 331—333—Necessity for uniformity in the patterns of tents in the three Presidencies, *Reynell* 455, 456.

Comparison as to tentage allowances of King's and Company's European officers, *Malcolm* 704—707—Plan that should be adopted with regard to tentage allowance, *Malcolm* 707, 708—Reasons for Native officers being in receipt of full tent allowance, *Pritzler* 1171—European officers of Native corps are always prepared with camp equipage, *Leighton* 1965.

## INDEX.

## VAC—WAT.

## V.

*Vacancies.* See 'Skeleton Corps.' 'Staff.'

*Victualling.* Calculation of comparative expense of victualling European troops in the field beyond the stoppage for that purpose at Madras, App. p. 56, 57—In the field, and at full batta stations at Madras, an additional charge is incurred for victualling Europeans beyond the stoppage for that purpose, App. p. 56, *note*—The like at Bombay, App. p. 58, *note*.

See also 'Commissariat.' 'Rations.'

*Villiers, T. Hyde, Esq.* Letter from T. Hyde Villiers, Secretary to the India Board, dated 2d February 1832, to officers in the India service, requesting information on subjects connected with the Indian army, App. p. 154—Answers thereto, App. p. 155, 168, 257, 260, 270, 273, 277, 285, 291, 300, 301, 303, 308, 314, 323, 333, 350, 357, 383, 385, 387, 393, 401.

## W.

*Warden, Mr.* See 'Sebundies.'

*Warrant-Officers.* See 'Officers, VIII.'

*Watson, Lieutenant-colonel.* (Analysis of his evidence.)—Situations held by witness in the Bengal Presidency, 881—884—Efficiency and discipline of Native troops, 885—888—Those convicted of drunkenness invariably discharged, 889—Expense of European over Native regiments, 890—894—Regimental rank of officers holding staff appointments, 895—899—Number of general officers, 900—Additions to the rank of brigadier, 901—Employment of Native infantry on guard over European, and how far harassing to Natives, 902—905—Officers necessary to be present with regiments of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, 906—915—No fixed rule of selection for staff employment, 916—918—No advantage in employing Native officers on staff duties, 919—923—No advantage of giving them higher rank than they can now obtain, 924—Necessity of increasing Native troops, and keeping up a better balance between European and Native troops, 925—927—Efficiency of the artillery, 928—930—Horses should be substituted for bullocks for drawing artillery, 930—From whence artillery stores supplied, 931—933—Necessity for assimilating artillery stores in the three Presidencies, 934—937.

Natives well adapted for cavalry service, 938—941—Pay and allowances of staff officers, 942—946—Comparison of expense of officers in the three Presidencies, 947—Pay and allowances of regimental officers the same in all the Presidencies, 948—Pay and allowances of Madras and Bombay sepoys more than the Bengal, 949—951—Assimilated while acting together, 951, 952—Difficulty of assimilating the three Presidencies with regard to pay and allowances, 953—958—No bounty paid to sepoys on enlisting, 959—Cost price of cavalry horses, 960—Comparison between stud and Native horses, 961—969—Manner in which staff employment injurious to the efficiency of regiments, 970—973—Reason of increase in the staff since 1813, 974, 975—Reasons why number of brigadiers should not be reduced, 976, 977—Necessity of brigadiers' staff, 978—980—Reasons why Native regiments can turn out a greater number of efficient men than European regiments, 981.

[Second Examination.]—Instances of sore backs of horses not numerous, 982—984—Rate of pay of sepoys, 985, 986—Deductions therefrom for clothes and accoutrements, 987—990—Invalid pension to sepoy after a certain period of service, 991, 992—Sepoy should not be enlisted at a lower rate than his present pay, 993—Ages to which European soldiers should be allowed to remain in India, 994—996—Arrangements for

pay in the three Presidencies, 997, 998—How far cadets upon arrival in India have to do duty with Native regiments, 999—1001—Arrangement to be made for staff officers in the event of reducing European infantry in Bengal, 1002, 1003.

Advisable that cadets should first serve with European regiments, 1004—Invalid battalions of sēpoys at Bengal and Madras, 1005—Difficulties of officers being eligible for staff duty at either Presidency, 1006—Advisable that the Company's army should be made a King's army, 1007—1011—Arrangements as to promotion in that case, 1008—1009—Necessity for three commanders-in-chief, with controlling power to one, 1010—1012—Method of clothing regiments, 1013—Comparison between the three Presidencies, 1014—1017—Comparison of off-reckonings in the three Presidencies, 1017, 1018—Constitution of the Bengal military board and its duties, 1019, 1020—How far business thereof efficiently conducted, 1021—1026.

*Weight.* Weight of Native and European soldiers with their accoutrements, and how far horses sufficient, *Dickson* 1670—1674—Comparison of weight between European and Native cavalry soldiers, *Houstoun* 1826—1829, *Dalbiac* 2000—2004.

*Wellington*, Duke of. His talents, which first became known by his services in India, would have been useless, with reference to the safety of England and the general liberties of Europe, had he been a Company's instead of a King's officer, *Salmond*, App. p. 167.

*Widows.* Funds from which officers' widows and children are provided for, *Melvill* 2116—Assistance of the Company thereto, and advantages from high interest on balances and advantageous rates of exchange on remittances, *Melvill* 2117.

See also 'Military Fund.'

*Wilson*, Major D. Reply of Major D. Wilson, dated 29th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 357.

*Woolwich.* See 'Addiscombe.'

*Works, Public.* Number of staff officers, and in what services, employed in public works at Bengal, App. p. 46—At Madras, App. p. 47—At Bombay, App. p. 48—Most buildings, canals, and roads are, and all are ordered to be, executed by officers of engineers, *Salmond*, App. p. 162.

*Worsley*, Major-general Sir H. Reply of Major-general Sir H. Worsley, K.C.B., dated 30th March 1832, to circular of the Board of Control, requesting information relative to the army in India, App. p. 323.

F I N I S.



